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The Man Who Would Be Caliph: A Sixteenth-Century Sultan's Bid for an African Empire
Author(s): Stephen Cory
Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2009), pp. 179200
Published by: Boston University African Studies Center
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InternationalJournal of AfricanHistorical Studies Vol. 42, No. 2 (2009)

179

The Man Who Would Be Caliph: A Sixteenth-Century

Sultan's Bid
foran AfricanEmpire
By Stephen Cory
Introduction
fromtheWestAfrican
of 1591,localvillagers
In theearlymonths
SonghayEmpirespotted
a
an
at
across
the
desert
was
an unusualsight.1
Moving steadypace
armyof some3,000If
and
the
had
armed
with
cannons
muskets.2
4,000 soldiers,
villagers notknownbetter,
themselves
to be thevictimsof a desertmirage.Butthis
theysurelywouldhavethought
of
offthegoldensandsoftheSahara.Within
was
no
trick
vision
lightreflecting
surprising
itselfon thebanksof theNigerRiverand
days,theMoroccanarmyhad reassembled
constructed
wouldsoondefeata hastily
Songhayforceofbetween28,000-50,000menat
theBattleofTondibi(March13,1591).3WestAfricawouldneverbe thesameagain.
whoundertook
thisriskyventure,
It was theSavdisultanMulayAhmadal-Mansur
launched
beforeorsince.In 1590,al-Mansur
whichnootherMoroccanrulerhasattempted
overtheregion
invasionoftheSonghayEmpire,afterseekingto gaincontrol
a full-scale
thisattacktounifythe
ofyears.The Moroccansultanclaimedhe undertook
fora number
Africaunderone leader.Andwhocouldbe a betterchoiceas
Muslimlandsof western
descendent
oftheProphet
andthelegitimate
thesharifian
monarch
thanal-Mansur
himself,
wouldhave
claim
to
of
world?
this
Muslim
leaderoftheentire
right sovereignty
Although
theOttomans
hadnotbeenable
sultaninIstanbul,
beenvigorously
disputed
bytheTurkish
toassisttheSonghayin their
toextendtheirempireintoWestAfricaandcoulddo nothing
predicament.
WestAfrica?The reasonsgivenby
s motivesforinvading
Whatwereal-Mansur'
to
the
from
his
claim
be
himself
derive
Ahmad
caliphoverthe
divinely-appointed
Mulay
his rightto securethesubmission
andthushe asserted
Muslimcommunity;
international
believethatal-Mansur's
and properdefenseof Islamiclands.However,mosthistorians
his controversial
weremorematerialthanspiritualwhenhe undertook
considerations
1 The

Songhay Empire was establishedby Sunni vAli in the late fifteenthcentury.Its centrallands
consistedof the Middle Niger Riverregion,includingthe cities of Jenne,Timbuktu,and Gao, an area mostly
also
containedin the moderncountriesof Mali, BurkinaFaso, and Niger. At its greatestheight,its territory
extendedinto the moderncountriesof Senegal and Nigeria. The empiregained much of its wealth through
controllingthe southernend of theprosperoustrans-Saharangold trade.
2 For theestimatednumberof Moroccan

troops,see JohnHunwick,Timbuktuand theSonghayEmpire:

Al-Sa^ds Ta'rkh al-sdn down to 1613 and OtherContemporaryDocuments (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 188 n.
13.
3 For the estimatednumberof
Songhay troops at Tondibi, see Hunwick, Timbuktuand the Songhay
n.
25.
189-190
Empire,
2009 bytheBoardofTrusteesofBostonUniversity.
Copyright

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180

StephenCory

desireto
hadan insatiable
assaultupona fellowMuslimdynasty.4
thesharif
Theymaintain
in
for
centuries
full
on
control
over
the
trade
that
had
been
carried
gain
prosperous
gold
WestAfrica.5Indeed,theinfluxof gold intoMorocco,a directresultof thisinvasion,
earnedal-Mansur
thetitleof"al-Dhahabi"
("Thegoldenone").
Thosewhoarguethatgreedwas theprincipal
motivefortheinvasioncanpointtoa
numberof primarysourcesthat seem to supporttheircharge.And yet, careful
to be overly
of all the historicalevidencerevealsthis interpretation
consideration
a visionfar
Ahmad
had
A
ambitious
and
man,
Mulay
simplistic. complex extraordinarily
sultan
saw his
Moroccan
The
than
his
with
coffers
greater simplystuffing
Songhaygold.
conquestof Songhayas thefirststepin a grandschemeto uniteIslamicAfricaundera
thantheeast.His goalswere
revivedArabcaliphate,
thistimearisingfromthewestrather
s claims
no less than to challengethe mightyOttomanEmpireitself.Al-Mansur'
an institution
an attempt
(the
represented
by an EarlyModernmonarchto reinvigorate
had
but
which
of
that
had
been
the
earliest
centuries
Islam,
caliphate)
important
during
of
Abbasid
in
all
name
and
fall
the
vanished
but
after
thedecline
Empire.6
The FightforNorthAfrica
overa periodof
dramatically
By 1591,Morocco'sinternational
positionhad improved
the
brink
ofbeing
was
on
the
the
sixteenth
At
of
the
century, country
fifty
years.
beginning
into
inroads
considerable
had
made
several
The
dividedamong
powers. Portuguese
foreign
coasts.7Fresh
andAtlantic
Moroccoby subjugating
a seriesofportson theMediterranean
to
was
states
fromitsfinalconquestof al-Andalus,
thenewlypowerful
beginning
Spanish
in
showinterest
intheMaghribas well,capturing
Mediterranean
Algeria
ports modern-day
and Tunisia.And the Ottomandynastyalso threatened
fromtheeast,havingrecently
established
in eastern
footholds
andcentralNorthAfrica,fromwhereit battledSpainfor
Mediterranean
In theface of suchchallenges,
theweakWattasiddynasty,
supremacy.8
4 Forthis
Markus
Princeton:
see E.W. Bovili,TheGoldenTradeoftheMoors(1958; reprint,
argument,
Weiner,1995),154-202;Charles-Andr
Julien,
History
ofNorthAfrica
fromtheArabConquestto1830,ed.
New York:PraegerPublishers,
RogerLe Tourneau,trans.JohnPtrie,re-ed.C.C. Stewart(1952; reprint,
1970),232-235; AbdallahLaroui,TheHistory
Essay,trans.RalphManheim
oftheMaghrib:AnInterpretive
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1977), 256-58; JeromeBruce Weiner,"Fitna,Corsairs,and
Diplomacy:Moroccoand the MaritimeStatesof WesternEurope,1603-1672"(Ph.D. thesis,Columbia
1976),36-37.
University,
^A
whoclaimstobe descendedfromtheProphet
Muhammad.
sharif(plural:shurafa')is an individual
In Morocco,mostshurafa'tracetheirlineagethrough
Hasan.
Muhammad's
grandson
6 Most historians
believe thatthe Abbasidcaliphatewas in fulldeclineby the late ninthcentury.
toclaimthepositionofcaliphuntiltheMongolssackedBaghdadin 1258.
However,theAbbasidscontinued
7 For the history
of the Portuguese
outpostsin Morocco,see Vasco de Carvalho,La domination
portugaiseau Marocdu XVemeau XVIIIemesicle (1415-1769) (Lisbon:SPN, 1942); Pierrede Cenival,
trans.,Chroniquede Santa Cruzdo Cap de Gue (Paris: Geuthner,
1934); and J. Goulven,La Place de
(1502-1769) (Paris:EmileLarose,1917).RobertRicardhas written
Mazagansous la domination
portugaise
on thePortuguese
colonialperiodin Morocco,including
des
RobertRicard,tudessurl'histoire
extensively
au Maroc(Coimbra,Port.:Universidade
de Coimbra,1955).
Portugais

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 181

itcouldthrough
alliances
whatever
whichruledfromFez, soughtto maintain
sovereignty
oftheseforeign
withoneoranother
powers.
threat
It was in response
to thisforeign
thattheSavdistate,risingoutofthefertile
The earliestSavdi sultans
first
Sus valleyin southern
Morocco,
gainedmomentum.
oftheProphet.
theirclaimtobe directdescendents
a following
Declaring
through
garnered
victories.
thosesultanswonsomeimpressive
a holywaragainstthePortuguese
intruders,
a
Savdis
built
from
southern
the
the
Afterexpelling Portuguese
Morocco,
powerbase in
Wattasid
fromwhichtheylauncheda full-scaleattackon the crumbling
Marrakesh
direct
confrontation
withthe
in
them
into
of
Fez
1549
Their
put
conquest
dynasty.9
that
the
into country
whohadbeenhopingtogainentry
Ottomans,
through important
city.
the superior
The Savdi sultanMuhammadal-Shaykhgained credibility
by fighting
theirwestward
advance.10
nearTlemcen,
forcestoa standstill
Ottoman
checking
was to comea fewdecadeslater.Concerned
Savdivictory
However,thegreatest
launchedan all-outinvasionof
in Morocco,thePortuguese
fortunes
abouttheirflagging
In 1578,theforcesofKingSebastian
mistake.
Thisprovedtobe a disastrous
thecountry.
defeatat thehandsof theSavdisat Wadi al-Makhazanin northern
a crushing
suffered
was killedin thisbattle,alongwiththeSaNdisultanvAbdalMorocco.Sebastianhimself
as "The
whichled Europeansto referto theconflict
Malikandhisrival,al-Mutawakkil,
Ahmad
international
Amidstan auraof increasing
Battleof theThreeKings."11
prestige,
in theshadowsof
roseto thesultanate.
al-Mansur
MulayAhmadhadremained
Although
Savdipolitics,the Ottomansand Spaniardsweremistakenif theythought
theycould
he
was
andcapable,and
ableto
thisquietman.Al-Mansur
provedtobe shrewd
manipulate
his twenty-five
forcesthroughout
his country
frominvasionby superior
foreign
protect
in
years power.
withinhis domainsand securedhis bordersfrom
Once he established
authority
to extendhis
outsideinvaders,the ambitiousyoungsultanlooked for opportunities
andAlmohaddynasties,
abroad.Livingin theshadowof thefamousAlmoravid
influence
8 Fora summary
A History
ofOttoman
of
expansionandruleinNorthAfrica,see JamilM. Abun-Nasr,
and
theMaghribin theIslamicPeriod(Cambridge:
Laroui,
Press,
144-205;
1987),
CambridgeUniversity
withSpain over NorthAfrica,see
The Historyof theMaghrib,273-335. For the Ottomancompetition
Frontier
the
A
Frontier:
The
AndrewC. Hess,
Sixteenth-Century
Ibero-African
Historyof
Forgotten
ofChicagoPress,1978).
(Chicago:University
9 TheSavdis'mainmilitary
overthePortuguese
alongtheMoroccancoastwas theirconquestof
victory
decidedto cuttheirlossesand
thePortuguese
SantaCruz(modernAgadir)in 1540.Followingthatvictory,
Mazagan(modernAI Jadida),whichtheyheld
theyrefortified
although
pulledoutof Safi and Azemmour,
oftheMoroccanconquestof SantaCruz,see WestonF. Cook,TheHundred
until1769.Forthesignificance
Years Warfor Morocco: Gunpowderand theMilitaryRevolutionin theEarly ModernMuslimWorld
(Boulder:WestviewPress,1994),194-200.
10 Cook,HundredYears Warfor Morocco,218-224; Hess, TheForgotten
Frontier,
76-78; Dahiru
Century:Problemsand Patternsin AfricanForeignPolicy (Bristol:
Yahya,Morocco in the Sixteenth
1
1-17.
LongmanGroup,1981),
11Cook,HundredYearsWarforMorocco,241-55; E.W. Bovili,TheBattleofAlcazar:AnAccountof

La
theDefeatofDon SebastianofPortugalat El-Ksarel-Kebir(London:Batchworth,
1952);PierreBerthier,
diteBatailledes TroisRois(4 Aot1578) (Paris:Editionsdu CentreNational
Bataillede l'ouedel-Makhazen
de la Recherche
1985).
Scientifique,

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182

StephenCory

al-Mansur's
claimtogreatness
depended
largely
uponthedegreetowhichhecouldexpand
andeastslammedshutby
theborders
ofhisstate.Withthedoorsforconquesttothenorth
for
theSpaniards
andtheOttomans,
thesultan'sonlyoption expansion
laytothesouth.
At thetimeof al-Mansur'sascensionto power,WestAfricawas dividedamong
theSonghay,theKanem,theBornu,the
severalsub-Saharan
Muslimstates,including
1
shows
thelocationsof thesestatesrelativeto
the
and
the
Dendi.
Mossi,
Hausa,
Map
andruleda territory
of thesedynasties
Morocco.12
The Songhaywas themostpowerful
sourcein Songhay
which
had
its
A
southeast
of
Morocco.
trade,
gold
directly
prosperous
The desireto gain
Africa
for
centuries.13
northwest
had
carried
on
been
lands,
throughout
into
incursions
thePortuguese
controlof thisresourcehad beena keyfactormotivating
force
assumethatthissamedesirewas thedriving
southern
Morocco,andmanyhistorians
behindal-Mansur's
intotheregion.
forays
RevivingtheCaliphate
it
Ratherthansimplyassumethatal-Mansurhad the same goals as the Portuguese,
claimed
Ahmad
an Islamiccontext.
hisactionsfromwithin
behoovesus toconsider
Mulay
thetitleof caliph,a positionwhoseoriginsdate back to theearliestyearsof Islamic
Muhammad.
The originalcaliphswerebelievedto be successorsof theProphet
history.
and politicalleadershipover the entire
Theirpositioninitiallyinvolvedbothspiritual
oftheFaithful."14
inthetitle"Commander
Muslimcommunity,
as is reflected
Particularly
withthehouse
oftheearlycaliphswas theirassociation
criticalto thepoliticallegitimacy
of thetruefaith,and theirsuccessful
of theProphet,
theirclaimto upholdthepractices
ofIslamicrealmsthrough
anddefense
military
might.15
expansion
and political
lostboththeirreligiousauthority
However,thecaliphseventually
real
held
the
sultans
controloverIslamiclands.By thetenthcentury,
political
regional
was in thehandsoftheulama(counciloflearnedmen).No
authority
powerandreligious
seriousattempts
weremadeto revivecaliphalauthority
alongitsoriginallinesuntilthe
the
in
the
sixteenth
After
Arab
lands
earlypartof thatcentury,
century.
conquering
its
Ottoman
dynasty
begantolayclaimtothetitleofcaliph,inorderto legitimize primary
in this,since
wereat a disadvantage
positionintheIslamicworld.However,theOttomans
the
abandoned
could
not
claim
sharifian
and
soon
descent, they
project.On theother
they
hand,Ahmadal-Mansurhad arisenfroma familythatwas widelybelievedto have
afterbecomingsultan,al-Mansurbeganto
descendedfromthe Prophet.
Thus,shortly
12The arearuled these
was referred
to as theSudan,a termderivedfromtheArabicword
by
dynasties
to a specific
thanitsmodernreference
for"black."Thusthetitle"Sudan"had a muchbroaderconnotation
in
northeastern
Africa.
country
13Fora
ofthistrade,see Bovili,TheGoldenTradeoftheMoors.
discussion
thorough
14 For a
discussionof theoriginalmeaningof thetitleof caliph,see PatriciaCroneand
thorough
Martin Hinds, God's Caliph: Religious Authorityin the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge

Press,1986).
University
15 Qualifications
forthecaliphateweresummedup succinctly
jurist,vAliibn
by theeleventhcentury
see Abu'lMuhammadal-Mawardi.For an Englishtranslation
of his discussionof caliphalgovernance,
asHasan 'Ali ibn Muhammadibn Habib al-Basri al-Baghdadial-Mawardi(d. 450 AH), Al-Ahkam
= TheLawsofIslamicGovernance,
trans.AsadullahYate(London:Ta-Ha,1996).
Sultaniyyah

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Man WhoWouldBe CaUph 183

openlyassertthathis caliphalclaims betterfitthehistoricqualificationsforthepositionof

"Commanderof theFaithful"thandid thoseof theOttomans.16

and
Musketeers,
Map 1. North Africa and the Sudan. Source:LansincKaba, "Archers,
Mosquitoes:The MoroccanInvasionof the Sudan and the SonghayResistance(1591-1612),"
JournalofAfrican
Press.Usedbypermission.
History22,4 (1981),457-475,Cambridge
University

It was in this role as the rightfulcaliph over the Islamic world that al-Mansur
approachedtheMuslimrulersof thekingdomssouthof theSahara. In letterswrittento the
rulersof Bornu, Kebbi, and Songhay, al-Mansur assertedhis caliphal supremacyand
maintainedthathe was onlyattempting
to restoreIslamic unityas God intended,underthe
of
the
of
the
rightfulleadership
family
Prophet.The sultan's lettersto the sub-Saharan
monarchsemphasizedthathe neededtheirsupportto stemtheprogressof theunbelieving
Europeans,and to fulfillhis role as leaderof holywar to advancetheexpansionof Islam.17

^ For information
on theOttomanuse of thetitleof caliph,see thefollowingworks:H.A.R. Gibb,
"LuftiPashaon theOttoman
as Caliphofthe
Oriens15 (1962),287-95; Colinlmber,"Siileymn
Caliphate,"
Muslims:Eb's-Su'd's Formulation
of OttomanDynasticIdeology,"in Gilles Veinstein,
d., Solimanle
ei son Temps(Paris:Ecole des HautesEtudesen SciencesSociales,1992),179-84;ColinImber,
Magnifique
"IdealsandLegitimation
in EarlyOttoman
in MetinKuntandChristine
Woodhead,eds.,Suleyman
History,"
theMagnificent
and His Age: TheOttoman
Empirein theEarlyModernWorld(London:Longman,1995),
"Relationsentrele Marocet la Turquiedansla secondemoitidu XVI et le
138-53;Chantalde la Vronne,
XVII sicle(1554-1616),"Revuede VOccidentmusulman
etde la Mditerrane
15-16(1973),391^01.
17 Severalof theseletters
have beentranslated
intoEnglishand can be foundin Hunwick,Timbuktu
and theSonghayEmpire,292-308.OthersappearintheiroriginalArabicinvAbdAllahGannun,Rasa' il alSa'diyya(Titwn,Morocco:Ma'had Mulayial-Hasan,1954).

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184

StephenCory

ofDar al-lslam(theHouseof
ofhismessagewas that,as members
The clearimplication
to al-Mansuras therightful
Africans
should
submit
the
sub-Saharan
Islam),
willingly
whileresistance
and
wouldbringblessing prosperity,
caliphoverall Muslims.Submission
wouldbringdestruction.
a caliphatethatwouldspantheSahara
The Savdisultanappearstohaveenvisioned
thisidea
to
a
Ottoman
on bothsides,andwouldserveas challenge
supremacy.
Although
and selfto us now, livingas we do in the age of nationalism
seems far-fetched
Islamic
with
historic
was
in
accordance
s
al-Mansur'
determination,
ideology.
approach
The Umayyadand Abbasidcaliphateshad managedto hold togethervast empires,
and
of separatenationalentities
thattodayencompassa number
largeterritories
spanning
also
of
the
Ottoman
time
the
ethnicities.
of
different
al-Mansur,
Empire
During
peoples
at least,
regionsunderone head,while,superficially
manydifferent
together
brought
that
he
could
no
to
think
Al-Mansur
had
reason
their
sultan.
to
of
the
title
caliph
applying
werebetterthanthoseof the
notdo thesame,especiallysincehis claimsforleadership
betweenNorth
economicand religiousconnections
In addition,
Ottomans.
long-standing
thesultanto conceiveofthesetwoareasas one community,
andWestAfricaencouraged
he was uniquely
as well.18He arguedthat,as a sharif,
whichoughttobe linkedpolitically
Islamicstates
and thattherulersof the sub-Saharan
qualifiedto lead thiscommunity,
tohisauthority.
andsubmit
shouldrecognize
WindowsintothePast
his invasiondoesn'tmeanthathe
claimedthecaliphatetojustify
Justbecauseal-Mansur
wasn'tmanipulating
ideologyto supporttheftof Songhaygold. In fact,a numberof
evaluatethesultan's
haveaccusedhimof doingjustthat.In orderto properly
historians
for
the
Moroccanconquest
historical
sources
the
we mustconsider contemporary
motives,
Moroccanaccountwas written
of Songhay.The mostimportant
by thesultan'sscribe,
Manhilal-saf'fi ma'athirmawlnalAl-Fishtali's
vAbdal-vAzizal-Fishtali.
account,
an
s"), is considered
("The PureSpringsof theExploitsof ourLordstheSharif
shuraf*
s preparations
al-Mansur'
It describes
s reign.19
workforal-Mansur'
for,andthe
apologetic
of
It
also
invasion.
Moroccan
the
eventsconnected
with,
providescopies contemporary
suchas al-Ifrani,
LaterMoroccanhistorians
relatedtotheconquest.
documents
al-Zayyani,

18

have oftenfailedto recognizetheselinksbetweenNorthAfricaand subAlthoughWesterners

SaharanAfrica,thismentalbarrierhas not alwaysexistedin themindsof Africans.The oldestwritten
The earliestArab
Africaare almostall fromthepensof Arabwriters.
recordsthatwe haveof sub-Saharan
had
been
carried
on sinceprior
which
with
sub-Saharan
trade
of
to
the
writers
Africa,
virility Maghribi
testify
and
landsduringthethirteenth
to thecomingof Islam.The expansionof Islam withinthe sub-Saharan
centuriescreatedanotherbond betweenthe two areas. Sub-SaharanAfricanscholarskept
fourteenth
centersas CairoandFez, and
in suchnorthern
andpoliticaldevelopments
abreastof intellectual
themselves
theMaghrib,
to Mecca passedthrough
who werefortunate
thoseAfricans
enoughto makethepilgrimage
In theeleventhcentury,
ranin theotherdirection.
influences
Sometimes
connections.
further
strengthening
whichruledthewestern
thefamousAlmoravid
Saharaestablished
nomadictribesfromthesouthern
dynasty,
one
hundred
for
over
and
al-Andalus
years.
Maghrib
19 Abu Faris vAbd al-vAziz al-Fishtali,Manhil al-saf1ft ma'athir mawln al-shurafa', ed. vAbd al-

Casablanca:Matbasatal-Najhal-Jadda,
KarimKurayyim
2005).
(1973;reprint,

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Man WhoWouldBe CaUph 185

abouttheinvasionfromtheaccountof aland al-Nasirilargelydrewtheirinformation

Fishtali.20
The problemwithal-Fishtali's
textis thatit is clearlya panegyric
source,which
the regimeof Ahmadal-Mansur.Al-Fishtali
was written
withthe aim of glorifying
orevenfabricated.
His account
makesstatements
thatappeartobe exaggerated
frequently
as
was
known
which
used to
in an extremely
is written
insha',
style
complexliterary
Arab
courts.21
For
these
in
official
documents
reasons,many
pre-modern
produce
to use themore
avoideddealingwithal-Fishtali,
historians
have completely
preferring
of al-Ifrani.
foundin the eighteenth-century
Nevertheless,
history
orderlypresentation
was
the
nearest
sourceto
sultan's
scribe
thereis noescapingthefactthatthe
contemporary
an
hismaster'spurposesin undertaking
andthusthemostlikelytounderstand
al-Mansur,
assaultuponthe Songhay.In orderto fullyexplainthe Moroccaninvasion,we must
thetextofal-Fishtali.
consider
The earliestaccountfroma West Africanperspectiveis Tankh al-Fattash
a scholar
toMahmudal-Kavti,
whichis usuallyattributed
oftheResearcher"),
("Chronicle
in
the
was
interested
whodiedin 1593.22Al-Kavti mainly
ofTimbuktu
describing impact
Another
of theinvasionuponWestAfricaandhe saysverylittleaboutal-Mansur.
early
of
is
Ta'rkh
the
al-Sdn
accountfroma WestAfrican
Sudan"),by
("History
perspective
al-Savdi'sworkis based
inthelateseventeenth
Written
al-Savdi.23
Abdarrahman
century,
sources.His textprovidesan extensiveaccountof the Moroccan
upon contemporary
aboutthe Savdisand al-Mansur.He discusses
numerous
comments
invasion,including
betweenal-Mansurand
eventsleadingup to the invasionand reportscorrespondence
severalSonghayrulers(Askias)overa fifteen-year
period.Someofal-Sasdi'sdetailsseem
of
historians
use his textto impugntheveracity
and thusmodern
al-Fishtali
to contradict
s scribe.
al-Mansur'
also shedlightuponthiscontroversial
Variousotherdocuments
conquest.These
includeaccountsby Europeanobservers,such as English,Spanish,or Portuguese

20 Al-Ifrn,Muhammad
al-Saghr ibn al-Hajj, Nuzhat al-hadl bi akhbr mulkal-qarn al-hdT,ed.
vAbd al-Latfal-ShdhilT(Casablanca: Matbavatal-Najh al-Jadda, 1998), ed. in Arabic and French trans.

Saadienne(1511-1670) (Paris:Leroux,1888-1889);
Histoirede la dynastie
OctaveHoudas,Nozhet-Elhadi:
Al-ZayynT,Abu al-Qsim Ahmad ibn vAl ibn Ibrahim,Al-Turjumnal-Mu'rib^an duwal al-Mashriq wa alMaghrib,trans.Octave Houdas, Le Maroc de 1631 1812 (Paris: E. Laroux, 1886). The Savdi sectionof this
work has been edited and translatedby Roger Le Tourneau as 'Histoire de la Dynastie Sasadide\ Revue de

AhmadbinKhalid,Kitbal-istiqs
23 (1977), 1-107;Al-Nsir,
etde la Mditerrane
l'Occidentmusulman
li-akhbrduwal al-Maghrib al-aqs, vols. 5-7, eds. Muhammad Hajj, IbrhmBtlib, Ahmad al-Tawfq
(Casablanca: Matbavat al-Najh al-Jadda,2001). The Sasdi section of Nasiri's text was translatedinto
Frenchby Mohammad al-Nasiriin ArchivesMarocaines 34 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1936).
21 This formal
style of writinghad been popular in Muslim chancelleriessince the Abbasid era. For
more on al-Mansur's use of insha' literature,see Stephen Cory, "Language of Power: The Use of Literary
Arabic as Political Propaganda in Early ModernMorocco," The MaghrebReview 30, 1 (2005).
22 Muhammad K. al-Kavti,TarTkhal-Fattash, ed. and trans.Octave Houdas and Maurice Delafosse,
(Paris: Adrienne-Maisonnueve,1913).
23 For an
English translationof al-Saxdi,see Hunwick,Timbuktuand theSonghayEmpire.

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186

StephenCory

businessmen
orofficials
whowereinMoroccoaroundthetimeoftheinvasion.24
Someof
themwitnessed
al-Mansur's
for
while
caravans
others
observed
war,
preparations
returning
to Marrakesh,
ladenwithprizesclaimedfromWestAfrica,followingtheconquestof
to
of theseeyewitnesses
Songhay.The enthusiastic
descriptions
largelycontributed
of
the
sultan's
for
wealth
his
motives
the
and
Europeanimpressions
great
acquisitive
invasion.
viewedtheconquestfromtheoutsideand
Yet,forthemostpart,theseEuropeans
theirimpressions
ofthesultan'smotiveswerenotgainedfrominteraction
withal-Mansur
himself.
thatremainsfrom
amountofroyalcorrespondence
Finally,thereis a considerable
al-Mansur's
addressed
to theSonghayAskiasandothersubregime.Thisincludesletters
Saharanrulersor notables,lettersaddressedto Moroccansinvolvedwiththeinvasion,
lettersto European or Muslim courts that refer to the invasion,and official
meantto be readfromthepulpitsof themosquesin citiessuchas Fez or
pronouncements
in theregionoftheSus.25Producedbyal-Mansur's
court,theseletters
supplytheofficial
for
the
attack.
memoirs
fromMoroccan
thereare no private
explanation
Unfortunately,
officials
to provide"an insidelook"behindthescenes.Suchdocumentation
is extremely
rarein thepre-modern
as shameful
Islamicworld,whichconsidered
revelations
private
andinappropriate
literary
topics.
whichwe can look
thesesourcesprovidetheonlywindowsthrough
Altogether,
backintothesixteenth
in
Savdiinvasionof
order
to
understand
the
reasons
for
the
century
base theiranalyseson theEuropeanor WestAfrican
Songhay.Mostmodernhistorians
sourcesand on al-Ifrani'struncated
versionof Fishtali'saccount.Almostwithout
these
writers
have
assumed
that
al-Mansur'saimsin attacking
exception,
Songhaywere
formaterial
andMercedes
primarily
gain.OnlyDahiruYahya,vAbdal-KarimKurayyim,
GarciaArenaigiveseriousattention
to thesultan'savowedreligiousmotivations
forthe
invasion.26
The generallack of interest
in al-Mansur'scaliphalaspirations
stemsfroma
bias towardsmaterialist
whichfails to give adequate
twentieth-century
explanations,
consideration
to sixteenth-century
in the
realities.This approachcan be summarized
the
French
historian
Felix
Dubois:
following
quoteby

24 Mostof thesearefoundin themammoth

collectionof documents
assembledby Henryde Castries
andassociates.See Henryde Castries,Pierrede Cenival,RobertRicard,Chantaide la Vronne,andPhilipp
de Cosse Brissac,eds.,Les sourcesindites
de l'histoire
du Marocde 1530 1845,Premire
srie,dynastie
saadienne(1530-1660)(Paris:E. Leroux,1906-23;Archives
etbibliothques
de Angleterre,
3 vols.(London
and Paris:E. Leroux,1918-1936);Archiveset bibliothques
de France,3 vols. (Paris:E. Leroux,19051911); Archives
etbibliothques
de Pays-bas,6 vols.(ParisandtheHague:E. Leroux,1906-1923);Archives
etbibliothques
de Portugal,5 vols.(Paris:P. Geuthner,
etbibliothques
de Espagne,
1934-1953);Archives
3 vols.(Paris:E. Leroux,1921-1961).
25 This
can be foundin thefollowing
sources:Hunwick,Timbuktu
and theSonghay
correspondence
Rasa'il al-Sa^diyya.
al-Fishtali,
Empire-,
Manhilal-saf';Gannun,
26
Morocco
in
the
Sixteenth
yahdal145-67;Abd al-KarimKurayyim,
Yahya,
Century,
Al-Maghribfi
dawla al-Sa'diyya(Casablanca:Sharikatal-Tabavwa al-Nashr,1978), 145-73; MercedesGarcia Arenai,
Messianism
and Puritanical
MahdisoftheMuslimWest,trans.MartinBeagles(Leiden:Brill,2006),
Reform:
269-95.

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Man Who Would Be Caliph

187

So manyattractions
underone sky(inWestAfrica)couldnotfail
together
gathered
torousetheattention,
andby-and-by
thecupidity,
ofneighboring
territories.
Chief
was
these
that
nearest
the
Morocco.
From
the
first
Sudan,
among
naturally country
theiravariceassumeda harshly
definite
for
the
of
Morocco
had
character,
people
noreven
not,andneverdidhave,anydesiretocolonizeanddevelopa commerce,
a religiouspropaganda.
looked
Sudan
in
to institute
the
the
upon
They
lightof a
their
and
their
first
like
ultimate
were
concentrated
efforts,
aspirations,
goldmine,
ofthispreciousmetal.27
uponthemeredrainage
view
The followinganalysistakesa different
approachfromthe conventional
a
Since
al-Fishtali
had
for
above.
good reputation reliability
generally
among
expressed
and sincehe is clearlytheclosestremaining
historical
Moroccanhistorians,
pre-modern
I givepreference
to his accountand to theMoroccanroyal
sourceto al-Mansur
himself,
consideration
the
of al-Savdiand the European
into
writings
taking
correspondence,
theEuropeanaccountstobe leasthelpful
formypurposes,
dueto their
sources.I consider
ofthepoliticalandcultural
milieu
lackofaccesstotheMoroccancourtandtheirignorance
an
As
I
will
Moroccan
that
whichal-Mansur
within
show, analysis preferences
operated.
fromthatofDubois.
conclusion
sourcesyieldsa verydifferent
PeripheralNegotiations?
s seemingobsessionwith
ofManhilal-safystemsfromal-Fishtali'
Partof thecriticism
main storyline.
After
view
as
to
the
modern
historians
that
peripheral
negotiations
s conquestof two desertoases along the Saharancaravanroute
al-Mansur'
describing
and
Gurara),Manhil al-saf' devotesa considerableamountof space to
(Tuwat
Africanruler,Mai Idris
sub-Saharan
thesultan'sdealingswitha prominent
discussing
s
Aloma of the Bornu. Most modernhistoriansshow littleinterestin al-Fishtali'
even
that
the
SaNdi
historian
is
Dahiru
asserts
with
these
Yahya
negotiations.
preoccupation
of theMoroccan-Borno
in hisdescription
Thus,it is
diplomatic
activity.28
untrustworthy
of
ofManhilal-saf'sinceittouchesuponthequestion
toexaminethisportion
important
of
considers
his
account
these
as a source.The following
s reliability
al-Fishtali'
analysis
historical
inlightofmodern
interpretations.
negotiations
on thebanksoftheYo
haditscapitalinthecityofNgazargamu
TheBornodynasty
statesofNigerandNigeria.More
River,nearwhatis nowtheborderbetweenthemodern
aboutMai IdrisexiststhanforanyotherBornorulerpriorto thenineteenth
information
forthefirst
chronicle
twelveyears
ofIbnFartuwa'spanegyric
duetothesurvival
century,
"the
IbnFartuwa'saccountas presenting
JohnHunwicksummarizes
ofMai Idris'reign.29
and
a
of
his
borders
on
ruler
who
embarked
of a vigorous
plannedpolicy securing
picture
with
Idrisintocontact
Thepursuit
ofthisenterprise
hisowndomains."30
brought
pacifying
27 Felix Dubois, Timbuctoo,the

Mysterious,trans.Diana White (New York: Negro UniversitiesPress,

1969), 122.
28

Yahya, Morocco in theSixteenthCentury,150.

29 Ahmad b. Fartuwa,The Kanem Wars,trans.H.R. Palmer in Sudanese Memoirs

(Lagos: Government
publication,1928), 1: 15-81. Also trans,by J.W. Redhouse,J. Royal Asiatic Society,Vol. 19 (1862), 42-123.
K)John Hunwick,
"Songhay, Bornu and Hausaland in the SixteenthCentury, in J.F.A. Ajayi and
Michael Crowder,eds., Historyof WestAfrica(Cambridge: Columbia UniversityPress, 1972), 1: 208.

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188

StephenCory

thesuperpower
thenexerting
its influence
Northeastern
Africa,theOttoman
throughout
Idris
to
reach
a
formal
with
the
Ottomans
toprotect
Empire.
initially
attempted
agreement
hissovereignty.
Whenthesenegotiations
turned
his
attention
brokedown,theBornoruler
totheotherNorthAfrican
power,theSavdistateinMorocco.
Al-Fishtali
It was evidently
theBornuwhotooktheinitialstepin thisrelationship.
"in
the
he
was
in
thecityof
while
990
al-Mansur
received
writes,
news,
(1582 CE)
year
Fez, of the approachof the messengerof the masterof the kingdomof Bornu."31
a sizeablegift
themessenger
withhima largedelegation,
including
Apparently
brought
male
"of whatwas current
of
their
customs
to
among
bring,(a gift) youthful andfemale
slavesandsub-Saharan
andcuriosities."32
The chronicler
goeson to describealclothing
Mansur'
s meeting
withthisconvocation
on a largeplainin theFez area.The purposeof
of armiesand
of theFaithful,
thisvisitwas "to ask the assistanceof theCommander
whobordered
warriors
anda number
and cannonsto battlethoseunbelievers
of muskets
arose
in thisinitial
a
on
the
far
of
Sudan."33
side
the
However, problem
(the Bornu)
withtheBornu.
whichal-Mansur
in hisnegotiations
woulduse to hisadvantage
meeting,
oftheFaithful,
therehappened
"When(IdrisAloma's) letterwas readto theCommander
So al-Mansur
seizedthe
tobe a discrepancy
between
itandthewordsofthemessenger....
andhe heldthis
andtheletter
becauseofthedifference
between
themessenger
opportunity
the
master
of
the
of
Bornu."34
against
kingdom
the
backto IdrisAloma(withtheappropriate
gifts),al-Mansur
Sending messenger
stipulatedsome conditionsunderwhich he would providethe requestedaid. "He
demandedthe oath (of allegiance)fromthemand (required)thattheyenterintohis
in the
whichGod imposeduponthemanduponall theworshippers
summons,
prophetic
to them)that
thatweresubmitting
toit.... (Andhe communicated
regionsofthecountries
...
theholywar,forwhichtheyexpressed
an inclination
anda desire,couldnotbe fulfilled
as longas theyhadnotsoughtpermission
intheiraffairs
fromtheImamofthecommunity
whomGod haddistinguished
oftheFaithful
inhisroleas the
as Commander
(al-Mansur),
this
for
to
the
inheritor
of
the
of
the
provider
community,
According
legacy
prophecy."35
the
Borno
a
the
took
this
oath.
The
scribe
includes
of
al-Fishtali,
text,
messenger
copy
whichhe wroteoutandsentbackwiththemessenger
toIdrisAloma.
Al-Fishtali
appearsto haveviewedthissequenceofeventsas significant,
devoting
oversevenpagesto describing
It seemsthatal-Mansur
thenegotiations.
was hopingto
utilizehis alliancewiththe Bornuas a stepping-stone
in his attempts
to controlthe
The
Bornu
must
have
understood
for
in
his
the
initial
addressto
this,
Songhay.
messenger,
theSavdisultan,"compared
to
the
events
in
which
the
Commander
of the
(his request)
Faithful
had directed
his armiesfortheregionalconquestof Tuwatand Gurara,and he

31 Al-Fishtali,
Manahilal-saf',67. All translations
fromal-Fishtali's
textaremine.
32 Ibid.,67.
33 Ibid.,67-68.
34Ibid.,68.
35 Ibid.

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 189

hoped that (al-Mansur) would make the two of them (Bornu and Tuwat/Gurara)into
fortheconquestof thecountryof theSudan and capturingitskingdoms."36
stirrups
The main problemwiththisaccountis thatit does not fitwithsubsequentevents.
There is no indicationanywherethatal-Mansurprovidedthemilitaryaid thatIdrisAloma
asked of him.Indeed, givenhis plannedassault upon the Songhay,it is doubtfulthatthe
sultanwould have had the resourcesto devote to such an alliance withthe Bornu. And
thereis also no recordthatthe Bornu aided the Moroccans in any way when al-Mansur
laterlaunchedhis offensiveagainsttheSonghaycapitalin Gao. Indeed,thereis no further
mentionanywhereof thissupposedalliance,a factthatseems verystrangegiventhestrong
languagein whichtheagreementwas couched.
He lamentsthat
Yahya views thesefactsas evidence of al-Fishtali'sunreliability.
"our knowledgeof theworkingsof Bornudiplomacyis severelylimitedby theone-sided
nature of our documents,i.e., Osmanli and Savdi, there being no Bornoan official
is
documentsexceptfor some briefreferencesby Ibn Fartuwa."37Yahya' s interpretation
filled with unfavorableallusions to the Moroccan sultan, such as his statementthat
"Moroccan officialsourcesgrudginglyadmitthatthe motivebehindthe Bornu embassy
was Idris Aloma's wish to acquire arms fromMorocco and the use of some sharifian
in the Sudan."38Yahya findsit
soldiersto help wage jihad againstthe idol-worshippers
a
unlikelythatal-Mansurcould have deliveredupon promiseof militaryaid to theBornu.
However, "to admit all this to the embassy would have been both undiplomaticand
harmfulto theimage of Morocco."39Thus, al-Mansurdrewoutthenegotiationsin orderto
buy time, never intendingto honor the request.Beyond this,Yahya doubts that Idris
Aloma would ever agree to accept "the spiritualsupremacyof Morocco by recognizing
of
Ahmadal-Mansuras theonlycaliph and Imam of Islam."40He questionsthecredibility
theMoroccanrecords,claiming,
There seems to be some factual erroror at least discrepancyin al-Fishtali's
accounts.The statementthatthe second embassy broughtback the draftof 4the
Blessed Bay'ah of therulerof theBornu' (theoathof allegiance)cannotbe correct.
The second envoy (as anotherof al-Fishtali's passages has it) came with the
of
of Bornu's demands,and onlyafterthiswas he toldthatrecognition
clarification
aid.41
a
for
condition
of Morocco was
thespiritualsuzerainty
anymilitary
Anotherof Yahya's criticismsof al-Fishtaliis based uponthescribe'sclaim thathe
himselfwrotetheoath of allegiancethatwas agreedto by IdrisAloma. Yahya statesthat
of theoathis broughtintoquestionby al-Fishtali'sadmissionthatthetext
theauthenticity
was notwrittenin Borno.The Savdi scribeclaimedto have writtenit himselfbecause the
"a claim
people of Bornudid nothave a good graspof Arabicand weregenerallyignorant,
36 Ibid.
37

Yahya, Morocco in theSixteenthCentury,147.

38 Ibid., 148,
emphasis mine.In my readingof al-Fishtali,I fail to notice the "grudging"natureof this
admission.
39 Ibid., 148.
40 Ibid., 150.
41 Ibid.

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190

StephenCory

was wellestablished....
whichwasofcoursebaseless.Thereputation
ofBornoscholarship
The textofthebay'ah reflected
andthe
thenatureof Morocco'sforeign
policyproblems
in
the
Islamic
Morocco's
used by
propaganda
theologically-based
politicalarguments
werethus
relations
world."42
diplomatic
Yahyagoesontoconcludethat"Moroccan-Borno
satisfaction
some
inconclusive....
SharifAhmadal-Mansurhad apparently
illusory
got
fromthenegotiations,
butnothing
elsecameoutofthem."43
fromsucha cynical
narrative
al-Fishtali's
to interpret
However,it is notnecessary
accountof the
of
Fishtali's
basic
outlines
For
the
Hunwick
instance,
accepts
perspective.
motivated
as
been
the
Borno
with
Bornu.
He
by a
request having
negotiations
interprets
fearof the Ottomansand suggeststhatthiscould have accountedfor the "marked
of the
discrepancybetween the contentsof the letterand the representations
value
to alimmense
as
Hunwicksees theagreement having
ambassador."44
potential
Mansur,writingthat,"Firstly,it would providehim withimportant
supportin his
of
the Muslim
head
as
for
to
the
Ottoman
sultan
recognition supreme
challenge
of
one
ofthegreat
submission
itwouldsecurethe
inAfricaatleast.Secondly,
community,
empiresoftheSudan,leavinghimwithonlytheSonghayto subdue-a planwhichwas no
wentawry.HunwickspeculatesthatalBut something
doubtalreadyin his mind."45
and
aid due to his otherobligations
his promiseof military
Mansurwas unableto fulfill
whenhisforces
wasmadetoBornubyal-Mansur
"no appealforsupport
thatconsequently
thelastdecadeofthecentury."46
wereengagedin subduing
Songhayduring
in al-Fishtali'stextto whichYahya alludes is not
Indeed,the discrepancy
'
with
immediately
apparentupona readingof Manhilal-saf. The criticalstatement
of
to
al-Mansur
a
back
whichYahyatakesissue(thatthesecondemissary
copy the
brought
failsto includea
bay'ah) does notappearin al-Fishtali'saccount.Yahya inexplicably
in other
forthisstatement,
even thoughhe is verydetailedin his references
reference
of
al-Mansur
In
that
accuses
the
debate
engagingin
places. addition, theological
Yahya
to assumethat
itis realistic
withtheemissary
does notappearin thetext.As forwhether
Hunwick
writes
an oathofallegiancetoal-Mansur,
theBornorulerwouldsubmit
totaking
al-Mansur
for
its
was
to
the
demanded,
"Bornu,
price
willing pay
part,
apparently
no doubtthatMoroccowas toodistant
forallegianceto itsrulertobe anything
assuming
morethana formality."47
Finally,while Yahya may have conclusiveevidencethatthe claim of Borno
whether
al-Fishtaliwouldhave had sufficiently
ignorancewas false,it is questionable
detailedknowledge
oftheBornuto verify
whether
or notthisignorance
existed.The text
that
the
excuse
to al-Mansur
of
Borno
was
the
as
reports
ignorance givenby
messenger
forhis requestthattheMoroccansdrawup thedocument
of theoath.If the
justification
claimwas untrue,
itseemsthatthefaultlieswiththeemissary
fromBornuandnotwithal42 Ibid.,150.
43 Ibid.,151.
44 Hunwick,
"Songhay,Bornu,andHausaland,"212.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 191

Fishtali.
IdrisAlomaevidently
hadsomereasonforwanting
theMoroccans
todrawupthis
himself
fromitiftheagreement
fellapartand
document,
possiblyso thathe coulddistance
theOttomans
choseto takeissuewithit. Yahya's portrayal
of Mai Idrisas an innocent
s machinations
victimof al-Mansur'
seemssomewhat
It is muchmorelikely
far-fetched.
thateach of the two sultanswas attempting
to manipulate
the situationto his own
In addition,
al-Fishtali
was no doubtinfluenced
by a longstanding
perceivedadvantage.
of sub-Saharan
beliefinthebackwardness
Africa,a beliefthatwasexpressed
Maghribi
by
earlier.48
IbnBattuta
twohundred
years
To assertthatal-Fishtali'
s accountis unreliable
simplybecauseit seeksto portray
To further
in themostfavorable
al-Mansur
lightis unconvincing.
allegethatal-Mansur
out of somedesirefor"an illusorysatisfaction,"
or selfengagedin thesenegotiations
actual
of
underestimates
the
increased
that
the
sultan
advantages
prestige
gratification,
thesubmission
of the
havegainedfromsuchan alliance.By securing
couldpotentially
in his
al-Mansur
wouldhavestrengthened
hishandsignificantly
BornuandtheSonghay,
the
alliance
between
Morocco
and
Bornu
failed
with
the
Ottomans.
Although
competition
the
invented
in subsequent
to materialize
events,thisdoes notindicatethatal-Fishtali
entire
account.
IllegalAssault?
withtheBornuas well as his invasionof Tuwatand
his negotiations
Havingcompleted
In
hisattention
towards
theAskiaandtheSonghay.
nowturned
al-Mansur
Gurara,
directly
a
demanded
thattheSonghayrulerpaytheMoroccans
toAskiaIshaqII, al-Mansur
a letter
ofgoldforeveryloadofsalttakenfromtheSonghaysaltminesat
taxequalinga mithqal49
Taghaza.The sultanclaimedthathispurposeforthetaxwasto "spendwhataccruesfrom
andjihad."50Indeed,it was theMoroccanarmies,alof campaigning
this... in pursuit
theSonghayfrombeingoverwhelmed
thatprotected
Mansurinsisted,
by theforcesof
"Wereitnotforthe
"TheyarethearmiesofGod,"wroteal-Mansur.
Europeanunbelievers.
... (the
betweenyou and theinfideltyrants
factthattheirsharpswordsforma barrier
and
flood
land."51
Yet
these
same
inundate
...
torrents
would
infidels')flowing
your
you
Moroccanarmieswereto be unleashedupon the SonghayEmpire,whichtheywere
afterthisletterwas written.
Througha strangetwistof
shortly
protecting,
supposedly
for
the
defenseof Islamiclands
his
that
sultan
the
caliphalresponsibility
argued
logic,
hisauthority.
torecognize
a bloodyattackagainsta Muslimprincewhorefused
justified
thatal-Mansur
didnot
thissequenceofevents,al-Fishtali
In describing
emphasizes
"hedidnotexchange
ina hastyfashion.
On thecontrary,
sendoffhisletter
correspondence
48 N. Levtzionand J.F.P.
Hopkins,eds., Corpusof EarlyArabicSourcesfor WestAfricanHistory
(Princeton:Markus Weiner Publishers,2000), 279-304. For a translationof Ibn Battuta's account of subSaharan Africa,see Said Hamdun and Noel King, Ibn Battuta in Black Africa (Princeton:Markus Weiner
Publishers,2005).
49
Equal to a dinar of pure gold, the equivalent of 4.25 gm. Hunwick, Timbuktuand the Songhay
Empire,142, 280, 282, 286.
50 "Letter from
Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur to Askiya Ishaq II, dated Safar 998/December 1589,"

Timbuktu
and theSonghayEmpire,295.
Hunwick,
51 Hunwick,
Timbuktu
and theSonghayEmpire,295.

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192

StephenCory

withhimon thisuntilhe had askedtheulamaof hisprovincefora legalopinion... of

it."52He thenadds,"So theygave hima legalopinion... thatthecontrolof themines
andsolelytotheImam(al-Mansur),
andthatitwasnotforanyone
belongsunconditionally
And
ofthesultanorhisdeputies.
tohaveanyauthority
in thismatter
exceptbypermission
al-Mansursentthosefatwas(to Ishaq), alongwiththeletterdirectedto him,withthe
the
to theletter,
al-Mansur
WhenIshaq delayedin responding
interpreted
messenger."53
So he decidedto
and he "becamefurious.
delayas a refusalto submitto thecommand,
these
sendhissoldierstotheSudan.Andthiswas thebasisfor(hisdecision)togo towards
landsandto subjugate
them."54
it
of Songhay,
In lightof al-Mansur'
s cleardetermination
to conquerthekingdom
is notsurprising
thattheulamawentalongwithhisrequestandprovided
legaljustification
the
is that,within
forhismoveagainsttheWestAfrican
state.Whatis moreunexpected
ranksof theMoroccannotables,
thereseemsto havebeensomedissentexpressedabout
with
describes
thesultan'smeeting
theideaofmilitary
actionagainstSonghay.Al-Fishtali
Aland ... themenofjudgment."55
"hiscommanders
... andthenotablesofhiskingdom
called thismeetingto gain a rubber-stamp
Mansurhad apparently
approvalfor his
for
theexpedition,
reasons
After
his
invasion.However,he was infora surprise.
detailing
So he
fellsilentanddidnotaskanything.
al-Mansur
noticedthat"thosewhowerepresent
between
said to them'Are you silentin approvalof myopinionor is therea difference
which
theirreservations,
andmine?'"56
The notablesdescribed
yourviewofthesituation
andthefact
an offensive
acrossthedesertwasteland
includedthedifficulty
of launching
and
Almohads
theAlmoravids,:the
thatthegreatMoroccandynasties
ofthepast(including
that
the
sultan
theMerinids)had neverattempted
sucha thing.Al-Fishtali
easily
reports
overthat
tothesuperiority
oftheMoroccanweaponry
answered
theseobjections,
pointing
of theSonghay,thefactthatmerchants
crossedthedesertin safety,and the
routinely
This
in the situationsbetweenthe Savdi dynastyand its predecessors.
difference
to al-Mansurthat
seemsto have satisfied
thenotables,fortheyresponded
explanation
answer
was
and
its
correctness
so
that
there
is no longer
effective
"(your)
inspired(us)
for
is
in
minds
to
There
truth
the
'The
of
are
kings thekings
anything anyone say.
saying
ofminds.'"57
of one Muslim
Nobodyappearsto have raisedtheissue of theappropriateness
even
is
clear
that
there
evidence
dynastyinvadinganother,
though
Songhaywas an
52 Al-Fishtali,
Manhilal-saf',122.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.,125-126.Al-SavdistatesthatAskia
butthat"he senta
Ishaqdidrespondto al-Mansur'sletter,
in
couched
a
and
two
iron
In
a footnote
shoes."
to this
reply
intemperate
language,accompaniedby spear
Hunwick
"The
custom
of
a
of
an
iron
shoes
as
of
war is
insult
and
threat
writes,
passage,
sending pair
recorded
Park
158.
The
of
Bambara
sent
such
an
to
(1815), I,
by
'king'
object the'king'of Kaarta,adding
that'untilsuchtimeas thekinghadwornoutthesesandalsin hisflight,
he shouldneverbe securefromthe
arrowsof Bambara.'"Hunwick,Timbuktu
and theSonghayEmpire,187-88. Al-Savdi'sversionprovides
additional
intothereasonwhyal-Mansur
wouldbecomeso furious
overIshaq'sresponse.
insight
55 Al-Fishtali,
Manhilal-saf\126.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.,128.

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 193

was respected
in WestAfricaas a
orthodox
MuslimregimeandthatthecityofTimbuktu
Hunwickquotesa description
of thecityby al-Kavti,
centerof Muslimscholarship.
who,
he says,
has leftus a glowing
evenif we allow forsomeexcessof parochialenthusiasm,
and the Sunna
accountof sixteenth
centuryTimbuctoo."Religionflourished
In thosedaysit(Timbuktu)
bothreligiousandworldly
affairs....
enlivened
hadno
equal in the Sudan,fromMali to theedges of theMaghrib,forsoundnessof
institutions,
politicalliberties,purityof customs,securityof life and goods,
andrespectfor,
and
towardsthepoormanandthestranger
clemency compassion
andmenoflearning."58
andassistance
to,thestudents
ofTimbuktu,
Elias Saad adds:
thereputation
Regarding
a wholetownwouldbe
heirto (the)legacywhereby
was theprincipal
Timbuktu
as
a
of
ora "cityof
on basisofitsautonomous
identified
leadership "city scholars"
forscholars
becamethemainpointof convergence
jurists."In a sense,Timbuktu
as a "cityof scholars"subsequently
and literatiin the region.Its reputation
thatofotherearliertownsandsettlements.59
overshadowed
inal-Fishtali's
Muslimdynasty,
So, ifSonghaywasa faithful
whyis therenohintofregret
them?
noone
thattheMoroccaninvasionwreaked
textaboutthedevastation
Indeed,
upon
the
West
Ahmad
this
African
al-Mansur
on
seemsto havechallenged
jurist
pointexcept
intheyear1594.60
from
Timbuktu
Baba,whowasexiledtoMarrakesh
buttheydo not
ofthistypemayhavebeenraisedearlier,
someobjections
Actually,
thatal-Mansur
two
earlier
Al-Savdi
describes
in
Manhil
expeditions
al-saf'.
appear
He
sentto WestAfricain theyears1584-85and whichendedin failure.61
apparently
of theSonghayfromthe
invasionled to thewithdrawal
claimsthatthesecondattempted
thatal-Savdi
saltminesin Taghaza,leavingtheseminesto be abandoned.
Yahyareports
indicates
wereshocked
oftheMoroccanmenofreligion
ofIslamicbrotherhood
thefeelings
as by "the arsonand murder"
not so muchby the failureof the expeditions
committed
upon theirfellow Muslims in the course of these preliminary
foropposition
Theseearlyunsuccessful
expeditions
provided
grounds
expeditions.
s laterplanstowagewaragainsttheSonghay
toAhmadal-Mansur'
empire.62
to
al-Mansur'
s
In fact,it was thisoppositionof the ulama
expansionist
plansthat,in
Yahya's opinion,createdthe need forthe sultanto developan elaborateideological
s meetingwiththe Moroccan
forthe war.Yahya believesthatal-Mansur'
justification
to the
notableswas stagedin orderto advocatethisideologyandto quellanyopposition
58 JohnHunwick
(citing Mahmud al-KaNti),"Ahmad Baba and the Moroccan Invasion of the Sudan

(1591),"Journal
oftheHistoricalSocietyofNigeria2 (1962),313.
59 Elias Saad, Social Historyof Timbuktu:
The Role of MuslimScholarsand Notables,1400-1900
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983), 18.
60 Hunwick discusses this
challenge by Ahmad Baba, foundin the pages of al-Ifrani,in "Ahmad Baba
and theMoroccan Invasion of the Sudan, 1591," Journalof Historical Societyof Nigeria 2 (1962), 319-24.

61 Hunwick,
and theSonghayEmpire,166.
Timbuktu
62

152-53.
Century,
Yahya,MoroccointheSixteenth

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194

StephenCory

of
invasionbeforeit arose.The resultof thismeeting
was that"his shrewd
manipulation
those
who
to
his
in
serve
and
economic
succeeded
interests
thus
religion
silencing
political
objectedonreligious
grounds."63
al-Mansur's
WhileYahya'sinterpretation
seemsplausiblein explaining
certainly
fails
to
it
once
of
the
invasion's
of
the
providean
again
legitimacy,
handling
question
omits
text
As
the
of
al-Fishtali's
text.
mentioned
above,
anydoubts
adequateexplanation
of one Muslimdynastyinvading
thelegitimacy
on thepartof the notablesregarding
them.Instead,thenotables
does notmention
If theyhad suchdoubts,al-Fishtali
another.
of suchan invasion.
the
success
about
seemedto raisemostly
practical
questions
possible
theory,
Yahya,dependent
uponthetextof al-Savdiand enamoredwithhis propaganda
the accountof al-Fishtalito supporthis own
seemsto have once again manipulated
conclusion.
intothesultan'smotivescan be foundin Charles
Perhapsone of thebestinsights
s comment
thatal-Mansur
A. Julien'
caliphate
"mayhave desiredto establisha western
Ottoman
rival
the
later
a
descendant
of
the
of
that,undertheauthority
might
prophet,
This
to accomplish.
was attempting
I believethisis exactlywhatal-Mansur
caliphate."64
the
sultan's
have
at
our
that
we
into
all
the
evidence
takes
account
disposal:
interpretation
of theSavdiclaimto
theintrinsic
importance
rivalrywiththeOttomans,
longstanding
thatal-Fishtali
on thebasis of theirsharifian
status,thesignificance
placed
legitimacy
Moroccan
in
the
allusions
numerous
with
the
the
Bornu,
caliphal
upon
negotiations
inMoroccantexts
Ottoman
thatchallenged
references
authority
panegyric
correspondence,
ownexplanation
in theIslamiceast,andal-Mansur's
fordistribution
intended
giventohis
of God to rule theIslamic
notablesthathe had been appointedas therepresentative
al-Mansur'sideological
Viewedfromthisperspective,
appears
justification
community.65
of unruly
to be morethansimplypropaganda
subjects
developedto quellthereservations
into
withSudanesegold.Itprovides
whilethesultanmadea movetofillhiscoffers
insight
abouta far
thethought
manwhohad dreamsof bringing
processesof a veryambitious
Islam.
moresignificant
goldeneraforwestern
An EphemeralVictory
to al-Mansur's
of submitting
Once it becameclearthatAskia Ishaq had no intention
theSavdisultanbeganpreparations
fora full-scale
invasionoftheSonghaystate.
authority,
Afterdescribing
thesepreparations,
thearmy'stripacrosstheSahara,anditsastounding
overtheSonghay,
al-Fishtali's
narrative
backtoMarrakesh,
wherethesultan
shifts
victory
in honorof his army'svictoryover theAskia's forces.Alorderedgreatcelebrations
Fishtalidescribeselaboratefestivities,
in whichthepoets
including
poetrycompetitions
tookturns
the
brilliant
Moroccan
Great
riches
cameto Marrakesh
panegyrizing
triumph.66
fromWestAfrica,includinglargeamountsof gold dustand manyslaves,so thatal63 Ibid.,157.
64 Julien,
232.
History
ofNorthAfrica,
65 Forfurther
discussionof thisevidence,see

StephenCory,"Chosenby God to Rule: The Caliphate

and PoliticalLegitimacy
in EarlyModernMorocco"(Ph.D. thesis,University
SantaBarbara,
of California
2002).
66 Al-Fishatli,
Manhilal-saf\156-63.

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 195

Mansurpaidthesalariesof his staffin puregold.67The resultof thisastounding

victory,
toal-Fishtali,
was that"thecommand
ofal-Mansur
was effective
fromNubiato
according
theocean on thewesternside ... (and he gained)marvelousauthority
thathad never
existedforanyonebeforehim."68
thesuccessof theinvasion,E.W. Boviliwrites"The Sudancampaign
Regarding
hadcertainly
failedinitspurposeofobtaining
control
ofthesourcesofthegold,butithad
enriched
thealreadywealthy
al-Mansur
on a scalewhichcannothavelefthimwithmany
eveniffewcouldsharehissatisfaction."69
Thesultaninvested
hisadditional
wealth
regrets
in improving
fortifications
forhiscountry's
defenseandin strengthening
such
industry, as
and
the
of
"re-equipping developing important
sugarindustry Sus."70Otherexpenditures
includedlavishsupport
formosquesand madrasas,further
of al-Mansur'
s
improvement
in
and
to
construct
a
in
the
central
of
Marrakesh,
grandpalace
plans
hugemosque
square
thecapital.71
theSavdidynasty
failedin its
Yet,despitethesepromising
beginnings,
ultimately
onto
West
to
hold
Africa.
After
their
initial
Savdi
encountered
an
success,
attempts
troops
intensiveguerillawar led by exiled Songhayleaders,whicheventually
undermined
in theregion.Withinthreedecades,al-Mansur'
Moroccanauthority
s son MulayZaydan
theinterpretation
thatal-Mansur
pulledtheplugon theinvasion.Do thesefactssupport
of West
was,indeed,interested
onlyin Songhaygold andnotin a longtermintegration
AfricaintotheSavdistate?Whatwerethereasonsfortheshortduration
of effective
inWestAfrica?
Moroccanauthority
Historians
forthisfailure.Sincemostbelievethat
providetwomainexplanations
inmilking
al-Mansur
was simplyinterested
fromtheWestAfrican
profits
goldmines,they
made
no
effort
to
that
he
the
infrastructure
for
a
more
annexation
argue
develop
permanent
of Songhaylands.Second,theyclaimthatMoroccolackedthecapacityto effectively
thelargeSonghayterritory
intotheMoroccanempire,sinceit was separated
incorporate
fromsouthern
Moroccoby thousandsof miles of desertwasteland.Althoughtheir
in weaponrygave the Moroccansan initialadvantage,the permanent
superiority
wasa different
annexation
ofthisterritory
story.
vAbdal-KarimKurayyim
TheMoroccanhistorian
contests
thefirst
for
explanation
thefailure
toannexWestAfrica.He arguesthattheMoroccans
tocreatea stable
attempted
administration
to governthe country,
and even made efforts
to improveagricultural
methodsin the region.Indeed,the scholarassertsthatthe majority
of the Moroccan
officialsruledjustly,and did theirbestto establishpeace and security
in the former
thatal-Mansur
tookconcrete
Songhaylands.He also suggests
stepstodealwithMoroccan
abuses everytime theywere broughtto his attention,
and thathe establishedan
administrative
for the majorityof his reign.In
systemthatfunctioned
effectively
explainingthe disorderthatbefell West Africafollowingthe Moroccanconquest,
67 Hunwick,
Timbuktu
and theSonghayEmpire,3 14.
68 Al-Fishtali,
Manhilal-saf\163-64.
69 Bovili,GoldenTrade theMoors,196.
of
70 Ibid., 192.

71 GarciaArenai,Messianism
and Puritanical
277.
Reform,

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196

StephenCory

to resist
Kurayyim
placesmostof theblameupontheSonghayleaderswho continued
Moroccanauthority,
In
to
a
war
the
leading
protracted
guerilla
throughout region.72
and
misfortunes
within
Morocco
an
extended
addition,
itself,including
plague
occurring
internal
unrestafter1596, could be adducedto help explainthe Moroccanfailureto
establish
a morelastingpoliticalassociation
withWestAfrica.
LansineKaba mostlyattributes
theMoroccanfailureto the secondexplanation
listedabove,i.e., thatMoroccolackedthecapacityto effectively
incorporate
Songhay
a
Kaba
al-Mansur
had
that,
territory.73 argues
although
developed highlysophisticated
societal,and
standards),the Moroccan governmental,
army (by sixteenth-century
economicinfrastructure
lackedthe same degreeof sophistication.
Indeed,in orderto
had
to
such
an
al-Mansur
been
forced
troops.
army,
relylargelyuponmercenary
develop
withMoroccoitself,theywere
identification
Since thesesoldierslackedanylong-term
in their
andinconsistent
to be overlyharshin theiradministration
untrustworthy,
tending
tothesultan'sgoals.
commitment
concludethatWest AfricansrejectedalAs indicatedabove, mosthistorians
fortheinvasionandlargelyopposedtheMoroccanadministration
Mansur'
s justifications
the
following conquest.This conclusionis also commonlyadducedas evidenceto
themercenary
natureoftheMoroccanendeavor.However,Kurayyim
demonstrate
points
welcomedthe
a numberof Songhayleaderswho initially
out thatthesourcesidentify
Numerous
Moroccans,and who seemedpreparedto cooperatewiththeirauthority.74
abusescommitted
appearto haveturned
by Moroccantroopsagainstthelocal population
of this"unification
WestAfricans
MostWestAfricans'experience
againsttheinvaders.
and
was
the
loss
of
their
violence,turmoil,
generalanarchy.75
project"
possessions,
themercenary
Whether
therebellious
Songhayareblamedforthischaos(perKurayyim),
himself
soldiers(perKaba), or thedisingenuous
aimsof al-Mansur
(perYahya),theend
resultwas not conduciveto garnering
West Africansupportfor a greaterWestern
headedbyal-Mansur.
Caliphate
with
Kaba arguesthatal-Mansur'
s invasionoftheSonghaywas carriedoutmostly
in
view.
of
Desirous
with
the
al-Mansur
Europe
keepingpace
Europeanpowers,
soughtto
uniteWestAfricaunderhis authority,
his
in orderto utilizeits resources
to strengthen
thisgoal,
states.However,insteadof achieving
positionvis--vistheotherMediterranean
72

165-71.
Al-Maghrib
fi^ahdal-dawlaal-Sa^diyya,
Kurayyim,
73 LansineKaba,"Archers,
andMosquitoes:The MoroccanInvasionoftheSudanandthe
Musketeers,
22 (1981),457-75.
(1591-1612),"Journal
SonghayResistance
ofAfrican
History
74
Al-Maghrib
164-65.
fahd al-dawlaal-SaKdiyya,
Kurrayim,
75 Al-Savdi itthis
puts
way:"TheSaNdian
armyfoundthelandoftheSudanatthistimetobe oneofthe
mostfavoredlandsof God Most High in anydirection,
and themostluxurious,
secure,and prosperous,
thanksto thebaraka (blessing)of themostauspicious,thedivinely-favoured
of theFaithful
Commander
Askiaal-hajj Muhammadb. Abi Bakr,because of his justiceand the strictness
of his all-encompassing
whichwas as effective
at thebordersofhiskingdom
as it was in hispalace.... All ofthischanged
authority,
then:security
turned
to fear,luxurywas changedintoaffliction
anddistress,
andprosperity
becamewoe and
harshness.
thelengthandbreadth
ofthekingdom,
Peoplebeganto attackone another
throughout
raidingand
becamegeneral,spreading,
and becoming
(free)personsand slaves.Such iniquity
preying
uponproperty,
evermoreseriousandscandalous."Hunwick,
Timbuktu
andtheSonghayEmpire,192-93.

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Man WhoWouldBe Caliph 197

outtobe a complete
which"finally
swallowed
Kaba believestheinvasionturned
disaster,
andtheconquered."76
Notonlydidthecontinued
warfare
devastate
up boththeconqueror
and
the
of
a
but
cost
theWestAfrican
economy society,
supportinglong-distance
foreign
It drained
resources
thatcouldhave
warplacedunduestrain
upontheMoroccaneconomy.
withthe
to developan infrastructure
to competeeconomically
usedelsewhere
beenbetter
Europeans.
was
situation
Kaba feelsthatal-Mansur'sanalysisof theinternational
Ironically,
"was to understand
he writes,
thatMoroccoandthe
accurate."Thegeniusof al-Mansur,"
roles
within(the) global
if
not
economic
Sudan performed
common,
complementary,
of
system.In thisprocess,it seemsthatsome form religiousunitycould have been
whenthesultan
ofthecaliphaldreamcameinitsimplementation,
Thedownfall
useful."77
His ambition
to createa western
was unableto achievethestatethathe had envisioned.
thisgoal.A shrewd
he possessedtoaccomplish
exceededtheresources
manager,
caliphate
theseresourcesintodevelopinga modernarmyto buildupon the Savdi
he funneled
he
success.Whilethisstrategy
formilitary
gavehimtheabilityto winbattles,
reputation
he had conquered.Kaba
and developtheterritory
to maintain
lackedthewherewithal
in
the
toutilizemodern
thesultan'sattempt
describes
following
way:
weapons
littlequalitative
ofthisdynasty's
elements
The"modern"
policyseemedtoindicate
arms
The use of "modern"
bytheSultan'sarmy
changein thesocialstructures....
Ratherit
did notmeanthathis statehadreacheda modernstageof development.
be
and
"borrowed"
ofmodern
thatproducts
indicated
transplanted
technology
may
and corollary
neededto make
thesocialprerequisites
elsewherewithout
support
themeffective.78
In lookingbackwards
Perhapstheseedsofruinalsolayinthecaliphaldreamitself.
thatwasno longer
had
a
model
ofthepast,al-Mansur chosen
tothegreatIslamicdynasties
hadsuccessfully
used
As mentioned
inthesixteenth
functional
above,nodynasty
century.
the
three
in
a
and
assert
to
claims
political religiousauthority largeempireduring
caliphal
was attempting
hundred
Thus,al-Mansur
yearspriortotheriseoftheSavdisinMorocco.79
Muslimdynasty.
Not
a projectthatwas notbeingundertaken
by anyothercontemporary
no
remained
but
there
universal
enforce
to
the
he
lack
did
authority,
longer
power
only

76 Kaba, "Archers,Musketeers,and Mosquitoes," 457.

77 Ibid., 475.
78 Ibid., 464.
79

Althoughthe Ottomansclaimed caliphal authorityfortheirsultan,thistitlewas clearly added as an

once the Turkishdynastyhad assumed oversightof the holy lands of the Hijaz. It is significant
afterthought,
thatthe caliphal title,"Commander of the Faithful,"was rarelyused to describe the Ottoman sultan,and
the Ottomanswiththe caliphatefaded away afterthe sixteenthcentury.For
argumentsin favorof identifying
Ottomanclaims to thecaliphatewere mostlyadvanced by
that
Imber
Colin
instance,
sixteenth-century
argues
demonstrate
the
Eb's-Suvd
to
ai-Islam
the shaykh
legitimacyof Ottomanassertionsof universal Islamic
sovereignty,in line withthe termsof Islamic law. However, thisargumentnevergained widespreadsupport.
"When Eb's-Suvd died in 1574," writes Imber, "the theoryof the Ottoman caliphate died with him."
Imber,"Ideals and Legitimationin Early OttomanHistory,"153.

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198

StephenCory

ofthecaliphate.80
The worldwas a much
Islamicsupport
forhisinterpretation
widespread
different
than
it
had
the
hadestablished
their
been
when
and
the
Abbasids
place
Umayyads
the
had
even
use
of
claims.
New
of
begunto
legitimacy
through
caliphal
ways thinking
factorin thefailureof alinfiltrate
bothMoroccoandWestAfrica,andthiswas another
Mansur'sproject.
of theAskiaandhis
Kaba makesthisobservation
whenhe writesthattheretreat
entourageintothe historicSonghayheartland
"galvanizedthe resistanceand gave a
to theabusesthat
to it."81In a footnote,
Kaba explainsthatresistance
'national'character
in thatit
a
'national'
character
the
"assumed
theMoroccanarmyinflicted
upon populace
entailedbroadtrans-ethnic
feelingshostileto alien rule and based on some typeof
as
commonhistoricaltraditions."82
Thus, Kaba sees the Songhayguerillamovement
in
Africa.83
West
thebeginnings
ofproto-nationalist
feeling
representing
Conclusions
The invasionof WestAfricashouldbe viewedin lightof theongoingSavdistruggle
of Savdi
whetherOttomanor European.The foundation
againstforeigndomination,
with
for
successful
confrontation
rested
their
foreign
powersand
reputation
authority
upon
madethemuniquely
oftheProphet
statusas descendents
upontheclaimthattheirsharifian
meantthatother
a
claim
of
such
The
inherent
to
rule
the
Muslim
world.
logic
qualified
effective
hadbeensingularly
Thislineofreasoning
Muslimdynasties
mustbe illegitimate.
in combatingthe Wattasids,who had no such pedigreeto bolstertheirclaims to
In ordertobe consistent,
italso hadtobe appliedwhendealingwith
however,
sovereignty.
been at peace with
thathad historically
otherMuslimregimes,even Islamicdynasties
could
of WestAfrica.Indeed,al-Mansur
Morocco,suchas theneighboring
governments
of his
extension
well have feltthathis legitimacy
as rulerdependedupona continued
toSavdisupremacy.
overthoseMuslimstatesthathadnotyetsubmitted
authority
The writings
of al-Fishtali
of al-Mansurwho
wereproducedby a contemporary
s
was an eyewitness
In lightofthisfact,al-Fishtali'
to manyoftheeventsthathe records.
an
havebeentoo readilydismissed
he was hardly
historians.
Granted,
reports
by modern
80 For
IbnKhaldunarguedthatthetruecaliphatehad cometo
example,in thelatefourteenth
century
an end aftertheperiodof theRightly
GuidedCaliphs.Withtheriseof theUmayyads,
"thecharacteristic
traitsof the caliphatedisappeared,and only its name remained."Ibn Khaldun,The Muqaddimah:An
Introduction
to History,trans.FranzRosenthal,ed. and abridgedby N.J.Dawood (Princeton:
Princeton
heldbeliefamongtheulama,whotooka rather
Press,1967), 156.Thiswas a commonly
University
cynical
towards
the
exercise
of
even
as
Muslims
to
submit
to that
position
worldlyauthority,
theyencouraged
authority.
81 Kaba,"Archers,
andMosquitoes,"
468.
Musketeers,
82 Ibid.,469.
83 Mohammed
and seventeenth
of
centuries
witnessed
thebeginnings
Hajji arguesthatthesixteenth
Moroccannationalism
as well.In hisarticle,"L'Ide de Nationau Marocet quelques-uns
de ses aspectsaux
XVI et XVII sicles,"HesprisTamuda9 (1968), 109-21,Hajji discussestheMoroccanresistance
against
andSpanishterritorial
and arguesthatthesameresistance
incursions,
Portuguese
displayedagainstTurkish
toexertauthority
overtheregionshowsthattheMoroccanresponseincludedan element
ofnational
attempts
thatsuperseded
consciousness
religiousaffiliations.

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Man WhoWouldBe CaUph 199

as providing
the
As a functionary
oftheSavdistate,he maybe regarded
unbiasedwitness.
it mustbe remembered
thatal-Fishtali
came
officialSavdiversionof events.In addition,
thando modernscholars.Thus he had no problem
world-view
froma verydifferent
on theonehand,
inflicted
theatrocities
upontheSonghaybyMoroccantroops,
describing
al-Mansur's
ontheother.
thatGod wona greatvictory
andproclaiming
invasion,
through
s premisethatal-Mansurwas therightful
However,if one considersal-Fishtali'
is
whythesultanneededto take
caliphoftheentireMuslimworld,it easierto understand
hisauthority.
It is
flaunted
decisiveactionagainstan amirsuchas Ishaqwhodeliberately
ofhindsight,
as
did notpossessthebenefit
to keepin mindthatal-Fishtali
also important
of Bornuor Songhay,the
do modernscholars.Neverhavingtraveledto thesultanates
inthosetwo
thestateofaffairs
hereceivedfromothers
scriberelieduponreports
regarding
s
reliable
which
al-Fishtali'
account
he
constraints
under
the
Given
wrote,
presents
empires.
theextentof alabouttheeventshe records.Even his statements
information
regarding
be shownto have been false,shouldbe
Mansur'snew empire,whichcan definitely
inthe
thatreigned
ofMoroccanbeliefs,amidsttheeuphoria
thecontext
within
understood
theinvasion.
themonths
directly
following
country
during
as
too readilydismissal-Mansur'sIslamicjustifications
Mostmodernhistorians
his
own
in
to
achieve
order
masses
on
the
monarch
used
the
that
solely
gullible
propaganda
it.
tobe believedevenbythosewhopropagate
ends.It is possibleforpropaganda
personal
sharifian
thatemphasized
whowas raisedin an Islamictradition
In thecase ofal-Mansur,
sultan
that
the
of thepast,it is entirely
descentand thegreatMuslimdynasties
plausible
of
fortunes
theflagging
tobe theanointed
believedhimself
caliphwhowouldrestore
truly
eventstohis
utilizedcurrent
theIslamicworld.Thereis no doubtthatal-Mansur
shrewdly
Islamiccaliphaltradition.
inthisfactthatcontradicts
Butthereis nothing
ownadvantage.
between
and religiousconnections
Al-Mansurobservedtheeconomic,cultural,
as well.
MoroccoandWestAfrica,andarguedthatthereoughtto be politicalunification
would
WestAfricaundersharifian
He believedthatunifying
eventually
caliphalleadership
andcouldcreatea statecapableof challenging
to Savdiauthority
induceEgyptto submit
Andyet,itwasatthispointthatthings
in theIslamicworld.84
forsupremacy
theOttomans
was unableto achievehis dreamof a caliphatethatspanned
brokedown,as al-Mansur
was
bothsidesoftheSahara.The unification
projectforsucha broadexpanseofterritory
ofthis
statesuchas Moroccoto achieve.The difficulty
fora moderate-level
toodifficult
infrastructure
of
lack
that
Morocco's
the
fact
was
sophisticated
by
complicated
project
oversuch
whichwerehardto control
relianceuponmercenary
createdan extreme
troops,
these
connections
two
the
between
connections
the
distances.
regions,
Despite many
great
tosupport
alonewereinsufficient
politicalunification.
WestAfricainto
at integrating
al-Mansur's
is correct,
If Kaba's argument
attempt
forbothNorthand WestAfrica.By
disastrous
his statehad long-lasting
consequences
invasiondid irreparable
in
sub-Saharan
state
the
Africa,al-Mansur's
destroying strongest
andWestAfrica.
both
Morocco
traderoutesthathadenriched
damagetothetrans-Saharan
tothesouth,whereitwas accessedby
thistradeincreasingly
Instead,
begantobe diverted
all of the
The processof devoting
Gold
and
Slave
Coasts.
the
merchants
along
European
theSavdidynasty,
itextremely
theinvasionalso exhausted
towards
state'senergies
making
84

Cory,"ChosenbyGod toRule,"48-100.

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200

StephenCory

hitin theformof the

and collapse,once misfortune
vulnerable
to outsideinterference
his
various
The
sons
of
al-Mansur
tore
and
famines.
plague
dynasty
apartafterhisdeath,
and Morocco would never again become a significant
power in the Islamic or
worlds.
Mediterranean
Becausehe
ofal-Mansur'
s projectledtoitseventual
Theambitious
nature
undoing.
was drivento
al-Mansur
forIslamicleadership,
wasdetermined
tochallengetheOttomans
located
to managea territory
expandhis state,evenwhensuchexpansionmeanttrying
to
thousands
ofmilesfromhiscapitalandacrosstheworld'slargestdesert.By attempting
al-Mansur
sharifian
under
establisha trans-Saharan
caliphalleadership,
politicalunity
before
hastened
divisionanddecline,leavingbothMoroccoandWestAfricaunprotected
Thesultan'scaliphal
centuries.85
thatwastocomeinthefollowing
theEuropeanonslaught
forthe
desertmirage,withdisastrous
outto be just another
dreamturned
consequences
tounite.
regionhe hadsought

85 Kaba makesthis
pointwhenhe writes"Withthedisasterin theSudan,thelastgreatArabhope,
oftheeconomyfrom
cametumbling
down.Thenthereemergeda Europe-centered
dominion
unfortunately,
whichthe Maghriband West Africahave yet,nearly400 yearslater,to recover."Kaba, "Archers,
andMosquitoes,"
475.
Musketeers,

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