Socrates and Self-Knowledge

Sara L. Rappe

Introduction: Teaching and the Elenchus

In the sense which he would give to "teaching" engaging would-be

learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth the teacher
held backin that sense of "teaching" Socrates would want to say that
he is a teacher, the only true teacher: his dialogue with his fellows is
meant to have, and does have, the effect of evoking and assisting their
efforts at moral self-improvement.1

In Gregory Vlastos's account of Socrates's activities as a teacher, at least

one point seems unassailable: Socratic elenchus results in the interlocutor's realization that he doesn't know what he thought he knew. The
effect is felt by willing participants and unwitting victims alike. For some
interlocutors, impasse becomes providence, spurring them on as it does
to turn within for the truth in question.2 But what is this inner truth that
is sought and subsequently discovered?

1 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 32, quoted in Nehamas, 1992,
180.
2 At least the young Lysis and Theaetetus seem eager to pursue the answers to
Socrates's questions. See however Nehamas 1992b, 181. Nehamas points out that
many of Socrates's clients appear to be either unmoved by their encounters with
Socrates or moral derelicts in their own right.

to you
| University of South Carolina Li
APEIRON a journal for ancientBrought
philosophy
andbyscience
Authenticated
0003-6390/95/2801 1-24 $3.00 Academic Printing & Publishing| 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

2 Sara L. Rappe

Quot homines, tot sententiae: scholars who agree that self-knowledge is

the primary goal of elenctic conversation have found little else on which
they agree, while candidates advanced for the contents of this selfknowledge proliferate. Among the nominees we find, e.g., innately
correct beliefs3, a self-consistent set of beliefs4, the so-called Socratic
precepts5, virtue itself, and even knowledge of knowledge6. Yet with few
exceptions, one candidate is conspicuously absent from the ballots:
self-knowledge in the context of the Socratic elenchus is rarely taken to
be knowledge of the self 7
In this essay I discuss the Socratic elenchus as a method whereby
Socrates attempts to reacquaint his interlocutors with themselves. It
proves to be a thankless task, as every reader of the Apology knows, not
least because the one person uniquely qualified to perform such a task
is finally the interlocutor. Rather than attempting to explain or to describe it, Socrates, by means of the elenchus, resorts instead to invoking
and summoning forth the genuine self that he hopes his interlocutors
will encounter. An encounter with Socrates turns out to be an encounter
with the self.
As stated above, scholarly opinion concerning the meaning of the
term, self-knowledge, varies widely. On a literal reading of certain texts,
we might construe self-knowledge as knowledge of what one does or
does not know:8
Whoever realizes, as Socrates does, that he has in reality no worth with
respect to wisdom is wisest among you. (Apology, 23bl)

Self-knowledge in this passage is presented as a second-rate attainment

that at most delivers one from that even worse condition, the pretense

3 Vlastosl983
4 Bumyeatl991
5 Brickhouse and Smith 1991
6 Mackenzie 1988b
7 Notable exceptions are Comford, Annas, Gerson, and now Brickhouse and Smith
1994.
8 For this approach, see Reeve 1989,179 and Vlastos 1991,269.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

to wisdom.9 In this essay, I interpret self-knowledge to mean not only

knowledge of one's knowledge, but also knowledge of oneself, qua
knower. That is, self-knowledge means not only knowing what you
know, but also and more importantly that you know, i.e., that you are by
nature a knowing being, by virtue of being a human being.10 This
isolation of the epistemic aspect of the self recalls the identification of the
wisdom-loving element as the true self, a doctrine that informs Plato's
tripartite psychology. However, the elenctic dialogues place greater
emphasis upon practice, upon the care of the soul. As Socrates narrates
in the Apology:
I tried to persuade each of you not to be concerned with any of the
things that belong to you before you concern yourself with how your
self can be in the best possible and wisest condition. (36el)

Because wisdom is singled out as the exemplary feature of this self that
is to be cultivated before all else, it looks as if Socrates is asking us to
regard the self as primarily characterized by the ability to know. Socrates
also tells us here that the elenchus is the way that he persuades people
to attend primarily () to the self.
As the means by which Socrates directs attention to the epistemic self,
the elenchus prescribes a fundamental shift in values.11 It demands from
the would be disciple an objectivity or even lack of concern with regard
to his personal interests12 which seems to be entirely antithetical to

9 Cf. Apology 21d5-6: 'Inasmuch as I do not possess knowledge, neither do I imagine

that I possess it. So I am probably to some small degree wiser than this man, because
I do not imagine that I know what I do not know.' Moreover Socrates explains his
philosophical activity as a divine behest in which he sets out to deliver his fellow
citizens from their pretense to knowledge, and so to instill within them this cognitive
self-knowledge: 'Even now, I continue to investigate this very matter on behalf of
the deity, if I imagine that someone, either citizen or foreigner, is wise. And
whenever it strikes me that he is not, I come to the assistance of the deity and
demonstrate that he is not wise.' (Ap 23M-7)
10 In this paper, I will henceforth refer to this aspect of the self as 'epistemic self',
confining the meaning of that term to this identity of self as a knower.
11 See Vlastos 1992,139.
12 On modem theories of objectivity and its relation to ethics, see Nagel 1985, and Grice
1991. One theory which has been used to bolster the claims of moral obligation

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

4 Sara L. Rappe
traditional Greek values. We shall see that Plato seeks to represent to us
a Socrates who personally and concretely embodies these consequences,
which become exemplified in his detachment from private affairs and in
his devotion to the well-being of his community.
Since the elenchus is a process of continually refining one's self-inquiry, Socrates makes sure that any answers obtained during the course
of it do not displace the living reality of the person who makes the
inquiry. For this reason, we should emphasize self-knowledge in the
elenctic dialogues, even though what Socrates is apparently after are
good definitions of moral terms.13 In the first part of this paper, I argue
that Plato himself represents the elenchus as originating in the pursuit
of self-knowledge. Yet whatever the origin of the elenchus may be, my
interpretation also demands that it must aim primarily at the development of self-knowledge rather than at the production of definitions.14 In

against skeptical attacks upon the objective existence of values is the idea of the
'centerless view', whose development Nagel describes as follows:
To arrive at this idea I begin by considering the world as a whole, as if from
nowhere, and in those oceans of space and time TN [i e., Thomas Nagel] is just one
person among countless others. Taking up that impersonal standpoint produces in
me a complete sense of detachment from TN....Essentially I have no particular point
of view at all but view the world as centerless.. .The experiences and the perspective
of TN with which I am directly presented are not the point of view of the true self,
for the true self has no point of view and includes in its conception of the centerless
world TN and his perspective among the content of that world, (bl)
In his book Nagel tries to show that 'ethical thought is the process of bringing
objectivity to bear on the will', so that this expansion beyond the horizons of
exclusive identity with his individuality enables the agent to engage in an objective
confrontation wilh value.
13 See Nehamas 1989,294, footnote 38 where he extensively documents that Socrates's
'What is xT question refers to virtue.
14 One might choose to argue for this as follows: By asking his interlocutor to produce
a definition, Socrates engages him in the activity of introspection vis--vis his beliefs.
What is of value for Socrates's purposes is not the definition, but the effort that the
interlocutor makes both to articulate and to examine his own beliefs. This explanation seems consistent with the elenctic procedure and has been previously suggested (Mackenzie 1988b) but it lacks a textual basis. For any reader of the dialogues
will know that the contents of the definitions which Socrates disputes do matter, so
much so that there are interpreters who claim that Socrates is engaging in a positive
ethical teaching by means of the elenchus. This is the well known view of the late
Professor Vlastos, and is shared by a great many of his students and critics.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

the second part of this paper, I argue that the practical result of the
elenchus (self-knowledge) coincides with the intellectual goal of the
elenchus (the answer to the question, 'What is virtue?'). Virtue turns out
to be identical with self-knowledge.
In the third part of the paper I make two suggestions as to why this
equivalence prevails. I suggest that Socrates anticipates the Platonic
teaching that one is most truly the knowing or intelligent self (as distinct
from the appetites or emotional self).15 Socrates also leaves open the
possibility that identification with this intelligent self enables one to
transcend individual self-interest.16

I Self-Knowledge and the Elenchus

Four dialogues two elenctic dialogues and two late middle dialogues
provide us with evidence that the elenchus is primarily intended to
elicit self-knowledge, and that Plato consciously links the character
Socrates with this theme. Furthermore these same dialogues, Apology,

15 A similar thesis has been developed in another context by Lloyd Gerson (Gereon
1987) who uses it to support a theory according to which the denial ofakrasia, moral
weakness, is left intact as a cornerstone of Plato's ethics. The basic strategy behind
his analysis of moral choice in the middle dialogues is as follows: People consistently
choose the good, as Socrates maintains, but they fail to understand the good as a
univocal value. This absolute good, if it exists, is only attainable through the
employment of reason, since it is through reason that we become aware of universals, and it is in reason that there can exist an objective determination of value. So
true attainment of the good is dependent upon self-knowledge, in particular, the
knowledge that one is most truly the cognitive self, as distinct from the appetitive
or emotional self. Virtue, it turns out, is in fact knowledge, according to this
interpretation of middle dialogue theory, and so there is a continuity between
Socratic and Platonic ethics as demonstrated in the viability of the Socratic paradox
with respect to Plato's theory of psychic conflict. While not presuming to beg the
question of a Unitarian versus revisionist reading of the dialogues, I cite this
treatment of the theme of self-knowledge as an introduction to the study of the
Socratic elenchus.
16 One further note about methodological assumptions is in order at this point. This
essay considers only the Platonic character of Socrates and makes no claims whatever about the historical Socrates. My working hypothesis is that Plato ties this
character to a method of doing philosophy which is oriented toward the cultivation
of self-knowledge.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

6 Sara L. Rappe

Charmides, Theaetetus, and Phaedrus?7 consistently emphasize Socrates's

connection to Delphi and to the precept, 'Know Thyself!', either through
direct allusion to Delphi, or through mention of a divine patron who
sponsors Socrates's activity. It is important to go through the evidence
briefly but systematically in order to show that these dialogues demonstrate a self-consistent conception of the elenchus.
In the Apology, Socrates's chief witness for the defense is Apollo. Of
course, the specific testimony to which he alludes during the trial is the
oracular dispensation to the effect that 'no one is wiser than Socrates',
but it is clear that Socrates associates this response with the Delphic
precept, ' '. Socrates interprets the statement, 'No one is
wiser than Socrates', at 23bl to mean: 'Whoever realizes, as Socrates
does, that he has in reality no worth with respect to wisdom is wisest
among you.' This interpretation amounts to the admission that Socrates
in fact possesses self-knowledge in at least this respect, that he knows he
has no wisdom.
It is evident that Socrates's interpretation of the oracle is dependent
upon his possessing this self-knowledge, since he falls into a state of
aporia when confronted with the oracle precisely because he knows he
has no wisdom. Thus the aporia marks his own self-admission that he has
no knowledge, but at the same time, it helps him to recognize the value
of his self-knowledge. By means of the oracle, Socrates comes to believe
that it is the distinctive mark of one who possesses wisdom to know that
he has no wisdom. That is, Socrates comes to equate wisdom with
self-knowledge. Thus Socrates becomes the delegate of the Delphic
injunction, 'Know Thyself!', extending both his own self-inquiry and his
peculiar brand of wisdom to his successive interlocutors. That the
elenchus is his recommended method for self-inquiry is supported by
the fact that the most important procedural requirement for the elenchus
is that the respondent say what he believes to be true. Thus the elenchus
originates as an inquiry into knowledge, producing self-knowledge even
as it relies upon self-knowledge for its continued operation.
It might be worth noticing that this analysis of Socrates's opera as
recounted in the digression takes the Socratic disavowal of knowledge

17 In the following discussion, the Phaedrus is mentioned only in footnote 21, below.
The theme of self-knowledge and the Delphic tag are sufficiently discussed by
Griswold 1988, so as not to warrant a fuller treatment here.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

at face value. In rejecting an ironic interpretation of the disavowal,181 am

claiming that the aporia related in the Delphi story is a kind of miniature
representation of Socratic method. Socrates succeeds in transmitting his
own realization to his interlocutors only by provoking a similar experience in them.19
Socrates's interpretation of the oracle's response aligns it with the
original precept, 'Know thyself!', although the Socratic exhortation is
more restricted in scope. The kind of self-knowledge which Socrates
seeks to elicit in his elenctic encounters is distinctively focused on one
and only one aspect of the individual: the cognitive level of identity. This
epistemic approach explains why Socrates is so eager to examine those
who have a reputation for wisdom. Socrates responds to the oracle by
approaching citizens whom he selects because they possess three distinct
types of knowledge: phronesis, moral wisdom, poteisis, mimetic artistry,
and techrie, technical expertise. These three kinds of knowledge are only
false contenders for the title, sophia, which turns out to be legitimately
bestowed only upon self-knowledge.
The same division between knowledge as technical expertise and the
self-knowledge which is equated with knowledge of one's knowledge is
drawn in the Charmides. At 162c, Socrates and Charmides discuss the
definition of sophrosune as , whereupon Critias is
suddenly called up to defend the thesis. Critias construes One's own
deeds' to mean only those actions which are skillfully performed. Now
Socrates challenges this thesis on the grounds that it does not specify that
the expert must be capable of predicting when he will obtain successful
results. In short, the expert craftsman can still lack knowledge of his own
knowledge.
At this juncture, Critias introduces the traditional maxim, that the
virtue in question is none other than self-knowledge (164d), 'for this is
exactly my definition of temperance, to know oneself.' Next, Socrates
asks Critias what the distinctive object of this knowledge is, to which
Critias replies that self-knowledge is knowledge of itself as well as of
other knowledge. Why doesn't Critias just say that as, e.g., iatrike is

18 For an excellent discussion of the difficulties with the ironic interpretation of

Socrates's disavowal of knowledge, see Nehamas 1992b, 187 and ff.
19 Cf. Mackenzie 1988b.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

8 Sara L. Rappe

knowledge of what is healthful, so self-knowledge is knowledge of the

self? Instead, Critias changes his original definition of sophrosune as
self-knowledge, and claims that it is knowledge of knowledge.
Critias had previously attempted to define sophrosune as 'doing one's
own', or performing the task appropriate for oneself. In this case, performing one's proper function as a knower is to know oneself as a
knower, which means to be aware of one's knowledge and its limitations.
Critias in amending his former statement is trying to take into account
Socrates's suggestion that self-awareness, that is, a condition upon the
epistemic state of the agent, and not just a condition upon his state of
behavior, is an essential feature of temperate action.
At this point in the dialogue, Socrates, who had refuted every previous definition by reference to an example fitting the proposed definition but violating the interlocutor's own intuitions about the nature of
sophrosune, shifts his strategy. He proceeds to examine, not the appropriateness of the definition, but rather whether there really is such a thing
as self-knowledge, and if so, what possible use it might have.
The rather abrupt transition in the Charmides between the two definitions of sophrosune, as self-knowledge, and as knowledge of knowledge,
can be explained as Plato's attempt to convey the meaning of self-knowledge in the special sense of knowledge of what one knows.20 The identity
between the two ways of describing this knowledge is adduced at
167a5-7: 'So this is being temperate, and temperance or knowing oneself
amounts to this, to knowing what one knows, and what one does not
know.' In other words, if the self just insofar as it has knowledge or does
not have knowledge is the self we are talking about, then it makes sense
to call self-knowledge a knowledge of knowledge.
At 164d5, Critias links Socratic knowledge to Delphi:
And I agree with the inscription to this effect set up at Delphi. Because
this inscription appears to me to have been dedicated for the following
purpose, as though it were a greeting from the god to those entering.

20 Here I do not claim that mine is the only available explanation for this shift, but only
that it allows us to understand Plato's inscription of an apparently bad argument
as part of a larger narrative structure.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

Just as it is in the Apology, here the approach to self-knowledge in its

special cognitive sense is associated with the Delphic injunction. In both
passages, the god is described as enjoining the duty of examining one's
epistemic health or lack thereof.21
At 166, Plato sign-posts this kind of self-knowledge as distinctively
Socratic: Attention is drawn to that fact sophrosune differs from every
other kind of knowledge (166cl) because it alone brings knowledge of
knowledge in its train. This language exactly parallels the formulation
used at Apology 21b, cited above, to describe the distinguishing feature
of wisdom. At 166c5, Critias implies that Socrates is already familiar with
his definition. So far from denying this, Socrates agrees that by examining the definition, he is in effect examining one of his own beliefs:
'Because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in your
company whatever is put forward' (165b).
Above I stated that Plato constantly associated the character of Socrates
with the theme of self-knowledge, even in the post-elenctic dialogues.
Since Bumyeat22 has recently made this point quite persuasively, it hardly
needs amplification here. However, by pointing to the features of
Burnyeat's account of Socratic maieusis in the Theaetetus23 that correspond
to the above account of Socratic elenchus, I hope to underscore the central-

21 Other than the Apology, the fullest account of Socrates's philosophic activity and its
connection with his piety is to be found in the Theaetetus (150d7). "The god compels
me to practice midwifery/ he says, speaking this time of Artemis. Earlier in the
passage, he explains that Artemis assigns the office of midwife to those unable to
bear, and hence he has been assigned to deliver men of their claims to wisdom. Here
there is evidence for the other half of the equation; this divine office is linked to an
inquiry into self-knowledge in its cognitive application. Socrates describes his
maieusis as 'able to test in every way whether the intelligence of the youth has
brought forth a spurious image or has given birth to truth'.
22 Bumyeat 1992.
23 For another middle dialogue allusion to Socrates and self-knowledge, c.f. Phaedrus,
where we encounter Socrates walking barefoot through the Ilissos, and sitting by
its banks, talking of his own philosophical activity: myself have certainly no
leisure .. and I'll tell you why my friend: I can't as yet "know myself," as the
inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me
ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.' I believe that Plato pointedly portrays
Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue in such a way as to remind us of the Socratic
method which is explicitly linked to self-knowledge and in order to provide a foil
against which he can introduce the method of collection and division.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

10 Sara L. Rappe

ity of our theme. Bumyeat tells us that the figure of midwife (148e-151d)
'signals a return to the aporeutic style of those early dialogues and to the
Socratic method which is the substance of that style./24 After discussing the
differences between Sophistic education which involves sowing ideas in
the mind of the student, with Socratic education which involves bringing
to light the conceptions which already exist in the student's mind,
Bumyeat25 goes on to elaborate upon the benefits of the latter:
.. .the progress that can be made in this way [is] measured not only by
the valuable truths found within oneself and brought to birth (150d-e),
but also by the accompanying growth in self-knowledge, the awareness
of what one knows and does not know. (210bc)

Since exposing or revealing the cognitive dimension of a person is

precisely Socrates's skill, this process is usually central to an elenctic
dialogue. The chief burden of his task lies in overcoming the various
sorts of obstacles which lie in the way of elenctic progress. One obstacle
consists in the refusal to expose one's beliefs for fear of the moral
disapproval which they may invite. Another obstacle, the one to which
most of Socrates's encounters fall prey, is the refusal to acknowledge the
inadequacy of one's opinions concerning the disputed term. The removal of these obstacles, even when the subject is a willing participant,
can be extremely painful and laborious. This clearing away of resistance
to the elenchus and exposure of the respondent's opinions is exactly the
maieutic function described at Theaetetus 150-1.
However Socrates's midwifery is different from the art which is
applied to pregnant women. Not only is he responsible for bringing
ideas to birth, he must also test whether they are genuine. That is,
Socrates wants the interlocutor to discover both what he believes and
also whether he really believes what he says he does. Bumyeat connects
this psychological dimension of the elenchus with Socrates's doxographic elaboration of Theaetetus's thesis (159-63). He accounts for this
elaboration by suggesting that Socrates's promulgation of the interlocutor's self-knowledge includes testing a thesis in the light of its implications: '... to discover the limits of one's knowledge ... it is necessary first

24 Bumyeat 1992,55
25 Bumyeat 1992,56

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

11

to find out what one really believes.' Thus an individual belief should fit
into the systemic knowledge constituted by relevant experiences of the
interlocutor; otherwise, the interlocutor may not be said genuinely to
hold that belief.

II Self-Knowledge and Virtue

What is the connection between elenctic procedure, the requirement that
the interlocutor say what he believes to be true, and the final goal of the
elenchus, knowledge of virtue?26 The traditional interpretation of the
elenchus as the search for moral knowledge fails on this score.27 On the one
hand, the claims that Socrates makes for its results seem overly ambitious:
how can the elenchus prove or disprove a given thesis? The most it can do
is show that within the context of a certain belief-set the thesis must be
rejected, not because it is false, but because it is inconsistent with a given
interlocutor's other beliefs. On the other hand, Socrates's reliance upon
the elenchus seems anything but ambitious: how certain can it be that the
elenchus will ever advance our moral knowledge?28 It is a purely contingent affair as to whether Socrates will stumble upon somebody whose
answers will provide a solution to the puzzles of his lifetime.
Behind the frequent pattern of search and aporia, another dynamic is
under way. Some stranger bares his soul to Socrates, and what emerges
are not hidden secrets. Instead, the very way in which the conversant
confronts the world takes on a verbal shape. Socrates catches the process
as it happens. Socrates reflects back to the interlocutor what the inter-

26 As Vlastos (1992,141) himself pointed out with great perspicuity. Cf. Kraut 1983,
61.
27 This view is of course that of the late Gregory Vlastos, who powerfully and
persuasively advocates the Aristotelian account of Socrates's interests in moral
definitions.
28 On the procedural requirement that Socrates is only interested in statements that
the interlocutor holds to be true, and its relationship to the elenchus as a genuine
quest for truth, see Vlastos, 1992,140: 'Since Socrates' real purpose is not merely to
search out and destroy his interlocutor's conceit of knowledge, but also to advance
the search for truth, if he is to find it by this method, while professing to know
nothing, he must worm it out of them.' See also Benson 1990,63-4.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

12 Sara L. Rappe
locutor shows to Socrates. A Socratic encounter is, so to speak, a confrontation with the self, by the self. Within this dynamic, the goal of the
elenchus just is epistemic self-knowledge.
An interview with Socrates forces the interlocutor to submit an account of his life.29 Why is it that Socrates does not examine someone's
life in a straightforward manner, but instead shows more interest in his
interlocutor's expertise? For example, at Ap. 21c3-5, Socrates represents
as his targets those who have gained a reputation for wisdom: ' ...
.' Nowhere in the text is there any mention of direct moral evaluation, nor does the word occur. Likewise, at 23b4-6, also cited above,
Socrates says that he tries to demonstrate to people who lack wisdom
that they actually do lack this wisdom. That is, he is concerned with their
degree of epistemic self-knowledge alone. Once more, he makes no
mention of, e.g., searching out those with a reputation for justice, courage, or any other moral capacity.
From these remarks, we might better understand the peculiar structure of Socrates's examination, even when the moral character of the
interlocutor is capable of being impugned: Socrates always approaches
the interlocutor only in his capacity as an expert, someone with a claim
to knowledge, and proceeds to examine the validity or the scope of this
claim to know. For example, Euthyphro's action against his father,
although undoubtedly morally reprehensible in Socrates's view, is not
subjected by him to investigation on moral grounds, such as violation of
the stringent Greek prohibitions against patricide. Instead, Euthyphro's
claim to be an expert in the field of theology comes under Socrates's
critical eye. Likewise, in the Apology, Meletus is cross-examined concerning his expertise in the sphere of education, while Lysis and Menexenus
must demonstrate their knowledge of friendship, and Laches and Nicias,
their knowledge of what courage is.30
A virtuous life may best come about for one who is willing to undergo
this form of inquiry, which offers a kind of training in identifying with

29 This point is made persuasively by Brickhouse and Smith, 1994.

30 This is not to deny that often there is an implicit criticism of the moral character
which may be traced back to the inadequate knowledge displayed on the part of the
respondent. Clearly the moral status of Euthyphro is implicitly criticized, and the
language at the end of the Charmides hints of the violent role which Charmides and
Critias were to play during the reign of the Thirty.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

13

the epistemic self. Just as the Republic ends with Glaukos, the encrusted
sea-monster whose inner beauty must be uncovered, an image which
dissolves the community of selves within the individual self by identifying the person with the cognitive self, so in the Socratic dialogues, the
elenchus is used as a method by which the interlocutor may come to
identify with the epistemic self. In this sense, the conclusion of the
elenchus will not simply be a proposition descriptive of what the interlocutor knows or does not know, nor will it simply be a state of belief,
whether that state be true or false.
This interpretation of the elenchus does not make of Socrates a dogmade teacher of any kind, nor does it impute to him a set of beliefs that
he either holds to be true or invariably discovers that his successive
interlocutors hold to be true. In fact, this interpretation does not make of
Socrates a moral teacher, in the sense that he wishes to impart or to
discover moral tenets. If we are to take Socrates at his word when he
claims to have no knowledge of virtue,31 then there is a strong temptation
to follow Socrates's own strategy, when he shows that without such
knowledge, moral instruction is mere pretense.
Perhaps we can begin to see why Socrates might have found it worth
his while to engage in the elenchus with others, whether or not their
opinions might assist him in his own search, and whether or not he was
able to extract an admission of ignorance. There is no reason to think that
Socrates cannot promote virtue, even if he lacks definitional knowledge
of virtue. In fact, virtue is not a matter for definition at all: as self-knowledge it is simply equivalent to the ability to identify the epistemic dimension of the self as the primary sense of self. Since he is not a dogmatic
teacher, Socrates does not trade in opinions or beliefs. Socratic opinions
cannot be parroted successfully, and Socrates must, if presented with
formulaic (Socratic) answers, continue past them to a seeming impasse.32

31 As Woodruff (1988), Benson (1990 and 1991), and Nehamas (1988) all do.
32 On the topic of Socratic beliefs and their refutation within the elenctic dialogues, see
Woodruff 1988,105, footnote 28. Of course, one could easily claim that the reason
why Socrates refutes the belief is because the interlocutor simply does not hold the
identical belief as Socrates, although he uses the same words. Such an argument
may suggest that we would do well to look for a notion of self-consistency that
considers more than the set of beliefs that a person holds, in the sense of a given
body of propositions.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

14 Sara L. Rappe

For example at Charmides 166c5 (mentioned above), Critias cites what

is evidently a well-known Socratic formula, namely, that saphrosune is
self-knowledge. Far from denying that he does indeed hold this belief,
Socrates indicates that it is because he holds this belief that he insists
upon investigating its truth. Another text in which Socrates refutes a
belief that is attributed to him by the interlocutor is Laches 194dl. Nicias
says, have often heard you say that each of us is good at those things
in which he has wisdom, but bad at those in which he is ignorant.' To
this Socrates replies, 'You are right, Nicias', and then proceeds to refute
the statement. The answer as such is not the final goal of the search, since
the elenchus continues even though what is very likely a correct answer
has been obtained by means of it.
Socrates, in order to engage in the elenchus, does not have to have any
special definitional knowledge of virtue. What is required for its success
is knowledge of oneself as knower. But Socrates cannot give this knowledge to another in the form of a definition, since it is up to each person
to demand a kind of epistemic accountability, above all from himself. He
can only point to its operation in practice, that is in elenchus, which is
just the practice of self-inquiry.
Socrates shows by his own example that he thinks the elenchus should
be constantly practised and that it is beneficial for its own sake. The
cognitive self-knowledge which Socrates advocates has direct ethical
consequences. However I suggest that we look for its ethical consequences precisely where the Athenians would look for them,33 in deeds,
not in words. Socrates practices a living wisdom, expressing by means
of his own actions the very orientation that he tried to convey in his
elenctic conversations.
The attitude34 displayed by Socrates is an intense identification with
himself as a knower, before all else. Many of the scenes portraying the
behavior of Socrates show that his life of action is one founded on the

33 Apology, 32a5
34 Gadamer describes it as the quality of being monimos, steadfast in the quest for the
good and able to free oneself from the possible distractions along the path (96). This
quality of remaining steadfast is, I believe, most successfully captured in the
description of Socrates's retreat at Delium at Symposium 221. There Plato tells us it
is the apotropaic stare, the alert gaze that Socrates delivers to all comers, which in
the end rescues Socrates and his companion.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

15

practice of self-inquiry, whose chief virtue consists in an ability to rise

above the tendency to identify with non-epistemic (i.e., bodily or emotional) parts of the person. Expressed as a doctrine, this ability to be
detached is captured in the Socratic precept, that virtue is knowledge,
and in his teaching that the intellect is the primary determinant of
voluntary behavior, given that the person is most truly his epistemic self.
Clearly the greatest demonstration of the ethical dimension of Socrates's teaching is the very manner in which he comports himself while
delivering his apologia. Several sentences in the speech direct our attention to his practice of radical detachment from what might be called the
non-epistemic self. At 31bl, Socrates tells us that his 'complete detachment from everything belonging to' him,35 has effected a transformation
in his relations with his fellow men. Evidently he feels the same concern
for the well-being of everyone he meets, including foreigners, as he
would if they were members of his own family. He makes no distinction
between his own welfare and that of the community. Such lack of
attachment to his own private interests is the very thing that Socrates
knows is so offensive to his jurors. After his condemnation he reproaches
them for their stubborn prejudice:
Indeed I have been condemned because of a shortcomingnot in
argument, but in cheek, in recklessness, since I refuse to tell you the
kind of things which you find so pleasant to hear. (Ap 38d6)

This detachment extends so far into the comportment of Socrates that he

conducts his defense upon the premise that he does not know whether
death is truly an evil.
At one point in his speech, Socrates makes it clear that the practice of
elenchus does have direct ethical benefits, and that these benefits follow
upon the ability to identify with the epistemic dimension of the self:36

35 Since the cognitive self is the true self, everything else about a person, including his
body, might be thought of as 'belonging to the self, rather than as 'the self'.
36 For a confirmation of the relationship between self-knowledge and virtue in this
sense, see Bumyeat 1992,58.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

16 Sara L. Rappe
I do nothing else besides go around trying to persuade the young and
old among you alike, not to be attached to your bodies nor to your
possessions nor to anything except to the effort to make your soul as
virtuous as possible. (Ap 30A7-B1)

Socrates, again defending his everyday venture, here refers to it as an

exhortation to virtue rather than as a form of epistemic inquiry.37
I should note that this equation of the ethical and didactic functions
of the elenchus is utterly at odds with the separation of these functions
recently advocated by Reeves.38 Reeves distinguishes between several
different stages of the elenchus in the evolution of Socrates's mission. He
holds that the last stage (alluded to at 31bl-5), that of moral evaluation,
is clearly segregated from the earlier epistemological phase (alluded to
at 23b) by means of the explicitly moral language Socrates employs. But
Socrates does not adhere to such an artificial division in his narrative.
For at 23b Socrates says that he 'even today' continues upon his epistemic
path, and at 38a his famous exhortation reminds the jury of his epistemic
exploits.
The very effort to know oneself makes a great demand upon its
practitioner, for it necessitates that one adopt a rational approach to life.
This process of reawakening to the demands of the intellect is the gadfly
in Socrates, whose sting is felt in the admonition to take no thought for
the external possessions to be had in life, but to look into the soul and its
moral condition. In beginning to receive the benefits of Socratic elenchus,
one must undergo a kind of reversal. Rather than looking outward at the
objects of desire or forward to the fruits of action, the learner is asked to
redirect his attention inward, toward his own epistemic states. It is this
readjusted orientation to life rather than any doctrinal system that
Socrates seeks above all to inculcate by means of elenctic practice.

37 For a discussion of the elenchus as exhortation, see Woodruff, and Bnckhouse and
Smith.
38 Reeves 1989,122

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

17

III Knowledge of the Good and Knowledge of the Self

What still remains to be accounted for is the relationship between the
kind of definitional knowledge that Socrates is apparently seeking, and
the self-knowledge which seems to accrue at the expense of the former.
If it is self-knowledge and not definitional knowledge that enables one
to become virtuous, then why does Socrates expend so much effort in
trying to distill moral definitions? In part, I have already answered the
question by suggesting that it is just the aporetic realization that virtue
cannot be defined but only lived, that the elenchus is designed to bring
about. Nevertheless, as they stand, the texts apparently show that Socrates considers a certain kind of objective knowledge to be requisite for
virtue.
Although the calling card of Socratic intellectualism, his thesis that
virtue is knowledge, in the elenctic dialogues usually refers to knowledge
of the good simpliciter,39 in the Charmides we are presented with two
competing versions of the Socratic formula: virtue is self-knowledge,
and virtue is knowledge of the good. A last-ditch effort to reconcile them
fails: at 174d5, Crito tries to advance the argument that if sophrosune is
knowledge of knowledge, then it will be beneficial by governing other
kinds of knowledge, including knowledge of the good. Socrates counters
by asserting that only productive knowledge can be beneficial. Thus
Socrates brings his examination of sophrosune to an end by explicitly
criticizing the definition of self-knowledge as knowledge of knowledge,
on the grounds that he has discovered it to be useless:40
We granted that [sophrosune] was knowledge of knowledge, although
the argument refused to allow it and even denied it. And to this
knowledge we granted the knowledge of the productions governed by
the other knowledges, even though the argument would not allow this
either, in order that our temperate person might know that he knows
what he knows, and that he does not know what he does not know.
(175b6)

39 Cf. Lysis 210, Charmides 174b, Laches 199b.

40 Thus argument is connected to the Socratic thesis that a virtue must benefit the one
who possesses it Cf. Charmides 172; Crito 47d, (the thesis is that the virtue, justice,
benefits the soul, while its opposite, injustice, harms the soul).

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

18 Sara L. Rappe

I am very sorry on your behalf, Charmides, if you with your looks and
your great modesty will enjoy no benefit from this temperance, nor will
its presence in your life assist you. (175el)

Yet the emphatic position that this irresolution occupies at the end of the
dialogue suggests that when it comes to obtaining happiness, Socrates
does think there is some important relationship between knowledge of
the good and knowledge of the self.
Both the Apology and the Charmides may be read as extended interpretations of the Delphic precept, 'Know Thyself!', woven around the
parameters of objective self-definition. Thus the traditional teaching
measures an individual member of the community in terms of his arete,
his standing among peers with regard to professional competence.41 By
contrast, the Socratic method captures the way in which an individual
understands the role that he plays for the community; it elicits a self-representation, which may be sorely amiss. In either case, the precept urges
a kind of epistemic responsibility and generates a subtle shift in one's
self-apprehension; it functions as a corrective for personal myopia.
Many of Socrates's examinations play upon the perspectival difference that arises when the traditional precept is pitted against its Socratic
renovation.42 Expert knowledge spills into the brink of uncertainty
precisely because it does not prepare the expert to tell us what it is
that makes his enterprise not merely successful, but truly beneficial.43
That is, the elenchus points out an incommensurability between the
goals of the individual, who necessarily must choose a good relative
to his own perspective, and the goal of the self qua knower, to whom

41 Cf. Nehamas 1988.

42 On the conflict between expert knowledge, that is, knowledge under the province
of a specific discipline, and knowledge of the good, or philosophical knowledge,
see Woodruff, 1988. See also Gadamer, 1986,80-1, who points out the central conflict
in the Republic (e.g., at Republic 601 ff.) between techne and philosophical knowledge.
43 Attention to the conflict between community expectations and philosophic endeavor is a standard feature of the middle dialogues. Cf. The end of Protagoras's
myth concerning the distribution of justice, which Plato clearly treats as a fallacious aitiology, since the assumption it supports is that all members of the
community are competent transmitters of virtue. Another example is Laches 195d,
where the physician is shown to be incompetent to judge whether his patient's
recovery is a blessing.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

19

Socrates makes an appeal for the existence of an absolute good. A

notional confrontation between the limited aim of a particular skill and
the appeal to an absolute good is present not just in such overt texts
as laches 196:
But whether the suffering or not-suffering of these things will be best
for a man is a question which is no more for a soothsayer to decide than
for anyone else.

It is also implicit when Socrates asks whether virtue can be taught,

whether there is a science of human advantage, a knowledge which
covers this absolute good as distinct from particular goods.
If your sons had been colts or calves, we should have had no difficulty
in finding and engaging a trainer to perfect their natural qualities... But
seeing that they are human beings, whom do you intend to get as their
instructor? Who is the expert in perfecting the human and social
qualities?*1 (Apology 20bl)

Again when Socrates distinguishes a traditionalist, role-specific conception of virtue from what we might call its absolute conception, the same
confrontation appears
The same with the virtues. Even if they are many and various, yet at
least they all have some common character which makes them virtues.
That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers the
question, What is virtue?45 (Meno 72c5)

The good is never good for me, but bad for you. However, our interests
necessarily diverge insofar as we are individuals, and ethical conflict
consistently arises precisely when we identify exclusively with our
individual interests.
If virtue can be construed as knowledge of the good,46 if knowledge
is sufficient for virtue, then the good in question cannot be limited to the
interests of any given individual. Such a good would not be the good,
but only a good. Still, Socrates maintains that virtue is beneficial to the

44 Tredennick's translation.
45 Guthrie's translation.
46 Irwin 1986

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

20 Sara L. Rappe

one who possesses it, and that it is contrary to human nature to choose
a lesser good when a greater good is available.47 Somehow the Socratic
appeal to self-interest must be integrated with his larger appeal to the
univocal value of the good which is offered as the intelligible terminus
of any discussion of virtue.
One solution that we might look to is the idea of an impersonal self,
a self in whose interest we are motivated to act, and yet in doing so, can
identify with the intellectual struggle to press on to an absolute standard.
This reconstruction of the Socratic self is consonant with the detachment
we saw operating in Socrates's attitude toward his own personal affairs,
as well as with the epistemic distance from the personal self that the
elenchus fosters.48 And yet considerable difficulty lurks in the concept of
an impersonal self, especially perhaps in the eyes of modems, for whom
the word 'self can denote what is entirely personal i.e., not shared with
another. After Socrates, Greek philosophers made use of the concept of
the impersonal self, all the way from Plato's world soul or form of human
being, to Plotinus's Nous. But what reason do we have to foist such a
doctrine upon Socrates?
Above, I have tried to indicate in what direction we might begin a
search for this conception of an impersonal self, by introducing the
notion of the cognitive self. This epistemic self always scrutinizes whatever state one happens to be in. No matter how firmly convinced one
may be of the truth of his/her beliefs, the epistemic self can always
reassess or withdraw assent from any such belief state. I believe that the
Charmides tries to sketch a picture of such a self, in its digression on the
possibility of self-reflective knowledge.
Socrates describes self-reflective knowledge at 167blO:
... a single knowledge which is no other than knowledge of itself as
well as of the other knowledges.

When Socrates proceeds to examine the structure of this kind of knowledge, he turns for the purpose of comparison to a list of other human

47 Cf. Meno 77e; Lysis, 210d and 219 (but here it is treated as a controversial thesis),
Protagoras 358dl.
48 The suggestion that Socrates taught the existence of a true self has been made
previously by P.M. Comford in the Cambridge Ancient History. More recently,
Comford's suggestion has been endorsed by Brickhouse and Smith.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

21

faculties. He begins by discussing vision, hearing, and sensation in

general:
Is there any perception of sense-perceptions and of the faculty of
sense-perception, which does not perceive the objects of sense-perception?

The negative answer to this query should not be taken for the end of
the matter. Indeed the same sequence is repeated three times before
Socrates turns to the other items on his list: appetite, wish, sexual desire,
fear, and opinion. Included on the list are virtually all of the possible
states that comprise human experience, at least on a Platonic view:
epithmia, thumos, doxa, and aisthesis.
If we regard them as faculties, then sensation, appetite, etc. are always
associated with their respective unique objects. But considered as states
of experience, there is a sense in which they in turn may be seen as objects
for what I have been calling the cognitive self. One way of viewing the
elenchus in relation to epistemic self-knowledge is as a method whereby
the interlocutor comes to be aware that he has the desires, opinions, fears,
and appetites that he in fact has. But once aware that he has them, he can
begin to exercise his autonomy as an epistemic self, to scrutinize their
value, and to begin to free himself of those he deems pernicious. The
Charmides suggests a kind of priority of the epistemic self; this priority
is realized both as self-determination and as self-knowledge.
Elenchus is the technique whereby Socrates tries to make available
this epistemic dimension of the self to his interlocutor, helping him to
isolate or to identify the epistemic criteria for the satisfaction of a particular dilemma, quite part from any initial resolution at the personal
level. When practicing the elenchus, there is scope to pursue a kind of
detached inquiry into one's values and to take up a stance vis--vis the
world qua knower, thereby pursuing at least temporarily one's epistemic
interests. Moreover Socrates insists that identification with the epistemic
interests of the self has practical consequences.

Conclusion: Philosophical Friendship

It is time to take stock of the initial claims made in this essay. I claimed
that Socrates was more interested in pointing to the epistemic aspect of
the self, rather than in simply cataloguing what sots of things one knew.
Yet Socrates pursues the elenchus as a scrutiny of what his interlocutors
know or do not know.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

22 Sara L. Rappe

How to account for this disparity? Here I would like to glance briefly
at the later philosophical tradition, in which the strong connection
between self-awareness and ethics is clearly articulated. At 1170alO and
ff. of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the contemplative value
of friendship: it is easier to contemplate the fine actions of a friend than
to contemplate one's own fine actions. Nevertheless, this enhancement
of one's life flows directly from the essentially contemplative nature of
human beings. Human life is characterized by the powers of awareness
and of intelligence (1170al6), and an authentic human life involves the
exercise of these powers (1170al9).
Aristotle goes on to illustrate this thesis by discussing the self-reflective
awareness that typically attends human action. When we see, we are
aware that we see, and when we engage in intellectual activity, we are
aware of this too. Self-awareness is what makes our lives authentically
human. This same capacity for self-reflection is realized in our relationships with friends, whose actions we contemplate. The good person who
cultivates this life of self-awareness has the same relationship with himself
that he has with his friend (1170bl 1). It is a life of mutual contemplation.
The work of a friend, Aristotle says, is to ',' to share in
the human capacity for self-awareness. Precisely this sort of friendship is
the friendship that Socrates offers to his interlocutors. Does it follow that
Socrates improves any of his interlocutors? How can he make them better
than they are? As Socrates puts the matter (Apology 33b3): If any of [my
audience] turns out to be good or not, I cannot justly bare responsibility.49
Department of Classical Studies
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
U.S.A.

49 This essay was presented in a previous incarnation to the Department of Classical

Studies at the University of Michigan in the Winter of 1991.
Special thanks go to Professor G.R.F. Ferrari of the University of California at
Berkeley and to Professor James I. Porter of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
for their helpful suggestions and continued encouragement. Thanks also to Roger
Shiner for his editorial suggestions. I am also grateful to the Chairman of the
Department of Classical Studies at the University of Michigan, Professor Ludwig
Koenen, for his kindness in reading and commenting upon the manuscript. All
errors of course remain the responsibility of the author alone.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

23

Bibliography
Annas, J 1985. 'Self-Knowledge in Early Plato'. In D O'Meara, ed., Platonic Investigations.
Washington, DC: CUA Press, 11-138.
Benson, H. 1990. 'The Priority of Definition and the Socratic Elenchus'. Oxford Studies m
Ancient Philosophy 7. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 19-65.
1992. Ed. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press
Brickhouse, T. and Smith, N. 1991. 'Socrates' Elenctic Mission'. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 11. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 131-59.
1994. Plato's Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bumyeat, M. 1992. 'Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration'. In H Benson, ed., Essays on
the Philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press. First published in BICS
24,7-16.
Comford, P.M. 1933 'The Athenian Philosophical Schools, I. The Philosophy of Socrates'.
Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 6, 302-9. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
Gadamer, H.-G. 1986. The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Gerson, L. 'Plato on Virtue, Knowledge, and the Unity of Goodness' In J. Anton, and A.
Preuss, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 111. Plato. Albany: SUNY Press.
Grice, P. 1991. The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Irwin, T. 1977. Plato's Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kelly, J. 1989. 'Virtue and Inwardness in Plato's Republic'. Ancient Philosophy 9 189-205.
Kosman, A. 1976. 'Platonic Love'. In W. Werkmeister, ed., Facets of Plato's Philosophy. Assen:
Van Gorcum (Phronesis Supplement Volume ), 53-69.
Mackenzie, M.M. 1988a. 'Impasse and Explanation: From the Lysis to the Phaedo'. Archiv
fr Geschichte der Philosophie 70:15-45.
1988b. "The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance'. Classical Quarterly 38 331-50.
Mackie, J. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books.
Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nehamas, A. 1987. 'Socratic Intellectualism'. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in
Ancient Philosophy 2,275-316.
. 1992a. 'Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher'. In H. Benson, ed., Essays
on the Philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press.
1992b. 'Voices of Silence'. Anon 2 no. 2.
Nussbaum, M. 1986 The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM

24 Sara L. Rappe

Robinson, R. 1971. 'Elenchus'. In G. Vlastos, ed.. The Philosophy of Socrates. New York:
Anchor Books, 78-93.
Rosen, S. 1989. The Ancients and the Modems. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Santas, G. 1973. 'Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge'. In E. Lee, A. Mourelatos, and
R. Rorty, eds., Exegesis and Argument. New York (Phronesis Supplement volume 1).
1979. Socrates. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Vlastos, G. 1981. 'The Individual as Object of Love in Plato'. In Platonic Studies (Second
Edition). Princeton, NJ- Princeton University Press, 3-42
. 1983. 'The Socratic Elenchus'. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 27-58.
1992. 'Elenchus and Mathematics'. In H. Benson, ed., Essays on the Philosophy
of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press. First published in Socrates, Ironist and
Moral Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 107-31.
Williams, B. 1986. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Woodruff, P. 1988. 'Expert Knowledge in the Apology and Laches: What a General Needs
to Know'. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3, 79-115.

Brought to you by | University of South Carolina Li

Authenticated | 129.252.86.83
Download Date | 7/31/13 7:31 PM