undertaking, I can report that the book does contain much of the lore of the graduate student and young faculty subculture of the early postwar years, and not a little of the affect that arose in seminars on anthropological theory in those days. But these are retrospective ments, of course, and while the portraits reveal some blemishes and unsightly pores, for the most part they are rather serene likenema. instantly recognizable. As for the nonpersonal side of things, there are no revelations of the sort that will require revision of the many texts in the history of anthropology. Alexander Lemr offers an adulatory account of Franz Boas as the architect of modem anthropology and its one great theorist, a citizenscientist, and a natural historian and empiricist. Most students will find that the discussion of Boas as citizen-scientist contains the material with which they are least familiar. For Eric Wolf, like myself, Alfred Louis Kroeber was the 1iving.embodimentof American anthropology (p. 36). Wolf distilla the essential Kroeber, a natural historian in the preDarwinian RIM, as well as a natural historian of the superorganic. Unlike Boas, he was not a citizen-scientist, and Wolf offers abundant evidence of Kroebers contempt for politics and his refusal to become involved in the hues of his day. Stanley Diamonds portrait of Paul Radin is a work of love. The legendary quality of the man and his extraordinary c a m r are rightly emphasized, and for those who did not know him, Diamond has provided an eloquent panegyric to a man who was in many ways a victim (p. 97). The discussion that followa this article contains a remarkable exchange between Lesser and Diamond that makes one wish for some clarification of the relationship between the former and Radin. Raymond Firths amcmment of Bronislaw Malinowski, the least biographical of the eight pieces. concentrates mainly on his theories. It covers much familiar ground, but it is difficult to think of another place in which so admirably succinct a presentation of Malinowslris manifold contributions to our field can be found. Sidney Mintz accomplishes the well-nigh impossible task of saying something new about Ruth Benedict. In the coum of his examination of the many ways in which she saw clearly what more than SO yearn later still acema problematic to many-such as the relationship between the study of c l w and culture, for example-he ~
719
carefully avoida a trap into which the editor has
fallen in her biographical sketch. Benedict was not a student of national character; she was, aa Mintz observes, a study of national cultures. Robert Murphys article on Julian Steward is the best of the lot. To be sure, he has some advantage over the other contributors in that Steward has not been written to death by a generation of survey-history writers. I learned more about the man than I knew before, and Murphy has exercised a sure hand in placing Stewards ambiguous career in proper context. Robert Carneiro, Leslie Whites student. gives us a thoughtful appraisal of his teacher and a rather poignant picture of his last years. Carneiro and I are the same age, and it was with particular interest that I read of the feeling of Whites students that he spent too much time in spirited e x c h a n p with those who challenged his views. Most of us who were students of Whites opponents, as Carneiro calls them, felt exactly the same way. That our ancestors leave their mark is demonstrated with great clarity in the 40 footnotes to this paper, far more than all the other footnotes in the book combined. How Leslie White would have enjoyed reading thisl Nathaniel Tarns piece on Robert Redfield is unlike all the others, and it is difficult for me to guess what todays students will be able to make of Redfield when they have read it. They may well find the Poet more interesting than the Professor. That concludes this brief summary of the celebration of the ancestral rites for some of the great and near-great of our profession. The totem never make an appearance. The proportion of living anthropologists who knew all of these people is surely very small, and it is only they who know what has been omitted and what distorted. Only the very large number who knew none of them can finally judge the success of this undertaking to make the eight manifest as human beings whwe anthropology was shaped by their life experiences and the society and times in which they lived.
Edward EvanePritehard. Mary D o u g h . New
York: Viking Press, 1980. x + 151 pp. $12.95 (cloth), David M. Schneider University of Chicago This book purpom to present a brief account
720
AMERICAN A NTHR 0POL OCIS T
of why Evans-Pritchard is held in high esteem
by showing his contributions and their relevance to contemporary intellectual problem. It takes its stand firmly on the ground that objectivity b possible, that this was one of Evans-Pritchardb guiding commitments. The problem that the book presents to the reviewer is whether it is in any ordinary acme of the term an objective statement of what Evans-Pritchard wrote and its significance. On the accond and third p a w we are told that
[83, 19811
vances that can be built upon his work.
Douglas then adds with disarming, charming naivete, The reader will have no difficulty, I hope, in distinguishing the masters original work from the pupils presentation (p. 2). Here the point is that if this book is a personal reconstruction and that one of EvansPritcharda major contributions was so illformulated that Douglas had to find a name for it, thereby concentrating the idea, then Douglas herself has produced just the same deeply interpreted account of what can only be deemed a fictional text as she m fiercely decries. many scholars . . . have been tempted to Douglas says that moral and social accountgive up striving for objectivity and to shift ability is one of the central concern in Evanstheir own writing into a mystical mode, inPritchards work and that his contribution lay in dulgent to their own subjectivity. . . . In adas a guiding theme in t e r n of which taking this vance of this critical juncture Evansto conduct his fieldwork and report his ethnogPritchard felt the dilemma keenly. . . . he did not abandon the wkh for objective com- raphy. She em to me to imply that the idea parison . . . there are ways of getting valid was largely original with Evans-Pritchard (though she had to give it its name). I find this evidence. . . . difficult to accept. Durkheim spent much of his This same position is repeated on the last page, intellectual output demonstrating that society thus bracketing the entire work. At this time, was a moral aystem, that constraint could not be younger anthropologists, beset by philwphical understood in strictly utilitarian terms, so that for quandaries from which they see no =ape, are Douglas to fail to indicate that Durkheim was content to treat the best understanding they can one of the most important murces of this idea report as well-obrerved, deeply interpreted fic- puzzles me. tional texts (p. 135). At this point there is a There is one interesting difference between footnote to Ceertz. Back on page 2, Douglas Durkheims treatment of morality and its conproceeds by suggmting that objectivity was an straining features and Evans-Pritchards. For important value for Evans-Pritchard and im- Evans-Pritchard, Douglas telb us, there is the plies that it is for her too. But on the same acc- important component of individual initiative: ond page we learn that It is only right to say Society is compcwed not of ciphers but of active that this is not a straight summary and mme- agencies endowed with intelligence and will. Inthing different from a synthesis. I have made a tentions create and sustain institutions . . . personal reconstruction upon the writings, forc- (p. 4). Although Durkheim certainly (as I read ing them into closer confrontation with prob- those texts) located the main force of social conl e m that were evidently present to Evans-Prit- straint (or moral accountability) within the inchard. . . So, after blating the doubters, the dividual too, perhaps he did not stress as strongwriters of interpretation, we learn that it is ly as Douglas does the element of will. perfectly all right for Mary D o u g h to do a Whether Evans-Pritchard was so clear on this pemonal reconstruction (a deeply inter- point as Douglas, is not clear to me. A crucial methodological device which Evanspreted text, that M) but that younger anthropoiogists like Geertz (who M not that much Pritchard is said by D o u g h to have uacd is that younger than Douglas) should not. of the response to mbfortune. My reading of Let us consider one such act of objectivity. this may be suspect, of course, since it is m difOne of the main themes of the book is that a ficult to interpret texts such as Douglass. But as central problem to which Evans-Pritchard I understand her account, Evans-Pritchard took devoted his attention was that of moral (some- the fact that all human beings must somehow times social) accountability, But Evans- come to t e r n with misfortune an the pivot of his Pritchard nowhere IWS this terml I realized comparative work. Closely associated, of course, that a name for his method was missing. A is the problem of moral accountability, for one name b a powerful concentrator of ideas. By of the questions that mbfortune nececsarily naming a theory of social accountability, I can raises is that of how to explain it and where the ahow more cogently the methodological ad- final accountability rests- with a malicious .I
GENERAL AND THEORETICAL
neighbor whose witchcraft has brought about
the misfortune, with divine providence of some sort, or elsewhere. And here again it is made to seem as if this idea was first born fully formed in the head of Evans-Pritchard. Yet one can imagine that the idea was not so far different from what Malinowski and other functionalism were doing at the time, though Douglas hardly mentions Malinowski and certainly not as a significant influence on EvansPritchards thinking. These functionalists, like Durkheim and the French School. looked to the invariant conditions of social existence as the foci for comparative study. For some, like Malinowski, this meant such simple things as eating and sexual activity. For others, the foci were those having to do with the maintenance of the social system. Moreover, though Douglas does not say anything on the subject, it is said that Evans-Pritchard could not abide Marx or Weber. Yet surely the ideas of these men were very much in the air at the time, and EvansPritchards concern with misfortune as a pivot on which his comparative work turns sounds very much like Webers concern with ultimate values, for example, with the universal problem of why, as someone said, the good die young and the evil flourish like the green bay tree. And Marx was certainly concerned with the misfortunes of the working clam Let me put the matter simply. An I read this book, Douglas t a l b about Bartlett as having had some influence on Evans-Pritchards thinking. Even s u p p i n g that this were m, which I personally doubt, I find it hard to understand her almost total neglect of the intellectual context of the times in which Evans-Pritchard worked. Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown are barely mentioned; Durkheim is merged with the French school and there are mainly vague references to them. The specific lines of influence on Evans-Pritchardb thought are seldom clearly delineated. Was Evans-Pritchard really sui generis, his whole lifework clearly laid out in three papers published in 1933,1934 and 1936 as Douglas claims (p. 25)) Not only does Douglas present Evans-Pritchard as if he managed to do all his own thinking almost without reference to anyone e k around, but nowhere d o a she raise so much as a vague question of doubt. In boldly retailing Evans-Pritchards silly equation of incest prohibitions with exogamy (p. 80ff.) as p p e l and in failing to note fiis inept attempts to account for the stability of Nuer mamage, to cite but two examples, she surely does the man a great
721
disservice. He was quite human after all, by no
means infallible, and had his frailties both intellectual as well as penonal. His capacity for rudeness was monumental and his scathing tongue did not endear him to all. In sum, this book is a very penonal interpretation of Evans-Pritchards principal works. It omits almost all penonal details of his life, even those events that might be closely related to his work. In my opinion, as an interpretation of what was of value in Evam-Pritchards work, it is one with which few will agree. The interested reader should see the reviews of this book by Beidelman and Leach, respectively, in the Times Literary Supplement (December 12. 1980) and the London Review of Boohs(4) (December 17, 1980), as well as Beidelmans short biography in the new 18th volume of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences for other interpretations.
Soviet and Watcrn Anthropology. Ernest
Gellner, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. vii + 285 pp. $37.50 (cloth). Steve Rayner R u ~ c l Sage l Foundation This collection of essays originated from a conference in 1976 at which the Wenner-Gren Foundation made the bold move of bringing together nine prominent Soviet and ten Western anthropologists. The tenns of reference of that conference, chaired by Ernest Gellner. focused on the relationship of anthropology to other human sciences. As may be expected, the Soviet participants present a more homogeneous approach than their Watern counterparts, who reflect a wider range of interests and theoretical backgrounds. Whereas the Soviets adhere quite meticulously to their brief in presenting an oveMew of Soviet anthropology, the Western papers tend to reflect the more specialized fields of their authors. The only statements of general theory from the West arc Pouillons attempt to clarify the definition of structuralism and Godeliers review of the major kues in the development of French Manrist anthropology. All of the Soviet papers, on the ocher hand, highlight the two theoretical mainstays of Soviet anthropology,