Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 68946 May 22, 1992

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELINA
SARMIENTO, respondents.
Marvil Hill for private respondent
W. Topacio Garcia & Associates collaborating counsel for private respondent.
Dollete, Blanco, Ejercito & Associates for movants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner urges this Court to review and set aside the decision of 12 October 1984 of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court 1 (now Court of Appeals) in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126
which affirmed the decision of 2 June 1982 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167 granting the registration of a parcel of land with
an area of 376,397 square meters, located in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, in favor of
private respondent.
After the filing of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in its resolution of 27
February 1985, 2 gave due course to the petition, considered the Comment as the Answer
and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The petitioner moved for
leave to adopt the petition as his Memorandum 3 which this Court noted in its resolution
of 17 April 1985. 4 Private respondent filed her Memorandum only on 8 December
1986, 5 after her attorneys were held in contempt of court and fined in the amount of
P300.00.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the following factual antecedents in this case:
On 13 August 1970, private respondent and the spouses Placer A. Velasco and Socorro
Busuego filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Bulacan, Branch V, at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an application for the registration of title over

Lot No. 1005 of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of
376,397 square meters.
On 18 January 1971, private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador filed their opposition
on the ground that the land belongs to them.
On 19 January 1971, an Order of special default against the whole world, with the
exception of oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador and the municipal mayor of San Jose
del Monte, was issued by the trial court.
Upon the filing of an Opposition by the petitioner and upon motion by the Provincial
Fiscal for the lifting of the order of special default and for the admission of the
Opposition, the trial court issued an Order on 24 August 1971 granting the motion and
admitting said Opposition. 6 Separate oppositions filed by Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco
Maningas and Simeon Albarico were also admitted by the court after the lifting of the
order of special default. 7
Subsequently, private respondent moved to drop as co-applicants spouses Placer Velasco
and Socorro Busuego on the ground that they were made co-applicants because of a
contract of services 8 between her and the spouses under which the latter agreed to
shoulder all the litigation expenses and the cost of survey and attorney's fees in this case;
the spouses failed to comply with their commitment. The trial court deemed said
agreement validly rescinded by private respondent and considered her as "the only
applicant in this case." 9
After hearing the application on its merits, the trial court handed down on 2 June 1982 a
decision in favor of private respondent granting the registration of the lot in question,
together with all the improvements thereon, in her name:` 1
. . . with the exception of the three (3) houses erected therein owned and possessed by her
predecessors-in-interest, who are claimed (sic) to be tenants of the property, namely:
Macario Cruz, Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo. . . . subject, however, to the payment of
real property taxes in arrears since 1971 as well as to the provisions of Presidential
Decree Nos. 65 and 296, with respect to those portions of the perimeter bounded by the
river, barrio and provincial roads, respectively.
The decision is based on the trial court's findings of fact, to wit:
. . . That the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Angelina Sarmiento as early as 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 8388 (Exhibit J), with
an assessed value of P10,350.00. That the real property taxes from 1965 to 1970 were
paid in full (Exhibit K). That a small portion of the subject parcel of land consisting of
94,000 sq. m. is devoted to agriculture while the rest is cogonland. That the subject parcel
land was acquired by applicant Angelina Sarmiento from:

1) Juan Reyes, married to Avelina Emocling, who had been in possession of a portion of
the subject land consisting of 168,000 sq. m. for 41 years prior to the transfer of their
rights, interests, and participation over the same in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento,
which transfer was made through a deed of absolute sale (Bilihang Lampasan at
Patuluyan Exhibits G and G-1), executed on April 7, 1969, for and in consideration of
P42,000.00.
2) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who had been in possession of a portion
of the subject land, consisting of 14 hectares since 1948, until on August 16, 1965 said
spouses transferred their rights, interests and participation over the eastern 1/2 portion of
said 14-hectare property, in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in
consideration of P1,500.00 (Exhibits I and I-1 Bilihang Lampasan at Patuluyan).
3) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who, by virtue of a deed if (sic) absolute
sale executed by them on November 15, 1965, sold the remaining 7-hectare property
covered by Exhibits I and I-1, to applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration
of P21,000.00; which deed of absolute sale, having been lost, was confirmed by vendor
Mariano Castillo thru a Confirmatory Deed of Sale executed on April 18, 1969 (Exhibits
H and H-1).
4) Macario Cruz, married to Antonia Guilalas, who had been in possession of a portion of
the subject land, consisting of 73,000 sq. m. more or less prior to the transfer of their
rights, interest and participation in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento on March 31,
1969, for and in consideration of P18,750.00.
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and
possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, the spouses
Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets of spouses having been in
possession as early as 1928 and 1948, respectively, during which time they possessed,
occupied and cultivated their respective portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in
the concept of owners. That by virtue of the aforesaid deeds of sale (Exhibits G, G-1, H,
H-1, I and I-1), possessions over the same were transferred to the herein applicant. That,
thereafter, said spouses remained in the same property, maintaining their houses and
acting as tenants for the new owner, applicant Angelina Sarmiento. That applicant
likewise introduced improvements on the property by fencing the same with barbed wire,
planting crops and other fruit trees, and by constructing there a house of her own. The
oral testimony of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, insofar as location, possession and
ownership over the said parcel of land is concerned, was corroborated by the testimony
(sic) of Victor Jarvinia and Enrique Buco, both claiming that they were with the group
who conducted the survey of the subject property; and said Enrique Buco also declaring
that he had known the subject land since 1932, he being the owner of an adjoining titled
property. Witness Enrique Buco likewise claimed that the subject land is way beyond the
perimeter of the titled property of oppositor 2nd Manila Newtown City Development
Corporation, the latter's land being situated far from the subject land.

xxx xxx xxx

The subject parcel of land appears not to be within any military, naval, civil or a
government reservation; nor is it traversed by any road, river or creek, except that it is
bounded on the North and East, along lines 4 to 33 by the Katitinga River; and on the
Southeast, along lines 34 to 40 by Dean Kabayo Barrio Road; on the South by Igay
Provincial Road, along lines 40 to 44. 10
The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seasonably appealed
from said decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the appeal as
A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126. The Director raised before it the following assignment of error:
The lower court gravely erred in holding that the applicant and her predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner of
the land applied for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application. 11
In its decision promulgated on 12 October 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court found
no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same. It held follows:
We find no merit in the appeal. While it may be true that the vendors of the portion of the
land in question to the herein applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been clearly
established that Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Sarmiento (sic) and
also spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes were in possession of the land in 1928
and 1948, respectively in concept of owners, without anybody molesting them. They
introduced improvements by planting different kinds of trees and constructing houses
thereon. When a person occupied (sic) a parcel of land under a claim of ownership
making improvements and generally held (sic) himself out as owner of the land, it is only
upon the most convincing testimony, in the absence of any competent documentary
evidence, that the courts would be justified in declaring him to be the real owner thereof.
A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a
certain lands (sic) for more than thirty years, in the concept of owner, is entitled to a
confirmation of his title to said land. (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 956).
Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in concept of owner from her
predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, the land in question was surveyed as Lot 1005 for the herein applicant for the
cadastral survey of San Jose del Monte, without anybody else claiming ownership of said
land.
It further appears that the land in question is within the alienable and disposable land as
certified to by the officials of the Bureau of Forest Development. It is for this reason that
the oppositor Director of Lands did not introduce any evidence opposition (sic) and
merely submitted the case for decision.

We reiterate what we have said in previous decisions in similar cases that unless the
government has serious grounds of opposition such as the fact that the land applied for is
within a forest zone or government reservation, registration of agricultural lands within
the alienable or disposable area should be encouraged to give more value to the land and
this promotes their development rather than remain as idle lands. 12
Undaunted by this second defeat, the Director filed on 5 December 1984 this petition
asserting that the respondent Court had decided a question of substance in a way not in
accord with law and the applicable decisions of this Court. 13
The petition is impressed with merit. This Court will have to overturn the challenged
decision, as well as that of the trial court.
While the rule is well settled that findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive
upon this Court, 14 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the
findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion. 15 This exception is present in this case insofar as
the findings of the respondent Court and the trial court on the character of possession are
concerned.
It is not disputed that private respondent seeks registration of the questioned lot on the
basis
of
paragraph
(b),
Section
48
of
the
Public
Land
Act, 16 as amended by R.A. No. 1942, 17 which reads as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war of force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 18
This section is the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. By its
very nature, the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he as an imperfect or
incomplete title. Such is the duty of one who holds the affirmative side of an issue
In Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 19 this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., held:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942. . . .
Specifically, under paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notirious
possession and occupation of an agricultural land of the public domain; (b) such
possession and occupation must be for a least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of the
application; and (c) such possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the order. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession
of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands: 20
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director
of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304).
But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in
that case is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that
among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant." While,
therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession", possession
under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or
symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense
tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. . . .
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, 21 this Court noted:
. . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it
every once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession.
In the case of The Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 22 this Court also stated:
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon
of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession
is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. 23 It
is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; 24 exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; 25 and notorious when it is
so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. 26
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious. 27
Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not affect the continuity of
possession is that caused by war or force majeure.
Private respondent does not pretend to be the original possessor of the property in
question. She relies on the alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest, namely:
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos. From Juan Reyes, she
acquired a parcel of land located in Karahumi, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area
of 168,000 square meters as evidenced in a deed of sale executed on 7 April
1969. 28 From Mariano Castillo, she first acquired a portion, consisting of 7 hectares, of a
parcel of land located in Licau-licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, per a deed of sale
executed on 16 August 1965. 29 She purchased the remaining portion thereof, with an area
of 7 hectares, allegedly on 15 November 1965, but she lost the deed of sale; however,
Mariano Castillo subsequently executed a so-called Confirmatory Deed of Sale on 8 April
1969. 30 Per the findings of the trial court, the property purchased from Cruz on 31 March
1969 for P18,750.00 consists of 73,000 square meters. 31 No deed of sale was presented to
prove this acquisition. There is no proof as to the area of the property allegedly purchased
from Santos.
None of private respondent's predecessors-in-interest declared for taxation purposes their
alleged land holdings. Accordingly, they had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the
private respondent who declared them in one (1) tax declaration, Tax Declaration No.
8388, on 18 September 1969. 32 Per this tax declaration, the land covered is located at
Gaya-Gaya, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 37.6 hectares, of which 9.4
hectares are ricelands while the remaining 28.2 hectares are cogonal.
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos were not presented by
private respondent as witnesses during the hearing of her application. There can be no
question that they were the best witnesses to identify the parcel they sold to the private
respondent and prove the character of their possession thereof. Instead, she presented
Victor Jarvina and Enrique Buco, whose testimonies on direct and cross examinations are
partly summarized by the petitioner as follows:
Victor Jarvina testified that he knew the applicant (p. 4, tsn, June 20, 1977) who bought a
parcel of land with an area of more than 37 hectares, located in Licau-Licau, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, from Macario Castillo and Juan Reyes (pp. 5-6, ibid); that he was with
the surveyor when the survey was done; no person contested the survey; he identified the
survey plan, Exhibit "F", the deed of sale executed by Juan Reyes, Exhibits "G" and "G-

1", the deeds of sale executed by Mariano Castillo, Exhibits "H" and "H-1" and Exhibits
"I" and "I-1" (pp. 7-11, ibid); the land was declared for taxation purposes by Angelina
Sarmiento and the taxes were paid; he identified Exhibit "J", the tax declaration, and
Exhibit "K", the tax receipt (pp. 12-13, ibid); after the properties were purchased by the
applicant, her possession was never disturbed by any other person (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 29,
1977). On cross-examination, Victor Jarvina stated that he could no longer recall the date
when the survey was made (pp. 14-19, ibid); the land was bought by the applicant from
different persons, including Mariano Castillo, Juan Reyes, Macario Cruz and Feliciano
Santos; he was present when the sales were made, and the vendors did not show any
written document to prove that they owned the property, but they claimed to have been in
possession of the same for ten (10) years (pp. 14-16, tsn, Sept. 16, 1977); the property is
hilly and rolling and full of cogon, but a portion was planted with camote, corn and
seasonal crops by the vendors; he came to know the (sic) property three (3) years before
Angelina Sarmiento bought it in 1969 (pp. 20-22, ibid); Castillo had a house on the land
but it was wrecked by a storn (sic), so that there was no more house existing on the land
(p. 25, ibid).
Enrique Buco testified that he had known the land subject of the case since 1932 because
he owned a parcel of land adjoining it; he had known Angelina Sarmiento since 1950;
since 1932, the land was in the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual,
Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano Castillo, and a certain Arsenio, whose family
name he did not know; the possession by the parents of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes
was never disturbed by anyone; Mariano Castillo and his parents planted bananas, mango
trees, palay and sweet potatoes, but he did not know how many hectares were cultivated
(pp. 2-7, tsn, October 24, 1977); Juan Reyes and his parents planted two (2) hectares with
palay, and the rest of the area with mango, caimito, avocado and langka trees, some of
which were already fruit bearing; Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes sold their rights over
the land to Angelina Sarmiento; the land was surveyed by the cadastral team, and
Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were present during the survey; and Castillo and Reyes
remained in possession of the land as tenants of Angelina Sarmiento (pp. 7-13, ibid). On
cross-examination, he admitted that in 1932, he and the parents of Mariano Castillo and
Juan Reyes were just starting to clear up the area, and that only around three (3) hectares
were cleared up by the parents of Castillo and Reyes (pp. 13-16, ibid); that Feliciano
Santos was still in possession of a small portion of the land in question; they were not
able to take possession of the land in question because it was already occupied by the
Japanese forces; they returned to the land only after liberation (pp. 16-18, ibid); that his
land adjoined the land in question on the east, adjoining the property of Isidro Cabacang
and Roman Reyes, who were the ones appearing as adjoining owners in Exhibit "F", the
plan of lot 1005; that he left his land and stayed in Quezon City in 1973 because the
security men of Puyat Enterprises were mauling many persons in the community; to
avoid trouble he transferred his family to Quezon City (pp. 19-23, ibid); that the parents
of Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo cleared up a portion of the wooded area in 1932 and
that was how they came into possession of their respective portions of the property; that
he did not know the extent, in terms of square meters, of the land possessed by Castillo
and Reyes; that the subject land was no longer occupied since two years ago because the
people ran away (pp. 27-30, ibid). On redirect examination, Enrique Buco stated that at

present only Mariano Castillo is staying on the land in question as an overseer of

Angelina Sarmiento; and that the last time he went there was in April, 1978 (pp. 3-5, tsn,
August 18, 1978). On re-cross-examination, he admitted that when he went to the land in
question in April, 1978, he did not see anyone cultivating the property, and that Puyat
Enterprises had built a factory near the property (pp. 6-7,ibid). 33
It was further established tha
t from the Land
34
Classification Report dated 8 August 1971, only one-half (.5) of a hectare is planted
with banana and fruit trees, while 36 hectares are "grass land."
From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondent. As earlier stated, none of them even thought of declaring their respective
areas for taxation purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. 35 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one'sbona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Added to this, as
certified to by Jarvina, who claimed to have been present when the sales were made to
private respondent, none of the vendors could show any written document to prove their
ownership of land; they merely alleged that they have been possession of the same for ten
(10) years. In the case of the 73,000 square meters (7.3 hectares) purportedly purchased
from Macario Cruz, no deed of sale from the latter was presented. Interestingly enough,
without this acquisition, private respondent would only have more or less 308,000 square
meters, or 30.8 hectares, which she acquired from Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo, and
not the 376,397 square meters, or 37.6 hectares which she applied for. No plausible
explanation was offered as to why Macario Cruz did not or could not execute a deed of
sale. There is as well no evidence concerning the area of the property purchased from
Feliciano Santos and no explanation why no deed of sale was executed by him. Then too,
there is absolutely no credible testimony describing the boundaries and extent of the areas
each vendor had allegedly occupied before the sale to the private respondent. On the
contrary, the testimony of Enrique Buco throws more doubts thereon. He claims that the
land applied for was, since 1932, in the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis
Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano Castillo and a certain Arsenio. If that
be so, then the parents of Luis Pascual and Arsenio have a claim on portions of the
property applied for. Private respondent miserably failed to show that she also acquired
such portions or that they were earlier sold to any of her vendors.
Respondent Court considered the year 1932 as the starting point of the possession of the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. In the light of the aforesaid testimony of
Enrique Buco, such a conclusion has no basis. As a matter of fact, the trial court itself
found and so held as follows:

The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and
possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, and spouses
Mariano Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets spouses having been in
possession as early as 1928 and 1948, respectively, during which time they possessed,
occupied and cultivated their respective portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in
the concept of owners. . . . 36
If the Castillo spouses' possession actually commenced in 1948, as found by the trial
court, it goes without saying that their possession of the 14-hectare portion was only for
seventeen (17) years since they sold the same to the private respondent in 1965. Tacking
this possession to that of the latter as of the time the application was filed on 13 August
1970, it is obvious that the 30-year possession required by paragraph (b), Section 48 of
the Public Land Act was not satisfied.
Further, if indeed private respondent has a genuine claim of possession over the property
in question, We find no reason why, as reflected in the Land Classification Report dated 8
August 1971, 37 or barely a year after the filing of the application, only one-half (1/2)
hectare of the vast area applied for was in fact planted with nothing but banana and fruit
trees while thirty-six (36) hectares thereof are "grass land". These fruit trees are not
identified. If the testimony of private respondent to be believed, these could be kamias,
santol and mangoes which, according to her, were existing at the time she bought the
property. Also, if the testimony of Enrique Buco is to be believed, these fruit trees could
be mango trees allegedly planted by Mariano Castillo and his parents or, mango, kaimito,
avocado and langka trees planted by Juan Reyes and his parents. This Court can not
accept these testimonies at face value. The respondent court and the trial court should not
have been credulous enough to have given them full faith and credit. In her own Tax
Declaration No. 8388 dated 18 September 1966 and which she secured sometime after
she allegedly purchased the property and almost a year before she filed the application,
private respondent merely declared that the property is comprised of riceland with an area
of 9.4 hectares and cogonal land with an area of 28.2 hectares. the existence of this 9.4hectare riceland is even doubtful. Private respondent herself admitted that the land is not
conducive to the planting of palay, 38 the portions cultivated by her vendors Castillo,
Reyes and Cruz were scattered in different places and the area each cultivated could not
be more than one (1) hectare. 39 Upon the other hand, as earlier mentioned, Enrique Buco
only mentioned two (2) hectares planted to palay by Juan Reyes and his parents.
Another factor which impairs the bona fides of private respondent is her failure to pay the
real estate taxes after the filing of the application. She made a payment on 26 September
1969 40 after declaring the property for taxation purposes on 18 September 1969, 41 and
only for the taxable years 1965 to 1969. Evidently, such payment was made only for
purposes of the application. A picayune amount was involved annually. For the period
beginning in 1965 and ending in 1969, she paid P517.50 only. She did not want to part
with any sum thereafter until it would become certain that the court would award the
property to her. Such an attitude is an execration of good faith.

One last point which bears heavily against the claim of private respondent is the fact that
she had the temerity to make it appear in the application that she and the spouses Placer
Velasco and Socorro Busuego are co-owners of the property who have registerable title
thereto and who must, therefore, be awarded the property. This claim is of course
deliberate falsehood for, as private respondent later revealed when she decided to drop
the spouses as co-applicants, the latter do not have any claim of either possession or
ownership over the property. They were made co-applicants only because they agree to
shoulder all the expenses of litigation, including the cost of survey and attorney's fees.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that such an agreement was in fact made with
the spouses, it was not necessary that they be made co-applicants. The interest of the
spouses could still be effectively protected without sacrificing the truth. To this Court's
mind, there was a clear attempt on the part of the private respondent and the spouses to
deceive the trial court. Unfortunately, the trial court glossed over this point and impliedly
declared as validly rescinded the contract with the said spouses.
The foregoing disquisitions sufficiently prove that private respondent is a smart land
speculator who saw in the land applied for not just the blades of cogon grass, the color of
which changes from green during the rainy season to brown during summer, but huge
profits as business, industry and the general population move outward from the
metropolitan area. It is incumbent upon land registration courts to exercise extreme
caution and prudent care in deciding so-called applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles over lands of the public domain; if they are lax in these proceedings, they
may, wittingly or unwittingly, be used by unscrupulous land speculators in their raid of
the public domain.
More deserving citizens should be given priority in the acquisition of idle lands of the
public domain. These could serve as relocation sites for the urban poor. They may be
disturbed to landless farm workers. In so doing, the ends of social justice, appropriately
the centerpiece of the 1987 Constitution, could be further enhanced.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of 12
October 1984 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 is hereby REVERSED. The decision of the
trial court of 2 June 1982 in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC Record No.
N-39192 is likewise REVERSED and said case it hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 144057

January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions
of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26,
1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of
Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S.
Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of
a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as
Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area
of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents
imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public
prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico
Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration
No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of
the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955
or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition

to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding
taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject
land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the
government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject
parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of
Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was
declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration
in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC,
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of
the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the
Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court
gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the
subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable
within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No.
10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in
arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first
be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as
required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land
was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and;
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The

unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR
as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of
the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the
land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court
noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that
the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in
1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nt Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the
property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not
apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part of a reservation
for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar,
the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence,
the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration

derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the
Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration
by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in
possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion
is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower
courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of
50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be
traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That
she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.