Is Theism Compatible With Gratitutious Evil by Daniel and Frances Howard-Synder

North American Philosophical Publications
Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?

Author(s): Daniel Howard-Snyder and Frances Howard-Snyder
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 115-130
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American
Philosophical
Quarterly
Volume 36, Number 2, April 1999
IS THEISM COMPATIBLE WITH

GRATUITOUS
EVIL?
Daniel
A he most widely
taught and frequently
discussed
version
is known
as the argument
Its most
evils.
William
Rowe.
of the argument
and Frances
of the "problem
from
of evil"
gratuitous
is
representative
popular
His most
famous
version
Howard-Snyder
Now, on the face of it, the idea that God

evil is absurd.
may well permit gratuitous
can
After
all, if God
get what He wants
without
1. There exist
instances of intense suffering

could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or per?
mitting some evil equally bad or worse.
that God
He'd
evil equally
3. So,
God
does
good
or
permitting
of Rowe
exist.1
shall
thereby
mitting
Premise
is
it. No
incompatibility
unpacking
to call any being?not
being?morally
that
writes
Wykstra
truth
conceptual
itmeans
omniscient
losing some greater good or per?

some evil equally
bad or worse.
1 is the factual
claim
that there
good.
claim]
part
of
just any
. . .
[De?
it] is tantamount to saying that God

allow some intense suffering either
because he enjoys the sight of occasional
suffering for its own sake, or because he is
nying
could
of gratuitous
instances
and
evil,
2 is Rowe
's incompatibility
claim
premise
that God would not permit gratuitous
evil.
Critics mainly
the
In
factual
claim.
target
prospects
...
what
are
this essay,
than Stephen
The heart of [Rowe's
of intense
say that an instance
a
is
evil
gratuitous
suffering
just in case
God
could
have
it without
prevented
We
to do anything
about
that Rowe
writes:
shared by both the

principles,
principles
ists and nontheists"
is not
(336). And Rowe
in this assessment.
alone
No
less a critic
some
bad or worse.
not
horror
"This
then,
not too distant from
(or something
premise
it) is . . .held in common
by many atheists
. . .
seems
and nontheists.
to express
a
[It]
belief
that accords with our basic moral
prevent the occurrence of any

intense suffering He could, unless He
could not do so without
thereby losing
greater
be unable
wonder,
2. God would
some
some particular
on
(or anything
bad), why
comparably
earth would He permit it? It's not as though
come as a surprise to Him, or that
it would
like this:
goes
permitting
indifferent to it. It is hard to see how such a

being could be meaningfully
praised as a
our
of
God,
good
worthy
worship, our obe?
we begin to assess the

however,
of denying
the incompatibility
dience,
and?not
least?our
trust.
I take
to be a basic conceptual
truth deserving
sent by theists and nontheists alike.2
claim.
115
this
as?
116/ AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

Terence
And
Penelhum
that the
concludes
set by Christian
belief?
priorities
on
stress
"fundamental
certain
the
namely,
and states of mind"?imply
relationships
moral
that a Christian,
An
to be an evil,
it because
the
hold
[must]
existence or possibility of it, or of something
equally bad, is a necessary condition of some
or state of mind. To [say
such relationship
otherwise] would be to admit a proposition
he admits
that God allows
with Christian
inconsistent
theism.3
sec?
And many others recommend
Rowe's
as a necessary
ond premise
truth. So it
seems that expert opinion
and the light of
on the verdict
that
converge
to query whether
theism
is incompatible
un?
with gratuitous
evil is a monumentally
reason
promising
project. Who would dare to try?
as
turns out, three people: Michael
it
Well,
William
and Peter van
Peterson,
Hasker,
we assess
In what
follows,
Inwagen.
efforts of the first two and commend
the
the
third.4
Before
regarding
Clarifications
some clarifications
proceeding,
Rowe's
claim are
incompatibility
incompatibility
evil"
"gratuitous
use
Philosophers
evil" in different
the
claim
and
term
briefly
our use of the term
First, and foremost,
is fixed by Rowe's
claim.
incompatibility
Thus,
instance
is gratuitous
=df God
could have prevented it without thereby los?
some
ing some greater good or permitting
evil equally
of evil
bad or worse.
We
in this way
proceed
has
been
raised
question
peatedly
with
because
explicitly
to
respect
our
is gratuitous
theism.
=df
it is in?
ism.
our title question

these definitions,
has
a brief, unrefutable,
an?
and uninteresting
swer:
"No." On Rowe's
of
conception
an
it
is
evil,
however,
open ques?
gratuitous
tion whether
evil is incompatible
gratuitous
On
with
theism.
of gratuitous
Third, Rowe's
conception
evil is not captured by this definition:
An
instance of evil is gratuitous =df it is not

for the occurrence
of any greater
necessary
or
the
of
any equally bad or
good
prevention
worse
To
evil.
see
this point,
suppose
so that we have
that God
evil
it within
per?
our
a significant
to make
to
difference
power
this good
how things go, and suppose
is
to justify
that permission.
great enough
in question,
Then, given the definition
any
title
and re?
Rowe's
instance
of evil God
is gra?
permits
can
tuitous?for
how things go
be up to us
even
if there is no evil because,
say, we
"gratuitous
ways. To avoid confusion,
clarify how we will use it.
we
with
An instance of evil is gratuitous =df it has

some feature which is incompatible with the?
actual
in order.
1.1 Rowe's
instance of evil
compatible
mits
1. Preliminary
An
of these ways:
what
faced with
moral
claim. We
shall call this
incompatibility
Rowe's
of
evil.
conception
gratuitous
we
use
not
term
do
the
in either
Second,
the good. By way of

always
freely choose
actual
instance
of evil God
contrast,
any
it within
permits for the sake of our having
our power to make a significant
difference
on Rowe's
is not gratuitous
conception?
for
that good would

those evils had been
ing comparably
1.2 Rowe's
not have
and noth?
prevented
bad had been permitted.
incompatibility
consequentialism
Rowe's
incompatibility
presuppose
ible with
if
occurred
claim
claim
consequentialism.
nonconsequentialist
and
does
not
It is compat?
moral
ISTHEISMCOMPATIBLEWITH GRATUITOUSEVIL? / 117

as
it can be viewed
for example,
theories;
a prima facie
More
duty of beneficence.5
even
if no
however,
importantly,
stance
that it
theory implies
for God to permit
nonconsequentialist
is morally
wrong
of
He
an in?
could
have
suffering
some
without
prevented
thereby
losing
or
some
evil
greater
good
permitting
an
or
bad
it
is
that
worse,
equally
arguable
such
prevent
supererogatorily
1.3 Rowe's
God
good
unsurpassably
incompatibility
the best possible
ibility claim
is implausible
that God must
entails
such a way
and
incompat?
because
correctable
Alston
conditions
for their flourishing.

necessary
So long as He prevented
any intense gold?
fish suffering
that wasn't
related
properly
to greater
parable
Rowe's
it
in
minor
says:
There are more
For
gument.
balance more
ate the best possible
actual
that
evaluative
level.
gument
like
starting
gate.6
comes
...
up
On
There
are two mistakes
never
confuse
some
these
never
Rowe's
create
would
to
gets
minimal
out
ar?
of
the
nature, create
some minimal
evaluative
by virtue of His
that comes up to
level. Rowe's
claim expresses
the latter
incompatibility
not
the
former.
the incom?
idea,
Second,
claim does not entail
that God
patibility
would
or must
For were
God
create
the best world He
to abide
by
that claim,
can.
He
might well refrain from creating

anything
at all, in which case a virtually empty world
would
not be as
that would
result, a world
world
on
contains
world.7
By
How
that could
permitted,
might
not
obtain
namely
this result
Rowe's
simply modifying
the
be
in?
compatibility claim like this:

2
God would,
by virtue of His nature, create
the best possible
universe with the irresist?
would,
a universe
greater
good
that evil were
avoided?
an
views
the actual
good than evil, and so for any

of evil that you please,
there is
instance
some
God
would
prevent
the occurrence
of
any
intense suffering He could, unless He

could not do so without thereby leaving
off than they otherwise
things worse
here. First, we must

the contentious
claim
that
ible idea that God
premise.
state of affairs G
if the conjunctive
only
and E is a good state of affairs. Then we
must deny the factual claim of Rowe's
ar?
unless
a universe
incompatibility
in Rowe's
claim.
incompatibility
we
For example,
define
the key
suppose
term "greater good"
like this: a good G is
than an instance
of evil E if and
greater
to Rowe's
radical objections
I
think
claim].
[incompatiblity
particularly
of those who question or deny the principle
that God would, by virtue of His nature, cre?
universe,
of com?
goods or the prevention
not run afoul of
evils, He would
licities
the world
some
a world
create
might
inhabited only by happy goldfish and the
claim and
incompatibility
some minor
infelicities
Several people have noticed minor
infe?
govern
that it is the best, or among the
He could bring about. For ex?
best, worlds
ample, after citing
infelicities, William
create. Al?
could
1.4 Rowe's
suffering.
world
say that Rowe's
God
ternatively,
He
would
claim
creating
Some critics
as some worlds
good
would
This
new
avoids
be.
the objection
and
incurs
no
ones.8
We mention
this objection
in order to il?
the sort of thing that we are not up
we have no principled
to here. While
com?
lustrate
such nitpickiness,
against
we
are much
will
examine
objections
plaint
the
more
no tinkering
if they work,
fundamental;
will help.
We now turn to the first argument
for the
compatibility
of God
and gratuitous
evil.
118 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

suppose we cannot have a significant
say
about the sorts of persons we become
and
we main?
about the sorts of relationships
on Rowe's
2. Peterson
Claim
Incompatibility
we
tain unless
stated
argument
two decades, Michael
Peterson
2.1 Peterson's
have
about
One
weigh
order
for those
fications
pose that if God

all of the "most
the compatibility
is the
Here
for
argued
evil.
gratuitous
of his argument:
has
of God
and
version
latest
line of argument
for gratuitous
evil
within a theistic universe traces out the rami?
of significant
free will. Plantinga
has argued that evil is possible
in a theistic
universe
that
contains
morally
free
creatures.
can extend
this point, saying that if the

of
free
choices
available to free crea?
range
tures is to be really significant
rather than
trivial, then creatures must be capable of the
highest goods as well as the most terrible
We
to limit the possibility of very

serious evils is to limit the range of free
choice. It would seem that significant free?
to bring about
the ability
dom involves
evils. For God
evils, a risk inherent in

utterly meaningless
God's program for humanity. To preserve the
value of human freedom and its potential
of
goods, God must allow the possibility
horrible evils. The actuality of many evils is
not
to
necessary
any
greater
such
goods;
goods could have existed without such evils

being actual. But the possibility of these evils
is necessary
to
the
preservation
of
signifi?
cant free will. If God narrows the scope of

the possi?
free choice in order to eliminate
bility of such evils, the moral enterprise
robbed of much of its importance.
is
then
the critic's
assumption?[notably
Rowe's, whom Peterson explicitly cites]
God would not allow gratuitous evil?can
that
be
rejected.9
What
should we make
of Peterson's
for "gratuitous
model
enterprise"
a theistic universe"?
within
"moral
evil
an incompatibilist
of
Suppose
conception
human freedom
fits best with theism; and
to
that must
the evil
"horrible"
goods
kinds
be permitted
in
to obtain;
and sup?
systematically
prevented
and
terrible,"
"serious,"
in fact bring
of evil we
be
about, the scope of our freedom would
to trivial matters
restricted
and we would
not have
a significant
say about who we
we relate to others;
finally,
God has given us this moral
free?
are and how

suppose
dom and
and let us
deep
responsibility
that
humans
have
blown
it, badly.
suppose
to Peterson,
"this way
of
According
out
drawing
theism"
has
the implications
the consequence
claim "can be
compatibility
he right? In the model,
does
God must permit gratuitous
2.2 Why Peterson's

argument
in the model
Sure enough,
instances
of evil which
of Christian
that the
in?
Is
rejected."
it follow
that
evil?
fails
there will
are themselves
be
un?
for moral
and those
freedom
necessary
that
moral
freedom.
But does
require
goods
is unneces?
it follow
that their permission
sary
If this way of drawing out the implications

of Christian
theism is essentially
correct,
our power
"the most
terrible evils";
and
our
the
of
suppose
good
being responsible
in these ways and the good of the freedom
out?
such responsibility
requires
together
bring
For
it within
and its potential

freedom
at all. Thus,
instances
of evil
sake
of
for the
moral
freedom
for moral
goods?
Not
permitted
and its potential
tuitous
would
not be gra?
goods would
sense of the term?they
such that "God could have
in Rowe's
not be
them without
thereby
losing
prevented
some evil
some greater good or permitting
equally bad or worse."
claim
So why does Peterson
persistently
that his moral enterprise model
shows that
and gratuitous
evil are compatible?
God
is
The best answer we can come up with

a different
that he is deploying
conception
an
instance
this:
of gratuitous
evil, namely
or
evil is "gratuitous"
of intense suffering
in case
little
relevant
ibility
(or something
itself
comparably
not necessary
of
for the existence
bad)?is
some outweighing
good or for the preven?
will
just
evil
particular
tion of some greater evil.10 Of course, given

of gratuitous
this conception
evil, God and
are
in Peterson's
evil
compatible
gratuitous
moral
lows
model.
enterprise
that,
gratuitous
But
it hardly
fol?
Rowe's
of
conception
are
and gratuitous
evil
given
evil, God
in Peterson's
moral
enterprise
compatible
as
Peterson
in
himself
model.
notes,
For,
an
even
occurrence
it?
if
of evil is
general,
for a greater good
necessary
self neither
nor the prevention
of a greater evil, itmight
it without
be that God could not prevent
some greater good or per?
thereby
losing
some
in
evil;
and,
greater
mitting
true
of
in
is
all
those
evils
this
particular,
in moral
freedom.
the model wrought
To
sum up,
then:
if Peterson
conception
iosyncratic
his "moral
enterprise"
uses
his
id?
of gratuitous
evil,
is irrelevant
model
to Rowe's
how?
incompatibility
premise;
of gratuitous
ever, if he uses a conception
evil that is relevant
his ar?
(i.e., Rowe's),
a
non
is glaring
gument
sequitur.
on Rowe's
3. Hasker
Incompatibility
Claim
To
his
Hasker
credit,
Peterson's
conception
and he
from Rowe's,
in permitting
may be justified
were
themselves
freedom.
distinguishes
of gratuitous
evil
concedes
that God
evils which
for moral
unnecessary
he says, God and
Nevertheless,
evil
gratuitous
3.1 Hasker's
that the exercise
of moral
freedom
Hasker
incompat?
continues:
to individual
value
instances
of the exercise
of free will
is surely unrealistic?it
would
to
the
that
for
evil
instance,
say
hardly do,
a
is
of
deliberate murder
outweighed
by the
will
inherent value of the exercise of free
by
which the murder was decided on! A more
others,
seem
view would
reasonable
exercise
intrinsic
lasting
harms.
prevents
all
. . We
.
to be that the
have
of free will might

value to outweigh
but not to outweigh
sufficient
slight harms to
major or long
now
see
that
if God
. . , there
evil.
gratuitous
is still
some possibility
to exist. But
for morality
the range of application
for morality under
re?
these conditions
would
be severely
it could apply tominor
stricted:
not
or
to murder
...
treason.
affronts, but
If God
were
to
limit our moral freedom to situations such

as this, he would be running a sort of moral
us to develop our
kindergarten,
permitting
characters
by
in to
stepping
arguing
over
intervene
the
before
blocks,
anyone
but
actu?
ally gets hurt. Perhaps we could describe

such a situation as one in which morality
is
or
And
undermined
truncated.
it
is
partially
surely consistent with theism to hold that a
situation in which morality
is severely trun?
as one
cated is for God just as unacceptable
in which
it is undermined
In short, Hasker's
1.
If God were
then morality
even
stated
argument
To begin to see that God and gratuitous
consider
evil are compatible,
says Hasker,
the fact
claim?
value.
is that fact
If the value assigned to the exercise of free

is high enough, then conceivably
gratu?
itous moral evil could be entirely eliminated
[i.e., the value of the
by this consideration
exercise of free will]. But to assign this much
are compatible.
main
or "intrinsic"
"inherent"
so, we might
ask, how
to the denial of Rowe's
even
of
it?the
instance
has
But
2.
argument
is this:
to prevent all gratuitous evil,

would be partially, perhaps
undermined.
in arranging
be justified
a
in
that
such
way
morality would
things
God
not
3.
severely,
entirely.11
would
be
thus
undermined.
So, God and gratuitous evil are compatible.

What
we
should
We
thought?
make
begin
this
of
two
with
line
points
of
verse
of
God's
We
agreement.
3.2 Two points

of agreement
First, we agree with the second
premise.
God would be justified in arranging things

so that what
mattered.
we
did and who
could
Depending
benefit
others
could
harm
ourselves
are really
we
choices,
too, with
have
that might
repercussions
nal well-being.
we
or we
enormously
we
and
could
severely,
them
or break
make
on our
all the
for our eter?
to set things
If God were
our
this
behavior,
virtue,
up
way,
personal
and individual
and our so?
relationships,
cial mores,
and institutions,
practices,
would matter
tremendously.
we agree that no individual
in?
Second,
stance of the excercise
of free will can by
itself justify God in permitting some in?

stance
of horrific,
undeserved
suffering.
the fact that a perpetrator
acted
Neither
or by?
freely nor the fact that the victim
to
standers responded
suffices
freely
justify
in itself, and not in rela?
God. Considered
tion to anything
else at all, moral
freedom
is not valuable
enough
to outweigh
horrific,
undeserved
suffering.
In connection
with
is a relationship
as
with God?not
or
as
but
God's
friends.
tools,
pets
can't be friends with God
if we are
mere
causal
must
be
conduits
and misery,
both to ourselves
the same goes for these
individual
instance
this
point of
to see that even
itmay nevertheless
have
to secure other goods that are
it is required
Are
there any such
valuable.
immensely
so. For example,
there are
with what makes
associated
It seems
so significant:
the good of
our forming
our own characters;
the good
worthwhile
of our developing
relationships
these, the
amongst
good of the best forms of love; in addition,
there is genuine
and friendship
creativity
with God. Consider
the latter briefly. Ac?
good
from
to Christian
for human
of the exercise
of a free
will justifies God in permitting horrible

evil
and
the greater
suffering,
life that matters
immensely
moral
good of a
does jus?
tify God.
3.3 Why the first premise
of Hasker's
main argument
isfalse
With
these two agreements
in place, what
should we make of Hasker's
first premise?
Is it true that if God prevented
all gratu?
itous evil, the moral
life would be restricted
to the equivalent
of a moral
kindergarten,
to argue over the
where we are permitted
blocks
but prevented
from really hurting
Is it true that if God prevented
range things
didn't matter
cording
other
each other?
by itself,
immense value if
and
God
goods.
So then, we agree with Hasker
that while
or "intrinsic"
the "inherent"
value of no
it is important
agreement,
if moral
freedom
has little value
others
and
and others.
And
all gratuitous
with
We
that we
requires,
paradoxically
perhaps,
can reject it. Consequently,
we must have
our power
it within
to bring about harm
second
goods?
all the goods
the moral
life
action.
of
creativity
with
friendship
Moreover,
change.
for His
sources
fresh
the greatest
tradition,
in a theistic
uni
beings
On
seem
it, these questions
a
bit
After
all,
just
puzzling.
God prevented
instance of
every
of
than
suppose
horrific
evil
that neither
sion
really
all that much?
the face
more
to ar?
have
evil, He would
so that what we did
of
and suffering
its permission
which
is such
nor
the permis?
is
bad
comparably
something
for some greater good. And sup?
necessary
pose that one of the greater goods He aims
at is the maintenance
of a human moral
life
which
sider
is as significant
those instances
suffering
sion of
necessary
whose
as ours
permission
something
for that
is. Now
of horrific
con?
and
(or the permis?
comparably
to be
good
evil
is
bad)
secured.

Would
God
out permitting
bad?
not.
Surely
namely,
if He
Because
good would
a significant
greater
(b) the class of ostensibly gratuitous evils is

the class of evils each member of which
all of these evils, with?

else comparably
anything
prevent
be
completely
morality. Would
did,
could have been prevented by God with?

out thereby preventing
the existence
of
the
any greater good (or necessitating
of some evil equally bad or
permission
lost,
God
any of them, without

permitting
no.
else comparably
bad? Again,
anything
if He did, the very same good
Because
be partially
would
undermined.
Morality
prevent
would be slightly less significant than it in

fact
is. But
then
it follows
could
ing propositions
God prevents
that the follow?
be
true all at once:
all gratuitous
evil.
God permits all those instances of horrific

evil and suffering whose permission
(or the
is
permission of evils equally bad or worse)
for the preservation
necessary
cance
of the signifi?
of morality.
is neither
Morality
severely
nor partially
undermined.
Hasker's
Thus,
first premise
worse) apart from the benefit God's per?

mission
in
of such evils may have
the
preventing
undermining of morality.
(34, his italics)
It follows
Hasker
response
is aware of
. . .and
why
this objection.
itfails
And,
for the
for the sake of argument?but

only
to grant
sake of argument?he
is willing
its presupposition
that there is some par?
ticular
permits
nificance
amount
such that if God

of evil,
of evil the full sig?
of morality
is maintained,
but
that amount
if He
less,
at
(33).
any
permits
least partially
it is undermined,
Hasker
defends
1 by first distinguishing
two
of evils,
the class of "genuinely
evils" and the class of "osten?
gratuitous
evils":
sibly gratuitous
premise
classes
(a) the class of genuinely gratuitous evils is

the class of evils each member of which
God could have prevented
without
some
thereby losing
greater good or per?
mitting
which
some evil equally
bad or worse,
is just the class of gratuitous

evils
sense of the term "gratuitous";
in Rowe's
on the other hand,
all
those
(or the permission

of something
bad) is required
comparably
for the prevention
of the undermining
of
as Hasker
It might
also contain,
morality.
some
evils as
notes,
genuinely
gratuitous
as Hasker
well. And itmight
does
contain,
not note,
some
genuinely
italicized
evil, in light of the

nongratuitous
clause. For it seems that a great
evils
of evil must
maintain
3.4 Hasker's
of osten?
(b) that the class

evils
contains
sibly gratuitous
evils whose
permission
deal
is false.
from
in which
that are clear
be permitted
cases
of
in order
to
the full
of morality,
significance
case a great many actual instances
are such that their permission,

or
the permission
of some evil equally bad or
is strictly necessary
for the preven?
worse,
tion of the (at least partial)
undermining
of evil
of morality.
all
tion,
defini?
Thus, given Hasker's
are "ostensibly
such
evils
gratuitous"?even
they are genu?
though
and may seem to be so.
inely nongratuitous
it turns out that an
So, rather surprisingly,
instance of evil can be "ostensibly
gratu?
sense of the term,
itous," in his technical
and obviously
!
yet genuinely
nongratuitous
long as we keep this quirk in mind, we
shouldn't
be too far misled
by his termi?
So
one will
(although
nology
one wished
for better).
it seems
Now,
in two different
as to imply
(bl)
be pardoned
if
to us that (b) might be read

It might
be read so
ways.
that
the class of ostensibly

gratuitous evils
is the class that contains all those evils

of
(or the permission
permission
is
necessary
something comparably bad)
for the maintenance
of significant mo?
rality, a class that includes both actual
whose
occurrences
of
mitted
as merely
as well
evil
evils,
i.e.,
per?
were
that
evils
permitted but which did not occur due to

the good free choices of moral agents.12
the other
On
hand,
(b) might
be read so as
to imply that
(b2) the class of ostensibly
gratuitous evils
is the class that contains all those evils
of
whose permission
(or the permission
is
necessary
something comparably bad)
of significant mo?
for the maintenance
a class
that includes
actual
rality,
occurrences
of evil but excludes merely
permitted evils.
we trace the im?
sections,
of
both
arguing
interpretations,
plications
defense of premise
that either way Hasker's
In the next
two
In effect,
falsehood.
1 implies
then,
we
a dilemma.13
present
Suppose
itous evils
the class
contains
permission
of ostensibly
those evils
all
(or the permission

bad) is necessary
of something
for the main?
comparably
tenance of significant morality,
includes both actual occurrences
well
move
did
not
is to define
of evil
that
as
merely
permitted
occur. Hasker's
next
an optimal
class of os?
evils, one which obtains
tensibly gratuitous
when the evils it contains
permission
a class
that were
as evils
but which
gratu?
whose
are such that their
(or the permission

is "just
bad)
of something
in
sufficient"
comparably
to prevent
amount and severity,
Given
of morality.14
mining
the under?
(bl),
an
evils
class of ostensibly
gratuitous
optimal
actual occur?
that (i) contains
is a class
rences of evil as well as merely
permitted
or the permis?
(ii) whose
permission,
sion of something
bad, is "just
comparably
in amount and severity to secure
sufficient"
evils
First,
three
the
sufficient"
suggests
"just
phrase
"barely
and sufficient.
sufficient,"
i.e., necessary
"in an optimal
class of os?
Consequently,
none
of the
evils,
gratuitous
of evil is genuinely
gratuitous,
none could be deleted
by God with?
tensibly
instances
since
out
undermining
second, and most
deleting?or
morality"
importantly,
(34). But,
while God's
evils
preventing?some
at least partially
would
of morality,
the significance
class
optimal
dermine
in an
un?
our
to bring about any of them

failing
not do the same. Third, on this defi?
if the class of ostensibly
nition,
gratuitous
amount for
evils falls below
the optimal
freely
would
whatever
morality
With
then the significance

of
reason,
will be at least partially undermined.
this notion
of an optimal
class of
gratuitous
of premise
claim
3.4.1 The first horn of the dilemma: (bl)
Note
the full significance

of morality.
of
this
definition.
implications
evils
in hand, Hasker's
defense
1 of his main
argument?the
that if God were

evil,
to prevent all (genu?

then morality
would
even severely,
under?
inely) gratuitous
be partially,
perhaps
to the following:
mined?comes
la. Suppose
that morality
is as significant
as we tend to think it is.
is as significant as we tend to
lb. If morality
think it is, then God must govern the
world so that the level of ostensibly
gra?
the
tuitous evils does not fall below
optimum,
of
"an
(from
optimal
la and the [bl] reading
class")
lc. So, God must govern the world so that

the level of ostensibly
gratuitous evils
does not fall below the optimum,
(from
la and lb)
Id. The only way God can govern the world
so that the level of ostensibly
gratuitous
evils does not fall below the optimum is
to permit
genuinely
gratuitous
le. So, God permits genuinely

evil, (from lc and Id)
evil.
gratuitous

If. So, ifmorality
is as significant as we tend
to think it is, then God permits genuinely
gratuitous evil, (from la-le, conditional
proof)
1. So, if God prevented all gratuitous evil,
then morality would not be as significant
as we tend to think it is; that is, it would
be
partially,
perhaps
dermined,
(from
The main
man
severely,
some heinous
crime.
Our agent knows . . . that if he brings about

an ostensibly
gratuitous evil, this evil will
be a member
of an optimal class of such
evils. But if this is so, then the omission of
such an evil will mean that the class of os?
tensibly gratuitous evils will be sub-optimal;
it "will be depleted beyond the point neces?
sary for significant morality." But of course
such a situation cannot be allowed to stand:
We are assuming that the maintenance
of sig?
is an overriding concern in
nificant morality
the divine governance of the world, so if the
gratuitous evils is ren?
of a
by the omission
class of ostensibly
dered sub-optimal
then
member,
must
the balance
surely
re?
be
of some other
by the permission
one
which would
evil,
ostensibly
gratuitous
not have been permitted had the evil action
stored
under
the original
ing neither
are
than
has
can
been
for
it is evident
be no
contain?
optimal,
nor more
severe
evils
evils
requisite
less
the maintenance
than
. . .
the one
ing evil
action
the
in question,
is permitted
economical
means
to an
significant
morality.
ity is undermined.
What
tional
used
should
end
the
So
that if he
result?
as the most
of
overriding
maintenance
once
(35-36,
we make
the
the
by God
importance?namely,
which
[Consequently,]
agent will be able to say to himself

performs
of
that the "replacement
severe
foregone.
And
performed.
was
class
more
morality,
evil"
been
consideration
since
again,
of
moral?
his italics)
of Hasker's
condi?
and the thought-experiment

proof,
in its defense?
evil. Unfortu?
gratuitous
genuinely
this premise
is false,
for two
permit
nately,
reasons.
First, it implies that God has it within

His
is Id. To help us dis?

asks us to imagine a
here
contemplating
un?
If)
premise
its truth, Hasker
cern
even
The proof hangs on premise

Id, the claim
that the only way God can govern the world
gratuitous
evils does not fall below
the optimum
is to
to do
that is abso?
something
see this, note
to
To
lutely impossible.
begin
with an obvious
that, in conjunction
truth,
an
Hasker's
Id
has
im?
premise
important
power
The obvious
truth is this: it is
plication.
to govern
within God's
the world
power
gratuitous
evils remains optimal.
Surely no one will
it takes
deny this.15 All
chestrate His permission
and evil
suffering
to or?
is for God
and prevention
of
a way
that the
in such
of morality
ismaintained.
But,
significance
if it is within God's
to govern
the
power
world
gratu?
itous
evils
Hasker
remains
optimal,
the only way God
if, as
can do that
then
says,
is by permitting
evil,
genuinely
gratuitous
it follows
that God has it within His power
to permit
of evil of a peculiar
instances
sort, evils that are (i) genuinely

gratuitous
even though
(ii) their permission
(or the
of
bad)
permission
comparably
something
is necessary
for the level of ostensibly

to remain optimal. Why
evils
tuitous
evils
that have
so peculiar?
both
of these
Because
any
To
two features
such evil
see
gra?
are
is ab?
this
solutely
impossible.
point,
some instance of evil is such that
suppose
of
(ii) its permission
(or the permission
is
bad)
necessary
something
comparably
for the level of ostensibly
to remain optimal;
then
the permission
of
is necessary
bad)
evils
(or
something
comparably
a greater
for
good,
namely
the maintenance
morality
in fact
(or the degree

obtains);
gratuitous
its permission
of significant
of significance
that
consequently,
given

of a gratuitous
evil, it
conception
that (i) it is genuinely
gratuitous.
for
So then, it is absolutely
impossible
there to be an instance of evil that has these
Rowe's
is false
two
in that case,
But
features.
really have it within

such peculiar
evils,
His
does
power
as Hasker's
Presumably
implies?
has itwithin his power
not.
For
God
premise
somebody
to permit
gratuitous
genuinely
to
it within His power
that is absolutely
impossible;
so it's false
that
such power;
can
so
world
the
the only way God
govern
evils
that the level of ostensibly
gratuitous
do something
has no
the optimal
level is to
evil.
That is,
gratuitous
Id is false.
not drop below
permit genuinely
Hasker's
premise
The second reason
Id is false
is
premise
the permission
that, even if, per impossible,
one way for
was
of genuinely
gratuitous evil
God to govern the world so that the level of
ostensibly
gratuitous
low the optimal level,
evils
then
did not drop be?
there is another
option:
to permit instances of horrendous
suffering
and wickedness
whose
(or the
permission
is
of
bad)
something
permission
comparably
to
life
in
order
for
the
moral
really
required
matter
amount
know
that if he
may well
there will be fewer actual
of ostensibly
not follow?nor
But, it does
he knows
God
does
evil
tuitous
refrains,
occurrences
to permit
something
sum up:
if
that
is
To
only
thing
possible.
to govern
the
God has it within His power
world
gratu?
remains
itous evils
thus, if, as
optimal;
the only way God can do
Hasker
asserts,
that is by permitting
evil, then God has
an agent who was deliberating

some heinous
to perform
deed in
a universe
in which God prevents
all gra?
enough,
whether
that
of ostensibly
or that God
optimal
some other
significant
degree)
it does
evil.
not
at all
to whether
in order
permits
the optimum
in defense
of premise
it
moral
the deliberating
agent? Doesn't
show that God must permit genuinely
gra?
the world
tuitous evil in order to govern
so that
evils
the
remains
level
of ostensibly
Not
optimal?
gratuitous
at all. Sure
to permit
of
the maintenance
(at such and such a

to permit
the crime;
the crime to occur. So
the class
to maintain
level.
of evils
God
is at
morality
our agent
Indeed,
an ostensibly
gratuitous
the optimal
class of ostensibly
not
can?
delete
from
itous
evils
suffices
permitted
optimal
since
evil
gratu?
their
simply
being
for the class to be at its
level, whether
else
commits
or not
he or any?
of
them.
any
the agent knows
an ostensibly
gra?
of
this evil will be a member
body
although
Consequently,
that "if he brings about
tuitous evil,
an optimal
class of such evils," he will not
contra Hasker,
be able to say to himself,
"If I forgo this wicked
deed, then the class
of ostensibly
optimal;
gratuitous
evils
will
be
it will be depleted beyond
evil, one
We now
ment
evil
require
our agent commits
or refrains from
no difference
the crime makes
committing
evils does not fall be?

ostensibly
gratuitous
and this way does not
low the optimum;
of any genuinely
gra?
require the permission
tuitous evil at all.
thought-experi?
Id, the case of
gratuitous
will have
is not
whether
point necessary
God will have
about Hasker's
the
then
refrains,
For
morality
requires God
to the degree that it in fact does. Surely

that is a way God can ensure that the level of
But what
if he
evil.
gratuitous
is it true?that
sub
the
for
morality.
significant
to replace
it with another
that is no less severe."
turn to the second
horn
of
the
dilemma.
horn of the dilemma:
(b2)
us
that the class of ostensi?
Let
suppose
evils is the class containing
bly gratuitous
3.4.2
The second
permission
is necessary
whose
(or the
permission
of something
bad)
comparably
of moral?
for the maintenance
ity, a class
that excludes
all
those
evils
merely
permitted
ISTHEISMCOMPATIBLEWITH GRATUITOUS EVIL? / 125

evils.
an optimal
class of os?
as one
is defined
evils
In that case,
tensibly gratuitous
that (i) contains
all and only actual
rences of evil (ii) whose
permission
occur?
cure
in terms
defined
timal
of (bl)
that contains
class
merely
permitted
an optimal
class
evils,
defined
that an optimal
evils.
permitted
implies
merely
mal
class
contains
bad)
and
to se?
of morality.
Notably,
of an optimal
class
the significance
while
the conception
some,
the conception
in terms of
class
contains
of
(b2)
no
On (b2), an opti?
of ostensibly
evils
gratuitous
occurrences
but
actual
of
nothing
evil whose
(or the permission

permission
of something
bad) is necessary
comparably
to
and sufficient,
and severity,
in amount
the significance
of morality.
an important question
arises: could
there be such a class? Suppose
that only
Here
time
the
choice
that humans
were
given
good and bad they freely
In that case, would
there be a
between
went
wrong.
of all and only actual occurrences
of
evil whose
the
(or
permission
permission
of something
bad) is sufficient,
comparably
class
in amount
tomaintain
and severity,
the full
of morality?
Not at all. For
significance
that class would not include the vast num?
ber of merely
permitted
did not perform when
free choice
between
evils
that humans
were
a
they
given
went
and
bad
and
good
right, a vast class all of whose members

are such that their permission
(or the per?
mission
of something
bad) is
comparably
for the maintenance
of morality.
necessary
our judgment about this case change
Would
if 80 percent of the time that humans were
given
a choice
freely
all. For
went
tensibly
at least
between
wrong?
in each case
actual
occurrences
of evil whose
permis?
the permission
of something
in amount
bad) was sufficient,
comparably
to maintain
and severity,
Now
let
morality.
(or
us
are so depraved
that humans
suppose
that on every occasion
that God permitted
them to choose
freely between
good and
In that case, every
bad, they went wrong.
an actual evil; thus
evil
would
be
permitted
the class
of all and only
good and bad they

not at
99? Again,
the optimal class of os?
90?
evils would not include

gratuitous
some merely
evils
that
permitted
actual
occurrences
of evil whose
the permis?
bad) would
(or
permission
sion of something
comparably
be sufficient,
in amount
and
maintain
Indeed, on reflection,
other way
in which
class. Consequently,
maintain
half
are necessary
for
the
bad)
parably
maintenance
of morality;
consequently,
not be a class of all and only
there would
sion
for an op?
even only,
allows
went
evils
(or the
of something
permission
comparably
is "just sufficient"?i.e.,
necessary
amount
and severity
sufficient?in
did not perform when

they freely
and
those
right,
merely
permitted
com?
of something
(or the permission
humans
to
severity,
of morality.
there seems to be no
there
could
be
such
it seems
that the only

to
for
God
the world
way
govern
possible
gratuitous
not fall below
evils
does
the optimal
level?the
level
amount
that is "just sufficient,

for the maintenance
of
and severity"
He
orchestrates
of morality?is
so that humans
in
if
al?
things
ways
freely choose what's wrong.
And now we are in a position
to see an
important point.
fense of premise
defense
Recall
that doubles
jection
of
premise
that
that Hasker's
de?
1 of the main
section
argument?a
as a reply to the ob?
3.3?contains
the
lb. If morality is as significant as we tend to

think it is, then God must govern the world
so that the level of ostensibly gratuitous
evils does not fall below the optimum.
In the last paragraph
way God can govern
we
saw
the world
that the only

so that the
level of ostensibly
evils does not
gratuitous
fall below the optimum
is ifHe orchestrates
things so that humans always freely choose

if premise
lb is true,
Therefore,
wrong.
as we tend to
then morality
is as significant
think it is only if God orchestrates
things so
that humans always freely choose wrong. But
God
can't orchestrate
so that humans
things
He has to leave
always freely choose wrong.

it up to them. So premise
lb is false.
3.4.3
On
We
class
"teaching
have
argued
morality"
that if we
of
"ostensibly
of either
(bl)
terms
Hasker's
conception
ostensibly
gratuitous
Id or lb is false.
premise
understand
either
evils,
But perhaps nei?
ther (bl) nor (b2) capture what Hasker is

after.
he means
Perhaps
to combine
ele?
ments of both (bl) and (b2). Let's look into

the matter
briefly.
Suppose we begin with the (bl) idea that

an optimal
class of ostensibly
gratuitous
evils
is a class that (i) contains
actual oc?
as merely
currences
as well
of evil
evils
whose
(or
(ii)
permitted
permission
the permission
of something
comparably
in amount
and se?
bad) is just sufficient,
to maintain
of
verity,
Now
morality.
there must be
let's
some
add
evils
vent
a (b2)-ish
idea:
in order to pre?
of morality.
the undermining
there must be some evils for
Specifically,
it to be apparent to humans how they ought
and ought not to behave.
Such evils, one
lessons which
say, would be "object
might
are needed
this apparent"
(35, our
For our own part, we don't quite
to make
emphasis).
see why suitable
hardwiring
couldn't
stand
analogues
"object
or Hollywood
in for real,
won't
press
but we
lessons,"
Let's
that actual
suppose
point.
of horrific
wickedness
and
intense
the kind forbidden" by morality

that if there aren't
this purpose,
then
the full
enough
live
the
instances
suffer?
ing are the only possible

object lessons
are hurt by behavior
show how persons
follows
on
"to
of
(35). It
evils
significance
for
a
discussion,
evils is at the
the hybrid
view under
class of ostensibly
gratuitous
some ac?
level only if it contains
optimal
occurrences
tual
of evil, just sufficient,
in
amount
and severity, for
moral?
teaching
ity, which
maintenance
evils
in
gratuitous"
or (b2), then, given
of an "optimal
class"
of
will not be apparent and morality

morality
will be at least somewhat
undermined.
So
Does
the
is
itself
of morality.
defense
Hasker's
claim
that
the
1?
of premise
if God
all
prevented
then
would
be
evil,
morality
even
under?
perhaps
severely,
on this hybrid
any better
gratuitous
partially,
mined?fare
To get at the answer,

to recast Hasker's
worthwhile
view?
in terms
plicitly
for
necessary
of
defense
the essential
evils
actually occurring
it is:
ity. Here
it will
prove
ex?
role
in teaching
of
moral?
la. Suppose
is as significant
that morality
as we tend to think it is.
lb. Ifmorality
is as significant as we tend to
think it is, then God must govern the
world so that the evil needed for teach?
ing morality
is just sufficient,
and
for
severity,
rality,
(from
in amount
of mo?
the maintenance
la and
the story
about
teaching morality)
lc. So, God must govern the world so that
the evil needed for teaching morality
is
just
sufficient,
in amount
for the maintenance

la and lb)
and
severity,
of morality,
(from
Id. God must permit genuinely

gratuitous
evil in order to govern the world so that
the evil needed
is
for teaching morality
in amount and severity,
just sufficient,
for the maintenance
of morality.
le. So, God permits genuinely

evil, (from lc and Id)
gratuitous
If. So, ifmorality

is as significant as we tend
to think it is, then God permits genuinely
gratuitous
evil,
(from
la-le,
proof)
of
conditional

1. So, if God prevented all gratuitous evil,
then morality would not be as significant
as we tend to think it is; that is, it would
be
partially,
dermined,
What
even
perhaps
4. van
(from If)
we make
should
Clearly
enough,
reasons reminiscent
of this argument?
Id is false for
premise
in section
of those
to do
that is absolutely
something
it the case that
make
namely,
impossible,
some instance
of evil
is (ii)
(or the permission

bad) is necessary
permission
such
that
its
gratuitous.
and (i) genuinely

of morality,
even
if permitting
Second,
evil was one way for
gratuitous
genuinely
God to govern
of evil needed
sufficient,
maintenance
option:
mission
is just
in quantity
and severity,
for the
there is another
of morality,
permit
instances
of evil whose
(or the permission

bad) is required
comparably
ing of morality.
the deliberating
he will know
heinous
crime,
rences
of ostensibly
does not follow?nor
know
that
per?
of
something
for the teach?
as for the case of

Finally,
moral
agent: it is true that
that if he refrains
from the
there will
be fewer
gratuitous
is it true?that
if he
it
he will
the evil
then
refrains,
is not suffi?
teaching morality
in amount
and severity,
for the
cient,
nor will he know
maintenance
of morality;
needed
for
that if he refrains, God will

some other
"replacement"
to permit
evil for the
have
teaching of morality.
Hasker's
rejection of Rowe's
incompatibil?
In the next section,
ity claim is unjustified.
we sketch a more promising
strategy.
a God
if His purposes
the
greater goods
anything
in our most plausible
involved
theodicies,
some
He would
in permitting
be justified
even
a
intense
great
suffering,
perhaps
included
and
like
an
who endorses
everyone
(Virtually
evil accepts this.)
argument from gratuitous
that God would
Now,
suppose with Rowe
of intense
any instance
prevent
suffering
He could, unless He could not do so with?
some greater good or
out thereby
losing
some
permitting
equally bad or worse evil.
It follows
that if the greater

of which
He permits
goods for the

evil did not,
to permit
call for Him
strictly
speaking,
some particular
or
to
horror,
permit any?
bad, then He would
thing else comparably
it. To illustrate,
suppose
prevented
some
has set His mind on achieving
some
that involves
purpose
greater good
have
God
that can
Rowe's
be
fawn
several
fire
occur?
evil. But
ous ways. What

forceful.
particularly
sake
so that the level
the world
of Rowe's
rejection
can be put in vari?
follows
is one that we find
deal.
of something
for a greater
comparably
the level of evil
good,
namely
keeping
needed
just suffi?
in amount
and severity,
for the
cient,
maintenance
Claim
van Inwagen's
claim
incompatibility
Peter
If there were
3.3.
First, it implies thatGod has itwithin His

power
on rowe's
Incompatibility
un?
severely,
in wagen
secured
if He permits
only
to lie in excruciating
pain for
after being burned
in a forest
days
caused
by
(or He
permits
either
bad). Now,
something
comparably
in His pur?
involved
(a) the greater good
to permit
the
poses does not call for Him
lightning
fawn's
(or anything
suffering
comparably
bad), or else (b) it does. Naturally
enough,
God would
know which
is true. Suppose
He
knew
it does.
Then He will
or else prevent
fawn's suffering,
mit something
else comparably
permit the
it and per?
bad. If, on
the other
that the greater

hand, He knows
to
in
not
does
call for Him
good
question
the fawn's
He will pre?
permit
suffering,
vent it, and He will not permit anything
else
comparably
bad
to "take
its place."

an
if
emerges:
is true, then
is true
suffering
in order
that must
be permitted
suffering
in God's
for the greater
involved
goods
was
to
be
if
and
there
secured,
purposes
of every other instance of intense suffering.

im?
This important point has an equally
if
Rowe's
portant
implication:
than that amount permit?

any less suffering
not all be realized
ted, those goods would
And
here
Rowe's
important
incompatibility
is true of the fawn's
what
claim
incompatibility
a minimum
amount
point
claim
is true, then there is

of suffering
that God
must
in order for the greater goods

permit
to be secured. To
in His purposes
involved
see this, consider
the following
oversim?
an
but useful
story:
Imagine
plified
enormous
in?
instances
of
of
possible
pool
tense suffering
each of which God has it
within
to permit
His
or prevent.
some, but not
power
that He must permit
Suppose
involved
all, in order to secure the goods
So He must
select from
in His purposes.
he asks of each
the pool. As He selects,
"Do the greater goods require the per?
mission
of it or something
(or some things)
amount of suf?
the
bad,
given
comparably
one:
I'm
fering
answer
already
is "yes,"
if the answer
permitting?"
then He puts
If the
it on His
is "no," He puts it on
is
selection
process
true.
will
be
First,
things
right;
His
left. When
this
three
complete,
for any possible
instance of intense suffer?

it
will
be on God's
either
right or on
ing,
on His right will be a set
His left. Second,
the collective
bad?
of instances of suffering
ness
of which
no more
is such that God must
or no
from
reach
permit
to secure the
(What if
purposes.
one
were
to prevent
on
His right
of suffering
in His
involved
goods
for some reason
of those
in order
less
God
instances
have to
Then He would
occurring?
over to His
left to find some other
instance
badness
or instances
to permit;
goods would
total comparable
the relevant
otherwise,
of
at
be thwarted,
purposes would
in part. It follows
that?and
this is
the crucial point to which
the preceding
has
been leading?the
involved
greater goods
and God's
least
in God's
the permission
purposes
require
a
amount of intense suffering.
of minimum
that there is a minimum
This presupposes
amount
of intense
to secure
permit
the oc?
To sum up, then: ifGod prevented
currence of any instance of intense suffering
He could, unless He could not do so without
thereby losing some greater good or permit?
ting some equally
there is a minimum
bad or worse
amount
of
evil,
intense
then
suf?
in order to secure
fering God must permit
in His purposes.
those goods involved
there is no such
But, says van Inwagen,
amount.
that there is
minimum
To suppose
such a minimum
amount
is like supposing
that, if God's purposes
required an impres?
to
tall
appear at a certain
sively
prophet
height
place and time, there is a minimum
a prophet must
have and if he were
would
the least bit shorter God's
purposes
not be served;
it is like supposing
that if
a
to de?
fine
the state's purposes
required
such
is a minimum
there
illegal
parking,
dollar-and-cents
suffice,
figure that would
ter
and if the fine were one cent less, it would

if
not be a significant
deterrent. Of course,
no minimum
there is no minimum
height,
no
amount
of intense
minimum
and
fine,
it is absolutely
suffering,
God or the state to permit
so
it is absurd
not occur.) Third,

if
greater
we were to add up the amount of suffering
on His right, we'd eventu?
in the instances
and
amount.
at a precise
ally arrive
of
amount would
be the amount
thought?
That
that God must

suffering
those goods.
should
do so.16
What
should
we
to
make
impossible
or produce
insist
of
intense
for
it,
that either
this
line
of
ISTHEISMCOMPATIBLEWITH GRATUITOUS EVIL? / 129

It seems
pretty clear that God and gratu?

are incompatible
only if there is
a minimum
amount
of intense
suffering
in
for the
that God must
order
permit
at which
greater goods
cured. Thus,
//"there
amount, then Rowe's
articulate
for
principled
grounds
we
can?
No
the
Minimum
Claim,
denying
not
that
theism
is
say
responsibly
a powerful
it. To date, no one has met this

indeed, no one has even tried.17
with
goes
for
challenge;
reasonably
deny
That is, can we rea?
Seattle
Western
that
is no minimum
There
case
the
Claim?
deny
sonably
such minimum
claim
incompatibility
before those who find
is this: can we
No Minimum
with gratuitous
evil; until we
incompatible
articulate
for denying
principled
grounds
we
cannot
this,
accept Rowe's
responsibly
or
the
that
claim,
argument
incompatibility
se?
to be
aims
is no
is false. The question

in Rowe's
argument
atheism
He
we
Until
itous evil
amount
of
intense
University
Pacific
University
Washington
suf?
fering that God must permit in order for the

greater goods He aims at to be secured.
NOTES
1. "The Problem
(1979):
of Evil
2. "The Humean
Obstacle
'Appearance',"
of God
assess
van
5. W. D. Ross,
Journal for
and the Problem
Inwagen's
and Gratuitous
6. William
to Evidential
International
3. "Divine Goodness
4. We
and Some Varieties
of Atheism,"
American
Philosophical
16
Quarterly
335-341.
argument
Evil,"
of Evil," Religious
in a companion
2 (1966-67):
Studies
essay,
On Avoiding
the Evils
16 (1984): 15-11.
and
"Vagueness
of
107.
the Compatibility
essay.
unpublished
The Right and the Good
Alston,
from Suffering:
Arguments
the Philosophy
of Religion
(Indianapolis:
Hackett,
1988), p. 21.
"The Inductive Argument

from Evil and the Human Cognitive
Condition,"
5 (1991): 63, n. 10; collected
in The Evidential Argument from Evil,
Indiana University
Press, 1996).
(Bloomington:
Perspectives
Philosophical
ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder
7. Plantinga,
"The Probabilistic
Argument
from Evil," Philosophical
Studies
35 (1979):
7-8.
to Rowe's
8. This is equivalent
from Evil," Rationality,
Reli?
(B) in "The Empirical Argument
ed. Robert Audi and William Wainwright
Cornell
gious Belief, and Moral Commitment,
(Ithaca:
in the text im?
Press, 1986), p. 228. Note: neither Rowe's
(B) nor our modification
University
plies that God must create the best possible world that He can. So contrary to what Rowe says at
and Schlesinger?"
The Probabilistic
from
p. 228 n. 3, the arguments of Plantinga
Argument
Evil,"
pp. 8-10,
respectively?cast
and Religion and Scientific Method

(Dordrecht: Reidel,
no doubt on (B) or our modification.
1977), chaps. 9 and 10,
9. "The Problem
of Evil: The Case against God's Existence,"

chap. 6 in Reason and Religious
2nd
ed.
York:
Oxford
Press, 1998), pp. 126-127. See also Evil and the
(New
Belief,
University
Christian God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1982), chap. 4.
10. See Evil and the Christian
God, p. 96.
11. "The Necessity

of Gratuitous Evil," Faith
in the text refer to this article.
and Philosophy
9 (1992):
32. Parenthetical
references
page

12. Note to fastidious metaphysicians:
Unless you are an extreme modal realist, you will have choked
on the phrase "evils that were permitted but which did not occur." Merely possible evils are not evils
any more than merely possible elephants are elephants! Fair enough, read (bl) as follows:
gratuitous evils is the class of all those evils whose
(bl) the class of ostensibly

permission
class
that
moral
We
of
bad)
comparably
occurrences
actual
something
includes
both
to bring
agents
invite you to make
were
but which
about
the appropriate
for
is necessary
as well
of
evil
not
brought
changes
of
the maintenance
as
about
states
due
in the text when
of
affairs
to their
good
(or the
permission
significant
morality,
which
God permitted
free
choices.
fitting.
or don't get to the

13. Others find fault with Hasker's
argument, but they are either mistaken
heart of the matter which, by our lights, is confusion over (bl) and (b2). See, e.g., Keith Chrzan,
11 (1994): 134-137; William Rowe, "Rumi?
"Necessary Gratuitous Evil," Faith and Philosophy
5
nations About Evil," Philosophical
69-88, esp. 79-86; and David O'Connor,
(1991):
Perspectives
God and Inscrutable
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman
Evil
& Littlefield,
1998), pp. 53-70.
14. Hasker writes: "the optimal class of ostensibly

gratuitous evils is optimal if the evils it con?
of morality"
in number and severity, to prevent the undermining
tains are just sufficient,
(34).
This is misleading,
for two reasons. First, even if there is some particular amount of evil, such
and if He permits
is maintained
of morality
that if God permits that amount the full significance
no
exact
is
A
of
of
the
number
evils
necessary.
any less it is not,
precise amount of
permission
the clause "whose
evil can be instantiated by different numbers of instances of evil. Second,
must
not
or the permission of something comparably bad"
be dropped from the defi?
permission,
are
an
not themselves "just sufficient,
nition of an optimal class. The particular evils in
optimal class
of morality." While
in number and severity, to prevent the undermining
they, in amount and
severity, are sufficient for that good, they, in amount and severity, are not necessary; hence, they,
in amount
and
In what
15. Provided,
of
Hasker
are
severity,
ties matter.
course,
to make,
is willing
not
"just
we will
follows,
that
there
i.e.,
sufficient,"
correct
is such
an
and
necessary
two
These
sufficient.
infelici?
for them.
optimal
level,
an
assumption
we
which,
have
seen,
for the sake of argument.
16. Peter van Inwagen, "The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,"
and Dis?
5 (1991): esp. p. 64, n. 11, and "The Magnitude,
Duration,
Perspectives
Philosophical
in God,
collected
both
tribution of Evil: A Theodicy,"
67-68,
(1988):
Topics
Philosophical
in
The
Evidential
and
the
first
Cornell
and
Press,
1995),
(Ithaca:
University
Mystery
Knowledge
Argument from Evil.
claim and the argument from particular
17. Some philosophers
give up Rowe's
incompatibility
instances of gratuitous evil that goes along with it; they then develop and assess an argument
like the claim that God would not permit so much horrific evil rather
grounded on something
"The Argument
from Inscrutable Evil," in The
than a lot less. See, e.g., Daniel Howard-Snyder,
Evidential Argument from Evil, esp. pp. 286-291; David O'Connor, God and Inscrutable Evil,
1998),
(Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus,
esp. pp. 70-75; and Theodore Drange, Evil and Nonbelief
we
can
wouldn't be polite
as
else
far
So
tell, everybody
writing on the topic?it
esp. pp. 37-38.
to rely on Rowe's
claim knowing full well that the
to mention names?continues
incompatibility
reliance
is found in theists as well, as
This
the
in
Claim stands
No Minimum
way.
irresponsible
and the Problem of Evil
Richard
Providence
their targets. See, e.g.,
Swinburne,
they develop
6-14.
Press, 1998), esp. pp.
(New York: Oxford University
For
comments
on
earlier
drafts,
we
thank
Michael
Bergmann,
Terence
Cuneo,
C.
Stephen
Lay?
Stephen Minister, William Rowe, and, especially, William Hasker, without whose gracious
went wrong.
replies to several drafts of this paper we would never have seen so clearly how he
man,

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North American Philosophical Publications

Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?

Volume 36, Number 2, April 1999

IS THEISM COMPATIBLE WITH

taught and frequently

Now, on the face of it, the idea that God

instances of intense suffering

to call any being?not

losing some greater good or per?

it] is tantamount to saying that God

The heart of [Rowe's

shared by both the

prevent the occurrence of any

indifferent to it. It is hard to see how such a

we begin to assess the

116/ AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

our title question

instance of evil is gratuitous =df it is not

An instance of evil is gratuitous =df it has

the good. By way of

that good would

ISTHEISMCOMPATIBLEWITH GRATUITOUSEVIL? / 117

that God must

for their flourishing.

There are more

ate the best possible

are two mistakes

the best world He

might well refrain from creating

compatibility claim like this:

good than evil, and so for any

intense suffering He could, unless He

here. First, we must

ible idea that God

inhabited only by happy goldfish and the

say that Rowe's

118 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

pose that if God

this point, saying that if the

to limit the possibility of very

evils, a risk inherent in

goods could have existed without such evils

cant free will. If God narrows the scope of

are and how

2.2 Why Peterson's

If this way of drawing out the implications

and its potential

ISTHEISMCOMPATIBLEWITH GRATUITOUSEVIL? / 119

tion of some greater evil.10 Of course, given

that the exercise

of free will might

limit our moral freedom to situations such

ally gets hurt. Perhaps we could describe

If the value assigned to the exercise of free

to prevent all gratuitous evil,

So, God and gratuitous evil are compatible.

120 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

3.2 Two points

God would be justified in arranging things

did and who

for our eter?

itself justify God in permitting some in?

will justifies God in permitting horrible

all that much?