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SALlH ZBARAN
(Universityof Istanbul)
THE
OTTOMAN TURKS
IN THE PERSIAN
AND THE
GULF,
PORTUGUESE
1534-1581.*
TO THE
46
SALIHZBARAN
IN THEPERSIANGULF
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47
48
salh zbaran
IN THE PERSIANGULF
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49
50
salh zbaran
at Basra. These fustawere well armed with guns and had fiftyRumes
on board. When Rashid ibn Megamis declined to do so, Belchior de
Sousa burnt the settlementslocated on the adjoining coast and withdrew to Hormuz.14
Also in the same year, 1529, the Portuguese sent a forceto Bahrayn.
The ruler of that island, the Ra'is "Barbadim" (Baha al-Din or Badr
al-Din?), a nephew of the guazil of Hormuz, Sharaf al-Din, was in
revolt against Hormuz, having refused to pay the tribute due from
him. On 8 September 1529, Nuno da Cunha, the Portuguese governor
of India, despatched his brother,Simo da Cunha, with fiveships and
almost fivehundred men to Bahrayn. At this time Belchior de Sousa,
with six oared vessels,was also patrollingin the waters adjacent to the
island, seeking to prevent the Ra'is Badradim fromrecruitingtroops
in the coastal areas of Persia. The Ra'is, with some eight hundred
Persians under his command, refused to surrenderthe fortressof
Bahrayn. The Portuguese now bombarded the fort, but in vain-a
shortage of powder and an outbreak of sickness15compelled them to
withdrawto Hormuz.16
The years after 1529 saw little of note occuringat Hormuz. But the
patternof relationsprevailingthus farbetween Christiansand Muslims
in the Persian Gulfand in the adjoining territorieswas soon to undergo
a notable change. A new factor would influencestronglythe future
course of events.
THE OTTOMAN TURKS IN THE COASTLANDS OF THE
PERSIAN GULF
In 1534 the Ottomans entered into a new conflictwith Persia. The
campaign of 1534-1535 brought them substantial gains in Eastern
Asia Minor. It also saw the conquest of the two Iraqs, Iraq-i Ajem
(Persian Iraq) and Iraq-i Arab (Arab Iraq). A numberof considerations
14Barros,Dec. IV, Liv. III, pp. 348-350.
15The sourcesstatethattheeast windblowingin September
oftenbrought
withit or causedoutbreaksofsickness-as,forexample,on a lateroccasionin
ofLahsa was engagedin a campaignagainst
1559,whentheOttomanbeylerbey
theBahrayn.
16Barros,Dec. IV, Liv. III, pp. 362ff;Diogo do Couto,Da Asia, (Lisboa,
1778),Dec. IV, Liv. IV, capitulosIII and IV; GasparCorrea,Lendasda India,
I-IV, (Lisboa,1862),III, pp. 325ff;FernoLopes de Castanheda,Histriado
e Conquistada India pelosPortugueses
Descobrimento
, (Lisboa,1833),Liv. VII,
capitulosCII-CIII.
IN THEPERSIANGULF
TURKSANDPORTUGUESE
51
led the Ottomans to begin this war against the Safavids. The desire
to win a more effectivecontrolover the important trade routes-e.g.,
the "silk route" runningfromTabriz to Erzurum, Tokat and Bursa,17
and the "spice route" extendingfromBasra to Baghdad and Aleppo18must be counted no doubt among the reasons for the campaign. On
the political and militarysides the occupation of Iraq can be viewed as
a logical complementto the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt in
1516-1517. There existed in the eastern frontiersin Asia Minor a
continuingfrictionbetween pro-Safavid Shi'i elements and the Ottoman frontier authorities.19The extension of Ottoman control in
Eastern Asia Minorto such areas as Erzurum and Lake Van must have
seemed to Sultan Sleyman and his viziers eminentlynecessary. The
immediate pretext for war was the desertion to the Safavids of the
Kurdish chieftainSharaf Khan of Bitlis and the accession to the Ottomans of an important Safavid frontierbeg, Ulama Khan, who now
entered the Ottoman service. To settle the Turco-Safavid problem,
and also having in mind a campaign against Baghdad, the Ottoman
Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, firsttook Tabriz in July 1534.20 In
September Sultan Sleyman joined the Grand Vizier. Aftera difficult
march from Tabriz, in December the Ottomans entered Baghdad
whence Tekeli Khan, the Safavid commanderhad fled.This campaign
gave to the Ottomans possession of the region around Erzurum and
also of northernand centralIraq. As yet theirinfluencedid not extend
to the regions of Basra and Lahsa.
During his stay at Baghdad (December 1534-April 1535) the
Sultan received the submission of Rashid ibn Megamis. He sent his
son Man'i to the Sultan with the keys of Basra and with a fulsome
assurance of his loyalty.21The local chieftains of Jezayir, of Garraf,
17Cf.H. nalcik,in EI2, s.v. Bursa; also hispaper"The OttomanEconomic
Mindand AspectsoftheOttomanEconomy,"in M.A. Cook(ed.),Studiesin the
EconomicHistoryoftheMiddleEast, (London,1970),pp. 209if.
18A. H. Lybyer,"The OttomanTurksand the Routesof OrientalTrade,"
in EnglishHistoricalReview
, LXX, (London,1915),pp. 577-588.
19 . H. Uzunarili,
OsmanliTarihi, I-IV, (Ankara,1949),II, pp. 336ff;J.
vonHammer,HistoiredeVEmpireOttoman
, trans.J.J. Heilert,V, (Paris,1826),
pp. 202ff.
20On thecampaignof IbrahimPasha see T. Gkbilgin,
"Arzve Raporlarina
Gre IbrahimPaa'nm IrakeynSeferindeki
Ilk Tedbirlerive Ftuhati,"in
Belleten
, XXI, (Ankara,1957),pp. 449ff.
21RsternPaa( ?), Tevrih-i
l-i Osman,University
Library,Istanbul,MS.
nu. 2438,fol.205r.
52
SALHZBARAN
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PersianGulfin theSixteenthCentury(SouthernSection)
Scale 1:5.000.000
53
54
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55
56
SALHZBABAK
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THE OTTOMAN-PORTUGUESE RIVALRY IN THE
PERSIAN GULF
As shown above, in 1547 the Ottomans had made an amicable approach to the Portuguese governor of Hormuz. From the political
point of view the efforthad been fruitlessfor the simple reason that
the existence of the Turks in the Persian Gulf was against the interest
of the Portuguese who wanted to control the trade to Basra. The
Portuguese saw the Ottoman occupation of Basra as a threat in the
Persian Gulf. At this time,therefore,the Portuguese were on the alert.
The Ottoman Turks, wishing to exploit the advantages arising from
theirpossessionofBasra, could send naval assistance,wheneverneeded,
fromthe Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. It was importantfor them to
maintain a firmhold over the waters of the Red Sea.45 In fact the
Portuguese were to have littlesuccess in theirattemptsto pass through
the Bab al-Mandab. Aden came into the hands of the Ottomans in
1538 and ten years later the town was broughtstill more closely under
Ottoman influence.46In 1550 a furtherevent occured in the Persian
Gulfwhichled the Portuguese to undertakea campaign of some importance. The Arabs of Katif yielded theirfortressto the Ottomans. This
event alarmed the Portuguese and induced them to take advantage of
approaches coming fromthe Arab chieftainsof Basra.47 Some of the
local Arab chieftainsin that region,even beforethe Ottoman capture
of Basra in 1546, had sought the interventionof the Portuguese.48
D. Afonso de Noronha, the Portuguese governorof India, now appointed D. Anto de Noronha to command a force of 1,200 men and
seven galleys, orderinghim to move against the Ottoman Turks in
45Cf.C. Orhonlu,"XVI. AsrinIlk YarismdaKizildanizSahillerinde
Osmanlilar,"in TarihD ergisi,XII/16, (1962),pp. 5ff.
48R. B. Serjeant,ThePortuguese
offtheSouthArabianCoast, (O.U.P., 1963),
pp. 107-108.
47"El Rey [i.e.,theKingofPortugal]o sentiomuitopela perdahumafortaleza to importa. . ." (Couto,Dec. VI, Liv. IX, p. 244). See also Faria e
Sousa, Asia Portuguesa
, trans.M. Busquets de Aquilar,I-VI, (Porto,1945),
III, p. 227.
48The copiesof the lettersfromAli ibn Ulyan and SheikhYahya to Luis
ofHormuz,are in Col.Loureno,
IV, fols139rFalco,thePortuguese
governor
141r and 493r-494r.Couto,referring
to the 'King of Basra' (perhaps,in fact,
ofIndia,offering
to theGovernor
SheikhYahya),saysthathe sentambassadors
to the Portuguesea fortin the harbourofBasra (Dec,VI, Liv. IX, pp. 244245).
IN THEPERSIANGULF
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59
the Persian Gulf. Turan Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, was also asked to
reinforcethem with three thousand men for the venture of Katif.
Anto de Noronha set sail forKatif, accompanied by Ra'is Sharaf alDin of Hormuz and Amir Majid of Moghistan49with three thousand
men. The Turks there,some fourhundredstrong,defendedthemselves
bravely,but surrenderedto the Portuguese aftera siege of eight days.
Noronha now destroyedthe fort of Katif and resolved to go against
Basra. He achieved verylittlethere,forthe beylerbey
of Basra50carried
out a clever plan. He made the Portuguese commander believe that
the Turks and the Arabs of Basra had formedan alliance against the
Portuguese-whereuponD. Anto de Noronha decided to withdraw
to Hormuz. There he learned that he had been deceived.51
As yet the Ottomans had no adequate naval facilitiesin the Persian
Gulf. Thereforethe ships, and the naval equipment employed for
their firstsea campaigns in the waters of the Gulf came from their
naval bases in the Red Sea. Afterthe conquest of Egypt in 1516-1517,
Suez became the base for the Ottoman naval activities directed towards the Indian Ocean. This base had been inheritedfromthe Mamluks of Syria and Egypt, and it had played a significantrole in the
years before the Ottoman conquest. Selman Reis, a Turkish captain
in the service of the Mamluks, also served the Ottomans after 1517.
He seems to have been the firstOttoman High Admiral of the Red
Sea (Kapudan-i Bahr-i Ahmer). In his famous lyiha, a report presented in 1525 to the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, he underlined the importance of the trade in the Indian Ocean.52 The first
and the most ambitious Ottoman attempt to intervene against
the Portuguese came in 1538. In that year Hadim Sleyman Pasha,
the beylerbeyof Egypt, led a strong Ottoman armada into the In49Coutorefers
to thetroopsfromMagostoas Perseos,i.e., Persians,and to
the troopsfromHormuzas Aramuzanos(Ibid., p. 326). Magostoor Mina
as Moghistan
orMughistan,
(Minam),a namewhichappearsin modernhistories
and whichis describedin the letterof GonaloRodriguez,dated 31 August
1552,as beingat a distanceofsix or sevenleaguesfromHormuz(I. Wicki,op.
cit.,p. 11, 331,337). Cf.also Barros,Dec. III, Liv. IV, p. 37; L. Lockhart,in
EI 2,s.v. Hormuz.
50Couto givesthe name of this beylerbey
as Ali Pasha whereasthereis a
mentionofKubad Pasha in an Ottomandocumentas earlyas 1550(Rus 209,
p. 51).
51For thefullstoryofthecampaignsee Couto,Dec. VI, Liv. IX, pp. 334ff.
52F. Kurtoglu,"SelmanReis Lyihasi,"in Deniz Mecmuasi,XXXXVII,
(Istanbul,1934),pp. 67-73.
60
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62
salh zbaran
lvaro de Noronha was well informedabout the activities of the Ottoman fleetand had made all the necessarypreparationsfor resistance.
The Turks captured the city of Hormuz and bombarded the castle
intermittently.The Portuguese, seven hundred in number (it is also
said that they numbered more than the Turkish besiegers), defended
themselves,but never ventured out to attack the Turks.58According
to Portuguese sources,Pr Reis then withdrewto the island of Kishm,
having been informedthat the richestpeople of Hormuz residedthere.59
He foundno resistanceon the island. The rich communityof the island
consisted of some thirty merchants who had an average capital of
20,000 cruzados.60There was also a Spanish Jew who alone had no
less than 80,000 cruzados in gold.61Towards the end of October, Pr
Reis sailed forBasra with all the spoils. Meanwhile,Goa had also heard
of the impending Ottoman threat.62ThereforeAffonsode Noronha
decided to sail to Hormuz with more than eightyships (over thirtyof
them being of large dimensions)and with several distinguishedsoldiers
at his side. On his arrival at Diu he learned that the Ottoman fleethad
sailed to Basra. So he decided not to go in person to Hormuz. Instead
he sent his nephew, D.Anto de Noronha,at the head of a squadron
consistingof twelve large ships and twenty-eightlight ones. D. Anto
reached Hormuz towards the end of November and found it relieved
fromall danger. But he saw visible signsof the damage inflictedduring
the recent siege.63
of
On the arrival of Pr Reis at Basra, Kubat Pasha, the beylerbey
that province, sent the Sultan a report about Pr's activities. When
he learned that Kubad Pasha's report was unfavourable to him, Pr
departed fromBasra, taking with him on three galleys all the spoils
that he won duringthe campaign includinghis Portuguese prisoners.64
68See AppendixII.
59Cf.The LetterofAlvarode Noronha
in theArquivoNacionalda Torredo
Parte
89,
Ia, Mao Documento9, fol.2v; also Couto,
,
Tombo,CorpoCronologico
Dec. VI, Liv. X, p. 426.
80Cruzadowas a Portuguesecoin of thistimeworth400 Reis (Antniode
Dicionrioda Lingua Portuguesa
MoraisSilva,Granda,
, (Lisboa, 1945),III, p.
729,col. 2).
61Coutomentions
This
that20,000peoplein theislandweretakenprisoner.
Liv.
Dec.
much
too
no
doubt
is
X,
VI,
p. 426).
high(j
figure
62Ibid.,p. 427.
63Ibid.,pp. 439 and 465.
64The spoilsare said to havebeenworthmorethana millionofgold: 4mais
de hummilhode ouro" (Ibid.,p. 468).
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64
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66
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recourseleftto the combatants save to make peace at last. The Ottomans surrenderedtheirarms to the Portuguese and gave a payment of
12,000 cruzados. In return,the Portuguese undertookto transportthe
remainingOttoman troops back to the mainland.83
Since the Ottoman occupation of Basra in 1546, the Persian Gulf
had been the scene of conflictbetween the Portuguese and the Ottomans. The Portuguese were unable to establish themselves on the
shores of Basra and Katif, and the Ottomans failed to win controlover
the strait of Hormuz. Bahrayn remained as a "buffer"island separating the rival powers and their limits of influence.On the whole, the
conflict had been harmful to Ottoman interests. Realizing that it
would be more advantageous to encourage the flow of trade to and
ofBasra in 1562 sent an envoy to
fromthe Ottoman lands, the beylerbey
Hormuz to negotiate with the Portuguese fora resumptionof commercial relations through the Persian Gulf.85The viceroy of India (then
the Conde do Redondo) also sent a certain Antonio Teixeira to the
Sultan.86At Istanbul, Teixeira was given an audience with the Sultan
and according to Couto, Sultan Sleyman told him that he asked for
peace fromno one. "If the King of the Portuguese required peace, he
should send to Istanbul a great man from his court to discuss the
matter." The letter, however, which the Sultan sent to the King of
Portugal, dated 28 Muharrem972/6 September 1564, reveals what the
actual policy of the Ottomans was. The letterasked the King to ensure
secure passage on land and on sea forthe people and merchantsof the
Ottoman Empire trading to and fromthe lands under the Portuguese
domination. Friendship between the two powers would be established
if the King complied with his request.87
From time to time "incidents" in the waters of the Indian Ocean
continued to disrupt Ottoman-Portugueserelations. There is mention
of a Portuguese attack in February 1565 on a big Atjehnese ship
sailing off Hadramawt and having on board four hundred men,
amongst them, according to Couto, a number of "white Turks,"
Brancos Turcos** Moreover,in 1566 and also in 1567 the Portuguese
83Couto,Dec. VII, Liv. VII, p. 145.
84Cf.I. Wicki,op.cit.,IV, pp. 180-181.
85"Ho ano de mylle quinhentos
e sasentae dousveoha Ormuzhumembaixador do turquoenvyadopelo baxa de Baora ..." (in As Gavetasda Torredo
Tombo
, V, p. 137).
88Couto,Dec. VII, p. 44.
87See AppendixIII.
88Dec. VII, p. 60ff.
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SALITIZBARAN
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71
I*
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these regions; and that the otherArabs who lived in Basra were of the
same kind. He assured me also that Mehmed Pasha wanted to make
friendshiponly with me and that the Turks waited in hope until I
arrived in this fortress[of Hormuz], where I would remain for three
years. And all these matters that Hajji Fayat told me-he begged
that I would keep them in great secrecy.
of Basra,
In the time of Luis Falco, Mehmed Pasha, the beylerbey
ordered that a place called Lahsa (laaa) [situated] on the coast of
Arabia, not far fromBasra, should be taken, and gave it to an Arab
and made him the ruler (rey)13of it.
This Hajji Fayat asked me many times to send a factor ( feitor
) of
mine to Basra. This was the main thingthat Mehmed Pasha had asked
me and it was what he wished most of all ; because the cafillasand the
merchantsdid not want to go to Basra until they saw that therewas a
factorof mine there. To take advice on this matterin orderto do what
would be best for the service of the King, Our Lord, I summoned the
most important persons of his town (i.e., Hormuz], who were about
14
twenty-eightor thirty[in number]. Throughthe ouvydor 1 requested
them to swear on the Holy Gospels that it would be advantageous for
the service of the King, Our Lord, that this factor of mine should go
to Basra and that certain terradoswhich were at Hormuz should also
go to Basra. All of them declared on the oath which they took that it
would be well fora trustedman to be in Basra, one who could send me
fromthere all the news and whatever else might be needful, also for
the terradosto be allowed to go [to Basra]. It seems to me that it
would be [advantageous] for the service of the King, in that [the
Turks] would not be able to make any decision without my knowing
about it. Moreover,it will be possible to get news of [what is happening
at] Suez and all the other regions,for to Basra come the merchants
from all parts, more commonly from Cairo, Damascus, Birejik and
Aleppo; and inevitably there will be means of knowing what [the
Turks] are doing and what they intend to do. In addition, the Arabs
who dwell in Basra will also give me news truthfullyabout these
matters,because they are the enemies of the Turks.
I am sending to Basra a certain Domingos Barbudo, and he is
taking with him a letter of mine to Mehmed Pasha in response to his
13Rey-i.e., presumably
the sanjakbeyof Lahsa. This sanjak was later-in
1555-tobecomebeylerbeylik.
14ouvydori.e., thecrownjudge.
76
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and also the factorof Kalhat wrote [and gave] to me the news about
the strait [of Mocha]. They said that there had come fromAden [to
Kalhat] a certain sheikh Abdullah and also another terrada. They
[also] said that there had come fromthe port of Suez to the port of
Mocha a capitou)with twenty galleys and two large ships, with three
thousand Turks on board. [The Turks] had given orders to take all
the land which was then in the possession of the Zaidi Imam who is a
ruler (rey) in these territoriesof Arabia. Before the Turks (rumes)
came, a son of the Zaidi Imam had control of all the troops of his
father. This son was at variance with the Imam. He took no heed
whetherhis fatherwould fightagaint the Turks or not. And when the
Turks arrived,they attacked and captured the fortressof Ta'izz ( toez);
and, in addition, they seized five other ports, attacking them by
treachery. However, they were unable to take the fortressof San'a
(anaa). Although the son was on bad terms with his father,once he
saw the land was being lost [to the Turks], he entered into amicable
relations with his father,made ready all his soldiers one night and fell
on the Turks, killing four hundred of their horsemen. [Sheikh Abdullah] says [also] that there will come to Muscat and Kalhat, within
this firstmonsoon,whichis threemonth's time,ten or twelve [Turkish]
fustas, as they did last year. It is certain that there are [already] at
Aden three well equipped fustas and more [of them] will come from
the port of Mocha. Sheikh Abdullah states that beyond doubt they
will come. Many of his friendshave told him they are certain that
these ships will come this year and they have advised him to remove
his residence out of Kalhat. Last year there came no more than four
fustasbut none of the Portuguese stayed at Kalhat, all of them going
to Muscat last year, the guazil of Kalhat, with the help of the King,
Our Lord, drove them fromthe port and did not even allow them to
take water. Now, if these ten or twelve ships come with many troops,
it would be necessary for the Portuguese and the Muslims (mouros)
to help him [i.e., the guazil of Kalhat] in such manner as to make
possible a resistance [to the Turks]. And it will not be more than two
monthsand a half beforethese Turks arrive.
At the end of the month of June there arrived at this town of Hormuz a ship which came fromMecca ( mequa) and in it there came a
merchantwho lives here in Hormuz and is a native of the place. He
told me that he had come through Mocha, that there were seven or
eight oared ships lying there and that he had not seen more than this
number. The Turks kept him there [at Mocha] forthree days and did
78
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not let him go outside the gates so that he should not warn the 'fustas'
which Your Lordship had sent to the strait [of Mocha]; [he stated]
that the Turkish vessels were waiting there,thinkingthat the 'fustas'
mightenterinto the harbour.It seemed to him that the eight [Turkish]
ships which came to Kalhat and Muscat [last year] were there then.
I believe that this informationmay well be true. I have ordered to
be made ready nine fustasand catures, which are here [at Hormuz]. At
the end of this monthof Julythey will leave forMuscat, in orderto lie
in wait there for the fustasof the Turks, in case they should come in
August or at the beginningof September.I am writingto sheikhRabia
and also to the guazil of Kalhat [bidding] them hold in readiness the
best terraquiswhich they have there. And these are ships which [can]
hold ten or twelvePortuguese and whichrow well; forthe rest,if there
is a need, Arab archers [can] be put in them, to give aid in what may
be necessary. To Muscat, according to what I was told by people on
the ships which have arrivedfromthose parts afterI passed that way,
there came fortyof fiftyPortuguese [soldiers]-this is an excellent
reinforcementwhich can go on board wheneverit is most needful,in
order, with the aid of Our Lord, to fightthe Turkish ships, if they
should come to Muscat. And over the Turkish ships Our Lord will
surely give us a complete victory.
It seems to me that [it will be for] the service of His Majesty and
of Your Lordship to send these ships to sea, because the vessels which
are settingforthfrom[Hormuz] forIndia carry [each of them] two or
three Portuguese and much money; and if these Turks succeed in
plundering Muscat, and in findingthe ships [which have on board]
many xerafinsand tamgas,17and then in makingoffwith theirprizes to
the strait [of Mocha], it will be an inducementforthem to come each
year against Muscat.
Dom Payo thought that he had better stay here [in Hormuz] and
he asked me for [command of] the fleet,forit seemed to him that in
this manner he could do better service for the King. And I gave the
fleetto him and he is going with it as admiral-in-chief(capito mor).
The captains and the soldierswho are on board can be expected to act
as honorable and reliable men.
At the beginningof August I am going to send to the cape Ras alHadd fcabo do rroalgate)two catures, the ones with the most oars,
17 Tamga(ortanga)-a Portuguese
coinworth60 reis(cf.Dalgado,op.cit.,II,
p. 355).
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II
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for the service of the King, Our Master. Because this land has been
so ruined, [then] all will be lost. We all believe, however, that Your
Lordship will [send aid] as fully as the necessityrequires, in accordance with the news we now have that Your Lordship is preparing [to
send to] this land a great armada, should the need arise. Please believe
that, just because Your Lordship is mindfulof us, we feel freealready
of all these troubles that we expected.
I wrote to Your Lordship, by Ruy Lopes, how we were besieged on
land and sea by the Turks, in the course of which [siege] these Turks
placed six pieces of heavy artillery,[i.e.,] [four]basalisks, one espalha2
fatoj1 one salvage togetherwith some small pieces set on the flatroofs
of certainbuildingsbelongingto the King. During the eleven days the
Turks bombarded the fortress,they did little harm to it, because it
3 and
was so strong. The Turks destroyed one of our camello de ferro
with one of our shots we ruined fromthe fortress,their espalhafato.
That killed four Portuguese and wounded some ten or twelve; but as
it appeared aftertheir departure-theyreceived [even] greaterdamage
fromthe good shootingthat our gunnersmade against theirmantelets.
On the last night when the Turks gathered togethertheir cannons
and raised the siege,theybroughtto the walls a Portuguesebombardier,
whom they had captured at the fortressof Muscat. [This man] came
to speak with the men on the [fortress]wall, asking that they should
try to rescue him and the other captured. Until that moment we
knew nothing about him, though in fact on numerous occasions at
night our men had called out to the renegades [in the Turkish camp],
asking them to come to speak with the soldierswho stood on the wall
-but the renegades had never replied to this request. On the day that
the Turks went away they left with us two Christians, the one a
Russian by race and the other an Italian; through these men we
learned all that occured at Muscat-that Mehmed Bey, the son of
Pr Bey ( Barba Negra) who was admiral ofthe Ottoman fleet,attacked
1 Pierisand Fitzler(Ceylonand Portugal
1539, Pt. I: Kingsand Christians
". . . thegreatestofall gunswas
1552, Leipzig,1927,p. 304)writethefollowing:
jBazalisco,whichreacheda weightof 150 quinteswitha lenghtof 35 palms.
. The espala70 quintes
weredescribedas bastardos
Smallerbasiliscosweighing
fattowas heavierthantheselatter,thoughit was onlysixteenpalmsin length,
whichwas also the lengthon the salvage,a piece of 40 quintes.Therewere
whichwereusedwithstoneballs,
smallergunslikethecamelloand thecamalete
as wellas theLeo (lion),Aguia (eagle),Serpe(serpent)and co (dog)."
2 See above,note1.
3 See above,note1.
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the fortressforsix days. At the end of that time his father [Pr Bey]
arrived with thirteengalleys. The son [Mehmed Bey] had begun to
bombard the fortresswithsix galleys only. On the second day following
the arrival of Pr Bey, Joo de Lisboa and all the Portuguese yielded
on condition of being allowed to depart safely for this fortress(i.e.,
Hormuz]. But Pr Bey managed the affairwith such address that he
put them as galley slaves bound to their bench with iron chains and
subjected to the lash. For a man who [like Joo de Lisboa] showed
such weakness, it was merited judgement. The [Ottoman] admiral
would never discuss a ransom for them, even though on a number of
occasions there were offers made for the women only-but these
infideldogs treated the matter in such a fashion that it seemed there
would never be a successfulresult.
After this event Pr Bey, on a Monday morning- the 19thSeptember- arrived at this island [of Hormuz] with twenty-fivegalleys
and one galleon with which he departed from Suez; also another
4
galleon which he was bringing,together with two quartetosand numerous guns and all the powder, cannon balls and munitions-[this
vessel] was lost in shallow water at Aden. AfterBarba Negra had set
out forthis place [Hormuz], he took two ships and one caturat Muscat.
What he did here [at Hormuz] I have already writtento Your Lordship. Moreover,he captured here a large ship of a certainJoo Nunez
a man from Chaul. Having stayed at Hormuz for sixteen days [the
Turks] went to the island of Kishm (Queyxome) which is three
leagues fromhere. At Kishm were the principal people and merchants
fromthis town [of Hormuz] with a great quantity of goods, of gold
and silver, and of cash. The Turks took all these things, nothing
escaped them, and Your Lordship can be assured that this was the
richestprize that could be foundin all the world. Pr Bey did all these
things with only seven hundred fightingmen and two thousand or
two thousand and five hundredsailors and galley crews.In this fortress
[ofHormuz] therewere seven hundredsoldiersmuch esteemed and the
best arquebusiers that there were. If we had known more about the
Turks, it might have been possible to seize their guns and to inflict
much harm [on them]. Accordingto what we have learned,the [Great]
Turk ordered Pr Bey not to seek out Hormuz beforehe had gone to
Basra to take on board other troops there-but as a result of the
weakness he found at Muscat, Pr Bey thought it would be the same
4 Quartoi.e., an old typeofgun (cf.Pierisand Fitzler,op.cit.,p. 302).
salh zbaran
82
here [at Hormuz] and so, with the powder that he brought from
Muscat, he subjected us to a bombardment.
From Lara and Shiraz news came that Shah Tahmasp was marching
into the lands of the Ottoman Sultan across the frontierof Tabriz.
Subsequently I have heard nothing more about this matter. Should
[fresh]news arrive,I will writeto Your Lordship [and send the letter]
by ships leaving forthat quarter.
I have sent a terraquimto the island of Kishm to get news about
the intentionsof the Turks. I am writingto Your Lordship today, in
the afternoon,Sunday the 30thof October-a terraquimhas come, from
which we have learned that this same day all the fleet of the Turks
assembled at the point of the island of Kishm and departed-from
that spot where they have been all the time since theirdeparturefrom
this place [Hormuz]. They have taken their course to Basrah-setting
out this very nightjust gone. Trust in God that all this will be forthe
great destruction of these people, by reason of the coming of Your
Lordship to this land and by your going towards Basra, so that Pr
Bey will in no wise escape fromthe net. The letterYour Lordship sent
to me for Murad Ra'is [the ruler of Bahrayn], this I have despatched
to him forthwithand I wrote and bade him gather his strengthin
case the Turks come to seize [Bahrayn], so that he could defendhimself as it mightbe needfulforthe service of S.A., Our Lord. May the
life and affairsof Your Lordship increase for many years. [Written]
fromHormuz on the 30thday of October 1552.
rrex nordim
[Ra'is Nur al-Din, the guazil of Bahrayn]
APPENDIX
III*
MD, v, p. 70.
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84
salh zbaran
APPENDIX
Rus 225, p. 222.
IV
These are the changes in the subdivisions of the Province and the
appointments which have been ordered in accordance with the subof Basra. The arz was made
mission (arz) of Ali Pasha, the beylerbey
on 15thZilkade, [i.e., on 19*hMarch]:
with its revenue,1has been conferredon
The liva of Garraf (
Madina
the
of
(o>),
bey
Haydar Bey,
The Uva of Madina, with its revenue, has been conferredon Said
Bey, the beyof Garraf.
The Uva of Rahmaniyya (vl>j), with its revenue,has been conferred
on Mehmed Bey, the beyof Hafa (U>-?).
The Uva of Hafa, in the beylerbeylik
of Lahsa, with its revenue, has
been conferredon Pervez Bey, the beyof Rahmaniyya.
The Uva of Takpr
U>),with its revenue,has been conferred
on Sam Bey who had been removed fromthe above-mentioned liva
[i.e. Hafa].
with its revenue, has been conferred
The liva of Akakale (<uU
on Hiiseyin Bey who had been removed fromKinahiyya
The Uva of Kinahiyya has been conferredon Arslan, the Kapudan
of Remle (<Lj).
The liva of Kan Kinabad (^LJuT
jf), with its revenue, has been
conferredon Sinan Bey, at present,the beyof Hemmar
The liva of Hemmar in the vilayetof Basra :
The beylerbeyof Basra has sent a letter,referringthat Sinan, formerly the kajmdan of Basra, has undertakenthe has2 of Hemmar at
more than 200,000 ake, on condition that the afore-saidprovince be
4
assigned to him. Veli, the present agaz of the Azaplar in the above1 Bedeliylei.e., withtheannualrevenues.
2 Has-i.e., the biggesttype of fief,the minimilm
incomeof whichwas
100,000ake.
3 Aa, meaningin OttomanTurkish"chief"or "master."
4 The namegivento a particularcorpsof Ottomantroopsused in fighting
bothon landand at sea.
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85
mentioned liva, has also undertaken to farm the has at more than
200,000 ake, on condition that the province be assigned to him. The
of Basra has presentedan arz that the afore-saidUva be duly
beylerbey
and legally assigned to Veli. Order has been made that the province be
so conferredon the conditions [mentionedabove].
The Agalik* of the Azeban of Hemmar has been conferredon Muzaffer,one ofthe avuslar6at Basra, with 15 ake.1
The liva of Turre-iJezayir (y|>- **}>?) has been conferredon Hseyin
Bey, the aga of the Gnlllerat Kuban (Oli).
And the agaltk of the above-mentioned liva has been conferredon
veys Aga, the aga of the Azablar at Jarur (jjjU).
And the above-mentioned agalik of veys has been conferredon
eref,the kethvda8of the fortressof Jarur.
9 of the above-mentionedfortresshas been conAnd the kethudahk
ferred on a certain person called Ferruh, one of the Blkbasts10
stationed at Rahmaniyya, with 15 ake.
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned[i.e., the beylerbeyof Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon Ali Bey,
the beyof Madan (ol.u.).
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned [b.b. of
Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon Ali Bey, the bey
of Katif.
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned [b.b. of
Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon Hemmad Bey,
the beyof Abu Arba (b j*^.1 ?).
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned [b.b. of
Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon Ahmed Bey, the
beyof Sadr Sevib
j-u).
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned [b.b. of
Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon Ahmed Bey, the
beyof Zernuk
Terakki: in response to the arz of the above-mentioned [b.b. of
Basra] a terakkiof 20,000 ake has been conferredon ankoglu Mehmed
Bey, the beyof Hafa.
5 Aalikofaa.
i.e., theoffice
avu-i.e., a memberofthecorpsofPursuivants.
7 i.e., perdiem.
8 Kethuda-i.e.,an adjutant.
9 i.e., theofficeofkethvda.
10Blkbair-i.e.,
the commander
of a blk.Blkmeans a Regimentof
troops.'
86
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APPENDIX
MD, xxvn, p. 81.
V
9 Safer 983/20 May 1575
Given to stipl Ali avus.
of Baghdad :
Order to the beylerbey
of Lahsa has sent a letter,statingthat the conquest of
The beylerbey
Bahrayn (with God's favor) be easy. He writes that there are [very]
few warriors (cenkci) in the fortress,also that the galleys (kadirga)
actually at Basra are sufficient.Now it is not admissible to treat the
foe as of no account, but it is essentialto make [proper]preparationfor
it. You, who where once beylerbey
of that region,must know the local
conditions; I have commandedthat when [thisfirman]reaches you, you
shall informyourselfof all details and reportaccordingto yourknowledge and accurately how best to prepare for this enterprise-i.e.,
what number of galleys, and what number of siege guns, of soldiers
11Zema, thepluralofz im. A za*im was theholderofa zeamet
, a typeof
fiefyieldingan annualrevenueofmorethan20,000ake.
12Defterdarhkwas the termused for
i.e., the officeof defterdar.
Defterdar
theofficials
ofthefinancial
administration
(cf.B. Lewis,in EI 2,s.v. Daftardr
).
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