Tech Tidbits, vol.

8 - Failure of Subsea Hydraulic

Conduit Hose
Many catastrophic failures frequently occur as a result of compounding factors. The recent failure of
the LMRP hydraulic conduit hose on a floating drilling rig was due to such a situation:
a) the hose used was built to an API Specification that did not include a collapse specification,
b) not having a documented management of change process,
c) not following written rig procedures for running the stack, and
d) not adhering to the hose manufacturer's inspection schedule.
The failure caused the LMRP to be pulled twice subsequent to testing the stack after landing on the
wellhead.
The failed hose showed evidence of collapse. The client requested that WEST validate the failure
mechanism and cause. Further, WEST was to determine if this and other flexible hoses in use (LMRP
choke and kill hoses, moonpool drape hoses, and others) were optimally selected based on failure
risks. The manufacturers' specifications for the failed, as well as other, flexible hoses were then
compared and contrasted.

The failed hydraulic conduit hose on the LMRP

There was no documentation on the collapse rating of the failed hose on the rig. It was later confirmed
that this hose was built to API Specification 7K, Specification for Drilling and Well Servicing Equipment
for rotary hoses. This standard does not have any criteria for minimum collapse strength. A better
specification for this service would be API Specification 16C, Specification for Choke and Kill Systems,
that covers flexible and rigid choke and kill lines. This standard has not only a collapse rating, but also
requirements concerning use in H2S environments.

The ruptured flexible hose was manufactured in July 2002.

The hose has evidence of collapse for approximately 60" from each end.

The written rig procedure for running the stack included filling the flexible conduit line with water
during the running of riser; but this procedure was not followed. Adhering to procedures could have
prevented this downtime incident. If procedures are altered, a formal Management of Change system
should be used to document the change and to gain approval from the rig's management.
Best practices require preventive maintenance systems to include prescribed procedures, frequencies,
acceptance criteria, tracking, and auditing components. Additionally, in U.S. waters, revised MMS CFR
250.446(a), effective 24 March 2003, requires compliance with API Recommended Practice 53 Blowout
Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Sections 18.10, 18.11 and 18.12 on inspections,
maintenance and quality management. The vendor's inspection requirements recommend full periodic
testing and inspection every six months. No documentation on the maintenance performed on the
failed hydraulic hose was available for review on the rig.
Although not a cause of this failure, an improper procedure was used (an air impact wrench) to
tighten the 7/8" studs on the #2 clamp of the hydraulic hose connection and the fastener torque was
not verified after hydrostatic tests were completed. This could result in exceeding the recommended
bolt preload.
To prevent future failures of the flexible conduit line, WEST recommendations included the following:

Consider using API Spec 16C, Specification for Choke and Kill Systems, for all subsea flexible
hose applications.

Resume the past practice of filling the flexible conduit line with water during the running of
riser.

Evaluate the rig's Management of Change system. Reference API RP 75, 2nd edition, section
4.4.

Obtain flexible hose certificates of testing and keep the certificates current. Reference API RP
53, 3rd edition, section 18.13.2.

Report hose failures to the manufacturer for root cause analysis. Reference API RP 53, 3rd
edition, section 18.13.3.

Implement manufacturers' preventive maintenance recommendations for all flexible hoses in

use on the rig. Reference MMS regulation Title 30, Chapter II, Section 250.446(a) and API RP
53, 3rd edition, sections 18.10.2, 18.10.3 and 18.12.1.

Utilize the procedure recommended by the manufacturer to make up the hydraulic hose
connections. Reference MMS regulation Title 30, Chapter II, Section 250.446(a) and API RP
53, 3rd edition, sections 18.11.2 and 18.11.4.