CRUZ VS.

COA
G.R. No. 138489 November 29, 2001
FACTS: Twenty petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. On September 19, 1997, the Commission on Audit issued
Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/ auditors/ team leaders of the national
government agencies and government owned and controlled corporations which have effected
payment of any form of additional compensation or renumeration to cabinet secretaries, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to:
a.) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or renumeration given
to and received by the concerned officials, and
b.) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc
Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and AntiGraft League of the Philippines, Inc. et. al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et. al., promulgated
on February 22, 1991.

The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became
final and executory on August 19, 1991 declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional
insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in
addition to their primary offices and to receive compensations therefor.
Accordingly on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and
per diems amounting to P276,600.00 of "Cabinet members who were ex- officio members of the
National Housing Authority Board of Directors and/ or their respective alternates who actually
received the payments."
Petitioner through then Chairman dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the
Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit on these following grounds:

a.) that the SC Decision in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the Philippines; was clarified
in the resolution of the Court en banc that the constitutional ban against multiple positions
applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. It does not cover
appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary;
and
b.) The National Housing Authority Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant
Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-381 denying petitioners' appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not COA erred in disallowing compensation in favor of NHA Board Members

RULING: No. Under Sec. 7 of P.D. 757 or the law in creating NHA, the persons mandated by
law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: 1. Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, 2. the Director- General of the National Economic and
Development Authority 3.) The Secretary of Finance 4.) the Secretary of Labor 5.) the Secretary
of Industry 6.) the Executive Secretary and 7.) the General Manager of the NHA.
While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are "alternates" of the said
officers, "whose acts shall be considered as acts of the principals".
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.
The Court, in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the Philippines interpreted in Sec. 13 to
mean that the prohibition in holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed as applying to
posts occupied by Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials'
office.
It should be obvious that, if say, Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board
as an ex- offficio member, he is actually in legal contemplation performing the primary function
of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation whether be in the form of per diemm or an honorarium or an allowance or some
other such euphemism. Such additional prohibition is prohibited in the Constitution.
In rendering its challenged decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion. Petition
DISMISSED in favor of the respondents.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the nonviolent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar.
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt and plunder of nation by
Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in
the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right
to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.
ISSUE: Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under
scope of the Executive are concerned.
DECISION: Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope
of the executive power.
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section
1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the

laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secs. 1423). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power
to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on
the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

PIMENTEL VS. ERMITA

472 SCRA 587 Political Law Commission on Appointment Ad Interim Appointments vs

Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Law on Public Officers Modes and Kinds of Appointment
FACTS: While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to

issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim
appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim
appointments this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is
the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter
ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress,
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her
alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the
president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.

ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY G.R. NO. 132601 OCTOBER 12, 1998

Per Curiam
FACTS:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty
for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both
motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under
the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due
process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of
the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A.
No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas
chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or
impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to
promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the
Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear
as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They
alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the
petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
ISSUES:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
HELD:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in
administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of
execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection
inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes
not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time
and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As
petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court
which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to
the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.
8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year
nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor
wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications
in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar
as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered
are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein
execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
without any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that
all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance
of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the
death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of
death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain
or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason,
is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only
be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings
of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death
of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration
of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see
that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not
the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the

exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws
that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of
the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed
to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date
of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age.
In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists
that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.
No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in
petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. NO. 132601, JANUARY 19, 1999

FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the
issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still
has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By
the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction.
It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene
and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power
of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has
in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the
Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death
convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of
insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power.
It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the
temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of
death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3
branches of the government.

CONSTANTINO VS. CUISIA

Qualified Political Agency when not applied

FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bondconversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such
power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They
argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires
that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces
the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind
the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president
may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be
onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct
subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision
of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the

process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the
required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign
debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on
a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting
countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often
than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents is not
unconstitutional.

Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval
or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of
the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

GUDANI VS. SENGA

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has
the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-

advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is

similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.