Automated Election System:

the AES Watch STAR Card

Updated as of January 26, 2010

 AES Watch Conveners
UP Alumni Association (UPAA); Center for People Empowerment in
Governance (CenPEG); National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA-CBCP),
Bishop Broderick Pabillo (CBCP) and Bishop Deogracias Yniguez (CBCP and
Ecumenical Bishops Forum / EBF); National Council of Churches in the
Philippines (NCCP); Dr. Reena Estuar, chair of AdMU Dept. of Information
Communications System; Dr. Jaime Caro, UP computer science & President,
Computing Society of the Philippines (CSP); Dr. Rachel Roxas, DLSU College
of Computer Studies; Computer Professionals Union (CPU); Association of
Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP); Association of Schools
of Public Administrators (ASPAP); Philippine Computer Emergency Response
Team (PhCERT); Transparency International (IT-Philippines); National Union of
Students of the Philippines (NUSP); Engr. Rodolfo “Jun” Lozada; Health
Alliance for Democracy (HEAD); Senior Catholic Citizens’ Organization;
Transparentelections.org; CCM; Coordinating Council for People’s Development
(CPDG); Solidarity Philippines; Pagbabago (Movement for Social Change);
Council for Health & Development (CHD); Movement for Good Governance
(MGG); and others.
 AES Watch STAR Card
v AES Watch is a network of concerned groups and
individuals monitoring the poll automation preparations.
v AES Watch uses the System Trustworthiness,
Accountability, and Readiness Scorecard (STAR Card)
to assess the readiness and trustworthiness of the AES.
v The STAR Card assesses 20 items of concern based on
available facts.
v Each item is rated:
Ø PASS
Ø WARNING
Ø DANGER
Ø FAIL
 Categories of Concern
v The 20 items of concern in the STAR Card are
grouped into 4 categories:
A. Setting up of the AES
Ø Will the AES be ready for full implementation by May 10?
B. Internal Systems and Trustworthiness
Ø Will the AES have the necessary safeguards to prevent fraud?
C. Personnel Training and Voters’ Education
Ø Will the teachers and the voters know fully what to do on May 10?
D. Contingency Plans
Ø Will all concerned know what to do when things go wrong?

The country cannot afford a failure of elections!

 A. Setting Up of the AES
1. Timely delivery of hardware and software
components to Comelec
2. Quality of machines
3. Technology certification
4. Availability of transmission facilities
5. Deployment of machines
6. Physical security of machines
7. Precinct-specific ballots
8. Resource inventory at the voting centers
9. Adequate General Instructions
Will the AES be ready for full implementation by May 10?
 A. Setting up
1. Timely Delivery of AES Components
vWill all components (software & hardware) of the AES
be delivered on time?
vHas the supply of ballot boxes been contracted?
vIndividual configuration, testing, and certification of the
machines can be a long and tedious process.
vDelayed delivery of PCOS: only 32,000 of the 82,200
machines are with Comelec now.
vComplete delivery of PCOS expected by Feb 21.
vNo update seen on the supply of ballot boxes.
vRating: DANGER
 A. Setting up
2. Quality of Machines
vWill quality assurance tests be completed in time to
meet other requirements dependent on such tests?
vPassing the tests needed for technology certification
by Feb 10 (or 3 months before election day).
vActual case as reported in the papers: Out of 600
ballots fed in a test, only 30 were read properly.
vComelec admitted lack of manpower for testing.
vRating: DANGER
 A. Setting up
3. Technology Certification
v Will the technology certification be completed by Feb
10, the deadline set by AES Law?
v Comelec reports that SysTest Labs of Colorado was
contracted for the certification in Oct 2009.
v Comelec claims deadline will be met but no detailed
progress report has been disclosed.
v What arrangements have been made to assure all
stakeholders that the SysTest certified source code is
the one used for the programs actually installed in each
of the PCOS machines?
v No arrangements for this have been reported yet.
v Rating: WARNING
 A. Setting up
4. Availability of Transmission Facilities
v Are electronic transmission facilities available at all
clustered precincts? Has contracts been signed with the
telcos? Has provisions been made for transmission in
areas not covered by the telcos?
v There is no functional geographic information system on
the location and adequacy of the needed facilities
throughout the country.
v Site survey by Smartmatic-TIM 93% done: 64% of
country has connectivity and 32% none.
v No update reported on needed contractual arrangements.
v Rating: DANGER
(Former rating: WARNING)
 A. Setting up
5. Deployment of Machines
vHas Comelec prepared a plan that ensures
problem-free deployment of machines? Has a
contract been signed with an established logistics
company?
vPCOS machines are precinct specific. Errors in
delivery can upset AES implementation.
vBallot boxes are expected to be quite bulky.
vNo update reported on the logistics arrangements.
vRating: WARNING
 A. Setting up
6. Physical Security of Machines
vAre there adequate plans for ensuring all machines,
including the CF cards, are protected from theft or
tampering in their assigned locations?
vThe General Instructions specifies that political
parties are free to send their poll watchers to secure
the machines themselves but there is no clear
agreement yet as to how security is going to be done.
vRating: WARNING
 A. Setting up
7. Precinct-Specific Ballots
v Will the ballots with pre-printed names of candidates
for specific localities be ready in time? What are the
logistics arrangements for deployment of ballots?
v More than 1,600 ballot faces; fixed number of
ballots per clustered precinct; ballot packs are thus
precinct specific.
v List of qualified candidates not yet finalized.
v The scheduled ballot printing on Jan.25 postponed
for next week.
v No update reported on logistics arrangements.
v Rating: WARNING
 A. Setting up
8. Resource Inventory at Voting Centers
vAre all the necessary resources available
at each of the voting centers, including:
ØPower supply and periods of operation?
ØIT-capable personnel for the BEIs and BOCs?
ØTransmission facilities?
vThe site survey being conducted covers
only transmission; no mention on critical
facilities such as power and IT-enabled
BEI personnel.
vRating: WARNING
 A. Setting up
9. Adequate General Instructions
vAre adequate General Instructions (GI) for the
conduct of automated elections ready?
vGIs for BEIs on the Voting, Counting, and
Transmission of election results issued.
vDrafts of GI for the Consolidation, Transmission,
and Canvassing of Votes not finalized.
vNo response from Comelec about refinements of
the GI as suggested by stakeholders, e.g., security
of private keys, canvassing, disposition of ballots
rejected by the PCOS, etc.
vRating: DANGER
 B. Internal Systems
& Trustworthiness of Results
10. Source code
11. Verifiability of voting and
results at all levels of canvassing
12. Secured transmission of election
results
13. Initialization of machines
14. Manual audit of vote counts
Will the AES have the necessary safeguards
to prevent fraud?
 B. Internal Systems & Trustworthiness of Results
10. Source Code
vWas the source code made available to interested
groups for review as mandated by the AES Law?
vNo.
vWhile the source code is said to be released on Feb 10,
it is already too late to conduct a serious independent
review as provided for in Sec 12 of RA 9369.
vReliability and trustworthiness of the system put in
doubt.
vRating: FAIL
Source code: human-readable set of computer program
instructions used to specify the internal actions to be performed
by the voting & canvassing machines.
 B. Internal Systems & Trustworthiness of Results
11. Verifiability of Voting and Results
vWill voter be able to verify if machine has registered
his chosen candidates as required by the AES Law?
vNo, function available in machine but disabled.
vWill canvassers and watchers be able to easily verify
if the right election results are the ones transmitted to
the different levels of canvassing?
vNo clear provision on this as GI on canvassing has not
been released yet.
vRating: DANGER
 B. Internal Systems & Trustworthiness of Results
12. Secured Transmission of Results
vWill the teachers themselves individually
generate their password, hold it for
safekeeping, and use it for signing?
vRules silent about a lot of things re procedures/
mechanics for making transmissions secure.
vRating: WARNING
 B. Internal Systems & Trustworthiness of Results
13. Initialization of Machines
vWill the machines be required to show that there
are no votes or ballot images stored in the machine
memory prior to voting?
vNo provision for this. Comelec reply to AES
Watch did not satisfactorily address the concern on
pre-stored entries.
vRating: WARNING
 B. Internal Systems & Trustworthiness of Results
14. Manual Audit of Vote Counts
vWill the random manual audit be done for a
sufficient number of precincts, by independent
auditors, and before proclamation?
vSample size for the audit of one precinct per
congressional district is low. Will not cover each
and every municipality.
vAudit will be done by the Random Manual Audit
Committee (RMAC) whose members are from
PPCRV which is part of the Comelec Advisory
Council (CAC).
vRating: WARNING
 C. Personnel Training
& Voters’ Education
15. Training of technical
personnel and members
of the BEI and BOC
16. Stakeholder education
and training
17. Precinct assignment of
voters
Will the teachers and the voters know fully
what to do on May 10?
 C. Personnel Training & Voters Education
15. Training of Technical Personnel
v Will Comelec be able to train the teachers and other election personnel in
time for the elections on both normal and contigency operations of the
AES? Where are the training plans and materials? Who and how many will
be the trainors?
v AES Law requires BEIs/BOCs to each have an IT-capable person.
v Training for 230,000 teachers (BEI) to start March 1 instead of the original
Jan. 20, about 2 months shorter time for training and certification. 76,340
teachers must be DOST certified.
v No indication if the continuity plan is covered in the training of teachers.
v Reports show growing fear among teachers that this delay will leave them
inadequately trained in operating the machine.
v Will Smartmatic-TIM be able to recruit 45,000 competent technicians
needed on election day? From where and how?
v No report on this.
v Rating: DANGER
 C. Personnel Training & Voters Education
16. Stakeholder Education & Training
v Will the voters have sufficient training and education on the AES in
time for the elections?
v Section 26 of RA9369 requires the Comelec, not later than 6 months
before election, to undertake widespread stakeholder education and
training.
v Pulse Asia's October 2009 Nationwide Survey: 60% of Filipinos have
little or almost no knowledge at all of the AES.
v SWS October 24-27, 2009 National Survey: half (49%) of adults
sense that people power will happen if the 2010 elections fail; 47%
fear the counting machines are vulnerable to sabotage; and only 44%
trust the COMELEC to ensure the counting machines will not be
sabotaged.
v Voter education is an enormous task.
v No detailed plans reported for reaching out to rural and other remote
areas of the country.
v Rating: DANGER
 C. Personnel Training & Voters Education
17. Precinct Assignment of Voters
vWill voters know ahead of time which clustered
precinct to go to so as to avoid confusion and
delays on election day ?
vThe AES involves clustering of precincts.
Majority of voters will likely have to go to new
polling places.
vNo update reported on the preparation of voters
list for each of the clustered precincts and on the
plan for informing voters of their new precinct
assignments.
vRating: DANGER
 D. Contingency Plans
18. Continuity plan
19. Electoral protest mechanism
20. Alternative election system
in some parts of the contry
Will the Comelec and all concerned know
what to do when things go wrong?
 D. Contingency Plans
18. Continuity Plan
v Is Comelec ready with an adequate continuity plan that covers
all foreseeable eventualities?
v RA9369 requires the development, provisioning, and
operationalization of a continuity plan to cover risks to the
AES at all points in the process such that a failure of elections,
whether at voting, counting or consolidation, may be avoided.
v The continuity plan shown by Comelec so far appears to be
inadequate. Other eventualities such as natural disasters, civil
disturbance, failure of transmission facilities, hardware or
software failure at canvassing are not covered.
v Rating: DANGER
 D. Contingency Plans
19. Electoral Protest Mechanism
vHas Comelec identified the grounds for electoral
protests under the AES and defined the appropriate
process for addressing and resolving such protests?
vNo specific legal provisions available for AES-
based protests (e.g., differences between machine
and visual appreciation of ballot shading,
discrepancies in printed and transmitted results,
appeal for recount, etc.)
vNo information from Comelec yet.
vRating: WARNING
 D. Contingency Plans
20. Alternative Election System
vAre preparations being undertaken to implement a
manual election system if full automation is no longer
realistic? How will this be done: manual counting,
transmission, and canvassing? With traditional ballots
or pre-printed ballots?
vNo guidelines or procedures have been announced yet
for the conduct of manual elections where needed.
vNo clear criteria/ trigger points have been defined nor
deadline set yet for determining whether to manual
and in which localities.
vRating: DANGER
 STAR Card Assessment of the AES
As of Jan 15 As of Jan 26
PASS None None
WARNING 11 10
DANGER 8 9
FAIL 1 1

vOverall the AES is in the DANGER zone.

vReadiness of the AES is at risk due to the
pattern of delays and changes in the calendar.
vTrustworthiness of the AES is in question as
needed system safeguards are not yet in place.