Policy making in the periphery of the European Union: the

case of the South Caucasus

Licnia Simo
PhD Candidate, University of Coimbra, Portugal
Junior Researcher, NICPRI, University of Minho, Portugal
Teaching and Research Fellow, OSCE Academy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
liciniasimao@gmail.com

Paper to be presented at the ISAs 51st Annual Convention, New Orleans, US,
17-20 February 2010

Work in progress / Draft. Do not quote or cite without authors express consent.
Comments are welcomed!
Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Unions (EU) Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in
2003, institutional cooperation among state actors in the Wider European context has
deepened and widened. This has meant closer relations between the EU member states,
EU institutions and the states standing on the borders of the enlarged EU, in a growing
number of issues. One area where the ENP has been centrally active has been security,
not only due to the recognition of the increasing interdependence between security
inside the EU and outside its borders, in a context of enlargement and fast changing
security perceptions; but also due to the neighbours activism is engaging institutional
actors in Western Europe in their security concerns. This interplay of interests and
perceptions has reinforced the agency not only of EU institutions and member states,
but also of its neighbours, demanding a closer observation of the political processes
through which state actors define and pursue their foreign policy priorities.
This paper focuses on the role of the EU and its Neighbourhood Policy in the processes
of foreign policy formulation in the South Caucasus region. Since independence from
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, these states have established independent foreign
1

policy relations, a process that demanded not only new assessments and skills but also
the affirmation of their sovereignty and the definition of their national interests in the
international arena. Interaction with important players such as the United States (US)
and the EU became a means of achieving these goals. As such, EU impact in these
states foreign policy formulation can be seen from the view point of its effect on agents
and structures. As the these states evolve from monolithic agents in the international
system, shaped by one-party politics and centralised economic planning, to multifaceted
actors, in which increasing numbers of domestic and international forces come to bear
pressure on, foreign policy becomes a complex affair. This paper focuses on the
potential for external actors to shape third actors preferences and decision making in
foreign policy. The argument is developed by analysing the interplay between the
increasing agency these states have acquired and the European structure with which
they directly interact. This work is therefore pertinent, not only to understand foreign
policy formulation outside the EU, but also to assess the levels of impact of the EU in
these processes.1
The first section provides a theoretical background on foreign policy making, dealing
with the domestic and external dimensions and the agency-structure debate. A matrix of
analysis is put forward to integrate these four approaches to foreign policy analysis. The
second section, focuses on the foreign policy options of these states in a postcommunist context, looking at how each of the three regional states has pursued
different paths towards achieving their stated goals, as the interplay of the four
dimensions considered in the matrix explains. The following sections focus on the
Neighbourhood Policy of the EU and the changes in foreign policy discourse in these
three countries, by looking at how the EU has sought to shape these states foreign
policy, according to the matrix presented above. The outcome is a diffuse pattern of
influence both at the external and domestic as well as the agent and structure level,
indicating that the EU faces not only increased competition for influence in shaping
international structures and setting patterns of normative behaviour in the
neighbourhood, but also that domestic actors have become selectively permeable to
1

It is acknowledged that the EU is not a monolithic actor, with several layers of actors and structures
influencing its foreign policy towards third actors. However, the EU has gained its own actorness
capabilities and often it also works as the meeting point between member states, institutions and
transnational actors, acting under the umbrella of European interests.

external actors influence, thus limiting their ability to democratise domestic

environments and consequently promote pluralism, a goal closely linked with a
normative approach to security. The article finishes with the conclusions.
1. External actors and foreign policy formulation: agency and structure in
perspective
Foreign policy analysis has dealt for long with the question of favouring agent or
structure-centred approaches to explain decision-making and foreign policy outcomes.
Hudson (2007: 8) has called this problematic a perennial philosophical conundrum
and a permanent feature of foreign policy, demanding an integrated approach to explain
foreign policy behaviour. Brighi and Hill (2008: 119) have suggested a strategicrelational approach, focusing on the dialectic interplay between the actors own
strategy on the one hand, and context on the other hand. Context is seen by the authors
as different from structure: it is the other actors and the relations, which they entertain.
Such perspective favours a more relational approach, in which the context is not
deterministically given, but results from the interaction between actors choices and
actions and a given environment. From the constant interplay and feedback between
actors and context, foreign policy is formed and in turn feeds into this process changing
both the environment and the actors perceptions (Brighi and Hill, 2008: 120).
An approach that looks at the dynamic process of interaction between agents and
structure in foreign policy analysis is useful when looking at how external actors
influence foreign policy outcomes. How do the choices, perceptions and actions of one
international actor influence events, perceptions and outcomes in the foreign policy
behaviour of another actor? Structuralist approaches such as realism enhance the fact
that some actors are more powerful in the international system and therefore might
coerce and impose a course of action upon others. The focus on material power and
capabilities has been particularly visible in neo-realist analysis by authors such as Waltz
(1959) and Mearsheimer (1995). Realism thus favours a structural orientation, since at
the core lies the notion of state power, defined in terms of structure of the international
system or in a combination of domestic power resources and international structures
(Carlsnaes, 2008: 92). Agency-based approaches such as liberalism favour a bottom-up
view of the political system, [in which] individual and social groups are treated as prior
3

to politics, because they define their interests independently of politics and then pursue
these interests through political exchange and collective action (Carlsnaes, 2008: 95).
Moreover, and according to Moravcsik (1997), state preferences are set by a limited
number of actors, namely state officials, according to their interests, and depending on
the constrains imposed on state behaviour by interdependent preferences.
In an attempt to look at the process of mutual shaping between agents and structure in
the case of the foreign policy of South Caucasian states, the proposal of this article is to
focus on the way the EUs Neighbourhood Policy has shaped actors perceptions and
preferences and the context within which they act. Moreover, there is an
acknowledgement that foreign policy is a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), where
domestic and international context and actors interact. As Hill (2003: 38) argues, the
domestic and the foreign are two ends of a continuum, and foreign policy analysis is not
complete if an account of the domestic is not included. The EU is particularly well
positioned to illustrate this overlap between domestic and external issues, in its foreign
policies. As Ruggie (1993: 172) has argued, the European Commission can be
conceived of as a multiperspectival institutional form, where territoriality is
questioned, both as source of legitimacy and identity. Distinctions between domestic
and international dynamics become fundamentally blurred and agents and structures
become increasingly interdependent. The EU has also been a purposeful exporter of its
norms and governance models to regions outside the Union (Christiansen, et al., 2000;
Lavenex, 2004), increasingly linking the states and peoples standing outside the EU to
the developments occurring inside it.
The EU stands as an important international actor both on its own and through its
member states. It shapes the international context on several levels, namely through
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations or the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). These sources of power and influence are
particularly relevant if the focus shifts from hard power to soft power, to include issues
such as trade, ideas and norms. Whitman (2006: 105) argues that the decisive criterion
for distinction [of the EU and European international society] rather is the degree of
identification and of the acceptance of being bound by the rules and norms of the
respective international society. Then, if we recognise that the EU has established itself

as a normative model for others, its ability to shape the international context
exponentially increases as third actors take EU rules and norms as their own.
These processes of both contamination by transfer and contention by shaping,
however, are not automatic, meaning that agents involved in foreign policy exercise
their preferences and mediate processes, affecting outcome. Bureaucracies in Brussels
horse-trade extensively, searching for consensus to advance EU decision making,
resembling the illustrations provided by Graham Allisons Bureaucratic Politics theory
(Allison, 1971). EU foreign policy making has still to overcome, not only the famous
capabilities-expectation gap (Hill, 1993), but also a consensus-expectation gap (Toje,
2008). Therefore, EU impact on other actors is largely dependent on how actors inside
the EU manage power relations, how they are socialised and socialise each other and
how institutions evolve. Kelley (2006: 32) illustrates these dynamics by looking at how
the ENP built on previous enlargement experiences and how actors inside the European
Commission structures adapted to assure survival.
In keeping with the logic of dynamic interaction between agents and structures in the
process of foreign policy making, it is necessary to notice that EU transfers towards the
neighbours are by no means unidirectional. Adoption of EU rules, as has been argued
by other authors, can happen through socialisation processes, but also through rational
choice and a cost-benefit analysis (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2006), implying
that the receiving end also plays an important role in this interaction. I would suggest
the notion of selective permeability to rules and norms coming from the EU,
evidenced during the negotiation of the ENP action plans, between the European
Commission and the Foreign Ministries of the ENP countries. Georgia, for instance,
was particularly successful in promoting a selective convergence with the EU (Vieira
and Simo, 2008). A final note must also be made to the increasing competition for
influence over the contexts within which agents make their decisions. Particularly in the
former-Soviet space, the EU has increasingly faced the open competition of Russia, in
setting up the institutional and normative frameworks for interaction.
Thus, EU impact on the external actors foreign policy choices can be conceived of as a
matrix, affecting both the external (international society) and the domestic structures
(governance export) and both domestic (selective permeability) and external agents () of
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foreign policy formulation. The table below illustrates the spectrum of approaches
through which foreign policy can be influenced. Overall, four major trends have been
identified, depending on the point of entry. If favouring an external dimension one can
affect outcome by dealing with agents (point A) or by shaping the structure of
interaction (point B). If one decides to influence the domestic level, the same process
can be conceived, focusing on agents (point C) or on structures (point D). Naturally,
most actors attempting to influence other actors foreign policy-making will attempt to
act on all four points simultaneously, although the constraints to achieve high quality
results in all fronts are high.
Table 1. Points of entry in foreign policy shaping.
Agency

Domestic

External

Structure
A Agent-centred domestic view

B Agent-centred external view

C Domestic structuralist view

D External structuralist view

According to this model, four major variants to shaping third actors foreign policy can
be conceived: an agent-centred domestic view (A), an agent-centred external view
(B), a domestic structuralist view (C) and an external structuralist view (D). An
agent-centred domestic perspective looks at how external actors reinforce agency at the
6

domestic level. As we have seen, states are far from monolithic elements and a growing
number of actors are shaping policy making, including in foreign policy. Such a variety
of domestic agents opens the possibility for third actors to influence foreign policy from
within. An agent-centred external view, on the other hand, favours the reinforcement of
external agency, including International Organisations, transnational corporations and
international non-governmental organisations. Agents working at this level often have
to deal with all the remaining dimensions, making their actions highly unpredictable.
The domestic structuralist view favours a focus on the structural level within each state.
These include issues such as changing the political systems, the constitutions and the
domestic contexts, within which agency is exercised. We can include at this level
democracy promotion policies, as well as legislative reforms supporting freedom of
speech and human rights. The goal of such policies is often to empower domestic
agents, beyond the state, increasing their impact on policy making, and therefore closely
linked to the agent-centred domestic perspective. The external structuralist view, on the
other hand, privileges action at the international level, thus shaping global material and
ideational structures and providing means and value to agency from one specific group
of actors. Dynamics such as the global competition for energy and the competition for
hearts and minds in the former-Soviet space have impacted the foreign policy choices
of the states in Eurasia to a large extent.
Whenever, an external actor has enough power to influence all the four levels, it has
potentially a high level of control of other states foreign policy options. However, it is
from the interplay of interests, perceptions and choices that action is conceived, thus
creating constant alternatives to escape pressure and to selectively engage with external
actors. This is further developed, in the final sections as regards the EUs policies
towards the three South Caucasian states.
2. Explaining foreign policy choices in post-communist South Caucasus
The process of state-building in South Caucasian states, following the dissolution of the
USSR and the end of the cold war, was the point of departure for their emergent foreign
policy. In Georgia, transition from communist rule was marred by conflict and a process
of violent fragmentation of the state, which led to a civil war, by late 1993. In
Azerbaijan and Armenia, the violent contention over Nagorno Karabakh blurred the
7

processes of nation-state building and the development of independent institutions

capable of articulating national interests at the domestic and international levels.
Moreover, these states have had very limited experiences of independence, prior to
1991. They had been part of former empires, such as the Russian (Soviet), Persian and
Ottoman, for most of their existence. This has limited their ability to develop a national
identity, state structures or the ability to relate with the outside world, which in turn
made the process of defining their national interests and the means to achieve and
protect them even harder (Hunter, 2000: 25).
With the demise of the Soviet structures, the new independent states of Eurasia faced
multidimensional transition challenges, including complex state-building processes
demanding the transformation of institutions centred around Moscow and a one-party
system, into modern multiparty systems, whose centre was now independent and
sovereign. It included economic transition from central planning to a liberal capitalist
system of open competition, and also a cultural transition into a globalised world,
dominated by Western conceptions of democratic development, individual and
collective rights. This is part of what Huntington (1991) has called the third wave of
democratisation, although transition processes should be acknowledged as being far
from complete or irreversible. The Soviet legacy lingered in the South Caucasus most
prominently in the form of a control mentality (Altstadt, 1997: 115), legitimising the
control of the masses by the authorities and of the local authorities by the centre.
Moscow was regarded as the centre of all political, economic and security aspects and
the maximum authority. This led to a centralisation of power in the hands of the
political leaders, perceived as necessary to safeguard the interests of the state.
Moreover, looking at the Georgian case, Derlugian (2005: 199) convincingly argues
that the neopatrimonial relations developed between the nomenklaturas in Moscow and
in the Soviet republics, the dependence on Moscows subsidies and protection, and the
lack of a strong bureaucratic ethos among the Georgian nomenklatura, partly explain
why the process of national consolidation proved highly divisive in Georgia. In all, the
Soviet heritage characterised the transition processes of the region and conditioned the
post-communist choices of the new independent states, including the development of
power relations at the domestic level, the management of wealth and economic assets,
and their security concerns.
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Foreign policy has thus been affected by the peculiarities of the post-communist context
of these states. Priorities among the Caucasian states include the assertion of a national
identity, through which national interest could be established; the consolidation and
defence of their sovereignty and independence; and a related goal, that of integration
into the international society. Foreign policy emerged as a central vehicle to attain this
last goal and thus assure a more effective transition. Economically, international actors,
particularly in the West, represented the possibility of macro-economic assistance and
foreign direct investment, much needed to develop the economies of the region.
Membership in international organisations such as the IMF and the WTO provided
recognition and assistance. Moreover, economic development also demanded political
stability, which the Caucasus lacked. Although the international environment was
propitious to the democratisation efforts of these countries (Parrott, 1997: 8), postcommunist democratisation varied in depth and speed.
2.1.

Agent-centred domestic view

In the South Caucasus, the role of political leaders was particularly important, as well as
the ideas they carried. As argued by Jones the collapse of institutional life, the
displacement of universal values with particular identities, the tasks of state building,
the rise of nationalist movements all this has made ideas and ideologies singularly
important (Jones, 2003: 85). In these turbulent times, leaders provided guidance and,
more importantly, they appeared as unique guarantors of independence, stability, and
communal harmony (Akiner, 2000: 96). However, the example of Azerbaijans and
Georgias accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can be seen as
an illustration of the coercion external actors can exercise on weaker states, even in the
presence of strong leaders. Despite the attempts by Azerbaijans first government to
limit the channels for Russian influence, namely by declining to participate in the CIS,
the coup that brought Heidar Aliyev to power has been speculated to have had Russian
support, justifying his decision to enter the CIS shortly after (Kononczuk, 2007: 33).
Georgias President Zviad Gamasakurdia also sought to disconnect Georgia from
Russias influence. However, Moscows manipulations of the separatist conflicts proved
a powerful pressure tool to bring Georgia into the CIS (Jackson, 2003).
Besides foreign policy bureaucrats and elected leaders who are the main responsible for
foreign policy elaboration, civil society and opposition movements can certainly
9

influence foreign policy outcomes. Although the domestic structures within which these
actors operate have increasingly been restricted and placed under control by the current
regimes, they represent an important voice in society. Often, these agents develop
strategies to enhance their independence and influence, by integrating international
networks, or by developing public relation campaigns domestically and abroad,
including through the internet, exposing the realities of their countries and forcing
policy revisions.
Moreover, the ultimate domestic test to foreign policy lies with domestic constituencies
and can be reflected in electoral results (Hudson, 2007: 127), a situation illustrated by
the negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Over the last fifteen years of
negotiations one of the closest moments for agreement was the meeting of the Armenian
and Azerbaijani Presidents, in Key West, in 2001. The lack of agreement has often been
linked by analysts, with both Presidents domestic agendas and fears that a compromise
would cost them their mandates. In President Kocharians mind was the price paid by
President Ter-Petrosyan by displaying his willingness to accept the principle of
Azerbaijans territorial integrity as part of a final agreement, which eventually cost him
his mandate (Petros, 2003: 3; Waal, 2004: 258-261). For President Aliyev, his attempt
to solve the conflict by conceding on crucial issues such as Karabakhs status was too
much too fast for his domestic constituency and soon he withdrew from this position.
Moreover, both former Azerbaijani Presidents Abulfaz Elibey and Ayaz Mutalibov had
been taken from power, mainly due to their failed policies on Karabakh, something
President Aliyev was not willing to repeat (Waal, 2004: 260, 266-268).
A further illustration of how domestic actors play a crucial role in foreign policy choices
can be taken from the way European integration notions have been widely supported
by most domestic actors. Official statements by the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of
the three countries have welcomed the ENP. Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian said in 2007, in Brussels, that We in the neighborhood and in Armenia
embraced this invitation [to share [the EUs] values, duplicate its economic successes
and meet its democratic standards]. We appreciated deeply the farsightedness and the
generosity of spirit (Oskanian, 2007). On June 19, 2007, President Ilham Aliyev spoke
of the ability of countries in the Caucasus and Black Sea to strengthen [their]
independence, economy, and have the criteria of [their] countries close to the ones of
10

developed countries. He added in [the] Caucasus we are acting within the EU New
neighboring programme for South Caucasus countries, [which] in [the] coming 5 years
will let us have our criteria close to [the] ones of EU in all directions political reforms,
democratic processes, solution of social issues, lifting prosperity of population, poverty
reduction etc (Aliyev, 2007).
It is thus clear that domestic actors are foreign policy agents on their own and bargain
over their views on foreign policy orientations, and their preferences should be taken
into consideration both in foreign policy analysis and formulation.
2.2.

Domestic structuralist view

A shift from agent-centred approaches to look at the role of domestic structures is also
necessary. This includes issues such the political system, socio-economic models and
constitutional orders, for instance (Hill, 2003: 203-248). These represent the web of
concepts, rules, institutions and values which have been institutionalised to create a
domestic system of interaction. Decision-making in foreign policy must fit the rules that
have been legitimised by the domestic constituencies and therefore must not contradict
the common understanding of what is expected of a certain type of state. The most
widely generalised approach on the impact of domestic structures on foreign policy
action is the democratic peace theory (Russett, 1993). Democracies do not fight each
other and are less prone to engage in wars with each other, due to institutional
constrains inherent to their domestic systems, as well as due to their normative
proximity (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Russett, 1998). These hopes were partially replicated in
western actors approaches to the region.
The argument can be made that the democratic peace theory failed to develop in the
South Caucasus, not so much because the notion that democracies do not fight each
other, did not apply there; but because the early process of liberalisation, initiated with
Perestroika, was insufficient to promote sustainable democracy. Although in all three
states nationalist movements arrived to power by mid-1992, they were unprepared to
manage the hardships of economic transition and to implement liberal democratic
values. This would prove to be a fundamental aspect in the development of violent
contention for territory and identity, which in turn facilitated the consolidation of semiauthoritarian leaders in all three states (Cornell and Starr, 2006: 39).
11

Although these were not democracies by any standard, the politico-ethno-territorial

conflicts that emerged in the region, in the process of national independence, were
frozen through cease-fire agreements by mid-1990s, illustrating a growing awareness
on the ability of democratisation processes of promoting peaceful means of conflict
resolution. We can therefore say that, as democracy became a clear option to these
states, their commitment to non-violent means was increased. The accession of Armenia
and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, in 2001, despite the active conflict between
the two states, emanated from the commitment to creating democratic systems, as
established in the Constitutions of both countries.2
2.3.

External structuralist view

Focusing on the level of external structure, we speak of pre-dispositions and general

trends that influence state behaviour more than direct causality that is hard to underpin
on such an abstract scale. Hudson (2007: 161) speaks both of systems attributes and
transition moments as important references in this level of analysis. Hill focuses on the
increasingly transnational environment within which state actors act (Hill, 2003: 189).
Beyond any doubts, the major systemic impact to the South Caucasian states foreign
policy was the end of the cold war. Not only due to the consequences at the domestic
and regional levels, but also due to the new forces which gained new qualitative
attributes to shape the international system, and which had been repressed under
bipolarity.
The international context within which these countries sought to integrate changed
profoundly marked by a fragmentation of the political and social space, while
economically there was an increasing uniform trend towards capitalism. Security
concerns widened to include transnational issues such as migration and the
environment, increasing the complexity of the international governance system. From
clear spaces of bipolar influence, the post-cold war context opened international
competition in most geographical spaces, including the Caucasus. No longer was Russia
the only power exercising influence over local and regional events. Others such as the
2

The constitution of Armenia states, in Article 1. that The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign,
democratic state, based on social justice and the rule of law. The Azerbaijani constitution states that
The people of Azerbaijan [...] declare the following objectives: [...] to guarantee a democratic regime
within the framework of the constitution.

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US and China emerged along with Russia as interested, albeit at times, competing
forces (Maynes, 2003: 129). Such competition has become more marked, since 2000
with the arrival of President Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin and following NATOs
eastward enlargements, and has become a central factor in generating instability in the
region over the last decade. As argued by Cornell (2004: 126) international interest in
the region tended to increase polarisation of regional politics. Examples of such rivalry
and polarisation include the pro-Western democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine
and the competition for energy resources. A violent culmination of this tendency was
visible in the war between Russia and Georgia, in 2008, over the region of South
Ossetia.
For the South Caucasian states, attracting external interests, particularly those of the US
and Europe, thus meant first and foremost an assurance against Russian appetites
towards its near abroad. It also meant a real possibility for diversification, much needed
both at the economic and political levels (the region is mainly landlocked and trade
development depends on good neighbourly relations). External engagement with the
South Caucasus has evolved through different stages and has taken different shapes. As
Sabanadze (2002: 27) argues, Western engagement in the region carried both a
normative and a geopolitical agenda, which the West saw as mutually reinforcing.
Although spreading democracy and liberalism was regarded as both a normative and
geopolitical end in itself, allowing for the strategic expansion of Western interests in
friendly environments, the export of such notions as self-determination and territorial
integrity revealed a fundamental contradiction. The ethno-political conflicts that erupted
in the region attest for the irreconcilable and fundamentally dangerous nature of such
dilemma.
Another fundamental contradiction lies between the pursuit of a normative agenda,
based on democracy and human rights and the achievement of geo-economic goals in a
highly competitive environment. Interest in and competition for the Caspian energy
reserves has led Western companies to lobby for greater engagement with the region,
even when the political and human rights record of regional leaders was far from
acceptable by Western standards. Recognising the delicate balance of interests and
principles at play in the South Caucasus, local political elites have played them to their
advantage in a more or less successful way. Taking into account both material and
13

ideational constrains and possibilities, each South Caucasian state acknowledged also
that external actors had to be accounted for in their foreign policies, and both the West
and regional neighbours could play to their advantage in the disputes that emerged.
2.4.

Agent-centred external view

Naturally, the international structures become more visible when international agents,
become engaged in a region or country. The most significant international presence in
the South Caucasus, after independence, was managed by International Organisations
such as the OSCE, the United Nations (including the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund) and latter the Council of Europe. These organisations steered not only
reforms of the domestic system in these states, but they also sought to influence the way
foreign policy was managed, even if only indirectly. The accession of the South
Caucasian states to the OSCE and then the Council of Europe has influenced these
states European vocation very clearly. Similarly, the European Neighbourhood Policy
has also reinforced the prominence of European values in the region.
The US also increased their presence in the region, notably through their engagement in
the energy sector, but also militarily, especially after 9/11 and the war on Afghanistan.
Other European Union member states, such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany
also became important and visible supporters of the South Caucasus states, which gave
them some leverage over their foreign policy choices. Overall, however, regional actors,
such as Russia, Turkey and Iran remain central actors in shaping foreign policy of these
states, not least because of their most pressing foreign policy challenges relate to
regional relations and the prospects of peace and development.
As early as 1998, Turkey had engaged in military cooperation with both Georgia and
Azerbaijan, although it refrained from opening military bases in any of these countries
(Winrow, 2001). Turkey also grew increasingly as a strategic energetic hub linking
Western consumers to the energy resources in the Caspian. Much like Turkey, Iran
regarded the demise of the Soviet Union as a challenge to its security, to which Tehran
responded by adopting a pragmatic approach, concerned with promoting regional
peace and stability and normal state-to-state relations (Herzig, 2001: 172). Overall,
both international and regional powers began to define their interests in the region,
imposing new dynamics on the foreign policy choices of the new independent states.
14

3. The ENP and foreign policy in Armenia

EU engagement with Armenia has been somewhat more limited. Although Armenian
political leadership stated their European aspirations, the geopolitical context in which
Armenia finds itself is more limitative. Economic and military dependence on Russia,
as well as the limited options for cooperation at the regional level due to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict, make the prospect of cooperation with the EU both highly attractive
and hard to pursuit. In the words of Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister, Armen
Baiburtian: the European integration was and still remains one of the principal lines of
our foreign policy and we strive for more close cooperation and integration into the EU.
The ENP opens for Armenia the possibility of institutional access to the EU internal
market what is one of the most important constituents and stimuli of the program
(PanArmenian Network, 2006). A similar position has been reciprocated by the
European Commission former-Desk Officer for Armenia, who stated that Armenia is
the most consequent of all the South Caucasus countries in terms of ENP work and that
Armenian leaders are eager to reform (Interview, 2007b). Two aspects, thus seem to
favour a close cooperation between Armenia and the EU: on the one hand, the economic
potential for Armenia of cooperating with the EU and a low profile but competent
approach by the Armenian bureaucrats, which pleased the European Commission.
Therefore, Armenian bureaucrats can be mentioned as central domestic actors in
relations with the EU. This partly reflects the advantages of a centralised and
consolidated regime in Armenia (Stefes, 2008), capable of conducting foreign policy
without interference from other domestic actors. Nevertheless, although Armenia has
committed itself to implement important reforms, most civil society actors speak of an
imitation of democracy which remains an obstacle to true reform (Interview, 2007a;
2009). Power structures in Armenia remain in the hands of an elite, which controls not
only wealth, but has also made use of the siege mentality developed with the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict to increase its power over the society at large (Freire and Simo,
2007; Stefes, 2008). This has left other domestic actors, including opposition and civil
society, with apparent room for dissent, but without real power to achieve change. Thus,
the EU has had limited impact on domestic actors in Armenia, both at the state and civic
level. There have been positive changes at the level of the domestic structure in
Armenia, including a constitutional reform and closer cooperation with the Council of
15

Europe and the OSCE/ODHIR. However, Armenia missed the opportunity to make
elections a barometer of its commitment to democracy (Freire and Simo, 2007: 7-8)
and the sustainability of reforms remains highly dependent on the achievement of a
lasting and peaceful solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, a central feature of the
external structural context of Armenia.
Thus, democratization of the Armenian regime has not achieved peace either. Armenia
still occupies Azerbaijani territory and has used this occupation as a bargain chip in the
peace negotiations, hoping to achieve independence for the Nagorno Karabakh territory.
The EU has also provided support to the ongoing process of normalisation of relations
with Turkey, a EU candidate, although it has never made it an explicit demand in
Turkeys accession process. This was however an expectation among the Armenian
society, which regarded Turkeys accession to the EU as an important security
guarantee, in the regional context (Interview, 2006). Moreover, Armenia remains highly
dependent on Russia for economic development and assistance, as well as military
cooperation, under the CIS Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenias largest
Diaspora resides in Russia and there are close cultural ties between the two nations.
Further economic and political integration with the EU, although representing and
important possibility of diversification in Armenian foreign policy, has been counterbalanced by a consolidation of Russian presence in the Armenian economy (Giragosian,
2006). Moreover, the poor state of regional relations and the real danger of renewed
conflict with Azerbaijan have remained unaltered, raising the question of how the EU
can shape regional actors choices and regional dynamics.
The balance of the EUs impact on Armenian foreign policy, according to our model, is
a mixed record. On the one hand, the EU represents a clear attractive model for
economic integration, for local elites, with important cultural and political affinities.
This has made domestic agents at the elite level engage in cooperative behaviour with
EU actors, although civil society actors represent this process as an imitation of
democracy, with few visible and significant changes in the domestic structure of
Armenia. Moreover, over the last years, Armenian leaders have also engaged in further
consolidation of Russias political and economic influence in the country, increasing
Armenian dependence on Moscow. Significant failures of the EU in supporting
effective and inclusive regional cooperation among the South Caucasian states (most
16

notoriously in the establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad) have important

consequences for Armenia and for the perception of the EU as a relevant actor in
shaping the external structure and external actors choices around Armenia. A positive
note is linked to the normalisation of relations with Turkey, fully supported by the EU.
4. The ENP and foreign policy in Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has entered the ENP as a reluctant partner, which can be explained by
several central aspects in Azerbaijans foreign policy. One crucial issue for Azerbaijani
diplomats has been the recognition of Azerbaijans territorial integrity, and the
importance of this aspect to what they see as a fair resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. Although the EU has been loudly stating its support for Georgian and
Moldovan territorial integrity, regarding their conflicts with breakaway separatist
regions, it has been reluctant to clearly include Azerbaijan in this approach. This has
raised doubts in Baku on the EUs added value for Azerbaijani foreign policy.
Moreover, since Heidar Aliyev came to power in 1993, Azerbaijani foreign policy has
been marked by a careful equidistance towards neighbours and international players, a
trend continued by President Ilham Aliyev. In this view, closer relations with the EU, in
the framework of the ENP were seen as an important option for diversification, but not
a major direction. Illustrating this trend, were reluctant to included a clear reference to
Azerbaijans European vocation in the ENP Action Plan, negotiated with the EU, and
it was not until pressures from civil society became more visible that such a reference
was included (Alieva, 2006: 13).
Such a careful dealing with the EU has also been perceived as a result of Bakus new
gained assertiveness in international politics. This is clearly linked to its vast energy
reserves, providing the country with added leverage in its equidistant foreign policy.
Thus, relations with the EU were framed as an important step in the Azerbaijani strategy
of becoming a major alternative to Russian supplies of energy to Europe, elevating the
strategic importance of Azerbaijan for the EU. With the completion of the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline, the EU became a major partner of Azerbaijan, increasing
interdependence between the two countries. However, the EU has been unable to
capitalise on this state of affairs and increase its political influence in Azerbaijans
foreign policy, in many of the levels of our matrix.
17

Domestic elites in Azerbaijan, although rhetorically embracing European integration,

have pushed for conservative and authoritarian reforms, incompatible with the
commitments taken under the ENP Action Plan, with the EU and in their accession to
the Council of Europe and the OSCE. This has caused an important fracture between
civil society actors and elites in Azerbaijan, who value their liberal tradition to different
extents (Freizer, 2003). EU insistence on democracy and human rights, especially
regarding civic liberties and media rights, has been seen by the elites as unwanted
interference and preaching and by local civil society as innocuous efforts to make
authorities accountable to their international commitments, leading instead to
disappointment. This has a clear influence on the ability of the EU to be perceived as a
normative actor, capable of influencing the domestic structure. Azerbaijan is therefore
advancing its own model of political and economic development, based on energy
revenues and closely shaped by the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Behind the opaque
notion of national interest the Azerbaijani elites have been increasingly restricting civic
freedoms and have limited the space for pluralism, promoting a militant form of
nationalism linked to the recovery of the lost territories during the war (Euronews,
2010).
The outcome of Azerbaijans engagement with the EU and the ENP process has so far
proved very limited. However, this does not mean that the EU has been completely
unable to shape events and local dynamics. Civil society actors have been emboldened
by the ENP to become active demanders for democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, which
could have a direct influence on how Azerbaijani foreign policy could be developed.
Greater transparency and accountability by political leaders, who in turn are highly
interdependent with their international partners for energy-related development, could
produce positive dividends for the peaceful regional relations. This could be seen in
relations with Armenia, but also with Azerbaijani neighbours in the Caspian, where
Baku has been instigated to develop cooperative relations with Turkmenistan (Simo,
2008). This process could in time facilitate an agreement on an international division of
the Caspian, removing an issue of contention in regional politics that could lead to
violent conflict.
EU presence in Azerbaijan must be considered from a multi-actor perspective. This
means that, besides the politico-institutional relations developed between the
18

Azerbaijani government and the EU institutions, member states retain specific interests
in Azerbaijan, namely the United Kingdom (UK), as well as transnational actors, such
as oil companies, which represent a fundamental axis of the EU presence in the country.
British Petroleum was present in Azerbaijan before many EU countries opened
embassies there, and they shape not only UK policies towards Baku, but the EUs, as
well. This is especially true as the EU has made energy security a fundamental issue in
its foreign policy. This makes the development of a coherent policy toward Azerbaijan
hard, with negative effects on many different levels. On the one hand the EU has not
been able to be a fully pragmatic partner, supporting Azerbaijans energy development
and its own energy security, and on the other hand, it has also failed to be a normative
actor, pushing for high standards of democracy and human rights.
5. The ENP and foreign policy in Georgia
The announcement by the EU of a new initiative for the neighbours of the enlarged
Union was received in the South Caucasus with disappointment, since the region was
not included in the initiative in 2003. But it would take only a few months, from March
to November, for the EU to be under pressure to revise its decision. The Rose
Revolution in Georgia, in November 2003, was a landmark event, which forced the EU
to extend the ENP to the South Caucasian states. Naturally democracy in Georgia
benefited from the establishment of the ENP, but its leadership showed resolve to make
the democratic and peaceful revolution a moment of change towards Europe. The
symbolism of the Georgian decision to display the EU flags on all the administrative
buildings, of the appointment of French diplomat of Georgian descent, Salome
Zourabichvili as Foreign Minister and of the introduction of the position of State
Minister for European Integration, was not left unnoticed in Brussels. The EU displayed
unprecedented activism towards Georgia, convening a Donors Conference, in Brussels,
in June 2004, together with the World Bank, and pledging about US$1 billion to support
the reform programme of the Georgian government (Devdariani, 2004; Vieira and
Simo, 2008).
The increasing attention of the EU to the reform processes in Georgia played on two
different levels. One the one hand the EU committed itself to support domestic reforms
aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and curbing corruption
19

(acting on the domestic structuralist level). The EU deployed a Rule of Law mission in
Georgia, by July 2004, aimed at providing guidance on a new criminal justice reform
strategy, including support in the planning of new legislation, for example the Criminal
Procedure Code (Gularidze, 2004). On the other hand, however, the EU displayed great
caution in engaging in the regions security challenges, including in Georgias relations
with Russia (external structuralist level). Despite an incremental engagement in the
frozen conflicts in Georgia, the bulk of EU activities in the South Caucasus have
focused on assistance to regulatory and administrative reforms, democracy and good
governance, economic modernisation and poverty eradication, legal harmonisation with
the EU (Europeanisation) and only to some extent peaceful conflict resolution
(European Commission, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). As Popescu (2007: 20) argues in the
Georgian case, EU support for the rehabilitation of the conflict zones were effective in
easing at least some of the difficulties that people in the conflict regions faced. The
political effect of EU assistance was less important, however.
Although the EU did get involved in conflict resolution, especially in Georgia, through
the appointment of a EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and through
assistance to rehabilitate the conflict areas, its long-term structural approach was in
direct contrast with the situation on the ground. Under Russian economic and military
pressure, Georgian leaders took their attention from long-term reforms and economic
development to the short-term needs of state survival. Their approach was to engage the
EU in conflict resolution and to secure its commitment to their territorial integrity. This
in turn, might include increased EU assistance to Georgia, including in border
management, and ultimately in replacing the CIS-led peacekeeping formats in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow escalated over the last years,
culminating in a war over South Ossetia, in 2008, despite EU efforts to defuse tensions
and to commit the Georgian leadership to peaceful conflict resolution principles. As
argued above, the conflict resulted partly from the escalation of tensions between Russia
and the US, an area where the EU not only had limited ability to intervene, but was also
somehow made hostage of global dynamics it did not control. The Georgian State
Minister for European Integration was quoted saying that the Georgian party welcomes
more active participation in settlement of problems in the region, but that EU
participation in conflict resolution in Georgia, visa issues and free trade were among the
20

most difficult aspects being negotiated in the ENP Action Plan (The Georgian Times,
2006).
We can thus argue the EU showed limitations on several levels. First, the EU was
unable to shape the wider context of increased competition between the US/NATO and
Russia in the former-Soviet space, and might eventually have contributed to the increase
in tensions by setting up the ENP and lately the Eastern Partnership. Although the EU is
a global actor it has limited ability to shape patterns of competition, particularly since its
foreign policy instruments lack coherence and need to be streamlined. As for Georgia,
although the Rose Revolution symbolized the beginning of a shift in the former-Soviet
space towards democracy and the West, followed by similar events in Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan, this was by no means a consolidated or irreversible path, as the increasing
concerns with democracy and peace in the country suggest. Moreover, the EU did not
manage to exert conditionality on the Georgian government to reform and follow suit on
its promises of peaceful conflict resolution. Similarly, EU support for civil society
actors, which had been crucial in bringing about a democratic shift in Georgia, was to
some extent neglected. This limited their ability to exert pressure on the government
and keep it accountable. The EU was particularly well positioned in the framework of
the ENP to address these issues, and was expected to do so, raising expectations that it
did not match.
Thus according to our model the EU acted strongly at the domestic structuralist level,
supporting reforms, and promoting a clear Europeanisation agenda. However, domestic
agents, including Georgian officials followed a selective engagement strategy with the
EU, focusing instead on promoting changes at the external structural level. Moreover,
civil society actors and domestic constituencies, which had been crucial to the
revolution in 2003, were increasingly left out of the decision-making process, as
security concerns emerged as the major issue in Georgias foreign policy. While
European integration was presented as a preferable strategy to help stabilise the
domestic and regional context of Georgia, local actors engaged in an attempt to
radically alter the external context, by shifting patterns of regional competition among
the US and Russia as well. Putting it differently, Georgian leaders expected the EU to
be more proactive in affecting the behaviour of external agents, particularly Russia,
which the EU failed to achieve. However, the EU did manage to engage other
21

International Organisations and EU member states in Georgia, improving the level of

influence of external agents in Georgian foreign policy options.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to shed light onto the process of foreign policy formulation,
looking at the South Caucasian countries relations with the European Union. It
proposes four main axis of analysis, including actor and structure-centred approaches
and domestic and international perspectives. It was argued that the EU fits well into
these multiperspectival approaches, since it is a complex actor, working on several
levels, including both the domestic and international and often addressing both actors
and context. The next section sought to apply the matrix of analysis to foreign policy
making in the post-communist South Caucasus, by looking at how agency and context,
both at the domestic and international level have shaped foreign policy in the region.
Examples such as the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents reluctance to compromise
on Karabakh due to calculations over the reactions of their constituencies at home; the
growing democratisation of the region, which partly managed to halt military hostilities;
the increased US/Russia rivalry which is equivalent to a new international context
affecting issues such as democracy promotion and energy competition; and finally the
role of the international institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe in
reinforcing these countries Western orientation faced with Russias increased
competition.
A similar analysis was then put forward regarding the engagement of the EU through
the ENP. The main conclusions regard the focus of the EU on the domestic structuralist
perspective, which had some positive results in Georgia, but failed to deliver credible
reforms in Armenia (imitation of democracy) and in Azerbaijan (regression of
democratisation). The EU is also working on the external structural level, seeking to
mediate tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi (which it failed to achieve) and to
improve the regional context around Armenia (especially in relations with Turkey but
with limited results) and reinforcing the strategic importance of Azerbaijan on energy
(with some positive results). At the level of domestic agency, the EU has focused on
state agents and engagement with civil society has been minor, so far. Georgian leaders
promoted a selective engagement, while the Armenian bureaucrats displayed good
22

technical capabilities but limited commitment to reform and Azerbaijani leaders

circumvented EU conditionality by engaging the EU at the strategic level. Finally, at the
level of external agents, the EU has been powerless to influence Russian actions in
Georgia; it has focused on International Organisations in Armenia; and has been
dividing attention with member states and transnational actors in Azerbaijan.

23

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