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Article history:
Available online 29 July 2013
Keywords:
Individual irrigation
Small private irrigation
Common resource management
a b s t r a c t
Small reservoirs in Burkina Faso are constructed for many purposes such as domestic water uses, livestock
watering and irrigated rice production downstream of the dam. Increasingly farmers use individually
owned motorized pumps to draw water directly from the reservoir and irrigate vegetables upstream of
the dam. This practice, while tolerated, is unauthorized and referred to as irrigation pirate in French.
Upstream vegetable cultivation is successful because it is more protable than downstream rice cultivation. Often, the unofcial irrigated area around the reservoir is much larger than the ofcial command
area below the dam. However, in the absence of an overarching authority to manage the water source,
this may lead to conicts and resource degradation. We take the example of the Korsimoro reservoir in
Burkina Faso to illustrate the positive and negative impacts of spontaneous individual irrigation around
communally managed water bodies.
2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Small reservoirs capturing local runoff play a signicant role in
rural livelihoods and agricultural production. Wisser et al. (2010)
estimate that water stored in small reservoirs around the globe
could increase global cereal production by 35% through supplemental irrigation. In India there are some 208,000 small reservoirs
(called tanks) irrigating 2.3 million ha (Palanisami et al., 2010).
In South India where geology is less favorable for groundwater
storage, groundwater abstraction is costly and rivers are seasonal,
irrigation from small reservoirs produces 4.2 million tons of rice.
In Sri Lanka tank irrigation is the predominant form of irrigation,
with the oldest reservoir dating back more than one thousand years
(Sakthivadivel et al., 1997). In Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique
there are more than 9000, 2000 and 600 small reservoirs respectively (AgWater Solutions, 2011). In Burkina Faso there are more
than 1300 small reservoirs (Cecchi et al., 2009; Leemhuis et al.,
2009) and at least 900 in Ghana (Annor et al., 2009; Venot and
Cecchi, 2011).
In villages without easy access to other water sources, small
reservoirs play a vital role in supplying water for many uses such as
domestic purposes, bathing, washing, watering cattle and cottage
industries, such as brick making (Faulkner et al., 2008; Boelee et al.,
2009; Lautze et al., 2008). More recently, governments and donors
McCartney, 2010). The Ministry of Agriculture and Water in Burkina Faso (2006) estimates that of the 32,000 ha developed, only
20,000 ha are actually used (MAHRH, 2006). In addition to technical difculties and poor construction quality, problems relate to
the management of common property (Birner et al., 2010; Sally
et al., 2011).
Ostrom and Gardner (1993) provide several successful examples
of self-organization in which irrigation systems have avoided the
pitfalls of common property management. This tends to occur when
certain conditions are met (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001). Collective resource boundaries and user rights need to be clearly dened;
the external environment needs to be favorable; user groups must
be more or less homogeneous (or at least willing to cooperate);
and local institutional arrangements often informal facilitate
collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). To enhance collective action and resource mobilization for the management of small
reservoirs, some governments and donors call for the formation or
strengthening of water user associations (Palanisami et al., 2008,
2010; Anbumozhi et al., 2001; Birner et al., 2010). Some donors even
regard the presence of well-functioning water user associations
or similar structures as a prerequisite to further interventions
(IFAD, 2009). However, Venot et al. (2012) warn that top-down
approaches to WUA formation are not always appropriate. A uniform approach disregards many formal and informal institutions
and local collective action initiatives which already are involved in
the governance of small reservoirs.1 Further, water user associations often focus primarily on management of water for irrigation,
such that other water users including shermen and cattle herders
are under-represented or not represented at all.
Some observers question the common notion that small reservoirs are under-performing. Actual performance measures are
narrowly dened in terms of area under irrigation, crop production, and crop water productivity. Multiple benets, such as
livestock watering, domestic uses, small enterprises and groundwater recharge account for an additional 12% of the value of
benets derived from water stored in small reservoirs (Palanisami
et al., 2011). Venot et al. (2012) nd that extension workers who
base their judgment on the state of the infrastructure, agricultural
outputs, and functionality of the ofcially recognized water user
association, rate the performance of reservoirs much lower than villagers who consider many benets and social values when making
their judgment.
In this paper we argue that debates about investments in small
reservoirs should account for the growing trend of irrigation development upstream of the dams. Increasingly, farmers use small
mostly individually owned motorized pumps to draw water
directly from reservoirs and irrigate vegetables upstream of the
dam (Ki et al., 2010; Ndanga-Kouali, 2011; Payen and Gillet, 2007).
This highly protable activity is spreading, particularly in Burkina
Faso. Often, the area under irrigated vegetables upstream is several times larger than the area under rice downstream (Sally et al.,
2011). Overall, this trend has a positive impact on the local economy and boosts the costbenet ratios of otherwise low yielding
irrigation investments in small reservoirs.
Irrigation on the banks of small reservoirs in Burkina Faso is not
a new phenomenon. Already in the early 1990s Abernethy (1994)
reported vegetable cultivation around several reservoirs. Recently,
however, the scale of this activity has expanded rapidly, with the
import of affordable and portable motorpumps from China and
India. Government subsidies and development projects also have
spurred the recent increase in private irrigation upstream of small
reservoirs. No statistics exist regarding upstream use of reservoirs,
213
but based on eld observations and Google Earth imagery, we estimate that most of the small reservoirs in Burkina Faso support
irrigation upstream of the dam. In 2005 about 170,000 smallholders
produced $32 million worth of vegetables on 8900 ha of irrigated
land (DSA, 2005). An estimated 94% of the produce was sold on local
markets. It is likely that most of these vegetables were irrigated
informally from reservoirs, as ofcial irrigation schemes are dedicated to rice, and irrigation from rivers and lakes is not common in
Burkina Faso.
The uncontrolled proliferation of small pumps for vegetable
cultivation upstream of reservoirs can lead to environmental problems such as over-abstraction, resource degradation and pollution
from agricultural chemicals. Also, it is a source of conict between
competing groups of water users around the reservoir, such as
households, shermen, rice farmers and pastoralists (Sally et al.,
2011; Ndanga-Kouali, 2010). We chose the Korsimoro site as an
illustration of a small reservoir that is relied on by many competing users, and where the informal area irrigated by pumping
directly from the reservoir is 8 times larger than the ofcial command area irrigated by canals downstream of the dam. Sally et al.
(2011) and Mvondo-Ayissi (2010) describe other reservoirs in Burkina Faso where similar trends are observed. Field observations and
scrutiny of Google Earth imagery provide evidence that these are
not isolated cases.
We examine the positive and negative impacts of small, private irrigation upstream of the Korsimoro reservoir and we describe
the ensuing dilemmas for water management and governance. On
one hand, this private irrigation adds substantial value to the benets derived from water stored in small reservoirs and needs to be
incorporated in performance measures. It also provides examples
of the farmer-led emergence of institutions for the management
of irrigation infrastructure and distribution of water. On the other
hand, it adds to difculties related to communally managed water
resources and conicts over water resources.
Fig. 1. Google Earth image of the irrigated areas upstream and downstream of the Korsimoro reservoir in Burkina Faso during the dry season JanuaryApril 2011.
Table 1
Characteristics of vegetable farmers organized in producer groups and individual
pump users around the Korsimoro reservoir, Burkina Faso.
2
Based on yields of 2535 tons of onions per ha; average onion price of 150 CFA
per kg; and exchange rate of 475 CFA per US dollar.
Farmers sharing
a pumpa
N = 84
Individual
pump ownersb
N = 41
2305
750
4552
39
5.1
57%
13%
5350
1805
8550
31
2.5
84%
9%
Based on farmer surveys around the Korsimoro Reservoir during eldwork in the
dry season from January to April 2011
a
These are farmers organized in a group who share a motorized pump. In total
we counted 43 groups with 1870 registered members, though not all are active.
b
These are farmers owning a small motorized pump for individual use. We identied 67 individual pump users.
c
These are individuals who migrate to the Korsimoro area during the dry season specically to engage in vegetable cultivation around the reservoir. They are
considered as outsiders by villagers living in Korsimoro.
Women
group
(N = 1)a
60 (35)
3.86 (3.47)
1265 (440)
5512 (5957)
1346 (835)
4166 (5265)
870 (473)
70
2.80
526
1474
758
716
256
Source: group ledgers and accounts, available with bureau members, accessed during eldwork JanuaryApril 2011.
Figures in brackets are standard deviations.
a
Out of the 43 user groups we could locate 12 with consistent and accessible
accounts. We identied 2 women groups of which 1 had complete written accounts.
b
Running costs include fuel, pump repair and maintenance and, where applicable,
salaries of a pump operator and/or watchman.
215
Table 3
Estimated costs and benets of irrigated vegetable cultivation above the Korsimoro reservoir in Burkina Faso for individual farmers in the dry season of 2011 in US dollars.
Costs per 1000 m2
Pump owner
group chairman
Typical small
irrigator (renter)
Irrigator (renter),
early harvest
168
11
70
166
2
0
0
17
19
77
1
0
161
7
63
175
2
4
418
114
411
Total revenue
Prot for 0.1 ha
Prot per hectare
24
44
0.27
14
45
0.27
1061
643
6430
17
116
0.70
634
500
5000
1968
1557
15,570
The rst column provides an illustration of a typical average smallholder farmer who rents 1000 m2 of irrigated land from a pump owner for onion cultivation, sowing in
December. The second column represents a pump owner and president of a producer group. Land and irrigation costs are paid from the rent payments from group members.
He cultivates a larger area but less intensively (lower fertilizer application and yields). The third column in the table shows a farmer who harvested his onions in December
and obtained a price three times higher than a few months later in the season. Because he harvests early in the season he partly relies on hired labor. Based on farmer surveys
around the Korsimoro Reservoir during eldwork in the dry season from January to April 2011.
expansion of the rice area. Currently there are 169 local farm families and 7 womens groups owning rice plots of 0.16 ha each. Some
farmers choose not to cultivate their plots, as they prefer to rent
them out for $32 or two bags of rice per season. A water fee of $4.70
per plot per season is levied by the cooperative of rice farmers. At
the beginning of the season, each rice farmer is supposed to contribute to maintenance work or pay a ne of $1.25, but lately this
rule has not been enforced and maintenance of canals has become
long overdue. Steel gates have disappeared and canal lining is in bad
shape. Despite its poor physical state, the system is used intensively
to produce two rice crops per year. Recently, farmers have begun
using the command area to produce vegetables in the dry season,
sometimes by pumping water directly from the canals or reservoir.
However, the area under vegetable cultivation is (still) very limited. In 20102011 the observed rice cropping intensity was 194%
and average yields ranged from 4.5 to 5.5 tons/ha per crop cycle.
The total rice harvest is estimated at 280340 tons, valued at US
$134,400US $153,600 per year (2 crop cycles).
Table 4 illustrates the revenues and expenses of rice farmers.
The farmers in the rst and third columns are members of the rice
cooperative and own one plot of 0.16 ha each. The farmer represented in the second column leases the land. One crop cycle of
paddy earns about $150$200 on 0.16 ha of land. A handful of farmers grow paddy for the seeds. This is a protable activity, earning
three times more than paddy (Table 3, third column) but requires
higher investments and more knowledge that are needed for rice
cultivation.
3.2.1. Rice cooperative
A Cooperative of Rice Producers was formed directly after the
command area downstream was brought into use in 1988. The
cooperative is headed by a bureau of 7 ofce-bearers. Membership
is compulsory for rice producing farmers and women groups. At
the beginning of the growing season, the rice cooperative acquires
a loan from the local bank of about $10,000 to buy fertilizer in bulk.
The cooperative receives the fertilizer at a subsidized rate from the
Ministry of Agriculture and distributes it to interested members.
Following the harvest, farmers pay back the cooperative the equivalent of the fertilizer market price plus interest in bags of rice. The
cooperative retains the difference and can make a prot of about
$45 per 50 kg bag of fertilizer. Consequently, those members who
can afford to pay cash at the beginning of the growing season prefer buying fertilizer on the open market to avoid interest payments.
The cooperative pays a lower price for rice than on the open market.
Farmers who do not need the money immediately after the growing season, or do not have loans to repay, prefer to sell their rice on
the open market.
Table 5 summarizes the earnings from irrigated agriculture
using water from the Korsimoro reservoir for different actors
and activities during the dry season in the ofcial and unofcial
Table 4
Estimated costs and benets of rice farmers with irrigated land downstream from the Korsimoro reservoir (Burkina Faso) in the dry season of 2011 in US dollars.
Costs (dollar per plot of 0.16 ha one crop cycle)
Rent of land
Water fees
Labor, land preparation
Seeds
Fertilizer
Pesticides
Total costs
Revenue
Value of rice produce (dollar/0.16 ha)
Prot (dollar/0.16 ha)
Prot (dollar/ha)
Typical rice
farmer
0
4.7
10.5
1.6
42.1
1.1
60
284
214
1338
Renter of
paddy land
31.6
4.7
10.5
1.6
44.7
0.0
97
256
158
988
Farmer of
rice seeds
0
4.7
10.5
15.8
44.7
1.1
81
682
601
3756
Rice farmers depend on exchange of labor during busy times, such as harvest, transplanting and weeding. Sometimes payments are made in bags of rice. The production costs
exclude labor, due to the difculty of pricing these exchanges. Based on farmer surveys around the Korsimoro Reservoir during eldwork in the dry season from January to
April 2011.
217
Table 5
Comparison of typical prots by different actors in irrigated agriculture upstream and downstream of the Korsimoro reservoir (Burkina Faso) in the dry season of 2011 in US
dollars.
Prot per farmer
(USD/dry season)
Remarks
Depends on
landholding size
Up to 350
3850
1370
(1) 225290
(2) 675
200600
(1) 50006500
(2) 15,550
13403760
150
990
Rents out land during the dry season and uses it for rainfed
cereals in the wet season. Guaranteed rent income, no
effort, risk free
Assumption: owns one pumps, rents 3 ha of which he
cultivates 0.3 ha: rent income + onion sales = 2350 + 1500
(1) Rents 3 plots of 150 m2 , harvest in March
(2) Rents 3 plots of 150 m2 , harvest in December
One plot of 0.16 ha; prot during dry season; excludes the
harvest during the rainy season
One plot of 0.16 ha; prot during dry season; excludes the
harvest during the rainy season
Based on farmer surveys around the Korsimoro Reservoir during eldwork in the dry season from January to April 2011.
nominal membership fee of $2 per year, but the group has been
inactive in recent years and fees have not been collected.
Several thousand cattle are watered at the Korsimoro reservoir.
Pastoralists belong to 49 different groups, organized in a Union of
Livestock Farmers, again at the insistence of the agricultural extension worker in 2004, but the groups and union are inactive. Near the
reservoir bed, a few farmers engage in brick making. Their number
is small and they have limited impact on water use, though their
activities may be the cause of local erosion.
4. Discussion
3.3. Other users: shermen, pastoralists, brick makers
During our study, we counted 29 shermen making a living from
the reservoir, but this is likely an underestimate. All shermen must
obtain an annual, renewable permit for $16 from the Ministry of
Agriculture, but the nearest ofce is more than one hours drive
and government ofcials rarely come to the site to check. Thus,
many residents sh without a permit. At the insistence of the agricultural extension worker, the shermen organized themselves in
an ofcially registered group in 2004, the same year in which the
Union of Vegetable Farmers was established. The group charges a
Table 6
Overview of water users around the Korsimoro reservoir in Burkina Faso.
Organization
Number of beneciaries
Area under cultivation
Total annual water withdrawn
Total value of produce
Value generated per unit of
withdrawn water
Rules and regulations
Vegetables upstream,
pumping directly from
reservoir
Cattle watering
Fisheries
High degree of
self-organization guided by
market transactions
between land owners,
pump owners, and lessees.
Active groups and Union.
More than 1000
232 1.33 = 308 ha
2.7 million m3
$2.5$3.0 million
$0.93$1.11 per m3
Communally managed
through Rice Farmers
Cooperative. Farmers face
difculties in mobilizing
resources for maintenance
of irrigation infrastructure.
176
32 1.94 = 62 ha
0.82 million m3
$0.134$0.154 million
$0.16$0.19 per m3
Low degree of
organization. Individual
activity. Common interest
groups and Union exist but
inactive.
Low degree of
organization. Individual
activity. Common interest
groups exist but inactive.
A few dozen
NA
Negligible
Not known
NA
None
NA
Increased water
abstraction upstream could
lead to water shortage for
rice in dry season
Based on farmer surveys around the Korsimoro Reservoir during eldwork in the dry season from January to April 2011.
3
Value of production divided by withdrawals for rice: $134,000 to
154,000/0.82 million m3 = $0.160.19 per m3 . For vegetables $2.53 million/
2.7 million m3 = $0.921.11/m3 .
5. Concluding remarks
Irrigation directly from small reservoirs for vegetable cultivation
during the dry season is increasing. It adds substantial economic
value to the use of the reservoir water. It is small-scale, private,
self-funded and guided by market transactions involving land owners, pump owners, and lessees. Our analysis provides evidence of
a high level of self-organization among those involved. Its spontaneous nature and strong economic drivers raise several pertinent
questions that remain unanswered. The questions address policy
pertinent topics, such as the nature of public and donor-driven
investments in irrigation projects in developing countries, and
the potential gains from supporting small-scale, private irrigation
activities. When the goal of irrigation projects is to enhance smallholder access to water for productive uses, it seems wise to take
note of the dilemmas that arise from the upstream irrigation from
reservoirs in Burkina Faso. We note, in closing, several dilemmas
and questions that motivate further analysis.
Upstream vegetable farmers can be regarded as pioneering an
innovative and protable way of exploiting small reservoirs that
would otherwise lie underutilized. On the other hand, downstream
farmers regard them as pirates who steal water at the expense of
ofcially recognized water user groups. Disallowing irrigated vegetable cultivation upstream of the dam and along the shores of
reservoirs would mean a considerable loss of much needed income
for numerous smallholders. Can such activities be regulated and
incorporated within the existing water user association structure,
or should private farmers be allowed to continue withdrawing
water from reservoirs without regulation or management of the
communal resource?
Donors invest substantial amounts in expensive canals and protection dikes downstream from the reservoir. They also invest
substantial effort in training of sub-optimally functioning water
user associations. As the Korsimoro example shows, farmers are
quite effective in organizing themselves around shared used of irrigation equipment and land, based on market principles. Should
development projects reconsider their investments in irrigation
infrastructure and training of water user associations? Should they
support individual pumping instead as a more affordable alternative to enhancing access to water for productive uses? What would
be the long-term tradeoffs for the environment?
These questions are gaining in importance as spontaneous
irrigation around small reservoirs is increasing in Burkina Faso,
Northern Ghana and elsewhere. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the
design of water infrastructure, and the management and allocation
of water in reservoirs. Important lessons can be drawn from the
economic success of spontaneous irrigation and the high degree
of self-organization that is inherent in small, private irrigation
initiatives. Yet, there are good reasons also to study potential implications regarding efciency, equity, and the environment.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on a case study conducted under the Agricultural Water Management Solutions project funded by a grant
from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (see project website at:
http://awm-solutions.iwmi.org). The ndings and conclusions contained within are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reect
positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. We
thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments
and suggestions, which have notably improved the quality of this
paper.
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