Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18364

February 28, 1963

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY WORKERS INDEPENDENT UNION

(NLU), petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondent.
Eulogio R. Lerum for petitioner.
E. B. Garcia Law Office for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari of petitioner Philippine American Cigar & Cigarette Workers Independent Union
(NLU), from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing a complaint of said petitioner
for unfair labor practice, and ordering respondent Philippine American Cigar & Cigarette
Manufacturing Co., Inc. to reinstate Apolonio San Jose, within five (5) days from notice of said
decision, without backpay.
The pertinent facts are set forth in said decision from which we quote:
Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a) of the complaint states:
a. That sometime on October 23, 1958, Apolonio San Jose's brother, Francisco San Jose,
who is also a regular worker of the respondent and a member of the complainant union, filed
a charge for unfair labor practice against herein respondent docketed as Case No. 1857-ULP
of this Court, which case is still pending.
b. That subsequent to the filing of the said charge, or on about November 29, 1958 and also
on or about December 11, 1958, the respondent herein, by its manager Chua Yiong,
summoned and advised union president Lazaro Peralta that if Francisco San Jose will not
withdraw his charge against the company (Case No. 1857-ULP), the company will also
dismiss his brother Apolonio San Jose, to which the union president replied that that should
not be the attitude of the company because Apolonio has nothing to do with his brother's
case.
c. That on or about January 24, 1959, respondent, by its officers and agents, did dismiss
Apolonio San Jose without just and valid cause and in gross violation of the operative
collective bargaining agreement between the complainant union and respondent corporation.

The allegations in said sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the complaint were substantiated
by the oral testimony of complainant's witnesses, but the Court finds that such allegations do
not constitute unfair labor practice acts on the part of respondent. In sub-paragraphs (a) and
(b), the Court finds no interference, coercion and restraint against the employees in the
exercise of their guaranteed rights to self-organization and discrimination against
complainant Apolonio San Jose in regard to hire or tenure of his employment. In short, the
complainants' charge is that if Francisco San Jose would not withdraw his unfair labor
practice charge against respondent company, the manager of the latter would dismiss
Apolonio San Jose, the brother of Francisco. In fact, said manager dismissed Apolonio San
Jose. This may be an illegal or improper dismissal, but certainly, it does not constitute an
unfair labor practice.
The Court further finds that in sub-paragraph (c), complainants allege that the dismissal of
Apolonio San Jose was in gross violation of the collective bargaining agreement between
complainant union and respondent corporation.
The Court of Industrial Relations found "that the moving cause of Apolonio's dismissal was the
refusal of his brother Francisco San Jose, to withdraw his charge of unfair labor practice against the
company. But" it added "be that as it may, it cannot constitute an actionable offense under the
Act". Seemingly believing that, since the one dismissed by reason of said charge of unfair labor
practice was, not the complainant therein, Francisco San Jose, but his brother Apolonio San Jose,
the latter's dismissal does not constitute another unfair labor practice under Section 4 (a) (5) of
Republic Act No. 875, which provides that:
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
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(5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for

having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act.
the lower court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of petitioner herein. This
conclusion is untenable.
Although subdivision (5) of paragraph (a) of said Section 4 would seem to refer only to the discharge
of the one who preferred charges against the company as constituting unfair labor practice, the
aforementioned subdivision (5) should be construed in line with the spirit and purpose of said
Section 4 and of the legislation of which forms part namely, to assure absolute freedom of the
employees and laborers to establish labor organizations and unions, as well as to prefer charges
before the proper organs of the Government for violation of our labor laws. Now, then, if the
dismissal of an employee due to the filing by him of said charges would be and is an undue restraint
upon said freedom, the dismissal of his brother owing to the non-withdrawal of the charges of the
former, would be and constitute as much a restraint upon the same freedom. In fact, it may be a
greater and more effective restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant may be willing to risk the hazards
of a possible and even probable retaliatory action by the employer in the form of a dismissal or
another discriminatory act against him personally, considering that nobody is perfect, that everybody

commits mistakes and that there is always a possibility that the employer may find in the records of
any employee, particularly if he has long been in the service, some act or omission constituting a
fault or negligence which may be an excuse for such dismissal or discrimination. Yet, such
complainant may not withstand the pressure that would result if his brother or another member of his
immediate family were threatened with such action unless the charges in question were withdrawn.
In fact, it is a well settled rule of law that what is prohibited to be done directly shall not be allowed to
be accomplished indirectly. Thus in the Matter of Quidnick Dye Works, Inc. and Federation of Dyers,
Finishers, Printers and Bleachers of America (2 NLRB 963) it was held that the dismissal of a laborer
on account of union activities of his brother constituted an unfair labor practice. To the same effect,
substantially, are the decisions in the Matter of the Fashion Piece Dye Works, Inc. and Federation of
Silk and Rayon Dyers and Finishers of American, 6 NLRB p. 274; In the Matter of Ford Motor
Company and H.C. McGarity, 26 NLRB, p. 322 (which refers to the union activities of the wife of the
discharged employee), and Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. and United Textile Workers of America,
AFL, 98 NLRB p. 1055 (involving the dismissal of a female employee, due to the union activities of
her husband). Hence, Teller in his work on Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (Vol. 2, p. 859),
says:
The discharge of relatives of an employee who was himself been discriminately discharged,
for no other reason than the relation, is itself of a discriminatory discharge, in violation of
Sec. 8(3) of the Act. An illustration is Memphis Furniture Co. (3 NLRB 26 [1937], enforced 2
F2d 1018 [CCA 6, 1938], cert. den. 305 US 627, 59 S Ct 91, 83 L. Ed. 402 [CCA 6,
1938])where the evidence indicated that the sole reason for the dismissal of a female
employee was that she was the wife of an employee who has been discharged. It was held
that the discharge under the circumstances was discriminatory and a violation of the Act,
even though discharged female employee was not herself a member of any union. The
Board said: "The respondent thus made union membership and activities a bar to the
employment not only of the union member himself but of members of his family as well. A
more effective mode of discouragement of union affiliation could hardly be found than the
knowledge that such activities put not merely the union member's employment but that of
those closely related to him in jeopardy. The direct cause of Mrs. Barmer's discharge was the
fact that her husband had been discharged, but the indirect and antecedent cause was
discrimination against union members in regard to hire and tenure of employment with intent
to discourage membership in the Union." So also the Board has held that the discharge of
discriminatingly discharged employees' wives for the reason that the employer did not desire
the employees to continue to live in the employer's houses, which they would do so long as
their wives remained employed, is itself a discriminating discharge in violation of the Act.
(Mexis Textile Mills, 11 NLRB 1167 [1939], enforced 110 F2d 565 [CCA 5, 1940].) In
Mansfield Mills, Inc. (3 NLRB 901 [1937] ), the respondent alleged that the wife of an
employee who had been discharged allegedly in violation of the Act was herself discharged
in consequence of a company rule requiring the dismissal of all members of the family when
the head of the family is discharged. The Board said: "Assuming this as the reason for Mrs.
Sutton's discharge, we would necessarily find that she was the victim of discrimination in
violation of the Act, if we determined that Sutton was discharged as the result of his union
affiliation."

In the usual case, it is the wife who is the sufferer because of the husband's union affiliation.
In I. Youlin and Company (22 NLRB No. 65 [1940]),the husband was discharged for failure to
secure his wife's resignation from the union this was held violative of Section 8(3) of the Act.
In addition to violating Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, the discharge of Apolonio San Jose
is, therefore, an unfair labor practice under subdivision (4) of said Section 4(a), which is the
counterpart of Section 8(3)of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of the United States.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, insofar as it dismisses the complaint
of petitioner herein, and another one shall be entered finding respondent Philippine American Cigar
& Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering said respondent to
reinstate Apolonio San Jose, immediately after his decision shall have become final, with backpay. It
is so ordered..
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19767

April 30, 1964

RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS UNION (FFW), FRANCISCO OLORES, ET AL., petitioner,

vs.
MADRIGAL & COMPANY, INC., CANDIDO DE LEON and JOHNNY DE LEON & COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondent.
Beltran and Lacson for petitioners.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Rizal Cement Workers' Union (FFW), hereinafter
referred to as the Union, seeking for a modification of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations in Case No. 1020-ULP, and to have the respondent Rizal Cement Co., Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the Company, declared guilty of unfair labor practice, and the 21 unionmembers involved in the case entitled to back wages from May 28, 1956.

In connection with the unfair labor practice case filed by the Union against the Company, resulting
from the alleged locking out of the 21 complainants, a decision was rendered by the Court of
Industrial Relations, after due trial containing the following findings of fact:
The Rizal Cement Workers Union, affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers, heretofore
referred to as the Union, is a legitimate labor organization. The twenty-one complainant
workers are members of the Union and work at the Bodega Tanque, Paco, Manila, ... .
The respondent Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is a corporation likewise organized under the laws of
the Philippines and is engaged principally in the manufacture of cement. (Exh. "30 Rizal"). It
operates a plant in Binangonan, Rizal, where it manufactures cement. The bags of cement
are then sent in barges to the Bodega Tanque at Paco, where they are unloaded by workers
therein and sent either directly to customers on trucks and pick-ups or stored in the
warehouse for future deliveries.
There is also no dispute as to the fact that on May 27, 1956, the Union staged a strike at the
plant of the respondent Rizal Cement Co., Inc. in Binangonan, Rizal. In the early morning of
the following day, that is, on May 28, 1956, Candido de Leon warehouseman-encargado at
the Bodega Tanque, received a telephone call from one Johnny de Leon, manager of the
respondent Rizal Cement Co., Inc., with the information that the Union staged a strike
against the company on the previous day, May 27, 1956, in Binangonan, Rizal De Leon
further informed him that he should take precautionary measures in protecting the properties
of the company stored at the Bodega Tanque because of the strikers caused damage to the
factory in Binangonan and sabotage might occur. For this reason, he was advised by the
manager to request the members of the Union to stay meanwhile outside the premises of the
Bodega Tanque. What he did in the morning of May 28, 1956 was to station himself at the
gate of the compound. When the workers arrived for work at 7:00 a.m., he did not allow the
21 complaining workers who are members of the Union to enter the gate and allowed only
those who are not members of said Union. Upon refusal of Candido de Leon to allow the
complaining workers to work on that day, the Union, through Ramon L. Kabigting, VicePresident of the FFW, sent a letter addressed to the Manager, Bodega Tanque, Rizal
Cement Co., Inc., which, for ready reference, is hereby quoted as follows:
May 28, 1956
The Manager
Bodega Tanque
Rizal Cement Co., Inc.
Tanque, Paco, Manila
Dear Sir:
This morning our union members reported for work at your company promises. Instead of
being made to work, they were told by your goodself that they will not be allowed to work
anymore. This inspite of the fact that non-FFW members were allowed to work.

This is pure discrimination on your part. We are protesting vigorously against your act and
are asking you to reinstate these men immediately.
Yours truly,
s/t RAMON L. KABIGTING
Vice President
Federation of Free Workers
(Exhs. "A" for complainants, and "19" for respondents)
The Rizal Cement Co., Inc. through counsel, made a reply dated May 30, 1956, to the
foregoing letter, as follows:
May 30, 1956
Federation of Free Workers
508 Jalandoni Building
Dasmarias, Manila
Att'n: Mr. Ramon L. Kabigting
Vice President
Gentlemen:
Your letter dated the 29th instant, addressed to the Manager, Bodega Tanque, of our client,
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. has been by the latter referred to us.
In reply, please be informed that as the Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW) National
Organization of Laborers and Employees (NOLE-FFW) Federation of Free Workers, of which
the persons subject to your letter are members, declared a strike against the Company since
two o'clock Sunday morning, May 27, 1956, said persons or "union members" referred to in
your letter were requested to stay outside the Company premises, in view of the threat that
they were going to commit sabotage, threats which our client had reason to believe would be
carried out, considering, as you know, what actually happened in Binangonan, Rizal.
Our said client emphatically denies your claim of "discrimination" as being illogical and
preposterous.
Very truly yours,
BAUSA & AMPIL
By: s/ FELINO G. AMPIL
Attorneys for the Rizal
Cement Co., Inc.

On May 30, 1956, the complaining workers formed a picket line in front of the Madrigal
Building on the Escolta, Manila, where the Offices of the respondent companies are located.
The picket lasted up to April, 1957.
After the complaining workers were not allowed to work on May 28, 1956, the respondent
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. hired substitutes in order that the work in the Bodega Tanque, which
consists mainly in unloading and loading cement, may not be paralyzed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
With the foregoing facts, the Court of Industrial Relations resolved in the negative the issue
presented therein, i.e., whether the Company's denial to the 21 complaining workers, of entrance to
the compound and work constitutes a lockout, for the reason that the said act was resorted to
forestall any possible sabotage in the warehouse. It was pointed out that although the strike was
declared in and confined the factory in Binangonan Rizal, the activities in the Tanque warehouse in
Paco Manila, where the complainants work, complement those at the plant. Also, in the letter of the
Union dated September 24, 1954, addressed to the management, and as found by the lower court,
the Union made it clear that the set of demands (presented to the Company and denial of which led
to the declaration of the strike in question) covers all employees of the Rizal Cement Co., Inc.
"including those workers at the Bodega Tanque" (p. 31, decision of Dec. 14, 1961), and that in the
notice of strike filed by the Union (Exhs. 125-Rizal and 125-A-Rizal), it was specifically declared that
the establishment covered by the objected strike covers the "factory, quarry and warehouse," the last
place obviously referring to Bodega Tanque. Thus the court held that, under the circumstances, the
court was resorted to as a defensive weapon or dictated by economic necessity and, consequently,
did not constitute an unfair labor practice. And, as in the decision rendered in the main case (No. 14IPA) the strikers were ordered reinstated to their former positions without back wages, which
decision became final and executory on May 27, 1961, the court directed the Company in this case
to reinstate the 21 complainants with back wages only from May 28, 1961. This decision was
affirmed by the court en banc by resolution of January 27, 1962. Hence, the filing of the instant
petition.
It is claimed by petitioner Union in this proceeding that the Company's refusal to admit the 21
complainants to work in the warehouse, simply because they belong to the same Union that staged
the strike in the factory, constituted a violation of Section (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act
875). Consequently, it is argued, complainants should have been awarded back wages from May 28,
1956 when the discriminatory act commenced and not only from May 28, 1961 when the decision in
the main case because final.
1wph1.t

Republic Act 875, on unfair labor practices provides:

SEC. 4. Unfair Labor Practices
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
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(4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition

of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That nothing in this Act or any other Act or statute of the Republic of the
Philippines shall preclude an employer from making agreement with a labor
organization to require as condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section twelve.
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(Emphasis supplied.)
It is not herein controverted that the complainants were locked out or denied work by the respondent
Company. Under Republic Act 875, however, for the discrimination by reason of union membership
to be considered an unfair labor practice, the same must have been committed to courage or
discourage such membership in the union. This cannot be said of the act of the Company
complained of. As clearly established by the evidence, its refusal to all complainants to work and
requirement that the latter stay out of the premises in the meantime (perhaps while the strike was
still going on at the factory) was borne out of the Company's justified apprehension and fear that
sabotage might be committed in the warehouse where the products machinery and spare parts were
stored, as has been the case in Binangonan. It has never been shown that the act of the Company
was intended to induce the complain ants to renounce their union-membership or as a deterrent for
non-members to affiliate therewith, nor as a retaliatory measure for activities in the union or in
furtherance of the cause of the union. As the strikers were declared entitled to wages only from the
finality of the decision in the main case (No. 14-IPA) or from May 28, 1961, the award of back wages
to herein complainants, also from said date, is justified and reasonable. It may even be stated in
support thereof that on May 30, 1956, complainants actually joined the picket line formed in front of
the Company's office at Escolta, Manila.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Regala, JJ., took no part.