Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This book thereby offers a unique and invaluable insight into the
activities of national civil servants in the EU, and uncovers some of
the secrets of this hidden world of EU governance.
9 789053 567975
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CONTENTS
chapter one:
STUDYING EUROCRATS AT WORK 13
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
chapter two:
TOWARD A EUROPEANISED CIVIL SERVICE?
A SURVEY STUDY 31
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
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chapter three:
EUROCRATIC WORK AS STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR: MOVING
BEFORE THE COMMISSION DOES IN VETERINARY POLICY 51
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
chapter four:
GETTING THINGS DONE IN EUROPEAN POLICE
CO-OPERATION 77
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
chapter five:
BRIDGE BUILDERS OR BRIDGEHEADS IN BRUSSELS?
THE WORLD OF SECONDED NATIONAL EXPERTS 103
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
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chapter six:
UNDERSTANDING EUROCRATIC WORK:
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 129
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
Appendix
151
Notes 153
Bibliography 161
About the authors
Index
173
171
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tables
Table 1.1
18
Table 2.1
Table 2.2
Table 2.3
Table 2.4
33
35
35
Table 2.5
Table 2.6
Table 2.7
Table 2.8
Table 2.9
Table 2.10
37
38
39
40
43
46
47
Table 4.1
100
Table 5.1
Table 5.2
Table 5.3
Table 5.4
108
110
112
115
Table 5.5
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125
132
figures:
Figure 2.1. Time spent on EU-related activities by civil servants
whose work is affected by the EU
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The researchers would like to thank a number of people for their support
during the process of doing this study. First, we would like to thank the
Dutch Ministry of the Interior (BZK) for its financial support and the members of the supervisory group for their comments and suggestions during
our discussions in The Hague. We would like to extend our particular
thanks to Tanja Timmermans, who was our contact at the Ministry and
helped us contact the right people on several occasions, and to Daphne de
Groot, who took over this role during the final stages of the process.
We would like to thank Andr Dickmann for his generous offer to include a number of questions in the large-scale POMO survey that he coordinated for the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, his expertise was of
great help in further developing the survey questions and analysing the
survey data. Melchior Bus opened doors to EU co-ordinators in various ministries to identify and contact potential participants for the expert meetings
we held. Commissioner Anita Hazenberg generously provided us with an
extensive briefing about who is who in the Dutch community of policemen
and policy bureaucrats working on European police co-operation. Guido
van Os offered much needed assistance in transcribing the expert meeting
discussions.
Drafts of some of the chapters of this report were commented on by
fellow scholars. In particular, we would like to thank Mirko Noordegraaf
(Utrecht University), Rod Rhodes (Australian National University), Dvora
Yanow (VU University of Amsterdam) and Jane Mansbridge (Harvard University) for useful feedback and advice.
Finally, our thanks go out to all those people who, either as interviewees
or as participants in the expert meetings, were willing to share their experiences and ideas with us. In particular, we would like to thank the people
who allowed us to shadow them in the hallways and meeting rooms of The
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Hague, Brussels and elsewhere as they went about their Eurocratic working days. These interviews and observation periods have been invaluable.
This study was conceived and conducted by the four of us. However, three
other individuals have made crucial contributions to parts of it. Our co-author on chapter 3 was Ellen Mastenbroek of Radboud University, Nijmegen.
And chapter 5 was written entirely by Semin Suvarierol of Utrecht University and Caspar van den Berg of Leiden University as a standalone project
which fitted into the overall framework of this study perfectly and its findings are therefore included in this book. We are grateful for their pivotal
contributions to this book.
Karin Geuijen, Paul t Hart, Sebastiaan Princen, Kutsal Yesilkagit
Utrecht and Canberra, November 2007
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CHAPTER 1
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tions to be answered, detail and justify the methods used to answer them,
and draw the outlines of the subsequent empirical chapters.
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dilemmas inherent in the practices of domestic civil servants in EU governance, which inform the central questions of this study.
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the two world wars, the main challenge to traditional diplomacy came from
economists, who were placed in embassies to deal with the growing importance of international economic policy co-ordination (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 169-170 and 203-204). Since then, the international agenda
has come to encompass a wide range of issues that in earlier times were
thought to be domestic in scope, such as environmental policy, social policy
and health policy. This has undermined one of the basic assumptions underlying the diplomatic model, that is, the separation between foreign and
domestic policy. Furthermore, it has led to a proliferation of direct contacts
between policy-specific departments in different countries, which Berridge
(2002: 15) has described as direct-dial diplomacy.
Other authors (e.g., Coolsaet 1998) identify the rise of multilateralism as
the driving force behind the rise of a new type of diplomat. Since multilateral forums typically deal with specific issues, countries tend to staff them
with specialists in those areas who, moreover, often report directly to a policy-specific department rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kennan
1997: 207). Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the EU, which has established a plethora of specific forums to deal with almost every conceivable
policy area.
This way of organising a countrys international representation can be
seen as a shift toward a new model of international representation. In its
purest form, this model has quite a different set of characteristics than the
classic model. To begin with, international representation is seen as an integral part of a policy area, and the main claim to professional knowledge is related to substantive technical expertise rather than diplomatic expertise. As
a result, a country is represented by environmental civil servants in talks and
negotiations on international environmental policies or by criminal justice
experts in international crime policies. Second, the governments external
representation is not organised in a single hierarchical system. There is no
single foreign office that co-ordinates all of the external relations. Rather,
governmental representatives report directly to their own department and
have little to do with representatives from other departments. Insofar as coordination among them takes place, this only occurs through the mechanisms that are available for domestic policy co-ordination, not through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Coolsaet (1998: 21) notes, this development
gives the current diplomatic structure and organisation a cobweb character,
without main threads as it seems. Finally, the new model is not primarily
based on bilateral diplomatic relations but on a combination of bilateral and
multilateral relations, in which the emphasis often lies on the latter.
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Classic model
New model
Role of diplomatic
professionalism
Diplomacy as a distinct
profession
Diplomacy as aspect of
policy-specific
professionalism
Organisation of
diplomatic service
Hierarchical in a
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Non-hierarchical,
reporting to specialised
departments
Main type of
diplomatic relations
Bilateral
Multitude of government
agencies with functional
specialisations
Distinction between
foreign policy and
domestic policy
Clear separation
between foreign and
domestic policy
No separation between
foreign and domestic
policy
Characteristics:
Assumptions:
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missions expert groups, comitology committees and the Councils working parties is difficult to assess, since some groups may be dormant while
others do not appear in official overviews. Wessels and Rometsch (1996:
331) estimate that approximately 25,000 national officials were involved in
Council and Commission working groups in 1994. Drawing on a Commission overview from 2004, Brandsma (2006) counted some 1,090 expert
groups, excluding subgroups and working groups within these expert
groups. Moreover, the number of Council working parties is estimated at
some 160, while the number of comitology committees, in which member
state representatives monitor the implementation of EU law by the European Commission, stands at approximately 320. Most of these groups are
typically attended by lower-ranking civil servants who are specialists in their
policy field or on a specific policy issue. In addition to departmental civil servants, these groups may also include representatives from independent
agencies in the member states.
The most systematic data on participation in EU policy-making by domestic civil servants can be found in surveys conducted in the Nordic countries. In a survey among officials from ministries and directorates in Norway, not even an EU member state, approximately 45% of respondents
(both in ministries and in directorates) indicated that they were affected to
some extent or more by the EU and/or the EEA Agreement (to which Norway is a party). In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this was as high as 61%
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999: 135). Although the impact does not imply that
an official is active within the EU, the figure does attest to the importance of
the EU for domestic civil servants.
In a survey among governmental units in Norway, Iceland, Sweden and
Finland (two EU members and two non-members), Lgreid et al. (2004) report figures concerning the perceived impact of the EU and the countries
contacts with EU institutions and their participation in EU committees.
The number of respondents who perceive the overall consequences of
EU/EEA policies and regulations on their department to be fairly large/
very large ranges between 31% (for Norway) and 64% (for Iceland), with
57% for both Sweden and Finland. In terms of actual contacts, their results
show that most of their contacts are with the Commission (a high of 43% of
respondents in Sweden), while participation in EU committees ranges
from between 7% (for comitology committees among Finnish respondents) and 26% (for Commission expert committees, again among Finnish
respondents). These figures probably overestimate the levels of contact
since the survey was conducted among the EU specialists of each govern-
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mental unit. Still, they indicate the wide range of officials within those
countries governments who are active in EU policy-making.
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mats (in both models) is characterised by a great deal of discretion and autonomy. Diplomats typically operate in the international arena with relatively little direct control from hierarchical superiors (cf. Coolsaet 1998: 20).
There are three reasons for this. First, the work of diplomats often requires
specific expertise, which makes it difficult for others than the diplomat
properly to assess the processes and outcomes that take place in the international arena. Second, hierarchical superiors often concentrate their scarce
time and resources on a limited number of salient issues. Since expertisedriven international policy issues are normally not high on the domestic
administrative and political agenda, hierarchical superiors may take a fire
alarm approach to the work of diplomats, only interfering when problems
arise (cf. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Third, in their interaction with
colleagues from other states, diplomats form networks that they can use to
strengthen their position vis--vis their hierarchical superiors. In domestic
settings, they are able to point to an international consensus which they
can use to reinforce claims at home (cf. Haass analysis of epistemic communities; Haas 1989; 1992). Moreover, since decisions are made in international networks, the work of diplomats suffers from what scholars of public accountability have called the problem of the many hands, meaning
that many people contribute to a single outcome and individual contributions are difficult to distinguish; it is almost impossible to find one single
person responsible for any one outcome (Bovens 1998: 45-52).
In the classic diplomatic service, the tension between autonomy and control is mediated by a range of organisational instruments that are set in
place to establish accountability relationships between individual diplomats and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomats receive instructions
and mandates from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while they are also required to report back to the Ministry on their activities, which allows the
Ministry to keep tabs on what diplomats are doing abroad. Moreover, diplomatic services exhibit a strong esprit de corps, nurtured by the organisational characteristics discussed above, such as diplomacy as a life-long career, the practice of diplomats entering the service at the lowest levels and
working their way up from there, as well as training programmes specifically designed for newly recruited diplomats. These unifying mechanisms are
much more difficult to establish for the heterogeneous and dispersed set of
civil servants that represent states in the new model of diplomacy. Therefore, an important question is how governments deal with the tension between the autonomy that is inherent in diplomatic work and their desire to
exert a degree of control over the people who represent them abroad.
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In addition to the tension between autonomy and control, both traditional and new diplomats have to deal with a range of dilemmas arising from
their positions as intermediaries between the domestic bureaucracy and
their international counterparts. These intermediary positions may expose
diplomats to opposite claims from the two sides as well as to conflicting
loyalties and different senses of belonging. In diplomatic services, one way
to prevent diplomats from going native is to establish a system of continuously changing jobs, in which diplomats typically spend only a few years at
one and the same foreign post and are assigned posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself every so many years so they stay in touch with their home
country. For non-professional diplomats, the situation may be somewhat
different, since they typically commute between their home department
and international forums. At the same time, this may result in new forms of
split loyalties, as civil servants continually have to move back and forth between their national and their European roles (Thedvall 2007).
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1.5 Methods
The questions we seek to answer are multifaceted and include both quantitative and qualitative elements. Thus, in answering them we employed a
combination of research designs and data-gathering methods. This allowed
us to tap into several sources of potentially relevant information and to capture a wide range of perspectives on the pertinent issues.
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responsibilities, which enabled us to compare two different Dutch civil service organisations operating within one and the same European domain.
At the same time, the two cases sharply contrast in terms of the timing
and degree of Europeanisation of regulatory and policy activity. Veterinary
policy is a longstanding EU (and international) policy field, in which participants have been meeting regularly and for prolonged periods of time, and
which operates according to well-established and formalised operating procedures. Police co-operation, by contrast, is a relatively novel policy area
within the EU, which is in the development stages and operates under
much less fixed and formalised operating procedures. In institutional
terms, the two areas differ because veterinary policy forms part of the EUs
First Pillar, in which the Commission and the European Parliament play an
important role, while police co-operation is part of the Third Pillar, which relies much more on co-operation between member states with a weaker role
for the supranational EU institutions.
Although this limited comparison can obviously not aspire to the formation of a foundation of empirical generalisations, the contrast between the
two cases does enable us to shed some light on possible differences between
civil service work in more and less developed governance regimes in the
EU. At the European level, the issue in this context is whether Europeanised
civil service practices differ across the various governance regimes (the pillars) that the EU harbours. Within the Dutch civil service, the two cases allow us to analyse whether Dutch government organisations that have been
dealing with the EU for decades employ different work methods than those
whose involvement is more recent.
In order to capture the variety of activities and perspectives in each of the
two cases, we opted for a methodological triangulation approach that included three distinct methods. To begin with, we conducted structured, thematic interviews with 49 middle-ranking and top officials in the two policy
sectors. These officials worked for four different ministries, their associated
executive agencies and the Dutch Permanent Representation in the EU in
Brussels. We asked them about their experiences in doing European policy-making (and, to a lesser extent, policy implementation) in The Hague, in
Brussels, and anywhere else their jobs took them. The interviews were
recorded on tape and later transcribed. All interviewees agreed to be cited by
name, but we have generally refrained from doing so unless the quotations
were clearly recognisable as coming from a particular person. Likewise, interviews were conducted with 28 current and former SNEs in order to gain a
more nuanced and in-depth understanding of their activities and roles.
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Furthermore, we engaged in non-participant observation of the EU-related work routines of officials in different parts of the Dutch police, the
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature and Food Quality and the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. We attended a total of 16 meetings and/or visited relevant organisations to observe how EU-related activities take place and how the participants engage in those activities. We shadowed the officials involved as they
went about their jobs preparing for and participating in European meetings, mostly for one but sometimes for several full days. Shadowing
amounted to a mix of non-participant observation and seizing the opportunities offered by joint travel, breaks and lunches to have more informal discussions with both the people to be shadowed and the people they interacted with. This gave us the opportunity to understand the world of Dutch
Eurocrats as they themselves experienced it, at least more so than any other
of the research methods used were able to. Detailed notes were kept during
or immediately after the observation periods in order to document observations and impressions.
Finally, after completing all this and having drawn preliminary conclusions on the basis of the survey and the two case studies, we conducted five
expert meetings with middle-ranking and top-level officials from throughout the Dutch government, to check on the broader salience of these initial
findings. These meetings of experts were designed to further deepen our insights about what it means to be, and organise, national Eurocrats. A total
of 27 officials participated in these sessions, which lasted 2.5 hours each.
Each session was taped and transcribed.
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ground for the more specific, in-depth analyses of the subsequent chapters.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the results of the two case studies we conducted
in the fields of veterinary policy and police co-operation, respectively. Chapter 3 focuses on veterinary policy. In their daily policy work, the actions of
Europeanised civil servants are to a large extent directed towards translating
their departments interests into EU policies. This chapter describes how
Dutch veterinary policy Eurocrats derive and upload their national preferences to the European policy process (Brzel 2002). Through extensive interviews with civil servants from the Ministry of Agriculture and subordinate agencies we were able to detect three alternative strategies that
Eurocrats from this department regularly employ: frontloading, signalling
and coalition formation.
Signalling consists of targeting Commission officials who are working
on a given policy dossier and conveying the preferences of the national government on that dossier. Frontloading moves one step further, as member
state civil servants try to become actively involved in preparing EU policy
proposals. Coalition formation is used to influence debates in committees
and working groups. This chapter will also show how these strategies are
employed and how the decisions for one or another strategy are made.
The chapter focuses on a phase within the EU policy process that has
hitherto received scant attention, but which is pivotal to any member state
for which the upload of its own preferences is a strategic priority. It zooms in
on one particular aspect of EU policy work: the manoeuvring that takes
place during the early stages of the policy-making process in First Pillar settings, e.g., when the Commission is considering formulating a proposal.
Secondly, we differ from the mainstream studies on uploading in that we
focus on the strategic behaviour of individual civil servants and ministries
instead of aggregated member states or European institutions (Scharpf
1997) whose parts may in fact harbour their own perceptions and pursue
their own interests.
In chapter 4, we study Dutch Eurocrats in the field of European police cooperation in order to understand the worlds they work in, and the ways in
which they define and do their work. We identify three quite distinct logics
of Eurocratic work, i.e., different ways of operating in different European
arenas. The first logic encompasses that of the bureaucrat-diplomats at the
ministries as well as in working groups and committees in Brussels who
bargain in the area of national positions. The second is that of street-level
entrepreneurs who build transnational coalitions of the willing as they are
confronted with transnational crime. The third and last logic of Eurocratic
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work is that of departmental co-ordinators focused on ensuring that the machinery of the domestic preparation of EU policy processes continues to
function smoothly. Because these three types of civil servants work via different European action channels, the demands imposed on them and the
way that their work is organisationally embedded and facilitated are very different.
Chapter 5, which is co-authored by Caspar van den Berg and Semin Suvarierol, looks at one specific type of national civil servant in the EU: seconded national experts (SNEs). The duality of national and European roles is
perhaps the most profound for them since they are practically torn between
two employers: their daily employer under whose supervision they work
(the Commission) and the national employer who sent them on the secondment and continues to pay their salaries (the member state). Other than
these atypical terms of employment, SNEs also form a particular group of
European civil servants in terms of their position at a crossing point of
European and national governance at the micro-level. This chapter asks if
SNEs build bridges between the Commission and the member state or
whether they act as national bridgeheads in the supranational Commission
arena through their (transnational) networks. This chapter addresses how
SNEs use their networks during and after their secondment and assesses
the extent to which the SNEs and the Dutch government benefit from the
secondment period in terms of exchange of information and career development.
Chapter 6 finally assembles the argument and formulates a number of
conclusions based on the books general themes.
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CHAPTER 2
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Services, and Prison Services. From this group of some 90,000 civil servants, a random sample of 10,000 respondents was drawn. The survey
could be completed on paper or online. In the end, 4,502 civil servants responded, yielding a response rate of 45%.
The questions focused on producing an overall picture of EU involvement among civil servants as well as the organisational management of and
support for EU-related job activities. To get these results, respondents were
first asked to indicate if their work was affected by the EU. To emphasise the
effects of the EU on their work (rather than their organisation, policy sector
or policies in general), the question referred to a list of eight types of EU-related activities that we discerned. This list was deliberately broad, ranging
from participation in Commission expert groups or Council working parties to the transposition and enforcement of EU law and activities that involve taking into account EU law and policies when working on national
policies. In this way, an inclusive assessment could be made of the extent
and variety of EU-related activities within the Dutch national government.
After this preliminary filter, respondents were then asked to indicate how
important each of the eight types of activities were in their work, using a
five-point scale from totally unimportant to very important. Respondents
then had to indicate how many hours per week on average they spent on
these EU-related activities. This allowed us to assess not only the number of
civil servants working on EU-related activities but also the amount of time
spent on these activities.
Finally, respondents were presented with six statements on the way their
organisations managed and facilitated EU-related activities. Three of the
statements were related to issues of personnel management: training opportunities, the selection of personnel for EU-related activities, and
whether or not working on the EU is beneficial for ones career. The three
other statements related to the policy management of EU-related work: the
clarity of the mandate that civil servants receive when they go to EU meetings, the priority accorded to EU-related activities in the organisation, and
the co-ordination between policymakers and implementers when it comes
to EU policies. For each statement, respondents could indicate to what
degree they agreed on a five-point scale, from I do not agree at all to I totally agree.
What follows are the results of this survey, starting with the individual
level of EU involvement, and then proceeding to the organisational embeddedness and facilitation of those activities. On the basis of these results, we
can draw a number of overall conclusions about Dutch national Eurocrats,
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which form a general background to the more specific and detailed qualitative analyses of chapters 3 and 4.
EU involvement
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
No
3066
68.1%
69.8%
Yes
1329
29.5%
30.2%
Valid total
4395
97.6%
100.0%
Missing
107
2.4%
Total
4502
100.0%
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It is difficult to say whether 30% is a high or a low figure, because comparable data for other countries are scarce. In a survey among Norwegian civil
servants, Egeberg and Trondal (1999) found that 45% of civil servants working at domestic ministries were affected to some extent or more by the EU,
compared to 44% at agencies and 61% at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3
Likewise, an earlier study by Wessels (1997: 281) estimated that some 40%
of higher (i.e., policy-making) German civil servants were directly, i.e., by
their presence in Brussels, involved in one segment or other of EU policy
cycles as part of their everyday duties. In a comparative study covering four
Nordic countries, Lgreid et al. (2004) reported figures ranging from 31%
(Norway) to 57% (Finland and Sweden) and a high of 64% (Iceland) of respondents who thought that the overall consequences of the EU on their
policy area were fairly large or very large.
These figures are generally higher than the ones we found in our survey,
but in these other surveys, either the wording of the question or the sampling method differed from our study. When it comes to wording, Lgreid
et al. (2004) asked respondents whether EU policies and regulations affected their policy area, while we asked specifically about the respondents jobs.
In terms of samples, the Nordic surveys included either the EU specialists
of departmental units (Lgreid et al. 2004) or only officials in positions requiring a university degree (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Wesselss estimate, which is not based on a formal survey, also refers to higher level civil
servants in the German government. This normally leads to higher figures
compared to our sample, which was drawn from all employees, including
support staff not directly involved in policy-related work.
We can increase the comparability of our figures with those reported by
Wessels and Egeberg and Trondal by distinguishing the types of jobs and
the educational levels completed by the respondents. Table 2.2 presents the
figures for EU involvement broken down by job type, which respondents
noted in another part of the POMO survey.
Table 2.2 shows that civil servants involved in policy preparation score highest when it comes to EU involvement at 47%, while those involved in secretarial and support jobs score below 20%. Overall, the figures for civil servants involved in policy-related jobs (policy preparation, oversight,
management and policy implementation) hover around the 40% that
was also noted by both Wessels and Egeberg and Trondal.
Table 2.3 presents EU involvement broken down by the level of education
completed by a respondent (also a question that was included in another
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Job type
Pagina 35
Involved in
EU-related work
Total number of
respondents
Percent
Frequency
Frequency
Policy preparation
47%
270
581
Oversight
43%
282
660
Management
37%
186
498
Research
35%
71
201
Policy implementation
30%
224
749
Secretariat
18%
49
275
Support
17%
144
829
Other
17%
92
558
Total
30%
1318
4351
part of the survey). This table shows a close association between educational level and EU involvement, with 46% of those holding university degrees
being involved in EU-related work. Again, this comes close to the figures
reported by both Wessels and Egeberg and Trondal, which suggests that the
levels of EU involvement found in the Dutch government is quite similar
to figures found in Norway and Germany in the 1990s.
Educational
Level
Involved in
EU-related work
Total number of
respondents
Percent
Frequency
Frequency
19%
44
237
General secondary
education
25%
297
1210
26%
473
1813
University degree
46%
506
1092
Total
30%
1320
4352
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Being involved in EU-related work is one thing, spending time on EU-related activities is quite another. This point is illustrated by figure 2.1, which
shows the average weekly number of hours spent on EU-related activities by
respondents whose work was affected by the EU.
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
0
9 10 12 15 16 18 20 22 24 25 27 28 30 31 32 33 34 36 38 40
Figure 2.1 Time spent on EU-related activities by civil servants whose work is affected by the
EU (N=1244)
Within the group of civil servants whose work is affected by the EU, the vast
majority spends relatively little time on EU-related activities. A bit more
than half of all civil servants spend two hours or less a week on EU-related
activities, and almost 75% spend less than 10 hours. On the other side of the
spectrum, there are peaks at 30 hours, 36 hours and 40 hours. The latter two
presumably reflect a full working week for those respondents, making
them the true Eurocrats.4 In terms of all the respondents (including those
whose work is not affected by the EU), they comprise some 3% of the Dutch
civil services.
The mean time spent on EU-related activities among civil servants whose
work is affected by the EU is 7.81 hours per week. This figure is biased, how-
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Share of contract
time spent on EU
Frequency
918
73.9%
25-50%
113
9.1%
50-75%
76
6.1%
135
10.9%
Total
1242
100%
Table 2.4 Time share of EU-related work among civil servants whose work is affected by the
EU (N=1242)
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EU-related activities
Important
Percents
Implementation
67%
Frequency
Unimportant
Percents
Total
Frequency
852
33%
417
1269
51%
640
49%
619
1259
Transposition
44%
555
56%
701
1256
Bilateral consultation
33%
420
67%
843
1263
Preparation of negotiations
33%
417
67%
853
1270
25%
317
75%
940
1257
25%
309
75%
947
1256
17%
211
83%
1048
1259
Table 2.5 Importance of specific EU-related activities among civil servants whose work is
affected by the EU
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EU-related activities
Component
1
Dutch input into
EU policy-making
2
Implementation of
EU law and policies
.930
Preparation of EU meetings
.920
Bilateral contacts
.878
.878
.624
.498
.453
Transposition
.455
.581
Enforcement
.904
Table 2.6 Factor loading of specific EU-related activities on the two extracted components
(factor loading shown if they are greater than .4; the total explained variance is 73%).
Table 2.6 shows that the principal component analysis yields two such clusters (called components).7 The figures in the table show how strongly each
of the activities is correlated with these two components (the so-called factor loading of each activity). The closer a factor loading is to 1, the stronger
an activity is related to that component. Factor loadings have only been indicated if they are greater than .4.
The first component includes all specific activities except enforcement.
Bottom-up activities score highest on this component, while transposition
scores lower on this component than on the second. As this component
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refers mostly to the Dutch input into EU policy-making, we labelled it accordingly. The second component consists of enforcement, transposition
and taking into account EU policies when developing domestic policies,
although the latter activity scores higher on the first component. These are
activities that all relate to the top-down activities of implementing EU law
and policy.
Hence, civil servants tend to specialise to some degree in one of the two
types of activity. At the same time, component 1 shows that all specific activities, with the exception of enforcement, are clustered to a considerable
extent. Specialisation is therefore not absolute there is no sharp division
between the activities but is a matter of emphasis within a wider set of
activities.
A closer look at pairs of specific activities reveals that there is in fact a consistent pattern in the relations between them. Table 2.7 illustrates this well;
it shows the relationship between participation in both Council and Commission working groups.8 The columns show the percentages of respondents who find participation in Commission Working Groups unimportant
and important, respectively. The rows indicate how many respondents find
Participation in
Commission
Working Groups
Total
Unimportant Important
% within Council
Participation Unimportant Working Groups
in Council
Working
% within Commission
Groups
Working Groups
Important
% within Council
Working Groups
87.0%
13.0%
1039
96.7%
43.7%
14.8%
85.2%
210
Total
% within Commission
Working Groups
3.3%
57.0%
Count
935
314
1249
Table 2.7 Cross table between Importance of participation in Council Working Groups and
Importance of participation in Commission Working Groups, based on the dichotomous variables for each (N=1249)
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Organisation
Pagina 43
Ministry of Agriculture
61%
8.0
0.47
276
56%
4.0
0.32
113
52%
3.0
0.35
111
52%
4.0
0.34
115
38%
1.5
0.27
114
37%
2.0
0.31
167
Ministry of Finance
37%
4.0
0.33
100
Immigration Service
34%
2.0
0.22
101
Ministry of Health
33%
2.0
0.35
141
Tax Department
31%
4.0
0.34
1237
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Housing
31%
2.0
0.32
340
30%
2.0
0.25
86
25%
1.0
(0.49)
52
Ministry of Education
18%
2.0
0.38
116
Ministry of Justice
17%
1.0
0.16
687
17%
1.0
(1.00)
12
Prison Services
11%
0.0
0.10
554
Other
39%
2.0
0.28
66
Total
30%
2.0
0.31
4388
Table 2.8 EU involvement, median time spent and dispersion index by government organisation (N=4388)
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Three of the statements related to personnel management (training opportunities, selection criteria for EU-related jobs, and career prospects for people working on the EU), while the other three covered issues of policy management (the clarity of mandates for EU meetings, the priority given to
EU-related work, and the co-ordination between policymakers and policy
implementers).
Statement
Training
Completely
disagree
8%
Largely
disagree
18%
Neither agree
nor disagree
27%
Largely
agree
35%
Completely N
agree
12%
810
Selection
9%
16%
43%
28%
4%
661
Career
15%
15%
32%
28%
10%
772
Mandate
11%
14%
44%
22%
9%
504
Priority
20%
32%
28%
14%
6%
802
Co-ordination
9%
19%
37%
27%
8%
668
These overall results show a mildly positive response to all of the statements, bearing in mind that the statement on priority was formulated in a
negative way so that disagree becomes a positive response. How, then, do
responses vary among survey participants?
On the individual level, we can look at the correlation between the responses to the six statements and the amount of time respondents spend on
EU-related activities. As it turns out, all of these correlations are negative,
ranging from -.3 to -.4, and are thus highly significant.16 Hence, the more respondents are involved in EU-related work, the less positive they are about
both personnel and policy management in their organisation. The only exception is the statement on priority because the more time respondents
spend on EU-related activities, the more positive they are about the priority
given to EU-related work. Still, overall, personnel and policy management
were judged most positively by respondents for whom EU-related work is
only a small part of their job.
This does not imply that organisations with relatively high levels of EU
involvement are also judged more negatively by their employees. Quite the
contrary, table 2.10 shows that respondents are generally more positive the
more Europeanised their organisations are. In table 2.10, we distinguish
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between the three types of organisation that we discussed above. For each
statement, the do not agree and do not agree at all categories have been
combined under the category disagree, while the original answers agree
and totally agree are combined under the agree category.
Statement
Type of organisation
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Training
National champions
37%
21%
42%
83
Eurocratic runners-up
25%
28%
47%
465
Eurocratic bulwarks
24%
28%
48%
260
Selection
Career
Mandate
Priority
Co-ordination
National champions
33%
31%
36%
64
Eurocratic runners-up
25%
47%
28%
374
Eurocratic bulwarks
24%
39%
38%
221
National champions
38%
23%
38%
73
Eurocratic runners-up
33%
35%
32%
449
Eurocratic bulwarks
25%
29%
46%
248
National champions
26%
38%
36%
47
Eurocratic runners-up
27%
50%
23%
279
Eurocratic bulwarks
22%
36%
42%
176
National champions
39%
34%
27%
82
Eurocratic runners-up
49%
30%
21%
454
Eurocratic bulwarks
62%
24%
14%
264
National champions
31%
36%
34%
59
Eurocratic runners-up
28%
42%
30%
386
Eurocratic bulwarks
28%
37%
43%
221
Table 2.10 Responses to the six statements by respondents in the three types of organisations
The statement on training does not reveal any major differences, although
respondents from national champions tend to agree a bit less often than respondents in Eurocratic runners-up and Eurocratic bulwarks. For the other
five statements, respondents in Eurocratic bulwarks are consistently more
positive than respondents in the other two types of organisation, again bearing in mind that disagree is a positive answer when it comes to the statement on the priority given to EU-related work. The negative responses
(disagree for most statements, and agree for the statement on priority),
show the same pattern, but with smaller differences.
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tend to correlate with both higher median numbers of hours spent on EUrelated activities and a wider dispersion of EU-related work among civil servants. Therefore, EU-related work on all counts tends to be much closer to
the core of what organisations are doing when the work of more people in
these organisations is affected by the EU.
These differences are also reflected in the way organisations manage and
facilitate EU-related work. Respondents in organisations with high levels of
EU involvement are more positive about the way EU-related activities are integrated in personnel management as well as the way EU policy processes
are managed.
Overall, then, our findings suggest that there is a virtuous spiral of Europeanisation in Dutch central government organisations: the more civil servants are involved in EU-related work, the better it is managed and facilitated. This, one may assume, will in turn lead to a greater awareness of EUrelated activities within the organisation and hence greater EU involvement. The findings also suggest that there may be a critical threshold for this
effect to occur. Our data show small differences between moderately and
weakly Europeanised organisations, but a strong difference between highly
Europeanised organisations (which we called Eurocratic bulwarks) and
the rest. In our survey, the threshold lies at approximately 50% of civil servants being involved in EU-related work. This specific figure may be a result
of characteristics of the Dutch national government or of the organisations
that were included in our survey. In general, however, this type of threshold
effect may well be present in other EU-member states and other parts of
government as well.
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CHAPTER 3
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The strategic interaction with other Eurocrats is part and parcel of a civil servants work, which includes colleagues from other member countries, their
superiors at their home departments, and the officials of the Commission
and the Secretariat of the Council. Getting things done in Europe entails a
strategic effort to produce timely, coherent and sensible national policy positions, and to build support for these at the European level. Thus, the work
of most individual Eurocrats is embedded in two arenas of strategic interaction: departmental and interdepartmental preparation and the co-ordination arenas at the national level; and Commission and Council Secretariat
counterparts and arenas at the European level. Hence we examine the work
of departmental Eurocrats in terms of strategic manoeuvring within and
between those arenas. We look at how they are instructed and guided by
their superiors, how they give and receive feedback and how they are held
accountable for and render account for their actions.
We are not concerned with covering the role and various behaviour
patterns of Eurocrats during the full policy cycle. Our focus is limited to a
specific phase therein, i.e., the pre-proposal phase, which we will elaborate
upon below. This chapter is therefore situated within the broader category
of uploading studies (Brzel 2002), e.g., the process of advocating departmental preferences, transforming these into national positions, and introducing these at the various EU levels during the policy development phase.
Obviously, policy development in the real world does not stop at this particular stage, and the politics of policy formulation continues into the implementation phase. Once a policy package has arrived at the comitology stage,
the representatives of member states within the management boards of the
committees will continue to bend and shape the process and output of the
policies agreed upon to fit these into their national preferences (Brandsma
2006).
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launch new policy ideas, and draft and submit proposals to the Council and
European Parliament. National governments have strong incentives to
monitor the Commission services so that when the early signs of action are
detected the interested departments at home can be alerted and begin to
take steps to decide a policy (Kassim 2001: 16). Remarkably, however, there
is scant attention within the academic literature to the strategies member
state governments employ during the proposal formation (or pre-proposal)
stage. The majority of studies on the European policy process focus on the
formal structures of national position co-ordination after the Commission
has launched its position (Kassim et al. 2001, 2003) or deal exclusively with
the decision-making process at the supranational level (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Thomson et al. 2006).
Secondly, our study of pre-proposal phase uploading is unique in that we
focus on the strategic behaviour of individual civil servants and ministries.
Existing studies focus on member states or European institutions as aggregate actors, examining their strategies. Although, for example, Brzel
(2002) acknowledges that the uploading strategies (which she labelled as
pace-setting, foot-dragging, and fence-sitting) may vary from policy sector to policy sector, her model addresses the strategy choices of member
states at an aggregate level. One notable exception is the work of Schneider
and Baltz (2005). They examine the discretionary powers of national governments in the preparatory stage of European legislation, but their focus
rests exclusively on the strategic interactions between ministries and domestic interest groups in the formulation of the national position.
Whilst useful in its own right, the aggregate approach only goes so far (cf.
Scharpf 1997). Given the high degree of sectoralisation of European policymaking it is rather a bold assumption to treat member states as unitary actors. Clearly, each of these aggregate actors is composed of other actors
which have a certain capacity to act autonomously based on their own interests and perceptions. A series of Scandinavia-based studies has addressed
individual civil servants, but the focus of these studies has been on the roles
of individual officials role orientations and conceptions within Europeanised arenas, such as the committees and working groups of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, and not on their actual
roles in uploading and other strategic interactions in the EU policy process
(Beyers 2005; Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2002;
Trondal and Veggeland 2003). In fact, by all accounts, the EU-lobbying behaviour of national civil servants is relatively understudied when compared
to private interest groups (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Van Schendelen
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1998, 2006; Coen 1998; Woll 2006). The remainder of this chapter therefore explores the types of strategic instruments national ministries employ
and individual civil servants apply when they upload.
Uploading is a strategy aimed at ensuring that a member states status
quo within a given policy area is left untouched as much as possible. When
successful, it can be highly beneficial to member states, at least from an opportunity-costs perspective. It can be an effective strategy to maximise the
benefits and to minimise the costs of European policies because the more
a European policy fits the domestic context, the lower the adaptation costs in
the implementation process (Brzel 2002: 196). What is at stake are the
member states existing or preferred modes of governance. For example,
the Dutch approach to hygiene inspections in slaughterhouses, which is
self-regulation by the business sector, contrasts sharply with the more public and state-directed approaches such as in Italy. Which country should
adapt to the other countrys national system? Who will bear the costs?
Making EU policy on any given subject forges a confluence of hitherto divergent national modes of governance. Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999:
271) have noted that:
EC decision making does not start in a vacuum, but in a setting of varying national modes of governance. And precisely because the EC is
still in its formative phase, the actors are struggling to introduce what
they consider to be the most appropriate mode of governance The
negotiation of Community policies is always a competition about
modes of governance.
In this setting, member states are in (latent) competition regarding the best
models of integration. The conflicts are partly ideological, in some areas,
pitting liberals against pro-interventionists. But they may also derive something from the different potential consequences of (negative or positive
co-ordination) policies for the various member states, and in particular, specific policy sectors and interest groups within them (Hix 2002: 215).
Given these stakes, all stakeholders face the tactical question of when and
where to upload. The ideal timing of uploading policy preferences, according to Kassim, is before the Commission has considered it [an issue] or before it has drafted a text (Kassim 2001: 16). In formal EU legislative process
terms, this is the stage just before the Commission releases a green or white
paper on a topic and instigates consultations for new legislation or initiates
a legislative process. Once the Commission has adopted a proposal, it en-
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ters the EU legislative process and will be dealt with under one of three legislative procedures (i.e., consultation, co-decision or co-operation).
The position of the Commission in the legislative process is crucial.
Nothing, as Peterson writes (2002: 88), can become Community legislation unless the college [of commissioners] chooses to propose it. 19 The
importance of this prerogative cannot be underestimated.20 During the
process of proposal formation, the Commission has a variety of discretionary powers to shape the content of the final proposal (Larsson 2003).
For example, the Commission enjoys the power to initiate and control expert committees. The Commission herewith not only learns the positions
of member states by inviting their experts to appear before these committees, but also benefit from the expertise to improve the quality of their proposal. Or as Wessels and Rometsch (1996: 226) argue:
the Commission controls the game in this phase and its basic strategy
is one of engrenage i.e., to include relevant national civil servants
and representatives of lobby groups early enough in its work to get additional information and insights From the point of view of the national civil servants, there is an expectation that their input will be taken seriously by the Commission and that its later proposals will not
include unpleasant surprises for them.
Even when mutuality forms the underlying culture of the relationship between the Commission and the national civil servants, the relationship is in
fact unequal, to the advantage of the Commission. First, the Commission
may, for example:
set up an expert group to find out whether the Member States and interest groups are interested in trying to formulate a common position.
But should the Commission discover that the support for a common
approach is rather weak or seems to go in an unwanted direction, it can
hold the group on hold, waiting for the right moment to reactivate it
(Larsson 2003: 18).
Other powerful instruments are the selection of the chairman and the selection and appointment of the participants. As Larsson (2003: 18) observes:
allowing just a few experts, interest groups or Member States representatives to be part of a group is a strategic decision that may affect the result
and functioning of an expert group profoundly.
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ber states because the regulation of animal disease and welfare is also part
of a fundamental debate between member states on regulatory styles or
modes of governance (cf. Knill 2001). The Netherlands, for example,
prefers the deregulation of meat hygiene inspections, whereby the state
delegates the treatment of animals and the hygiene at slaughterhouses
to private firm; whereas Italy maintains direct public supervision of the
slaughterhouses by departmental inspectors.
It is difficult to say at this stage if veterinary policy is a typical or an atypical, even crucial (George and Bennett 2005) case when it comes to the
study of uploading. However, being a fully Europeanised and institutionalised area, the strategic behaviour at the pre-proposal phase may at least
reveal the shape of things to come in other Europeanising policy areas. The
insights gained from this research may indicate the natural evolution of
strategic behaviour of other national ministries the more their policy areas
are integrated into the EU. In other words, as more governments and departments are confronted with the (forced) implementation of EU policies
that are less preferred, the more we can expect goal-seeking strategic interactions at this initial phase of the policy process.
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Signalling as described above is not only part of the job of Permanent Representation officials, but increasingly that of civil servants in The Hague
as well. This signalling can take various forms, from just giving a call to
asking for a draft of an upcoming report or stepping into a Commission officials office when a national civil servant happens to be in Brussels for a
meeting (VWA official). The nationality of the Commission officials is an important issue here. Although our respondents told us that nationality played
no major role in the approaching of a Commission official, it was clear from
their further explications that the presence of Dutch people within the Commission services (both permanent as well as seconded national civil servants; see more below) can make a difference. Dutch Commission officials
more often than not contact their national departments when they receive
information on specific subjects. They are also more easily approachable by
their compatriots, notwithstanding the fact that Dutch commission officials
consider themselves to be acting in strict accordance with Commission
guidelines concerning loyalty and neutrality.
Most interviewees regard signalling to be the most effective when it is
embedded in enduring relationships between national Eurocrats and Commission officials. They claimed that trust is the most important aspect in
building and maintaining lasting and effective relationships between national and Commission officials:
I work a lot on personal relationships. I know two Commission directors very well. When I arrive, they know something is happening.
Whenever there are conflicts Ive always been keen on seeing the problems from their perspective as well and not just trying to get the most
out of it for the Netherlands (Ministry of Agriculture official).
The same interviewee, a very senior civil servant within the department, illustrated his point by describing the following event that took place several
years ago:
The first meeting with these people [the higher Commission officials]
often occurs during an incident. In my case, I built up trust during the
handling of a crisis concerning the presence of hormones in animal
fodder. The Commission proposed destroying all of the animals that
had been fed the contaminated fodder. I told them that we just had
foot and mouth disease and that a lot of livestock had been destroyed,
but that this time there was no immediate threat to public health. In
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the end, we only had to destroy a far smaller proportion of the animals
than initially discussed. I then implemented the decisions carefully
and transparently (Ministry of Agriculture official).
Ultimately, signalling is applied by both agriculture Eurocrats at the Permanent Representation and the home department. Nurturing networks by national civil servants with Commission officials is a way of institutionalising
the signalling strategy. Similar to the situation with private interest lobbies
in Brussels, easy and swift access to officials who are co-ordinating or writing the relevant proposals is an important asset for national ministries to
cultivate. At the same time, interviewees emphasise that signalling alone is
unlikely to do the trick as far as successful uploading is concerned. From
the perspective of the national department, i.e., the sender, signalling may
appear a relatively cheap and direct strategy, but from the perspective of the
receiver (Commission officials) it is bound to be just one of many signals
from different sources they receive on a continuous basis. They are not only
being signalled by Eurocrats from other member states but also by a range
of private interest organisations. When the number of signals from a variety of sources increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for Commission
officials to properly assess their relative value. The accumulation of signals
may produce a level of noise that may discourage Commission officials
from properly scrutinising and assessing the individual signals.
Frontloading proposals
Frontloading aims at exerting direct, substantive influence on the writing of
the proposal. Members may obtain direct access to the writing of a Commission proposal by seconding national officials at the targeted DirectorateGeneral. SNEs comprise one of three categories of Commission officials.
The first consists of the permanent staff of the Commission services (i.e.,
grade A officials) who are recruited for the service after having successfully
passed their concours. The second group consists of support and administrative staff. SNEs, on the other hand, are appointed for fixed periods of
time. They are part of the Directorate General and work on a specific file
for a period of up to three years. One of the pragmatic reasons for their appointment is that SNEs assist the Commission services staff and bring
expertise on issues the Commission lacks knowledge on, or as the official
logic of secondments describes it:
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nary Office in Dublin for a few years I think the changes from output
to outcome control we have made look very promising. Thus, I try to
exert some influence at the source [of the policy process], to in turn exert some influence on the writing side (VWA official).
The question is: how is this done? How is this strategy executed? It would
not be entirely accurate to see the issue of secondments as a one-way street.
Reciprocity between international organisations and national governments
seems to be a necessary condition for secondments:
International organisations often want to address a problem, but dont
have sufficient manpower at that moment. The deal we make is that we
find it interesting as well [sic]. We second someone to the organisation
and pay all or part of the expenses. They can then begin doing the important work [e.g., against an outbreak of bird flu], that is also important to the Netherlands. This is how we can acquire influence on things
that are important to the Netherlands (Ministry of Agriculture official).
But this does not imply that the Ministry of Agriculture can freely choose
from amongst the available positions:
The input from the Netherlands should add to the Commissions work.
The Netherlands has a good reputation when it comes to cases involving animal diseases and animal welfare. The Netherlands stands a
good chance of gaining some positions in these areas if our department decides to lobby for them (Permanent Representation official).
Active lobbying involves a good network and preferably personal relationships between Dutch and European officials. I know the director of the
Food and Veterinary Office very well, one respondent told us, and he asked
me for personnel. I immediately arranged that (VWA official).
To what extent is this strategy effective in terms of policy outcome? Do
seconded civil servants steer the direction of the policy process? Or is the ultimate benefit of having seconded officials within the Commission to take
the knowledge of Community issues back home as the official statement of
the Commission notes? Seconded national civil servants are expected to be
loyal to the Commission and to develop supranational identifications via
their frequent interactions with the permanent staff. Some of our respondents are clear about the role of seconded national servants: once they begin
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in their positions they should be loyal to the Commission and should not be
put under pressure by their previous department. At the same time, no respondent denies the benefits that the department accrues from having a
seconded official at a strategic position. One benefit is that the parent department can establish a larger network for the entire department through a
seconded official:
We try to encourage the directors of the SNEs to visit them on location.
The SNE makes an appointment with his unit head, the director of the
unit where he works, and if possible, with the director-general or the
vicedirector-general. They first talk about the project, but eventually
they end up discussing a whole range of other issues. The purpose of
these meetings is to get to know one another. It is much easier to pick
up the phone when you know someone personally (Civil servant at the
Ministry of Agriculture).
The goal is to use the SNE and his or her position to pave the way for high
level networks. SNEs are further provided with the basic technical facilities
to keep in touch with the parent department. That way they can communicate easily with their colleagues via Internet and via the mail, so that both
sides remain informed. The annual securing of The Hagues networks occurs during the come back days when all of the SNEs stationed throughout
the many international organisations around the world are invited back for
a two-day meeting. SNEs are requested to give seminars on their ongoing
affairs. Directors-general are expected to attend these meetings as well. The
two-day meeting is concluded by an informal dinner with the directorsgeneral and secretaries-general. The presence of top-level officials sends
a signal to the rest of the department that this is an important meeting.
Sometimes, if the events are managed well and the situation allows it, a
co-ordinated network of SNEs can lead to the exertion of significant influence on the policy-making process, even as early and as crucial as setting its
agenda. One such instance occurred during a crisis management situation
involving avian influenza (bird flu) in early March 2006, when a senior
Dutch Agriculture official was called upon to attend a meeting at the Food
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) offices:
I have seconded someone to the FAO for avian influenza, someone to
the OIE [Office International des Epizooties] and a couple of people to
DG SANCO [the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Af-
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fairs]. What happened is that suddenly all of these organisations became preoccupied with the avian influenza situation. Last week I was
called to a conference at the FAO to speak about crisis management in
cases involving outbreaks of avian influenza. The United States were
also invited. There was also someone from OIE, who happened to be
a Dutch woman from my directorate who was seconded to the OIE. Another participant in the meeting was a representative from the European Commission, again seconded from my directorate. And finally
there was Louise Fresco24 who was joined by yet another SNE [at FAO]
seconded from my directorate. I jokingly proposed lets do the meeting in Dutch with an English translator (Ministry of Agriculture official).
The basic impression by the Dutch officials, a majority of whom were SNEs
we interviewed, shows that the purposeful and strategic use of seconding
may lead to situations where a (small) national state can have a substantial
impact on decision-making and agenda setting.
Ethical guidelines notwithstanding, SNEs bring their own national doctrines and their Dutch norms and values to Brussels:
I think that everyone from the Netherlands, whether they are seconded
officials or not, approach their work from the perspective of Dutch
norms and values. That is very valuable. Therefore, I think that as a
member state you can gain influence here if a member state has a lot of
officials seconded to the Commission, so that the process in Brussels
becomes similar to that of your own country (SNE).
This occurred to some extent when the Dutch were invited to second a national civil servant to work on the meat hygiene control dossier. The official
was seconded to DG SANCO and worked for three years on the preparation
of a proposal for meat hygiene control as part of the General Food Law. The
Netherlands has been in favour of developing and implementing a regulatory system whereby hygiene inspections are no longer performed by the
state but by the private sector itself. The essence of this system consists of
the fact that the Dutch government only assumes system responsibilities,
remains removed from the actual physical inspection of the slaughterhouses and meat-processing industries, and instead only inspects the systems
designed by the private sector itself. The proposal that the Commission submitted to the EP and the Council contained the mode of governance preferred by the Netherlands. However, the interviewee explains:
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mission then says that the reports are internal and we wont share
them with the member states. Well, on certain occasions, for example,
the Netherlands wants to know the content of a specific report. One
thing you can do is to give an oral summary of the report. Going one
step further would mean doing this by mail. Or you might just send the
entire piece. You can do all this the day after the release of the internal
report or a month later. There is an entire grey area of options and what
the effects of these options are is dependent on the number of interests
that play a role. If the negotiations only concern one country well, in
that case you can inform that member state of what the Commission
intends to do. But it changes when several member states, with diverging interests, are involved. If you dont act carefully as a seconded official, or according to the rules of loyalty [which every seconded national
official has to agree to upon assuming office] you could end up banging your head against the wall (SNE).
Therefore, if the Commission:
has files that ought to remain secret, they give it to that person [a seconded official] to see what happens next. I dont know whether the
Commission does this consciously, but they are, of course, not naive
(SNE).
SNEs are generally hired to work on a specific dossier. As noted earlier,
they inevitably bring their own national and professional norms and values
to the task, and this is often precisely why the Commission wants a representative of a certain member state to work on a proposal. The moment an
SNE enters his or her directorate-general, he or she will inevitably experience a clash of governance modes:
There was much ado when I was appointed to Brussels. A storm of
protest came from Italy because it was fiercely opposed to the Dutch
approach regarding meat hygiene controls. They felt that the Netherlands had squandered their meat inspection responsibility by privatising inspections and giving the state only a small role. The Italian CVO
[Chief Veterinary Officer] invested a lot of effort in preventing my secondment (SNE).
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The secondment could not be prevented, however, but this particular SNE
did not have an easy inauguration into Brussels:
My secondment was looked upon very sceptically, especially by colleagues from Southern Europe. They were very suspicious and critical. My patron, a Fleming and the director of my department supported me while my immediate colleagues most of whom were
French or Italian were the most suspicious. They were sceptical
about the Dutch way of thinking regarding meat inspections However, they had not been instructed by their governments to oppose my
work. It was their natural attitude. They have been brought up differently (SNE).
To be successful in these circumstances requires a lot from an individual.
Our interviewee was fluent in French and Italian and this certainly helped
him establish cordial relationships with his colleagues. He also spoke at
meetings in Italy on the subject in Italian to explain the Dutch approach.
And perhaps most of all, you have to show that youre not a bad guy (SNE).
In conclusion, we have observed that the use of secondments is a highly
preferred and strategic instrument for influencing the content and direction of Commission proposals, but it does not necessarily lead to a successful outcome. Working as a seconded national civil servant is fraught with
pitfalls and the Commission is constantly checking the loyalty of its seconded officials.
Coalition formation
The coalition formation strategy typically emerges when representatives of
relevant national ministries convene for the first time at a committee meeting. An interviewee gave us an impression of such a meeting, which was
concerned with the drafting of a regulation that would control foodstuffs
and animal fodder as part of the General Food Law:
On the basis of a rough draft by the Commission, we [a number of experts from various departments] took a look at the various draft provisions, keeping in mind what the position of the Netherlands should be
We put our ideas down on paper and went to Brussels and submitted
our viewpoint very explicitly The meeting began with a round during which each member state presented its views. You immediately
pick your potential allies on different issues during this round. You de-
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cide on an issue-to-issue basis who your allies will be. The views of the
member states remain quite consistent throughout the subsequent
committee meetings. So you find yourself in agreement with country
A on issue X and with country B on issue Z. Then at the coffee machine
you exchange some more ideas in a very informal manner (Ministry of
Agriculture official).
Prior to a committee meeting, the positions of the other member states on
the various issues are often unknown to you. It is even less clear who your
potential allies are and what the results of the meetings will be.
A more activist stance is also possible, of course. Interviewees were quick
to point out that there are alternatives to letting the outcome of committee
meetings be determined by happenstance events. Many of those who regularly travelled back and forth between Brussels and their home base to participate in Commission committees (and Council working groups) on a regular basis stressed the importance of informal discussions around the
coffee machine during breaks, after lunches, as well as over drinks and,
occasionally, during dinners before or after a meeting.25 However, these informal circuits are more effective when they are not just limited to committee meetings. One interviewee, who worked on the General Food Laws
inspection of hygiene measures, set up and co-ordinated a so-called fourcountry consultation group. Some time in 2004, during Luxembourgs
presidency, German, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgian civil servants began meeting on the day before the actual committee meeting in order to discuss the agenda of the upcoming meeting, and to co-ordinate the various issues regarding the import of veterinary products:
During these meetings we look for issues on which we can reach an
agreement and where our views diverge. On issues we agree on, we
support each other. and take similar positions. We also discuss tactics: who will say what and when At the last committee meeting it
went so well that we dominated the meeting We had an alliance.
What happened then was that none of the newer member states said
anything which is not unusual. But countries like France and the
United Kingdom also remained silent. The other countries then apparently figure that when Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium already agree the issue is pretty much settled. We have to be careful with
this kind of situation, however. We must not become too dominant
and pursue variations. Meaning that we should sometimes openly
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declare: I dont agree with you. You shouldnt create the impression
that the three of us have pre-cooked everything beforehand. I dont
think the Commission would be pleased with this state of affairs. But
nevertheless we keep going! (VWA official).
The consultation between the four countries and the subsequent domination of the committee meeting one must admit occurred during the
rather weak Luxembourg Presidency. A small group of member states had
managed to pre-cook a position and had presented themselves as a united
front vis--vis the Commission and the rest of the member states. Under a
normal presidency, there is much less room to operate in this fashion and
the co-ordination and negotiation costs between the member states are
much higher. Nevertheless, this example shows that in a setting with a large
number of member states, coalition formation and the pre-cooking of a
common position, a small core group of member states can form a front
against the Commission and overwhelm the other member states.
This kind of close co-operation between a limited number of member
states not only depends on the weaknesses of the presidency but also on the
personal relationships between the national Eurocrats involved. In the
aforementioned example, the core group often held informal meetings and
if this could not take place in a restaurant for financial reasons, they met
over home-cooked dinners. Of course this requires a certain level of good
personal chemistry.
In a more general sense, the expert committee meetings further impede
the strategic actions of member states because of a lack of information
regarding the initial positions of the other member states. If you add the
complex voting structure to this situation it is not difficult to imagine how
difficult it is to determine who will form coalitions with whom, let alone
predict the results of the meeting or the Commissions final decision. One
further important point should be stressed, however. Our interviews were
conducted two years after the EU enlargement. Prior to the enlargement,
coalitions in the veterinary field were predictably clustered around the
larger member states. Since enlargement, however, agreements within this
arena have become much more difficult to predict:
strategic insight is no longer important. In the old days, the voting
blocks were almost always fixed. If the Netherlands was in favour of
something, the Italians opposed it. Then if we approached the Germans to support our views and Germany concurred, then the issue
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was pretty much settled. We just needed to sit back and relax and add
nothing. Furthermore, you used to have member states with a certain
number of votes so you could make your own calculations. Nowadays,
it has become so complex that it is not worth trying to calculate. With
twenty-five member states, calculations have become impossible.
With which combination of states can you achieve a voting blocking
majority? The number of parameters has grown so large that strategic
interactions with the representatives of other member states within
the committee have become useless. Too many variations are now possible (VWA official).
Despite the possibilities for forging small blocks of like-minded countries
to dominate the expert committee meetings that pressure the Commission
to adopt your positions, this coalition formation strategy is probably less
likely to succeed than frontloading plus signalling. Expert groups are established once the Commission has already adopted a direction. It requires a
civil servants networking skills and long-term personal devotion to an issue to invest in coalition formation in order to change the course of a discussion within an expert group toward his countrys interests. But the Commission remains in the drivers seat and to a large extent determines the
substance of the proposal it submits to the Council and Parliament. Effectively approaching the Commission before it sends something through to
various other committees makes perfect sense.
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meetings. Given the Commissions powers during this phase and the difficulties of forming a successful coalition, the member states that move first
actually end up succeeding in locking-in their own positions before the
Commission formally submits the proposal to the Council and European
Parliament.
This chapter has identified three strategic options based on this logic.
Two of these options yield first-mover advantages. The first of these is signalling. Signalling was not only considered a major task of Eurocrats at the
Permanent Representation, but was also actively employed by their departmental counterparts in The Hague. Moreover, not only middle-level civil
servants but also the high-ranking civil servants we interviewed reported
that they actively contacted and informed Commission officials as an important aspect of their EU-related work.
As regards frontloading, secondment turned out to be a highly strategic
instrument during the pre-proposal phase, a point that has largely remained unexplored in research on SNEs. Existing studies rightly suggest
that secondments will affect role perceptions of seconded national officials
to some extent and eventually instigate a process of Europeanisation of the
culture and social practices at national departments upon their return to
their own departments. What has been overlooked, however, is the strategic
use of seconded national civil servants in the uploading of national preferences into the EU policy process. In our interviews we found that, more
than top-level instructions, the natural national perceptions and outlooks
of the seconded national experts were considered as the most important
mechanism through which national preferences are translated into Commission proposals. Once uploaded and launched into the supranational
policy process, the preferences of the member state are usually locked into
the highly institutionalised policy process at this level.
Finally, the findings we presented on the coalition formation strategy of
member states during the proposal formation phase underscore the findings in the literature thus far. The Commission has extensive formal and informal powers during the pre-proposal phase; it not only has the right to initiate a proposal but also the capacities to steer and shape the committee
deliberation process during the pre-proposal phase. The increased number
of member states and increased complexity of voting influence among the
member states within the Council working groups during the subsequent
decision-making phase have made it almost impossible for member states
to operate strategically during the proposal-formation phase. Thus, the only
successful case we noted is, in a sense, exceptional: the co-ordination of
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national positions among the four countries occurred in one specific area
during a weak presidency. Like in the case of signalling, individual civil servants are alone out there when negotiating with their counterparts from
other member states. Furthermore, they need to know how the game is
played and must have sufficient knowledge and expertise to earn the necessary standing and reputation.
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CHAPTER 4
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low we present our observations and interviews in several arenas where this
issue gets processed and plays out in terms of both policy-making and implementation.
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throughout the meeting. Film cameras were an essential part of the interaction process because everyone had their own screen on their desks with
each speaker in close up, for everyone to read his or her every facial expression. There were also several enormous screens projecting the same images. The Dutch delegation was small; besides the delegation leader there
was also an official from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU.
The most striking aspect of the meeting ritual was that participants were referred to not by their own names, but by their countrys. Every participant
was seated around a large oval table, behind a sign which bore the countrys
name. When a participant wanted to speak the chairperson would grant
him or her permission, by declaring: The Netherlands, the floor is yours,
and would wrap up the Dutch presentation with words like Thank you, the
Netherlands. Another striking thing was how little contact there was between the representatives of the different delegations. Everybody was polite
but reserved. There were very few informal greetings or casual asides. Participants were also very formal toward the chair. The Presidency had just
changed hands, as it does every six months in the EU. And so, each of the
speakers prefaced his or her opening remarks by formally wishing the Austrian chair well with their presidency and expressing their intention to fully
co-operate. The politeness was reciprocal as all of the participants had found
small gifts at their desk when arriving in the conference room, bureaucratic
gifts like a tie or a booklet with the logo of the new presidency on it.
Furthermore, there was no sign of the much-vaunted Brussels lunchingcum-lobbying circuit. The Dutch delegation had a simple lunch together at
the Salle Bleu, one of the restaurants in the building. The head of the delegation finished his lunch before the others to have a talk with the Irish delegation on a project the Irish had proposed, which partly overlapped with a
Dutch proposal that was also up for discussion. He also made a phone call
to The Hague to one of his colleagues.
During the meeting, the various proposals on the agenda were discussed
in depth. It was a long day with arcane technical matters receiving much of
the attention. The key proposal had been discussed before in other Council
working groups like ENFOPOL, ENFOCUSTOM, CRIMORG and COMIX.
Remarkably, almost no one referred to these earlier discussions; it was as if
the participants had never been briefed on these other meetings.
Meanwhile, the Austrian chair tried to reach agreements on as many aspects of the proposal as possible. The meeting was mostly about gauging,
shaping and bending words until everybody could agree. By the end of the
discussion, the chair offered a short summary of the suggested proposal
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changes. She also summed up the issues for which no consensus had been
reached. The proposal was now forwarded to next weeks Comit de lArticle
Trente-Six (CATS), another co-ordinating committee of more senior civil
servants. CATS would zoom in on those parts of the proposal on which no
consensus had been reached. These parts were now referred to as the more
political parts of the proposal. Apparently, they were not technical, for no
consensus had been reached. After CATS had been fully discussed, perhaps
modified and signed off on the proposal, it was then sent further up the European policy-making hierarchy, to the Comit de Reprsentants Permanents
(COREPER), the meeting of the EU ambassadors of the member states.
Once it was approved there, the proposal would end up being voted on in the
JHA Council of Ministers.
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are first and foremost national civil servants, and feel compelled to act as
such or face uncomfortable questions back home.
The CATS delegation leaders identify themselves first and foremost as
national civil servants, at least as much as the participants in the Working
Party on Police Co-operation described earlier, even though they seem to
know each other better than their lower-level counterparts do, addressing
each other (by way of the chairperson) by their first names during the meeting. The Dutch delegation leader said that he himself would like to act more
as a genuine European, taking the common good instead of the Dutch interest as his reference point for judging proposals and taking positions. Unfortunately, he said, his colleagues in The Hague, as well as his counterparts
in forums such as CATS are overwhelmingly locked into their national perspectives and seem primarily intent on preserving their existing national
policies, procedures and judicial systems. He welcomed the pressure put
on his colleagues by the Foreign Ministry and Permanent Representation,
who regularly argue that something has to happen, some improvements
have to be made. If it werent for that, everybody would simply lie back and
wait.
A member of the Permanent Representation confirms this point of view:
There is very little vision on which way to head in police co-operation. The
general idea is to try to avoid inconveniences brought on by anything new. It
would be so much better to try and benefit from new initiatives. A colleague
from the Ministry of the Interior hints at why civil servants seem to act the
way they do: As long as there is no clear political vision regarding a certain
theme, there is not much vision developed among civil servants either. We
stick to the political vision. This, he said, breeds conservatism: We are
against a proposal because we have always been against it even if no one
knows any more what exactly was the reason for taking that position.
The CATS delegation leader considered himself lucky to have a European-minded minister. This gave him a lot of support in urging his colleagues to get on with it. The Dutch Minister for Justice had made crimefighting his top priority and was strongly aware of its European dimension.
After the CATS meeting, the delegation leader pointed out that this provided him with opportunities. Within the Netherlands, you often act as the
representative of an EU position: you overact your European allegiance in
order to create room to manoeuvre. You do the reverse in Brussels, by saying: I cannot possibly take this back to my superiors at home.
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egation leader mentioned that the discussion regarding the first candidate
of three was still going on. Representatives of some member states were
quarrelling despite intensive diplomacy and agreements earlier. At 13:00,
there was another break, now for lunch. Discussion began again at 14:00
and finally at 15:00 the closed session was finished. As was noted by one
of the delegation members during the closed session, after about half an
hour, some participants were already beginning to leave the meeting in
order to be able to catch their planes at Schiphol airport to be able to get back
home that same day. At 17:00, when the chair finally wanted to discuss and
confirm the minutes of the last meeting, there were not enough participants left to have a quorum.
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to agree upon policies that fit their national systems. They detest the conservatism that it breeds, as one of them labelled it. However, at the same
time, they remain trapped in doing exactly the same thing themselves. At
the end of the day, they too define their professional success in terms of getting their national positions passed and at the very least of preventing
them from being disregarded altogether. After all, this is what they are held
accountable for by their peers and in their national back offices. And so they
too display a reluctance to embrace truly post-national solutions, and play
the tedious game of multinational bargaining instead.
So far so good. But to leave it like this would obscure as much as it reveals
about how Dutch officials do their European business. The various Dutch
policing Eurocrats we studied were engaged in rather different types of
international transactions. The nature of what it was they co-operated on
across borders seemed to reflect the kinds of transnational network
arrangements in which they did so.
Bureaucrat-diplomats
Take the data availability issue that was just presented above. The Brussels
Working Party on Police Co-operation and the CATS committee represent
what we could call bureaucratic-diplomatic arenas of making European policy. The craft of the Eurocrats that populate these arenas revolves around
two stages: first, as bureaucrats at home, they need to construct a national
position out of often heterogeneous sets of views and preferences of various
(sub-)departmental and other stakeholders (i.e., the police), often without
any clear political positions steering them; then, as diplomats, they need
to represent and defend those national positions whilst bargaining with
representatives from other member states. To some this is simple stuff.
One Ministry of Justice official boasted:
Working in EU settings is actually very straightforward. Everybody
knows this but it is rarely ever said aloud. When you go to Brussels you
say to your colleagues at home: It will be tough to achieve this. When
you are in Brussels you tell your fellow committee members: I must
be able to sell this at home. And so you always have an explanation for
the result you achieve.
The bureaucratic-diplomatic view of Eurocratic work corresponds closely to
the traditional picture of the EU as a multilevel system of committee governance. We found it to be prevalent among two groups of Dutch officials.
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tute (ROI). This is deemed useful by many to get a grip on the institutional
framework of the EU, learn about intercultural negotiation and so on. Such
formal training remains useful even for those with hands-on experience, as
one official confirmed:
After two years on the Brussels circuit I went to the Dutch Institute of
International Affairs to do a course. It was interesting to finally get the
bigger picture about the entire EU project how all the pieces of the
puzzle are supposed to fit. If you are only attending committee meetings you dont grasp this at all.
The second group which practices and espouses the bureaucratic-diplomatic view of Eurocratic work are the EU insiders: EU co-ordinators at
ministries, officials attached to the Permanent Representation, and highlevel officials who chair delegations at high-level meetings. For all the differences between their average working days, all of these people describe
their work as proceeding in a more-or-less scripted, predictable fashion.
Theirs is the world of institutionalised bargaining both at home and in
multilateral forums. In that world, which they regard as not very unlike that
of other multilateral institutions such as the UN or the WTO, the scope of
the possible is determined by existing treaties, agreements and regulatory
frameworks, as well as by balances of power, veto players and coalitions.
Knowledge about these things tends to be widely shared among the participants, all socialised over time to become EU insiders.
Being effective in this world, these civil servants maintain, requires astute anticipation of the institutional balance between Council, Commission, Parliament and member states. Preparatory work may also involve
massaging key gatekeepers within EU institutions, particularly Commission policy bureaucrats who are shaping the proposals, but also pivotal
MEPs. More generally, it requires smart venue shopping within these constituent forces: talking to the right people in the right bodies at the right time
in the right way. The actual EU working group, committee and Council
meetings are seen as pivotal occasions for bargaining and issue-by-issue
coalition building that build on this preparatory work. Those who do their
homework well ought not to be surprised by what transpires there, and they
should be well-placed to shape their decision-making processes, if only by
short-circuiting them in advance (as became clear in some of the examples
we gave above). By virtue of their institutional and tactical know-how, EU insiders are ideally able to foresee how particular issues will play out, and take
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timely action to steer the process in desired directions. However, the sheer
complexity of the processes involved makes the fool-proof prediction and
control of the policy process difficult to achieve.
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structions, and if thats impossible, you try to at least achieve its bottom line. However, the instructions are often useless, frankly. The official who actually attends the working group knows its dynamics best.
You must not lose out on the really vital issues. You have a lot of discretion, but you must of course anticipate The Hagues reactions.
The co-ordinators at ministries are at the hub of this process of defining
positions, drafting instructions and monitoring outcomes. As one puts it:
Most EU dossiers touch upon the work of two or more parts of this
ministry: the EUs way of dividing up policy issues does not correspond perfectly with the Dutch departmental division of labour. There
is a need for a sorting station. Thats what we do.
In some ministries (Justice, Agriculture) these units provide a comprehensive, centralised system of co-ordinating EU policy matters across the full
range of the ministrys portfolio. Others, such as the Ministry of the Interior, have opted for a more hybridised system where a central co-ordination
unit focuses on procedural matters, whereas the international units of the
policy or executive sections deal more closely with the substantive preparation of meetings in specific issue areas (such as policing and intelligence).
Meanwhile, others, such as the Ministry of Health, have no such co-ordination unit at all. The domestic EU affairs co-ordinators we encountered seem
to agree that two things are particularly important in their jobs. The first is
getting those that matter in ones own department to grant appropriate priority to the issues. This may be an uphill struggle, however. In the four ministries examined here, differences in ministerial involvement were marked:
low, passive and almost non-existent in Health and Interior; the opposite in
Agriculture and Justice. When ministers have other priorities, the ministrys top officials tend to have the same priorities.
The second part of a co-ordinators job is to develop a clearly articulated
departmental position on any given issue, and make sure this position carries weight in interdepartmental co-ordination processes prior to EU meetings. Bureaucratic politics does not stop at the border and the domestic coordination of EU policy is a well-known bureaucratic battleground in many
countries (Kassim et al. 2000). The Netherlands is certainly no exception to
this rule; its ministries are large and internally heterogeneous; joined-up
government has proven an elusive ideal at best; and the machinery of interdepartmental co-ordination of EU affairs has been the subject of repeated
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Street-level entrepreneurs
How different is the world of the other kinds of Eurocrats we encountered.
In general, they were people whose main orientation is their own profession, whose natural habitat is the operational practices in the field (i.e.,
street-level), and whose main drive is to have themselves heard on the international/European stage, ultimately to solve the practical problems they
encountered in these practices in whichever way that works.
The function of Eurocrats is experienced quite differently by those who
work in the Euregional Bureau. The employees there have an entrepreneurial perspective, which involves forging street-level co-operation to solve
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pressing problems in public service delivery. Entrepreneurial Eurocrats focus on the establishment of transborder investigations, enforcement measures and officer training programmes.
The dichotomy of national versus post-national identities (with traces of
departmental identities) that bureaucrat-diplomats struggle with does not
fully capture the role orientation of these operational practitioners because
they are, above all, experts in their field. Technical knowledge and professional skills are their stock-in-trade, and form the primary lens through
which they view and assess their foreign counterparts and the possibilities
for co-operative ventures. Combining an experts knowledge with a zealots
drive in a context of at best embryonic European institutions and policies
that circumscribe and define what needs to be done and how can go a long
way toward helping a national Eurocrat shape specific policies with a small
group of kindred spirits. When we asked Police Commissioner Ad Hellemons, Director of European Affairs of the Transport Police Division of the
Dutch National Police Agency, to describe a typical working day on the European circuit he picked a particular day and recounted:
My alarm clock goes off at 3 a.m. I live in the western part of Brabant (in
the southwestern region of the Netherlands) and can hop in and out of
Paris in a day. I am in my car half an hour later and arrive in Paris in
time to beat the rush hour. I reach the Gendarmeries headquarters
well in time to share a coffee with the officers on duty in the Generals
secretariat. I know them from previous encounters and, since I am
reasonably fluent in French, I can chat a bit with them to get a sense of
the days mood. I visit the French to get them to commit to certain new
TISPOL [see box] initiatives. I helped found TISPOL and was president of it for many years. When I arrive I know that my immediate
counterpart in the French traffic police division is already on board,
but French hierarchy requires that the matter be taken up by the very
top before anything can happen. I know I have to begin my conversation with the General in such a way as to enable him to conduct himself
in French without having to draw attention to his limited fluency in
English. That hurdle taken, we make some small talk. Then I gently
steer the conversation toward the topic at hand. I stress the pivotal importance of French leadership, you know, the stuff he likes to hear. In
fact, it is not all that difficult to get people like the General to co-operate. They know I am not a loose cannon. TISPOL has a good reputation
because, since its inception, the number of road deaths in Europe has
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tain good contacts with Commission officials and have had about 19 of
our proposals funded.
Q: How did you get into the Commission with this project?
Its very simple, you check on the Web who is dealing with traffic safety issues and you walk in. To give you an idea, there are only seven people in
the entire Commission involved in road transport issues and they all sit
in adjacent rooms. Each of them is happy to do business with you. We
feed them ideas and proposals that help them achieve their stated Commission objectives in this policy domain, which is to reduce road deaths
in Europe by 50% by 2010. The Commission drafted this on paper but
had no idea how to implement it At that time we stepped in and the
Commission discovered that it needed the police, and needed the knowhow from certain countries. And things are marching along beautifully
now. We are now at the midway point on our timeline and we are right on
schedule. And this is about a structural annual reduction in the number
of road deaths of no less than 11,000.
TISPOLs director is clearly a man with a mission: to reduce traffic deaths
and casualties by beefing up prevention and enforcement on a pan-European scale. Operational necessity got it established, but trust among professionals across borders is what makes it tick. The same goes for all of the
other police co-operation networks we studied. With some trust, they can be
vibrant, as in the case of Epic described above. But when trust is lacking, as
in the Europol case, then progress will remain limited. The following exchange with another senior Dutch police officer highlights this:
Q: Is there such a thing as a policy framework that dictates whether or not you
engage in co-operation with police forces from other countries?
Yes. It is very simple: do you trust someone or not? It begins with the people involved, and only after that it becomes a matter of organisations or
countries.
Q: What must I do to gain your trust?
Be open and transparent. You get to know people through international
committees and networks. It all starts with interpersonal relationships.
Q: This trust appears to be very personal. Isnt there some sort of guideline?
There is a kind of division, for example through Interpol: we do business
with so and so, and not with these others there is a list of this kind. But
most of it is individual. You look at the quality of democracy in the other
persons country and all that.
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Q: What is the ultimate aim for the Dutch police when it comes to international
police co-operation?
It would be good if policemen and the mayors and public prosecutors
who work with them accept international co-operation as something selfevident. This implies that they should also be convinced that they should
devote time to it and be courageous in doing it. It means they will co-operate on the basis of solid agreements and institutionalised trust. Most of
all, it is about co-operation becoming something that can be taken for
granted.
Street-level entrepreneurs have no intrinsic commitment to the EU project
and its main institutions. They try to work through these institutions, but
often run up against legal and political constraints. This is especially relevant in the Third Pillar, where the development of EU-wide co-operation is
slow and the main advocate for truly post-national policies, the Commission, occupies a weaker position vis--vis the member states. Street-level
Eurocrats in this domain are constantly confronted by the gap between their
felt needs for deeper co-operation and the murky realities of EU practices:
they want things for which there are no policies in place yet. Their coping
strategy is one of circumvention: bypassing the obstacles of working within
the EU institutions by developing alternative forms of co-operation, showing that these do the job, and over time, trying to integrate them into the EU
mainstream.
They tend to strive for autonomy, and regard the role of ministries as gatekeepers to participation in relevant EU networks as unhelpful meddling in
affairs that could more effectively be settled among professionals. One police chief said:
I dont think that the current governments orientation on putting
the citizens first by letting the professionals do their job is properly
safeguarded by having us represented in Brussels predominantly by
departmental bureaucrats. They are not sufficiently on top of the substance of the issues, which can be quite intricate. It is easy to get it
wrong or gloss over the important details if youre not a professional
yourself. Besides, it is much easier to build transnational rapport
among professionals in a particular field.
They are not comfortable with the world of instructions, mandates, interdepartmental co-ordination, procedural intricacies, forced inclusiveness and
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98
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99
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Departmental
co-ordination bureaucrats
Bureaucrat-diplomats
Street-level entrepreneurs
Natural habitat
Departmental working
groups and interdepartmental meetings of European co-ordinators.
Role orientations
Operational problem
solving. Dominant identity:
balancing act between
Dutch civil servant and
transnational area expert.
Activity and
contact patterns
Arenas and
channels
Mainly domestic-bureaucratic.
Measures of
quality and
effectiveness
Arriving at agreed-upon,
coherent and timely Dutch
initiatives and policy positions prior to EU meetings.
Achieving tangible
operational successes.
Knowledge and
expertise
Professional know-how.
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laboration), and the need to prepare domestically for positions taken internationally.
Different European action channels pose different demands on national
Eurocrats. And so, when compared to the old and deeply institutionalised
world of EU veterinary policy as described in chapter 3 or the equally scripted world of the Brussels committee system, there are relatively few precedents and rules to observe for those involved in developing European police
co-operation from the ground up. In that arena there is considerable scope
for bottom-up agenda-setting and experimentation. There are no fixed allegiances; the challenge is to build coalitions of the willing and find resources
to get them going. So, this is part of the answer to the second research question we posed: the way in which European work is organisationally embedded and facilitated is hugely differentiated.
Moreover, co-ordination bureaucrats and bureaucrat-diplomats, on the one
hand, and street level-entrepreneurs, on the other, clearly inhabit different
worlds. Street level-entrepreneurs complain about departmental co-ordinators and bureaucrat-diplomats knowing too little about the real work
(which is about preventing crime and catching criminals in whichever way
works); co-ordination bureaucrats and bureaucrat-diplomats complain that
street level-entrepreneurs allow tunnel vision and zealotry to disrupt the
even-handed development of policy across the full range of dossiers that together constitute the police co-operation portfolio.
Whereas departmental co-ordinators focus on sustaining smooth and
timely consultation procedures, bureaucrat-diplomats are preoccupied
with articulating and defending the national point of view in multilateral forums, and operational zealots seek to create vehicles for practical transborder co-operation in a truly post-national fashion. The latters sense of interdependence is strong, simply because the nature of the phenomena they
deal with makes it impossible to belie this. Treading cautiously in the formal
EU committee settings is not for them, and they seek to work around them.
One way to do so is to draw on the ambitions and the financial resources of
the European Commission to gain support for smaller-scale experiments.
A related way involves building informal coalitions of the willing to find
out if and how new forms of co-operation across borders can be made to
work, both on the ground and in legal terms. In doing so, they hope to create
irreversible facts. The Bureau of Euregional Co-operation in Maastricht described above is one such attempt.
Currently, street-level entrepreneurs rather than bureaucrat-diplomats
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CHAPTER 5
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105
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were able to contact 51,30 and 44 of the contacted former SNEs filled in the
questionnaire (a response rate of 86%). The use of snowball rather than
random sampling does not pose great problems for interpreting the results,
since we only report frequencies, means and medians in our analysis. In
addition, 20 in-depth interviews have been conducted with this group of respondents. The item non-response rate was low for the surveys, the poorest
item score was 78 respondents. The survey questions have been streamlined to enable comparison between the two groups of SNEs. The former
SNEs have been asked questions regarding their secondment period and
their current functions to enable cross-time comparisons.31
5.3 Demand and supply: The Dutch and the expert secondment
system
The growing number of tasks accorded to the European level of governance
over the years has brought up the need for more staff, which has led the European Commission to increasingly resort to external assistance through
temporary employment arrangements, partly due to budgetary stringency
and partly to changing agendas that require extra expertise. There are
22,543 officials working for the Commission, 6,868 of whom are external
or temporary staff.32 Seconded national experts number 1,077, but their relative weight is better understood when one takes into consideration that
their number equals 9.7% of the total number of 11,052 policy officials (Administrator/A-level officials), i.e., the highest level of Commission officials.
The primary aim of the secondment system is to inject into the Commission the high level of professional knowledge in a specific area of expertise
and work experience in the member state the national experts possess,
especially in areas where such expertise is lacking within the Commissions
rank and file. The potential benefit for the national administrations in return is that SNEs increase their expertise at the European/international level while gaining insider knowledge on the institutional set-up and functioning of the EU, which, one presumes, they take back to their administrations.
SNEs are typically seconded from the administrations (national, regional
or local) of EU member states, though the Commission also recruits experts
from the private and voluntary sectors or international organisations where
their expertise is needed. SNE vacancies are usually made public by informing the Permanent Representations of member states in Brussels, which
subsequently contact the respective national authorities. The recruiting
Commission unit receives the applications of SNE candidates from the
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107
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POLICY
AREA
Market-oriented
Social
Regulation
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DIRECTORATEGENERAL
FREQUENCY
PERCENT
DG Competition
DG Internal Market and
Services
DG Economic and Financial Affairs
DG Enterprise
Total
DG Environment
DG Health and Consumer
Protection
DG Employment
DG Justice
DG Education and Culture
Total
9
7
4
4
24
7
5
4
4
1
21
26.7%
23.3%
Supply side
7
5
4
3
19
21.1%
4
2
2
2
1
11
12.2%
3
3
2
8
8.9%
5
2
7
7.8%
N= 90
100%
Administration
Eurostat
DG Budget
Secretariat-General
Legal Service
OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office)
Total
External affairs
DG External Relations
DG Trade
DG Enlargement
Total
Provision
DG Agriculture
DG Development
Total
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POLICY
AREA
MINISTRY
FREQUENCY
PERCENT
Market-oriented
13
9
3
3
1
1
29
14
2
Provision
Social Regulation
16
5
4
3
3
1
1
1
16
33%
18%
18%
Supply side
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
15
17%
10%
External affairs
Administration
3
1
4
4%
N= 89
100%
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Not surprisingly, the top five suppliers of SNEs are the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Safety, the Ministry of Finance (including the Dutch
Tax and Customs Administration), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
There is a clear parallel between the organisations that are key providers
of SNEs and the organisations with the highest density of Europeanised
civil servants (chapter 2). Four out of the top five suppliers of SNEs feature
in the cluster of Eurocratic bulwarks, the Ministry of Finance and the Tax
Administration being the only exceptions as Eurocratic runners-up. This
can be seen as strengthening the validity of the league table of EU-ness of
Dutch public organisations presented in chapter 2.
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FORMER
SNEs
CURRENT
SNEs
TOTAL
28
(66.7 %)
24
(58.5%)
52
(62.7%)
14
(33.3%)
12
(29.3%)
26
(31.3%)
0
(0%)
5
(12.2%)
5
(6.0%)
42 (100%)
41
(100%)
N=83
(100%)
TOTAL
in ranks 14 and above.43 In section 5.6, we will return to the issue of rank,
within the framework of the discussion on career development through the
secondment system.
In the previous section, we already indicated the distribution of SNEs in
terms of their home organisations (table 5.1). Introducing the dichotomy of
executive agency vs. policy department (see also chapter 2), we observe that
76% of all respondents originated from policy departments, and 24% from
executive agencies. Apart from the fact that part of this difference is explained by the fact that most SNE positions are policy positions and many
fewer are executive positions, assuming that the share of SNEs delivered by
each type of organisation is a valid indicator of EU involvement, our findings are analogous with the conclusion found in chapter 2.3.2, namely that
policy departments are more involved in EU affairs than executive agencies.
With respect to the duration of the secondment, we observe that 17% of
the SNEs were seconded for less than a year, 34% for a period between one
and two years, 30% between two and three years, and 19% between three
and four years.44 So, the large majority of SNEs remains at the Commission
for about two years. A two-year stay is bound to provide enough time to supply substantive contributions to the work in the Commission and to constitute a substantial improvement for the individual SNE in terms of skills and
knowledge on the EU. If we consider the fact that 49% of Dutch SNEs stay
in the Commission between two to four years, this period of time is presumably also long enough to build a network at the EU, if not at the transna-
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tional level. Does the secondment period translate into returns for the SNEs
and the Dutch government in terms of networks and knowledge and can the
Dutch SNEs exchange their value-added for better career opportunities
which involve them using this EU know-who and know-how?
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(53.3%) reported drawing upon the network they built in the Netherlands
prior to their secondment once a week. Another 47.7% said they were approached monthly by their former colleagues at the Dutch organisation
they worked for. Only 18.2% of the former SNEs were approached weekly
and 34.1% monthly by their former colleagues during their secondment period. Clearly, the current Dutch SNEs have more frequent contacts with
their network in the Netherlands. Their contacts also involve sending written information to their home organisation 53.3% have such contacts
monthly.
What does this network entail, however? To what extent do SNEs build up
and become part of transnational networks extending to different administrative levels in different member states, to non-state players, and other EU
and international organisations? Or are they just individual bridges between the Commission and the member state they come from? And, since
policy networks are assumed to be relatively stable and persistent; what happens to these networks after the secondment period? To what extent do the
bridges remain intact?
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Median:
Current
SNEs
Colleagues within other DGs
SNEs from:
- The Netherlands
- Other member states
Other EU institutions
Other international organisations
The Dutch EU Permanent Representation
EU Permanent Representations of other
member states
Median:
Former
SNEs during
secondment
Median:
Former
SNEs in
current
function
3
4
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
4
2
3
2
4
3
3
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2.5
3
2
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
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If we concentrate on the medians higher than 2, since this offers the most
regular contacts, we see that only a few actors actually fall into this category.
The most frequent contacts are within the Commission and with the Dutch
national administration within the officials own policy sector. Other EU institutions, international organisations, the Dutch EU Permanent Representation, and sectoral contacts with other member states are the most
forthcoming contact points in the supranational and national arena. The
non-governmental aspect among the SNE networks is occupied by Dutch,
and to a lesser extent, by European business.
The figures for the contacts of past SNEs during their secondment follow
a similar pattern with few exceptions.47 When we turn to the network patterns of former SNEs in their current function, however, we see that their
contacts are clustered predominantly within the Dutch national administration. Meanwhile, the Commission and Dutch business figures are the
other most forthcoming network partners. The results clearly show that the
only lasting transnational or supranational networks for SNEs are within
the Commission.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these observations. The
SNE secondment system does stimulate the formation of transnational networks, but applying these data to the three types of network relations set out
in this article, we see that the network connections fall largely under the vertical dimension of network relations, to a lesser degree under the horizontal
dimension, and only to a very limited extent under the diagonal dimension
of network relations. Therefore, the SNEs do indeed form bridges between
the Commission and the member state and provide a channel for the flow of
information, ideas and contacts.
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mission apparatus and vice versa. When Dutch government officials begin
seeking an access point within the Commission, they first seek out a fellownational to talk to.50 This usually means an SNE, who plays the role of a
switchboard within the Commission. Roughly half of former SNEs and the
majority of the current SNEs (63% of the interview respondents) indicate
they were relatively frequently used as an EU helpdesk for the members of
their home organisations. Words they use to describe their role include:
feeler, resonance box, ambassador, antenna, brainstorming partner
but also missionary and infiltrator.
The practice of signalling rests on trust-based reciprocity, and the necessary level of trust can stem from nationality or previous trust-generating interactions. In this sense, the SNE networks make the flow of information
between the Commission and the member state possible:
I have personal contacts with my former colleagues. My Ministry approaches me first. I discuss the issues with colleagues who call. The
other way around, when there is a new strategy I will first sound out
ideas with colleagues in the Netherlands in order to use existent
knowledge in the Netherlands within the ministries.51
Signalling can thus work in two directions:
Your SNE position makes it possible to notify colleagues at home, so
that they can anticipate the Commissions course of action. For instance, they can prepare sabotage strategies, proposals for amendment or forge alliances. In some cases, the timing of a member state
entering the policy game is decided by the SNE.52
In terms of the Commission, both the network and the experience of the
SNE at the national level are valuable for the Commission because:
the permanent officials do not need to have any experience or network at the national administration level. This is the value-added of an
SNE. At the end of the day, the Commission focuses on member states,
so it is important to have a network within these member states. Furthermore, the officials have no experience with practice. As an SNE,
you learn a lot about what happens on the ground in practice. That is
a big asset. You just know how it works and how things are implemented.53
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It is in the Commissions interest to know what the member state is considering.54 In turn, the information is then channelled to the Commission
which can thus be used as input on a proposal.
The importance of SNEs with respect to frontloading, is even more crucial, given that the appointment of SNEs within a specific DG is the central
instrument for this type of strategic behaviour. That the Dutch Ministry of
Agriculture, among others, sends its officials to strategic positions in the
Commission, as argued in chapter 3, finds support in the account of an SNE
seconded from this ministry:
Your influence depends on your position. I work in the field of phytosanitary and veterinary trade barriers. Of course, the Netherlands
has a strategic interest in this area. It is interesting to see how the Commission deals with this issue. As an exporting country, it is very important to have someone at such a strategic position within the Commission, both for the Netherlands and for my own Ministry.55
In short: strategic appointments in view of certain important dossiers are a
pivotal method of frontloading.
The other two mechanisms through which frontloading is secured as a
strategic route are (a) through instructions from superior; and (b) as a result
of the national-cultural perspective taken by the SNE in question on the
policy issue. Dutch SNEs claim that they do not receive any direct instructions from the Dutch government, which is quite different from SNEs of
other member states:
There are countries with an SNE policy. The UK sends instructions
and influences opinion-building with position papers. The French
SNEs are also given follow-ups. The Netherlands does this less. You
sometimes end up reading the national position bij chance in a newsletter.56
While some SNEs believe they should exert national influence, others believe the influence should be exercised by the Dutch Permanent Representation instead.57 In that sense, some SNEs seem to totally endorse their
Commission identity: Expertise is the most important. We are not the
member state representatives here. They are in the Council.58
Still, the secondment system offers the member state the opportunity to
support EU files with its own people.59 This happens via the direct involve-
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ment of SNEs in the Commission. They can make the Dutch voice heard in
Brussels.60 This is actually what our Dutch SNE respondents consider the
frontloading method, which is much more common and much more appropriate in terms of exercising influence. The Ministry does not need to
dictate to SNEs since they already have an indirect influence over them by
way of the process of thinking as a Dutchman.61 This is also a transparent
national method, since the proposal drafted by a Dutch SNE still needs to
pass through all the official EU procedures. Thus, this viewpoint gets locked
into the proposal and might be altered at various junctures, but the general
spirit rarely changes substantially. In other words, the first blow is half the
battle, and SNEs play a pivotal role in enabling member-states to strike that
first blow.
With respect to the contribution to the policy process, the nationality of
an SNE influences his or her way of thinking: 62 Although you never have
a substantial mandate, what you do bring to the table in the policy-making
process is a Dutch point of view on the policy issue in question.63 As another SNE observed:
The SNE brings his own experience, way of thinking, and problemsolving strategy to the Commission, all of which have been developed
within a specific framework of ones home country. Once you are faced
with real policy issues at the Commission, the first reflex is to fall back
into ones old routines. As time goes by, he may place issues within a
wider, more European framework, but still the SNEs prior experience
or even the tradition he comes from continues to play a large role.64
Furthermore, many SNEs reported that while they were seconded they continued to follow the Dutch media (newspapers, television, etc.) and that for
a considerable part, their social lives remained more centred in the Netherlands than in Brussels. As a result of the stronger links that SNEs have with
their home countries compared to permanent Commission officials, SNEs
are also better able to reflect the stakes of a member state and to anticipate
national policy positions.65 An interesting distinction that both current and
former SNEs made is the one between Dutch permanent Commission officials and SNEs. Permanent Dutch officials have reportedly far less direct
contact with officials at the national administration level than SNEs. At the
same time, SNEs perceive permanent officials as being more independent
in relation to their members home country. This seems to indicate that the
width and depth of an officials network in the member state does not de-
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after their return, given that many respondents were disappointed by the
treatment they received from their home organisations upon return, which
seems to be common as the following sections suggest.
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their disappointment with respect to how much they actually use their networks in their present jobs since their secondment. Given that many former
SNEs also reported that they had considerable expectations in this respect
before and during their secondment, we interpret these differences as an
indication of overly optimistic prospects on the part of current SNEs rather
than an increase in the levels of opportunities to utilise acquired networks
upon their return to their home administrations.
During the interviews with former SNEs, many respondents indicated
that their networks within and, when applicable, outside the Commission
had grown outdated and were thus of little or no use. This is remarkable,
considering that the secondments of our respondents had ended on average
only two years earlier. In most cases, the reason for their networks becoming outdated was the fact that their first job after the secondment did not require their networks. A considerable number of these respondents noted
that while they made little to no use of their established networks professionally, they did maintain personal contacts with their secondment colleagues.
Some of these respondents, with current jobs that do not enable them to
make formal professional use of their networks, did indicate that the personal contacts they maintained did yield some information, which may or
may not have a bearing on their current employment, although some of it
was sometimes of interest to their organisations. They were convinced that
their present colleagues for whom this information might be relevant did
not get the same information as timely: Through my network at the Commission I get information about issues that no one else within my organisation has access to; 71 and It is always nice to have more information on an
issue or receive it earlier than your boss, for instance. Because I know a
number of people at the Commission, I get this informational advantage
vis--vis my boss.72 These respondents reported networks form a more personal and indirect way back into their organisations.
Others who felt their network had, to some extent, dissolved indicated
that a large part of their network had already left Brussels as well, and that
they did not have new contact information for most of these people. Nevertheless, respondents who indicated that their networks were outdated did
acknowledge that their secondments and their familiarity with the structures of the Commission gave them an advantage in building up new networks in their current jobs.
On the contrary, former SNEs with jobs that still have a good connection
at the Commission reported that the benefits of their acquired networks
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CURRENT SECTOR
RETURN to PREVIOUS
ORGANISATION
Yes
No
Frequency
(Percent)
Public
25
29 (67.4%)
Semi-public
5 (11.6%)
Private
4 (9.3%)
3 (7.0%)
None (Retired)
2 (4.7%)
TOTAL
27 (62.8%)
16 (27.2%)
N= 43
As the figures for the former SNEs show, SNEs who do not return to their
home organisation make career moves in various directions.
One remarkable exception here is the Ministry of Agriculture SNEs. This
Eurocratic bulwark ministry in particular scores very high in terms of luring its SNEs back: of the eight Agriculture SNEs, seven of them are still
working for the ministry. This is because, interviewees pointed out, the
Ministry of Agriculture has a more consistent policy regarding their SNEs.
While some did end up in their old positions, others obtained promotions to
positions that matched their profiles.78 Thus the Ministrys reputation as a
true Eurocratic bulwark (see chapter 2) also applies to its career management of its SNEs.
On the whole, however, a secondment with the Commission can hardly
be seen as a route to career advancement for those involved. Being seconded
has actually had a negative career effect, at least for some of the SNEs who
were seconded in the early years of the 21st century. This is not a typical
Dutch phenomenon. A survey among former SNEs from various member
states conducted in 2002 shows that problems regarding career advancement were a general phenomenon associated with the entire secondment
system.79
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contacts between the Commission and national ministries allow the member state to signal and frontload its positions and viewpoints into the policy
proposals of the Commission through its SNEs. This, however, should not
be interpreted as a direct national influence. Firstly, the Commission welcomes the experience, networks and input of the SNEs because the success
of policy proposals depends on the member states themselves. SNEs also
stress how loyal they are to the Commission during their secondment. Secondly, the influence is exercised fairly indirectly through the SNEs own
thought processes which they characterise as having been shaped by their
national background and upbringing. Thirdly, there is an entire chain of
command before the SNEs draft proposal reaches the upper levels of the
Commission where sections of the proposal may be modified. Finally, other
than the distinction between national or EU interests, the role of expertise
itself may be a third significant variable. Experts working within transnational networks develop distinct professional norms and values. Although
this study does not take this factor into account, future contributions to this
field could benefit from the inclusion of the role of expertise as a source of
substantive preferences. On the whole, however, secondment seems still to
be a legitimate and valued exchange system of officials for both the Commission and the member states.
However, our study has also demonstrated that not all of the hopes people have for the secondment system are fulfilled and the long-term benefits
of these networks are often fairly limited, which can be perceived as an opportunity loss for the seconding member states. Many former SNEs do not
land in jobs that allow them to draw upon their Commission networks;
many do not return to their original home organisations.
Since networks are more dependent upon individuals than positions
within an organisation, the enhanced trust and frank exchange may persist
after someone changes position. The conditions under which this persistence is more or less likely to occur remains uncultivated research territory.
These networks can facilitate decision-making by dispatching more and
more national experts onto the supranational level and subsequently reabsorbing these same experts back into ones national administration (see
Beyers and Kerremans 2004).
In this chapter, we have identified a number of mechanisms through
which SNEs can potentially play a linking role between the Commission
and the member state. The secondment system does indeed facilitate information flows and, in specific cases, influences an intricate web of relations
across the formal institutional structures of the EU and its member states.
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The results of the Dutch case, however, show that the SNEs are not optimally utilised. Even though the recent efforts of the Dutch government have led
to increased levels of contact between the SNEs and their home base, there
is still much room for improvement. When considering how the benefits of
the secondment system can be made to endure after the secondment period, the career paths of the officials after their secondment are a crucial factor. At present, expertise and networks fade quickly as experts, quite literally, move on. Better career planning for the SNEs would prevent this from
happening and maximise the benefits for the member state.
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CHAPTER 6
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tions. We will also try to integrate the findings from the two surveys and the
two qualitative case studies to draw a number of overarching conclusions.
And we will confront our empirical findings with the outcomes of the expert
meetings that were held in the final stages of the fieldwork phase of the project. These expert meetings were meant to provide a sounding board for our
observations, allowing us to better assess the extent to which they were
shared by people working on EU-related matters within a wide range of organisations in central government.
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Role orientations
The original question here was: what do national civil servants see as their
chief tasks and goals when they participate in European policy processes?
This study clearly shows that there are various ways of perceiving Eurocratic work, which conform to the three categories of Eurocrats discerned in
chapter 4, and which can be grouped along a continuum ranging from
business as usual to the radical re-invention of policy work. Those closest
to the business as usual end are those officials who resemble the back
office co-ordinator ideal type. Their work is essentially in The Hague, and
consists of working the levers of intradepartmental and interdepartmental
consultation in order to facilitate coherent Dutch positions to fit into EU
timetables (cf. Ekengren 2004). A more hybridised role conception can be
found among a large majority of the bureaucrat-diplomats, who see themselves as having a dual role:
In EU arenas, their role is to articulate and represent the Dutch interest vis--vis other member-states and the European institutions;
In the Netherlands, they see their role as selling the EU to their colleagues and creating a better understanding of the possibilities and
constraints inherent in European co-operation.
These people are intermediaries operating on the cutting edge of two
worlds: the world of European co-operation and the world of national policymaking and its bureaucratic politics. These dual roles may conflict when
there are clear tensions between Dutch preferences and the EUs policy directions. At the same time, various interviewees confided that they often use
that tension creatively, telling constituents in one arena that they are under
severe pressure from the other, and vice versa. The job is perhaps more difficult for bureaucrat diplomats operating in organisations where the overall
degree of Europeanisation is low, and where doing business in Europe is
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Back office
co-ordinators
Bureaucratdiplomats
Street-level
entrepreneurs
Key strengths
Facilitate emergence
of timely and coherent
departmental and
national positions
Skilful negotiators
for national positions
while minimising
Dutch opportunity
costs of European
integration
Practical professional
problem solvers
exploiting opportunities for transnational
co-operation
Key weaknesses
Status-quo players
immersed in the
procedural politics
of European policy
processes
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European policy-making happens in The Hague. They are the central figures in (inter)departmental networks that are involved in EU policy-making
and/or the implementation of EU law and policies. For bureaucrat-diplomats, European policy-making happens in Brussels. They go to committee,
working group and high-level meetings in Brussels and meet colleagues
there. In the case of police co-operation, which falls under the EUs Third
Pillar, contacts with foreign counterparts outside of these formal meetings
are comparatively rare. In veterinary policy, which falls under the EUs First
Pillar, contacts also take place outside of the formal meetings in order to
form decision-making coalitions in the committee.
Finally, for Dutch street-level entrepreneurs, European policy-making can
happen anywhere in Europe. These officials are actively engaged in forming networks with foreign counterparts in order to exchange information,
enhance mutual understanding, and undertake joint actions in response to
commonly experienced problems. These informal networks and their joint
activities may be formalised in EU decision-making forums, but often this
is not the case, or EU actors only come in as targets for lobby activities, sponsors or simply people to talk to.
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and/or other member-states in the relevant EU arenas; and, more ambitiously, controlling the (evolving) framing of the issues on the agenda of the
relevant EU arenas.
Finally, what can be aimed for is also determined by the strategic political
stakes involved. One distinction kept popping up. There are defensive
issues, where the strategic aim is to prevent EU policies from coming into
being that require changes to existing and valued Dutch ones. And there are
also offensive issues where the aim is to further the adoption of certain
EU measures seen as advantageous to Dutch interests. In both cases Dutch
Eurocrats have to engage in advocacy work, but clearly trying to block, delay
or modify something presupposes a different set of trade-offs and tactics
than trying to make something happen.
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nas). This observation is also borne out by the results of the survey, in which
respondents evaluated the facilities for training most positively among the
six statements on the organisational context of EU-related work.
Virtually all of the officials we observed and interviewed emphasised that
the real key lies in generic networking skills (sociability, empathy, reciprocity, reliability), and add that in this regard there are no fundamental differences between what is required in Europe and what is required in The
Hague and environs. They did note that not everyone possesses these
skills. All recounted instances of having worked in EU settings with Dutch
colleagues who clearly lacked some of these essential qualities and duly
created problems for themselves and for the Dutch position. These experiences were not very frequent, however, and in many cases a quiet word was
sent back via the appropriate channels to their superiors, encouraging them
to find replacements or get the individuals involved to lift their game.
These findings may of course be read in two different ways, depending
upon ones own vantage point and preconceptions. They can be taken as a
much-needed demystification of Eurocratic civil service work, breaking
through the conspiracy of insiders and calling into question the key role that
the Foreign Office tends to see for itself in the European domain. Yet they
can also be interpreted as evidence of the casual, off-handed, almost cavalier
approach that Dutch civil servants apparently take towards the role of training and skill development in enhancing their capability to operate effectively in European policy processes.
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devoted to EU-related activities but whether EU-related activities are integrated into the departmental work in such a way that the organisation devotes sufficient attention to them. The correlation is evident: the various
officials who noted during interviews that they felt they should devote
more time to European issues and arenas tended to work in organisations
(or parts of organisations) where such activities did not enjoy a high priority.
Likewise, the survey findings reported in chapter 2 revealed a consistent
relationship between the degree of Europeanisation and the priority accorded to EU-related work in an organisation. Based on the three-fold distinction between Eurocratic bulwarks (highly Europeanised organisations),
Eurocratic runners-up (moderately Europeanised) and national champions (barely Europeanised), we found that the more highly Europeanised
an organisation was, the higher the priority accorded to EU-related work.
Moving from the empirical to the evaluational, an important question is
whether national champions devote too little attention to the EU. If so, it
would be tempting to label these organisations Eurocratic laggards (in
neat semantic contrast with the two other clusters of Eurocratic bulwarks
and Eurocratic runners-up), but this would be unfair. We ended up calling
them national champions to reflect the reality that these departments/
agencies tend to bear responsibility for policy portfolios that at present are
simply not Europeanised. Like any other organisation in Europe, public or
private, they too are bound by EU law in many and important aspects of
their operation. As such, they need to have a degree of awareness and skill in
dealing with the consequences of that reality. But to the extent that these organisations do not really have a core role in making or implementing EU
policy, their low degree of Europeanisation does not necessarily reflect a
parochial or backward attitude. It is simply a logical by-product of the institutional division of responsibilities and powers in their portfolio domains.
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in the fast lanes of the EU and other foreign capitals, and may begin to bank
on sticking around. As a result, they may not be as proactive in maintaining the informal networks in their home ministries needed to keep their
careers afloat. As a result, the survey among SNEs that was reported on in
chapter 5 shows that more than one-third of all former Dutch SNEs no
longer work at the organisation that had originally sent them, while less
than 30% still regularly use the networks they had developed during their
stay in Brussels.
Secondly, there is a tendency to send out people who are too old, e.g., occupy relatively senior positions in the department. By definition, the number of jobs for them is smaller than for relatively junior staff, which makes
them more difficult to place back into the department upon their return
from abroad. The added complication is that at both lower and middle-management levels there is much less interdepartmental job mobility than at
the highest levels. Many peoples careers are focused within their own department. As a result of these factors, the average returnee from the EU circuit tends to fish in a relatively small pond. This being the case, each department has various cases of EU returnees who ended up stuck between a rock
and a hard place career-wise. Stories about these cases circulate around the
organisation, and provide a disincentive for others to go down the route of a
European placement.
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145
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ing by example, personal ambition and competence in the European domain, and creating proper incentives for staff to do the same.
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even if we have only been able to sketch some preliminary results of this
kind of research programme. We do believe this study makes three significant contributions to the literature on European integration and EU governance. First, our study unveils a range of basic empirical insights into the
extent and nature of Dutch national Eurocracy. We unveil and chart a Eurocratic world that until now has largely remained hidden. It provides a snapshot of the who, where and how much of the penetration of European issues
and arenas into the work of national policy bureaucrats that complements
similar attempts to look at the extent to which the need to implement EU
legislation and guidelines occupies national administrations (Knill 2001;
Mastenbroek 2007). Second, the study of Eurocratic practices has revealed
an important distinction between types of civil servants dealing with the
EU. The nature of Eurocratic work can be usefully understood in terms of
these three types of public servant profiles: bureaucrat-diplomats primarily working in highly formalised EU decision-making forums (and, incidentally the Eurocrats who are most likely to be actively engaged in the three
types of pre-proposal stage, Commission-focused tactics described in detail
in chapter 3); street-level entrepreneurs, primarily found in informal, taskrelated European policy networks; and those working in the back office of
The Hague departments, co-ordinating EU-related work within and across
organisations (departmental co-ordination bureaucrats). It may be useful
to expand that typology even further to also encompass the Brussels-based
national Eurocrats, e.g., SNEs as well as those seconded to the Permanent
Representation, although it is not immediately evident that they share
much beyond their physical location at the heart of the EU polity. Clearly
SNEs have to engage in a subtle balancing act that officials at the Permanent
Representation do not. But they do share the fact that they have to survive
in the Brussels milieu on a full-time instead of a yo-yoing (Thedvall 2006)
basis.
The distinction between these types of civil servants runs through almost
all aspects of individual EU-related activities. As we have seen, it is relevant
for their role orientations, for their daily activities and contact patterns, for
the arenas in and channels through which they are active, for the formal and
informal rules of the game they have to cope with, and for the measures of
quality and effectiveness they apply. Distinguishing between types of Eurocrats is therefore crucial for understanding what kind of activities take place
and why these activities are done the way they are. Moreover, this typology of
civil servants highlights some key challenges in organising EU-related
work within Dutch government. The Dutch input in EU policy-making is
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formed by the combined efforts of all types of officials. More often than not,
their respective activities focus on related concerns and have an impact on
each other. At the same time, these types of civil servants have distinct outlooks on the EU and on the way EU-related work should be handled, making
it highly likely that there will be both clashes and a lack of co-ordination.
Hence, effectively organising EU-related activities largely consists of co-ordinating and accommodating these various activities so as to minimise
overlap and tensions, and increase possible synergies.
Our third major finding that lends itself to further exploration in crossnational comparative studies pertains to the organisational context of Eurocratic work. The overriding differences found in our study relate to the degree of Europeanisation that public organisations display. The more highly
Europeanised an organisation is, the higher the priority accorded to EU-related work, the better EU-related work is for ones career, and the better this
work is organisationally facilitated. We called this the virtuous circle of organisational Europeanisation, whereby greater degrees of Europeanisation
lead to better organisational facilitation which may in turn be expected to
strengthen EU-related work in the organisation again. This conclusion pinpoints key determinants of what one might call organisational EU competence: the degree to which EU-related issues and arenas are seen by top
management to affect the organisations core portfolios, and the degree to
which this contributes to ensuring that the special requirements of facilitating Eurocratic work in terms of personnel policies, organisational structures and co-ordination routines are met.
If this hypothesis is able to withstand more rigorous scrutiny in crosssectoral and cross-national empirical research, it has practical implications
for efforts to improve the way EU-related work is organised and facilitated
within national bureaucracies. The challenge from the top down becomes
how to get the organisation to pass the critical threshold that separates the
Eurocratic bulwarks from their counterparts where Eurocratic work leads
a more marginal existence. When should the few remaining national
champions prepare themselves to join the ranks of the Eurocratic runnersup and thus start to invest more heavily in freeing up and enabling their
members to become more active in European arenas? This is not an easy
call. Ten years ago, when the speed of the integration process was high, it
seemed there was an EU domino effect of sorts on the rise. It seemed only
a matter of time before each and every hitherto national policy domain
would be Europeanised. Not preparing for that onslaught would have been
bad management. Nowadays, the pace has decreased, and the imperative to
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APPENDIX
ITEMS ON EUROPEANSATION INCLUDED IN THE
POMO SURVEY
PART H IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In your work you may be affected by the European Union (EU). For instance, you may be
involved in preparing the Dutch input into EU decision-making, you may be participating
in meetings at the EU level or bilateral meetings with colleagues from other member
states, or you may play a role in implementing European legislation and policies. Some of
these activities are listed in what follows.
1. Is your work affected by the European Union?
Yes
No, go to question XXX.
2. Can you indicate the importance of the following activities in your work?
Totally
Not very
Fairly
Very
unimportant important Neutral important important
1. Preparation of the Dutch input
into EU-level meetings
2. Participation in working groups
of the Council of Ministers
3. Participation in meetings organised
by the European Commission
(e.g. expert meetings, comitology)
4. Consultation with colleagues from
one or more other member states
outside the formal EU framework.
5. Transposition of European policies
into national legal measures
6. Practical application or enforcement of rules and policies that
originated in the EU
7. Taking into account EU policies
during national policy-making
8. Involving local government
in EU-level decision-making or
policy-making
appendix
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3. On average, how many hours per week do you spend on the EU-related activities listed above?
hours per week (go to question XXX if you spend 0 hours per week on EUrelated activities).
4. The following statements concern how your employer facilitates EU-related activities
organisationally. This may involve training opportunities, career development or managerial support. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
I do not I do
I
Dont
I totally know/not
agree not
at all agree Neutral agree agree applicable
1. My organisation offers sufficient
training opportunities for EU-related
activities
2. When selecting candidates for
EU-related activities, my employer
sufficiently takes my European
experience into account
3. Gaining experience in EU-related
activities offers an advantage for my
career
4. When I participate in EU-level
meetings, I receive a clear negotiation
mandate
5. In my organisation, EU-related
activities have a lower priority than
purely national activities
6. In my policy area there is sufficient
co-ordination between those who
negotiate at the EU-level about European policies, and those responsible
for transposing and implementing
those policies
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NOTES
notes chapter 1
1
notes chapter 2
3
notes
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(nearly) full working week, these respondents have been added to the
40 hour category. This does not substantially affect the figures for this
category.
5 For a few respondents, the EU-related time allotment exceeds 100%.
This may be due to the fact that they regularly work overtime, or that
they have more than one job (since the contractual working time is calculated on the basis of the respondents primary job).
6 Principal Component Analysis is closely related to factor analysis but
uses a different statistical method to extract the factors/components.
7 The analysis was carried out on the original five answer categories for
each specific activity. The factors were extracted using Principal Component Analysis. Factor rotation was carried out using direct oblimin,
because all activities are correlated to some extent. Factors were extracted if their own values were greater than 1.0. Tests for multicollinearity
and sample size adequacy all scored well above minimally required values.
8 For the sake of clarity, Table 7 uses the dichotomous variables of Table 5
again.
9 The dispersion index is calculated as 1 / (n * vi2), in which vi is the share
of the i-th respondent in the total amount of time spent on EU-related
work in an organisation, and n is the total number of respondents in
that organisation. This formula is based on the formula for calculating
the effective number of parties in a parliament or election (see Laakso
and Taagepera 1979). The effective number of parties is used as a measure to account not only for the actual number of parties but also their relative size. For instance, if there are three parties, where one has 50% of
the votes and the other two each have 25%, the effective number of parties will be 2.67. This number reflects the fact that the party system contains three parties but in practice also resembles a two-party system. We
can use the same formula to calculate the effective number of civil servants working on EU-related activities in an organisation, based on the
amount of time spent by each civil servant as a portion of the time spent
on EU-related activities by all civil servants together in that organisation. By dividing the effective number by the total number of civil servants in that organisation, we obtain a figure of between 0 and 1.
10 This is the reason why we have restricted the calculation of the dispersion index to those respondents whose work is affected by the EU. If the
dispersion index is calculated for all respondents (thus including respondents whose work is not affected by the EU), the dispersion index
154
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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notes chapter 3
18 We do not discuss a potential third stream of uploading studies here.
The burgeoning literature on networked governance, new modes of
governance, or democratic experimentalism (Jordan and Schout
2006; Citi and Rhodes 2007; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007) examines the
problems of co-ordination associated with managing the networks
within policy areas emerging under the Open Method of Coordination.
The achievement of any of the four key elements of the OMC fixing
guidelines and timetables, establishment of indicators and benchmarks, translation of these into European guidelines and their imple-
notes
155
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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notes chapter 5
26 The authors would like to thank Jarle Trondal for sharing his work and
his questionnaires with us.
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27 CLENAD UK Section (2002) An Unofficial Guide for UK National Experts, 3rd edition, p. 44-45.
28 One of the respondents had been seconded before this period but was
included in the dataset to maximise the number of observations.
29 The survey was sent by e-mail, but the respondents were given a choice
of returning the completed document electronically or by post.
30 It only became clear when data were gathered that two of the respondents had been detached prior to 2000. They have also been also included in the analyses given the value of empirical data.
31 The cross-time comparisons should also be read with caution, however, since the responses to survey questions with regard to the secondment period of former SNEs rely on their memory. An inevitable problem connected with research that relies on respondents memories is
the potential inaccuracy of the respondents input.
32 The statistical figures concerning the Commission staff in this article
are based on the European Commission Statistical Bulletin of Commission Staff 04/2006, the period of which corresponds to our data collection period.
33 Commission Decision C(2004) 577 of 27 February 2004 laying down rules
on the secondment of National Experts to the Commission, Article 2.
34 CLENAD Nederlandse Sectie (2003), Op naar een win3 situatie: Een
overzicht voor de versterking van de banden tussen gedetacheerde medewerkers bij de Europese instelling en de overheid in Den Haag, Brussels, p. 3.
35 Commission Decision C(2004) 577 of 27 February 2004 laying down rules
on the secondment of National Experts to the Commission, p. 2.
36 Interview with SNE31, Brussels, Feb. 2006.
37 Caroline de Gruyter, 17-18 Jan. 2004, NRC Handelsblad, Banenjagen
voor het Vaderland, p. 39.
38 Interview with SNE23, Brussels, Feb. 2006.
39 Interview with SNE84, The Hague, March 2006
40 Interview with SNE25, Brussels, Jan. 2006.
41 We adopted the same division as used by Liesbet Hooghe (2001) in The
European Commission and the Integration of Europe to classify Commission Directorate-Generals according to policy areas.
42 We borrow Van der Meer and Raadschelderss classification (1999,
205-228), The Senior Civil Service in the Netherlands: A Quest for
Unity, in Page and Wright (1999), Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States.
43 Interestingly, this observation is in direct contrast to the findings in
notes
157
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
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158
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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notes
159
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Karin Geuijen is a postdoctoral fellow at the Faculty of Organisation, Culture and Management of the VU University, Amsterdam, and teaches
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Paul t Hart is professor of Political Science at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and professor of Public
Administration at the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University
Sebastiaan Princen is assistent professor of Public Administration at the
Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University
Kutsal Yesilkagit is assistent professor of Public Administration at the
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INDEX
index
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174
Organisational Europeanisation
48, 148.
Expert 15, 17, 51, 56, 57, 59, 70, 84,
86, 93, 100, 105-107, 111, 113, 126,
127, 133, 137, 138.
Expert committee 20, 56, 72,
73, 70, 133, 137.
Expert community 85, 143.
Expert group 13, 20, 21, 32, 56,
73, 135, 138, 145.
Expert meeting 25, 27, 88, 130,
135, 136, 138, 139, 142.
Expertise 15-17, 21, 22, 24, 56, 60, 62,
63, 75, 85, 100, 105, 106, 109, 113,
118, 121, 126, 127, 131, 132, 139, 142,
144.
Feedback 52, 144.
First pillar 26, 28, 53, 78, 86, 95, 99,
133, 135, 136.
Frontloading 28, 58, 59, 62, 73, 74,
78, 104, 116, 118, 119, 126.
High-level meeting 89, 135.
Home government/organisation
103, 104, 107, 111, 112, 114, 117, 120,
121, 125, 126.
Ideal type 19, 94, 100, 131, 132.
Implementation (see also transposition) 13, 14, 20, 26, 32, 34, 35, 3840, 46, 51, 52, 55, 58, 62, 67, 68, 79,
83, 96, 113, 117, 132, 134-136, 147.
Informal network 135, 136, 143.
Information 13, 16, 19, 24, 29, 56, 5861, 68, 72, 78, 79, 83-85, 90, 94, 95,
98, 100, 102, 104, 108, 113, 114, 116118, 122, 126, 135, 144.
Instruction 22, 24, 64, 74, 90, 91,
97, 107, 118, 138, 144.
Intergovernmental 86.
International 13, 15-17, 19, 21-23, 26,
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index
175
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176