Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela:

Analysis of the Events Leading Up to the 2009 Referendum

Sarah McGuire
PA 762 Leadership for the Public and Nonprofit Sector
Final Case Study Paper
Dr. Shea
May 18, 2010

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I. Introduction
Venezuela has a history of conflicting political ideologies as well as economic and social
disparities. For example, Venezuela has integrated democratic practices but military coups are
still a common practice; an increase in economic growth has lead to unequal distribution of
wealth; and lastly, Venezuela is made up of a wealthy minority and an underprivileged majority
(Venezuela Country Profile, 2008). At the peak of Venezuelas despair, Hugo Chavez presented
himself as the embodiment the countrys painful past and introduced a socialist solution for the
future. During the twelve years Chavez has served as president, Venezuela has changed. The
event that marked a turning point in the countrys future, as well as Chavezs role as leader, was
the approval of the 2009 referendum, which eliminated term limits for all elected officials in
Venezuela (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010).
By identifying the significant historical political, social, economic and technological
events leading up to the 2009 referendum, I will show how Venezuela, as a result of Chavezs
role as president, has been transformed since the early 1990s. Additionally, with the power that
Chavez has accumulated over the years and his influence in all matters of the state leads me to
question how truly democratic is Venezuela? With this question in the background, I will use a
variety of different leadership theories, including a comparison between transactional and
transformational, the charismatic leader, the legitimate power approach and Chemers' integrative
theory, to show how the environmental context and Chavezs leadership effectiveness resulted in
the 2009 referendum approval.

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II. Scenario Context
Context: Political Factors
Hugo Chavezs political career began amidst an economic depression, social uprisings
and political turmoil. In 1992, as an attempt to shift power, Colonel Chavez along with six
military officers lead a coup against President Carlos Andres Perez of the Democratic Action
Party (AD) (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). After one night Chavez surrenders and becomes the
voice [and face] of the young military generation, promising on live television to the country
that Por Ahora (For Now) the military would give up their arms; the Bolivarian revolution,
in reference to 19th century revolutionary leader Simon Bolivar, would be established using
alternative democratic means (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). In 1998, Chavez runs as the
non-politician president candidate during a time when politicians are distrusted by the masses
of poor Venezuelans, and wins (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).
Within the first year of his presidency, Chavez aims to dramatically change the political
structure of Venezuela. In 1999, Chavez rewrites the constitution to reflect a more decentralized
system of government (Country Profile, 2008, 5). Most notably, authoritative power in addition
to funding for social programs, such as healthcare and primary education, are redirected from the
central government to regional and local authority (Hidalgo, 2009, 86). Once the constitution is
approved, a new round of elections are held whereby Chavez wins and is given a new six year
mandate with the possibility of re-election for six new years (Timeline: Hugo Chavez, 2010).
As president under the new constitution, Chavez requests the newly modified unicameral
legislative branch (i.e. the National Assembly) pass an Enabling Law (Country Profile, 2008,
5). In light of his popularity and an economic downturn, the National Assembly grants Chavez
the power to decree laws in areas ranging from banking to petroleum to land reform []

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without legislative debate or approval (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 265-266). Ultimately, the approval
of the Enabling Law begins the deterioration of the balance of power between executive and
legislative bodies (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 266). In 2001, Chavez presents 49 new decrees that
mainly focus on the redistribution of the nations wealth via land and oil reforms (Timeline:
Venezuela, 2010).
The new decrees, and Chavezs heightened role in economic affairs, cause social disorder
occurs throughout the country. Likewise, after 2002, new opposition groups are formedin
addition to being opposed by the historically dominant political parties, now student-based
groups and Chavistas-lites, former supporters of Chavez, publicly oppose him (Country Profile,
2008, 11-12). After months of violent opposition protests, a military coup ousts Chavez for three
days before he is returned to power (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Realizing the opposition
groups cannot physically remove Chavez from power, they gather over two and half a million
signatures in support of a recall election (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). In August 2004, Chavez
wins the majority of the referendum votes, confirming his remaining two and a half year tenure
(Country Profile, 2008, 8).
An important aspect to consider as to why the opposition was able to collect 2.5 million
signatures only to lose the 2004 recall election may have to do with the creation of a black list
(The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). With the approval of the National Electoral Council (CNE),
the Tascn List, named after the Chavista parliamentarian who developed it and published it
on his website, compiled personal information about the 2.5 million voters who initially signed
the recall petition (Hidalgo, 2009, 83). Created supposedly to help prevent fraud, fear, armtwisting and blackmail spreads throughout the country (Hidalgo, 2009, 83). Despite ongoing
political protests through 2004 into 2005, Chavez ran and won his third presidential term in 2006

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(Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). With his political popularity at a high, Chavez goes on a
nationalism spree.
In early 2007, the National Assembly grants Chavez rule by decree for a second time
(Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). With his new legislative power, Chavez nationalizes key energy
companies (see Economic Factors) and refuses to renew the contract of major
telecommunications company RCTV, which Chavez views as his main political opponent (The
Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Consequentially, Chavitas and opposition groups alike protest the
closure of RCTV, as it was their main source of entertainment (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).
In December 2007, Chavez sets out to reform the 1999 constitution by presenting a set of
far-reaching proposals, including the abolition of term limits for the president and the weakening
of private property rights (Country Profile, 2008, 7). Though the National Assembly approves
the 2007 reform bill, voters reject it (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). This is Chavezs first political
loss. Chavez takes the loss personally and promises again to the people Por Ahora (For
Now) the government will accept the failed reform election results (The Hugo Chavez Show,
2008).
Though the 1999 Constitution states "a revised constitutional reform initiative may not be
submitted during the same constitutional term of office of the National Assembly," a shift in
political power forces him to change his mind (Morgan & Dallen, 2008). In the 2008 regional
elections, the opposition parties win several high-profile mayor and local elected positions
(Hidalgo, 2009, 87). Creating a loophole so as to comply with the 1999 Constitution, Chavez
suggests his allies launch a new referendum in 2009 (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010). Voters
approve the referendum, which would eliminate term limits for all elected officials, by 55% of
the vote (Boykoff, 2009, 1). Thus, Chavez and all Chavista elected officials are now free to run

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for office as soon as 2012 and forever after.
Context: Economic Factors
Simply put, Venezuela is rich in oil. Traditionally, the country has had a high growth oil
export economy, which supports their political and social programs (Garcia-Serra, 2001, 267).
When Chavez becomes president, he adopts an economy suffering an unemployment rate of
11%, a budget deficit that reached 9.5% of GDP and a price of oil that had fallen to $8.43US
(Garcia-Serra, 2001, 274). As part of his political campaign, Chavez promises to boost state
control over the oil industry and increase revenues from its operation (Ellsworth, 2009). These
factors greatly influenced the National Assemblys decision to grant him presidential decree
from 2000 through 2001.
Through precise strategic moves, Chavez slowly gains control over the countrys oil
industry. First, in 2001, one of Chavezs decree is a new law that required the state oil company,
PDVSA [to] hold a majority in all upstream oil projects (Ellsworth, 2009). In February 2002,
Chavez fires the Board of Directors, replaces them with leftist loyalists leading to trade union
and the Fedecamaras business association strikes and a brief military coup (Timeline: Venezuela,
2010). Unsatisfied by Chavezs return to power, PDVSA leaders and workers strike for nearly
two months practically paralyzing the economy (Ellsworth, 2009). With the help of a private
businessman, Chavez brokers a deal that restores PDVSA into the hands of the government (The
Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Now in complete control of the oil company, Chavez fires 20,000
employees and quickly begins using it to finance social programs (Ellsworth, 2009).
In 2007, Chavez obtains control over four multi-billion dollar Orinoco oil projects
(Ellsworth, 2009). Requiring PDVSA have majority in all oil projects, ExxonMobils and
ConocoPhillips refusal to hand over majority control in the Orinoco Belt leads Chavez to expel

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or seize their assets (Timeline: Venezuela, 2010; The Economic Meltdown, 2010). Though the
number of exported oil barrels falls throughout 2007, oil prices reached $150 per barrel, allowing
Chavez to further PDVSAs funding of social programs until the US financial crisis caused oil
prices to decrease in 2009 (Ellsworth, 2009).
In addition to increasing his influence in the oil industry, Chavez has gained control over
Venezuelan telecommunications and a key utility company. During Chavezs nationalism drive
of 2007, the government bought controlling stakes in two large private companies, CANTV
(Venezuelas largest telecom company) and Electricidad de Caracas (EDC) (Country Profile,
2008, 7). With the nationalizing of CANTV and the closure of RCTV, the Venezuelan people
now only receive government-controlled television stations.
Context: Social Factors
Venezuela is home to a polarized society. Its people are split politically (The Opposition
vs. Chavistas), economically (mansions overlooking shacks, The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008)
and socially (the elite minority vs. the poor masses). For twenty years, the politicians ignore
poor Venezuelans; Chavez rescued their hidden pain and put it on the table (The Hugo Chavez
Show, 2008). When he first ran for president, Chavez appealed to the masses using a populist
messageidentifying with their struggles and promising economic and social justice (The Hugo
Chavez Show, 2008). After becoming president, in contrast to his predecessors, Chavez has
made the welfare of the Venezuelan poor his top priority (Rodriguez, 2008, 1).
Chavez created social welfare programs called missions aimed at improving healthcare,
education, employment levels and housing opportunities (The Hugo Chaves Show, 2008).
Ironically, the greatest increase in funding came in 2003, after the take over of PDVSA and
before the recall election (Hidalgo, 2009, 81). Still, the government has turned them into fast

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and flexible instruments for funneling resources to the lowest social classes in a classically
clientelistic fashion, made easier by managing the programs outside the framework of traditional
public administration and budgeting (Penfold-Becerra, 2007).
Though social missions have been started and money has been pumped into them, none
of them ever appear to be finished or produce the intended results. Textile mills are a classic
example of failed intentions. The missions train textile workers how to sew but not how to run
the business; all orders come from the government; and as a result, workers remain stuck in the
slums (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Though it is reported that money is being allocated for
social programs, the government has no auditing system in placeno one has any idea of what is
being produced or how much money is being spent (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).
Prior to 1998, Venezuela suffered from a shortage of basic goods including food, housing,
utilities, adequate jobs and schooling, etc. Since Chavez has become president, the country has
continued to suffer. Lack of adequate police forces has caused Caracas, the capital, to attain one
of the highest per capita murder rates in the world (The Chavez Meltdown, 2010) and there are
thousands of robbery and kidnappings that occur throughout Venezuela on a yearly basis (The
Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).
The reliance on political campaigns and voting, in addition to protests, petitions and
recalls, suggests Venezuela is a truly democratic society. In fact, Boykoff (2009) notes
Venezuelas extensive democratic culture [] for the moment, presents a serious obstacle to
the presidents vaguely defined ideological project of driving Venezuela toward what he calls
twenty-first-century or Bolivarian Socialism (1). Though Venezuelans continue to rely on
democratic practices, Chavezs ability to single-handedly reform the government (see Political
Factors) suggests democracy is on its way out.

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Context: Technological Factors
As the Worlds First Virtual President, Hugo Chavez has changed the way mass media is
used for political purposes (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). Every Sunday at eleven oclock up
to fifteen million people tune in to watch Chavez hosts his weekly television show, Al
Presidente (Guillermoprieto, 2006). As mentioned on The Hugo Chavez Show (2008), he
obeys none of the normal ground rules for what is expected for the head of state or, for that
matter, a public official on TV. His show is an insight into his radicalized view of society, in
which the rich are evil, the poor are sainted, and those who disagree with [him] are enemies
(Guillermoprieto, 2006). Every week ministers are required to be part of his audience,
sometimes they are called on to answer questions or report on a projecthis TV show portrays
how political decisions are made (The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008).
In general, mass media in Venezuela has dramatically changed since Chavez became
president. Venezuelans access to diverse information via television channels or newspapers has
been significantly narrowed (i.e. the closure of RCTV, government-controlled CANTV).
Chavezs control over the media raises questions regarding whether the government is censoring
information to its citizens and whether or not people have the right to express themselves freely.
For example, in 2006, the new reform mandates up to five years in jail for crimes by the media
that range from disrespecting the president to inciting panic--offenses that could at whim include
unflattering photographs, nasty political cartoons, and vaudeville sketches (Guillermoprieto,
2006).
Looking at Venezuela and Chavez from an outsiders perspective, however, the question of
mass-media framing arises. Through framing, communicators seek to establish a dominant
definition or construction of an issue. In a way, issue framing is issue categorization: a

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declaration of what a policy dispute is really all about, and what it has nothing to do with
(Boykoff, 2009, 25). The United States and the United Kingdom have a tendency to report
Chavez in these four frames: the Dictator Frame, Castro Disciple Frame, Declining Economy
Frame, and the Meddler-in-the-Region Frame [which] send clear implications to readers: the
Venezuelan president is a demagogic dictator reminiscent of Fidel Castro who has inept
political-economic policies and cant keep his mitts out of other peoples business (Boykoff,
2009, 25). These frames are an interesting aspect to consider when questioning how democratic
a society Venezuela is, especially when the media indicates Chavez retains ultimate power over
the countrys politics, economy and society.
II. Analysis of the Scenario
In searching for the appropriate leadership theories to use in the analysis of Hugo Chavez
and the 2009 referendum scenario, I focused on theories that incorporate how extreme
personality traits can influence a broader context. In this analysis, I will explore both
transactional and transformational leadership styles, the charismatic leader and power approach
and Chemers integrative leadership theory to show how Hugo Chavez, a charismatic, legitimate
power-wielding authority, contributed to the 2009 referendum approval.
Analysis: Transactional vs. Transformational
In Montgomery Van Warts (2005) book, The Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service:
Theory and Practice, transactional leaders are described to generally be middle-level managers
using direct influence or legitimate power in a stable environment making decisions based on the
rational interest of their followers (Chapter 10, 305-333). Transformational leaders on the
other hand hold positions high in command, have referent power and use indirect power to make
decisions in a highly unstable environment with followers motivated by symbolic processes

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(Van Wart, 2005, 334-338). Based on these two descriptions, Chavez is less of a transactional
leader and more of a transformational leader. Chavez has gradually transformed the nation from
a democracy into a socialist state. For example, the Venezuelan governments control of the
economy and influence and funding of social programs. Despite the fact that democratic
practices are still used in Venezuela, Chavez directly changed most of the economic and social
aspects of the country during his legislative power sprees (i.e. 2000-2001 Enabling Law decree
and 2007 decree). Therefore, Chavezs use of referent power influences the approval of the 2009
referendum. As a result, this change to the Venezuelan Constitution could be seen as
transformational, as it will most likely have a significant affect on the future of the countrys
democratic standing.
Analysis: A Charismatic Leader
When comparing transactional and transformational leadership styles, Chavez is more the
latter but when contrasting transformational with a charismatic leadership style, Chavez
outshines as a charismatic leader. As Van Wart (2005) explains, a charismatic leader is
descriptive, focuses on his/her own personality and traits, is concerned about follower problems
and evaluates great leaders and their behaviors (338-345). In addition to being charismatic,
Chavez also uses an inspirational leadership style. Thus, he is able to successfully gain and
maintain supporters through articulating his vision for the country in a mesmerizing show of
emotion. Although he sometimes rants and rambles for hours about various political, economic
or social topics on his TV show, he always returns to the main issue or ideology
(Guillermoprieto, 2006). Furthermore, his constant appearance in the limelight allows him to
overtly display his three main character traits: high self-confidence, resilience and mass amounts
of energy (Van Wart, 2005, 93-102).

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Though many charismatic leaders are servant leaders, such as John F. Kennedy or Gandhi,
Chavezs charisma appears to be more of a self-serving aspect of his leadership style. For
example, he uses his inspirational leadership style to attract followers [who] are enthusiastic
sheep (Van Wart, 2005, 296). He links symbolic references, such as Simon Bolivar and the
Bolivarian revolution, to appeal to his followers emotions ensuring their allegiance. For the past
twelve years, he has relied on the Chavistas to support him as president and accept any and all
changes that he makes in the name of the Bolivarian revolution. In return, Chavez pushes money
through to social programs and continues to makes promises for social justice (i.e. redistribution
of wealth, land reforms, etc).
Though Chavez is not an extreme charismatic, there are more negative than positive
aspects to his charismatic personality. As Van Wart (2005) explains, a charismatic leader can
sometimes have difficulties admitting to problems, inhibits criticism, expresses excessive
confidence and is extremely optimistic (296). In reference to Venezuelas chaotic context,
Chavez does not appear to be admitting to any past mistakes he has made as president; Chavez
inhibits criticism not from the opposition parties but from his supportshe makes it very clear
that you are either with him or against him, there is no gray area (The Hugo Chavez Show,
2008). As mentioned earlier, Chavez is exceptionally confident and optimistic not only
personally but also professionally; it is as if Chavez is the physical embodiment of Venezuela, at
least according to him. His charismatic personality and inspirational leadership style have both
contributed to his ability to obtain and maintain power for the past twelve years.
Analysis: Power Approach
The combination of Chavezs leadership styles (transformational, charismatic and
influential), vastly contribute to his ability to acquire power. Chavez has been able to

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accumulate power based on the fact he has exceptional communication, social and influential
skills (Van Wart, 2005, 129-141). First, Chavez is an excellent verbal and nonverbal
communicatoras mentioned earlier, he has been described as the Worlds First Virtual
President. As expressed in The Hugo Chavez Show (2008), Al Presidente is more of a
variety show than a presidential addresshe sings, dances, conducts interviews, broadcasts from
locations across the country, from inside a studio to a seaside sidewalk. Furthermore, he fully
expresses his feelings while on the air: he yells and flails his arms when he is mad and uses soft,
gentle tones and facial expressions when he is being sincere.
Second, his communication skills further boast his social skills. Overall, he is responsive
to the people who were ignored for twenty years by politicians; is optimistic about his socialist
state; and as previously discussed, is charismatic. Also, Chavez is socially perceptive, meaning
he has an honest understanding of [his] own motives, values, drives, and preferences (Van
Wart, 2005,134). Throughout Chavezs political career, from the 1992 failed military coup to
the approval of the 2009 referendum, he has strategically adjusted the country to reflect his own
vision of 21st century socialism (Ten Mostly Wasted Years, 2009). The approval of the 2009
referendum is an indication that when he says he is going to do something, he will find a way to
get it done, whether it means rallying up his supporters or suppressing his opposition.
Third, influence skills are defined as the actual use of sources of power through concrete
behavioral strategies (Van Wart, 2005, 136). In this scenario, Hugo Chavez has both positional
and personal power. As President of Venezuela, Chavez has executive power stemming from
being elected president and for two short periods of time had legislative power, which allowed
him to control the environment by creating new economic and social decrees (Van Wart, 2005,
136). As previously discussed, his personal power comes from his charismatic and influential

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personality and as a result, his control over his supporters. In general, Chavez uses a wide
variety of power styles to influence his followers but it is his use of legitimate power that has had
the most crippling effect on the political status of Venezuela.
The accumulation of legitimate power has essentially resulted in the corruption of Chavez
as Venezuelas leader. In the beginning, Chavez used legitimate power to make citizens aware
of their commitments and responsibilities to the Bolivarian revolutionhe achieved this by
using accepted values, agreed-upon norms, or customary symbols to effect member compliance
and commitment (French and Raven, 1995, as mentioned in Van Wart, 2005, 375). Later on,
particularly before the 2004 recall election and then after the rejection of the 2007 referendum,
Chavez resorts to pressure tactics (i.e. the black list and Por Ahora) to ensure compliance
among Venezuelans. Likewise, he now retains control over the state oil company, which is the
countrys main source of income, as well as major utility and telecommunications companies
meaning Chavez influences nearly every part of a citizens day. The 2009 referendum is his
ticket to ultimate power; he is now free to run for president indefinitely. Thus, how true and free
is Venezuela when opposition parties are being threatened, freedom of speech is being censored
and the president is dictating the countrys economic and social programs.
Analysis: Chemers Integrative Theory
The combination of a leaders characteristics and the environmental context come together
to create Chemers integrative theory. The successful match up states that the outcomes of
leader and follower behavior are determined by the degree of fit between the behavior and
demands of the surrounding environment (Chemers 1997, 163 as mentioned in Van Wart, 2005,
389). In Chemers theory, there are three leadership styles: structuring, consideration, and
prominence (Van Wart, 2005, 389). Based on the historical background of Chavez as president,

14
it is appropriate to say that he has a prominence leadership style. As defined by Chemers (1997),
leaders sometimes act simply to increase their own ego satisfaction by drawing attention to
themselves and their contributions without true regard for goal attainment (as mentioned in Van
Wart, 2005, 389). Chavez is a huge political and public figure in Venezuela; essentially, he has
been described as a myth in progress, probably because his persona is larger than life (The
Hugo Chavez Show, 2008). As a means to bypass the fact Venezuela has no auditing system,
lacks transparency and accountability, he draws attention to himself, his rivals or future plans for
the country. In general, the prominence leadership style applies to Chavezs performance but in
regards to the 2009 referendum scenario, Chavez follows a more structuring (focusing on
objectives) leadership style (Van Wart, 2005, 389). The goal is for voters to approve the 2009
referendum, and it succeeds.
Applying Chemers three zones of leadership analysis to this scenario will identify how the
right combination of leadership characteristics (intrapersonal), his/his followers (interpersonal)
and an intended outcome (situational) will create productive variables. First, the zone of selfdeployment states, individuals must assess their personal characteristics and the situational
demands (Van Wart, 2005, 389). Reaching back to the 1992 failed military coup and then the
1998 presidential election, Chavez used the media to successful thrust himself into the public as
a non-politician with a populist message. During his time as president, he has only become
more comfortable, confident and persistent about staying in power (Van Wart, 2005, 389). His
successful claim to power and the increase of his legitimate power over time is a direct result of
his relationship with his people.
The second zone of Chemers integrative theory is transactional relationship, which
describes the socially constructed reality between leaders and followers [as] central (Van Wart,

15
2005, 389). From the very beginning, Chavez has played off the emotions of Venezuelans. He
constantly reminds the people that their struggle is his struggle; the Bolivarian revolution is his
solution to amending the problems of the past. Additional variables that play into the
transactional relationship zone are the behavioral intentions of leaders and the reactions of
followers and cultural ideals and social norms (Van Wart, 2005, 389-390). The referendums
and elections in a sense represent Chavezs intentions, while voting and ongoing political support
represent his followers reactions. Though not intended, the military coup against him in 2002
failed only as a result of his followers rallying for his releasethey marched and held protests
for three days before he was freed.
The zone of team deployment is the third part of Chemers integrative theory; it relies on
the fact that leaders effectiveness is enhanced by sustained team efforts, persistence, and
member contributions despite obstacles and setbacks (Van Wart, 2005, 390). The Chavistas,
representing elected officials and his followers, make up Chavezs team. On the other side are
the opposition parties. Though loosely aligned, they lack leadership and a political platform
(Hidalgo, 2009, 89). Despite the fact that they have overpowered Chavez a few times (i.e.
protests, oil strikes, recall election, 2007 referendum refusal), Chavez supporters continue to
upend them (i.e. 1999 Constitution approval, Chavez return to power in 2002, 2009 referendum
approval).
The last part of the Chemers integrative theory identifies performance variables as
productivity, efficiency and effectiveness (Van Wart, 2005, 390). Due to the fact that
Venezuela has minimum production levels, and the government is inefficient and ineffective
(The Hugo Chavez Show, 2008), I will use the approval of the 2009 referendum as a successful
performance variable in Chavezs political career. Thus, the main characters in this analysis are

16
Chavez, his followers and the situational context of Venezuela. Based on the three levels of
interaction, it is because of the relationships Chavez has internally (with himself) and externally
(with his people) that affect the outcome of the 2009 referendum. Essentially, the historical
trend of Chavezs leadership style is to create a law or write a referendum that he says is for the
good of the country and his loyal followers approve it. The 2009 referendum is no different in
this regard, except for the fact that he has been corrupted by power and this bill serves to satisfy
his egoin his mind, the approval signifies that the will of his people is to continue ruling as
president.
III. Conclusion
A leaders rise to power sometimes is the result of his/her characteristics, the context of a
situation or both. In the case of Hugo Chavez, it is both. Chavez presented himself as a
visionary in a country riddled with political, economic and social problems. Though seeking to
change Venezuela for the better, Chavezs inexperience as a politician or inability to follow
through with intended goals, has kept Venezuela in the same position, if not created an even
worse environment, than before he became president.
As this paper discusses, Chavezs charismatic, legitimate power leadership style in addition
to his relationship with his followers and the opposition parties lack of unity significantly
influenced the outcome of the 2009 referendum. In contrast to leaders who seek to do good and
positively influence their followers, Chavezs actions suggests he performs to increase his own
political power and continue sway over his followers, at least according to the US and UK news
authorities. Whether or not Chavez intentionally set out to become the leader is he today, the
approval of the 2009 referendum allows him the opportunity to remain present and powerful in
Venezuela until he is elected out of office or finds a way to become president forever.

17
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