ISA 51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE

THEORY VS. POLICY? CONNECTING SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS

European Union Conflict Management policy-Case of Georgia

Kornely K. Kakachia
Associate Professor, Tbilisi State University
Department of Political Science
kkakachia@yahoo.com

Paper prepared for International Studies Association 2010: Annual Convention,

New Orleans, February 20, 2010.

draft paper

(SC18)
Impacting Policy Makers: Conflict and Human Rights. Panel discussion. 1:45 PM

Abstract. In less than two decades, International conflict management has become a permanent feature of International
relations and consequently of European Security policy. The main aim of the EU, as stated in its draft treaty, is peace. Thus
conflict resolution permanently features as an objective of the European Unions foreign Policy. The extensive empirical
involvement of international organizations in attempts at conflict management and prevention, which often see this as
one of their main security tasks and the frequent calls to increase their involvement, as well as the simultaneous relative
lack of systematic comparative research on their involvement in these situations constitute the starting point for this
paper. Paper deals with EU conflict management policy and its effectiveness promoting peace and stability in its backyard
and specifically in Georgia.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the European Community, there have been ambitions to develop
Europe into a significant foreign policy actor with its own security and defense policy. The
development of an independent European defense is a key to fulfilling this goal and in fact
Security and defense is the area in which the EU has advanced most in recent years. At the same
time it is a more or less openly stated goal that the EU will also become stronger in military
terms and develop a capacity to intervene far away from its own region. One of the challenging
tasks of European Union is an international crisis management and conflict resolution issues.1
Until recently, the scholarly literature has remained rather underdeveloped in its
conceptualization of the EU as a purposive actor in conflict resolutions. 2 However, recent years
studies that focus on the role of the European Union in the resolution of various conflicts have
distinguished between the EU as an active player and EU as a framework 3 and combined in
their analyses the indirect effects of integration and association with the purposive interventions
of the EU in conflicts.4
In general, crisis management relates to exceptional situations in international politics when
preventive measures have failed and as such it is a response to an actual treat. 5 An important
assumption underlying any European approach to international crisis management is that
international crisis often poses a double political problem: EU member states have to arrive at a
common position about what needs to be done about the crisis, and they have to organize
themselves in such a way that, as a collective, they are effective.

Conflict resolution scholars offer a variety of intervention options at various levels of conflict. See C.
A. Crocker intervention: toward Best practices and holistic view in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and
P. All (eds), Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing International conflict (united States
Institute of Peace, Washington. DC.,2001; D. U. Eralp and N Beriker, Assessing conflict resolution
potential of the EU: The Cyprus conflict and Accession Negotiations. 2005 36 Security dialogue,
pp.175-192; N. Popescu. EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Reluctant Involvement in Conflict
Resolution. 2009 Kluwer Law international BV. European Foreign Affairs Review 14; pp. 457-477;
N.Tocci. The EU and conflict Resolution promoting peace in the backyard. Routledge. 2007
2 Perhaps the underdeveloped status of the literature could be explained by the fact that until
recently the EU itself was quite hesitant and timid to intervene directly in interstate and intrastate
disputes.
3 G. Noutcheva, N. Tocci, B. Coppieters, T. Kovziridze, M. Emerson and M.Huysseune,
Europeanization and secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories. 2004. Journal on Ethnopolitics
and Minority Issues in Europe, special Focus 1, pp. 1-35
4 Ayse Betul Celik and Bahar Rumelili. Necessary but not sufficient: The role of the EU in resolving
Turkeys Kurdish Question and Greek-Turkish Conflicts. Kluwer Law international BV. European
Foreign Affairs Review11: 2006. 203-222. See also C. Hill, The EUs Capacity for conflict Prevention.
2001. 6 EFA Rev,pp. 315-333; and N. Tocci, EU intervention in ethno-political conflicts: The cases of
Cyprus and Serbia-Montenegro. 2004. 9 EFA Rev. Pp.551-573.
5 Mark Houben. International Crisis Management, The approach of European States. 2005. p. 3
1

While, European Union is comparatively new actor in the field of conflict management since the
mid-1990s it has largely followed the global trend among international organizations of
reforming its structures and building capacities for conflict prevention and management. 6 To
have peace within the EU means, to a great extent to have peace outside of it which means that
if a degree of peacefulness does not surround the EU, then those living in non-peaceful
conditions will seek for more peaceful environment in the EU or elsewhere rather than at home.
In order to enhance the peacefulness within the EU as well as outside of it, it is quintessential to
have, especially in the still very diverse but still also divided EU, a solid common basis.7
The Unions foreign policy instruments are well placed to promote structural peace in the
neighborhood. In particular, EU contractual relations-ranging from accession process to looser
forms of association-can play a constructive role in conflict resolution. Moreover, in relation to
third countries the Union is providing the key enablers for peace and stability, ranging from
military operations to police, monitoring and rule-of-law missions. It aims not only strengthening
and enforcing economic development, but also the respect of human rights, democratic values
and the rule of law. For that purpose, the EU has launched various cooperation programs,
designed to assist political and economic transformation in all parts of the world, but in
particular with regard to the Mediterranean area, to Central and Eastern Europe as well as to
the Balkans.8 In some cases, this includes the prospect of EU membership; thus, the EU
enlargement process itself can be seen as a measure of structural conflict prevention (see
Rummel 1996).9
However, its widely believed that the EU continued to largely mismanage the area that the
Lisbon Treaty defines as the Union's top priority - peace. According to Oberg the Treaty itself
defines peace and security predominantly through a military prism and suggests military means
as main conflict-management tools rather than conflict understanding, dialogue, negotiations
and reconciliation. To put it bluntly the Treaty's peace understanding is not state-of-the art and
light years behind the decade-old UN Charter.10
All above said regional stability in European neighborhood is one of the strategic goals of the
European Union. The neighborhood policy presents the EU with huge economic opportunities
Ulrich Schneckener, Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management. Test Case Macedonia, ECMI
working paper #14; January 2002, p.3
7 Francesco Marelli, Proposal for a Different European Security Strategy.European Peace University,
Austria p.1 http://www.transnational.org/Resources_EU/Marelli_DiffSecStrategyEU.pdf (accessed on
18 November, 2009)
8 e.g. Phare, Tacis, Meda or Cards programs
9 Rummel, Reinhardt, 1996: "The European Union's Politico-Diplomatic Contribution to the
Prevention of Ethno-National Conflict", in: Chayes/Chayes, 197-235. (accessed on 23 November, 2009)
10 For the analysis to back up this judgement, see Jan Oberg, Does the European Union Promote
Peace? Analysis, critique and alternatives, The Transnational Foundation & New Agenda,
Copenhagen 2006http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2006/Oberg_EU_Promote_Peace.pdf(accessed on 10
December, 2009)
6

and vulnerabilities. Although Europes neighbors are so diverse EU is motivated by the fact that
these neighbors are all in different ways shaping the contours of tomorrows Europe. Beyond
the EUs self image as a normative power which promotes values abroad as ends in themselves,
the EU also has strong interest in promoting peace, democracy and successful transformation in
its near abroad.11 In this respect the EU enlargement process has turned out to be hugely
successful. Especially in the case of the former communist countries that entered the EU in
2004, the lure of membership represented the best incentive to accompany the political and
economic transition of these countries. Their domestic transformation provided the means for
EU to stabilize the region. And overall European political and diplomatic profile emerged
enormously strengthened.12
While EU transformative powers works effectively, violent conflicts in neighborhood threaten
European Unions security and produces serious development and humanitarian costs. Such
conflicts arise due to a complex set of variables coming together and reinforcing each other at
multiple levels and critical junctures of a country or regions development. Conflicts can reduce
growth and discourage investment, destroy human and physical capital, redirect natural
resources to nonproductive uses, and cause a dramatic deterioration in the quality of life.
Furthermore, in the public sector, funds that might otherwise be invested in public goods
necessary for growth are spent on security. And last but not least in countries undergoing
political transition in EU neighborhood, violent conflict has the potential to undermine popular
support for democracy. For these reasons, EU is promoting transformational development and
strengthening fragile regions while supporting EU strategic interests. European Union also is
giving substantial attention to conflict mitigation and management.
Georgia is of fundamental relevance for the EU-not only for reasons of energy security that
becomes increasingly important in EU security thinking, but also because Georgia embodies all
the (positive and negative) challenges that EU faces as a security actor at the beginning of 21 st
century.13 Political reforms in Georgia after the Rose revolution, coupled with the declaration
of the Georgian government that relations with the EU constitute a major priority of Georgian
foreign policy, have made the stability of Georgia a crucial issue in the EU's external relations.
With the post revolutionary new government in Georgia, new prospects for the spread of
democracy and economic reforms suddenly appeared. However, Russian invasion of Georgia in
August 2008 and setback of Georgian democracy revealed fact that while the vast majority of
the Georgian people emphatically assert their commitment to European institutions and values,
they also understand that these values have not sufficiently taken root in Georgia. 14 Georgia is
an aspiring democracy, not a consolidated one.
Manners, I. Normative power Europe: A contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 2002. P.235-38
12 For additional assessment of EU transformative power see: Fabrizio Tassinari. Why Europe Fears
its neighbors. 2009. p. 1-9
13 Dov Lynch, Why Georgia matters, in Chaillot Paper, no.86, Paris, February 2006, p.8
14 Ghia Nodia. Russian War and Georgian Democracy, August 22, 2008.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russian-war-and-georgian-democracy (accessed on 8 December,
2009)
11

The EU has an important influence on the whole process of Georgias post-Soviet

transformation. Indeed the EU is quite clear that one of its objectives in working with Georgia is
to promote good governance and greater respect for human rights in a bid to ensure the
stability and security15 for Georgia and the wider region. Generally EU agrees that the Georgian
people share a common destiny with the other peoples of Europe, and that the long term
integration of Georgia into European structures is in the interest of both the EU and Georgia. But
so far the EUs lack of enthusiasm to offer the prospect of membership and its fear of upsetting
Russia has prevented it from thinking strategically about Georgia. Nor has the EU used its
transformative power to underpin reforms in Georgia.16
The paper aims to evaluate the impact of European Union (EU) conflict management policy in
Georgia in order to trace the question of a stronger EU role in conflict resolution, that would not
only correspond to the EUs own assessment that conflict settlement is a key to the
effectiveness of any external assistance, but also to its proclamation to become more engaged in
conflict resolution itself. Moreover, it explores the EUs and its Member States interests in the
South Caucasus because they are relevant for the development of EU activities in the region. It is
also intends to analyze, the EUs actual activities since the early 1990s including relations with
Russia and its postwar activities in Georgia.

EU-Russian relationship in Post Soviet space and implications for Georgian Foreign Policy
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the period of 1991-94, international organizations
and Western powers started to slowly enter the former Soviet space by opening up regional
offices and local representations. However, apart from symbolic and rather limited activities, the
international community did not take great interest in the fate of the newly independent states.
To the contrary, the persistent Soviet legacy contributed to the perception of these emerging
new states as Russian satellites that belonged to the Russian sphere of influence and required no
external interference in their internal troubles.
The above position of the international community coincided with the active phase of ethnopolitical conflicts in the region, allowing Russia to step in as the only legitimate power to
mediate the conflicts and even use them for furthering Russia's own strategic interests. As
successor to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin tried to exert control over the new states as if
they were still vassals and tried to keep out foreign influences. Moreover, instead of
fulfilling the function of peacemaker among the various Post Soviet nationalities, Russia took

European Union, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia Country

Strategy 2007-2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf (accessed on
November 29, 2009)
16 Mark Leonard and Charles Grant. ,,Georgia and EU: Can Europes neighborhood policy deliver?,
Centre for European Reform; policy brief. Sept.2005 p.3
15

sides to favor one nationality over another. That only deepened regional conflicts and prompted
participants to search for support and protection in other regions.17
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union and the Russian Federation have
found it increasingly difficult to develop an institutionalized relationship. The current agenda of
the EU-Russian partnership is full of questions of strategic choice, including, whether and to
what extent Russia it is willing and able to Europeanize itself, i.e. to converge on modern
European values and standards; whether it is willing and able to be part of EU Neighborhood
Policy. While the EU's most successful foreign policy tool is enlargement, it cannot and will not
offer Russia membership, nor is Russia interested in this. Russia sees itself as an independent
player, a regional great power with global aspirations.
In its foreign policy, Russia prioritizes geostrategic and military issues rather than economics, as
would any country that sits on the world's second largest nuclear arsenal but ranks only 16th on
the list of the world's top economies. While, many EU policymakers and most Brussels
bureaucrats believe in postmodern ideas of statecraft, such as mutual interests, shared
sovereignty and win-win solutions, Russia's foreign policy establishment remains wedded to oldfashioned concepts such as spheres of influence, zero-sum games and strict reciprocity. And the
two sides also have a diametrically opposed approach to the rule of law. Rules and their equal
application are at the heart of the European integration process, while many Russians still
believe in the law of power rather than the power of law.18
Today, EU-Russia relations are characterized by mutual disillusionment and have encountered
numerous stumbling blocks since the 1990s, some with long-lasting effects upon bilateral
relations, such as the Georgian-Russian conflict, energy issue debacles, as well as the frozen
NATO-Russia dialog as most significant amongst others. One of the main divides between Russia
and the EU is the lack of collective bargaining power amongst the states of the latter vis--vis the
former. Some of the EU members see a resurgent Russia as a threat. Others, however, believe it
should not be upset.
The Russian-Georgian five day war war that took place in August 2008 highlighted the volatility
of the South Caucasus region as a new flashpoint in the common neighborhood between Russia
and the European Union (EU). What has made the conflict in Georgia so crucial to the EU is the
fact that this is not to be seen as an isolated occurrence. The incidence has repercussions
throughout a region that is marked by a plethora of challenges to political stability and
democratic consolidation-factors that directly affect European security and welfare. Moreover,
Russia's overwhelming military defeat of Georgia made the role and security of current or future

Yevgeny Bazhanov. A Smarter Caucasus Policy, Moscow Times, December 3, 2009 p. 2

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a-smarter-caucasus-policy/390791.html (accessed on
December 8, 2009)
18 Katinka Barysch, Whither EU-Russian Relations? The Moscow Times, 21 May 2004
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/barysch_moscowtimes_21may04.html (accessed on January 7,2010)
17

pipelines running through that country an issue that weighs heavily on the minds of many in the
EU.
By asserting a sphere of influence, strategists in Moscow hoped to prompt a suitably deferential
reaction from the West, including, perhaps, regional withdrawal.19 While Russias invasion did
not result in such a retreat, and was in fact seen as a challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, it did
not justify NATO intervention. Kremlin also took notice that although French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, whose country then held the rotating Presidency, played the central role in negotiating
a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, the EU collectively took Georgia's side over the five-day
war, something that has not been forgotten in Moscow.
In contrast to Russia's clear opposition to NATO enlargement, Russia has not yet actively
opposed the EU's enlargement. Moscow has, however, been increasingly uneasy about the
impact of the new EU members on the EU's attitude towards Russia. 20 There are deep-seated
doubts that the EU is attempting to undermine Russia's geopolitical dominance in Eastern
Europe and Caucasus.21 Russia is also anxious about the European Unions Eastern Partnership
program (EaP),22 which aims to draw the six post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe and the
Caucasus closer to the EU by improving human rights, easing visa regulations, and ensuring
energy security. The EaP is seen by some Russian experts as the EU's attempt to withdraw six
post-Soviet states from Russia's sphere of influence and establish a sort of protectorate for these
countries.
Another reason of the EU interest in the EaP is the construction of alternative oil and gas
pipelines bypassing Russia e.g. Nabucco or White Stream. Georgia and Ukraine are considered
important transit countries, while Azerbaijan can serve both as a source of, and transit point for,
energy supplies. In general, while Moscow's attitude towards the EU fluctuate, all this kind
strategic perceptions and misperceptions plays important role in EU policy initiatives aimed to
enhance regional security in South Caucasus.

19 More

details on Russo-Georgian present relationship see: Kornely Kakachia. Can Russia win
ideological battle in Georgia? PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 67.
http://ceres.georgetown.edu/esp/ponarsmemos/page/78361.html (accessed on February 8, 2010)
20 European security and Russia, House of commons, Defence Committee - Tenth Report ,
30 June 2009 Russia: a new confrontation? http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect /cmdfence/276/ 27602.htm (accessed on January 8, 2010)
21 Alexander Sergunin. EU and Russia: an Eastern Partnership Muddling on? Opendemocracy.com.
28 January 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexander-sergunin/eu-and-russia-easternpartnership-muddling-on (accessed on 1 February, 2010)
22 The Eastern Partnership is an organization aiming to improve the political and economic traderelations of the six Post-Soviet states of "strategic importance"- Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia with the European Union. The Eastern Partnership and
European Neighborhood policies of the EU are initiatives to help provide incentives to countries in
the region to become closer to the EU and Western norms. Such measures have included the
promotion of democracy and good governance, funding for projects to reduce socio-economic
imbalances and increase stability, and fostering alignment with EU declarations in the Common
Foreign and Security Policy arena on a case-by-case basis.

Evolution of EU strategy towards South Caucasus and its profile in Georgia

The South Caucasus earlier attracted relatively little EU interest, but this is no longer the case.
There are several reasons for the growing EU interest. The region is strategically important for
the West and to Europe in particular as a trade link and because of its fossil fuel deposits. Given
the regions geostrategic position as a natural link between Europe and Asia, and between
Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes a vital trade link as well as an important area of
transit. Moreover, the unresolved conflicts risk renewed hostilities and new migration flows,
thus posing a threat to human rights across the South Caucasus. In this context, any kind of
regional destabilization may seriously affect security in the EUs wider neighborhood. In recent
years, through its enlargements, the EU has got even closer to the South Caucasus
geographically and gained new members to which this region matters more. However, while the
accession of Romania and Bulgaria theoretically has brought the EU into play as a direct Black
Sea neighbor, the European Unions policy toward the region is still marked by fragmented
perceptions of the regions problems and interests and a lack of consensus over policy goals.
Since 2003 the EU has become more of a security actor in the South Caucasus, particularly in
Georgia. It has appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus, launched a European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission, and employed the Commissions Rapid Reaction
Mechanism to support post Rose Revolution democratization processes. It should be pointed
out that the mission was not only the first EU mission of its kind, it also marked the first
application of the bloc's defense and security policy outside of the Balkans or Africa. Since 2004,
the three Caucasian countries are included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). EU aid
to the region has been increased and in 2006, it was decided to add Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia to the list of countries in which the European Investment Bank can extend loans. A
modest but steady trend towards deeper EU engagement remained in place and this trend also
encompassed efforts to solve the conflicts in the region.
Furthermore, the EU faced a strategic dilemma as Russia is a major stakeholder in numerous
ways in the Black Sea region (in terms of military power and energy, as well as with regard to
soft power and public opinion).23Soon after, when Russia interrupted energy supplies to Ukraine
and Georgia, quite possibly for political reasons, the EU was gripped by a new sense of urgency
to limit its own dependency on Russian energy. Attention was quickly turned to the oil and gas
resources in the Caspian basin and the transit possibilities in the South Caucasus. The EU's new
energy interest in the region gave it an additional reason to feel concerned about the unresolved
conflicts there, on top of the reasons mentioned in the then newly adopted European Security
Strategy to regard regional conflicts as a key threat. At the same time, there were, and still is,

Daniel Grotzky, Mirela Isic, The Black Sea Region: Clashing Identities and Risks to European
Stability. CAP Policy analysis. N 4 October, 2008 p.1-7
23

considerable reluctance in some EU Member States to let the EU get deeply involved in security
matters in the South Caucasus, not least because of links to Russia.
Notwithstanding all above mentioned, the European Union supported the principle of territorial
integrity of Georgia, and was also prepared to increase its efforts to develop conflict resolution
policies in the region, but not in accordance with the Georgian time frame. 24 EU also was highly
involved in the improvements of Georgian border management. The EUs take-over of the OSCE
border mission in 2005 was a symptom of importance the Union gives to this area.25 As a result,
EU reinforced its political image and supported the OSCE in conflict areas by funding small-scale
rehabilitation programs, helped the OSCE to monitor sections of the GeorgianRussian border
and declared its willingness to support large-scale rehabilitation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
(Tskinvali region).
Yet during this period, the EU did not act coherently in developing a more concrete vision for the
political solutions of Georgian secessionist conflicts. Despite calls from the European Parliament
for firmer engagement in conflict resolution, member states did not succeed in further
elaborating EU policy. Although the EU retained an overall strategy for Georgia, specific EU
member states had clearer agendas with the possibility of adopting a concerted approach under
the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). In one hand Poland, the Baltic states, Great
Britain and Sweden have become strong advocates of building closer ties between modernizing
countries such as Georgia and Ukraine and supported active EU and NATO engagement in the
region, thus they have pursued simultaneously a strategy of containment toward Russia. In
another hand Germany and France remained cautiously skeptical about the active role of EU in
Russian backyard and an integration perspective for additional countries since they wanted to
retain some form of strategic partnership with Russia.
Unsurprisingly, the tragic events of August 2008 in Georgia brought changes to EU policy, in
which the EU effectively redefined its stance towards the Georgia. During the conflict EU officials
and French Presidency have both repeatedly visited Georgia and Russia and on 12th August
2008 managed to broker the six point cease fire agreement more known as Sarkozi-Medvedev
agreement. Europe, said German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, acted as the
honest broker in the event, however after the negotiations, many observers have highlighted
the weaknesses and vagueness of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreements. Some European analyst
(Tassinari, Van Herpen, Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier) noted that Europe acted as the notary of the
Russian occupation since the text of the agreement contained no reference to the territorial

Bruno Coppieters. The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution. Occasional paper
N79, December 2007
25 Oscar Pardo Sieraa. Stabilizing the neighbourhood? The EUs Contribution to SSR in Georgia.
European Foreign Affairs Revew14. 2009. p.495
24

integrity of Georgia and gave to Russia to apply additional security measures without
geographical accuracy.26
The appointment of an EU special representative in Georgia (EUSR) in July 2008 was another
important move which was followed by council decision on September 2008, to establish an
autonomous civilian monitoring mission in Georgia. The mission was deployed on 1 October
2008, in accordance with the arrangements set out in the Agreement of 8 September 2008. In
July 2009, the mandate of the mission was extended for another year until 14 September 2010.
The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia is an autonomous mission led by
the EU under the European security and defence policy (ESDP). Its objectives are to contribute to
stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region. In the short term, to contribute to the
stabilisation of the situation, in accordance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent
implementing measures.27 Given the cessation of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions, EUMM
is now the sole international monitoring mission in Georgia. This has increased the significance
of EUMM activities.
Most important strategic decision of EU in the region was establishment of Eastern
Partnership(EaP) program on May 2009, which included Georgia as well. The objective of the
Eastern Partnership is to support stability, prosperity and multilateral building of confidence
with the aim of contributing to territorial integrity and sovereignty of all partner countries. In
addition, it should also support efforts to resolve regional conflicts peacefully. The twenty-seven
EU Member States stated that they want to use this partnership to strengthen their cooperation
with six former Soviet Union countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belorus,
Moldova). According to initial statments by EU officials the Eastern Partnership should not
reinstate blocks or the fight for spheres of influence. It should not be a formal, but a pragmatic
cooperation of equal partners in the field of trade and energy security, and also in the field of
strengthening democratic principles and better governance.
According to the Prague declaration, "The main goal of the Eastern Partnership(EaP) is to create
the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration
between the European Union and interested partner countries... With this aim, the Eastern
Partnership will seek to support political and socio-economic reforms of the partner countries,

See : Fabrizio Tassinari. Why Europe Fears its neighbors. 2009. p. 75; Sarkozy committed in
Georgia the sin of voluntarism. Interview with Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, French Institute of
Geopolitics, Paris;
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Mongrenier_Sarkozy_Committed_in_Georgia_the_Sin_of_Vo
luntarism. pdf (accessed on January 20, 2010); Marcel H. Van Herpen, Sarkozys Foreign Policy: not
principled, opportunistic and amateurish. Cicero Foundation Great Debate paper No.10/01, February
2010 http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Marcel_H_Van_Herpen_Sarkozy_Foreign_Policy.pdf
(accessed on February 7,2009)p.4
27 The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) website. http://www.eumm.eu/ (accessed on
February 1, 2010)
26

10

facilitating approximation towards the European Union".28The EaP also has an important
political aspect: it shows partner countries attractive development prospects and offers them
the opportunity to make the strategic choice of adopting a pro-European orientation. The EaP
highlights the empowerment of these countries by treating them as independent entities and
not pawns that are organically linked to Russia.29
Indeed, Georgia has already been welcomed into the Eastern Partnership, which will give it an
opportunity to strengthen its ties with member nations, and address doubts about its capacity
for potential membership. It is also clear in Georgia's case that while the EaP has the potential to
become a more effective Neighborhood Policy, it is not a substitute for an effective conflict
policy. Indeed, it was not designed as a policy to tackle conflict issues. The proposal contains
only a timid recognition of the importance of conflict resolution for the EU. Whilst this shows a
continued awareness of the problem, it amounts to nothing more than the repetition of
intentions outlined in previous ENP documents.
EU priorities in Georgia after the Conflict and expectations
The conflict in Georgia involved Europe directly. Its vital interests were in the balance since
stability and peace are being threatened on its doorstep. 30 The EU, which has been indifferent
to Georgian problems for too long, for the first time, realized that Russia deliberately and
voluntarily waived international law. Moscow had not only invaded a neighbor for the first time
since the Soviet assault on Afghanistan in 1979. In recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states, it had broken the cardinal rule of post-cold war European security: that
borders in Europe would never again be changed by force of arms. Georgia's territorial integrity,
within its internationally acknowledged borders, which is an intangible right confirmed by the
UN Charter, all conventions and international organizations, Russia included were violated as
well. It also ignored all important document since the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference,
ranging from the NATO-Warsaw Pact Agreement of 19th November 1990, to the great number
of resolutions adopted at the UN Security Council every six months since 1993.31
August war has also made EU evident two things: EU found itself confronted with full fledged
war in its new neighborhood involving resurgent Russia and at the same time the conflict
opened new window of opportunity for Brussels to enhance and reposition itself in the region
Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit. 7 May 2009, Prague.
http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/PARTNERSTWO%20WSCHODNIE/4pw.pdf (accessed on January 14,
2010)
29 Radoslaw Sikorski. The EUs Eastern Partnership with former Soviet states holds the key to
relations with Russia. Europes World. Summer 2009.
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/Article
ID/21413/language/enUS/TheEUsEasternPartnershipwithformerSovietstatesholdsthekeytorelationswithRussia.aspx
(accessed on 26 January 2010)
30 Michel Foucher, Jean-Dominique Giuliani. The European Union and the Russo-Georgian war.
Robert Shuman foundation. European issues N 108, 1 September 2008. http://www.robertschuman.org/doc/questions_europe/qe-108-en.pdf ((accessed on January 11, 2010)
31 For example the resolutions 1615 (2005), 1656, 1666 and 1716 (2006), 1781 and 1752 (2007), 1808
(2008), that all reaffirm " the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and
the territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally acknowledged borders".
28

11

in order to attend to its interests. The EUs deliberate neglect for direct involvement in conflict
management issues in Georgia, largely explained by its priority to support UN and OSCE
mediated peace process that made EUs role as modest as fundraiser, excluding any options to
act as a security actor. After the August conflict EU realized that its role as a conflict manager in
the world over the next few years depends on how it reacts to problems like post-war Georgia
faces.
One year after the August war, the EUs profile in Georgia has significantly strengthened. The
most visible consequence is the presence on the ground of the EU Monitoring Mission, (EUMM)
which aside from seeking to implement cease-fire agreements provides decision-makers in
Brussels with first-hand information about developments in the country.32 The EUMM is a
Common Security and Defense Policy operation, and thus more visible in the EUs political
structure. In addition, through the establishment of the EUMM the EU overcame self-imposed
limitations on its involvement in Georgia.
The war in Georgia changed the rate of EU activity toward the region, and especially towards
Georgia itself. The EU made several priorities in Georgia claiming deep commitment to further
assist Georgia in tackling its multiple challenges. But, according to Brussels, in order to succeed
with this assistance, Georgia also must deliver more with its commitments. Speaking at the
European Parliament on December 15, 2009 former EU commissioner for external relations,
Ferrero-Waldner laid out those three priority areas in which, she said, Georgia had to deliver
more- democratic reforms; demonstrating strategic patience towards its breakaway regions
and preparation for new EU-Georgia Association Agreement.33 EU also welcomed President
Saakashvili announcement about the new wave of democratic reforms, as well as his
statement that Georgias response to Russian aggression would be more democracy. The local
elections in May, 2010 will be a test of these commitments as these elections would be
important since Tbilisi mayor would be directly elected for the first time. This fact presents, a
major opportunity for Georgia to restore its citizens trust in the electoral process and one that
must be seized since the shortcomings of the electoral system remain a significant potential
source of political instability in Georgia.
Democratic reforms are among political conditions under which EU also gave up to EUR 500
million aid package to Georgia in three year time. Along with democratic reforms, there was
one more condition, envisaging that aid funds should not be spent for military purposes and
being distracted from implementing the political and economic reforms. 34 In addition, EU was
sparing no efforts to help Georgia to actively prepare for negotiations on EU-Georgia
Association Agreement in the context of Eastern Partnership. Preparations for establishing
Oscar Pardo Sierra. A point of no Return? Georgia and EU one year after the August War. CACI
Analyst August 19,2009
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5160http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5160 (accessed on
November 25, 2009)
33 Commissioner Outlines EU Georgia Priorities, Civil Georgia, 16 December, 2009
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21789 (accessed on November 22, 2009)
34 EU Georgia parliamentary cooperation committee, 11 th Meeting. 16-17 February 2009, Brussels
http://www.parliament.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=491&info_id=22852&lang_id=ENG (accessed on
October 20, 2009)
32

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new legal framework for EU-Georgia relations are proceeding quite well, with draft
negotiation directives for EU-Georgia Association Agreement already prepared. The draft
includes future establishment of deep and comprehensive trade area with Georgia and EU had
already provided Georgia with key recommendations for steps to be taken before EU could
judge whether the country was ready or not to embark on negotiations. In addition
negotiations on the working level on EU-Georgia visa facilitation and readmission agreements
were completed in November, 2009. Those agreements, which have yet to be approved, could
become a milestone in EU-Georgian partnership. As EU commissioner Ferrero Waldner said
We are offering to Georgia new opportunities but Georgia also has to help itself. If it takes
good decisions, we will then be there to help on every step of the way...EU could not give
everything to every county without them doing their part.35
Aftermath of the conflict EU is supporting Georgias stated policy of strategic patience, which
increasingly recognizes the need to maintain links with the breakaway regions without
restrictions in the interests of citizens. In this context EU supports Georgias ongoing efforts to
elaborate a strategy paper towards its two breakaway regions; however, EU remained
concerned about Georgias law on occupied territories. Reiterating EUs strong support for
Georgias territorial integrity, EU official policy is that isolation of the breakaway regions will not
help efforts for conflict resolution. On the contrary a smart policy of engagement with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia(Tskinvali region) is needed. EU was calling on Georgia to amend the
law in line with Venice Commissions36 recommendations as it believes that if too strictly
implemented the law may unnecessarily increase frictions with the separatist entities,
complicate delivery of humanitarian assistance and may impede economic relations.
At present EUs Georgia strategy is contentious. While, Georgia would like the European Union
and the international community to step up their involvement in the country's unresolved
conflicts, the European Unions own role in such an operation is uncertain as the European
Security and Defence Policy is not believed sufficiently developed to allow for large
peacekeeping commitments. From Georgian perspective the Unions engagement in the conflict
resolution process may extend at least as long as the EU mission (EUMM) is allowed inside of
disputed Georgian regions.37 Georgian government also makes no secret that a greater EU
presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskinvali region) should come at the expense of Russian
involvement. As it seems now some member states from old Europe are not ready for such
approach citing that that conflict resolution doesnt work without Russia or in confrontation to
Russia.
Unwilling to challenge Russia, EU still robustly supports Georgia's European aspirations, which
constitutes a step further in forging closer relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbors, at
both bilateral and multilateral level, taking into account the current political and economic
realities. The EUs desire for a regional multilateral cooperation framework complimentary to its
The Messenger. Georgia must deliver in three areas says outgoing EU Commissioner, December 18,
2009 p.2
36 Council of Europes advisory body for legal and constitutional issues(K.K)
37 Kakha Gogolashvili. The EU and Georgia: The Choice is in the Context; in Tigran Mkrtchyan,
Tabib Huseinov and Kakha Gogolashvili. The European Union and South Caucasus Three
perspectives on the future of the South Caucasus. Europe in Dialogue 2009/01. p. 105
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Eastern ENP, but one which unlike Black Sea Synergy(BSS)38 would be independent from the
Russian presence and would provide greater reform incentives to aspiring partners, was perhaps
the rationale behind the Joint Polish-Swedish proposal on Eastern Partnership. Introduction of
EaP and the EUs advancement in the region has been strongly welcomed by Georgia. Georgia is
an eager participant in the EaP since it allows official Tbilisi to advance its own reform project, to
disassociate itself from Russia and possibly to rally others to its cause. 39 However, a
Europeanization project in Georgia will probably lead to more tensions with Russia, and more
assertive Russian policies in the entire region. Less visible, but with more far-reaching
implications for the countrys future, is progress in the implementation of the ENP and the
prospects for deepening relations with the EU in the form of an Association Agreement in the
context of the EaP.
The Georgian leadership will also seek to further its long-term ambition of achieving closer
relations with the EU. Compared with other actors, the EU can offer added value, with its image
as an honest broker free from traditional US/Russia rivalries; access to a range of soft and
hard-power tools; and the lure of greater integration into Europe. 40However, ongoing
enlargement fatigue, and reservations about expanding into the post-Soviet space, means that
the EU is unlikely to offer Georgia a clear prospect of eventual membership.

Conclusion
The EUs capability for conflict management has developed immensely over the last decade. It is
not surprising, given both the historical and political context of the EU's security focus that its
institutions and processes are not yet fully adequate to cope with international security crises.
But as the EU proceeds with the significant reforms it has itself identified, it can do more to
ensure that ambitions and expectations are in step with its own potential and performance. The
EU distinguishes itself as to its construction of identity from most other actors on the
international scene in being largely driven by normative concerns and in relying on civilian rather
than military means of influence. The emphasis on norms and communitarian approaches
implies that the EU aims at setting standards and endeavors at impacting what is considered
appropriate and normal behavior in the sphere of international relations. This policy is exactly
the case in post conflict Georgia, where EU tries to use normative approach for conflict
management.
The EU developed programme with a number of concrete initiatives looking at areas like transport,
energy, the environment, maritime management, fisheries, migration, and the fight against organised
crime, the information society and cultural cooperation.
39 Dominic Fean. Making Good Use of the EU in Georgia: the Eastern Partnership and Conflict
Policy.IFRI, Russia/NIS Center, September, 2009.
http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/ifri_fean_EU_and_Georgia_ENG_sept2009.pdf (accessed on November
1, 2009)
40 Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EUs Role; International Crisis group. Report N173
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Georgia has demonstrated in recent years that there can exist in the South Caucasus a
functioning modern democratic state, one in which the economy can develop without
government interference and where corruption does not reign. But Georgia faces the secure
challenge of providing a secure environment consistent with democratic norms and principles of
good governance. Understanding this post-conflict Georgia is flooded with EU personnel and a
variety of EU civilian offices that are directly and routinely involved in agenda setting and policymaking. However, it seems that huge sums of EU funding have been expended in South
Caucasus and specifically in Georgia without much deep strategic policy thinking about what
peace and conflict resolution means in the region, how it relates to a political accommodation,
or how aid might contribute to stability and a sustainable end to conflict. Georgia demonstrates
a disconnect between EU rhetoric and policy implementation in a specific case.
Turning to EUs role, its important to note that the EU has generally resisted secessions as tool of
conflict management and notoriously conservative on this issues. By turning to law EU
Parliament firmly condemned the unilateral acknowledgment of independence of the two
Georgian regions, and acknowledged that EU-mediated six-point ceasefire plan is not fully
implemented and every time EU works with Russian federation this is issue always will be on
its agenda. At the same time, while expressing its continued commitment to Georgia's
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as to the principal of non-use of force,
the EU emphasized the importance of measures to further build confidence among the parties,
including through taking advantage of the agreed Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanisms (IPRM).
The Extension of ENP and EaP to Georgia significantly strengthened its position in the region.
Quick deployment of the EUMM, which is now the only international monitoring mission in
Georgia, is highly appreciated among political circles and in Georgian society; it has undoubtedly
increased the political profile and the visibility of the EU in the area. However EUs potential in
Georgia has not yet been fully realised. The EUs weak specifications of conflict-related
obligations, its cautious approach to the separatist entities and its excessive concern not to
trample on Russias toes may hinder EU effectiveness as a conflict manager. While Georgia
expects more support in political and security issues and would appreciate a more active
involvement of EU in conflict resolution, its rather doubtful regarding the EUs ability to contrast
Russia. Georgian public believes that worsened Russian-Georgian relations over a set of issues
should become concern for the evolution of EU-Russia relations. It is widely accepted that due to
the specific affiliation between EU and Russia in some cases EU can play greater role in conflict
management than other international actors involved in Georgia.
As the UN and OSCE has now withdrawn from Georgia and the Obama administration is less
directly engaged in supporting the Georgian government than its predecessor, the European
Union has a historic opportunity to lead international pressure for reform. Working in
partnership with the US administration, the EU has an opportunity to use the leverage created
by the economic crisis and the continued fall-out from the August 2008 conflict to significantly
improve human rights and standards of governance in Georgia. Over the longer term, it could

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move to a position of being the primary international partner for Georgia, supporting both its
reform process and its conflict management policy.
In the South Caucasus, Georgia now appears best placed to make use of EU goodwill, especially
in conflict resolution and facilitation of Russo-Georgian political dialogue. It is time for the EU to
understand that promoting EU values abroad is not about some magic magnetism, it is hard
work. Perhaps with the Lisbon Treaty ratified, the EU will be able to mobilize itself for more
ambitious policies in the neighborhood including conflict management. Unless the EU presents a
success story as a conflict manager, be it in Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan, it may find even
fewer believers in European ideas a few years down the road in the post-Soviet space.

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