Rule 66: QUO WARRANTO

FACTS: In 1920, petitioner ABAYA was initially appointed to the post of justice of the
peace (JP) of 4 towns in Ilocos Sur but his jurisdiction was thereafter limited to only 2
(This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by a prewar justice of the peace whose municipalities then ONLY ONE municipality (Cervantes) during the Japanese
position was filled by the appointment and confirmation of the respondent after occupation. Abaya evidently accepted these appointments made during the Japanese
occupation and served as JP until 1944 when, because of the threat of military clashes
liberation.)
between Japanese forces on one side and the Filipino guerrillas on the other, he left his
post and fled to the mountains for safety. After liberation, Abaya was again appointed as
The facts bring this case within the authority of Luis Floresca vs. Amparo Quetulio, andJP of TWO muncipalities, after which a DILG delegate designated Abaya as temporary
Domingo Maddumba vs. Roman Ozaeta. Petitioner's acceptance of other public offices JP, the appointment to "terminate as soon as his successor was appointed by the central
incompatible with judicial function operate as an abandonment of the position to which office." Upon the restoration of peace and order and upon normal functioning of the
he seeks reinstatement.
Commonwealth government, President Osmea gave Abaya an ad interim appointment
as JP. When this appointment was submitted to the ConA, it was turned down. Abaya
It remains the petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Pilar, was again appointed as JP by President Roxas, but the ConA did not act upon the
Province of Cebu, in November, 1933. He had held that office until April 25, 1944, when appointment. Due to the inaction of the ConA, Pres. Roxas extended an ad
he ceased to act for reasons not disclosed in the record. On August 19, 1945, the interim appointment to Alvear, whose appointment was later confirmed by the ConA.
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of San Francisco, Poro and Tudela, Vicente de
Roda, was extended to comprise the municipality of Pilar. Vicente de Roda was later Abaya claims to have sent several protest letters to the Office of the President and
succeeded by Felixberto R. Sosmea, who was justice of the peace until April 14, 1946. conferred with the VP and another Senator. Failing to receive immediate relief, Abaya
From the latter date September 1, 1946, the office of justice of the peace of Pilar was commenced quo warranto proceedings for the purpose of having him declared the legal
vacant. It was on the last mentioned date that the respondent entered upon the and lawful JP and to have Alvear removed. Alvear claims that Abaya had lost his right,
performance of his duties in that office.
title or valid claim to the position of JP of Cervantes and Angaki by reason of
abandonment, consisting in his acceptance of the position of JP of CERVANTES ONLY,
Petitioner joined the police force of the City of Cebu as lieutenant from June 11, 1947, to during the Japanese occupation, said position being different and distinct from the circuit
January 15, 1948 From January 16, 1948, to April 24 of the same year, he was Assistant of Cervantes and Angaki held by him before the war.
Provincial Warden.
ISSUE: Whether Abaya abandoned his office of JP of the 2 municipalities (Cervantes

1. POTOT V. BAGANO

and Angaki), Province of Ilocos Sur?

That petitioner was forced to seek or accept jobs in order to live would not alter the case
even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that economic necessity was a valid plea. RULING: Because of the abnormal conditions obtaining in Ilocos Sur, particularly the
The government was not the only source of gainful employments that could have tide towns of Cervantes and Angaki during the war, there was reason to believe that the
him over while waiting, as he says, for reappointment to his old position. The truth is that changing of the original circuit occupied by Abaya eliminating therefrom the town of
for almost two years after liberation, before he accepted other government positions, he Angaki, was temporary measure to meet the exigencies of the administration of justice in
got position was without any permanent incumbent, he did not enter public service, and that area, under abnormal conditions, and that his acceptance of the new post did not
he did not raise a finger to claim his judicial post. It would seem that he lost all interest involve or entail abandonment of his old position. In proof of the temporary nature of the
change in the circuit is the fact that when conditions returned to normal, the old circuit
in the same until he changed his mind or found he had is dismissed with costs.
comprising the towns of Cervantes and Angaki was restored. And it is significant to note
that when said old circuit was restored, the petitioner was likewise restored to his old
* If this is hard to understand, its the fault of the Supreme Court. The case is so short post by appointments extended by two administrations (Osmena & Roxas).
this is actually the original.
In those days Abaya could not very well dictate his terms of acceptance of the positions
extended to him. He had to take them as they came, accepting the position of JP of 1
municipality alone during the occupation and accepting a new appointment to his old
circuit (2 municipalities) during the days following the liberation. He had no freedom of
2. ABAYA V. ALVEAR
choice. The important thing is that he never intended to abandon his old post and all
along during the Japanese occupation and even after liberation he continued in the

Rule 66: QUO WARRANTO

judicial service and exercised and discharged the functions of the JP in the same place the outbreak thereof, may, after liberation or after the war, resume and continue in his
and area which he did before the war. The appointments by Presidents Osmena and office until he either reached the age limit, becomes incapacitated, resigns from office, is
Roxas, though not confirmed by the ConA, were unnecessary; that it did not and could properly removed therefrom, or abandons the same. The appellant herein is still below
not add anything to or diminish his right to the office conferred by his original the age of seventy, and none of the other factors or elements justifying loss of, or
appointment, but that said appointments may be regarded as a mere restitution of the separation from, his office as justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, exists with the possible
office which belonged to him but which he failed to hold because of, and during the war. exception of that of abandonment.
3. TEVES V. SINDIONG

If the acts of acceptance in this case, particularly plaintiff's acceptance of the

FACTS: On 19 Dec 1914, Pablo Teves was appointed justice of the peace of Luzuriaga, two new appointments to the position first as justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and
Negros Oriental. He had since discharged the duties of said office up to the war in Dec Bacong and then of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, had taken place during normal
1941. Negros Oriental, or part thereof, was subsequently occupied by the Japanese army.conditions, there might be force and reason in the position maintained by the lower court
The plaintiff followed and stayed with the guerrillas in the free area and continued to regarding abandonment. However, the conditions obtaining at the time were far from
discharge his duties as justice of the peace of that part of Luzurriaga not occupied by the normal.
invaders. However, in Oct 1943, the plaintiff was arrested by the Japanese and was kept
as prisoner. Because of plaintiff's absence, the Deputy Governor appointed Atty. Mauro
The law and the doctrines governing abandonment of an office may not and
Edrial as justice of the peace of said municipality of Luzurriaga. In Oct 1944, Pablo should not be too strictly applied to cases occurring during war, especially in those areas
Teves managed to escape asked the Deputy Governor under the guerrilla Govt to restore occupied partly or entirely by the enemy. In accepting the post of justice of the peace of
him to justice of the peace of Luzurriaga. Plaintiff secured the necessary clearance, and, Luzurriaga and Bacong and Dauin, Teves did not abandon his post of justice of the peace
on 4 Jan 1945, he was appointed justice of the peace of the municipalities of Luzurriaga of Luzurriaga.
and Bacong , by Deputy Governor Margarito Teves, which appointment was approved byHe has the right to hold the same, not under the new ad interim appointment in
Alfredo Montelibano, Governor of the Islands of Negros and Siquijor. Plaintiff Teves December 1945, but by virtue of his original appointment in 1914. One cannot properly
resumed, or rather qualified for said office and discharged the duties thereof.
be appointed to the same post that he is already holding under a valid appointment.
On May 1, 1945, Teves was again appointed acting justice of the peace of Incidentally, it may even possibly be maintained, and not without reason, that the last
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, said appointment bearing the approval of the appointment for the post of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga in December 1945, was
Commanding Officer of PCAU 24. On the same day, the plaintiff qualified for and invalid for the additional reason that the President could not extend an appointment to
assumed said office. Then, on December 26, 1945, Teves was again appointed by one who, under a new appointment, is not duly qualified.
President Sergio Osmena, as ad interim justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, Negros
An appointment to the post of justice of the peace extended to one who had a
Oriental. Teves again qualified for and assumed said office. His appointments were not
right to it because of a previous pre-war appointment under which he had qualified and
confirmed. Despite this non-confirmation, plaintiff Teves continued in office.
Because of this non-conformation of Teves' appointment , the President discharged his duties, may be regarded as a mere restitution or restoration of the position
nominated the defendant Perpetuo A. Siondiong justice of the peace of Luzurriaga and which belonged to him; and that new appointment can add to or diminish his right to the
said nomination was confirmed by the ConA on 3 Sept 1946. Sindiong took the office conferred by his original appointment. The appointment extend to the plaintiff in
corresponding oath on 14 Sept 1946, and then advised the plaintiff of his appointment Dec 1945 was a mere restitution of the office which belonged to him but which he failed
and demanded of him the surrender of the office. Plaintiff refused to comply with this to hold because of the war.
demand. A summary order was issued, directing plaintiff Pablo Teves to make delivery
within 10 days of the office of justice of the peace of Luzurriaga, together with the 4. SERAFIN V. CRUZ
documents and records pertaining thereto to the defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong, under
Facts: Purpose of the present appeal in the case at hand is to have respondent Justo Cruz
penalty of contempt.
expelled from the office of chief of police of the municipality of Qunigua and that
petitioner Simplicio Serafin be reinstated.
Issue: W/N Teves has a right to his office as justice of the peace
It all began in Jan. 12, 1931, when Fr. Lopez filed with the provincial board of Bulacan,
Held: YES. Under the doctrine laid down in Tavora vs. Gavina, a justice of the peace administrative charges against Serafin who was chief of police of Qunigua, Bulacan, for
appointed and qualified before the war, but who ceased to discharge his duties as such at negligence in the performance of his duties. The board exonerated petitioner herein. Fr.

Rule 66: QUO WARRANTO

Lopez thereafter appealed with the provincial board composed of new members which 1.Did the COAs confirmation, without Lacsons acceptance of his nomination, create a
ruled for the dismissal of Serafin. The municipal president issued executive order No.1 vacancy in the post where Romero could be lawfully appointed? NO.
dismissing Serafin and appointed herein respondent Cruz as permanent chief of police of There are three steps to appointment: Nomination by the President, confimation by the
Quingua.
COA, and acceptance of the nominee. The first two steps constitute a mere offer for the
post and are respectively, the acts of the Executive and Legislative department. But the
Serfain filed with the new provincial board an MR which was subsequently granted last is necessary to make the appointment complete and effective. Since Lacson declined
exonerating Serafin of the charge of negligence in the performance of his duties.
to accept the new appointment, he continues as fiscal in his old post. No vacancy created.
Issue: W/N a duly appointed and qualified chief of municipal police may be dismissed in 2.Does the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the COA equivalent
order to reinstate another who had been dismissed from such office pursuant to a valid to a removal from office? YES.
decision? W/N Quo Warranto is proper?
To appoint and transfer from one province to another would mean removal and
separation from office. The nature of the office of the provincial fiscal falls under civil
Ruling: No to both. Respondent Cruz was permanently appointed chief of police by the service laws to be appointed by the President with the consent of COA.
municipal president to fill the vacancy as ordered by the provincial board after the
necessary proceedings provided by law. The appointment in question was confirmed by 3. Whether the President can, even with the confirmation of COA, remove a provincial
the municipal council after Cruz has been qualified and entered upon his duties as chief fiscal without cause? NO.
of police. Therefore, he has acquired a vested right and cannot be removed nor dismissed The (1935) Constitution denies such right, as it provides that no officer or employee in
therefrom except for any causes designated and in accordance with the proceeding the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The
established by law specifically Sec. 2272 of the Administrative Code.
prohibition against removal except for cause in our Constitution has no counterpart in the
Federal Constitution of the United States, thus, the American cases cited by respondent
are inapplicable.
Further, the Administrative Code provides that a provincial fiscal over 65 shall vacate his
5. LACSON v. ROMERO
office, the logical inference is that until he reaches 65 he has the right to continue in
office.
FACTS:
On 1946, Antonio Lacson was appointed provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental by the Furthermore, the Revised Administrative Code provides that before a civil servant is
President (Manuel Roxas). But on 1949, President (Elpidio Quirino) nominated Honorio removed, there must first be an investigation where he will be given a fair hearing and
Romero in Lacsons stead, nominating the latter as provincial fiscal of Tarlac. The opportunity to defend himself. In the case of petitioner Lacson, the record fails to show
nominations of both Lacson and Romero were confirmed by the Commission on that he has been charged with any violation of law or regulation or found guilty thereto
as to warrant his removal from office.
Appointments (COA).
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed.

While Romero assumed office, Lacson refused to accept his new appointment and
opposed the two court appearances of Romero as the new prosecutor of Negros
Orioental. He asked the judges (Narvasa and Ocampo) to strike from the records
Romeros appearances in their courts. But the two judges overruled Lacsons objection,
making them fellow respondents in this quo warranto proceeding.
MAIN ISSUE:
Whether Lacson has the right to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and to
oust Romero therefrom? YES.
The Court upheld Lacsons right to the office by answering sub-issues (as provided
below).
RATIO:

Inasmuch as Lacson neither left, abandoned, nor resigned from his post, there
has no vacancy, and consequently, the appointment of respondent is invalid.
TRIVIA, in case asked: The SC says:
But in justice to the President and the Commission on Appointments, let it be
stated once again that it would seem that the transfer of the petitioner to Tarlac
was not meant and intended as a punishment, a disciplinary measure or
demotion. It was really a promotion, at least at the time the appointment was
made, when the salary grade of a provincial fiscal in Tarlac (first class province)
is higher than that of Negros Oriental (second class province). Only, that later,
due to a change in the category of Oriental Negros as a first class province too,
the transfer was no longer a promotion in salary.

Rule 66: QUO WARRANTO

6. ACOSTA v. FLOR

specified in the two preceding sections can be established by proof, he

must commence such action."

Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the

Facts: It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections fiscal for a province, may, at his own instance, bring such an action, or
held on the 1st day of December, 1903, in the town of Laoag, Province he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced,
of Ilocos Norte, the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of
office of municipal president of the said town; that as a result of the and at the request of another person; but, if the action is brought at
said election the plaintiff was elected to the said office by a majority of the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer
100 votes, and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant has bringing it may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the
usurped said office and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff action, to be given to him by the party at whose request and upon
was the person entitled to the exercise of said office. The prayer of the whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it."
complaint is to the effect that judgment be entered against the
defendant, excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence
plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be given such action," provides as follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a
possession thereof, and for such other and further relief as the facts in public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring an
the case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.
action therefor."
In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to
before the defendant had presented his, the court, on the latter's maintain an action for usurpation of public office, he would have
motion, acquitted the defendant, imposing the costs upon the plaintiff. plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching
The court based its action upon the following grounds: (1) That the importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose.
plaintiff could not maintain the action brought by him because he had Far from it, the legislator has on the contrary especially and
failed to establish his alleged right to the exercise of the office in specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who
question; and (2) that there was no necessity to inquire into the right may bring such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to
of the defendant to hold the said office for the reason that this give such right to those expressly mentioned in the above-cited
question had already been determined by the provincial board after a sections and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio
consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to unius est exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred
irregularities committed during the last election held at Laoag for the to three sections only mention the Attorney-General, the provincial
office of municipal president and other municipal officials, and for the fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully
further reason that the presumption is that a person holding a public held and exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision
office was duly appointed or elected thereto.
that the individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for
usurpation of public office.
Issue/ Held: Whether, the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show
that he had any right to the office, he can maintain an action such as 7. GARCIA V. PEREZ
this for the purpose of excluding the defendant from the exercise of
said office on account of illegalities alleged to have been committed in FACTS: Petioner Purificacion Garcia was a Senior Clerk in the Court of Appeals with a
salary of Php 3400 per annum. In September of 1962, the position of Senior Clerk in the
the elections. NO.
Fiscal Management Division of the Court of Appeals with a salary of Php 4800 became
Ratio: Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, vacant. (Note: The positions of senior clerk and senior clerk in fiscal management
or the fiscal of any province, when directed by the Chief Executive of division are different). Petitioner filed a written application for the said position.
the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon the
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case However, it was Angelo Perez who was appointed to the vacant position on 12
September 1962. He was at that time a Cash and Payroll Clerk in the same division with

Rule 66: QUO WARRANTO

a salary of Php 3960 per annum. For this reason, petitioner filed a protest before the Civil petitioners and thus increasing the number of a majority to constitute
Service Commission arguing that she was next in rank, better qualified and entitled to a a quorum to do business.
preferential appointment to the position. The CSC denied the protest basing its decision
on the Deputy Clerk of Court of and Administrative Officer of CAs information that in Issue: W/N quo warranto is proper. NO.
the hierarchical organization, the Cash and Payroll Clerk is next in rank. Also, the nature
of work of the vacant position is almost same with the position previously held by Perez Ratio: Petitioners have no cause of action. Petition dismissed.
(Cash and Payroll Clerk) hence Perez is more qualified.
Held: Section 6 of Rule 68 provides that a person claiming to be
Thus, on October 1966 the appointment of Perez was confirmed by CSC. Petitioner then entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name. The present
commenced the action of quo warranto in CA which was denied. Hence this petition.
petition is not authorized because:
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner Garcia has the right to bring a quo warranto
1) The petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the public office
proceeding questioning the legality of the appointment of the Respondent Perez.
alleged to be unlawfully held or exercised by the respondents. The
HELD: No. In a quo warranto proceeding, petitioner must show that he is entitled to petitioners allege that they are elected members of the municipal
office. Absent such element the proceeding will not prosper. It was held in Acosta vs. board and that their term of office will not expire until 1951. They do
Flor that "No individual can bring a civil action relating to usurpation of a public office not and cannot claim that the respondents have supplanted them.
without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it
be shown that such individual has no right, the action may be dismissed because there is 2) If the elected councilors had the absolute & exclusive right to the
no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is membership, then no other person could become a member even if
vacancies should be created by law, death or resignation.
destroyed.
In other words, one whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remoted 3) The councilors are elected individually, each to fill one seat in the
possibility, that he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of action board, and not collectively as a body to constitute the board.
against the office holder. This is precisely the situation in the case at hand, and there is Vacancies may be filled by other persons, because an elected
no cogent reason to change the rule. She was not even next in rank. Mere expectancy of councilor cannot fill more than one seat in the board, thus, the
appointment is not the same with title over the position.
petitioners right to membership therein is not exclusive.
In this ground alone the petitioner must fail. Moreover, the petition was filed more than a 4) The mere fact that the membership of the board was increased from
year hence barred. The right to institute the proceeding should be counted from 14 10 to 12 does not in any way diminish the rights and prerogatives of
September 1964 when Perez assumed the position. However, the petition was filed only the individual petitioners as members of the board. It does not result
on 1966 or more than a year which is now too late.
in the diminution of the emolument or in the curtailment of the
participation in the deliberations and of the vote of each of the
8. CRUZ V. RAMOS
petitioners as a member of the board.
Facts: Petitioners were members of the Manila municipal board and **If RA 409 is unconstitutional, the remedy is Section 4 of Rule 68
were elected in the 1947 general elections. They filed a petition for relate the matter to the Solicitor General and request him to bring the
Quo Warranto claiming that RA 409 is unconstitutional since it action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Reason: a public
increased the congressional districts of Manila from 2 to 4 and office or franchise is created or granted by law, and its usurpation or
increased the members from 10 to 12, thus the 2 respondents are unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the Government. Thus,
illegally usurping & exercising rights exclusively pertaining to the the latter is the proper party to bring such action.