TH E O TTO M A N EMPIRE

A ND ITS HERITAGE
Politics;, Society and Economy
ED I T ED BY

OTTOMA NS, HUNGA RIA NS,

A ND HABSBURGS
IN CENTRA L EUROPE
The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest

S U R A I Y A FA RO Q H I A N D H A L I L I N A L C I K

ED ITED BY

Advisory Board
Fikret A d anir Id ris Bo stan A xnno n Co hen Co rnell Fleischer
Barbara Flem m ing A lexand er de Gro o t Klaus Kreiser
Hans Geo rg M ajer Irene M eliko f f A h m e t Yaar O cak
A bd eljelil Te m i m i Gilles Veinstein Elizabeth Z achariad o u

G Z A D V I D A ND P L

FO D O R

V O LUM E 20

BRILL
L EI D EN BO ST O N K L N
2000

This book is printed on acid-frcc paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

C O N TEN TS

D ata

Otto mans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the military confines
in the era o f Otto man conquest / edited by Gza Dvid and Pl Fodor.
p. cm. (The Otto man Empire and its heritage, ISSN 1380-6076 ;
v. 20)
Includes biblio graphical references and index.
ISBN 9004119078 (alk. paper)
1. Euro pe, CentralHisto ry To 1500. 2. Europe, CentralHisto ry 16th
century. 3. Europe, CentralHisto ry 1 7th century. 4. Europe, Central
Histo ry, Military . I . Fodor, Pl. I I . Dvid, Gza. I I I . Scries.
D A W 1038 .088 2000
943d c21
00-034284
CIP

LIST OF MAPS

V II

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE

VIII

PREFACE (PL FODOR)

IX

INTRODUCTION (GZA DVID and PL FODOR)

XI

PA RT O N E: TH E H U N G A RI A N - H A BSBU RG FRO N TIER

D ie D eutsche Bibliothek - CIP- Ei nhei tsauf nahme
Otto mans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the military
confines in the era o f Otto man conquest / ed. by Gcza David and Pal Fodor
- Leiden ; Boston ; Kln : Brill, 2000
(The Otto man Empire and its heritage ; Vo l. 20)
ISBN 90-04-11907-8

GZA PLFFY

The

O rig ins and

D ev elo p ment

of

the

Bo rd er

Defence System A g ainst the O tto m an Emp ire in

H u n g ary ( Up to the Early Eig hteenth Century )
A N DR S

KU BIN Y I The

Battle

of

Sz v asz entd emeter- N ag y o lasz i

(1523). O tto m an A d v anc e and H u ng ari an Defence

o n the Eve o f Mo hcs
J Z S E F K E L E N I K

ISSN
ISBN

1380-6076
90 04 11907 8

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PRIN TED IN T H E N ET H ERLA N D S

The M i l i tary Rev o lutio n i n H u n g ary

PA RT TW O : TH E O T T O M A N
KLRA HEGYI

) Copyright 2000 by Komnklijke Brill Mi Leiden, The Netherlands

71
117

FRO N TIER

The O tto m an N e tw o rk o f Fo rtresses i n H u ng ary ...

GBOR GOSTON The

Co sts of the O tto m an

Fo rtress-System

163

H u ng ary in the Sixteenth and Sev enteenth Centuries

PL FODOR

M ak i n g a Li v i n g o n the Fro ntiers: Vo lunteers i n

the Sixteenth-Century O tto m an A r m y

GZA DVID

195

229

A n O tto m an M i l i tary Career o n the H u n g ari an

Bo rd ers: Kasim Voyvoda, Bey, and Pasha

265

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

INDEX

315

LIST OF M A PS

1. The castles o f the Cro atian and Wend ish-Bajcsavar co nfines in

1582
2. The castles of the Bajcsavar, Kanizsa, and Gy o r co nfines in 1582
3. The castles of the M i n i n g To w n's and Up p er H u ng arian co nfines
in 1582
4. So uthern H u ng ary at the end of the fifteenth century
5. The battle of Szavaszentdemeter, 1523
6. Otto man fortresses in H ung ary

65
67
69
82
106
173

E ORIGIN S A N D D EV ELO PM EN T OF TH E BORDER DEFEN CE

SYSTEM A G A IN ST TH E O T T O M A N EMPIRE I N H U N G A R Y
(UP TO TH E EA RLY EIG H TEEN TH CEN TURY)
GZA PLFFY

"The system o f fortresses is the o nly means by w h i c h Yo ur Majesty w i l l

be able to co ntain the p o w er and the advance o f the enemy, and behind
w hich Yo ur co untries and peo ples w i l l be secure." This is h o w H absburg
military leaders summariz ed their o p inio n abo ut the significance o f the
Hungarian bo rd er defence system p ro tecting the imp erial city o f Vienna,
the A ustrian hered itary land s, and the German Em p ire in 1577. It w o u l d
be d ifficult to find a better expressio n to d efine the ro le o f the defence
system established b y the late sixteenth century o n the fro ntier zo ne o f
Hungary and its so uthern annexed p ro v inces (Slavo nia and Cro atia)
against the O tto man Emp ire. Even tho ug h the H ung arian defence system
constituted o nly a section of the lo ng and v aried fro ntier zone w hi c h
stretched fro m N o rthern A frica v ia the Med iterranean island s, Italy, and
Hungary to the Po lish-Lithuanian and Russian territo ries and p ro tected
Europe against the O tto m an attacks, it is ev id ent that the d ecisive events
of the century lo ng O tto man-Habsburg co nfro ntatio n o ccurred o n the
territo ry of Med iev al H u ng ary . O n the basis o f recent archiv al research
and the achievements o f A ustrian, So uthern Slav, and H u ng arian
histo rio graphy, this stud y attempts to p ro v id e an o utline o f the system
and its d ev elo p ment, co ncentrating o n the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. To w ard s the end of the tw entieth century it is ev en mo re timely
as, w hile several mo no g rap hs have been p ublished i n d ifferent w o rl d
languages abo ut the defence systems o n the Cro atian and Slav o nian
1

Pl Szeg, Vgvraink

szervezete a trk betelepedstl a tizentves

hbor

kezdetig

(15411593) [The Organization of the Hungarian Border Fortresses from the Establishment
of the Ottoman Rule to the Outbreak of the Fifteen Years' W ar], Budapest, 1911, 52.
2

Cf. Pl Fodor,

" Ottoman

Policy

Towards

Hungary,

AcademiaeScientiarum Hungancae 45:2-3 (1991) 271-345.

1520-1541," Acta

Orientlta

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

territo ries, no w e ll d o cumented stud y has been w ritten abo ut the system
of the H u ng arian defence d istricts and bo rd er fortresses w hic h p layed a
m u c h mo re imp o rtant role than the above mentio ned areas in the w ho le
structure.

line against the Otto mans' can o nly be und ersto o d m the kno w led g e of

Earlier inv estigatio ns have o nly discussed the Cro atian-Slavo nian
p art, that is a special section of the defence system established in the
sixteenth century to resist the O tto man advance, w hic h w as less decisive
f ro m the p o int o f v iew of the w ho le area, and have treated it simp ly as
the anteced ent o f the military fro ntier (Militdrgrenze) o rganized at the
b eg inning of the eighteenth century . But the d ev elo p ment o f the defence
5

The most important works in chronological order: Fr[antisek] V anicek, Specialgeschichte

der Militrgrenze.

I- IV . W ien, 1875. Jakob Arnstadt, Die k. k. Militdrgrenze 15221881 (mit einer

Gesamtbibliographie).

(Inaugural-Diss.) W rzburg, 1969. Gunther Erich Rothenberg, The Austrian

Militari/ Barder in Croatia, 15221747. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 48.) Urbana,
1960, and idem, The Milttan/ Border in Croatia 17401881: A Study of an Imperial Institution.
Chicago, 1966, and the two volumes together in G erman: Gunther Ejrich] Rothenberg, Die
sterreichische Militdrgrenze

in Kroatien 1522 bis 18S1. W ien- M nchen, 1970. Die k. k. Militr

grenze. Beitrage zu ihrer Geschickte.

(Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen M useums in Wien,

6.) W ien, 1973. Die sterreichische Militrgrenze. Geschichte und Auswirkungen.

Ed. by Gerhard

Emst. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 8.) Regensburg, 1982. Vojna Kra
jina. Povijesni pregledhistonografijarasprave.

Ed. by Dragurin Pavlicevic. Zagreb, 1984. Cf

also W inf ried Schulze, Landcsdefension und Staatsbildung. Studien zum Kriegswesen des inner
sterreichischen

Temtorialstaates (15641619). (Verffentlichungen der Kommission fr neuere

Geschichte sterreichs, 60.) W ien- Kl n- G raz, 1973. Karl Kser, Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die
Militarisierung

der agrarischen Gesellschaft m der kroatischslawonischen

Militrgrenze

(1535

1S81). (Habilitationsschrift) G raz, 1985, and the most recent work by Jean Nouzille (Histoire
de frontires. L'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman. Prface par Jean Brenger. Paris, 1991) which is,
however, a dull summary of earlier results.
4

So far Kurt Wessely has been the only one to realize that for an understanding of the

whole defence system against the Ottoman Empire it is indispensable to know the history
of the Hungarian border defence zones as well: Kurt Wessely, " The Development of the
Hungarian M ilitary Frontier Until the M iddle of the Eighteenth Century," Austrian History
Yearbook 9-10 (1973-1974) 55-110, and idem, " D ie Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576,"
in Die russische Gesandschaft am Regensburger Reichstag 1576. Mit Beitrgen von Ekkehard
V lkl und Kurt W essely. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 3.) Regens
burg, 1976, 31-55. Cf. also Istvn Sinkovics, " Obrana madarskog pogranienog teritorija od
Turaka u XV I i XV II stoljecu," in Vopna Krajina, 163-174. The most important Hungarian
monographs: Szeg, op. cit., and Imre Sznt, A vgvri rendszer kiptse sfm/kora Magyar
orszgon 15411593 [The Organization and Golden Age of the Border Defence System in
Hungary]. Budapest,
5

1980.

In A ustrian, G erman, Croatianand sometimes even Hungarian works, the Croa

tian-Slavonian defence zones are called military frontiers (Militrgrenze)

already from the

middl e of the sixteenth century, which is, in my opinion, a capital mistake. The units of
the defence system of the sixteenthth and seventeenth centuries, the respective areas of the

the w ho le H ung arian and Cro atian-Slav o nianbo rd er defence system

and this is true fo r the histo ry o f its subsequent p erio d s, to o . Belo w this
system w i l l be examined as a w ho le, v iew ed f ro m the ad ministrativ e
centres, that is f ro m Bud a until 1526, then temp o rarily f ro m Po zso ny and
Vienna, and f ro m 1556 up to the abo litio n o f the military fro ntier in the
nineteenth century , f ro m the Imp erial City and f o r an intermed iary
p i o d fro m Graz (1578-1705) respectively. This is the o nly aspect w hic h
can p ro v id e us w i th a mo re co herent and co mp lete p icture abo ut the
strategy of defence of the med iev al H ung arian Ki ng d o m and that of the
Habsburg military lead ership, and abo ut ho w the system w as co ntro lled .
er

THE PERIODIZATION O F THE HISTORY O F THE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN

HUNGARY AGAINST THE OTTOMANS
The new approach makes it necessary to establish a new p eno d izatio n fo r
the history of Cro atian and Slavonian territo ries w hich defines the mo st
important shifts based on the qualitative changes w ithin the w ho le system.
The former p eno d izatio n advanced in 1960 by Fedor Mo acanin, and o nly
partly corrected by those w o rking o n the p ro blem later o n, can hard ly be
used for the Hungarian territories in the narro w sense co nstituting the major
and more decisive part of the defence system. The Cro atian autho r d iv id ed
the nearly 500-year-old histo ry of the Cro atian-Slavo nian defence regio n into
the fo llo w ing tw o majo r and some mino r perio ds:
7

1. p erio d : Fro m the beg inning to 1593, the o utbreak of the so-called
'Fifteen Years' W ar' or 'Lo ng W ar'. W i thi n this, he d ifferentiated three
subperiods:
border fortresses (Grenzgebiet. Grenze, Grenzfestungen) were qualitatively different from the mil
itary frontiers organized in the early eighteenth century. A nother remarkable mistake of
Austrian historiography is to call the Croatian-Slavonian border territories A ustrian M ilitarv
Frontiers (sterreichische Militrgrenze, see notes 3 and 25), as in the sixteenth-seventeenth
centuries it was not these that were called A ustrian border fortress zone (sterreichische
Grenze), but the border castles subordinated to Gyr. Therefore it is more accurate to use
the term 'the Habsburg defence system against the Ottoman Empire' in the sixteenth-seven
teenth centuries for the imperial-royal border defence system in Hungary. Cf. Kurt W essely,
" Reply to Rothenberg's Comments," Austrian History Yearbook 9-10 (1973-1974) 119.
It is to be noted that scholarly works have so far identified the border defence system
against the Ottomans with the chain of fortresses, but this latter was, besides the mobile
field troops and soldiery kept by the counties, etc., onlv one, though decisive element in
it.
fi

Fedor M oacanin, " Periodizacija histonje Vojne Krajine (XV - XIX St.)," Historijski zbornik
13 (1960) 111-117.
7

G Z A

P LFFY

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

1.1. Fro m the o utset to 1522, w hen Ferd inand I, A rc hd u ke of A ustria,

sent an arm y at his o w n expense to help the defence o f the A u strian
territo ries threatened by the Otto mans.
1.2. Fro m 1522 to 1578, w hen the ad ministratio n of the Cro atian and
Slav o nian bo rd er fortresses w as subo rd inated to the new ly established
Inner A u strian W ar Co uncil (Innersterreichischer
Hofkriegsrat, Graz), separating them f ro m the H ung arian defence d istricts.
1.3. Fro m 1578 to 1593.
2. p erio d : Fro m 1593 to 1881, the eliminatio n o f the system of m ilitary
fro ntiers. W i th i n this p erio d Mo acanin d efined fiv e smaller sectio ns, o ut
of w hi c h tw o sho uld be mentio ned in co nnectio n w i th the era discussed
in this paper.
2.1.
Tu rkish
netw o rk
Danube,

Fro m 1593 to 1683, the beg inning of the so-called reco nquering
w ar (1683-1699). This w ar mad e it po ssible to establish the
of bo rd er fortresses and military fro ntier alo ng the Sava, Tisza,
and Maro s.

2.2. Fro m 1683 to 1755, the first refo rm of the m ilitary fro ntiers
co nsid ered im p o rtant by Mo acanin.

to create a q ualitativ ely new defence system called the ' m ilitary fro ntier'
(Mditdrgrenze).
In the d ef initio n of the subperio d s o f the third phase (1699-1881),
histo rians are m o re o r less o f the same o p inio n, so it is w o rth accepting
the p erio d iz atio n o f Mo acanin and Ro thenberg.
In the f o l l o w i ng I w o u l d like to summariz e the d ev elo p ment of the
bo rder defence system up to the o rg aniz atio n of the m ilitary fro ntiers in
the early eighteenth century . By sho w ing briefly the subp erio d s I w i l l
make an attemp t to analyze the mo st im p o rtant sections of the co ntinually
changing netw o rk and to evaluate its land marks g iv en the co nstraints of
time and space. A t the same time I w o u l d like to justify the significant
changes I have ap p lied in the p erio d iz atio n used so far.
1

T H E D E FE N C E S Y S T EM O F T H E M ED I EV A L H U N G A R I A N

( FRO M T H E O U T S ET T O T H E BA T T LE O F M O H A C S I N

KINGDOM

1526)

1 1. The origins of the defence system against the Ottomans

(late fourteenth

century-mid-M70s)

Tho ug h the autho rs of mo no graphs p rep ared after 1960

corrected

Mo acanin's p erio d izatio n in some po ints/ their ap p ro ach to the bo rd er

defence system sho w s no real change at all. This state of affairs can be
ascribed to the fact that, due to language p ro blems and a lack of archival
research, they knew practically no thing about the Hung arian bo rd er defence
system and therefore neglected it. So the p erio d izatio n to be presented here
is the first attempt to define new perio ds fro m the p o int of v iew of the w ho le
defence system in Hung ary against the Otto man Emp ire, and also applicable
to the histo ry of the Croatian-Slavonian regio n. In m y o p inio n the fo llo w ing
three majo r and several mino r periods can be d ifferentiated :
The first one lasted f ro m the beg inning to 1526, the terminatio n of
the med iev al H u ng arian King d o m . D u ring this era, the so uthern defence
netw o rk stretching f ro m the A d riatic Sea to Transy lv ania w as an o rg anically co herent defence line of the H ung arian Ki n g d o m .
The seco nd p erio d began in 1526 (the year o f the battle at Mo hcs)
and co ntinued till the peace treaty of Karlo v itz i n 1699, w hic h closed the

In the 1360s, the military and p o litical lead ership of the H u ng arian
King d o m d i d no t reco gnize the danger it faced w i th the appearance of
the O tto m an tro o p s in Euro pe. A l tho u g h the co nquests of the g ro w ing
military state w ere far aw ay f ro m the bo rd ers of the subsid iary p ro v inces
of King Lo uis A njo u I (1342-1382), the co nspicuo us p o litic al and m ilitary
expansio n of the Otto mans w as a clear signal that they w o u l d hard ly
stop o n the south-eastern Balkans after g aining the up p er hand in the
struggle amo ng the So uthern Slav rulers as their auxiliary tro o ps. Tho u g h
Lo uis I attemp ted ev en if in a so mew hat unp rep ared mannerto
co ntain the co nquero rs by establishing the Bulg arian banate o f V i d i n
betw een 1365 and 1369 and b y p lacing H u ng arian so ld iers in the castles
there, the strikes by the Otto mans i n the 1370s and 1380s d irectly
threatened the so uthern fro ntiers of H u ng ary . The situatio n w as mad e
w o rse by the fact that, to w ard s the end of his rule, Ki n g Lo uis d i d no t
pay to o m u c h attentio n to the reinfo rcement of the so uthern bo rd er
fortresses alo ng the Lo w er Danube, and the co nfused years after his d eath
further accentuated the p ro blems of so uthern d efence.
10

epoch o f the reco nquering Turkish w ars (1683-1699) and O tto m an rule in
H u ng ary . A f ter the peace had been co nclud ed it again became po ssible
8

Further periods: 2.3. 1755-1807, 2.4. 1807-1848, finally 2.5. 1848-1881.

See the works cited in note 2.

1 0

O n the history of the organization of the defence system before 1526, cf. Ferenc Szakly,

" Phases of Turco-Hungarian

W arfare Before the

Battle of M ohcs

(1365-1526)," Acta

G Z A

P LFFY

A fter Sig ismund of Luxemb urg , the H ung arian Ki ng (1387-1437)

later Ho ly Ro man Emp ero r (1410-1437), experienced the immed iate threat
by the Otto mans on the battlefield of N ico p o l (1396) and his w estern
neighbours d id so by means of the constant attacks," there remained
o nly one p o ssibility to d efend H u ng ary . It became imp erativ e that thev
lay the fo und atio n of a bo rd er defence system capable of co mp eting
effectively w ith the enemy at the fro ntiers in the lo ng ru n. Bearing this
purpose in m ind , Sigismund o rd ered that the bo rd er fortresses alo ng the
Lo w er Danube sho uld be g iv en into ro yal hand s, they sho uld be
reinforced, and that new castles sho uld be b u ilt betw een Sz rny and
Nndorfehrvr (fo r example Szentlszl ). In ad d itio n, he started to place
the mo bile tro o ps of the so uthern co unties, of the banates existing since
the time of the rulers of the rpd Ho use, and the so ldiers serv ing in
the bo rder fortresses und er central co ntro l. In the diet o f 1397, held in
Temesvr, w hich w as of crucial imp o rtance co ncerning the defence of the
southern bo rders, he tried to enfo rce his intentio n of q ualif y ing the
Hungarian military o rg aniz atio n fo r defence purpo ses by means of
several military law s.
12

The reforms led to the establishment of the so-called militia

portalis"

by w hich the ruler intend ed to create a lig ht cav alry o f co nsiderable

number w hich co uld be d ep lo yed o n the fro ntiers. In o rd er to increase
the number of sold iers on the bo rd ers, Serbian refugees w ere mo re and
Orientlta AcademiaeScientiaruni Hungancac 33 (1979) 65-111. Idem, " The Hungarian-Croatian
Border Defense System and Its Collapse," in From Hunyadi to Rkczi. War and Society m
late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary. (War and Society in Eastern Central Europe, 3.)
Ed. by Jnos M. Bak-Bla K. Kirly. Brooklyn, 1982, 141-158. Cf . also Leopold Kupelwieser,
Die KampfeUngarns mil den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohcs, 3526. W ien, 1899 . (I used
these works in presenting all three subpenods, so I am not going to refer to them separately
below.)
2

11 For the earliest attacks against Hungary, cf. Bdog Milleker, A trkknek els betrsei
DlMagyarorszgba Zsigmond s Albert kirlyok idejben s Keve s Krass vrmegyk
13931439 (The First Attacks by the Ottomans

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

megsznse.

Against Hungary in the Time of Kings

Sigismund and Albert, and the End of Counties Keve and Krassf Temesvr, 1914. O n the
attacks against Transylvania, cf. Gustav G undisch, Z r berlieferung

der Turkenemfallc in

mo re frequently hired as lig ht hussars, bo atmen [naszdos) o n the Danube

or mo re increasingly, tho ug h temp o rarily , as peasant soldiers (vopiiks,
Soidatenbauer) in return fo r certain exemp tio ns. The inco mes of the
co untry d i d no t rend er it po ssible to maintain a regular army p aid by
the king p ro tecting the fro ntiers, apart f ro m the bandrium o f the ruler.
In p arallel to the enlargement of the d efensive military forces, the
o rganizatio n of bo rd er defence w as mad e mo re co herent. The military
forces of the co unties of the Temesk z w ere subo rd inated tho ug h o nly
temp o rarily , fo r some majo r actio nsto the hig h sheriff of co unty Temes
(comes Temesiensis), w ho , at the same time, w as ap p o inted captain of the
garriso n so ld iers, besides head ing his o w n bandrium. A similar process
started in the neig hbo uring banate of Macs , ly ing w est of the Temesk z .
Thro ug h perso nal nego tiatio n, Sig ismund , und er the terms of the treaty
of Tata in 1426, acquired f ro m Djo rd je Branko v ic the castle o f Nndo rfehrvr (Belgrade), w hic h w as essential fo r the strengthening of the
defence. Ten years later he attached the castle to the banate of Macs , and
as a result a defence zone similar to the one i n Temesk z came into being ,
since the ban o f Macs dispo sed o f the m ilitary forces of the neig hbo uring
counties of Baranya, Bo d ro g, Bcs, Szerem, and Valk . The tw o ban o n
the Cro atian-Slav o nian territo ries had similar military autho rity , w hat is
mo re, the fav o urable natural end o w ments w ere further enhanced by
reinfo rcing the fo rd s on the Sava w ith w o o d en fo rts. A t the same time,
in the Temesk z , a chain of abo ut tw enty fortresses hand led by the king
secured the defence of the bo rd er.
14

The f o rmatio n of the defence netw o rk und er relativ ely calm

co nd itio ns w as facilitated by the fact that the O tto m an state u nd erw ent
one o f the mo st critical p erio d s of its histo ry d u ring the so -called
interregnum betw een 1402 and 1413. The H u ng arian military lead ership,
ho w ev er, d i d no t make use of the o p p o rtu nity to chase o ut the Otto mans.
Still, d ue to the activ ity of the comes Temesiensis, Pip of Ozo ra (Filip p o
Scolari), w h o imp lemented the military refo rms of Sig ismund and the
Thall czi bro thers (Matk and Frank ), and o w i n g to the campaigns and

Siebenbrgen. Kolozsvr, 1947. O n the first raids in A ustrian territories, see Hans Pirchegger,
" Die ersten Trkeneinflle (1396, 1415,

1418)," Zeschnft

des Histonschen

Veremes fur

Steierrrmrk 18 (1922) 63-73. See also the latest summary of the Southern Slav literature bv
Vasko Simoniti, Vojaskn organtzaaja na Slovenskem v 16. stoletju. Ljubljana, 1991,

5-23.

12 Elemr Mlyusz, Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn 13871437. Budapest, 1990, 136-166

13 It meant that well-to-do noblemen had to field one mounted archer for every 20, later,
after 1435, for every 33 peasants. A ndrs Borosy, " The Militia Portalts in Hungary Before
1526," in From Hunyadi to Rkczi, 63-80.

1 4

A t the turn of the 1430s Sigismund put the Teutonic O rder in charge of the bannte of

Szrny defending the entrance at the Lower Danube. But his hopes in connection

with

this plan soon failed. Erich Joachim, " Knig Sigmund und der Deutsche Ritterorden in
Ungarn 1429-1432. Mitteilungen aus dem Staatsarchiv Knigsberg," Mitteilungen des Instituts
fr sterreichische

Geschichtsforschung

33 (1912) 87-119, and recently Jen Glck, " A nmet

lovagrend a XV . szzadi Bnsgban [The Teutonic O rder in the Fifteenth-Century

Zounuk. A JszNagykunSzolnok

Megyei Levltr vknyve 8 (1993) 33-44

Banate],"

10

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

o rg aniz atio nal activ ity of Jno s H u ny ad i in the 1440-1450s, the med iev al
H u ng arian Ki n g d o m managed to b u ild u p a system o n the so uthern
territo ries of the co untry , w hic h w as still no t co herent eno ug h but
ad equate fo r p ermanent defence.
1.2. The furination of a coherent defence system: the military reforms of
Matthias Corvinus and their aftermath (147S-152V
Tho ug h the fo und atio ns of the bo rd er defence system w ere laid d uring
Sigismund 's reign, the siege of Nndo rfehrvr in 1440 indicated that those
buffer states in the Balkans w hich had previo usly served to protect Hung ary
w o u ld soon be ruined by the Otto man advance. In the lo ng ru n, neither the
so-called w inter camp aign (1443-1444) by Jnos H u ny ad i, no r his success in
Nndo rfehrvr in 1456, no r even the Bosnian actions by Matthias Co rv inus
in 1463-1464 co uld stop the process by w hic h the Hung arian military force
was once and fo r all d riv en back to the frontiers of the co untry by the 1460s,
except fo r the no rth-w estern Bosnian fortresses aro und Jajca.
The nearly fifty years' 'peace-time' starting in the mid-1460s, w hic h
w as characterized by the clashes of the raid ing tro o p s of the co ntend ing
parties, o ffered an excellent o p p o rtunity fo r the H u ng arian King to unif y
and refo rm the defence system co nstructed by his predecessors, that is
to make p rep aratio ns fo r p ermanent defence. The shift in the fo reign
p o licy o f Matthias Co rv inus (1458-1490) f ro m the South-East to the West
m ig ht have served the same p urp o ses. Presumably, he intend ed to create
15

an Eastern-Central-Euro p ean great p o w er w i th material resources to be

able to finance the reo rganized defence line and to co mpete successfully
w i th the O tto m an Emp ire that had changed into a Euro p ean great p o w er
w i th the cap ture of Co nstantino p le in 1453.

fortresses, and on the other, the bandena, co unty and no ble tro o ps, that is
the military of the areas neig hb o u ring the fro ntiers. This w as the mo st
decisive and mo st sig nificant part of his refo rms.
As a first step, in 1476 Matthias united the offices of the ban of CroatiaDalmatia and Slavorua. His intentio n was to subordinate the co mmanders of
border fortresses, as w ell as the mo bile troops of the counties, barons and
nobles of the area, under the unified control of the Croatian-Slavonian ban
(banus Croatuie et Slavoniae) fro m the sea to the Lo w er Danube. Tho ug h he had
already attempted to unify the tw o offices as early as in the mid-1460s, his
endeavours were frustrated fo r a decade by the pursuits for independence of
the ban of Macs, Mikls jlaki, w ho was appo inted King of Bosnia in 1471."'
After the occupation of Szabcs in 1476 and the death of jlaki in 1477, no thing
could prevent him fro m imp lementing his plan. A t the same time, he organized
the region of the Lo w er Danube into a unified border defence system, similar
to the Croatian-Slavonian ternto nes. To this end he created the office of the
captain-general of the Lo w er Parts (supremus capitenus paiiium regra Hungaruie
inferiorum), w hich was, w ith a few exceptions, assumed by the high sheriffs
of county Temes. Fro m that time o n, besides their bandena of considerable
numbers, the captain-generals disposed of the military forces of bo th the bo rder
fortresses and the neighbo uring counties. A t the same time, as hig h sheriffs of
county Temes, they w ere also responsible for the civil ad ministratio n of the
area. While the Croatian-Slavonian ban was personally m charge of the military
and civil administration of Dalmatia, O ld Cro atia, and the Slavonian counties
17

lh

l * A ndrs Kubinyi, " D i e Fragen des bosnischen Knigtums von N . jlaki," Studui Slavica
Acadermae Scientmrum Hungancae 8 (1958) 373-384
1 7

The reo rganizatio n of the defence system w as acco mplished in the

mid d le of the 1470s. The aims of the inno vatio ns w ere to create a mo re
coherent defence system, w hich co uld be co ntro lled f ro m the centre and w as
no t d iv id ed into many po litical, military ad ministrative centres, furthermo re
to establish an army that co uld be mo bilized faster and in a mo re unified
w ay to pro tect the bo rders. In the so uthern regions fro m the A d riatic to the
Eastern-Carpathians, Matthias Co rv inus united and integrated und er the
co mmand of three military officials the tw o basic elements of the defence
system: o n the one hand , the military forces and the netw o rk of the bo rder

11

The captaincy-general of Pl Tomori (1523-1526), the A rchbishop of Kalocsa, who had

his residence in Ptervrad and died in the battle of M ohcs, has to be ranked among these.
'8 It is appropriate to note here that Croatia and Slavonia as administrative and territorial
notions had different meanings during the middle ages and in the

sixteenth-eighteenth

centuries. The medieval ' O l d' Croatia was situated south-west of the river Sava, and its
territory

extended

between the Kapella M ountain and the A driatic Sea, bordering on

Slavonia in the north-east

Slavonia proper was located between the D rava valley and the

Kapela M ountain, extending as far as the river V rbas in the east. The Ottoman

advance

created a completely new situation by the second half of the sixteenth century. By that time
the southern parts of O ld Croatia were lost, its population sought refuge in the north, and
for this reason in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries the name Croatia designated the areas
stretching from the A driatic to the Sava, then, in the eigtheenth century, to the D rava, which
was formerly named Slavonia, then Upper Slavonia. For Slavonia proper shrank to the
territory between Drava, Sava, and Cszma by the 1570s. In the second half of the eighteenth

1 3

G yul a Rzs, " H unyadi M tys trk politikja [The Ottoman Policy of

Corvinus]," Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 22 (1975) 305-348.

Matthias

century, however, it included the counties Pozsega, Valk, and Szerem (the so-called Lower
Slavonia), and from that time on, Slavonia meant exclusively that territory.

13

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BL' RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

of Z grb, Vrasd , K r s, Ver ce, Dubica, Szana, and Orbsz, d ue to the

peasant so ldiers p aid by the king . ' So in case o f danger, the cap taingenerals of the bo rd er territo ries, as the leaders o f the mo re secure interio r
counties, dispo sed of a significant numb er o f banderia, co unty and no ble
troops, and unanimo usly co ntro lled b o th the bo rd er fortresses and the
mobile field tro o ps. Their concrete tasks w ere d etermined by the ruler,
w i t h o u t hav ing an ind ep end ent b o d y co ntro lling the m ilitary
affairsarrived at decisions on the defence of the co untry after co nsultation w i th the Ro yal Co uncil (consilium regis/regni) resid ing in Buda.

12

refo rms o f Matthias, the captain-general of the Lo w er Parts had the same
respo nsibilities o ver the six co unties of Temesk z (Keve, Krass , Temes,
To ro ntl, A rad , and Csand ), over the neig hbo uring six co unties of
Bo d ro g, Bcs, Cso ngrd , Bks, Z arnd , and Bihar, and o v er the counties
of Pozsega, Valk , and Szerem betw een the Drav a and Sava, that is all
the m ilitary and ad ministrativ e d uties o ver the territo ries called the Lower
Parts.' The third great unit of the defence line w as led by the Vo ivo de
9

of Transy lv ania (vajvoda Transilvaniae/Transilvaniensis)

au tho rity .

w i th

the same

20

A s a result of the refo rms of Matthias Co rv inus, the bases of the

defence system against the O tto man Emp ire laid d o w n by Sig ismund of
Lu xem b u rg w ere transfo rmed and changed into a co herent system. A t
the end o f the fifteenth century the H ung arian King d o m w as surro und ed
by a v ertically and ho riz o ntally d iv id ed , unified netw o rk o f defence. In
d ep th it consisted o f tw o p arallel lines of bo rd er fortresses. The southern
line stretched f ro m Sz rny via Orso v a, Szentlszl , Nnd o rfehrv r, Z im o ny , Szabcs, Szrebernik, Jajca, and Knin u p to Skardo na and Kiissza,
the seco nd, no rthern line f ro m Lgo s, Karnsebes, and Temesv r via
Ptervrad , the m ino r castles of the Szermsg and Dubica, Krup a, and
Bihcs to Z eng g o n the Dalmatian coast. The same system w as d iv id ed
into three sections v ertically to gether w ith the Transy lv anian territories:
the Cro atian-Slav o nian p art w i th Bihcs as its head quarters, the area east
o f it rang ing to Wallachia w i th the centre of Temesv r called Lo w er Parts
and the Transy lv anian bo rd er area. A l l three parts had the functio n of
serv ing and sup p o rting the bo rd er fortresses, in w hic h there w ere several
tho usand So uthern Slav and Hung arian garriso n so ldiers, bo atmen, and
' For the history of the captaincy-general of the Lower Parts, see recently Lszl Fenyvesi,
"A

temeskzi-szrnysgi

vgvrvidk

funkcivltozsai

(1365-1718) [The Changes in

Function of the Border Fortress A rea of the Temeskz and Szrnysg]," in Vgvrak s
rgik a XVIXVII.
2 0

w n 0

3.3. The fall of the defence system of the medieval Hungarian

Kingdom

(1521-1526)
Before the loss o f Nnd o rfehrvr, the key fo rtress of the Danube line,
in 1521, the system of bo rd er defence d i d no t seem to d iffer m u c h f ro m
the netw o rk that came into being after the refo rms o f Matthias Co rv inus.
While one element of the defence, ho w ev er, the chain o f fortresses still
existed, tho ug h in a bad state of repair, the o ther main co mp o nent, the
mobile tro o ps of the neig hbo uring and inner p arts o f the co untry became
practically unusable. So in the d isastro us eco no mic, social, and p o litical
conditions of H u ng ary in the Jagellon-era (1490-1526), the defence system
became mutilated alread y befo re the fall of Nnd o rfehrv r. The loss o f
the most imp o rtant castle then launched a process that culminated in
total collapse. Giv en the lack of a field army that co uld be m o v ed and
controlled quickly and co herently, Nnd o rfehrv r co uld o nly have been
replaced by a castle o f similar size and significance alo ng the Danube. A
stro ngho ld of such strength, ho w ev er, w as to be fo und o nly several
hundred kilo meters further no rth, in the centre o f the co untry , in Bud a.
22

The fall of Nnd o rfehrv r resulted in a huge breach in the defence

line and bro ug ht about the loss of several neig hbo uring fortresses: Z im o ny
and Szabcs w ere cap tured in the same year, Orso v a, Knin, and Skard o na
one year later, Sz rny, the o ther b u lw ark of the Lo w er Danube, fell into
Ottoman hand s in 1524. The p erd itio n o f the castles entailed the loss o f

szzadban. (Studia Agriensia, 14.) Eger, 1993, 238-246.

The only debatable element of the reform is why Nndorfehrvr did not become the

seat of the newly nominated

captain-general

of the Lower Parts. A l l this might be in

21

Cf. A ndrs Kubinyi's article in the present volume

2 2

Ferenc Szakly has dealt with the reasons and circumstances of the loss of the key

connection with the devaluated office of the ban of M acs held by Lrinc, the son of Mikls

fortress in several studies, which obtains very useful points of reference Ferenc Szakly,

jlaki. Though it might have seemed wiser to send the captain-general of the Lower Parts

" Nndorfehrvr, 1521: The Beginning of the End of the M edieval Hungarian K i ngdom, "

to Nndorfehrvr, the events afterwards justified the decision by Matthias Corvinus as the

nHungarianOttoman

office with the seat in Temesvr survived the fall of Nndorfehrvr in 1521, and continued

Ed. by Gza Dvid and Pl Fodor Budapest, 1994, 47-76. Idem, A mohcsi csata, 56-58, and

Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age ofSuleyman the Magnificent.

to function until 1556 with different centres as will be discussed later on. Cf . the different

'em, " N ndorf ehrvr 1521-es ostromhoz. Egy kirlyi adomnylevl kztrtneti tanuls

opinion by Ferenc Szakly, A mohcsi csata [The Battle of M ohcsi (Sorsdnt trtnelmi

gai [On the Siege of Nndorfehrvr in 1521. The Historical Lesson to Be D rawn From a

napok, 2.) Budapest, 1977, 55-56.

Royal Deed of G if t]," Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 25 (1978) 484-499.

14

G Z A P LFFY

those

15

T H E H L' N C A Rl A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

peasant

pro po sed to send several tho usand German inf antry m en to sup p o rt

so ld iers fo r a p ay o f so me mo nths and fo r d ifferent exemp tio ns. So

v illages w ho se inhabitants had p rev io usly served

as

Hung ary . O n the basis of the d o cuments at o ur d ispo sal, it can be stated
that abo ut 2,000 inf antry m en set o ff fo r H ung ary , and this w as the first
time w hen there w as an actual attemp t by the A ustrian p ro v mces to assist
in the defence of the H u ng arian King d o m .- Fro m 1522 to the defeat at
Mo hacs mo re and mo re frequently d i d field tro o p s arriv e f ro m the
neig hbo uring A ustrian p ro v inces to the area co ntro lled by the Cro atian
ban, but they w ere no t placed into the bo rd er fortresses as co nstant
garriso ns y et. Tho ug h the regular A ustrian m ilitary aid seemingly
strengthened the defence in this section of the bo rd er, i n fact it d isso lv ed
the unified lead ership of the military force that had been co mmand ed by
the ban up to this time. The captain-generals (Obnstcr Feldhauptmann der
nwderoblermchischen Landc) of the tro o p s sent by the A ustrian estates w ere
ap p o inted by the latter and w ere no t subo rd inated to the ban, tho ug h the
consequences of this d uality d i d no t manifest themselves in these years,
but o nly after the fall of the H u ng arian King d o m i n 1526. A s the mo st
decisive element of the defence system, the chain o f fortresses still
remained und er the co ntro l of the ban at that time.

Sley man the Mag nificent, the new sultan (1520-1566), exting uished the
so uthern line of the fro ntier fortressesexcept fo r Jajca and Kiissz aw ithin a p erio d of some years. These castles served as stepping-sto nes fo r hi m
to d o aw ay w i th the last remnants of the second line as w ell, except for
so me Cro atian fortresses, in the decades after the battle of Mo hcs in
1526.
W i th the co llapse of the so uthern chain of fortresses, the H ung arian
m ilitary lead ership lost the zone that w as to have d efend ed the w ho le
king d o m . The seco nd, no rthern line in the interio r of the co untry w as not
facilitated by the natural surro und ing s to such an extent as the p rev io us
one that w as situated almo st entirely alo ng mo untains and riv ers. There
w as a threat that if the gaps co uld no t be filled v ery fast, Ptervrad ,
w hic h w as cho sen to substitute Nnd o rfehrv r, co uld no t be reinfo rced ,
and no mo bile tro o p s w ere field ed , the w ho le interio r p lain area o f the
co untry w o u l d so o n fall. A ltho u g h some measures w ere taken by the
palatnus

Istvn Btho rv and the captain-general of the Lo w er Parts Pl

To m o ri aim ed at b ri n g i n g the fo rtresses

o f the seco nd

34

line into a

d efensible c o nd itio n and at reinf o rc ing them w i t h p aid inf antry m e n

and bandena, these failed one after the o ther, d ue to the mo d est inco mes
of the co untry . A s a result, the entire so uthern defence system inev itably
co llapsed in 1526, w hen the last units of the mo bile field tro o p s and the
majo r bo rd er fortresses perished . The d eath of Lo uis II (1516-1526) at the
same time b ro u g ht abo ut the fall of the med iev al H ung arian King d o m .
Before the co llapse of the med iev al bo rd er defence system, a change
to o k place w ho se effects co uld no t be felt in the 1520s, but w hic h p ro v ed

23 Lajos Thallczy- A ntal Hodinka, Magijarorszg

mellktartomnyainak

oklevltra (Codex

V ol. 1. A horvt vghelyek

oklevltra.

1490-1527 [A rchives of the Croatian Border Fortresses 1490-1527). (M onumenta

Hunganae

Diplomticas

Partium Regno Hungurtae Adnexarum).

Histrica I. Diplomataria, XXXI.) Budapest. 1903, 34-38: Nos. X X X V and LXU- LXXII1: Nos.
1-10 The year 1521 which I propose to start a new period, is both appropriate for marking
the collapse of the first chain of fortresses and for referring to the date when Ferdinand,
A rchduke of A ustria began to support

the defence system of the medieval

Hungarian

Kingdom with his financial and military power. That is why the year 1522 in Rothenberg's
monograph (The Austrian Military Border) is worth modifying to
; j

1521.

In connection with this, see G unther E. Rothenberg, " The O rigins of the A ustrian Mil

v ery im p o rtant in the lo ng ru n. A lread y in the early 1500s, King s

itary Frontier in Croatia and the A lleged Treaty of 22 December 1522," Slavonic and East

Vlad islav II (1490-1516) and Lo uis II and the Cro atian baro ns and nobles

European Review 38 (1960) 493-498. Cf. also W infried Schulze, " D i e sterreichische Militar-

turned to Emp ero r M axim ilian 1 (1493-1519) fo r help to jo intly avert the

grenze," Militrgeschichtliche

Mitteilungen

9 (1971) 191-192 Though Rothenberg proved in

his study published in 1960 that the alleged treaty of December 22, 1522 between Louis II

d anger threatening the A ustrian p ro v inces as w ell. But d u ri ng the rule

and Ferdinand, A rchduke of Austria is merely the result of a mistake by Frantisek V anicek

of M ax im ilian 1, the external military sup p o rt assisting the ban of Cro atia

(F. V anicek, op. of., 5-6) who misinterpreted the talks at the Imperial Diet (Reichstag)

remained o nly a p lan. H o w ev er, after the fall of the first chain of

Regensburg in 1522-1523, he (Rothenberg) was not the first to realize this. Lajos Thallczy,

fortresses, A rc hd u ke Ferd inand I, assessing the d anger threatening the

A ustrian p ro v inces go v erned by him m ainly Carnio la (Krain), Carinthia
(Kamten),

and Styria (Steiermark)resigned

himself to a significant step.

D u ring the siege of Nnd o rfehrv r in 1521 he summo ned his estates fo r
a special meeting and , at the request o f his bro ther- in- law , Lo uis II, he

of

in his introduction to the above quoted collection of documents had already corrected the
mistake (L. Thal l oczy- A . Hodinka, op. at.,

Nos. LV 1II- LX and LV LII: n. 1).

Rothenberg's

merit is that he again drew attention to the problem, as Thallczy's results were often
ignored even by Hungarian scholars. Pal Szeg, op. at.,

13 and 32. Cf . recently G erhard

Rill. Frst und Hof in sterreich von den habsburgischen Teungsvertrgen

bis zur Schlacht von

Molics (7523/22 bis 3526). Bd. 1. Auenpolitik und Diplomatie. (Forschungen zur Europischen
und V ergleichenden Rechtsgeschichte, 7.) W ien- Kl n- W eimar, 1993, 42-43: n. 17.

16

GZA PLFFY

17

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

2. THE DEFENCE SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMANS IN THE SIXTEENTH

AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES
The defeat at Mo hcs o pened up a new era in the histo ry of Hungary
The co untry lost no t o nly its ruler, but almo st the w ho le of its southern
defence system, includ ing bo th the netw o rk of bo rd er fortresses and the
neig hbo uring parts sup p o rting them w i th their field tro o ps. A l l this
resulted i n the establishment of O tto man rule in H u ng ary , the coronations
of John Szapo lyai I (1526-1540) and Ferd inand I (1526-1564) as kings of
H ung ary , and the d iv isio n of the co untry into three parts. Tho ugh the
so vereignty and ind epend ence of the co untry d id no t entirely disappear
in the f o llo w ing centuries, its territo ry became the battleg ro und of two
great p o w ers, the Habsburg and the O tto man Emp ire. In 1526, however,
the questio n w as w hether H ung ary w o u ld be able to o rganize a new
defence system or w hether it w o u l d share the fate of w hat had been its
vassal states in the Balkans. A n d if the co untry w as to succeed, in w hich
p art of it, in w hat f ramew o rk, and und er w ho se leadership w o u ld the
new defence system co me into being.
2.1.a. One and a half decades of confusion: the period of the commandersin-chief of the royal army paid by Ferdinand I of Habsburg
The fifteen years after 1526 remind us of the events at the turn of middle
of the fifteenth century. O nly the p erfo rmers of the Christian party had
changed : no w the A ustrian pro vinces w ere in the same situatio n as the
med iev al H ung arian King d o m had been earlier. The questio n was the
same: w o u l d they manage to stop the enemy in fro nt of the borders, on
the territo ries o f H ung ary und er the autho rity o f Ferd inand 1, crowned
the king o f this co untry , or, as the Cro atian-Slavo nian ban Tams Ndasdy
expressed it in his letter to Ferd inand in the summer of 1539: "If Your
H o l y Majestv does no t sup p o rt this co untry w ith y o ur other provinces it
w i l l certainly hap p en that, d ue to the loss of this co untry , the other
p ro v inces of Yo ur Ho ly Majesty w ill be lo st." But the extent of the
d anger w as no t adequately assessed in Vienna at the end o f the 1520s.
To p ut it mo re accurately: even if they reco gnized the Otto man threat,
they d id no t have the p o w er to act against it effectively. For the
25

rganization of a new defence systemas had been imp lemented on the

southern fro ntiers of H u ng ary in Matthias Co rv inus'- timethere w as a
need for a lo nger p erio d of peace, fo r the ap p ro p riate eco no mic and
financial backgro und and p o litical sup p o rt, fo r a d ip lo macy that w as
aware of the Otto man's custo ms and metho d s, fo r an ap p ro p riate apparatus to o rganize and co ntro l the system, and last but not least fo r a
thorough kno w led ge of local H ung arian circumstances. No ne of these
conditions w ere met at that time.
The conflict betw een the tw o rulers of Hung ary bro ug ht about civil w ar
conditions in the co untry and its annexed pro vinces (Slavonia and Cro atia).
To save his territories, John I w as forced to cooperate w i th the Otto mans,
while they advanced capturing mo re and more fortresses in the Szeremseg
and Cro atia. But these southern territories of Hung ary seemed far aw ay
enough fro m Vienna, no t to mentio n the palace of emperor Charles V
^519-1556) in Toledo, for w ho m the Hung arian theatre of w ar w as
overshadowed by the Mediterranean and Italian pro vinces also threatened
by the Otto mans. A ltho ug h it w as o bvio us to those kno w ing the
geographical situatio n of Hung ary that if the castles of Buda and the p lain
areas co uld not stop the Otto mans, they w o u l d get several hund red
kilometers nearer the centre of the A ustnan pro vinces. In vain d id the siege
of Vienna in 1529 cause a shock, the Habsburg military leadership w as
unable to p erfo rm the tasks of defence against the Otto mans. Tho ug h
among those A ustnan co mmanders w ho knew little about the co nd itio ns in
Hungary there w ere some w ho realized the severe consequences of d elay ,
26

27

28

2 6

Gabor Barta, " A Forgotten Theatre of W ar 1526-1528 (Historical

the Ottoman-Hungarian A lliance of 1528)," in HungarianOttoman

Events

Preceding

Military and

Diplomatic

Relations. 93-130.
2 7

Christine Turetschek, Die Trkenpolitik

der Universitt W ien, 10.) W ien,

2 S

After the royal

Ferdinands I. von 1529 bis 1532.

(Dissertationen

1968.

troops led by Hans Katzianer captured the castle of Szepesvr,

meister) suggested to his ruler on March 28, 1528, that the artillery arsenal here and in other
places should be transported to the southern border fortresses and the ruined cannon should
be cast again with the same purpose: " Euer Kunigliche Majestt etc. hetten solh Geschucz,
klain vnd gro behaltenn, vnd die ortflegkhen gegen dem Turgkhenn damit versechenn ...
hetten Euer Kunigliche Majestt etc. new geschuez giessen vnnd die Turgkhisch

35 " N isi Vestra Sacratissima Maiestas alicunde ex aliis regnis suis huic regno provident,

the

residence of the family Szapolyai, Ulrich Leysser chief field armoury officer (ObristFeldzeug

Grniczen

damit versechen lassenn." StA Kriegsarchiv [hereinafter K A ] Alte Feldakten [hereinafter A FA ]

actum erit de eo, et ex amissione huius regni amittentur alia etiam regna Vestrae Sacra-

'528/3/16 c. It is not a coincidence that it was Leysser who made these proposals as he had

tissimae Maiestatis." W ien, sterreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereinafter StA], Haus-, Hof- und

already taken part in the recruitment of the auxiliary troops commanded to Croatia from 1522

Staatsarchiv [hereinafter H H StA ], Ungarische Akten (Hungarica) [hereinafter Hunganca),

so he was among those who rightly assessed the real degTee of the Ottoman threat (see L.

A llgemeine A kten [hereinafter A A ] , Fase. 39. Konv. F. 1539. Juni-Juli fols. 36-37.

Thadczy-A. Hodinka, op. at.. 145-147: No. XCI and 148-149: No. XCOI).

18

G Z A PLF-FY

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

Ferd inand 's p o litical, eco no mic, and m i l i tary resources allo w ed tw
thing s i n this p erio d . O n the one hand , w i t h his tro o ps sent to Hungary
he g rad ually bro ke the p o w er of his riv al king , and o n the other hand'
w i th the help of the mo st end angered p ro v inces of Carnio la, Carinthia'
and Styria, he started to reo rganize und er his o w n co ntro l the Croatian
bo rd er defence system co o rd inated by the ban.

and the A ustrian co mmand er-in-chief. We can assume that the parties
'"ere perfectly aw are of the hig h stakes in the struggle fo r the sphere of
tho rity

31

The p o int w as that the w inner co uld take charge of the

Hungarian and Cro atian m ilitary affairs and simultaneo usly the co ntro l
f the bo rder defence system. So in the next fifteen years the Habsburg

2v

The tw o processes to o k place in a sim ilar framew o rk and were

acco mp anied by similar p ro blems. In o rd er to strengthen his p o w er both
in H u ng ary and in Cro atia and Slavo nia, Ferd inand sent considerable
numbers o f fo reig n (mainly German) tro o p s. These w ere supplemented
by the p aid so ld iers of the H ung arian and Cro atian nobles suppo rting
the Habsburg s, and by the units of the co unties and insurgent fielded
und er the law s of he co untry . The co o p eratio n of the German and
H u ng arian tro o p s w as no t unclo ud ed . The questio n of co ntro l caused
serio us co nflicts fro m the mo ment the first l.nmisknecht set foot on
H u ng arian so il, as the co mmand er-in-chief o f the tro o p s serving in
H u ng ary o r Cro atia (Obnster Feldhauptmann der mederosterreichischen Lande
in Ungarn/in Kroatwn) at the cost of the ' Lo w er A ustrian estates' (at that
time still co mp o sed of Lo w er A ustria, Carnio la, Carinthia, and Styria)
tried to extend his autho rity bo th o ver the H ung arian and Croatian
co ntingents. But acco rd ing to the so-called palatnus' articles of 1485, the
d ep u ty c o m m and ing these tro o ps in the absence of the king was the
palatnus regni Hungri. " The situatio n w as further co mp licated by the
fact that this o ffice had no t been filled since 1530 and the governor
(locumtenens regni Hungarme), the leader of the g o v erno rship {locumtenentta
regia), created to replace the palatnus, d i d his best to keep co ntro l over
the H u ng arian tro o p s. There w as a similar co nflict betw een the Croatian

19

litary leadership mad e an attemp t at w hat Sig ismund o f Lu xem b u rg

"nd his successors co uld no t achieve. They tried to ensure their p o w er

b

campaigns led o utsid e the A ustrian pro vinces and by taking co ntro l

of the military affairs and bo rd er defence in such areas they so ught to

stop the Otto man ad vance. For this p urp o se the eco no mic and military
power of the A ustrian p ro v inces sufficed even if Charles V w as reluctant
to g i

v e

sup p o rt. For H u ng ary to preserve its so vereignty and territo ry to

some extent, it seemed that it had to pay an eno rmo us p rice in return.
The Hungarian military - p o litic al o fficeho ld ers and the estates fo rmerly
controlling the co untry and its defence had to reno unce their po sitio ns
in leading the military . There w as hard ly any reassuring w ay o ut of the
dead end.
Up to the peace of Vrad in 1538 mad e w ith John Szap o lyai, the
foreign tro o ps led to H u ng ary by the A ustrian co mmand ers-in-chief
securedif no t quite satisfacto rily the territo ry o n w hic h the new
defence system co uld be o rg aniz ed later o n. A ltho u g h Kassa, the key to
Upper Hung ary remained in the hand s of John 1, and then passed to his
son, John Sigismund betw een 1536 and 1552, an adequate co unterp o int
was created by su p p ly ing the castle of Sro s w ith a sig nificant Habsburg
garrison. The fortresses p ro tecting Vienna (Ko mro m, Esztergo m, Tnta,
and Gyr) w ere similarly p ro v id ed w i th so ldiers o f v ario us natio nality
(i.e. Germans and Spaniard s) p aid by king Ferd inand . These military
decisions, ho w ever, lacked any kind of strategy aimed at the fo rmatio n

^ Though in the summer of 1528 Martin Fleugaus, the armoury officer of Ferdinand in
Carniola (Zeugwart

in Kram), mustered the border fortresses (Szeged, Temesvr, Csand,

and Lippa) in Temeskz with the aim of checking how they could be strengthened to serve
the purpose of defence against the Ottomans, they could not prevent them from getting
into the hands of John I. StA K A A FA 1528/7/6. See also StA H H S tA Hunganca A A .
Fasc. 8. Konv. 1. 1528. Jan.-Juni fols 175-176.
3 Magyar torvnytr. (Corpus juris Hungria) 10001526. vi trvnyczikkek (Articles of 1000-1526).
Explained and referenced by Dezs Mrkus. Budapest, 1899, 398-399: article No 4.
3 1

Istvn R. Kiss, A magyarhelytarttancs l. Ferdinnd korban s 15491551. vi leveles knyve

(The Hungarian Locumtenentia under Ferdinand I and its Letter Book from 1549 to 1551).

of a coherent defence system. Practically, they w ere decisio ns mad e in

an emergency situatio n.
Between 1526 and 1541, the military affairs o f H u n g ary and the
annexed areas w ere almo st exclusiv ely co ntro lled by the abo ve mentio ned
A ustrian co mmand ers-in-chief o f Ferd inand . A fter the battle of Mo hcs
the only efficient army w as co nstituted by the German tro o p s and by the
cavalry units p aid also f ro m abro ad but led by H u ng arian and So uthern

Budapest, 1908, and Gyz Ember, " A helytarti hivatal trtnethez a XV I. szzadban [To

Slav captains (Blint T r k, Lajos Pekry, and Pl Bakics). A s the p ay ment

the History of the Locumtenentia in the Sixteenth Century]," in Emlkknyv Szentptery Imre

of these troops w as co vered by the ruler f ro m his A ustrian p ro v inces, his

szletsnek hatvanadik vforduljnak nnepre.

Budapest, 1938, 142-156.

right to co mmand them c o uld no t be d ebated . So in these co nfused times

GZA

20

P LFFY

the 'task' of the go verno rs (locumtenens regni Hungri)

21

T H E H U N G A R1A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

in Pozsony w as

only to consult the co mmand ers-in-chief no t w ell-v ersed in the H u ng arian

conditions and to quarrel about the spheres of autho rity . The real military
assistants of the c o m m and er- in- c hief w ere the f ield marshals (Feldmarschall) co mmanded to help him and the w ar co uncillo rs (verordnete
Knegsrdte) either staying beside him or in V ienna inc lu d ing a w ar
secretary (Knegssckretdr):'' So in this p erio d a new military ad ministrativ e
organization came into being, w hich, tho ug h subject to changes in its
personnel, show ed some signs of stability and became o f great sig nificance as the precedent of the A ulic War Co uncil (Wiener
Hofknegsrat).
In Croatia the changes in the military ad ministratio n and bo rd er
defence were similar and even faster than in H ung ary . John I, after the
death of his captain-general and ban* Kristf Frangepn in September
1527, had less po w er to sup p o rt his fo llo w ers there. A fter the resignatio n
in 1528 of Ferenc Batthyny, the Cro atian-Slavo nian ban w h o had supported Ferdinand, the vacancy of the office o ffered an excellent o p p o rtunity to curtail the sphere of autho rity of the ban, and the locumtenens
in Pozsony had hard ly any w o rd in the d irectio n of these remo te territories. At the same time, the Otto mansas in the next one and a half
centuriesregarded this territo ry as a seco ndary theatre o f w ar besides
the main Hungarian front in its narro w sense. In spite o f this fact, the
Austrian provinces w ere mo stly threatened in these areas i n this p erio d ,
and therefore the estates of Carnio la, Carinthia, and Styria soon managed
to transfer control of this section of the defence system of the med iev al
Hungarian Kingd o m to A rchd uke Ferd inand and reo rganize it fo r their
o w n protection.
34

Thus the Habsburg military ad ministratio n started to f o rm the first

unit of the new defence system against the Otto mans in the Cro atian
border area. It has already been mentio ned as a precedent that after 1521
field troops paid by the A ustrian estates regularly marched to Cro atia,

but it d i d no t entailand it co uld no t w i th i n the med iev al H u ng arian

King d o mthe transfo rmatio n of the defence system. Ho w ev er, Ferd inand
I m his capacity as King of Hung ary and Cro atia, sent tro o p s p aid by his
A ustrian estates to the castles of Z eng g and Kiissza in 1527 and to Bihcs
after the resignatio n of Ferenc Batthyny in 1528. In ad d itio n to taking
charge of the majo r bo rd er fortresses, mo re and mo re field tro o ps also
arriv ed in the Sava regio n to sto p the O tto man raid s, and their
co mmand ers-in-chief (Mikls Jurisics, Hans Katzianer) began to o rganize
the bo rd er fortresses und er ro yal ad ministratio n into a co herent system.
A s a first step, in 1538 they set up the post of the captain-general w ho se
resp o nsibility encompassed the regio n called the O ld Cro atian co nfines
(alte krabatische/kroatische Grenze) in later sources. In the last d ays of A p r i l ,
w hen the ban Pter Keglevich, d efend ing Bihcs again, reno unced his
co ntro l o ver the castles he had been in charge of, Ferd inand ap p o inted
Erasm v o n Thu rn the captain-genera! of Z engg, Bihcs, Ripacs, and
Oto csc, and the m ino r fortresses belo ng ing to them, that is of the O l d
Cro atian co nfines. W ith the ap p o intment of Thu rn the co nstructio n of
the w estern section of the Cro atian bo rd er defence system extend ing f ro m
the Una to the A d riatic Sea actually started , and the w o rk w as co ntinued
by the co mmand ers-in-chief in Cro atia and Slavonia (Obnstcr Feldhauptmann windischer und krabatischer/kroatischer Lande) ap p o inted after 1540,
firstly by Hans Ung nad . ' In accordance w i th the practice fo llo w ed i n the
case of the co mmand ers-in-chief in H u ng ary they w ere also assisted by
35

36

35 L. Thal l ckzy- A . Hodinka, op. at., 671: No

D XXIV , 672-674: No. D XXV I and 677-686:

Nos. D X X X U - D X X X V and LV11.

3 6

" Pro

conservandis

partium istarum ad confinia Turcharum

Capitaneum assumpsimus et constituimus

iacentium

locis

illique Castrorum et O ppidorum

Bihigij et Repatz, Civitatisque nostrae Segmensis et Ottoschutz cum omnibus

attinentiis curam administrationemque

demandavimus" , and " in supremum

... in

nostrorum
eorundem

Capitaneum

universorum regni nostri Croatiae locorum finimorum simul et gentium ibidem nostrorum,
nec non Civitatis nostrae Segnensis et Attatschvz ac praeterea et oppidorum

nostrorum

Bihigij et Repath assumpsimus ct constituimus." StA H H StA Hungarica A A . Fasc. 35

On the war councillors, see the Hungarica collection of OStA HHStA (A A . Fase 2 -Fase.
70. passen) from the period 1526-1550
"Cnstoforus de Frangepanibus

1 7

rcgnorum Dalmaciae, Croaciae et Sclavoniae banus

ac capitaneus regius generalis" (Vehke. August 27, 1527) O StA HHStA Hungarica A A Fasc.
7. Konv. 3. 1527. fol. 38. Cf. Gbor Barta, La route qui mne Istanbul 15261528. (Studia
Histrica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 195.) Budapest, 1994, 12-13 and 86.
Stande Dargestelltanhand der stemschen Lmdlagc

15261541. (Inaugural-Diss.) G raz,

Budapest, Magyar Orszgos Levltr [hereinafter M O L] E 144, M agyar kincstri levl

trak, M agyar Kamara A rchvuma [hereinafter M K A j Trtnelmi emlkek. Belgy box 1

fols. 63-64. January 12, 1540. Without place The Bestallung of Ferdinand I for Hans Ungnad
" Oberister V eldhawbtman vnnserer Funff Niderosterrcichischen, W indischen vnd Crabatischen Lannde" . Cf. Bernd Zimmermann, " Landeshauptmann Hans Ungnad von Sonnegg

On the help given by the Styrian estates: Gnther Burkert, Ferdinand I. und die stemschen
57-173.

Konv. 1. 1538. A pr. fols. 94-95. Cf. ibid., fols 86-87, 89, 93 and 96-99.

1976,

(1493-1564). Ein Beitrag zu seiner Biographie," in Siedlung, Macht und Wirtschaft.

Festschrift

Fritz Posch zum 70. Geburtstag. (Verffentlichungen des Steiermrkischen Landesarchivs, 12.)
Ed. by Gerhard Pferschy. Graz, 1981,

210.

22

G Z A P LFFY

23

T H E H U N G A R1 A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

w ar co uncillo rs delegated by neig hbo uring p ro v inces. " In p arallel to this

the settlement of and o ffering of p riv ileg es to the Vlachs (Valaclu) and
Usko ks (Uscoci) started in the Cro atian-Slav o nian areas, w ho se certain
g ro up s later o n p lay ed an imp o rtant ro le in the defence of bo rd er
fortresses and then f ro m the eighteenth century in th m ilitary fro ntiers.*
In the p erio d lasting f ro m the battle of Mo hcs to the fall of Buda
the fo rmatio n o f a new defence system w as initiated by the Habsburg
m ilitary lead ership o nly in the Cro atian bo rd er area betw een Z eng g and
Bihcs. Ferd inand I to o k the necessary steps o nly in the territo ries mo stly
threatened by the O tto mans and even if he reco gnized the real nature of
this d anger (namely that Vienna w as also menaced ) he w as unable to
create a co herent defence system to av o id it. W i th his tro o ps reg ularly
sent to Cro atia-Slav o nia and H u ng ary each year, he o nly spo ntaneo usly
reto rted his riv al king John I; at the same time, he co mmissio ned
co mmand ers-in-chief to take charge of the military affairs and bo rd er
defence in H u ng ary . A n d tho ug h he d i d no t seek to o rganize a new
defence system in these far aw ay areas of H u ng ary , that is he w as no t
energetically inv o lv ed against the Otto mans, w i th these steps he still
ensured those regio ns w here later o n the new chain of fortresses co uld
be built u p as the basis fo r the o rg aniz atio n of the new defence system.
He co uld also benefit fro m the serious mistakes co mmitted by the Otto man
military lead ership; i n 1529 and 1532, Sleyman I w ithd rew his tro o p s
to the line of the Lo w er Danube and Drav a and d i d no t retain those
fortresses w hic h afterw ard s faced h i m as the b u lw arks of the new defence
netw o rk and c o uld o nly be regained at the expense of severe losses.
3

2.1.b. The first attempts to organize a new defence system

(1541-1556)

The fall of Buda in 1541 and of the fortresses of Sikl s, Pcs, Szkesfehrvr, Tata, N grd , H atv an, then of Esztergo m o n the Danube, and the
loss of Valp and A ty ina in Slavo nia d u ring the 1543-1544 camp aig n
justified those few w ho w ere of the o p inio n alread y in the 1530s that

Cro atian areasco uld be p o stp o ned , no w there w as no further p o ssibility

f delay d ue to the threat to Styria, Lo w er A ustria (Niedersterreich),
and
Vienna. Immed iate actio n w as needed in the Slav o nian p arts, in H u ng ary ,
and p articularly in the fo reg ro und of Vienna, w hic h the Otto mans had
already menaced by marc hing to the A ustrian fro ntiers. The p attern and
the metho d s w ere g iv en: bo rd er defence regio ns had to be f o rm ed that
w ere similar to those w hic h used to pro tect the so uthern bo rd ers of the
med ieval H ung arian Ki n g d o m ; the basis had alread y been established in
the Cro atian bo rd er zo ne. This w as no easy taskno t o nly fo r financial
or military reasons. W hile the military leaders of the estates of Carnio la,
Carinthia, and Styria in the Cro atian territo ries alread y had a certain
kno w led ge of the place and so me practice in the basics of ho w to create
a defence line, the leaders of the end angered Lo w er A ustria c o u ld o nly
start their job w i th the help o f the co mmand er-in-chief d elegated by them
and of the H u ng arian estates. A t the same time, the o p p o site w as true
as w ell. It w as no t by chance that the estates of H u ng ary , w ho se territo ry
decreased to the shape of a crescent, stressed so many times m the
fo llo w ing years that, fo r the maintenance of the bo rd er fortresses, "there
is a need fo r the financial and military assistance o f the H o ly Imp erial
and Ro yal Majesties and of the Imp erial Princes... because the H u ng arian
w ar tax (subsidium) alone canno t cover all these at al l . " The parties
fighting fo r co ntro l o ver the H ung arian military affairs w ere fo rced to
cooperate in o rd er to surv iv e. Fo rtunately, there w ere p o liticians and
military leaders o n bo th sides w h o und ersto o d the real consequences of
the lack of co o p eratio n.
40

Tho ug h the H ung arian estates elected tw o captain-generals of the

co untry (supremus capitaneus regm Hungri, Obrister Landeshauptmann in
Ungam) at the d iet of Besztercebnya in 1542," they c o u ld no t f u l f i l their
tasks d ue to the lack of financial resources. The d istricts of those fortresses
that co uld be fitted into a new line w ere ruined o w i n g to the O tto m an

these fortresses w o u l d have to be reinfo rced and a new defence system

co v ering the w ho le co untry o rganized . The repeated advance of the
Otto mans created a co mp letely new situatio n. W hile up to this p o int the
creatio n of the new sy stem w ith the exceptio n of the mo st end angered

4 0

" Subsidium vel pecuniarum, vel gentium Sacrae Caesareae et Regiae M ajestatum ac

imperii pnncipum omnino est necessarium..., nam Hungaricum per se subsidium ad ista
omnia haudquaquam satis futurum esse, jam majestas sua intelligit." 1547: article 16. Magyar
lmnytr.

(Corpus

Juris Hungria)

15261608.

rvnyczikkek

[Articles

A ccompanied by explaining notes by Dezs M rkus [hereinafter

1526-1608).
1899,

198-199.

3 Schulze, Landesdefension, 60-61.

A ntal Fglein, " XV I. szzadi kzigazgatstrtneti adatok Z l yom vrmegybl [Data

3^ Kaser, op. at., 60-79. Catherine W endy Bracewell, The Uskoks of Sen/. Piracy,
and Holy War in the SixteenthCentury Adriatic. Ithaca- London,

of

C/HJ. Budapest,

1992.

Banditry,

on the A dministrative History of County Z lyom in the Sixteenth Century)," Szzadok 57-58
(1923-1924) 474: n. 1.

24

C.7.A PA LFFY

camp aigns so their up keep and the p ay ment of so ld iers co uld not be
covered bv their d iminished incomes. Realizing this, the Hung arian estates
asked Ferd inand I in 1546 to care for the fortresses o f Do mb , Kapo sjvr
So mo g y v r, Lak, Szigetvr, Tihany , Csesznek, and Szentmrto n m Transd anubia, fo r Sg, Pszt , Drgely, Szcsny, Bujk, and Lva north-east
of the Danube w i th the help of his A ustrian p ro v inces, as these fortresses
had been d ep riv ed of all their incomes by the O tto m an ad v an c e " Bv this
time the Otto mans quickly mo v ed fo rw ard despite their military mistakes,
for after their o ccup atio n of the fortresses in the Szermsg there were
no natural obstacles (mo untains, majo r rivers o r marshy areas) u p to Lake
Balato n or the N o rthern and Transd anubian M o untains w hic h co uld have
sto p p ed them. The field tro o ps led by the ro yal co mmand ers-in-chief w ere
no t able to co unterbalance the disadvantages d eriv ing f ro m the natural
surro und ing s so the fortresses enumerated by the estates co uld rely on
o nly d im inished sup p o rt. W hile before 1521 all the military and financial
resources of the co untry co uld be mo biliz ed in o rd er to p ro tect the tw o
so uthern bo rd er castles defence lines, bv the late 1540s this task w as
m ainly entrusted to the A ustrian pro vinces and to the German Emp ire.
In v ain d i d the H ung arian estates try to finance the fortresses fro m the
w ar tax (subsidnim o r dica) of the decreased co untry in 1546; and later
to o , their effo rts resulted each time in f ailure.
41

Fro m all this the m ilitary lead ership i n Vienna came to the co nclusio n
that the field tro o p s o ccasio nally sent to H u ng ary and Cro atia-Slavo nia
w ere no t sufficient to pro tect their pro vinces. Lo w er A ustria and Styna
w ere no w faced w i th the same task as Carnio la and Carinthia w hic h
had been financing the O l d Cro atian bo rd er fo r a decade. Their o d d
sup p o rt, o ften granted y early , but still d ep end ing o n the extent o f the
O tto m an menace had to be replaced by co nstant p artic ip atio n. W hile
Lo w er A ustria, in o rd er to surv iv e, had to und ertake the sup p ly of the
fortresses p ro tecting Vienna and its d istrict and the castles no rth of Lake
Balato n, Styria had the same job co ncerning the bo rd er fortresses of
Slavo nia shrunken to the territo ries betw een the Sava and Drav a w est of
Pozsega. A t the same time, the estates of Carnio la and Carinthia w ere
co nfro nted w i th new tasks fro m the 1550s on as the o w ners o f the
fortresses in the regio n fro m Bihcs to Sziszek and no rth of the river Una

arhcl " e

^ TslsT^

a c

P"

M O L E 554 M K A Vrosi s kamarai iratok. Fol. Lat. 851

*P**

* un . "
t

154*

25

H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

more and mo re frequently turned to their ruler fo r help . The reason fo r

this w as that the Cro atian-Slav o nian ban, g rad u ally d ep riv ed of the
military autho rity he had possessed befo re the battle of Mo hcs, w as
unable to protect this territo ry effectively w i th the infantry and cav alry
troops co nsisting of o nly a few hund red p eo p le p aid by the king f ro m
the dica, that is he remained as helpless w i tho u t the sup p o rt of the
neig hbo uring A ustrian p ro v inces as the tw o captain-generals

of the

co untry elected by the H ung arian estates.

In the fo und atio n of the new defence system in the 1540s, a decisive
role w as p lay ed by N iklas Graf z u Salm, ro y al co mmand er-in-chief, and
Pal Vrday, A rchbisho p of Esztergo m and lucumtcncns. Salm, c o mmand er-in-chief fo r the w ho le theatre of w ar against the Otto mans (Obrister
Feldhauptmann der Krone Ungarn, der Windischen, Kroatischen und Niedersterreichischen
Lande)' * and ap p o inted in 1546, had a better w o rking
relatio nship than his predecessors w ith the locumtenens and w ith the
Transd anubian captain-general (supretnus capitnneus partium Transdanubianarum) and the 'Cisd anubian' captain-genera) (supremus capitnneus partium
Cisdanubtanarum) ap p o inted to the territo ries no rth and east of the D anube. The process w hic h resulted in the f o rmatio n of a co herent defence
system rang ing f ro m the A d riatic Sea to the Transy lv anian bo rd er in
tw enty years w as the f ruit o f their w o rk starting at the turn o f the 1550s.
Furthermo re, the metho d s w hic h w ere alw ay s ap p licable in their p erfected fo rms if new defence zones had to be created against the O tto man
advance, came into being in this p erio d . A n d tho ug h the m ilitary
lead ership in Vienna w as still far f ro m o rg aniz ing the defence on the
basis o f a coherent strategy, the many fo rced measures bro ug ht their first
results by 1556.
The restructuring w o rk w as hamp ered bv the fact that mo st of the
castles to be includ ed in the new system of fortresses w ere p riv ately
o w ned at that time. A n o utstand ing ly im p o rtant task of Salm, Vrd av,
and their successors w as either to take these fortresses entirely into ro y al
use (Szigetvr, Eger, Gy ula) or to make sure that the ro y al garriso n sho uld
be p laced in the p riv ate ones (Papa, Csesznek, Devecser). So metimes new
fortresses (Olhjvr)mainly p alisad esw ere erected, tho ug h this w as
still no t c o mmo n practice. It w as of mo re imp o rtance, tho ug h, that several
m ino r fo rts w ere strengthened in the d istrict of ro y al castles and w ere
1

StA

H H StA Hungarica A A

(V ienna, M arch 21, 1546).

Fasc. 54.

1546-1547

fols. 14-29. Contemporary

copy

26

m anned f ro m large fortresses and that the castles, mansio ns and cloisters
no t f itting in the system w ere d estro yed . But these actions w ere alw ays
acco mp lished i n the last minute so the establishment of the new defence
netw o rk p ro ceed ed quite halting ly ; and the aband o ned castles that w ere
no t b l o w n u p o ften became v ery imp o rtant elements in the Otto man
system o f stro ng ho ld s i n H ung ary .
The taking o ver of the castles by the king and the sup p ly of them w ith
so ldiers w ere fo llo w ed by their fo rtificatio n. Ho w ev er, mo st of the constructio n w o rks in this p erio d w ere no t subject to co mprehensive controls and
b u ild ing s w ere no t co nstructed acco rding to mo d ern architectural proced ures but in a ro ugh-and -read y w ay , mainly by build ing palisades made of
so il and beams. The exception to this rule w as the fo rtificatio n of the
strategically mo st imp o rtant castles such as Esztergom, Ko mro m, Gyr,
Szo lno k, Eger, and Kassa und er the d irectio n of Italian p ro fessio nal
m i l i tary architects hired by the Vienna hig h c o mmand . A t the same time,
there w ere halts in the w ar supplies and p ro v isio n of fo o d , and the use of
German and Hung arian so ldiery together caused some further pro blems so
far u nkno w n to the Habsburg military leadership. Tho ug h in o rder to defend
the hinterland pro vinces they started to create a system of signalling w ith
gunsho ts and fires (Kreidschuss- und Kreidfeuersystem)"
the w ho le defence
line still d i d no t w o rk effectively eno ugh. To develo p this bo rd er defence
into a coherent system there w as a need for a central d irecting bo d y that
c o uld go v ern them acco rd ing to the same concept. But before the
establishment of this in 1556 the fo rmatio n of the units of the new defence
system began, if no t in integrated framew o rks. The fo llo w ing table pro v id es
info rmatio n on these defence zones, the cavalry and infantry tro o ps serving
in them, and o n the mo nthly and annual costs of their p ay .
45

T h

, organization of the defence system against the Ottomans and the number
and payment of the soldiers in the border fortresses, 1D56
N umber
of
fortresses

^ I d ^ ^ ro ati aT T ci ^

2 major

N umber
of
infantry

Total annual
payment

565

241

6433 r. f. 50 k.

77 206 r. f.

944

900

9263 r. f 21 k.

I l l 160 r f.

fortresses
+ minor
ones
" vv^ndislTconftnes

15 +

12 k.

field
troops
^rToopT^ed by the ban
Border fortresses

Sziget +

around Szigetvar

minor

200

300

2338 r. t.

28 056 r. f.

1080

826

8144 r. f. 11

97 730 r. f. 15

k. 1 d.

k.

ones
Border fortresses

987

1874

around G yor

Confines protecting

11 933 r. f. 36

143 203 r. f.

k.

12 k.

928 "

150

5788 r. f.

69 456 r. f.

762

826

6711 r. f. 35 k.

80 539 r. f.

1375

859"

10 250 r. f.

123 000 r. i.

250

915

4927 r. f. 5 k.

59 125 r. f.

1000

2000

13 000 r. f.

156 000 r. f.

about 50

8978

8004

78 789 r. f. 38

945 475 r. f.

k. 1 d.

39 k.

Komarom

the mining towns

Border fortresses in

min. 4 +

Upper Hungary

field

51

troops
Captaincy-general of

min. 2 +

the Lower Parts

field
troops

Imperial troops in
Transylvania

48

V idor Pataki, " A XV I. szzadi vrpts M agyarorszgon [The Fortification of Castles

Total
monthly
payment

dumber
of
cavalry

46

4 5

27

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

G Z A P L FF Y

Total

R. f - Rheni sh forint; k=Kreuzer; d=Pfennig

in Hungary in the Sixteenth Century]," A Bcsi Magyar Trtneti Intzet vknyve 1 (1931)
98-132.
4 6

Endre M arosi, " Partecipazione

di architetti

militari veneziani alia costruzione

del

sistema delle fortezze di confine in Ungheria tra il 1541 e il 1593," inRapporti venetoungheresi
all'epoca del Rmascimento

(Studia Humanitatis, 2.). Ed. by Tibor Klaniczay. Budapest,

1975,

195-215.
4 7

G erman Mrser zu Kreidschssen

or Larmmrscr

= Latin mortanum pro dando signo seu

rumore or bombarda ad sonum apta = Hungarian hrlv mozsr or hrpattanty

= Croatish

glasnik and Turkish haberdar. Simoniti, op. cit., 169-179. G ustav Otruba, " Z ur Geschichte des
Fernmeldewesens

in sterreich," in Technologisches Cewerbemuseum.

Jahresbericht

1955/56.

V ienna, 1956, 15-43.

4

1556: StA H H S tA Hungarica A A . Fase. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juii fols. 16-37.

4 9

I counted the 24-person auxiliary staff of the commander- in- chief including the artil

lerymen serving in the fortressesin the infantry.

5 0

The 928 infantrymen consisted of 528 Hungarian boatmen (naszados) and 400 G erman

infantrymen
5 1

(Landsknecht).

I included in this figure the muster master (Mustermeister),

schreiber), the war paymaster (Knegszahlmeister),

zahlmeisterKontrolleur)

the muster scribe

and the war paymaster inspector

(Muster
(Kriegs

who were employed to supply the fortresses from Pozsony to G yul a,

and also the 125 infantrymen calculated from the amount of pay they received in the castle
of Saros.
Together with the 59 coach-horses (Postpferd) used in Hungary.
5 2

28

G Z A

P LFFY

29

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

Up to 1556 there w ere no essential changes in the o rganizatio n of

the O l d Cro atian co nfines established by 1538. Their fortresses were
d iv id ed into tw o captaincies (Hauptmannscluift),
the castle d istricts of
Z eng g (Oto csc, Brinje, Brlo g) and Bihcs (Ripacs, Szo ko l, Izacsics, and
To p licski turanj) . In ad d itio n to their g arriso n, the tro o ps o f the bo rder
zo ne inc lud ed the so ld iers serv ing in the guard -ho uses (German Skart,
Skarthaus; Latin excubia; H u ng arian gr; Tu rkish cardakf* and in the
forests p aid b y the ruler (Skartleut), w ho se task w asacco rd ing to a
co ntemp o rary d o c ument to w atch d ay and nig ht and signal in case of
a raid by the enemy .' The sailors o n the A d riatic Sea, w h o p lay ed an
im p o rtant ro le in c o ntro lling the coastline so uth of Z engg, belo nged to
this o rg aniz atio n as w ell. Besides the tro o ps o f the co mmand er-in-chief,
the Cro atian bo rd er area w as d efend ed by the bans Pter Keglev ich and
Tam s N d asd y (1537-1542), then f ro m 1542 b y ban Mikl s Zrnyi
(1542-1556) w i th a few hund red of his cavalry and infantry , especially on
the territo ries rang ing f ro m Bihcs to Sziszek alo ng the Una and the
Ku lp a.
53

Since the Otto mans w ere g rad ually ad v ancing on the Slavo nian territo ries betw een the Drav a and the Sava in the 1540s, in o rd er to defend
Styria, the fo und atio ns of the so-called W end ish, that is Slavo nian bo rd er
defence zo ne (windische Grenze) w ere relativ ely q uic kly laid . So ldiers p aid
by the Sty nan estates w ere sent to the bo rd er fortresses of the riv er valleys
(L nya, Csz ma, Drav a) so uth and south-east o f Vrasd , w hic h w ere supp o rted by the field tro o ps of the co mmand er-in-chief, even o ccasio nally
by the army of the ban in case of a majo r O tto m an raid . In ad d itio n to
the 1,800 ro yal tro o p ssimilarly to the Cro atian bo rd er lineseveral nobles
had their o w n armies, w hic h also to o k p art in the defence of the mo re
and m o re threatened p art of the co untry , tho ug h these w ere no t subo rd inated to the co mmand er-m-chief. N iklas Graf z u Salm ap p o inted in
1546 w o rke d in H u ng ary , w hic h w as mo re end angered than Slavo nia,
therefo re, as he had been represented in this bo rd er regio n by his assistant

co mmand ers-in-chief (Verwalter

der obristen Feldhauptmannschaft)

several
rimes, after his d eath i n 1550, the title of the co mmand er-in-chief of
Hung ary and Cro atia-Slav o nia w as d iv id ed into tw o parts. W hile his
tasks in H u ng ary w ere assigned to Sforza Pallav icini ap p o inted f ield
marshal (Obrister Feldmarschall in Ungarn, supremus bellicus mareschallus in
Hungria),
Hans Ung nad became co mmand er-in-chief in the Cro atianSlavo nian bo rd er area (Obrister Feldhauptmann an den imndischen und
kroatischen Grenzen) in 1553. In the co ntro l of this second defence reg io n
and in the co mmunicatio n w i th the three pro vinces p ay ing the so ld iers,
assistance w as p ro v id ed by a Styrian, a Carnio lan, and a Carinthian w a r
co uncillo r, apart f ro m the field marshal (Feldmarschall) in the mid -1550s.
The perso nnel of the co mmand er-in-chief also includ ed a muster master
(Mustermeister),
a w ar paymaster (Knegszahlmeister),
a p ro v isio n o fficer
(Proviantmeister);
furthermo re, o n the Cro atian bo rd er a special d ep u ty
(Leutnant) w as also c o mmand ed to help hi m .
%

57

The establishment o f the new defence zones in H u ng ary w as mo st

rap id o n territo ries p ro tecting Vienna and Lo w er A ustria. A n im p o rtant
step in this d irec tio n w hic h also d etermined later d ev elo p mentsw ass
that, in parallel to the ap p o intment of Salm as co mmand er-in-chief in
1546, the fortresses no rth of Lake Balato n (Gy r, Ppa, Veszp rm, and
Szentmrto n) w ere sup p lied w i th so ldiers p aid by the Lo w er A u strian
estates. Thus the o rg aniz atio n of a bo rd er fortress zone w as also initiated
58

in H u ng ary , a zone similar to bo th the one that had existed befo re the
battle of Mo hcs and the one that had already taken shape in Cro atia.
That this new defence unit w as of extreme imp o rtance to Vienna is sho w n
by the fact that in its eight fortresses there w ere many mo re so ld iers in
1556 than i n the tw o d o zen castles of the O l d Cro atian and Slav o nian
co nfines p ro tecting the three Inner A ustrian pro vinces.

3 6

See note 65.

57 Lopasic, op. cit., 1889, 420-426: No. XV .

Radoslav Lopasic, Spomcma hrvatske krajme (Acta histrim confirm militaris Croatia
illustrancia). III. Od godme 1693 do 1780 i u dodatkuodg. 1531 do 1730. (Monumenta Spectantia
Histrim Slavorum M endionalium, XX.) Zagreb, 1889, 390-391: No. III.
5 3

5 4

See the picture of a typical example in Vojna Krajina, supra, 33.

5 5

" T ag und nacht zwischen den trkischen Schlssern auf der W acht Hegen mssen."

Sndor Takts, Rajzok a trk vilgbl [Sketches from the Ottoman W orld], II. Budapest,
70: n. 2. Skartleuts

1915,

were employed on the Croatian border later, too. In 1573 for example

eight guards were serving " am Wasserflus V nna" : StA K A A FA

1573/11/1.

5 StA Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv

[FHKA J, Hofkammerarchiv

[hereinafter H K A ]

Niedersterreichische Kammer R N 46. 1566. Jan. (without fols.) and ibid., Hof f inanz Ungarn
[hereinafter: H FU ] R N 2. 1546. fols. 48. a/ 1-18. See also Lajos Gecsenyi, " Ungarische Stdte
im V orfeld der Trkenabwehr sterreichs. Z ur Problematik der ungarischen

Stdteent

wicklung," in Archiv und Forschung. Das Haus, Hof und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung

fr

die Geschichte sterreichs und Europas. (Wiener Beitrge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 20/1993.)
Ed. by Elisabeth Springer und Leopold Kammerhofer.
A ngelika Hametner, Die niedersterreichischen
1970,

84.

W ien- M nchen,

1993,

64-65, and

Landtage von 15301564. (Phil. D iss.) W i en,

30

G Z A

P LFFY

U p to his death in sp ring 1550, N iklas Graf z u Salm co ntro lled the
defence o f the co untry and started to fashio n the new defence system
w i th his d ep uty , his w ar co uncillo rs and his secretary, and w i th the
locumtenens Pl Vrd ay (d ied in 1549), co o p erating w i th h i m efficiently.
He w as g reatly assisted by Tams N d asd y , the Transd anubian and
A nd rs Btho ry, the Cisd anubian captain-general of the c o untry . W hile
N d asd y , after the ro yal taking o ver of Szigetvr in 1546, tried to create
a co herent system o ut of the castles so uth of Lake Balato n and the ones
p ro tecting his estate o f Kanizsa (Szigetvr, Kapo svr, Do mb , Lak,
Berzence, Bab csa, Segesd, Kisko mro m, etc.) w i th the help of the captain
o f Szigetv r und er his cap taincy-general,^ A nd rs Btho ry attemp ted to
f u lf il similar tasks in Up p er H ung ary . M eanw hile, in 1551, w i th the help
o f Geo rge M arti n u z z i , there w as an unsuccessful attem p t to place
Transy lv ania und er Habsburg lead ership. W hile Ferd inand I sent a majo r
army to the p rincip ality led by Gianbattista Castaldo, the Otto mans captured
fortresses o f crucial imp o rtance (Veszprm, Palota, Drgely, Szcsny,
Ho ll k , Bujk, Sg, Gy armat) d u ring their 1552 camp aig n. O nly the
hero ic f ig hting of the garriso n o f Eger co uld stop the enemy threatening
the up p er p arts of the co untry . But Szo lno k and Temesv r w ere o ccup ied
and had to be replaced b y Gy ula and Vrad , as in 1550, after the taking
o f Temesv r fo r Ferd inand , the Vienna hig h c o m m and had tried to
reo rganize the captaincy-general o f the Lo w er Parts (capitaneatus partium
regm Hungri inferiorum) created by Matthias Co rv inus in the mid-1470s
as p art o f the new defence system. In accordance w i th the med iev al
co ncept, considerable number of soldiers w ere sent to Temesv r and the
neig hbo uring m ino r fortresses; furthermo re, an attemp t w as mad e to
mo biliz e the nearby co unties in the hinterland to d efend these stro ng ho ld s,
tho ug h they w ere rather exhausted by the O tto man d ev astatio n. The loss
o f Temesv r and Szo lno k in effect shattered this exp eriment. A n d
altho ug h in 1554 the o ffice o ften called in this time the cap taincy-general
o f the areas bey o nd the Tisza (supremus capitaneatus partium
Transtibiscanarum) w as held by the Bisho p of Vrad and laterafter Vrad w as
attached to Transy lv ania (1557)by the captain of Gy ula, it w as o nly a
matter o f time before the remnants of the captaincy-general o rg aniz ed in

the so uthern parts of the co untry in the 1470s submitted to O tto m an

advance.
The o ccupatio n of the fortresses in co unty N grd in 1552 and of
Flek tw o years later cut an eno rmo us w ed g e into the co untry und er
Ferd inand I's rule. There w as a chance that the Otto mans w o u l d sever
the co nnectio n betw een the territo ries near Vienna and the areas and
fortresses o n the tw o banks of the Tisza. A t the same time, the m i n i n g
to w ns situated in H u ng ary alo ng the riv er Garam, still p ro v i d i ng a lio n's
share of inco mes i n the d iminished co untry , passed into the fo refro nt of
Otto man co nquest. Vienna regard ed their p ro tec tio n sim ilarly to the
significant Up p er H u ng arian partsas extremely imp o rtant. A fter the fall
of Flek in 1554, they placed Jno s Balassa, the hig h sheriff and cap tain
of Z lyo m (comes and capitaneus Zoliensis)
in charge of the bo rd er
fortresses d efend ing the m i n i n g to w ns f ro m Lva to Div ny (Lva,
Ko rp o na, Bo z k, Z lyo m, Kkk , Divny, Libetbnya, etc.). Balassa held
this office called the captain-general of the m i ni ng to w ns (supremus capi
taneus civitatum montanarum) u p to 1562. Similar tasks w ere fulfilled in
Up p er H u ng ary by Gbo r Pernyi (1554-1555), the successor of A nd rs
Bthory, w h o w as ap p o inted V o iv o d e of Transy lv ania (1552-1553), and
by Istvn Dersffy, the captain of Kassa (1556-1557) after Pernyi d eserted
to John Sig ismund .
A lbeit the instructio n sent to field marshal Sforza Pallav icini in
N o v ember 1552 decreed that all the so ldiers in the bo rd er fortresses no rth,
61

62

63

64

> A summary

of all this: Gza Plffy, " V delmi ve/ etek

a Tisztl keletre a XV I

szzadban [Defence Zones East of the River Tisza in the Sixteenth Century]" in In memonam
Barta Gbor. Tanulmnyok Barta Gbor emlkre. Ed. by Istvn Lengvri. Pcs, 1996, 209-227.
6 1

M rkus Khbach, DieEroberung von Flek durch die Osmanen 1554. Eme

krittsche Sludie zur osmanischen Expansion

europas, 11/18.) W ien- Kl n- W eimar,
6 2

histonschauellen

(Z ur Kund Sdost-

1994.

M O L E 185 M K A A rchvum familiae N dasdy [hereinafter E 185], M issiles. The letter

of Jnos Balassa to Tams N dasdy

6 3

un ostlichen Mitteleuropa.

O n the appointment

Z lyom, July

9,

1555.

of Pernyi: " A nno Chnsti 1554.

die 8. M artii supremus

For these smaller castles, see Csaba Csorba, " Erdtett s vrr alaktott kolostorok a

D l- D unntl trk kori vgvri rendszerben [Cloisters Fortified and Converted

into

Castles in the South-Transdanubian System of Border Fortresses in the Ottoman Era],"

Somogy megye mltjbl. Levltri vknyv 5 (1974) 13-47.

regm

Ungariae dux et capitaneus a rege Ferdinando constiruitur." Budapest, O rszgos Szchnyi

Knyvtr [hereinafter O SzK[, Kzirattr [hereinafter K t] Fol. Lai . 1402. t'ol. 7.

31

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

A greement

with him on the payment of his soldiers: M O L E 211 M K A Lymbus Series II. Item 24. fols.
74-75.
6 4

Dersffy's instruction: Kosice, A rchv Mesta Kosic, Collectio Schwartzenbachiana

1780 and O StA K A A FA 1557/ 6/ ad 8. His appointment:

Fasc. 11. No. 35.

No.

M O L E 142 M K A Acta publica

32

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

G Z A P LFFY

w est, and east of the Danube w ere to obey h i m / this d i d no t come into
effect except fo r the castles south-east of Gy r d esignated as his headquarters. '' In the curtailment of Pallav icini's autho rity those interests can
be reco gnized w hic h mo tiv ated the tw o captain-generals o f the co untry
and first o f all Tams Nd asd y , ap p o inted palatnus in 1554. They d i d not
w ant to g iv e u p the lead ership of the defence system o r at least active
p artic ip atio n in it. A n d the successes o f the O tto mans betw een 1552 and
1554 p rev ented the Habsburg military lead ership and Pallav icini fro m
so lv ing the p ro b lem o f autho rity amo ngst the mo st urg ent defence
measures. The new system co uld no t be o rganized w itho u t the Hung arian
land o w ners and military leaders possessing castles near the bo rd er and
w ell-v ersed i n w arfare against the Otto mans (such as Nd asd y , Balassa,
Btho ry, Pernyi, Dersffy , Ferenc Tahy, o r Jno s Krusith), no t to mentio n
the Cro atian-Slav o nian bans. The reason fo r this w as that there w ere
scarcely any Lo w er o r Inner A ustrian military leaders at that time w ho
c o u ld have efficiently replaced the H u ng arian no bles kno w i ng the
H u ng arian m ilitary and p o litical situatio n. It seemed ad visable to inv o lv e
the H ung arians in co ntro lling certain units of the defence system at the
expense o f so me co mp ro mise. A s palatimis, N d asd y w as p ractically in
charge of the fortresses aro und Szigetvr so uth o f Lake Balato n; Jno s
Balassa o rg aniz ed the castles p ro tecting the m ining to w ns; Gbo r Pernyi
and then Istvn Dersffy und erto o k the military co ntro l of the Up p er Parts
of the co untry east of co unty G m r (partes superiores).
5

By the mid-1550s the establishment o f the new defence system had

been co mmenced all o ver H u ng ary ruled by Ferd inand I . This huge m i l itary o rg aniz atio nev en in Euro p ean term s d id no t w o rk und er unified
6 5

" D ans

ad universos ac smgulos capitaneos, castcllanos ct milites nostras ex utraque

Danubii parte existentes firmissimis mandatis, ut eundem tanquam supremum bellicum

marescalcum nostrum colant et observent ipsique debitam et convenientem

obedientiam

praestent" (Ebcrsdorf, November 16, 1552). O StA H H S tA Hungarica A A . Fasc. 68.

N ov.

fols. 108-112. Cf . also " ipsique simul curam

superioribus

regni

nostri

Hungri

partibus,

ex

arcium et locorum
utraque

1552.

nostrorum

Danubii parte

in

existentium

demandaverimus" (Ebersdorf, November 16, 1552). Ibid., Fasc. 49. Konv. A . 1542. Okt. fols.

33

central co ntro l at that time. In the lo ng ru n , ho w ev er, the v aried zo nes

and units of the system co uld no t be efficiently o perated w i tho u t the
co o rd inatio n of the central military ad ministratio n because it w as at that
time that m ilitary affairs i n Euro p e started to d ev elo p in such a w a y
w hic h w as later labelled as the ' m i l i tary re v o l u ti o n' b y m o d e rn
histo rians. Strategy and tactics w ere g rad ually transfo rmed , firearms
became mo re and mo re d ecisive, the new metho d s of the castle
fo rtificatio n w ere inv ented in Italy , the military sciences u nd erw ent an
unusually fast d ev elo p ment, huge armies began to be emp lo y ed just to
mentio n the basic and w ell- kno w n changes. A l l this required that
qualitatively new metho ds o f lo gistics sho uld be w o rked o ut, eco no my
sho uld serve the p urp o ses o f w ar, and last b ut no t least that
military -ad ministrativ e refo rms sho uld be carried o ut w i th the aim o f
facilitating central co ntro l and the lo gistics o f the armies and the b o rd er
defence zones. A n d tho ug h u p to 1556 the signs of these changes co uld
hardly be recognized in the Hung arian theatre of w ar, the new system
co uld no t be co ntro lled w i th o u t a central sup reme c o mmand ev en in this
immature f o rm . This w as realized in time in Vienna, w hic h had just
become an Imp erial City , w hen i n N o v ember 1556 the A u lic W ar C o u nc il
(Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Consilium Bellicum) w as set u p .
67

2.2.A. The consequences of the foundation of the Aulic War

in Vienna

Council

(1556-1566)

Before 1556 the theatre o f w ar against the Otto mans in H u ng ary had been
go verned by the co mmand ers-in-chief of Ferd inand I and the m ilitary
co uncillo rs (verordnete Kriegsrdte) o rd ered to help them, w h o w ere ap p o inted o nly fo r the p erio d o f a camp aig n. The co ntro l o f the ne w d efence
system w as greatly hamp ered by the fact that the co mmand ers-in-chief
had to share their tasks w i th the bans in the Cro atian-Slav o nian b o rd er
areas, and in H u ng ary w i th the locumtenens, f ro m 1554 to 1562 w i th the
palatinus, and also w i th the tw o captain-generals o f the co untry . W i th the
establishment o f the A u l i c W ar C o u nc il in 1556 the p ro b l e m o f c entral

39-40 (under bad archival placement) and M . Khbach, op. t., 214-215, furthermore StA
K A M emoiren 28/1334/11. pp. 268-269.
" V igore instructions ratione officii mei bellimarsalcatus mihi datae universi praesidiarh
milites, equites et pedites ex utraque parte Danubii adusque Tijbiscum et D ravum existentes
mihi subiacent, verum deinde postquam bellimarsalcatus officio fungor, me inscio plures
capitanei et milites cum sunt dimissi vel noviter conducti, turn de uno in alium locum
traducti ..." M O L E 185 Missiles. The letter of Sforza Pallavicini to Tams N dasdy. Gyr,
July 6, 1555.

67 1 mention only some authoritative

works: M ichael Roberts, The Military

Revolution,

15601660. Belfast, 1955. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the
Rise of the West, 15001800. Cambridge, 1988. Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution?

Military

Change and European Society, 15501800. M acmillan, 1991, and most recently The

Military

Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation

Clifford

Rogers.

Boulder- San Francisco-Oxford,

1995.

of Early Modern Europe.

For the impact

of the

revolution in Hungary, see the article of Jozsef Kelenik in the present volume.

Ed. b y
military

34

G Z A

35

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BL' R C BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

PA LFFY

military leadership and ad ministratio n w as finally settled . The command

ers-in-chief and their co uncillo rs w ere replaced by a bo ard o f experts that
had a co nsid erable number of members and met d aily . The bo ard had
the task of exercising co mp lete central co ntro l o v er the military admin
istratio n. So its measures taken i n the name of the ruler co uld not be
d efied either by the locumtenens o r the captain-generals of H u ng ary and
the bans. A l l this d ecid ed the struggle fo r the lead ership of the central
m ilitary co ntro l w i th the H ung arian estates and their leaders to the
ad v antage of the ruler and his A ustrian estates. A fter the d eath of the
influential locumtenens and palatums, Tams Nd asd y , i n 1562, the
locumtenentm regia finally lo st its functio n of co ntro lling military affairs
and it co uld no t regain it after the co nsiderable streng thening of the
estates in the seventeenth century either.
The establishment of the A ulic W ar Co uncil w as necessitated by the
requirement that the d ifferent parts of the new defence system be organized into a unified w ho le. This w as expressed by the fact that d iplo macy
to w ard s the O tto m an state closely co nnected w i th the defence w as mostly
ad ministered by the War Co uncil u ntil the early eighteenth century. On
the o ther hand , all those offices that w ere to be o rganized o r stabilized
in the f o llo w ing decades to co o rd inate the d ifferent field s of military
affairs f ully served the sup p ly of the bo rd er fortresses in the sixteenth
century . The co ntro l o ver the arsenals of the bo rd er fortresses and the
hinterland sup p ly bases (Graz, Laibach, Triest, Prague, Kassa, etc.) and
o ver the central d irectio n of w ar sup p lies w as p u t in charge of the chief
arsenal o fficer (Obrist-Zeugmeister).
The fo rtificatio n w o rks in the border
areas w ere co o rd inated by co nstructio n superviso rs (Bausuperintendent,
for examp le in Vienna, G v o r- Ko m aro m , the Cro atian-Slav o nian confines),
then later as their superio r, by the chief fo rtificatio n co mmissary (ObnstBaukommissar)
resid ing in Vienna fro m the 1560s. The tw o most
p ro blematic areas o f military affairs w ere also led by separate officers
w i th their increasing staff. Food p ro v isio n w as o rganized by the chief
fo o d p ro v isio n o fficer (Obnst-Proviantmeister),
the p ay ment o f the soldiers
w as so lved by the chief muster master (Obrist-Mustermeister)
and his
68

bordinates, the w ar paymasters {Kriegszahlmeister).

The chief p o nt^neer (Obrist-Schiffmeister,
then Obnst-Schiffbrckmeister)
and the d irectors of the arsenals (Zeugwart) in Vienna and Po zso ny had a great task
the field of w ar sup p lies and the equip ment of the Danube fleet.
hV

A fter 1556, the duties of the War Co uncil and d ip lo macy to w ard s the
Ottomans w ere discharged by the staff of the A ulic War Chancery (Hofknegskanzlei Cancellaria Bellica) w hich was composed of tw o secretaries (Sekretr),
one Registrator, one Expeditor, several drafters (Konzipist) and scribes (Schrei
her) some servants (Diener) and a translator (Dolmetscher).' A t the same time,
0

ue to the ad ministrativ e reforms of Ferdinand 1, the financial matters of

Hungary and the A ustnan provinces had been managed fo r some decades
by separate offices also constantly meeting at certain headquarters and
working as a team. The A ulic Chamber (Hofkammer, Camera Aulica) set up
in 1527 w as the leading o rgan of financial ad ministratio n. A s a result, in
certain matters it exerted some influence o n the Hung arian Chamber
(Ungarische Kammer, Camera Hunganca) w o rking in Buda i n 1528-1529, then
in Pozsony after its reo rganizatio n in 1531. Their role in financing the military
was of utmo st impo rtance as the War Co uncil itself had o nly restricted
financial po w ers; the payment of the garriso n soldiers w as o rdered by the
War Co uncil, but it w as actually assigned by the chambers. The Lo w er
Austrian Chamber (Niedersterreichische Kammer, Camera Austriaca) also had
special tasks in this respect as fro m the 1540s the p ayment of the soldiers
in the fortresses in the vicinity of Gy r that w ere d efend ing Vienna w as
taken up by the A ustrian pro vince.
u

In p arallel to the establishment of the central lead ing o rgan of the

military affairs, negotiations started betw een Ferd inand I and the A ustrian
and Hungarian estates in 1555-1557 to create a coherent defence system.
Though it is beyo nd the scope of this stud y to present these nego tiatio ns in
* On the chief arsenal officer (1567): StA FH K A H K A Niedersterreichische Herrschafts
akten W - 61/ C/ 90/ B.

RN 300/2. fols. 1050-1053; on the construction supervisors: V Pataki,

op.cit., and E. M arosi, op. at.; on the chief fortification commissary (1578): StA K A Sonderreihe des Wiener Hofkriegsrates, Hofknegsrtliches Kanzleiarchiv [hereinafter H K R K1A ]
VI. 6; on the chief food provisional officer (1558): StA K A Protokolle des W iener Hof
kriegsrates [hereinafter H K R Prot.] Reg. Bd. 140. fols. 89-90; on the chief muster master: O .
Regele, op. cit., 84: A nlage 9, and on the chief pontooneer (1557-1558): W ilhelm Brinner,

h 8

Thomas Fellner- Hemrich Kretschmayr, Die sterreichische Zentralvenvaltung.

Maximilian

1. bis zur Vereinigung der sterreichischen

Geschichtliche

bersicht.

(Verffentlichungen

sterreichs, 5.) W ien, 1907,

der

I. Abt. Von

und bhmischen Hofkanzlei (1749). 1

Kommission

fr

neuere

Geschichte

234-241, and Oskar Regele, Der sterreichische

Hofkriegsrat

15561848. (Mitteilungen des sterreichischen Staatsarchivs, Erg. Bd. 1/1.) W ien, 1949, 13-17.

Geschichte des k. k. PionnierRegimentes m Verbindung mit einer Geschichte des

wesens in Oesterreich.
/ 0

KnegsBrcken

W ien, 1878, 7-9 and 611-613: No. 1.

Friedrich Firnhaber, " Z ur Geschichte des sterreichischen M ilitrwesens. Skizze der

Entstehung des Hofkriegsrathes," Archiv fur Kunde sterreichischer

(1864) 98-99 and 140-147: No. XV I.

GeschichtsQuellen

30

36

37

G Z A PA I. FFY

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

detail, tw o majo r develo pments demonstrate the kind of preliminary

w o rk needed to qualitatively transfo rm the bo rd er defence zones. In
January 1556 in Vienna, the representatives of Lo w er and Up p er Austria
(Obcrosterreich),
Stv na, Carnio la, Carinthia, and G rz assembled to take
measures against the O tto man assaults fo r at least tw o or three vears in
advance and to discuss ho w they co uld make the defence mo re efficient
w ith their financial aid . A t this meeting the estates arranged fo r the
establishment o f the War Co uncil, granted co nsid erable sums fo r the
p ro v isio n o f the bo rd er fortresses p ro tecting their p ro v inces and declared
their claim that the captain-generals of the tro o p s in bo rd er castles paid
by them sho uld be chosen fro m amo ng their cand id ates. This time it was
finally d ecid ed that f ro m then on the A ustrian estateseven if thev had
to be fo rced sho uld participate in the up keep and d irectio n of the
H ung arian and Cro atian-Slav o nian bo rd er defence zones no t o nly w ith
field tro o ps b u t w i th permanent garriso ns, to o .'
A t their talks w i th the ruler and the representatives of the A ustrian
estates in 1555-1556, the military leaders of the H ung arian estates also
accepted o ut o f necessity that in ad d itio n to the central d irectio n of bo rd er
defence, they w o u l d g rad ually lose co ntro l of the Cro atian-Slavo nian
bo rd er fortresses and the ones so uth o f Gy r. Ho w ev er, they tried to
ensure the w ar taxes p aid by the co unties and o ther resources of the
co untry to su p p ly the tro o ps of the bans and the captain-generals of
H u ng ary and o f the line of bo rd er fortresses so uth of Lake Balato n and

The structure of the bo rd er defence zones d evelo ped in accordance w ith

e pretensions p ut fo rw ard at the negotiations betw een the A ustrian and
Hungarian estates in the decades up to 1566. A s the Otto mans w ere g rad ually advancing in 'peace-time' as w ell, especially alo ng the Drav a, there
was a need for o rganizing the Cro atian-Slavo nian bo rd er fortresses und er a
single captain-general. In terms of this idea and of the decisions made at
the meeting in Vienna mentio ned above, Hans Lenko v ic w as appo inted
the first captain-general of the Cro atian-Slavo nian confines (Obrist wmdtscher
und kroatischer Grenze) in spring 1556 rather than a co mmand er-in-chief
(Obrtster Feldliauptmann an den windischen und kroatischen Grenzen). A no ther
fundamental change took place in the summer of 1559. The so-called N e w
Croatian confines (near kmatische Grenze) " had been o rganized by this time
on the no rth-w estern bank of the Una from Sziszek to Bihcs and o ppo site
Kostajnica. w hich had been captured three vears earlier. A t the same time,
Lenkovic w as again appo inted the captain-general of the tw o O l d and
New Cro atian and Wend ish confines, and he w as assisted by d eputies
(Obrist-Leutnant) in the three sub-zones." This practically meant the final
completion of the Cro atian confines (krontiiche/krabatische Grenze/Grenzgebiet)
co mbining tw o smaller parts in a short time and the Wend ish bo rd er castles
(windische Grenze/Grenzgebiet), tho ugh they w ere for a lo ng time co ntro lled
by one captain-general.

rang ing f ro m Po zso ny to as far as Gy u la. So they managed to gam

co ntro l of these fro ntier zones. In their ap p licatio n submitted the
f o llo w ing year they pro po sed the sup p ly of the mo st imp o rtant bo rd er
fortresses w i th permanent ro yal tro o ps. W ith their p ro p o sal they
effectiv ely d esignated the most significant elements of the system of
bo rd er castles u p to 1566: so uth and east o f the Danube Ko mro m,
Olhjv r, Lva, Bo z k, Murny, Eger, Ged , Kassa, Husz t, Ecsed, Vrad ,
and Gy ula; i n Transd anubia Gy r, Ppa, [Z alaJSzentgr t, [Z alaJKo mr,
[N ag y jKaniz sa, Csurg , Berzence, Palota, Tata, Vzvr, and Tihany .
72

73

74

73

The field marshal Sforza Pallav icini had similar autho rity in the area
pro tecting Vienna in the p erio d before the establishment of the A u lic W ar
Co uncil. His successor, A d am Gall, ap p o inted the captain-general of Gy r
(Obrist/Oberst zu Raab) at the same time as Lenko v ic in M arc h 1556,
p ractically if not by decreehad the autho rity of a captain-general o v er
the tro o ps in the border, fortresses south-east of Gy r.'" Fro m 1546 the

7 4

Staatsarchiv Nrnberg [hereinafter StA Nrnberg], A nsbacher Reichstagsakten

7 5

StA K A Sonderreihe des W iener Hofkriegsrates,

r

Bestallungen [hereinafter

No. 35. Though recent literature considers Hans Ungnad, appointed

in 1553,

border defence captain-general, his rank as commander-in-chief (Obrister

was only a transition to the formation of the office of border defence
possessed bv Lenkovic (Grenzobnst).

7 1

Jod. Shlz, " A ussohustag der fnf niederosterreichischen Lande in W ien 1556," Archiv

fr Kunde sterreichischer
7 2

GeschichtsQueen

8 (1852) 155-173.

M O L E 156 M K A Urbaria et Conscriptiones Fase. 23. No. 7. M O L E 142 Fase. 3. No.

10 and StA H H S tA Hungarica A A . Fase. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 40-62.
7 3

StA K A A kten des W iener Hofkriegsrates [hereinafter H K R A kten] Exp. 1557. M rz

No. 162.

(Rep

136.) Bd. 40. No. 19.

Cf

Rothenberg, Die sterreichische

Best]

the first

Feldhauptmann)
captain-general
Militargrenze,

.37

and 236-237: n. 33
7 6

" D ie N ew Crabatisch V nnd Yeczo die geferlichist Grniczen "

7 7

StA K A Best. No. 80 and StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 141. A pril 12, 1559, No. 77

and ibid., September 1. No. 1.

7 8

Gecsenyi, op. cit., 66-67. Cf. StA K A Best. No 41 and StA K A M emoiren 28/ 1334/ 11.

pp. 213-215.'

38

39

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

g arriso n tro o p s w ere p aid almo st entirely by the Lo w er A ustrian estates

w h o therefo re d emand ed that an A ustrian o r German captain-general
d elegated by the military lead ership in Vienna be placed in charge of
them. D u ri ng the term of o ffice o f Gall (1556-1560), and then that of his
successor, Eck Graf z u Salm (1560-1574), the autho rity o f the captaingeneral of Gy r further increased o ver the bo rd er fortresses south-east of
Gy r, w hic h p ractically resulted in the fo rmatio n of the Gy r confines
(raaberische Grenze/Grenzgebiet). In 1562, this w as imp arted to the command ers of the bo rd er fortresses as w ell (capitaneis in finibus
Austriacis
intra Damibium et lacum Balathon exislentibus) w hen it w as o rd ered that
they ackno w led g e Salm their sup erio r and captain-general (pro antecessor
et supenore capitaneo), that is the captain-general (Grenzobrist) of the bo rd er
fortresses aro u nd Gy r.

shrunk to the areas betw een co unties Po zso ny and Z lyo m. This d i d no t

Lo cal d irectio n of the bo rd er castles aro und Szigetvr, and o f those

p ro tecting the m ining to w ns and Up p er Hung ary w as carried o ut by the
m ilitary leaders of the H ung arian estates until 1566. The small fortresses
so uth o f Lake Balato n w ere co ntro lled d irectly by the chief co mmand ers
o f the fo rt o f Szigetvr (supremus capitaneus arcis Sziget) and w ere und er
the influence o f palatnus Tams Nd asd y until 1562. Fro m 1563 to 1566,
they belo ng ed to Mikl s Z rnyi, the Transd anubian captain-general, w ho
at the same time held the title of captain-general of Sz ig etv r. The
defence of Up p er H ung ary w as o rganized in a similar w ay ; bo rd er
fortresses and co unties w ere p u t i n charge of Im re Thelekessy, the
captain-general of Kassa and Up p er H u ng ary (supremus capitaneus civitatis
Cassoviensis
et partium
regni Hungri
superiorum)
by A rc hd u ke
M ax im ilian in M ay 1559. A s a result, the territo ries east o f co unty G m r
w ere w i th d raw n f ro m the autho rity of the Cisd anubian captain-general
and to gether w i th the bo rd er fortresses to be f o und there they w ere
subo rd inated to the new ly established Up p er H u ng arian captaincygeneral. So the autho rity of the mentio ned Cisd anubian captain-general

District Captaincy-Generals

79

80

81

StA K A Best. No. 102.

R 0

The instruction of Zrnyi as the Transdanubian captain-general

(A pril 28,1563): StA

K A H K R Prot. Exp. Bd. 142. fol. 166. His Bestallung (May 28, 1563): StA K A Best. N o. 122,
and StA K A H K R A kten Exp. 1564. Juni No. 24. The survey of his forces as captain-general
(after January 19, 1564): StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 143. fols. 8-9.

cause a p ro blem as the latter o ffice w as vacant at that time. W hen in 1564
Istvn Dersffy w as ap p o inted the new Cisd anubian captain-general, he w as
also co mmissio ned to be respo nsible fo r the bo rd er fortresses p ro tecting
the mining to w ns and earlier d irected by Jno s Balassa (1554-1562) and
Istvn Do b (1562-1564). Fro m that time o n these bo rd er fortresses
together w i th the castle of Olhjvr began to be called confinia
antemonlana o r confinia ante montanas cwitates in Latin and
bnyavrosok
eltti vgvrak i n H ung arian (confines in fro nt of the m ining to w ns), but
m German they co ntinued to be called bergstadterische Grenze, w hic h also
meant the bo rd er castles p ro tecting the m i ni ng to w ns.
82

2.2-fc. The consolidation of the new defence system: the Border Fortress

and

(1566-1578)

In the course of the last H u ng arian camp aig n of sultan Sleyman,

Szigetvr and Gy ula w ere cap tured by the O tto mans i n 1566. The loss of
the tw o key fortresses bro ug ht abo ut the p erd itio n of a w ho le chain of
castles, as the m am feature of the defence system w as that its units, the
border zones w ere co mpo sed of a majo r stro ng ho ld and several m ino r
castles subo rd inated to it. W hile the fall of Gy ula marked the end of the
histo ry o f the captaincy-general of the Lo w er Parts (capitaneatus partium
regni Hungri inferiorum) created by Matthias Co rv inus in mid-1470s,
the d o w nf all o f Szigetvr resulted in the loss o f the areas so uth o f Lake
Balaton. A lread y in the early 1560s Gy ula fell into the same iso lated
situatio n as Jajca after the battle of Mo hcs. Its o ccup atio n w as o nly a
matter of time as it w as surro und ed by O tto m an castles (Szo lno k) to the
west and east or fortresses (i.e. Vrad ) belo ng ing to the O tto m an vassal
state o f Transy lv ania. A n d up to as far as To kaj in the no rth there w as
no o ther castle that co uld have substituted it. So the ro y al defence system
was pressed back several hund red s of kilo meters to the line o f the Tisza
and the N o rthern M o untains. A s o p p o sed to Gy u la, there w ere mo re
favo urable o p p o rtunities to make u p fo r the loss o f Szigetv r. The hilly
areas of the co unties of Z ala and So mo gy, the marshy v alley of the riv er
Kanizsa and the med iev al castles to be f o u nd there c o uld be transfo rmed
into a system similar to the one aro und Gy r after a chief castle and the
head quarters of a new captain-general had been d esig nated . The necessity

The instruction of Thelekessy (M ay 8, 1559): M O L E 136 M K A Diversae instructiones

[hereinafter E 136] No. 173. fols. 323-331. A letter warning the Hungarian troops in Upper
Hungary to be obedient in connection with his appointment: StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd.
141. 1559. M ai. 13. No. 66.

82 Dersffy's Bestallung (January 22, 1564): StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 143. fol. 10. His
instruction (after February 6, 1564): ibid., fol. 16. Cf. 1563: article 16. CJH 488-491.

40

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A K 1 A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

o f this w as immed iately reco gnized in Vienna as- w ith the loss of southern
Transd anubia-the eastern bo rd er of Styria and the W end ish confines
became mo re threatened than ever befo re.
The peace treaty of A d riano p le (Ed irne) mad e fo r eight years in 1568
o p ened u p a new phase in the Habsburg -O tto man struggle f o llo w ing the
battle o f Mo hcs. Until the o utbreak of the Lo ng W ar in 1591 no serious
O tto m an attack w as launched against H u ng ary ; still, peace w as only
o stensible at the bo rd er of the tw o w o rl d empires. This p erio d was
characterized by co nstant incursio ns, attemp ts to extend taxatio n to the
territo ry of the enemy, and by skirmishes o n the fro ntier to capture some
m ino r bo rd er fortresses. For this reason the era is called the 'Little War'
(Kleinkrieg). The situatio n is w ell illustrated by a co mmand of Empero r
M ax im ilian II (1564-1576); he o rd ered the cap tain of the fortress of
Kisko mro m situated at the so uthern end of Lake Balato n to keep his
so ld iers in such readiness "as if there w as no peace of any k i n d " " in
o rd er to pro tect the neig hbo uring territo ries.

choice but to use the resources of his p ro v inces and the German Emp ire
to sup p ly the H u ng arian marches. The necessity of this step w as so o n
realized by the H absburg military lead ership f ro m those m ilitary registers
that w ere p rep ared nearly every year to calculate the amo unt needed to
pay the soldiers serv ing in the bo rd er fortresses in H u n g ary . It is w o rth
selecting three muster- and pay-registers (Muster- and Soldliste) fro m the
sixteenth century (1556, 1576, 1593) and using them to d etermine to w hat
extent H ung ary w as i n need of the sup p o rt of the neig hbo uring p ro v inces
and the German Em p ire.
The inco mes o f H u ng ary in the sixteenth century are no t entirely

N o t o nly d i d the lo ng peaceful p erio d facilitate the creatio n of the

o ffices co ntro lling the d ifferent areas of military affairs mentio ned above,
but it also ensured that the defence system co uld really assume a coherent
character. In the lo ng ru n this process, w hic h lasted fo r several decades,
w as d etermined by ho w the A ustrian p ro v inces to o k p art in financing
the bo rd er defence zones in H ung ary and to w hat extent the A u lic War
Co u nc il w as able to co ntro l defence and restrict the lead ing military role
p rev io usly held by the H ung arian estates. This questio n came to the
fo refro nt after 1566, as the territo ry of H u ng ary und er Habsburg autho rity
shrunk to a rather narro w strip stretching f ro m the A d riatic Sea to the
Danube betw een Pozsony and Ko mro m after the loss of Szigetvr. O nly
in the Cisd anubian area as far as co unty Z lyo m and in Up p er H u ng ary
d i d so me territo ries remain unto uc hed by O tto m an incursio ns.
Co nsequently , the defence system in H u ng ary became d ep riv ed of any
hinterland. In this situatio n M axim ilian II and his successors had no o ther

84

85

kno w n d ue to the d iv erg ent financial ad ministratio n and the lack o f

sources. But w e can rely on the estimates mad e by Gy ula Szekfu in 1935,
w hich have been generally accepted. Szekfu p ut the to tal inco me o f
Hung ary in the seco nd half of the sixteenth century at 750,000 Rhenish
fo rint (reinisch Gulden) at mo st. This sum co uld never be co llected co mpletely as, o n the o ne hand , mo st of it w as lo cally remitted , and on the
other hand , it co uld no t be entirely spent on m aintaining defence and o n
the p ayment of the so ld iers. A cco rd ing to Szekfu, a m ax i m u m of 350,000
Rhenish fo rint w as spent o n military expenses o ut o f this amo unt. ' This
is half of the total inco me, w hich seems an o ver o p timistic estimate g iv en
that the data suggest o nly 20.4% of the cash inco me o f the H u ng arian
Chamber w as spent o n the military in 1555-1562 Despite this it is w o rth
co mp aring the tw o m ax i m u m estimated values w i th the amo unts of the
pay of the so ldiers i n the three years mentio ned abo ve. The f o llo w ing
graph p ro v id es inf o rmatio n o n the ratio betw een the to tal annual inco me
of H ung ary and the sums spent on the military and the am o unt of mo ney
needed fo r the p ay ment of the so ldiers in the bo rd er castles.
8

8 4

O n these, cf. Gza Plffy, " A magyarorszgi s dlvidki vgvrrendszer 1576. s 1582.

vi jegyzkei (The Registers of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian Border Fortresses of

8 5

" M ilites autem

nostros nihilommus pro nostrae ditionis tibi subiectae

et vicinae

securiore permansione in eorum officio et statione, non secus, quam si nullae induciae
essent,

die noctuque

excubantes atque in omnem

fortunae casurn promptos

retineas." M O L P 485 Csaldi levltrak, Majthnyi csald, 8. csop. 1. fols. 2-3

S emp er

(Pozsony,

July 14, 1567). Cf . Gustav von Gmry, " Trkennoth und das G renzwesen in Ungarn und
Croatien whrend sieben 'Friedensjahren' von 1575
Kriegs- A rchivs," Mitteilungen des k.k. KriegsArchivs

bis 1582.

Nach Quellen des k. k.

(1885) 155-178 and V asko Simoniti, Turki

so v deleli ze. Turski vvadi na slovensko ozemlje v 15. m 16. stoletju. Celje, 1990, 172-196.

87

1576 and 1582]," Hadtrtnelmi

H ?

41

Kziemnvek 108:1 (1995) 114-185.

1556: StA H H S tA Hunganca hh.

Fasc. 76. Konv 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 16-37. 1576:

StA H H S tA Reichstagsakten der Reichskanzlei [hereinafter RT A ] Fasc. 53. fols. 350-369

Published by Plffy, op. at., 141-158. 1593: Alfred H. Loebl, Zur Geschichte des

Trkenkrieges

von 15931606. 1.Vorgeschichte. (Prager Studien aus dem Gebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft,
Heft 6.) Prag, 1899, 19-29.
8 6

G yula Szekfu, Magyar trtnet [Hungarian History], III. Budapest, 1935, 134 and 137

8 7

Gyz Ember, " A magyar kirlyi kamara pnzbeli bevtelei s szmadsai 1555-1562

[The Cash Incomes and A ccounts of the Hungarian Chamber in 1555-1562]," Szzadok
(1982) 537.

116

42

G Z A P LFFY

1 800 000

The m etho d of f inanc ing the b o rd er d efence m entio ned by the W ar

1 658 736,5

1 600 000

1 400 000

43

T H E H U N G A R I A N H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

1572

533

I
'

I annual payment
' in theory

Co uncil is of special significance because it f u nd am e ntally inf lu enc ed

the final struc ture of the d efence sy stem. In the past, the so u thern
defence line of the m ed iev al H u n g ari an K i n g d o m had been m aintained

the maximum
estimated
annual income
of Hungary

H the maximum part

^ of Hungary's
annual income
spent on military
expenses

1556

1576

1593

The data in the g rap h clearly sho w that the m ax i m u m estimated

inco mes o f H u ng ary co uld no t cover the p ay of the so ldiers in the bo rd er
fortresses. A n d if w e o nly examine the m ax i m u m estimated su m spent
o n m ilitary expenses w e may co nclud e that it w as eno ug h to co ver o nly
25-30% o f the pay o f the so ld iers in the established bo rd er defence system.
The sums in 1576 ind icate clearly w h y Carinthia, Carnio la, Styria, Lo w er
A ustria, the German Emp ire, and ev en Bo hemia and M o rav ia had to
p articip ate co nstantly i n the maintenance o f the bo rd er defence system
in H u ng ary . It also has to be emphasized that this calculatio n do es no t
includ e such 'co nsiderable sums' as the O tto m an d ip lo mac y , fo rtificatio n
o f castles, the p ro d u c tio n and sup p ly of am m u nitio n, fo o d p ro v isio n,
intelligence service, w ar posts and the costs o f the Danube fleet, tho ug h
these amo unts w ere g rad u ally increasing d ue to the p erfectio n o f
ad ministratio n and the results o f the m ilitary rev o lutio n. A s a co nsequence, the bo rd er defence against the Otto mans became a c o m m o n
task of the w ho le o f Eastern Central Euro pe and the H absburg Emp ire.
It w as no t accid entally stressed by the W ar Co unc il befo re the Thirty
Years' W ar (1618-1648) that "ev ery p ro v ince sho uld up keep their o w n
co nfines i n H u n g ary . "
88

89

fro m the c o u ntry ' s o w n inco mes,

" EG 1st aber alhie Z umerckhen, das hierczue rut gerait wiirt, was auf die Jarliche

8 8

sachen, was auch durchs Jar auf M usterung vnd andere Comissions sach lauftt, welches

chang ed

and ind ep end ence after the battle o f M o hcs, a d efence sy stem came
into b eing

on

its territo ry

that w as

financed

by

the

hered itary

pro vinces o f Habsburg s and the G erm an Em p ire, etc. The p rice o f the
suppo rt o f the A u strian p ro v inces w as hig h. The H u n g ari an estates,
alo ng w i t h the central c o ntro l of the m i l i tary af f airs and the O tto m an
d ip lo mac y w h i c h meant f o reig n affairs as w e l l g rad u al l y had

to

reno unce the d irec tio n of the bo rd er fo rtresses w h i c h w ere o f c ru c ial

imp o rtance to the p ro tectio n of the ne i g hb o u ri ng p ro v inc es. H o w e v e r,
they c o u ld no t be to tally ig no red i n the lo cal ad m inistratio n o f the
bo rd er d efence, as the c o unty , no b ility , and o ther H u n g ari an tro o p s
co uld no t be sub o rd inated to Germ an cap tain-g enerals. This c o nf lic t
was p erceiv ed i n Vienna an d i n the kno w led g e of the resu lts it can
be f i rm l y stated that it w as so lv ed satisfacto rily . A c o m p ro m ise had
to be f o u n d w h i c h p erm itted the A u l i c W ar C o u nc il to exert c o ntro l
over the bo rd er defence, b u t d i d no t exclud e the H u n g ari an estates.
In o rd er to achiev e this, the b o rd er fo rtresses m aintained f r o m the
sup p o rt o f the A u strian p ro v inces w ere g rad u ally w i t h d r a w n f ro m the
autho rity o f the o ffice-ho ld ers o f the H u n g ari an estates, the C ro atianSlav o nian ban, then later the Transd anu b ian and C isd anu b ian cap tain-generals of the c o u ntry . A s a co nsequence, the d efence sy stem
against the O tto mans assumed a d ualistic character. To p u t i t m o re
p recisely: o n each territo ry of H u n g ary tw o kind s o f cap taincy -g eneral
came into b eing .
In the o rg aniz atio n of the bo rd er defence the mo st d ecisive ro le w as
p layed

by

the

rist/Grenzoberst,
Turckhische verehrung, alles nottwendig gepew, Artoloreij, M unition, A rsional, Prouiandt

b u t the situatio n had

d rastically by the mid -1560s. W hile H u n g ary p reserv ed its so v ereig nty

so-called
supretnus

bo rd er fo rtress

captain-generals

capitaneus confiniorum).

fo r the d i re c ti o n o f the m i n o r b o rd e r castles

orten, confinia)

(Grenzob-

They w ere resp o nsible

(Grenzfestungen/Grenz-

su b o rd inated to a majo r key fo rtress d esig nated

as

man nit eigeritlich wissen khan, A ber auft dise abbemelte Possten Lauftt Jarlichen ain

their head q uarters in a certain area, that is i n the co nfines o r b o rd e r

ansehenliche grusse Summa gelts." O StA H H StA RT A Fasc. 53. fol. 369.

fo rtress z o ne (Grenze/Grenzgebiet).

" D asJedes landt seine sondere G raniczen in Hungern Z uerhalten" (December 29, 1613)
O StA K A H1CR A kten Reg. 1613. Dez. No. 68.

territo ries and at the same tim e, the so -called d istric t c ap tain- g en-

8 9

erals (Kreisobrist/Kreisoberst,

In p arallel to th e m , o n the same

supremus capitaneus partium regni

Hungri,

44

prorex banus ) w ere o p erating. They d irected the military affairs of the
co unties in the d istricts (Kreis, partes) und er their autho rity and disposed
of the tro o ps d irectly subo rd inated to them co nsisting of the o ut-o f-date
no bility , co unty , and to w n insurgent tro o ps and of the so-called district
cap tain-general arm y o f some hu nd red cav alry and infantry p aid by the
king . W hile the o ffice of bo rd er fortress captaincy-general w as filled bv
the representatives o f the A ustrian estates o r H u ng arian nobles accepted
by them, the d istrict captain-generals w ere exclusively Hung arian
subjects. The separatio n of the bo rd er fortress and the d istrict character
o f the defence system is further co mp licated b y the fact that the tw o
offices w ere o f ten in some parts of the co untry alw ay sheld by the
same perso n. A l l this d epend ed on w hether the War Co uncil w ished to
exercise co mp lete co ntro l over a bo rd er defence zo ne or w hether it ceded
the d irectio n to Hung arians (mainly on territo ries w hic h w ere no t so
d ang ero us fo r the A ustrian pro vinces). In o rd er to und erstand the
seeming ly co mp licated system w e hav e to enumerate the bo rd er fortress
and d istrict captaincy-generals that had been created by the mid-1570s
f ro m the A d riatic Sea to Transylv ania.
90

In Cro atia and Slavo nia the bo rd er defence had been o rganized by
the Cro atian-Slav o nian ban (banus Croatiae et Slavoniae, ban in Kroatien und
Slavomen/ban in Windischland) before the battle o f Mo hcs. The ban was
the military co mmand er o f his banderia, the ro y al garriso ns, and the
insurg ent no ble and co unty tro o ps in his area. A fter 1526 he lost co ntro l
o f the O l d Cro atian bo rd er fortresses and then of the Slavo nian and N ew
Cro atian castles. Later, after several decades, in 1559 their d irectio n w as
taken o ver by the Cro atian-Slavo nian bo rd er fortress captain-general
(Ofensf dcr kroatischen und wmdischen Grenze) and b y his d eputies, the
assistant Cro atian (Obristleutnant
der kroatischen Grenze) and W end ish
b o rd er fo rtress captain-generals (Obristleutnant der wmdischen Grenze). A s
the inco mes of the d iminished co untry d i d no t co ver the sup p ly o f the
bo rd er fortresses, they w ere financed by the estates of Camio la, Carinthia,
and Sty na, and thus the ban w as forced to reno unce co ntro l o ver them.
Fro m that time o n his autho rity in his capacity as d istrict captain-general
The contemporary Hungarian term to designate the district captain-generals was
" captain of the country" (orszghadnagi/, orszgkapitnya). See Gr. lllshzy Istxmn ndor
fljegyzse! 15921603. s Hdvgi Mik Ferencz histrija 15941613 [The Records of the palatnus
Count Istvn lllshzy 1592-1603 and The History of Ferenc Hidvgi Mik 1594-1613].
(M onumcnta Hungri Historica II. Scnptores, V II.) Ed. by Cbor Kazinczy. Pest, 1863, 8,
16, 28, 43 and 56.
9 0

45

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

G Z A P LFFY

as restricted to the military affairs o f the co unties in Cro atia and

Slavonia, that is to the p ractically unusable no ble insurrectio n and the
troops field ed by the co unties of K r s, Vrasd , Z grb, and to his o w n
forces mainly co nsisting o f 250 cav alry and 250 inf antry . The latter can
be regarded as his p rev io us bandrium, tho ug h their p ay w as assigned
from the w ar taxes granted by the Cro atian estates and by other Hung arian
incomes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centunes (see map 1).
On the territo ry betw een the Drava and the Danube, a similar fate befell
the Transdanubian captaincy-general set up in 1542 by the H u ng anan
estates. A fter the Lo w er A ustrian estates assumed the burd en of financing
the border fortresses pro tecting Vienna in 1546, their co mmand w as taken
over by field marshal Sforza Pallavicini and thenby the late-1560sby the
captain-general of the co nfines aro und Gy r (Obrist in Raab und zuge
hriger Grenzfestungen).
The autho rity of the Transd anubian district
captain-general (Kreisobrtst in Transdanubium, supremus capitaneus parlnan
regm Hungri Transdanubiannrum)
was subsequently restricted to the
military affairs o f eleven counties (Mosn, So pro n, Vas, Z ala, Gy r, Ko mrom, Veszprm, Fejr, Somogy, To lna, and Baranya) and the bo rd er
fortresses aro und Szigetvr, so uth of Lake Balaton, and a further 150 cavalry
and 100 infantry. A fter 1566, his sphere of influence w as even mo re limited .
After the fall of Szigetvr the A ulic W ar Co uncil o rganized a new bo rd er
fortress captaincy-general w ith Kanizsa as its centre, and ap p o inted Ferenc
Tahy as its separate captain-general. A ltho ug h he w as still called the
captain-general of the bo rder fortresses betw een Lake Balaton and the nvers
Mura and Drava (supremus capitaneus inter lacum Balaton et fluvios Muram et
Dravum regni Hungri finium) by co ntempo rary sources/ ' his successors
held the title of the captain-general of the bo rder fortresses aro und Kanizsa
(Obnst in Kanisclia und zugehriger Grenzfestungen). Fo llo w ing the O tto man
occupation of the counties o f Tolna and Baranya, the autho rity o f the
Transdanubian captain-general shrank to the military affairs of the
Transdanubian district (partes Transdanubiarme) co nsisting o f the nine
counties left and his infantry and cavalry tro o ps mentio ned above. This
captain-general had no permanent residence; it alw ays d epend ed o n w hether
the person ho ld ing the office chose to be stationed in his o w n p riv ate estate
or m a bo rd er castle w ith his tro o ps. In the latter case he w as the co mmand er
w

'" The extract of Tahy' s instruction (November 13, 1567): StA K A A FA 1566/11/1
also from 1567: " f inium intra lacum Balaton et D ravum ac M uram supremus
StA FH K A H K A Familienakten D - T. 5. fol. 1 and fol. 4.

See

capitaneus"

46

G Z A P LFFY

of that castle as w ell. In o rd er to protect the bo rd er mo re efficiently and

to enhance co o peratio n, this practice w as ap p lied mo re o ften. This
explains w h y Gy rgy Z rnyi, son of Mikl s Zrnyi (d ied in 1566, Szigetvr), co uld be bo th the captain-general of the bo rd er fortresses around
Kanizsa and the Transd anubian d istrict captain-general (see map 2) at
the same time in tw o perio d s (1574-1575 and 1583-1592).
92

The structure of defence on the Cisdanubian territo ry east o f Pozsony up

to as far as co unty Zlyom w as to a certain extent different fro m the setup in
Croatia-Slavonia and Transdanubia. The fortresses here w ere of special
significance for the security of the Bohemian and Mo rav ian provinces. Their
estates, at the incentive of the ruler, started to take part m the sup p ly of the
bo rd er castles pro tecting the mining to w ns (confinai antemontana o r confinia ante
montanas civitates, bergstcidterisclie Grenze) fro m the 1570s o n, mainly fro m the
fo rtificatio n of the totally new bo rder fort, rsekjvr (N euhusel) They,
ho w ever, d i d not w ant to interfere in their co ntro l, so this w as carried o ut by
the captain-general of the bo rd er fortresses d efend ing the mining tow ns
(bergstadterischer Grenzobrist, supremus capitaneus confimorum antemontanonim)
fro m 1564. He w as the district captain-general of the ten counties (Pozsony,
N y itra, Trencsn, Bars, Turc, rva, Lipt, Ho nt, Ngrd, and Z lyo m) of the
Cisd anubian parts (caries Cisdanubianae). Thus, after 1564, the office of the
Cisd anubian district captain-general (Kreisobrtst in Cisdanubium, supremus
capitaneus partium regni Hungri Cisdanubianarum) practically co mprised the
office of the captain-general of the border fortresses d efend ing the mining
to w ns as w ell. This is testified by the fact that, w hen Simo n Forgch in 1569
w as appo inted the captain-general of the confines and the district, he received
o nly one instruction (see map 3).
93

94

9 2

That the two offices were distinct is shown by the fact that Z rinyi received

two

instructions when he was appointed in 1574, and in 1588 he was supported by two assistant
captain-generals

in both

captaincy-generals

47

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

(Grenzobristleutnant

and

Kreisobristleutnant).

The bo rd er defence i n Up p er H u ng ary had a mo re d istinct character.

ftere there w as co nstant w arfare w ith the vassal of the Otto mans, Jo hn
Sz ap ly and his son Jo hn Sig ismund u nti l the late-1560s. For strategic
reasons the d irectio n of the garriso n tro o p s, o f the armies of the co unties
and of the Emp ire sent here co uld no t be separated . These w ere
unanimo usly subo rd inated to the Up p er H u ng ari an cap tain-general o f
e field tro o ps and o ther forces (Feldobnst/Generalobrist
in
Oberungarn,
supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae supenorum),
f ro m 1559 to the
above mentio ned Im re Thelekessy (1559-1560), then to Ferenc Z ay
(1560-1565), fo rmerly imp erial ambassado r to Co nstantino p le, and to the
Euro pe-w id e famo us Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schw end i f ro m 1565 to 1568.
After the treaty o f Speyer w i th Transy lv ania in 1570, there w as no need
to separate the tro o p s of the bo rd er fortresses and o f the co unties either,
so in the Up p er p arts of the co untry (partes superiores) the same cap taingeneralthe so-called Up p er H ung arian m ilitary assistant of the ruler
(prorex, kirlykpe: "imag e of the king " ) w as respo nsible fo r b o th the
border fortresses and the 13 co unties of the area (G m r-Kisho nt, Heves,
Borsod, Szepes, Sro s, To rna, A baj, Z emp ln, Ung , Szabolcs, Szatmr,
Bereg, and Ugocsa). In this manner in Up p er H u n g ary a cap taincy-general
came into being (see map 3) w hic h resembled that w as existing in the
southern p arts of the co untry (partes inferiores regni Hungariae) befo re the
battle of Mo hcs. H o w ev er, the offices and ranks f o rm ed , o w i n g to the
d evelo pment of military ad ministratio n and lo gistics, m arked an essential
difference. A t the incentiv e of Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schw end i, a separate
chamber (Szepesi Kamara, Zipsensche Kammer, Camera Scepusiensis) w as set
up in Kassa i n 1567 to finance the bo rd er fortresses mo re efficiently . In
ad d itio n to the lo cal centralizatio n of the financial ad ministratio n, several
offices w ere established w ho se task w as to act as substitutes of the central
office ho ld ers of the A ulic W ar Co uncil i n this remo te area.
ai

95

96

A ugust 14, 1574: " Instruction vber die Craihaubtmanschaff herdihalb der Thonaw. " StA
K A H K R K1A IX. c. 1 and StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 159. fol. 14. September 4,

1574:

5 Wilhelm Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi oberster Feldhauptmann und Rath Kaiser Maxi

" Instruction vber die oberst Haubtmanschafft Z u Kanischa." ibid., fol. 15. 1588: A rchiv des

milian'sU. Wien, 1871, and Roman Schnur, " Lazarus von Schwendi (1522-1583). Ein unerledigtes

G ermanischen Nationalmuseums N rnberg [hereinafter A rchiv G N M N rnberg], Weltliche

Thema der historischen Forschung," Zeitschriftfr historisclie Forschung 14 (1987) 27-46.

Frsten [hereinafter W F], Siebenbrgen Z R 7657. fol. 75 and fol. 80.

9 3

O n this, see the documents of the Bohemian diets. Die bhmischen

9 6

Landtagsverhandlungen

Upper Hungarian deputy of chief arsenal officer in V ienna

(ObristZeugmeisterLeutnant

m Oberungarn) from 1567; Upper Hungarian military judge (Kriegsrichter

in Oberungarn, judex

und Landtagsbeschlusse vom fahre 1526 an bis auf die Neuzeit. I-VTI. 1526-1591. Ed. by Kniglich

bellicus in parttbus regni Hungariae supenoribus)

Bhmisches Landesarchiv. Prag, 1877-1891 and Regesta fondu Mitare archivu

(Baumeister in Oberungarn) around 1580: Upper Hungarian saltpetre supervisor

ministerstva

from 1568; Upper Hungarian chief architect

(Salitterver

vnitra RCi \ V Praze. Dil I. 1527-1589. (Prameny k Ceskoslovenskym dejinm vojenskym.

ivahrer in Oberungarn) from the mid-1590s, and temporarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth

Svazek 1.) K vydni pfipravil Frantisek Roubik. Praha,

centuries: Upper Hungarian muster master (Mustermeister

9 4

1937.

StA FH K A H K A H FU RN 21. 1570. A ug. fols. 100-108 and M O L E 136 N o. 173. fol.

351 (October 26, 1569).

in Oberungarn),

war paymaster

(Knegszahlmeister in Oberungarn), pontooneer (Sc/iif/fanicicmtisfer in Oberungarn) and food pro

visional officer (Proviantmeister

m Oberungarn).

O n these, see Gza Plffy, " A fkapitnyi

48

GZA

H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

P LFFY

W i thi n this structure in Up p er Hung ary a separate p tainc y - g ene ]

w as set u p o n the territo ries adjacent to the Princip ality of Transylvania
in the mid-1560s. Up o n the p ro p o sal of Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schwendi
the captain-general of Szatmr or the territo ries bey o nd the river Tisz '
(Obrist zu Sakmar samt zugehrigen Ortflecken jenseits der Thei, supremus
capitaneus Zatmariensis et partium Transtibiscanarum)
w as p u t in charge of
the m ilitary ad ministratio n of the bo rd er fortresses (Kall , Kisvrda
Ecsed, and Szatmr) and the co unties (Szabolcs, Szatmr, Ugocsa, and
p artly Bereg) east of the Tisza. By this measure the defence of the territo ries far aw ay fro m Kassa w as effectively ensured . W i th the captaincygeneral o f Szatmr a special Hung arian fro ntier zone came into being
w h i c h d i d no t pro tect the territo ries und er the autho rity of the Hungarian
ki ng against the O tto man Emp ire, but against a rising Christian state that
w as a vassal of the sultan.' A t the same time, the p rincip ality itself established its o w n bo rd er defence zone against the Otto mans w ho se castles
(Z ska, Bajo n, Sarkad, Bl, Belnyes, Szkelyhd , A do rjn, etc.) were
co ntro lled by the captain-general of Vrad (Obrist in Wardein, supremus
capitaneus Varadiensis) w i th p o w ers of autho rity similar to those of the
bo rd er fo rtress captain-generals in the H ung arian King d o m .
ca

ra

The fortress o f Ko mro m also had a d isting uished ro le in the defence

system. This w as v iv id ly expressed by the palatinus Mikl s Eszterhzy
(1625-1645): "Ko mro m is a fo rt of its o w n , it does no t d ep end on any
c ap tain- g eneral" Its special situatio n w as d ue to its extreme significance.
Ko mro m served the defence of the Imp erial City d irectly w i th its Danube
fleet, w i th the Hung arian bo atmen (naszdos). Its chief co mmand er (Obnsi
in Komorn, supremus capitaneus Comaromiensis)
w as in charge of the
German infantry statio ned in the fo rt, the bo atmen serv ing in the town
98

hadiipari mhely kiplse Kassn s nyersanyagellt forrsai [The Formation of the Ar

senal of the Captain-General in Kassa and its Raw Material Resources]," in Vgvr s kr
nyezet. (Studia A griensia, 15.) Ed. by Tivadar Petercsk and Ern Peth. Eger, 1995, 183-221.
Idem, Katonai igazsgszolgltats a kirlyi Magyarorszgon

a XVIXVIl.

49

the fortress, and the H ung arian hussars. His o nly sup erio r w as
Co uncil, w ho se leaders after 1566 ap p o inted exclusiv ely
^rhief c o mmand ers w ith the exceptio n of Mikl s Plffy (1584German cm
icaq)to head the bo rd er castle.
When the peace treaty of A d riano p le w ith the Otto mans expired i n
the Habsburg bo rd er defence in Hung ary co nstituted a w ell o rganized
'
In the 123 bo rder castles registered at this time, there w ere 22,500
system. ^
f t r y tro o ps. The mo st decisive task in the defence w as
nalfuled by the border fortress and the district captaincy-generals in Hung ary
ro er By w ay of illustratio n it is eno ugh to say that o nly 22% of the w ho le
amount of pay was spent o n the salary of the soldiers serving in the 72
castles of the Croatian-Slavonian bo rder, w hile 14% w as allocated to the nine
fortresses in the confines aro und Gy r, and 32% to the 13 castles in Up p er
Hungary. By that time, the significance of the Cro atian-Slavo nian confines,
undoubtedly more imp o rtant fo r the A ustrian pro vinces in the 1520s-1530s,
was overshadowed by the Hung arian defence zones. A t this time and
throughout the fo llo w ing century, the bulw ark of Lo w er A ustria, p rimarily
of Vienna and of the German Emp ire w as Hung ary in the narro w sense.
The Croatian-Slavonian bo rd er defence zone lay far aw ay fro m the
immediate direction of the Otto man advance. Thus the A ulic W ar Co uncil
was able to yield its ad ministratio n in 1578 to the leaders of the Inner
Austnan territories, w hich had strengthened and become ind epend ent i n
the meantime.

n e x f

] i c

0 1 6

i n

a n

99

2.3.a. The endeavours to modernize and their results: the reforms of the great
military conference in Vienna

(1578-1591)

While the bo rder defence d ev elo p ed into a co herent system b y the

mid-1570s, the Otto mans had established their o w n line o f bo rd er
fortresses, and these served as a basis fo r their slo w b u t steady ad v ance.
They expanded their tax-co llecting activ ity in H u ng ary b y co nstant
plundering and then also o ccup ied dozens of v illag es. In 1575 they
100

101

szzadban [Military Ju

risdiction in Habsburg- Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]. Gyr, 1995,
84-85. Cf. also Ondrej R. Halaga, Poiatky Kosc azrod metropoly. Hospodrskosocilne, sprune
a kultme dejmy. Kosice, 1992, 380-390.

" " C ro n V ngernein Propugnakel vnnd V orM aur Deutscher Lannden" (1570). StA
Nrnberg, Ansbacher Reichstagsakten (Rep. 136.) Bd. 43. No. 19.
1 0 0

Klra Hegyi, Trk berendezkeds Magyarorszgon

[Ottoman Rule in Flungary]. (Histria

knyvtr. Monogrfik, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 81-117.

9 7

Plffy, " A magyarorszgi s dlvidki vgvrrendszer," 124-125.

9 8

" Comaromium per se est, quod a nullo supremo generli capitaneo depende!" Az

101

The Ottoman advance is testified by those reports which were prepared by the military

[The Period of the

administration of Vienna on the attacks and damages made by the enemy and sent to the

Uncelebrated Diet in 1642 (Dezember 1640-M arch 1643)]. (Esterhzy Mikls ndor iratai I

ambassadors to Constantinople in order to make a complaint to the sultan. See for example:

1642. vi meghisult

orszggyls idszaka (1640 december1643 mrcius)

[Administration

StA HHStA Trki (Turcica) Karton 43. Konv. 1. 1580. N ov.- D ez. fols. 25-32 and StA

Documents].) Ed. by Istvn Hajnal. Budapest, 1930, 129: No. 45. Cf . also Lszl Kecsks,

KA HKR Akten Exp. 1589. A ug. No. 88 and ibid., Reg. 1591. D ez. No. 41. Cf. also G mry,

Komrom az erdk vrosa [Komrom, the Town of Forts]. Budapest,

"p cit., and Simoniti, op. cit.

[Documents

of palatnus

Mikls Esterhzy]. Kormnyzattrtneti iratok

1984.

50

G Z A P LFFY

launched mo re serious attacks; in ad d itio n to their raids, they captured the

castles o f Divny, Kkk, So mo sk in the mining district and Fonyd by
Lake Balaton, and they fo ught a nearly constant battle near Bud acki by the
nv er Ko rana in the Cro atian confines, w here the assistant captain-general of
the Cro atian bo rd er fortresses (Obristleutnant der kroatischen Grenze), Herw art
Freiherr v o n A uersperg (1568-1575) fell, to o . In the meantime the peace
treaty of A d riano p le expired , and then Empero r Maximilian II d ied ; therefore
the A ulic W ar Co uncil deemed it necessary to discuss the pro blems and,
based o n the experience gathered i n the co ntro l o f defence, to reorganize
the system in an even mo re co nsidered w ay . In o rder to achieve this they
asked the central and local leaders of the bo rder defence fo r preliminary
proposals co ncerning the sho rtco mings as early as 1576; they made the
Imperial Diet (Reiclistag) in Regensburg grant a considerable military aid;
and they summo ned a great military conference i n Vienna (Wiener Hauptgrenzberatung) in the mid d le o f A ug ust 1577 to solve the pro blems.
A t the military conference, w hic h lasted fo r one and a half mo nths
and w as chaired by A rc hd u ke Ernest, the basic questio ns co ncerning the
defence system and strategy w ere d iscussed . The p ro blems o f military
d isc ip line, the fo rtificatio n o f castles, w ar sup p lies, and fo o d p ro v isio n
w ere d ealt w i th. The Defensionsordnung
o f the A ustrian p ro v inces and the
d ifficulties o f financing the bo rd er fortresses w ere also d isp uted , and
w hat is mo re, the p o ssibility o f settling d o w n the Teuto nic O rd er in
H u ng ary w as also b ro ug ht up as it had been d u ring the rule of
Sig ismund o f Lu xem b u rg i n the finteenth c entu ry . But the central
102

103

104

105

102 P[ ter] von Radics, Herbard VIII. Freiherr vonAuersperg (15281575), em kramischer Held
e

und Staatsmann.
l u 3

W ien, 1862, V11I-1X and 368-369.

The minutes of the great military conference (Hauptgrenzberatung) in V ienna survived in

several copies: 1. O StA K A A FA 1577/13/2.

51

T H E H U N G A R1 A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

2. M O L P 108 Csaldi Levltrak, Esterhzy

csald hercegi gnak levltra, Repositoriumok 77. Fase. N .3. A rchiv G N M Nrnberg, W F
sterreich Z R 7670. 4. W ien, sterreichische Nationalbibilitohek [hereinafter N B], Handschriftensammlung Cod. 8678. 5. N B Cod. 8345. 6. N B Cod. 12 660. The military conference
has not been given due attention by historians. Cf Wessely, " D ie Regensburger

question w as w hether the peace w i t h the O tto mans mad e fo r eight

years in 1568co uld be maintained o r w hether o ffensiv e w ar sho uld be
launched against the enemy . Fro m amo ng the p ro p o sals mad e by
Lazarus Freiherr v o n Sc hw end i and Up p er- H u ng arian cap tain-general
Hans Rueber v o n Pchsend o rf (1568-1584), the p articip ants sup p o rted
the ideas o f the first, and v o ted f o r an ev en mo re o rg aniz ed and
tho ug htful defence strategy by realistically w eig hing the p o w er o f the
German Emp ire and the A ustrian p ro v inces o f the Habsburg s. Since the
establishment o f the new defence system, this w as the first and last
occasion that the p ro blems o f bo rd er defence had been so tho ro ug hly
discussed and a co ncept based o n active defence (d efensive w ar in o ther
w o rd s) elabo rated . Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schw end i's strategy c o mp rised
the fo rmatio n o f closed and strictly co ntro llable defence zones, w hic h,
being based o n the fav o urable natural surro und ing s, co uld resist the raids
of the O tto man forces mo re efficiently and at the same time sto p the ever
increasing O tto m an tax-co llectio n i n the H u ng arian King d o m .
Before d w elling o n the im p lem entatio n o f the refo rms it must be
mentio ned that the conference w as an im p o rtant step i n the process that
lasted f ro m 1564 to 1578 and as a result o f w hi c h the Cro atian-Slav o nian
confines became subo rd inated to the Inner A ustrian W ar Co unc il (Inner
sterreichischer
Hofkriegsrat,
1578-1705) i n Graz. Thanks to the m o no graph of W . Schulze, the circumstances o f this are w e l l k n o w n , " so it
is eno ugh to und erline that the co ntro l of the d efence system against the
O tto man Em p ire w as d iv id ed into tw o p arts i n 1578. A rc hd u ke Charles
was mad e respo nsible fo r the d irectio n o f the Cro atian and Slav o nian
bo rd er areas as the cap tain-general o f the Cro atian- W end ish co nfines
(General-Obrist
kroatischer und windischer
Grenze) und er the central
lead ership o f the Inner A u strian W ar Co unc il, and at the same time
A rc hd uke Ernest w as p u t i n charge o f the f o ur H u ng arian co nfines
extend ing f ro m the Drav a to Transy lv ania (the bo rd er fortresses aro und
10

'harrige'

Reichshilfe 1576," 38-49. Schulze,Landesdefension, 65-69, and extracts of the conference published
in Hunganan by Istvn Gecze, " Hadi tancskozsok az 1577-ik vben [Military Conferences
in the Year 1577)," Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 7 (1894) 502-537 and 647-673.
W

1 0 5

Plffy, Katonai igazsgszolgltats,

75-77.

Hans von Zwiedeneck-Sdenhorst, " ber den V ersuch einer Translation des Deutschen

O rdens an die ungarische G renze," Archiv fr sterreichische

Geschichte

56 (1878) 403-445

W ilhelm Erben, " D i e Frage der Heranziehung des Deutschen O rdens zur V ertheidigung
der ungarischen G renze," Archiv fr sterreichische

Geschichte 81 (1895) 513-599 and Jnos

1 0 6

Schulze, op. cit. Cf . also V iktor Thiel, " Z ur Ceschichte der innersterreichischen

Kriegsverwaltung im 16. Jahrhunderte," Zeitschrift desHistorischen

Vereinesfr Steiermark 12

(1914) 159-170. A rtur Steinwenter, " D ie bernahme der G renzverteidigung in Kroatien duch
den Beherrscher Innersterreichs (1578)," Zeitschrift des Historischen

Vereines fr Steiermark

Illssy, " Trekvsek a nmet lovag-rend meghonostsra M agyarorszgon [Endeavours to

20 (1924) 43-59. Gnther Probszt-Ohstorff, " D ie innersterreichische Hofkriegsordnung und

Settle the Teutonic Order in Hungary], " Szzadok 36 (1902) 233-248.

die windisch-kroatische G renze," Bltter fr Heimatkunde 35 (1961) 92-98.

56
C

EZ A PALFFY
57

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

w as attached to the d efence area, b u t , as it w as kep t o nly fo r a year

the territo ries no rth o f Lake Bal ato n the bo rd er befo re the Lo ng War was
resto red .
o n

U n ti l 1606 the C hristian tro o p s w e re able to m o v e o nly the borders

o f the co nfines o f rsekjv r f u r th e r so u th. W i th the recapture of Flek
N g rd , Sz csny , and sev eral m i n o r O tto m an fortresses in counties
H o n t, N g rd , and G m r i n the w i n te r o f 1593, the bo rd er area f
rsekjv r p ro tec ting the m i n i n g to w n s w as co nsid erably reinforced
M e an w h i l e , Eger, being in a f o r w a r d p o sitio n similarly to Bihcs, had to
be rep laced i n the sev enteenth c e n tu ry by Szend r , w hic h had been
g rad u al l y f o rtif ied f ro m the 1570s, an d its neig hb o uring castles (Putnok
Sz d v r, no d , To kaj, Kr as z n ah o r k a, etc.). The mo st serious difficulty
w as caused by the loss o f Kan i z s a i n 1600, asunlike in the case of Bihcs
and Eg e r o nly so me i n s i g n i f i c an t m e d i e v al castles existed in the border
fo rtress cap taincy -g eneral i n its hinterland. Thus a co mp letely new border
z o ne had to be set u p w est o f Lake Balato n. This so-called bo rder area
f ac ing Kaniz sa {gcgen Kanischaiuarts
ligende Grenze, confinia Canisae opposita) w as at first established a l o n g the riv ers Rba and Z ala w i th centres
at K rm e n d and the rem o te S r v r .
H o w e v e r, the rebellio n against the
H u n g ari an K i n g Ru d o l f l e d b y Istv n Bocskai frustrated the fast dev e l o p m e n t o f the new b o r d e r d e f e nc e zo nes all o ver H ung ary . Their
o rg ani z ati o n c o uld o nly be c a r r i e d o u t after the peace treaty of Zsitvato ro k in 1 606.
0

1 1 9

was efficiently replaced by the bo rd er fortresses alo ng the rivers

Tsza Sajo, and Bo dva, above all by Szendro and Tokaj. A fter 1607 the
Confines facing Kanizsa w ere finally o rganized w ith the centre of
rszen on the river Z ala and in the districts of the castles of Lenti and
Kjskomrom. In theo ry, the fortress of Lgrd at the confluence of the
prava and the Mura also belo nged to this bo rd er zone, but practically
the members of the Zrnyi family w ere p ut in charge of it together w ith
some other garrisons i n the Murak z (praesidu Legradiensis ac tothis Insulae
Murakz supremus capitaneatus, Zerinische Grenze). A t the same time, the
Styrian estates reinfo rced and o rganized into a co herent unit their bo rd er
fortresses in the d irectio n o f Kanizsa (Hard berg , Frstenfeld , Feldbach,
Radkersburg, and Pettau) und er the name of the Styrian confines
(steinsche Grenze, steirische Konfinien-Plalze),
tho ug h this w as no t a
captaincy -general.
120

The Wend ish bo rd er area w i th the centre of Vrasd w as united w i th

Petrinja on the so uthern bank of the Kulp a and assumed the name o f
Wendish-Petrinja

co nfines

(wmdische

Slavomae confinia et Petrinia).

captaincy-general

w hic h

und petrimanische

zones and the new methods

w as

situated

aro und

Z eng g

tA

the

confines (Meergrenze, confinia maritima) fro m the m id d le o f the sixteenth

confinia Croatica et maritima/confima

und

Croatiae et maritima)

Meergrenze,

by the early

ban along the river Ku lp a (banische Grenze, confinia banalia) w ere o ften
named as the Kulp a co nfines (confinia

Colapiana).

The six bo rd er fortress captaincy-generals

w hic h co nstituted the

decisive element of the defence system and the temp o rary cap taincygeneral led by the ban surv iv ed until 1663 in an unchang ed f o rm . The
captaincy-generals

w ere listed by palatnus

Mikl s Esz terhz y

in his

memo randum to the ruler in 1641: "Und er the jurisd ictio n o f the Saint
Crow n of Hung ary there are six captain-generals, o r cap taincy-generals
from the A d riatic Sea to the Transy lv anian bo rd ers, namely the ones of
Gy r, the bo rd er fortresses

facing Kaniz sa,

the

Slavonian [that is the one of Vrasd ], the Cro atian [that is the one of

^ HKR KIA IX. c. 4, M O I _ P

trz si

of

century. As a result, the captaincy-general centered aro und Kro lyv ro s

Kassa, [rsekjjvr,

Pf

w est

seventeenth century. The bo rd er fortresses und er the lead ership of the

In 1606 ano ther lo ng p e r i o d o f p eace, o r mo re precisely an era of

' skirm ishes' o r Klernkrieg o n th e b o rd e rs, began. This p erio d lasted for
m o re than half a c entury i n th e H u n g a r i a n theatre o f w ar. A s d uring the
rule o f M atthias C o rv i n u s a n d M a x i m i l i a n I I , the years o f peace made it
p o ssible to f o rm new d ef enc e u n i t s o n the basis o f the sixteenth-century
m e tho d s and ad m i ni strati v e e x p e ri e n c e . O n the territo ry bey o nd the river
Tisz a, Sz af m r retained its e ar l i e r statu s, tho u g h d u ri n g the rule of Gbor
Bethlen (1613-1629), and th e n o f G y r g y Rk czi I (1630-1648) and his
so n (1648-1660), it w as o ften u n d e r the c o ntro l o f the Transylv anian princes.

csald levltra, A Batthyny cs al d

regni

Mountain Kapela w as w i th increasing frequency called the m aritim e

was called the Cro atian-maritime co nfines (kroatische

2.4. The organization of new border
of border defence (1606-1699)

Grenze,

That p art of the Cro atian bo rd er fortress

l e v l t r a k

- A herceg Batthyny

i ' i a No. 237 and StA KA

A ktn de.s nnersterreich.schen H o f k r i e e s r ^
'
Hsrates. Croatica 1600. Nov. No. 1.
M

r a b

" O N B Handschnftensammking Cod. 9225. fol. 4 and fol. 34

58

G Z A P LFFY

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

Kro ly v ro s), w i th the exceptio n o f the co nfines that are led by the
Cro atian-Slav o nian ban."
]2>

A fter the O tto man w ar in 1663-1664, ho w ever, a significant change took

place in the bo rd ers d efend ing the mining to w ns. A fter the fall o f the centre
o f the fro ntier castles captaincy-general (rsekjvr), Vienna, Lo w er A ustna
and the Bo hemian-Mo rav ian provinces became d irectly threatened, therefore
a mo d ern fo rt (Lip tvr) w as erected o n the bank o f the Vg and a new
bo rd er area w as o rganized aro und it i n 1665. This new defence zone was
called the confines facing rsekjvr [gegen Neulwitsel ligende Grenze, confinia
contra jvr posita) or o f Liptvr (leopoldische Grenze)}
The role o f this zone
w as almo st as imp o rtant as that of the confines aro und Gyr, also reinforced
to be able to d efend Vienna in this time. The ad ministratio n of the fortresses
aro und Lip tvr and o f Pozsony w as w ithd raw n fro m the autho rity of
captain-general of the m ining to w ns and w as confen-ed o n the German
co mmand er-in-chief of Liptvr, w ho w as the immed iate representative of
the A ulic W ar Co uncil.
122

23

In ad d itio n to the bo rd er fortress captaincy-generals, the system of

d istrict captaincy-generals also surv iv ed i n the course o f the seventeenth
century . In 1669 these w ere listed by a co ntemp o rary , Jno s Vano v icz i, a
missio nary belo ng ing to the Ord er o f St Paul, in his submissio n to the
H o l y Co ng reg atio n o f the Pro p agatio n o f the Faith [Sacra Congregatw De
Propaganda Fide) i n the f o llo w ing manner: " O u t o f the d istrict captaingenerals [ in H u ng arian: kirlykpe] the first lives i n Vrasd , Cro atia, the
second i n Nmetjv r, H u ng ary , the third i n Sempte, no rth o f the
Danube, the f o urth, the Up p er H ung arian captain-general i n Kassa."
The first d istrict captain-general mentio ned w as the Cro atian ban Pter
124

59

Zrnyi (1665-1670) resid ing i n Vrasd , w ho , in his capacity as a bo rd er

fortress captain-general, also ad ministered the special co nfines belo ng ing
to the ban alo ng the riv er Kulp a. The Transd anubian d istrict cap taingeneral, Krist f Batthyny, hav ing his seat i n N metjv r, co ntro lled the
confines facing Kanizsa, w hile the Cisd anubian cap tain-general Pl
Esterhzy, resid ing i n Sempte, supervised the co nfines p ro tecting the
mining to w ns, w i th the exceptio n o f Lip tvr and its zo ne. Co nsequently,
the leadership o f bo rd er fo rtress zones that w ere no t o f v ital imp o rtance
for the defence o f the A ustrian p ro v inces w as, as in the sixteenth century,
given to H u ng arian d istrict captain-generals. A ltho u g h, d ue to the
sho rtco mings of the co unty and no ble tro o p s, the d istrict captaincygenerals had lost mo st of their military imp o rtance b y that time, this
arrangement w as reasonable because the H u ng arian estates had co nsolidated their p o w er in the seventeenth century . H av i n g p ro v id ed their
blo o d as tax these estates still tenacio usly insisted o n m aintaining these
posts because these leg itimiz ed their actual p artic ip atio n i n the defence,
or at least i n its lo cal ad ministratio n.
Besides the system o f co nfines and d istrict captaincy-generals, new
fo rms and metho d s o f fro ntier defence appeared and strengthened in the
seventeenth century. These w ere related to the lo ng p erio d o f peace and
the p o licy o f the Habsburg hig h c o mmand against the O tto m an Emp ire.
During the Thirty Years' W ar the emp ire jo ined the c o m p etitio n o f great
po w ers by m ilitary means, and fo r this reason it tried to keep peace w i th
the Otto mans. Less and less sup p o rt w as sent to su p p ly the H u ng arian
theatre of w ar. A s a result, the number o f bo rd er fortresses w i th ro y al
troops i n them decreased f ro m 120 in the late sixteenth century to 88,
and the numb er o f g arriso n tro o ps f ro m 22,000 to 17,000. The system
of g uard houses p rev io usly co ntro lled by the ro y al bo rd er fortresses and
the ro ug hly 5,000 so ldiers p aid by the king w ere d if f ic ult to replace. A s
a so lutio n to this p ro blem, the land lo rd s liv ing near the fro ntiers to o k a
mo re active p art in the defence against the O tto m an raid s w i t h their
priv ate tro o p s and w i th their subjects d o ing m ilitary service i n return fo r
vario us exemp tio ns, the so-called peasant so ld iers (Soldatenbauer), w ho
125

" Sunt huiusmodi supremi generales capitanei seu capitaneatus sub jurisdictione Sacrae
Coronae Hunganae a M ari A dnatico usque ad limites et terminus Transylvaniae sex, urpote:
Cassoviensis, N ovae A rcis, Jauriensis, praesidiorum Canisae oppositorum, Sclavoniae et
Croatiae regnorum, praeter confinia banalia, quibus banus Croatiae et Sclavoniae praeest."
Hajnal, op. cit., 128: No. 45.
1 2 1

Frantisek Sedlk, " Z dejn pevnosti Leopoldov," Vlastivedny Casopis 12 (1963) 151-153
and Jozef Simoncic, " Mesto Leopoldovjeho vznik a vyvoj ," Vlastivedny Casopis 20 (1971)
72-73.
1 2 2

N B Handschrif tensammlung Cod. 7235. fols. 83-93 and O StA FH K A H K A H FU R N

219. 1665. M rz fols. 166-215.
1 2 3

1 2 4

" Proreges, unus V arasdini in Croatia, altr in Nemet Uyuar, in Vngaria, terrius in arce

Sente ultra D anubium, quartus Cassoviae, prorex partium supenorum regni V ngariae "
Relationes missionariorum

de Hungria

el Transilvania

116271707). (Bibliotheca

A cademiae

Hungri in Roma. Fontes 1.) Ed. by Istvn Gyrgy Tth. Roma-Budapest, 1994, 151: No. 14

1 2 5

Hajnal, op.cit., 128-131: No. 45. It was only after the 1663-1664 Ottoman war that the

Aulic W ar Council sent G erman troops attached into regiments in great numbers to the
Hungarian border fortresses.

Istvn Czigny, A kirlyi Magyarorszg

hadgyi

fejldsnek

sajtossgaiseurpai sszefggsei 16001700 [The Characteristics and European Connections of

the Military in Habsburg-Ruled Hungary 1600-1700]. Unpublished Ph.D . Diss. Budapest, 1996.

60

GZA PLFFY

w ere o ften settled o n those territo ries

O n the C ro atian- Slav o i
bo rd ers the same ro le w as p lay ed by the Vlachs (Valachi) and Uskoks
(Uscoci), w h o o btained ro y al p riv ileg es i n return fo r their military
serv ice. The significance of the g ro w ing number o f ro yal and private
H e y d u c k settlements also increased fro m the early seventeenth century
Thus the territo ries behind the military co nfines had to p articip ate more
activ ely i n the bo rd er defence. The system of garriso ns previo usly
maintained by the king w as replaced by a system o f fo rtified settlements
and g uard houses d efend ed by peasant so ldiers and Hey d ucks and
co ntro lled by the bo rd er land lo rd s and captain-generals. This second,
hinterland defence line co mp lemented the ro y al bo rd er defence system
v ery w ell, as the latter and the d istrict captaincy-generals w ere often
ad ministered by the same perso n in these places, w hic h mad e closer
co o p eratio n betw een the ro yal and p riv ate tro o p s po ssible.
126

61

T H E H U N G A RI A N - H A BS BU RG BO RD ER D EFEN C E SYSTEM S

an

127

,;R

3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY FRONTIERS AT THE BEGINNING

OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
A s a result of the so-called reco nquering Turkish w ar launched in 1683
and co nclud ed in 1699 by the peace o f Karlo v itz , the fro ntier betw een
the t w o w o rl d emp ires w as p ushed back to the line o f the Sava, Danube,
Tisz a, and Maro s. The terminatio n of O tto man rule in H ung ary mad e the
maintenance o f the bo rd er defence system built by the mid -sixteenth
century by the Habsburg military lead ership unnecessary. W i th the
excep tio n o f Nnd o rfehrvr (Belgrade) and the Temesk z reo ccupied
o nly i n 1718, the fro ntiers w hic h had existed befo re the battle o f Mo hcs
w ere resto red by the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The questio n in this situatio n w as w hether the new the third bo rd er
d efence system in the so uthern territo ries of H ung ary against the
O tto m an Emp ire sho uld reflect the structural and ad ministrativ e
f ram ew o rk existing befo re Mo hcs or the one in the sixteenth-seventeenth
centuries, or w hether it sho uld be a co mp letely d ifferent one.

Tw o pro po sals w ere w o rked o ut co ncerning the establishment of the

w bo rd er defence system. One of them w as f o rw ard ed bv the palatums
pl Esterhzy (1681-1713) and the H ung arian estates in co nnectio n w i th
the new establishment of the co untry in 1688,' '* the o ther w as the co ncept
of the A ulic W ar Co uncil fo rmed in the 1690s. The Hung arian estates
w anted to rev iv e the med iev al defence system w i th the resto ratio n of the
banales and the defence captaincy-generals, and the earlier autho rity o f
the palatums, the military assistant of the ruler. A t the same time, they
wished to sup p ly the bo rd er fortresses w i th regularly p aid stand ing
troops co nsisting of 12,000 German and 12,000 Hung arian and So uthern
Slav so ldiers und er the jo int lead ership o f German, Hung arian and
Southern Slav captain-generals. They w o u l d hav e field ed the latter o nes
out of the p rev io us bo rd er castle so ld iers in Hung ary , tho u g h in a
similar w ay to the German arm y in the f ramew o rk of regiments. They
considered the w ar tax of the reco nquered co untry sufficient to cover the
payment of the 24,000 so ld iers.
The concept of the A ulic W ar Co uncil w as fund amentally d ifferent
fro m the p ro p o sal o f the estates. The m ilitary leaders in Vienna w anted
to create a qualitativ ely new bo rd er d efence system, w hic h w as to a
certain extent similar to the setup in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. They intend ed to separate the zones of the new system f ro m
the rev iv ing c iv il local ad ministratio n, f ro m the Hung arian co unties, and
to establish a d istinct military fro ntier [Militargrenze). They d i d no t w i sh
to inv o lv e the Hung arian estates in the co ntro l of the military fro ntiers
to be d iv id ed into reg iment d istricts (Regimentbezirke/Kompaniebezirke),
as
they intend ed to co ntro l the new bo rd er defence netw o rk co mp letely f ro m
Vienna and no t fro m Buda as had been the case in the m id d le ages. Und er

n e

,w

Emma Ivnyi, " Esterhzy Pl ndor es a magyar rendek tervezete az orszg j

berendezkedsvel kapcsolatban [The Proposal of palatnus Pl Esterhzy and the Hungarian

Estates in Connection with the N ew Establishment of the Country]," Levltri

Kzlemnyek

42 (1971) 137-161 and Jnos J V arga, " Berendezkedsi tervezetek M agyarorszgon a trk
kizsnek idszakban. A z Einrichtungswerk [Schemes

for a N ew Establishment in

Hungary After the Expulsion of the Ottomans. The Einrichtungswerk},"

* stvan N . Kiss, Gesollschaft und Heer in Ungarn un Zeitalter der Turkenkriege Das
(G razer' For
Soldatenbaucrntum," in D,e wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen
der Turkenkriege
schungen zur Wirtschaft- und Soz,aIgesch,chte, 1.) Ed. bv Othmar Pickl. Graz, 1971 273-^96
Ekkehard V lkl. " M ilitrgrenze und 'Sta.u.a V al acho rumV in Die sterreichische
Mihtargrcnze,
9-24. Kser, op. ct., passim. Bracewell op at
'erreichte
Istvn Rcz, A hajdk a XV!,. szzadban (The Heyducks in the Seventeenth Century]
(M agyar trtneti tanulmnyok, 2.) Debrecen, 1969.

Szzadok 125 (1991)

449-488.'
]

~ A part from the works quoted in note 3, see recently Kurt W essely, " N euordnung der
]

unganschen G renzen nach dem grfin Turkenkrieg," in Die k. k. Militargrenze,

29-93

From

the Hungarian literature: kos Koroknai, Gazdasgi s trsadalmi viszonyok a dunai s tiszai
hatrrvidken a XVIII. szzad elejn [Economic and Social Conditions on the M ilitary Frontier
A long the D anube and the Tisza in the Early Eighteenth Century] (rtekezsek a trtneti
tudomnyok korbi. j sorozat, 73 ) Budapest,

1974.

62

G Z A

T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A BS BU R G BO RD ER D EFEN C E S Y S T EM S

P LFFY

this p lan they c o uld sim p ly abo lish the earlier d iv isio n o f the defence
system into d istrict and bo rd er fo rtress captaincy-generals, and co uld
establish the unif ied autho rity of the new military offices. A s o ppo sed to
the d raf t p lan of the palatums, they d i d no t w ant the H u ng arian bo rd er
castle so ld iers to take p art i n the p ro tectio n of the fro ntiers. O n the one
hand , they themselves w ere reluctant to leave their bo rd er fortresses,
aro u nd w hi c h they w ere mo re and mo re o ften eng ag ed in the seventeenth c entu ry in the cultiv atio n o f land o r animal husband ry , o n the
o ther hand , the d ismissed and ho meless members o f the H ung arian
bo rd er castle so ld iery had already been recruited into H u ng arian imp erial
reg iments f ro m the 1670s and 1680s. Due to their special lig ht cavalry
tactics they w ere needed o n the French battlefield s o f the Habsburg
Emp ire. Thus, apart fro m the German regiments, the tro o ps of the new
m ilitary fro ntiers w ere mad e u p o f Serbian, Cro atian, and Vlach refugees
w h o had settled in the so uthern territo ries of H u ng ary , d o ing military
service i n return fo r land and p riv ileg es. O nly one c o m m o n element of
the ideas o f the H u ng arian estates and o f the A ulic W ar Co uncil w as left:
the reco nquered co untry had to co ntribute financially to the sup p ly of
the new m ilitary fro ntiers to be established on the so uthern bo rd ers of
the c o u ntry .
The fo und atio ns of the new bo rd er defence system w ere laid in the
first decade o f the eighteenth century acco rd ing to the concept o f the
A u lic W ar Co u nc il. Fro m the A d riatic Sea to Transy lv ania, the m ilitary
fro ntiers o f Karo ly v aro s, of the ban, o f Varasd , the Sava, the Danube, the
Tisza and the M aro s w ere o rganized ; these fro ntiers w ere later d i v i d e d
into w e l l d isting uishable regiment d istricts. W hile the majo r bo rd er
fo rtresses w ere d efend ed by the regular German regiments, the land ed
and p riv ileg ed peasant so ldier sentries served

in the g uard houses

(cardaks) situated betw een them. Their central co ntro l w as entirely taken
o v er b y the A u lic W ar Co uncil after the d isso lutio n of the Inner A u strian
W ar C o u nc il in 1705. The H ung arian estates w ere f u lly exclud ed f ro m
the ad m inistratio n o f the new bo rd er defence system established i n the
territo ries o f H u ng ary . The military lead ership in Vienna so lv ed three
p ro b lem s w i t h the creatio n of the m ilitary fro ntiers. It d ecid ed

the

strug g le fo r the central and local ad ministratio n of m ilitary affairs and

b o rd er defence in the sixteenth and seventeenth

century to its o w n

ad v antag e; by settling and inco rp o rating in the bo rd er defence the mass

of So uthern Slav refugees, it abo lished a po ssible centre o f social tensions;

63

at the same time, it created a new bo rd er defence system w hic h c o u ld

effectively

p ro tect H u ng ary and

the H ab sb u rg

Emp ire against

the

Otto man tro o p s u ntil the f o rm atio n o f the natio n states in the nineteenth
century.
O ur surv ey o f the 500 year lo ng histo ry o f the bo rd er defence system in
Hung ary against the O tto m an Emp ire canno t have answ ered all questio ns
that the reader m i g h t have. W e are g o ing to f ind these i n the m o no g rap hy
to be w ritten o n this to pic. This piece o f w o rk has achieved its p urp o se
if it c o u ld ' d em o nstrate that the d ev elo p ment o f the defence system
against the Otto mans can o nly be und ersto o d i n the kno w led g e o f the
co mplete H u ng arian theatre o f w ar, i n the three p erio d s d esignated
above, as the real changes in the o rg aniz atio n and ad ministratio n o f the
defence system o ccurred in 1526 and 1699. Until the battle o f Mo hcs the
med iev al H u ng arian Ki ng d o m co ntained the ad vance o f the O tto mans
w ith its co herent bo rd er defence system co ntro lled by the Cro atianSlavo nian ban, the captain-general of the Lo w er Parts (supremus capitaneus
parthim inferiorum) and the V o iv o d e of Transy lv ania. A fter the co llapse
of the Ki ng d o m , the Habsburg rulers w ere expected to solve the p ro b lem
of sto p p ing the enemy o n the territo ry o f H u ng ary and o f d ef end ing the
A ustrian p ro v inces. In the o rg aniz atio n of the new defence system,
ho w ev er, they co uld no t reject the help of the H u ng arian estates, their
co unterparts in the d ualistic state structure, and fo r p ractical reasons they
co uld no t oust them entirely f ro m the lo cal manag ement of the system.
This explains w h y the bo rd er defence w as d iv id ed into a tw o f o ld system:
the co nfines captaincy-generals financed by the ruler and based o n the
bo rd er castles and the d istrict captaincy-generals based o n the o utd ated
insurrectio n of the no bility and the co unty tro o p s. Tho u g h the f o rmer
co nstituted the mo st imp o rtant p art o f defence, it w as o nly at the
beg inning of eighteenth c entury and after the settlement of So uthern
Slav peasant so ld iersthat the A u lic W ar Co unc il w as able to create a
system of m ilitary fro ntiers in the so uthern territo ries of the c o u ntry
w hic h exclud ed the H u ng arian estates.

GZA PLFFY

64

A PPEN D IX

ABBREVIATIONS
B = Bo snia; Cro = Cro atia; H = H ung ary ; R = Ro mania;
Slo = Slo v akia; Slo v = Slo venia; U = Ukrainia
MA P l : THE CASTLES OF THE CROATIAN AND WENDISH-BAJCSAVAR
CONFINES IN 1582
1. Laibach, Ljubljana, Slo v
2. Sankt Veit am Pf lau m , Fiume,
Rijeka, C ro
3. Led enice, C ro
4. Z eng g , Segnia, Senj, Cro
5. Bag, Karlo b ag , Cro
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Brinje, Cro
Brlo g , C ro
Oto cac, Oto csc, Cro
Dabar, C ro
Jesenica, Licka Jesenica, Cro

34. Krc u z , K r s, Kriz ev c i, Cro

35. Crad ec, Cro
36. Iv anic, Iv anic g rad , Ivanics, Cro
37. H eilig enkreu z , Szentkereszt,
Sveti Kr i , Cro
38. Cirkv ena, Cro
39. Sanktpeter, Szentp ter, Sveti Petar
Cv rstec, Cro
40. To p o lo v ac, To p o lo v c, C ro
41. Sanktgeo rgen, Sz entg y rg y v r,
Djurd jev ac, Cro

11. O g u l i n , C ro
12. Svetica, C ro

42. N o v i g rad , N o v ig rad - Po d rav ski,

Cro

13. M o d ru s , M o d ru s , C ro
14. D rez nik, D rez nik G rad , Cro

43. Kap ro nc a, Ko p n n i z , Ko p riv nic a,

C ro

15. Trzac, C ro

44.
45.
46.
47.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Izacic, Izacsics, B
Bihac, Bihcs, B
Rip ac, Rip cs, B
Slunj, Cro
Cetin, Ceting rad , Cro
M ala Klad usa, B

22. Hresno , Cro

23. Smrcko v ic, C ro
24. Blagaj, Cro
25. Bud acki, C ro
26. Karlstad t, Kro ly v ro s,
Karlo v ac, C ro
27. Petro v a g o ra, Petro vac, C ro
28. H rasto v ic a, Hrasz to v ica, Cro
29. Sred nji Grad ac, Cro
30. W arasd in, Varasd , V araz d in, Cro
31. V araz d inske To p licc, Cro
32. Remetinec, C ro
33. Lu d b re g , Cro

Derny e, Drnje, Cro

Keresztr, Murakeresz tr, H
Fty ehz a, H
Bajcsav r, Bajcsa, H

The territories under

the command of the
Croatian-Slavonian ban in 1582
Cro atia
K r s c o u nty
Varasd c o unty
Z g rb co unty

; E

66

H U N G A R I A N - H A BSBU R C

BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

GZA PLFFY

MA P 2: THE CASTLES OF THE BAJCSAVR, KANIZSA, AND GYR CONFINES

IN 1582
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Keresz tr, Murakeresz tr, H

Fity ehz a, H
Bajcsav r, Bajcsa, H
Lg rd , Leg rad , C ro
Kaniz sa, N ag y kaniz sa, H
Sz entmikl s, Mikl sfa,
N ag y kaniz sa- M ikl sf a, H

51. Bo tsz entg y rg y , Ro mlo ttv r, H

52. Kaniz sa m elletti to ro ny ,
N ag y kaniz sa, H
53. jud v ar, H
54. Kaco rlak, H
55. Ko mr, Kisko mro m ,
Z alako mr, H

The counties under the command

the Transdanubian
district
captain-general in 1582

0j

Fejr
Gy r
Ko m ro m
Mo s n
So mo g y
So p ro n
Vas
Vesz p rm
Z ala

56. Cskny , H
57. Kthely , H
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kielmansz ig et, Kilimn, H

Rajk, A ls rajk, H
Z alav r, H
Isabo r, Isebor, Pacsa-lsabo r, H

62.
63.
64.
65.

P l ske, H
Kap o rnak, N ag y kap o rnak, H
Csny , Z alacsny , H
Sz entg r t, Z alasz entg r t, H

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Br, Z alabr, H
Ke m e nd , Kemend o llr, H
L v , Z alal v , H
Gy r, Raab, H
Pp a, H
Kesz thely , H
Sz ig lig et, H
Cso bnc, H

74. Tihany , H
75. Vz so ny , V z so ny k ,
N ag y v z so ny , H
76.
77.
78.
79.

Vesz p rm, H
"Palota, Vrp alo ta, H
Csesznek, H
Tata, H

80. Sz entmrto nheg y , Sz entmrto n,

Panno nhalma, H
81. Ko m ro m , Ko m o rn , Ko m arno , Slo

tt
4-

The cases of Ihe Bajcsavr confines

The cases of ihe Kanizsa confines
The castlcs of the Gyr cofincs
Komrom, "a border fort of its own'

67