Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

193

Self-Predication in Platos
Euthyphro?
Elliot C. Welch

Introduction

In Platos Euthyphro, Socrates asks his interlocutor, What is the pious?1

This question is raised initially in order to lead them to a solution to
a practical problem: whether Euthyphros prosecuting his father for
murder is pious. How can Euthyphro and Socrates solve this problem?
When Euthyphro furnishes an answer that acts as a standard by which
to judge the pious from the impious: Then teach me what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and using it as a model ()
I may say that if anything either you or some other does is such as this,
it is pious, and if it isnt such as this, say that it isnt pious2 (6e3-6).
This passage is thought to express the paradigm commitment for So3
cratic definitions, so named for Socrates use of the word, .
More generally, the paradigm commitment is presumed for any of the
definienda of Platos so-called early dialogues, e.g., virtue, courage,
or temperance. Euthyphros attempt to meet this expectation fails.
Since he fails to answer What is the pious?, it follows that he fails to

See Euthyphro 5d7. In general, the definiendum expression throughout this dialogue is which can be translated ambiguously as the pious. I believe
this ambiguity is important for the argument I discuss, and so I preserve this ambiguity in English throughout this discussion. Socrates also uses the feminine abstract noun, interchangeably with . See Euthyphro 5c9.

Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.

means example at Apology 23b1 and Euthydemus 278e-82d.

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194

Elliot C. Welch

provide a standard or paradigm by which to judge the pious from the

impious. So, Socrates response at the end of this elenchos is not surprising: Then you did not answer what I asked, surprising man. For I did
not ask you what happens to be the same in being pious and impious,
what is god-loved and god-hated, so it seems (8a10-13).
That Euthyphro fails is obvious; how he fails isnt. Recent work on
this passage motivates the need to arbitrate competing interpretations
of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8.
One interpretation, proposed by Alexander Nehamas, and recently
advanced by Russell M. Dancy, denies that Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 follows
the structure of a reductio ad absurdum.4 On their view, the argument
at this passage does not generate a contradiction from its internal premises. Rather, the arguments conclusion that the same things are both
pious and impious contradicts an implied premise that the pious is
through and through pious and under no circumstances impious. According to Nehamas and Dancy, this premise is presupposed in the text
prior to the argument at 6e10-8a8.
Another interpretation of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8, suggested by Hugh
H. Benson, maintains that this argument has in fact the structure of a
reductio ad absurdum, which is just to say that an implication of Euthyphros initial definition, i.e., that what the gods love is pious and what
they hate is impious, is inconsistent with his other premises.5 According
to Benson, this is how Euthyphro fails to demonstrate his knowledge of
what the pious is. To demonstrate knowledge of the pious, Euthyphros
beliefs about the pious must at least be consistent.6 This reductio ad
absurdum interpretation (henceforth abbreviated, RAI) relies on the
principle of non-contradiction.7

Nehamas treatment (95) of this passage in Self-Predication and Platos Theory of

Forms, is brief. Dancy develops the self-predicative interpretation of this passage
in Platos Introduction of Forms, Chapter 5.

See Benson 2000, 47-52.

The rough idea of the Socratic elenchos is that an interlocutor fails to know what he
claims when the premises offered by him or offered by Socrates and then agreed to
by him are inconsistent with one another. In many cases, this leads the interlocutor
to reject or modify his initial definition, aiming to eliminate the defects of his initial
answer.

At Metaphysics IV 4, 1006a3-6, Aristotle says that we have just taken it as understood that it is impossible to be and not be at the same time, and by means of this
we have shown that this is the most certain of all principles.

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

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Whats at stake with these competing interpretations? Simply this:

the RAI is more charitable because it relies on the principle of noncontradiction, which doesnt require additional textual support to
presume it is implied in the argument. The self-predication interpretation (henceforth abbreviated, SPI) relies on the more controversial
self-predicative premise for the pious. Since there is only tenuous textual evidence for this premise, and this premise is not required in order
to make the argument work, we ought to prefer the RAI of Euthyphro
6e10-8a8. My main aim in this paper is to remove Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 as
a candidate passage for all further discussions of arguments that rely
on self-predicative premises in Platos dialogues. Though focusing on
Platos Euthyphro, one of Platos shorter dialogues, and one of many, is
modest interpretive work, removing it from further discussions of selfpredication is a decisive accomplishment, and a sign of philosophical
progress.
II

The Basic Argument of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8

In general, the main argument at Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 is as follows:

(1)

What is loved by the gods is pious and what is not loved by the
gods is impious.

(2)

The god-loved action () and man dear to the gods

() are pious (), and the god hated action () and man () are impious ();
the pious and the impious are not the same; they are completely opposite () one another.

(3)

The gods quarrel over the just and the unjust, the beautiful and
8
ugly, the good and bad.

This premise is justified by a discussion of the origin of disagreement: when we

lack agreed-upon ways of distinguishing the just from the unjust, the beautiful
from the ugly and the good from the bad. Since the gods argue, they must be
at odds about the same things. Socrates doesnt justify this comparison. In the
traditional Greek pantheon, the gods are wiser and stronger than people, even if
they are not perfect. See Burkerts Greek Religion 1985, 182-9. So, it wouldnt make
sense that the gods, who are wiser than humans, argue about the things for which
humans already have standards. The point is that the cause of enmity, both among
humans, and among gods (if they do in fact quarrel) has to be the lack of a standard.

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196

Elliot C. Welch

(4)

So, some things are thought by some gods to be good, others to

be bad [from (3)].

(5)

Each loves what he thinks is good, and hates what he thinks is

bad.

(6)

So, the same things hated by the gods and god-hated will be
loved by the gods and god-loved [from (4) and (5)].

(7)

So, the same things will be pious and impious [From (1) and
(6)].

The main interpretive controversy is not whether a contradiction

occurs in the argument, but where that is, between what premises
the contradiction arises. According to the Nehamas/Dancy view, the
conclusion (7) contradicts the more firmly held self-predicative premise
that the pious is always pious and under no circumstances impious. But
since the explicit evidence for this commitment in Platos Euthyphro is
uncertain, SPI must rely heavily on the presumption that the self-predicative premise for the pious is in the background.9 Nehamas briefly
explains this argument by supposing that when Euthyphro offers (1)
above, it is an implied substitution into the self-predicative premise for
the pious. Dancy develops this account by showing us how the role of
the paradigm requirement, which occurs in the passage that introduces
this elenchos, can be accomplished by the self-predication requirement.10
It is clear, then, that there is a tradition for supposing that the premise,
The pious is through and through pious and under no circumstances
impious is at work at Euthyphro 6e10-8a8. But in order for this interpre-

Nehamas maintains that Socrates and Euthyphro accept the self-predication premise at Euthyphro 5d1-5, though he notes that the sense of the text is not clear, citing
that R.E. Allens interpretation of it does not contain a self-predication: Or is not
the holy, itself by itself, the same in every action? And the unholy, in turn, the opposite of holy-is it not like itself, and does not everything which is to be unholy
have a certain single character with respect to unholiness? (1979, 93). I cite this
passage only in passing because Nehamas recognizes it as merely tenuous textual
support for the self-predication interpretation, and Dancy doesnt mention it at
all. This suggests that the virtue of the Nehamas/Dancy interpretation even
according to them is its logical necessity, on which I concentrate later in the
paper.

10

Its natural to connect these points: self-predication is involved in unpacking the

notion of a paradigm This gives us the opportunity to examine the paradigm
requirement with its associated self-predications (Dancy 2004, 115).

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

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tation to make sense, we have to suppose a strong logical relationship between the paradigm requirement and the self-predication requirement. Otherwise, we would have a difficult time explaining why
Socrates asks Euthyphro for a standard or paradigm for pious things in
the first place, and how, exactly, Euthyphro fails to provide one.
According to the RAI, which Benson endorses, and which I develop
hereafter, the contradiction in the argument arises between an implication of the conclusion (7), that there is something such that it is both
pious and impious, and an implication of premise (2), that there is
nothing such that it is both pious and impious. This interpretation only
presumes the principle of non-contradiction, which we can charitably
assume all Socrates interlocutors recognize. Dancy suggests that there
are two problems with this interpretation: it requires that we read the
conclusion (7) as a contradictory statement, and that Socrates response
to Euthyphro at the end of this elenchos is more compatible with the
SPI. I respond to both of these objections later, effectively removing any
obstacle to reading Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 as I suggest.
III

The Self-Predication Interpretation (SPI)

A textual exegesis of Euthyphro 5d1-5 cannot yield an uncontroversial

reading of Socrates and Euthyphros agreement to the self-predicative
premise for the pious. Given this, the principle of charity encourages
us to suppose that since it is unclear whether Euthyphro 5d1-5 contains
a self-predication for the pious, it most assuredly is unclear to Euthyphro. So, I suggest we leave the textual discussion behind and concentrate instead on the logical details of SPI, since these are supposed to be
its strengths anyway.
Recall that our target passage comes after Socrates introduction of
the paradigm requirement. The paradigm requirement (henceforth abbreviated PR) is as follows: if F-ness is defined as G-ness, then G-ness
is a paradigm for Fs. The Self-Predication Requirement (henceforth
abbreviated SPR) is as follows: if F-ness is defined as G-ness, then Gness is under all circumstances F and under no circumstances not F.
According to Dancy, the work of PR is taken over by SPR at Euthy11
phro 6e10-8a8. We can summarize Dancys explanation by substituting

11

where we look for a paradigm for Fs, we look for something, possibly repeatable, that possesses in a paradigmatic way, indefeasibly, the features that make

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Elliot C. Welch

F-ness with the pious and F with pious. Lets imagine the elenchos,
stripped of its literary details:
Socrates: What is the pious?
Euthyphro: The pious is ABC.
If ABC is an adequate answer, then The pious is ABC entails ABC is a
paradigm for pious things. This is expressed at Euthyphro 6e3-6, and is
the passage with which this paper began.12
So, according to the Nehamas/Dancy view, we suppose that in general Socrates holds (1), which entails (2):
(1)

SPR: If F-ness is defined as G-ness, then G-ness is through and

through F and under no circumstances not F.

(2)

SPRP (for the pious): If the pious is defined as ABC, then ABC
is through and through pious and under no circumstances
impious.

Taking Euthyphros definition of the pious, we have:

(3)

The pious is defined as what the gods love (Euthyphro

6e10-7a1).

If SPRP is implied in the course of this discussion, then we have:

(2)

If the pious is defined as ABC, then ABC is through and through

pious and under no circumstances impious

Substituting in Euthyphros answer for ABC, we have:

(4)

What the gods love is through and through pious and under no
circumstances impious.

something an F. So, the work of PR [the paradigm requirement] can be taken over
by the Self-Predication Requirement: (SPR) The F=df the G the G is under all
circumstances F and under no circumstances conF (Dancy, 120).
12

Then teach me what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and using it as a
model () I may say that if anything either you or some other does is
such as this, it is pious, and if it isnt such as this, say that it isnt pious.

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

199

The problem is that what the gods love is highly variable, depending
on the god. So, the same things are loved and hated by the gods. Since
they are loved and hated by the gods, they are also pious and impious.
This implied premise (4) contradicts the implication of the differences
in the gods preferences:
(5)

What the gods love is pious and impious.

According to this interpretation, then, Euthyphro fails to provide an

adequate answer to what is the pious? because he has failed to satisfy
SPR, which we should suppose is in the background, and is taking over
the work of PR.13
The problem is that this interpretation shows only how SPR is sufficient for PR and therefore failing SPR doesnt entail failing PR. Now,
if SPR were also necessary for PR, then we could see how Euthyphros
failure to meet SPR entails failing to meet PR. But that would require
much further argumentation than what Nehamas or Dancy supply. I
think that given the context of the dialogue, SPR is at most sufficient
for PR. To say that Euthyphro has failed to meet SPR and therefore fails
to meet PR is committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent. And to
offer such a reading would be extremely uncharitable.
Nevertheless, according to Dancy, the Self-Predication Interpretation
is also supported by the way Socrates ends the elenchos, by saying that
Euthyphro has not answered the question he asked: Then you did not
answer what I asked, surprising man. For I did not ask you what happens to be the same in being pious and impious, what is god-loved and
god-hated, so it seems (8a10-13).
If the argument were a reductio ad absurdum, then, according to
Dancy, Socrates would have responded much differently than he does.
I question this. A contradiction among Euthyphros internal premises
entail that he fails to supply Socrates with the answer he wants. In other
words, if Euthyphro contradicts himself, then he hasnt answered the

13

See Nehamas, The search [for Socratic definitions] should begin with an agreement (explicit or tacit) that the F itself is F; a plausible candidate should then be
selected, and its name substituted for the subject-term in the self-predication. One
should then try to determine whether the resulting sentence is true. This pattern
can actually be found-for example, in the second elenchus [sic] of Euthyphro
Socrates there expresses the view that Piety is pious by means of his paradigmatic
vocabulary at 6e3-6. Euthyphro agrees, and goes on to offer what is just a substitution instance of the self-predication (94-5).

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200

Elliot C. Welch

question insofar as a contradiction cant be an answer to any question.

So, the RAI is compatible with how Socrates ends the elenchos. Thus, the
passage cannot be textual evidence against RAI.
One final note: In Hippias Major, and in Protagoras, where the arguments actually require self-predicative premises, these premises are
introduced explicitly.14 In the case of Euthyphro, these other explicit references to self-predicative premises cannot be read back as support for
SPI. Why not? The explicit references in Hippias Major and Protagoras
can be used as support only if the argument in order to be charitable
at Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 requires them. In other words, we can read
those passages as support for our interpretation of Euthyphro only if
theres no other logically sound way to read the argument. But this is
not the case. Unfortunately for SPI, I provide a cogent interpretation
that doesnt appeal to the self-predicative premise for the pious. To that
interpretation, I now turn.

IV

The Reductio Ad Absurdum Interpretation (RAI)

Most recently advanced by Hugh H. Benson, the RAI of Euthyphro 6e108a8 needs to be further clarified and developed because of both the
historical opposition in Nehamas work, and the recently developed
opposition in Dancys work.
If Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 is indeed a reductio ad absurdum, then there
must be a contradiction among its internal premises. My strategy in this
section is to point out how a contradiction is implied by Euthyphros
premises, and to assume that Euthyphro at least must recognize that.
Much of my interpretation develops around premise (2) of the reconstruction of the argument in this paper. So, lets have that premise,
divided into two parts:

14 According to Malcom, there are only two explicit occurrences of self-predication

in the early dialogues: at Hp Ma 292e where Beauty is beautiful, and at Prt 330ce, where Justice is just and Holiness (or Piety) is holy (or pious). In these cases,
the self-predication is identified and clarified for the interlocutor. One might even
suppose that where a self-predicative statement occurs, it must be identified and
clarified because Socrates would like to make certain that the interlocutor recognizes the claim, which is a principle of dialectical charity. See Malcom 1991, 21-46.

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

(2)

201

(a) The god-loved action () and man dear to the

gods () are pious (), and the god
hated action () and man () are impious (); (b) the pious and the impious are not the same;
they are completely opposite () one another
().

On Dancys view, this second premise is just a restatement of Euthyphros definition of the pious, so lets have that as well:
(1)

What is loved by the gods () is pious and

what is not loved by the gods () is impious.

Premise (2) swaps beloved by the gods with god-loved ()

and the not beloved by the gods with the god-hated ().
Dancy acknowledges that this is a change in the original claim, but he
doesnt see anything important about it. Lets quote him on that for
good measure: This is all supposed to be what we are saying;
Socrates is not yet asking for any new concessions from Euthyphro
Socrates restatement of the definition is not a mere repetition, but I cannot see that the revisions are of any importance.15
Dancys interpretation overlooks the importance of the move from
premise (1) to (2). The changes Socrates makes are explicitly accepted
by Euthyphro, are intended to clarify the logic of Euthyphros position,
and are what allows Socrates to reveal the contradiction in the argument.
A passage from R.E. Allens now-classic, Platos Earlier Theory of Forms
stands as initial support. Allen views the purpose of Socrates restatement as making Euthyphros answer more precise (32). But another detail of Allens view is helpful here. He says that though the requirement
of universality has been met by Euthyphros answer, he also says, The
definition proceeds in a sense by example still: it specifies a group of
individuals things, actions, persons (7a) marked off from the rest
by being loved by the gods. And it is individuals, not their distinguishing mark, which are identified with the holy.16

15

See Dancy 2004, 125.

16

See Allen 1970, 29-30.

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Elliot C. Welch

Allen sees the importance of Socrates reformulation: he and Euthyphro discuss the relationship between the pious things and the things
loved by the gods. Euthyphros initial claim is a concrete assertion
about individuals, and Socrates reformulation is meant to bring out
that feature of the claim.
To understand this more clearly, lets address the second part of
premise (2). Once we see how to interpret the second part we can also
see more clearly the connection between it and the first part of premise
(2), and why they are put together in the first place.
Socrates says the pious and the impious are not the same; they are
completely opposite () one another ().
Now what could he mean by this? In order to answer this question, we
must first realize that the generically abstract noun phrases,
and , which are translated as the pious and the impious
respectively, are syntactically ambiguous.
Unlike English, where we have the words piety and the pious to
distinguish the attribute from the concrete collection of individuals to
which the word applies, Attic Greek has no such linguistic distinction.17
Generically abstract noun phrases are quite common in Plato.18 Since
they are so common, we assume at least that Plato could distinguish
between the attribute and the concrete individual. How do we know
this? A closer look at the first part of premise (2) reveals the answer.
The first part of premise (2) is this: (a) the god-loved man and action
are pious while the god-hated action and man are impious. The emphasis is on the man and action; it points out that here concerns
pious individuals, not the attribute of piety. This is why Socrates bothers to re-state Euthyphros initial answer: to clarify his position. Since
the expressions and are ambiguous, Socrates
must ask Euthyphro if this is what he means to say: that the pious and
the impious are completely opposite () to one another.
And this is just to say that the set of pious things and the set of impious
things have no overlap with one another: There is nothing that is both
pious and impious.
One objection might be that since the expressions, and
are ambiguous, there is nothing to force us to choose one
over the other. So, my recommendation that we read, as the

17

See Sharvy 1972, 121-2.

18

See Dancy 2004, 120-3.

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

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set of pious things, and as the set of impious things, at

this passage does not have the urgency it needs, especially because there
are other passages where the expression, clearly indicates the
attribute of piety, and not the set of pious individuals, as a passage in
near proximity to our target passage shows.19
Prior to the argument at 6e10-8a8, Socrates reminds Euthyphro of
what he expects in an answer to what is the pious? In the description
of what he expects, Socrates asks for the attribute by which all pious
things are pious. We are meant to read as piety rather than
as the set of pious things. At 6d9-e1, Socrates says, Do you remember
that I did not ask for you to teach me one or two of the many pious
things, but that form itself by which all pious things are pious? You
were saying that the impious are impious and the pious are pious by
one form, or do you not remember?20
So, the challenge is that given Socrates request for the attribute of
piety, why should we interpret his later expressions of and
as the set of pious things and the set of impious things,
respectively? I think that the answer has already been given in the first
part of premise (2). Socrates revises Euthyphros claim because he wants
to make it clear that according to Euthyphros definition, he means to
identify the set of pious things and the set of impious things, but not the
attribute of piety. So, we return to the first part of the premise:
(2)

(a) The god-loved action () and man dear to the

gods () are pious (), and the god
hated action () and man () are impious
();

This revision picks out the people and the actions that are pious, and
the people and the actions that are impious, specifically. So, it would
make sense, in the very next phrase, that when he says, and
, he means the pious people and actions and the impious

19

is in the dative case, a requirement for the object of

even if in English we would say, the pious is completely opposite the impious.
This dative of manner is used to show the degree by which one thing differs from
another. See Smyth 1513.

20

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Elliot C. Welch

people and actions, given the context of the passage. In other words,
supposing that Socrates is talking about people and actions, and not
attributes, allows us to make sense of his clarification in premise (2). In
this light, the claim that the pious and the impious are completely opposite each other must mean that there is no overlap between the set of
pious things and the set of impious things:
(2)

(b) the pious and the impious are not the same; they
are completely opposite () to one another
().

So, if there is no overlap between the set of pious things and the set
of impious things, then it must follow that nothing is both pious and
impious. So, premise (2) implies:
(2*) There is no x such that x is both pious and impious.
Once this is established, the rest of the argument develops to produce
the contradictory of (2*).
The next premise is that the gods quarrel with one another (7b2-4).
This is crucial because it will generate the conflict needed for the conclusion.
The upshot of the discussion about the quarrelling of the gods is that
some things are considered good by some but bad by others. Since the
gods disagree, some things are considered good and other things are
considered bad, depending on the god. With this summary, Socrates
introduces another premise: (5) Each loves what he thinks is good, and
hates what he thinks is bad (7e6-7).
With respect to the matters on which the gods disagree (because it is
not assumed in the argument that they disagree on everything, so that
everything is a source of contention among them), they are at odds with
one another. Some things will be loved by some gods and hated by others because some think them good while others think them bad. So, the
same things that are in dispute are both loved by the gods and hated by
them. So, we have:
(6)

The same things hated by the gods and god-hated will be loved
by the gods and god-loved (8a4-5).

Now we are in a position to see how the argument finishes. Euthyphros

initial answer is that what is loved by the gods is pious and what is

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Self-Predication in Platos Euthyphro?

205

hated by the gods is impious. Socrates wouldnt be surprised if Euthyphros prosecuting his father for murder were something Zeus would
love, but Cronus would hate (8b2-3). And since what is god-loved is
pious and what is god-hated is impious, the same thing could be both
pious and impious. So, we have the conclusion to the argument:
(7)

The same things will be pious and impious (8a7-8).

Finally, we arrive at where we can see the contradiction. The conclusion

(7) implies that there is at least one thing that is both pious and impious. We then formulate it in the following way:
(7*) There is some x such that x is pious and impious.
So, when we put (7*) together with the implication of premise (2), (2*),
we get our contradiction. Thus:
(2*) & (7*): There is no x such that x is both pious and impious
AND there is an x such that x is pious and impious.
This is why the argument at Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 is a reductio ad absurdum. Even if the contradiction is not straightforwardly explicit, it
is clearly an implication of the premises. So, Ive accomplished what
Ive set out to do: to tease out explicitly where the contradiction in the
argument occurs, and to show that the contradiction is generated from
premises within the argument. The next section discusses an objection
on behalf of the SPI proponent.

Objections

Evaluating interpretations on grounds of charity requires a discussion

of the principle of charity. Proponents of the Nehamas/Dancy view
might say that the SPI is the more charitable interpretation from an inter-dialogue perspective. If the more charitable interpretation is the one
that gets the maximum value out of the texts, then we have a way of
explaining an argument that relies on a premise to which Socrates is
committed in other passages. Since the other arguments in Hippias Major and Protagoras rely on self-predicative premises, it is not much of a
leap to suppose that a self-predicative premise for the pious is at work
at Euthyphro 6e10-8a8. Even if there is only tenuous textual evidence

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for supplying, The pious is through and through pious and under no
circumstances impious at the passage, we are well-justified in believing the argument develops in this way. It gives us a way to see the
dialogues as a group. This view can even be supplemented by noting
the similarity in the conclusion at Euthyphro 8a8 to other passages in
Charmides and Hippias Major where an apparently contradictory premise is tested against the self-predicative premise for the definiendum.
We ought to view Euthyphro in that light.
As Dancy emphasizes, the conclusion (7) at Euthyphro 8a7-8 is not a
contradictory statement. If it were, the argument would be irredeemably awful.21 No one sympathetic to the RAI of this argument needs
to take (7) as a contradictory statement, however. Dancy seems to be
pressing against a straw man, if he supposes that the RAI requires taking (7) as contradictory. Euthyphros prosecuting his father for murder
may be pleasing to Zeus, but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus, pleasing to Hephaestus, but displeasing to Hera. Thus, the gods are likely to
quarrel with one another on this matter. There is nothing contradictory
in this: each god expressing what he or she loves, rendering the same
things pious and impious, relative to a particular gods preference.
Since they differ at all, it is likely that they will differ about what each
loves. No contradiction here.
Moreover, if we look to other dialogues, well find statements similar
to the conclusion (7) that may appear like contradictions but clearly are
not. One passage comes at the argument against temperance as modesty in Charmides 160e4-161b2. Another comes at the argument against
gold as the fine in Hippias Major 290d7-10. Dancy cites these passages
as support for his interpretation of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 because he identifies statements that, though apparently contradictory, really are not,
and in fact, these passages imply a self-predicative premise necessary
for the argument to be successful.
At Charmides 160e4-161b2, Charmides offers a definition of temperance () as modesty. Once this answer is under scrutiny
Socrates says that Charmides must not agree with Homer, who maintains that modesty is not a good match for a needy man (
). This claim is the basis for the next
inference: modesty is good and not good (161a6). The way to read this
passage, however, is not to attribute to Socrates a contradictory state-

21

See also, I take it that the best thing to say is that Socrates is not supposing (6) [our
(7) above] is contradictory (Dancy 2004, 129).

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207

ment: modesty is good and not good in the same respect at the same
time. Rather, he is better interpreted as saying that modesty is good in
some circumstances but not good in others. The presumption is that
temperance is going to be good in all circumstances. Since modesty is not
good in all circumstances, Charmides fails here.22
Likewise, at Hippias Major 290d7-10, Hippias offers a definition of
the fine () as gold. Once again, the next inference is that things
can be fine and not fine, if gold is the answer to what is the fine? Once
again, this is not a contradiction. The point of citing these passages is
that they are supposed to show us, according to Dancy, how to interpret
the conclusion of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8. Like the passage in Charmides,
Socrates can claim that something can be good and not good without
contradicting himself. And as in Hippias Major, he can claim something
to be fine and not fine. We are not forced, on account of these passages,
to interpret Socrates as making a contradictory statement at Euthyphro
8a7-8.
All this work of emphasizing that the conclusion of Euthyphro 6e108a8 isnt contradictory is supposed to favor Dancys interpretation of
the passage over my reading of it. But the RAI doesnt require that the
conclusion be read as a contradictory statement, as I emphasized before. Thats a misreading. The contradiction in the argument occurs because of the implications between premises (2) and (7). But each of the
statements (2) and (7) are not contradictory in themselves as Socrates
acknowledges himself.
Nevertheless, this is an opportunity to re-think the principle of charity. Employing the principle of charity also means avoiding forced interpretations, e.g. taking a view about a set of dialogues as a group
rather than concentrating on a particular target passage. Such an approach leads us to read an argument in Euthyphro a certain way because
of a similarity it shares with other dialogues thought to work together
as a group. We would do this only if we already have a view about
these other dialogues. Taking Euthyphro on its own without having to
rely on inter-textual references to support our view would be the most

22

Since there is no mention of the Greek equivalent of Temperance is temperate,

self-predication doesnt arise here. Since temperance is good, must be interpreted
as temperance is always good, for the argument to work, this is an instance of
strict predication, not self-predication. See Woodruffs Plato: Hippias Major (1982,
153-6).

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Elliot C. Welch

charitable. Only if there were no other interpretations available but SPI,

would we adopt SPI. But this, I maintain is not the case.

VI

Conclusion

To summarize, the RAI of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 is more charitable than

the SPI, which is why it is the better interpretation. On SPI, premise (2)
of the argument is a mere reformulation of premise (1), with no important clarification:
(1)

What is loved by the gods is pious and what is not loved by the
gods is impious (6e10-7a1).

(2)

The god-loved action () and man dear to the gods

() are pious (), and the god hated action () and man () are impious ();
the pious and the impious are not the same; they are completely opposite () one another (7a6-9).

First, a consequence of this is that Dancy cannot explain why Socrates

reformulates Euthyphros initial answer. It is just a reformulation, yes,
but why? My interpretation can explain this reformulation: Socrates
wants to clarify Euthyphros position that he means to distinguish the
collection of pious and impious individuals from the attribute of piety.
Why would he want to do that? This is because the generically abstract
noun phrases in Greek are ambiguous between reading as
the set of pious things, or as the attribute of piety. So, extra clarification is sometimes required. Second, Dancy argues that the conflict
in the argument arises between its conclusion and a self-predicative
premise for the pious, presumed in the context of the argument. Since
the textual evidence at Euthyphro 5d1-5 for this commitment is uncertain, we should not assume, out of charity, that Euthyphro understands
what we as readers are unsure of. Moreover, the Nehamas/Dancy view
argues that the work of the paradigm requirement is accomplished by
the self-predication requirement, of which the self-predicative premise
for the pious is an instance. Yet even if we suppose that the self-predication requirement is presumed in this passage, and that the conclusion
of Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 is in conflict with the self-predicative premise,
then in order to show that Euthyphro fails to provide a standard or paradigm wouldnt the self-predication requirement have to be also necessary for the paradigm requirement? As SPI shows, the self-predication

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209

requirement is at most sufficient for the paradigm requirement. Given

this consideration, SPI is seriously flawed. If meeting self-predication is
sufficient for meeting the paradigm requirement, then failing to meet
self-predication cannot make sense of failing the paradigm requirement. So, not only would this interpretation fail to make sense of the
context of the passage, i.e. Socrates request for a standard or paradigm
by which to judge pious actions, it risks committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent! I suggest we abandon the self-predication approach
to interpreting this passage.
On my reading, we neednt look outside the argument to any other
passages because premise (2) furnishes us with the implication that
there is nothing that is both pious and impious. This is in conflict with
an implication of the conclusion (7): something is both pious and impious. The objection to this reading, according to Dancy, is that Socrates
says that Euthyphro has not answered the question he asked, instead
of saying that Euthyphros premises are in conflict with one another.
My response to this is that what Socrates says here equally compatible
with reading Euthyphro 6e10-8a8 as I suggest. Thus, it cannot be used
to count against my interpretation. Socrates asks Euthyphro, what is
the pious? and a satisfactory answer would at least provide a standard
or paradigm by which to judge pious things, since this is the context
in which the dialogue develops. Since Euthyphros response generates
contradictory premises, then Euthyphro has not answered his question
insofar as a contradiction in Euthyphros statements cant together say
anything at all about the pious. So, Euthyphro fails to answer Socrates
question, which entails that he fails to identify a standard or paradigm
by which to judge pious things. This is exactly what we should expect,
given that a contradiction is no answer to any question. 23
University of Maine, Farmington
Department of Humanities
270 Main Street
Farmington, ME 04938
U.S.A.
elliot.welch@maine.edu

23

I wish to thank Nicholas D. Smith for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.

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Woodruff, Paul. 1982. Plato: Hippias Major. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

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