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RAFAEL DE CLERCQ

Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic


Properties

In this paper I begin by arguing that aesthetic


terms cannot be used as metaphors and I end by
arguing that the concept of an aesthetic property
is analyzable in nonaesthetic terms. The beginning and the end of the paper are connected by a
complex reasoning that can be summarized as
follows: aesthetic terms cannot be used metaphorically because their applicability is never
restricted to a particular category of objects
(Section I); if the applicability of aesthetic
terms is never restricted to a particular category
of objects then a fortiori it is never restricted to
a category of nonvisual objects; if the applicability of aesthetic terms is never restricted to a
category of nonvisual objects, then all aesthetic
terms are applicable to visual objects (Section II);
if all aesthetic terms are applicable to visual
objects, then all aesthetic properties can be
exemplified by such objects; finally, if all aesthetic properties can be exemplified by visual
objects, then for the purpose of analyzing the
concept of an aesthetic property it suffices to
analyze the concept of a visual aesthetic property (Section III).
In arguing for the ultimate conclusion of the
paperthat the concept of an aesthetic property
is fully analyzable in nonaesthetic termsreference is made to an earlier paper, The Concept
of an Aesthetic Property, in which the concept
of a visual aesthetic property was analyzed in
nonaesthetic terms.1 However, understanding
the present paper does not require familiarity
with the previous one. Moreover, until the final
conclusion is reached, nothing hinges on
whether one is prepared to accept the claims
made in that earlier paper.

It may appear that the visual/nonvisual


distinction plays a central role in my argument.
However, as will become clear, an analogous
distinction in terms of a different sense modality (for example, auditory/nonauditory) could
have served as well and perhaps all reference to
particular sense modalities could have been
avoided, as Section IV suggests. Thus, the present
paper is only superficially scopocentric.

Aesthetic terms have at least one striking


feature in common and that is their resistance to
metaphorical usage. In other words, aesthetic
terms cannot be turned into metaphors.2 For
instance, it makes no sense to say that something is beautiful metaphorically speaking.
Likewise, it does not make sense to say that
something is metaphorically elegant, metaphorically harmonious, or metaphorically sublime.
The question is, of course, why this is so. At
a superficial level, the following explanation
suggests itself. Aesthetic terms do not have a
particular area of application associated with
them. There is not a particular kind of object
to which they are to be applied. As a result,
it is not possible to commit something like a
category mistake with respect to such terms.
By contrast, terms for animal species such as
elephant and crocodile can be applied only
within the animal kingdom: to apply them
outside this area is to commit a category
mistake (which may of course result in a
metaphor). This explanation is supported by the

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:1 Winter 2005

28
fact that aesthetic terms share their resistance to
metaphorical transference with other universally applicable terms such as the predicate
interesting and the verb to exist. (Nothing
can be said to exist metaphorically speaking.)
Of course, some aesthetic terms may already
be metaphors. The predicate balanced may be
a case in point. However, this does not contradict the suggested explanation since balanced
may be universally applicable when used
metaphorically. Moreover, the metaphorical
nature of some aesthetic terms may provide an
additional explanation of their resistance to
metaphorical usage. It seems that to apply a
metaphor metaphorically just is to apply a metaphor. At first sight, there seems to be no such
thing as a second-order metaphor.
Note that I am not saying that all metaphors
are category mistakes. In other words, I am not
saying that metaphorical usage always involves
substituting one domain of application for
another. This would be contradicted by such
metaphors as the brain is the heart of the nervous system. What I am claiming, though, is
that metaphorical usage always requires the
possibility of category mistake. Clearly, this
condition is satisfied in the case of heart because
we can say such things as investigators have
hit the heart of the criminal organization. However, if what I have said so far is right, then the
condition is not satisfied in the case of aesthetic
terms such as beautiful and sublime.
One might ask why universal applicability
orwhat comes to the same thingthe impossibility of category mistakes explains resistance
to metaphorical usage. An obvious answer to
that question, it seems to me, is (1) that a terms
universal applicability deprives it of substantial
descriptive content and (2) that in the absence
of substantial descriptive content, there is nothingor at least too littleto serve as the paraphrasable core meaning of a metaphor. (And
metaphors always have such a core meaning.)3

II

In the previous section I argued that aesthetic


terms cannot be used metaphorically because
there is no category of objects to which their
application is restricted. Now, if there is no
category of objects to which their application is

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism


restricted, then a fortiori it is not restricted to a
category of nonvisual objects; therefore, any
aesthetic term is applicable to visual objects, if
applicable at all.
One might object to this reasoning by saying
that even if the class of aesthetic terms as a
whole has no restricted domain of application,
there may be subclasses within this class for
which there exist such domains. (Clearly, if this
objection is correct, then either aesthetic terms
can be used metaphorically or my explanation
of why they cannot is mistaken.) In support of
this objection one might cite the term elegant
because the applicability of this term is sometimes said to be restricted to entities exhibiting
line or movement. However, it is not clear to me
whether this is supposed to amount to a genuine
restriction, in the sense of limiting the application of the term elegant to a certain category
of objects.4 Line and movement can be found in
visual objects, auditory events, and even in nonperceptible entities such as intellectual or emotional progressions. Of course, they may not be
literally present in such cases butcrucially
that does not seem to prevent the term elegant
from being applicable. For instance, a line of
thought (an argumentative line) may be
elegant and yet it is never literally a line. In
fact, that is probably what makes the term
elegance universally applicable: because there
is no clear a priori restriction on the
metaphorical applicability of line and movement, there is no clear a priori restriction on
the literal applicability of elegant either (for
the literal applicability of elegant seems to
depend on the overall applicability of line and
movement).5 In sum, the term elegant is
probably not a counterexample to the claim that
aesthetic terms have an unrestricted domain of
application.
Similar things cannot be said about (the
aesthetic uses of) garish and gaudy. These
terms are used exclusively to characterize
combinations of colors or textiles, even though
it is difficult to see how they might apply metaphorically to other sorts of objects. However,
this does not show that the applicability of the
corresponding aesthetic concepts is restricted to
the visual. For our current concept of garishness
(that is, the concept associated with our current
use of the term garish) may be an impure,
hybrid concept containing both an aesthetic and

De Clercq Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties


a nonaesthetic (for example, purely visual)
component. To undermine my proposal one
would have to show that it is the aesthetic component that is responsible for the restriction of
the domain. If it is not the aesthetic component,
then aesthetic terms with more or less disjoint
domains of applicationsay, garish and
cacophonouscould express the same aesthetic
concept. (Somewhat like boar and man may
both express the concept of being male.)
But if garish and gaudy do not apply
universally, then what about my initial claim
that aesthetic terms apply universally? Well,
garish and gaudy should be considered as
semi-aesthetic terms because they do not
merely express aesthetic concepts. As such they
fall outside the scope of my claim. Nonetheless,
my claim would have to be true of a term
expressing the purely aesthetic essence of
garish and gaudy. Perhaps this essence is
expressed by (a certain use of) harsh and
indeed I do not see why this term could not be
used without category restrictions.
The foregoing does not imply that the
application of aesthetic terms is entirely unconstrainedclearly, aesthetic terms apply to some
objects and not to others. However, what it does
imply is that the application of aesthetic terms is
not restricted to a specific category of objects.
In a sense, then, there is no category of aesthetic
objects.
At this point it becomes important to say
something more about the notion of category
on which I have been relying. The relevant
notion is more or less equivalent to the notion
of a kind, and its equivalent at the level of
concepts or predicates is sometimes called a
sortal. More specifically, what I have in mind
are categories to which entities belong necessarily. In other words, if an entity falls under
the corresponding concept, then necessarily so.
Thus, the category of beautiful objects is no
category in the intended sense, in contrast with,
say, the category of animals. In any case, some
form of essentialism is presupposed throughout
this paper. Therefore, the additional specification that categories are based on natural similarities is unlikely to add something
objectionable. (Thus, the union of the following two sets is not a category in the intended
sense: the set of all prime numbers and the set
of all mammals.)

29

Now something like the following objection


is likely to be raised. Perhaps artworks have (at
least some of) their aesthetic properties essentially. If so, then the set of ugly artworks
might constitute a category in the intended
sense, and surely this category would be one
within which an aesthetic term such as beautiful
cannot even in principle be applied. Thus, there
seems to be an exception to the rule that
aesthetic terms are universally applicable.
In response to this objection, the relevant
notion of a category should be characterized in
a more precise manner. More specifically, one
should take into consideration that categories
stand in hierarchical relations to one another
and that ugly work of art and beautiful work
of art are same-level categories (if they are
categories at all). To follow this suggestion is
not necessarily to make an ad hoc move, since
no one will regard the attribution of beauty to an
ugly work of art as a category mistake, that is,
as an outright absurdity. In other words, the fact
that beautiful cannot apply to ugly works of
art should not be considered as a category-based
limitation on its applicability.6
One caveat. I do not wish to deny that some
entities may be difficult to characterize in
aesthetic terms. For instance, directions, intervals, subatomic particles, and physical magnitudes are not the sort of thingsif things they
arewe would be inclined to call sublime or
elegant. However, what is striking is that these
entities form a gerrymandered set and that the
complement of this setthe set of things that
are not directions, magnitudes, and so forth
seems equally gerrymandered. In other words,
the entities to which aesthetic terms apply do
not seem to form a delineated, unified, or selfstanding category. Therefore, it does not seem
possible to define a category-based limitation
on the applicability of aesthetic terms.
The adjective category-based also helps
underscore the fact we are not interested in
de facto (limitations of) applicability. It may be
that some aesthetic terms are as a matter of fact
applicable only to a certain category of entities.
This would be a factual or contingent limitation
on their use, whereas the intended kind of
limitation is principled or necessary. In other
words, it is a kind of limitation that arises independently of what sorts of entities are actually
found in the world.

30
III

In The Concept of an Aesthetic Property, the


concept of a visual aesthetic property was analyzed as follows.
A property P is an aesthetic property of visual objects
if and only if
(1) P is, at least in part, a value-property
(2) for any visual object O: perceiving that O has P
involves perceiving the shape and color(s) of O
but not vice versa.7

The above analysis is clearly noncircular and


when applied to examples it appears to deliver the
right results: functional properties such as being
easily visible are classified as nonaesthetic,
prototypical aesthetic properties such as being
beautiful are classified as aesthetic. In further
support of the analysis one could cite its explanatory value: the analysis seems to explain why certain theses have come to be regarded as truisms in
aesthetics. For example, the second condition
seems to explain why aestheticians have been
inclined to accept the Acquaintance Principle
and the Heresy of Paraphrase.8 In addition, the
first condition explains why aesthetic properties
are often considered to be value-grounding.9
Admittedly, the second condition is still
somewhat crudely formulated. For instance, a
black-and-white photo may conceal the actual
colors of a sculpture and yet need not prevent
one from seeing that the sculpture has certain
aesthetic qualities. Similarly, it is certainly
possible to perceive that an object has certain
aesthetic qualities while perceiving it from
behind a colored screen.10 However, I take it that
the point of the second condition is nonetheless
clear: to perceive that a visual object has a certain aesthetic quality one has to perceive at least
some of its basic visual features.
In any case, suppose that we accept the above
analysis along with the following (intuitively
plausible) thesis.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism


quent. Put otherwise, this consequent amounts to
the following claim: if P is an aesthetic property,
then P is an aesthetic property of visual objects.
The reverse claimif P is an aesthetic property of
visual objects, then P is an aesthetic propertyis
of course trivially true. Therefore, the following
equivalence should have been established by now.
For all properties P, P is an aesthetic property if and
only if P is an aesthetic property of visual objects.

Otherwise said, the class of aesthetic properties


is identical to the class of visual aesthetic properties. If this identity is accepted, then we can
turn the analysis outlined in The Concept of an
Aesthetic Property into a perfectly general analysis of the concept of an aesthetic property. The
analysis would be:
For all properties P, P is an aesthetic property if and
only if
(1) P is, at least in part, a value-property
(2) for any visual object O: perceiving that O has P
involves perceiving the shape and color(s) of O
but not vice versa.

This strategydefining the class of aesthetic


properties as a whole by reference to what
appears to be one of its subclasseshad already
been briefly considered in the original paper.
However, it was not adopted there because the
a priori argument was still lacking.11
For those who are not yet convinced by the a
priori argument (as outlined in the previous
sections), I would like to point out that there is
also significant a posteriori evidence for the
claim that all aesthetic properties are aesthetic
properties of visual objects. For all the aesthetic
properties that one could plausibly cite as central
or prototypical cases (for example, being beautiful, elegant, sublime, harmonious, handsome,
graceful) are as a matter of fact aesthetic properties of visual objects. That would be striking
coincidence unless the above claim expressed
something like an a priori truth.

If all aesthetic terms are applicable to visual objects,


then all aesthetic properties can be exemplified by
such objects.

IV

In the previous sections I provided a priori


evidence for the antecedent of this conditional and
thus, by transmission of warrant, for its conse-

The strategy outlined in the previous sections


may give the impression that, on my account,
vision occupies a privileged position in the

De Clercq Aesthetic Terms, Metaphor, and the Nature of Aesthetic Properties


sphere of the aesthetic. After all, the class of
aesthetic properties has been defined with
exclusive reference to this particular sense
modality. However, the impression is misleading, for a different sense modality could have
served just as well (after all, there are supposed
to be no category restrictions). What is more, it
is likely that all reference to particular sense
modalities can be avoided. Consider, for
example, the following generalizing strategy.
1. A property P is an aesthetic property if and only if it
is an aesthetic property of perceptual objects.
2. A property P is an aesthetic property of perceptual
objects if and only if
a. P is, at least in part, a value-property
b. for any perceptual object O: perceiving that O
has P involves perceiving the basic perceptual
features of O but not vice versa.

Compared with the previous one, this strategy


has two clear advantages. First, this strategy is
more elegant (!) because it does not give the
appearance of privileging a particular sense
modality (for example, vision). Second, it is
more likely to be adopted because the extra
assumption it needs (to support the first part) is
weaker than the one needed for the first strategy.
(Recall that the first strategy required that all
aesthetic terms be applicable to visual objects,
whereas this strategy only requires that all aesthetic terms be applicable to perceptual objects.)
However, apart from possible worries about
the somewhat obscure notion of a basic perceptual featureHow is this notion to be defined
for all actual and possible sense modalities?the
alternative strategy may not offer all the argumentative benefits it promises. After all, to support the
extra assumption (all aesthetic terms are applicable to perceptual objects) one would probably
need to appeal to the same argument as the one
outlined in this paper. Thus, it seems that the
weakness of the assumption cannot be cashed
in at an argumentative level (which is normally
part of what makes weak assumptions attractive).

In this paper I argued as follows: aesthetic terms


cannot be applied metaphorically because they
are universally applicable; if aesthetic terms are

31

universally applicable, then (roughly speaking)


there is no aesthetic property that only certain
objects can have; if (again, roughly speaking)
there is no aesthetic property that only certain
objects can have, then there is no aesthetic
property that only nonvisual objects can have;
finally, if there is no aesthetic property that only
nonvisual objects can have, then all aesthetic
properties are (also) aesthetic properties of visual objects.
This conclusion matters because it allows one
to demarcate the class of aesthetic properties as
a whole by means of an analysis, given in a
different paper, for visual aesthetic property
(or perceptual aesthetic property if one prefers
the alternative strategy).12
RAFAEL DE CLERCQ

Institute of Philosophy
University of Leuven
B-3000 Leuven
Belgium
INTERNET:

rafael.declercq@hiw.kuleuven.ac.be

1. Rafael De Clercq, The Concept of an Aesthetic


Property, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60
(2002): 167176.
2. In searching for counterexamples the reader should be
careful to distinguish metaphoric from idiomatic and even
ironic uses of terms (to name just two rivaling categories). For
more on the idiomatic/metaphoric distinction, see, for
example, Richard Moran, Metaphor in A Companion to the
Philosophy of Language, ed. Bob Hale and Crispin Wright
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 249250. For more on the
ironic/metaphoric distinction, see, for example, Ted Cohen,
Metaphor in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold
Levinson (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 369370.
3. For a convincing defense of this view, see Jerrold
Levinson, Whos Afraid of a Paraphrase? Theoria 67
(2001): 723.
4. The notion of a category will be further elucidated in
due course.
5. By speaking of the literal applicability of the term
elegant I do not mean to suggest that the term is also
metaphorically applicable.
6. It may have occurred to the reader that I have concentrated on categories of objects. However, the argument
could also be stated in terms of events, states of affairs,
ways, configurations, and so forth. It will always turn out
that the applicability of aesthetic terms is never restricted to
a category of nonvisual entities.
7. De Clercq, The Concept of an Aesthetic Property,
p. 170.
8. See The Concept of an Aesthetic Property, pp. 172173.
Note that the acceptability of the analysis is independent of
the truth of these alleged truisms. The analysis merely

32
explains why they have come to be regarded as truisms. For
recent doubts concerning the Acquaintance Principle, see
Malcolm Budd, The Acquaintance Principle, The British
Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 386392, and Paisley
Livingston, On an Apparent Truism in Aesthetics, The
British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 260278.
9. See the references to Monroe Beardsley and Alan
Goldman in note 28 of The Concept of an Aesthetic
Property, p. 176. In addition, see note 1 of Jerrold
Levinson, Aesthetic Supervenience in Jerrold Levinson,
Music, Art, and Metaphysics (Cornell University Press,
1990), pp. 134135.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism


10. Compare note 7, De Clercq, The Concept of an
Aesthetic Property, p. 175.
11. Compare Another way to generalize the account
would be to claim that all aesthetic properties are also aesthetic properties of visual objects, so that, when one has
defined the latter, one has also defined the former. I do not
see, however, how this claim could be argued for on an a
priori basis (De Clercq, The Concept of an Aesthetic
Property, p. 173).
12. Thanks to Malcolm Budd, Leon Horsten, Jerrold
Levinson, Hans Maes, and the editor of this journal for
helpful comments and/or discussion.

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