ON THE GUYANESE DICTATORSHIP:

SUBSTANCE, FORM AND COURSE

Ravi Dev
“The trouble with us, comrades, is that we don’t know to read between the lines; we are always reading
on top of the lines; we are more democratic than the people who teach us democracy.” 1

Tyranny, it has been said, is tyranny, and academic distinctions between “Authoritarianism”,
“One–Party Dictatorships” and “Totalitarianism”, leave the unfortunate souls who have to endure them,
singularly unmoved. However, for those seeking to determine how and why these political systems
persist, change, or are changed, an apprehension of the fundamental nature of the “dictatorship” in
question is a threshold issue that must be addressed.
Even his fervent supporters conceded that Forbes Burnham, who ruled Guyana and dominated its
politics form 1964 to his death in 1985, to be “dictatorial”. Desmond Hoyte, his successor, has vowed to
uphold the ‘Burnham legacy’,2 thereby indicating that the inevitable systematic continuities, inherent in
all polities, will be reinforced.
This analysis will attempt to demonstrate the following:
(i) Burnham established an “exclusive” one–party state in Guyana, based on support
from the minority Coloured and African sections of the society, and the permanent
exclusion of the majority Indian section from political participation.
(ii) His regime acquired a totalitarian form in operationalzing the goals of permanent
subjugation of the Indian masses, and the satisfaction of his personal ambition for
absolute power.
(iii) He adopted a Marxist–Leninist ideology out of a combination of personal conviction;
a need to mobilize the Coloured and African sections; and a desire to rationalize his
totalitarian excesses with an appropriate vocabulary and methodological postulate.
(iv) The Hoyte’s regime (which succeeded Burnham’s) is a continuation of the
exclusionary one–party state without the Marist–Leninist rhetoric. It is based on the
support of the middle and upper class Creole and Indian sections - in tandem with the
demobilization of the lower class African and Indian sections.
The analysis will incorporate three levels of generality both in terms of socio–cultural contexts
and historical epoch.3 At the highest level of generality and long-term outlook in time, the effect of the
global process of modernization/secularisation (this includes changes in modes of production) on nations
can be examined. One theory that operates at this level, and which will be implicit in the analysis, is that
of “imperialism” and its implications for the colonized nations. From the medium range, the social
sections within the state, and the processes they initiate in confronting the structural discontinuities
implicit in the modernization/secularisation drive within a colonial and neo-colonial context, will be
addressed. Here, the theories of “cultural pluralism”, 4 “one-party systems”,5 and “totalitarianism” will be
applied to Guyana’s historical record during and after the “decolonialization” period. Finally, from the

1
Forbes Burnham, Report on the Third Biennial Congress of the PNC, Aug. 22-26 1979, Sophia, Georgetown. p.
205.
2
Hoyte, Desmond, “Address to the P.N.C 7th Biennial Congress”, Sophia, Georgetown, 1987.
3
Germani, Gino. Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction books
1978.
4
Smith, M.G. A Framework for Caribbean Studies. Kingston, Jamaica: U.W.I Extra Mural Department, 1956.
Depres, Leo A. Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana. Rand McNally: Chicago, 1967.
5
Huntington, Samuel and Clement Moore. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of
Established One Party Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
4(a). see notes 15, 16, 17, infra.

1
short-range perspective, the principal actors in the social sections, and their tactics and strategies utilized
in the mobilization process, can be considered through theories of “leadership” and “personality”. 6
The analysis will address the dictatorship primarily from a medium range perspective (socio-
historically), due to the exigencies of focus and space. Cognizant however, of the influence short-range
idiosyncratic features of a society, together with the broader, underlying long range factors impinging on
that society has, in determining the substance of its political regime, the form it will assume, and the
course of its evolution - the short and long range theories will constantly be alluded to.
The reality the theories attempt to explain is an unbroken one and the various analyses are
inextricably interwoven. Reification of the analytic categories would substitute epistemological tools for
ontological reality; the result would be incomplete diagnosis and faulty prognosis.

One-Party Systems
Political parties arose during the eighteenth century as vehicles for the articulation of the
demands of the emergent middle class for a share of political power to complement the economic power
they already possessed at that stage in the development of capitalism. Other social alignments also
mobilized as they confronted crises of resource allocation and control, of legitimacy and power relations
and of participation and integration. Where the level of secularisation produces “a complex pattern of
cross cutting cleavages” in society to protect various interests, plural party systems emerge. 7 In contrast,
in countries where mutually reinforcing cleavages of race, social and economic classes, ethnicity or
language coincide, the “socially plural societies evolve as politically bifurcated”. 8 The emergent political
parties are “broker institutions” for groups, which define their interests in mutually exclusive terms with
reference to control of the state and allocation of its resources. 9 Politics is practised at a primordial level
with apocalyptic fervour: winner takes all.

A “one-party system” is, in effect, the efforts of a political elite to organise and to legitimise rule
by one social force over another in a bifurcated society. 10 In Europe, the result was either “a separation
into different countries so that the cleavages become international rather than national” or “the creation of
a one-party authoritarian or totalitarian state”. 11 In the latter case the social class on ethnic group that
controlled or captured the coercive apparatus of the state formed either an “exclusionary” or
‘revolutionary” one-party system. Exclusionary systems, generally found in ethnic or racial bifurcation,
“use the party as a means of mobilizing support for their constituency, while at the same time suppressing
or restricting political activity by the subordinate force”. 12 The revolutionary systems, on the other hand,
“attempt to eradicate the bifurcation of society by shrinking society to correspond to its constituency
through liquidation of the subordinate social force or by expanding its constituency to correspond to the
society by the assimilation of the subordinate social force”. 13

6
Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Time Books, 1951, 1963. Fromm Eric. The Sane Society, Greenwich
Conn, Fawcett. (1955)
7
. Huntington, Samuel, “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One Party System”, in Samuel Huntington and
Clement Moore, eds. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1971, p.11. As
the industrial revolution progressed the social relations of the feudal system in which it begun were profoundly
altered. A major change was the separation of maters of state and church in the activities of the populace (civil
society) – dubbed secularisation. The groups in “civil society” mobilised to protect or acquire interests.
8
. id. Generally p.10-11.
9
. Despres. supra.
10
. Huntington, supra, p.11.
11
. Dahl, Robert, ed. Political Oppression in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
12
. Huntington. supra.
13
. Huntington. supra.

2
 Both one-party systems have proven quite adaptive to the continued demands of “modernization”.
At the onset, however, the primary goal of both is to achieve control over the polity, and it is at this initial
stage that some one-party systems may adopt a “totalitarian” form. 14

The Totalitarian State 15

Friedrich and Brezinski’s 1956 “six-point syndrome” remains the most authoritative exposition of
the descriptive categorization of totalitarian regimes. Polities that exhibit the following symptoms
(abstracted from the experiences of Stalinist Russia, Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy) are by their
definition “totalitarian”:
“(i) An official ideology;
(ii) a single mass party led typically by the man, ‘the dictator’;
(iii) a system of terroristic control;
(iv) a near complete monopoly of control of all means of effective mass communication;
(v) a near complete monopoly of control of all means of effective control;
(vi) central control and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic
coordination.”16 In 1969 another feature was added –
vii) a near complete monopoly of control of “all organisations including economic
ones”.17
An alternative, and not necessarily a contradictory approach, which will be utilized here,
(rationalist and normative) is to view the abovementioned “symptoms” as the institutions and practises
through which the regime seeks to realize its “ideal” - posited here as absolute control and domination
over the society.18 The control is “exclusive” rather than “total”, implying that no other institution or
individual can effectively compete with the ruling elite. The elite or maximum leader decides on the
degree of control to be imposed on the society and always retains this initiative. 19
From this perspective, polities can vary from “anarchistic” through “liberal democratic”,
“authoritarian”, etc. and culminating in “totalitarian”. 20 The sine qua non of totalitarianism, then, is the
pervasiveness of the regime’s control, extending through and over every institution and every individual
in the society. The will and personality of the leader is an important element in the determination of
whether a one-party system will be “totalitarian” or “authoritarian”. 21 The latter “are political systems
with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with
distinctive mentality); without intensive or extensive political mobilization (except for some points in
their development), and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group), exercises power within
formally, ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.” 22

14
. Huntington, supra, 17.
15
. The term ‘totalitarianism’ has been used polemically to such an extent against the Soviet Union that many
scholars question the utility of the term. We believe that, as defined below, the term describes a reality that has
existed and which can reappear under the proper conditions as witnessed in Cambodia under Pol Pot in the late
‘70s’. See also Curtis, supra, 12.
16
. Friedrich, Carl, “Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger Press, 1956.
17
. Friedrich, Carl, Totalitarianism: Recent Trends”, in Problems of Communism. Vol. 17, No 3 May-June, 1972.
18
. Curtis, Michael. Totalitarianism. New Brunswich, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979. Other writers have focused on
other qualities as the ‘substance’ of totalitarianism –such as terror. Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of
Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace, Javanovich, 1973. “The Leader” in Leonard Schapiro,
Totalitarianism. New York: Praeger Pub., 1972.
19
. Jancer, Wolfe. Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power. New York: Praeger Press., 1971. p.6.
20
. Almond. G. and Powell. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.
21
. Shapiro, supra, 70-71.
22
. Linz, Juan, “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain”. For ‘authoritarianism” in general, see Perlmutter,
Amos. Modern Authoritarianism: A Sociological Perspective. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Press, 1970.

3
 It is the drive and single-mindedness of the leader that pushes “control” to its outer limits and
which results in the complete atomisation of the population and pre-emption of any opposition. He
promulgates an ideology which might express the “historical meaning or substance” of the regime but
which certainly will offer “a vocabulary and a methodological postulate for justifying and legitimising the
totalitarian state”. 23
From a medium level of analysis, the “legal order” - defined broadly as “the persistence of an
established system of rules, habits and institutions operating within a fixed framework of limits, each
single component part of which has to be overcome or set aside by a special enactment”- becomes an
obstacle to the totalitarian leader and this is what he attempts to destroy. 24
The leader and his party, however, do not operate in a vacuum and there are several factors, as
suggested before, which will determine the precise form the regime will adopt; the ideology it will
espouse and the course it will choose: these will be the long and medium term factors.

Guyana: Internal and External Factors

(i) The Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.) from its formation in 1950, adopted an aggressive
socialist posture and rhetoric. To the strongly anti-communist Churchill in England; and
Eisenhower, in an America caught up in the McCarthyism communist witch-hunting -
during the height of the cold war - this was simply unacceptable, especially to the latter
under its ‘Truman Doctrine’. 25 The U.S-inspired ouster of Mossedeq in Iran , 26 Arbenz of
Guatemala 27 - in 1953 and 1954 respectively - and the suspension of British Guiana’s
constitution in 1953, appeared to have convinced Burnham that his more gradualist and
less pro-Soviet brand of socialism was tactically, the more appropriate course to pursue.
This ideological difference was one of the precipitating factors in the 1955 split between
Burnham and Jagan.

(ii) Guyana was a minuscule British colony, situated in the Western Hemisphere. However,
as a potential ‘gateway’ into South America, the U.S took its strategic value as a potential
“communist” base very seriously. The strident rhetoric of the reflexively pro-Soviet
Jagan did little to allay those fears. In 1961, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba,
Kennedy could ill afford to “lose Guyana to the communists” and this fear was his
rationale for destabilizing the Jagan government. 28

(iii) Guyana was also an economically backward colony with severe unemployment
problems. Primarily foreign multi-nations and a small “comprador bourgeoisie”
controlled the economy. The few social organisations that existed were based primarily
on race and class (which initially coincided) and were geared towards increasing the
share of the ‘colonial pie’ for their middle class members. Politically, Guyana was
labelled “precocious” in the fifties due to the politicalisation by the radical P.P.P. 29

23
. Germani, Gino, “Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain”, In Huntington and
Moore, eds. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. New York: Basic Books, 1971. p.342.
24
. Schapiro, supra, p. 36.
25
.Truman, Harry S. Address before a Joint Session of Congress March 12, 1947. “We cannot allow changes in the
status quo, by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration” quoted in Richard Barnet,
Intervention and Revolution, 1972 p.19
26
. Barnet, Richard, supra, 265
27
. Barnet, Richard. id, supra.
28
. See general, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, Houghton Miflin,
Boston. 1965. p.522-779.
29
See generally, Leo Depres, supra.

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 (iv) Guyanese society was, and remains, a complex modified plural society, with race
forming the most salient cleavage, within which all other divisions (such as class) as
subsumed. The major sections are the Indians (the majority), Africans, Creoles and
Amerindians. They are ecologically distinct, with Africans and Creoles more urbanized
and proletarianilized, Indians rural and agrarian and the Amerindians relegated to the
interior jungles. The dominant Creole cultural forms have a “white bias” orientation and
are products of British colonial rule. The Creole section is the guardian and arbiter or the
“official” cultural norms, which are imposed hegemonically over other cultural
expressions, such as those of the Indians, Africans, and Amerindians, resulting in severe
problems of identity and authenticity in those groups. 30
(v) The organs of the state, especially the bureaucracy and armed forces, were inherited from
the British colonials and were staffed primarily by Creoles and Africans due to
historically biased recruitment patterns. The form of the state was basically an
authoritarian, paternalistic one, geared towards the protection of the planter class, local
business interests and other Imperial concerns.

The Leader, the Ideology and the Party 31

The personality of the leader is a most crucial variable in the determination of the precise
form the one-party system will assume. 32 Burnham’s overriding characteristics were his ambition
and his intellect. These qualities, along with his oratorical virtuosity 33 and tactical skills earned
him the label “charismatic”34 A member of the communist party while a student in England, he
was recommended by that group to Jagan as a “suitable” African, who tactically could rally the
African section for the soon-to-be formed nationalist P.P.P. He became Chairman of the party
under the leadership of Jagan; whose position he craved and fought for from the beginning. Other
ethnic leaders were recruited, as the party yet attempted to define itself as a “revolutionary” party
exploiting the cleavage of “class” - with the British ruling class and its small local representative
as the “enemy”.
The ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this approach were myriad but were
masked by the electoral mobilization in the first general elections under universal franchise in
1953. They were exposed as soon as victory was won and the “spoils” were to be distributed;
they are exemplified by Burnham’s persistent pursuit to be the leader from 1953 to the formation
of the P.N.C. in 1958.
Burnham craved to be leader for three reasons:
(i) His undeniable personal ambitions;
(ii) his realization that Jagan and other “extreme” leftists had a very naïve
apprehension of the geopolitical realities of the era; and
(iii) he considered himself the representative of the African and Creole sections, who
were increasingly seeing themselves in danger of being overwhelmed by
Indians.35

30
See generally, Leo Depres, and M.G. Smith, supra.
31
. See, Shapiro, supra, 70-71 for the relationships among leaders, party and ideology in totalitarian states.
32
. Curtis, supra, 33, in discussing totalitarian regimes, also Shapiro, supra, 48
33
. Manley, Robert H. Guyana Emergent. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1978, p. 19.
34
. Manley, Robert H. This quality consists of all apparent possession of “supernatural of superhuman or at all even
specifically out of the ordinary qualities which make him appear as an emissary of God or of a destined Leader”.
Weber is not concerned with the objective truth about the leader’s qualities, and is prepared to include frauds and
charlatans in his category of ‘charismatic’ leader. See Danns, Transition Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, for defining Burnham
35
as a ‘mesmeratic’ leader.
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, p.38.

5
 The last reason stemmed from several factors. Firstly, even though the P.P.P. thought it
had addressed the racial cleavages by recruiting leaders from each racial/ethnic group, the
dominance of the Indian top leadership, the aggressive entry of Indians into positions formerly
dominated by Creoles, the economic development plans that stemmed towards agriculture 36, and
the generally jingoistic response of this previously politically backward but numerically largest
section, raised concerns in the other sections as to the implications of their “minority” status.
While the P.P.P. had defined itself as a “revolutionary” party, which would eliminate the “ruling
class” and fuse the rest of society with the “working class”, the minority group began to perceive
themselves as potentially permanently dependent on the beneficence of the “major group”. The
P.P.P. was being defined, both by its supporters and its detractors, as an exclusionary party with
its constituency (Indians) and excluded group (Africans and Creoles) racially defined.
Secondly, the discomfiture of the African and Creole sections was exacerbated by the
implications of being dominated by a group with a completely different culture - one they had
been taught to consider as “heathen” and “inferior”. The national ethos had defined Guyana as a
“Creole” nation and the Creoles and Africans, as the guardians of this ethos, naturally presumed
they were to be the inheritors of the nation on the departure of the British. It was unthinkable to
permit power to fall into the hands of the group who were considered to be ambivalent about their
national allegiance.
Burnham, as a consequence, did not have much difficulty in legitimising his drive for
power by articulating the fears of the African and Creole sections, when he launched the P.N.C.
and provided a vehicle to address those fears. In fact Burnham was promised help by Manley and
Bustamante of Jamaica, Adams of Barbados and Padmore of Trinidad if he formed a party to
prevent Jagan from creating and “Indian State” in Guyana. 37 The formation of the United Force
(U.F.) in 1960, representing the White and near-white bloc, further increased the paranoia of the
African and Creole sections.
In a plural society where one section is over fifty percent of the population, “democratic
elections” are not very comforting to minority groups. It is simply a prescription for permanent
exclusion from power and the perquisites thereof, which issue from the exclusionary politics
practiced, once a group acquires power. There is no question that the fears of the minority groups
can be, and have been, heightened by demagogic politicians like Burnham, but one can assert
with as much certitude that the fears are rational and real, based on the experience of minorities
the world over. Unless these fears are addressed, minority groups will continue to be receptive to
mobilization by ambitious politicians. Burnham then, received increasing support from Africans
and Creoles as he strove for power because, to reiterate, they perceived their interests and his, as
coincident.
Burnham’s attempt to wrest control of the P.P.P. between 1953 and 1955 resulted in a
spilt of the nationalist movement. The ignominious defeat of his faction in the 1957 general
elections persuaded him that he could not win over Indian support by merely utilizing Jagan’s
tactic of fielding prominent candidates from the “other” group. Jagan had pre-empted the field. 38
Burnham’s fusion with the United Democratic Party (U.D.P.) - the political offshoot of the
League of Coloured People - in 1958 to create the P.N.C., was a natural development. It
combined Burnham’s support among the lower class rural Africans with the strategic support of
the urban based Creole and African middle class. 39

36
. Greene, J.E., “Participation, Integration and Legitimacy as Indicators of Developmental Change in the Politics
of Guyana” in Social and Economic Studies, Vol.21,No. 3. 1972. p. 274.
37
. Glasgow, Roy. Guyana: Race and Politics among Africans and East Indians. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1970.
38
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 36.
39
. Hintzen, Percy. Capitalism, Socialism and Socio-Political Confrontation in Multi-Racial Developing States: a
comparison of Guyana and Trinidad. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. New Haven: Yale University, 1980.

6
 The subsequent defeat of the P.N.C. in the 1961 elections demonstrated to Burnham that
the P.N.C. could not win office under the existing electoral rules. Presented with opportunity to
change those rules, he joined the C.I.A-Trade Union-U.F. sponsored violent destabilization of the
P.P.P. government between 1962 and 1963. 40 The Trade Union Congress, (T.U.C.) dominated by
Creole and African middle class leadership, provided both the external links to the U.S. and the
internal support to paralyse the P.P.P. government. 41 Burnham, to whom politics was the “science
of deals”, moderated his socialist rhetoric to obtain the support of his new partners. His first
priority was removing Jagan: to him it meant becoming leader; to his external supporter (the
U.S.) it meant removing a communist threat in its “backyard”.
Installed into power in 1964, Burnham resumed his drive for absolute control over the
polity. This control, as he other totalitarian leaders have recognised, cannot be achieved through
sheer will alone: individuals and organisations are needed. 42 To the dictator however, he is now
presented with a dilemma: the individuals and organisations that he must use will also be
strategically positioned to accumulate power and therefore become potential competitors to his
rule. The totalitarian leader addresses this concern by simultaneously publicly building his
instruments of rule - the party, the army, the bureaucracy, etc., while privately manipulating them
to ensure their complete dependence and loyalty, and forestalling any existence outside of his
“beneficence”. 43

The Ideology
If “ideology” is seen as “a system of ideas which refers to fundamental political aims and
designed consciously or unconsciously to influence and direct the course of action for those
within its sphere of influence”, then the ideology of the P.N.C. at the inception was essentially a
defensive one: the prevention of Indian control of the State. 44 The State was to be controlled by
Africans and Creole by any means necessary. In reality, this meant control by the Creole middle
class who manipulated racial symbols to bring along the African segment, who then also had a
share of power. The control of the state for, and by African/Creole sections remains the raison
d’etre of the P.N.C. and explains their initial general indifference to the “innovations” Burnham
introduced to build his power. The fear that is at its core, also explains why no Indian-led
movement has successfully generated significant support from these sections, notwithstanding the
excesses of Burnham.
It was asserted earlier that Burnham was always a Marxist-Leninist and had merely
moderated his rhetoric for tactical reasons. After the P.N.C. seized sole control of the government
by rigging the elections of 1968, Burnham cautiously begun to introduce ‘Marxist-Leninism’ into
Guyana and simultaneously construct his totalitarian state. Even if the former does not
necessarily inevitably imply the latter (and this is arguable), it undoubtedly provides a very
cogent rationale and methodology. 45 Concomitantly, Marxist-Leninism, at least on a theoretical
level, conflicts with the exclusionary party politics by Burnham and the P.N.C. The Marxist
definition of “classes”, as dependent on the relationships of the groups to the forces of
production, along which they would be mobilized, would have combined most Africans and
Indians, as “working class” against the bourgeoisie. 46 The latter, mostly Creoles together with
40
. Barnet, supra. Burnham had begun to question the constitutncy system in favour of proportional representation
even before 1961.
41
. Trinidad Guardian, 11 July,1963, quoted in Ashton Chase; A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 1964.
42
. Shapiro, supra, 58. Mussolini and Hitler founded parties and ‘captured power with a semblance of constitutional
rights and legality.’
43
. Curtis, supra, 35-43, Schapiro, supra 22-23.
44
. Schapiro, supra, p. 47.
45
. David Lowell. From Marx to Lenin: Marx’s Responsibility for Authoritarianism. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1986
46
. Bottomore, T.B., Classes in Modern Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1966, p. 14-18.

7
 Portuguese, Chinese, and the Indian elite, would have to be eliminated or “converted”. 47
Burnham’s Marxist-Leninist innovations, introduced a schizoid element to Guyanese politics: the
covert exclusionary ideology contraposed with an overt exclusionary one. Compounded by the
inevitable negative U.S. response, Burnham’s insistence on introducing this potential source of
instability is one reason for insisting that he considered himself as a Marxist-Leninist. If Burnham
simply desired to rationalize his dictatorship, there are certainly enough models on the “right”,
unobjectionable to the U.S., that assert their “vanguardism” as necessary to prevent “fissiparous”
tendencies or to promote “stability” for development, etc.
Burnham “resolved” the dichotomy between the two ideologies by operationalzing
differentially the two facets inherent in all ideologies: the instrumental and expressive. The
programmatic or instrumental component of Marxist-Leninist was applied to the Creole/African
sections while for the remainder of the population; the goals were translated into myth. “The test
of myth is not what it predicts is true but whether it can be believed”. 48 The Indian and other
excluded sections (which later included lower class Africans) were continuously propagandised
included to convince them of their unity as “the people” who would inherit Guyana in the
millennia and should then accept their present privations. Marxism-Leninism was subsumed
within the cleavage of race/culture. This is not an innovation; seventy-one years after the Soviet
revolution, nineteen of the twenty-three members of the ruling Politburo and Secretariat are
ethnic Russians, even though the latter are only fifty one percent of the population. 49 The fact that
Marxists routinely place their national interest ahead of the ideal of international proletarians
should suggest the extent to which the expressive has overwhelmed the instrumental in Marxism-
Leninism. The transcendence of “racial’ over “working class” interest is simply a manifestation
of the historical stage at which Guyana was mobilized and the persistence of race/ethnicity as
mobilization nuclei.50
Since Karl Marx did not bequeath a blueprint for the “transition” from capitalism to
communism, through the way station of “socialism”, he allowed Marxists from Lenin to
Burnham, much room for improvisation. Burnham’s chosen path was “co-operativism” and in
1970 he declared Guyana “the world’s first co-operative Republic”. He was now embarked on the
transformational imperative of Marxism-Leninism; constrained however, by the omnipresent
necessity to avoid irretrievably antagonizing the U.S. “Co-operatives” were not too controversial
- the U.S., after all, possessed some and the U.S.S.R. labelled them “utopian”. 51 By 1974, with
‘Watergate’ transfixing the American Presidency, Burnham declared the “paramountcy” of the
P.N.C. over the government, along with the socialist nature of his party. 52 Finally, in 1976,
emboldened by U.S. President Carter’s adoption of a “liberal” view of Third World
“innovations”, Burnham announced he was a Marxist-Leninist and that henceforth the P.N.C.
would be recognised as a vanguard party (52) 53. He also explained the tactical nature of his
1970’s, introduction of co-operativism: “the co-operative was identified (as) the instrument for
establishing socialism. Cryptically, we described our ideology as Co-operative Socialism. This
was never intended to be a new brand of socialism”. 54 He revealed the all-pervading goal of his

47
. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. London: Pergnon Books, 1967.
48
. Moore, Clement H., “The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy”, in Huntington and Moore. supra, 56.
49
. New York Times, Week in Review, April 11th 1988.
50
. For a discussion of the persistence of ethnicity as a source of mobilization, see Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict
and Political Development, Little Brown and Co. Boston, 1973.
. Kwayana, Eusi, “Economic Relations in Post Republican Guyana”, in Co-operation Republic, Guyana, 1970, p.
36.
51
. Kwayana, Eusi, “Economic Relations in Post Republican Guyana”, in Co-operative Republic, Georgetown,
Guyana, 1970, p. 36.
52
. Burnham, Forbes. Declaration of Sophia. Georgetown, Guyana, 1974.
53
. Burnham, Forbes. Report to the Nation. Georgetown, 1976.
54
. Burnham, Forbes, “Economic Liberation through Socialism”, 15, 1977. .

8
 ideology by elaborating, “co-operativism does not have its applicability confined to (production).
It applies as well in family relationships, in service institutions and in every form of association
which takes place in society…to effect a complete change of society against a mere revision to
the existing society is the definition of Marxism-Leninism for Guyana”. 55

The Party
The People National Congress and the state organs of the Bureaucracy and the Armed
Forces were the principal institutions used by Burnham in his creation of the totalitarian state.
The P.N.C. as the foundation of his rise will be considered first.
Political parties traditionally operate towards “securing and maintaining for their leaders
the power of governing or ruling the political community on the one hand, and giving the
members of such a party ideological and material satisfaction, benefits and advantages”. 56 With
Burnham in office, the spoils were distributed to its primarily African/Creole supporters. 57
Congress Place, the P.N.C.’s headquarters, became the nation’s employment centre; and the
Party’s ‘card’, the passport to the state’s largess. When ‘other means’ such as the rigging of
elections were found to secure power, and the need for a mass party was obviated, Burnham
announced his socialist path where party memberships was “something that had to be earned”.
The P.N.C. was to be transformed into a “Vanguard Party”, which would be guide in the
transformation of the “society” in conformity to the leader’s vision - Marxism-Leninism.
Burnham and his Creole lieutenants however retained political control, while the base to be
mobilized was the African/Creole sections as explained previously. The vanguard party
typically consists of a small percentage of the population who are “enlightened” as to the official
ideology, and who are dedicated to its implementation. 58 At its core are the trusted lieutenants of
the leaders who have to possess the additional quality of unswerving loyalty to him.

Building the Vanguard Party

When Burnham declared the “paramountcy” of the P.N.C. he defined its goals as
“mobilizing the nation in every sphere and not merely for periodic elections and in support of
specific actions and programmes…the party should assume unapologetically its paramountcy
over the Government which is merely one of its executive arms…The country must be given
practical and theoretical leadership at all levels-political, economic, social and cultural - by the
P.N.C., which has become the major national institution.” 59 The statement unambiguously refutes
the apologists of the P.N.C. who contend that ‘paramountcy’ merely describes the existential
relationship between all ruling parties and their government, in the limited sense that the former
inevitably sets the policies of the latter.
The doctrines of party paramountcy was operationalzed in 1974, by the creation of the
“Office of the General Secretary of the P.N.C. and the Ministry of the National Development”
(O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D.) under the direction of the General Secretary of the Deputy Leader and
General Secretary of the party - the loyal Dr. Reid. 60 It created the nexus between the party and
state and provided a conduit for state funds to accomplish the party’s prime directives. 61 These
were the mobilization of the party’s supporters and the demobilization of the Indian segment and
55
. Burnham, Forbes, “Report to the Nation”, Georgetown, 1976.
56

57
. Jeffrey & Barber, supra, 53. ‘…The P.N.C. came to office as essentially an African party.”
Burnham, Forbes.
58
. Lenin, V.L. What is to be done. New York: International Publishers, 1969.
59
. Forbes Burnham, The Declaration of Sophia, Georgetown Guyana, 1974.
60
. Jeffrey & Barber. Supra, 71. Fradululent Revolution, supra, 54.
61
. U.S. Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Guyana- 1980. p.1.

9
 sub rosa, to secure the supremacy of the newly designated ‘Founder-Leader’. Reorganized several
times since its formation, the O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D. in 1984 consisted of six departments, the
names of which suggest the scope of its activity: National Production, Financial Administration
and Economic Projects, Party Affairs and Mass Organisations, Personnel Administrative Service,
National Orientation and International Relations and Maintenance and Welfare. 62
The party was also organized as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party along the
principle of “democratic centralism”. 63 Seven rigid hierarchical layers of party organisations
corresponded to seven levels of local government while the eight and highest party grouping - the
Biennial Congress - was equivalent to the State Government. Each state organ was controlled by
its equivalent party entity: the state had become the party and the party the state - in theory at
least.64
The totalitarian leader, as was alluded to previously, needs the party to promulgate his
ideology and legitimise his rule, but once in power - considers it a rival for power, much as any
other institution.65 Burnham pursued control of the P.N.C. from its inception and ensured that if
the P.N.C. was going to be the State, he was going to be the P.N.C. Several stratagems were used
to rid accomplish this:
(i) Banishments: Individuals possessing, or gaining, influence within the party were
“rewarded” with ambassadorial postings to distant capitals. This tactic was used to rid the
P.N.C. of the U.D.P. leaders W.O.R. Kendall, John Carter and Lionel Luckhoo and
others.66
(ii) Dismissals: Before the 1968 elections, Burnham announced his intention to purge the
“old guard” on grounds they were not au fait with the “new realities”. They were to be
placed by “young men and women of imagination, earnestness and ability”, whom he
conveniently neglected to mention, also had no independent power base and would
consequently be completely beholden to the Leader. 67 Desmond Hoyte was one of these
“young men…of imagination”.
(iii) Cabinet Reshuffles: Rising stars would be appointed to the Cabinet, which was shuffled
with such frequency (three between 1971 and 1973) that they were taken seriously
neither by their constituency nor their Civil Servants. Ministers came and went while
Burnham remained the constant; all looked to him for answers. 68
(iv) Appointment of Loyalists: During the years of institutionalising the P.N.C. as the
paramount party (1974 to 1984), Ptolemy Reid was the “Deputy Leader and General
Secretary”. He was absolutely loyal to Burnham and could be trusted to be “next in line”.
Reid replaced Hamilton Green, who had earned a formidable party following as a result
of his exploits during the communal riots of 1963-64. Desmond Hoyte, the consummate
‘apparatchiki’, replaced Reid when the latter stepped down on account of illness. Green
was again left out of the direct line of succession.
(v) Technocrats in Cabinet: Burnham increased the number of technocrats, who had no
contact with the populace and who were completely beholden to him for their positions.
Many Indians such as Shridath Ramphal and Mohammed Shahabudeen were also
prominently displayed under this technique to “prove” to the world, the “non-racial”

62
. Jeffery & Barber. supra, 71.
63
. V.I.Lenin. supra.
64
. Jeffrey & Barber. Supra, 71.
65
. Schapiro. Supra, 22-23.
66a. Burnham. Leader’s Address to Congress, April 1967, p. 16. Unpublished Quoted in Burrowes, supra, 214-15
66
. Burrowes. supra. p. 216.
67
. Forbes Burnham, Leader’s Address to Congress, April 1967, p.16, Unpublished, Quoted in Burrowes, supra, p.
214-15.
68
. Burrowes, supra, 276-277.

10
 nature of the P.N.C. The reality was they never had power at any time (from the
standpoint of determining policy) but were merely Burnham’s functionaries.
(vi) Appointment of the Party Officers: Burnham selected all officers of the Party with the
only constraint that he select the General Secretary and Deputy Leader from the “Central
Executive Committee”, which was elected by Congress. 69
(vii) Supreme Leader: By 1983 Burnham was in a position to enshrine his supremacy over
the P.N.C. in the party’s Constitution, Article 22. This authorized him to “exercise any, or
all of the powers of the Biennial Delegates Congress, the general Council, the Central,
Executive Committee, any other committee, group, arm, organ or any officer or official
of the Party”.70

The Leader and the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces, or the “Disciplined Forces” as they are referred to in Guyana, as a
member of the triad of institutions comprising the pillars of Burnham’s regime, were subject to
much of the same dynamics as were the party and bureaucracy. In contrast to the other
institutions however, the Disciplined Forces were built to its present form and size after 1968,
when Burnham had already seized sole control of the Government. He had no need to make
concessions to internal opposition forces, and the development of the Disciplined Forces provides
a very reliable guide to Burnham’s political philosophy.
Using as the rationale an aborted secessionist uprising in the remote Rupununi, and
proactive actions by Venezuela and Suriname in their border claims - all in 1969 - Burnham
boosted the manpower of the armed forces from 2,631 in 1966 to over 21,000 by 1976. 71 The
resulting ratio of one soldier to every thirty-five civilian was one of the highest in the world.
Burnham though, could never even offer an explanation, at least publicly, why this new massive
armed force was 90% Creole/African, in a nation with over 53% Indians. 72 The Creole/African
sections acquiesced in this discriminatory recruitment because, as it did in other areas, the policy
took care of their unemployed youths while guaranteeing exclusion of their rival Indians. The
raison d’etre of the P.N.C. was being consummated.73
Burnham envisioned that the armed forces, with its rigid hierarchical command structure,
would be the most efficient vehicle for the mobilization of the African/Creole youth. 74 The
Guyana Defence Force (GDF), formed just before Independence, and the Guyana Police Force
(GPF) were joined by the Guyana National Service (GNS) in 1974 and the Guyana Peoples’
Militia (GPM) in 1976. The women and youth arms of the P.N.C., the Women’s Revolutionary
Socialist Movement (W.R.S.M.) and the Young Socialist Movement (Y.S.M.) were also armed. 75
The Forces were extensively politicised with the expressed mandate granted to involve the army
69
. P.N.C. Party Constitution, Georgetown, p. 64-65.
70
. Id.
71
. Danns, George, “Militarization and Development: An Experiment in Nation Building”. Transition., Vol. 1, No.
1.,1978.
72
. Danns supra, p 40, concedes that ‘only the black working class people these institutions ‘’ and ‘East Indians (do
not) , based on their over all opposition to the government’. However, in a later published work, he refutes this
argument, in reference to the Police Force at least, by demonstrating that the rate of applications for East Indians
was equal to that of Blacks. George K. Danns, Order and Domination in a Third World State: New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985.
73
. Hintzen, supra, 199.
74
. Hintzen. id, 208
75
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra. 56.

11
 in the “development” of the country and the people. There have been very meagre developmental
accomplishments but the army’s ubiquitous presence amongst the population, their seizure “of
ballot boxes during elections, their use as intimidators and strike -breakers and their unswerving
loyalty to Burnham, have been accomplishments crucial to the survival of his regime”. 76
Burnham demanded not “abstract loyalty”; 77 always paranoid of new centres of powers
being formed, he assured himself of the support of the Disciplined Forces through the following’
stratagems :78
(i) Non-Neutralism: In response to Burnham’s call for the military’s involvement and
unswerving support the disciplined forces declared the policy of ‘Non-Neutralism: they
committed their total allegiance to the ideology of the P.N.C. and not to any other
Government’. This meant that if the P.N.C. were somehow to be removed from office,
the army would not necessarily have to support the new Government.
(ii) Appointments: Burnham as Chairman of the Defence Board personally appointed all
officers who swore a personal oath of loyalty to him.
(iii) P.N.C. Army links: Senior officers attended the Biennial Congresses of the P.N.C.,
participation in deliberations and swore fealty to the “Comrade-Leader”. 79
(iv) Ideological Training: All officers were required to be fully conversant with the ideology
of the P.N.C. and to base their actions on its strictures. 80

The Leader, the Bureaucracy and the Centralized Economy

Of the triumvirate institutions undergirding the dictatorship, the bureaucracy (Civil
Service) was the only one, exclusive of the Police component of the Disciplined Forces, not
essentially created by Burnham and which had an independent and pivotal role in his accession to
power. Colonial bureaucracies, including Guyana’s, were always heavily politicised; the
Governor as a Colonial bureaucrat, along with his senior co-bureaucrats, both initiated and
implemented policy on behalf of the “home” Government. 81 The Guyanese bureaucracy
consequently always considered itself as part of the ruling class and expected to have a continued
and increased input into policy formation, upon “decolonisation”. This view was at variance with
the classical (Weberian) notion of bureaucracies as neutral instruments at the disposal of varied
interests, striving towards administrative efficiency and rationality. The colonial heritage
however, meshed perfectly with the mentality of the “New Class” postulated by commentators as
inevitable with the bureaucratisation of socialist states. 82
Historically, the Guyanese bureaucracy was recruited primarily from the Creole section
of the society.83 They protected their interests through their membership in the Public Service
Union, the League of Colored People and later the United Democratic Party, which merged with

76
. Danns, supra 1978, 31.
77
. Forbes Burnham, Address to the Officers of the GDF, 1970. Scarlet Beret, p.
78
. Reshetar, John S. The Soviet Policy: Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R., 2nd Ed. New York: Harper and
Row, 1976, p. 164-65. Many of these strategies were used by Stalin in his drive to control the Red Army. Quoted in
Curtis, supra, 47
Hintzen Danns. Supra 1978, 35
79
. See for instance, Report on the Third Biennial Congress of the P.N.C. Sophia, Georgetown, 1979.
80
. Danns, supra 1978.
81
. Shahabuddeen, M, Constitutional Development in Guyana 1621-1926. Georgetown, Guyana. 1978.
82
. Dijilas, Milovan. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. London: Allen and Unwin, 1966. (a
critical account.) For a positive account see J. La Palomabare. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971, in reference to ‘developing’ studies.
83
. Lutchman, Harold. Interest Representation in the Public Service. Guyana, 1973. From Colonialism to
Cooperative Republic. Rio Pedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1974.

12
 the P.N.C. in 1958. It was the combination of ‘encroachment’ by Indians into “their” bureaucracy
and their exclusion from, and disagreement with, the P.P.P.’s policies that precipitated anti-Indian
mobilization in Guyana. Lower class Africans were for the most part unaffected by the Indian
surge of participation in the national economy. The strike by the Civil Service in 1962, organized
by the C.I.A. but fuelled by their concern to preserve their social status, demonstrated to all the
participants the impossibility of governing the country without their strategic support.
On assuming power in 1964 Burnham embarked on the consolidation of this support
through dismissal of opposition supporters and mass hiring of the party faithful. 84 By the 1970’s
when Burnham manifested his socialist orientation, the essential conservativism of the
bureaucracy was overcome by the demonstration of the wider scope for exploitation; personal
gain and commandantist relations that would exist in a socialist economy than in the colonial one.
The Guyana National Co-op Bank (GNCB) was established in 1970; 85 Demerara Bauxite
Company (Demba) was nationalized in 1971; 86 Reynolds Bauxite in 1975; Bookers Sugar
(sixteen companies) and sixteen miscellaneous others in 1976. 87The Government now controlled
over 80% of the economy.88 Between 1965 and 1981 the bureaucracy grew by over 400% from
approximately 27,000 to 124,000. A major portion of the increase arose from the need to control
the nationalized industries, but an even greater part resulted from the practice of creating state
agencies to control every aspect of Guyanese life. 89 An ambitious “regionalization”
(decentralisation) plan necessitated an additional ten thousand (10,000) employees, while the
number of Ministries proliferated from ten in 1966 to forty in 1983, with a tenfold increase in
employees.90 Paralleling the experience of the Disciplined Forces, the jobs were reserved for the
African/Creole sections. Burnham reinforced the loyalty of race/ethnicity with the loyalty of
patronage - the P.N.C. was fulfilling its raison d’etre. While the middle class supporters filled
most of the positions in the bureaucracy, Co-operatives were to be the conduits for channelling
resources to the lower class Africans. 91 They were to be encouraged to return to the land and
become self-sufficient.
The increase in the size of the bureaucracy was accompanied by an increase in the
discretionary powers permitted in its dealing with the public. A new imperative, one that took
precedence over the other, joined their functions of administration and management: the
maintenance of the regime in power. The effort took two forms. Firstly, the economic resources it
controlled and the tremendous discretion it was granted, enabled the bureaucracy to condition the
population (especially the excluded groups) by a Pavlovian routine: punishment in the form of
loss of jobs or denial of a right which the Government disposed, or reward by the reverse
behaviour. In a country as small as Guyana this is not an inconsequential power; as Burnham
once remarked, “when I fire you, you stay fired”. 92
The second method was the power of the bureaucracy to contain potential conflicts and
prevent them from escalating to higher and more dangerous levels. 93 Paralleling the rise of the
“bureaucratic leviathan” was the vigilance of Burnham to preclude mobilization against him from
this quarter. This he achieved through a process of “politicization and de-bureaucratization”:

84
.Hintzen. supra, 199.
85
. Borrowes. supra, 241.
86
. Borrowes. id, 259.
87
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 51.
88
. P.N.C. Policy Paper on Cooperativism, Georgetown, 1980.
89
. Rai, Kemraj, “Managing Political Conflict in Guyana,” Transition. Issue 114, 1986, p. 76, citing Danns, George
“The Head of an Elephant” Sunday Chronicle, May 1, 1983.
90
Id.
91
. Hintzen, supra, p. 200.
92
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 56.
93
. See generally, Kemraj Rai, supra.

13
 (i) Weberian criteria of bureaucratic development such as objectivity, precision
and continuity, discretion and qualification for office were abandoned. 94
Through the doctrine of “party paramountancy”, the O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D.
oversaw the ideological “purity” of bureaucratic training and performance.
There was to be no objectivity in the reference to P.N.C. policies: they were
to be supported and not merely executed. Political loyalty became the sole
criterion for measuring competence and suitability for being hired or for
making recommendations.95
(ii) A “party bureaucracy” was developed parallel, but superior to the state
bureaucracy at every level.96
(iii) The party assumed many state functions, especially in reference to hirings and
firings.97
(iv) State employees were monitored for adherence to Burnham’s line; dismissals
accompanied transgressions.98
(v) Multiple hierarchies of bureaucracies were created, which were granted
overlapping jurisdictions; creating bureaucratic infighting.
(vi) Requirement that higher state bureaucrats may be party members.
The resulting competition for power between party and state, the dispersal of power
within the bureaucracy and the demands for ideological conformity all facilitated Burnham’s
control. The debureaucratization led to corruption and inefficiencies, which were major factors in
the deterioration of the economy. Others were policy decisions such as the peripheritization of
agriculture and the destruction of the small retailing trade - mainstays of Indian employment.
Burnham was willing to accept the destruction of the economy if the converse meant giving
Indians, his political opponents, an economic base from which they might mobilize politically.

The Leader and Mass Organisations

Political Parties

A “One-Party system” does not necessarily imply the non-existence of other political
parties, but that when permitted, these other parties have virtually no input in the legitimisation of
the political system, recruitment of political leadership, or interest aggregation and policy
formation.99 By these criteria, Guyana was a de facto one party state since 1968 when Burnham
rigged the elections to take sole control of the Government. Burnham never banned political
parties to create a de jure situation because of the special circumstances under which he had
achieved and maintained power.
The U.S. had instigated the removal of the P.P.P. Government because of the latter’s
communist proclivities; Burnham was considered an opportunist who was the lesser of two
evils.100 As Burnham consolidated his power domestically and became more openly Marxist-
Leninist, he needed to address the concerns of the U.S so as not to be destabilized in favour of
another “alternative”. However, if the alternative were a more orthodox, pro-Soviet Marist-
94
. Gerth, H.H, and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press,
1946. p. 196-244.
95
. Rai, Kemraj. supra, 76.
96
. See generally, Jeffrey and Barber, supra.
97
. Hintzen supra.
98
. PNC 3rd Biennial Congress, 1979, p. 310 – PNC resolution to fire state worker. Also Rai, Kemraj, supra, 77.
99
. In the ‘one party state’ the leaders of interest groups are dependent on the overall leader or elite, and only
secondarily dependent on the support of their membership. Further in having no input into the decision making,
these ‘groups’ constantly have to react to decisions made by the leadership/elite.
100
. Schlesinger, supra.

14
 Leninist Party; the U.S. would not have much of a choice. The P.P.P. obliged the P.N.C. by
formally declaring itself a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party in 1969, joined the Communist
International and reinforced its slavish pro-Soviet stance. 101 This permitted Burnham to construct
the only Marxist-Leninist state in the Western Hemisphere, without being destabilized by the
U.S.
The existence of the P.P.P. and the definition of it internally as an “Indian” party, also
gave Burnham a rationale for defending his subjugation of Indians on purely political grounds.
The survival of the P.P.P. as a distinct political force was therefore, a critical element in the
survival of the P.N.C. and for this reason the periodic “talks” between the P.N.C. could never
have resulted in a coalition. The “talks” merely sought to “demonstrate” to the U.S. that the
P.N.C. needed help or it would be “compelled” to compromise on the left.
The P.N.C., after 1968, did not consider the P.P.P. as a threat for a number of reasons:
(i) The P.P.P.’s base of support was immaterial in rigged elections. 102
(ii) The P.P.P. had abandoned any “revolutionary” action strategy against the P.N.C.
(iii) The P.N.C. weaned away many top level P.P.P. functionaries through patronage.
Burnham’s Marxist-Leninist rhetoric made the rationale more palatable. 103
(iv) Lower level P.P.P. supporters could be controlled through the police, bureaucracy and
state terror.

The only party to threaten the P.N.C. internally was the W.P.A. of 1978-79, under Dr. Walter
Rodney.104. By this time the economy had run aground and even though Burnham had succeeded in
excluding the Indians, there were now no largess to distribute to the P.N.C.’s faithful. The excesses of
Burn ham were thus less acceptable. When Burnham used troops in 1971against striking Bauxite workers
at Linden, formerly his most militant African supporters, the mask was ripped away from the face of the
dictator. The P.P.P. was still unacceptable but the W.P.A. provided an attractive alternative since it was
perceived as African-led, even though it preached and practised a non-racist line. 105 The party’s gathered a
significant multi-racial following, albeit primarily urban, with a high concentration of intellectuals. 106 The
part’s radical Marxist stance did not make it attractive to the U.S. and was thus not a threat to the P.N.C.
from this quarter. What was a threat was the W.P.A.’s infiltration of, and demonstrated support within,
two of Burnham’s pillars - the bureaucracy and the army. When Rodney attempted to topple the regime
through strikes and agitation in 1979, much as Burnham had done to the P.P.P. in 1962-63, Burnham
broke the strikes through force and intimidation of the union leaders and strikers. He fired bureaucrats
sympathetic to the W.P.A. and purged as well as reorganised the Disciplined Forces. Burnham taught the
W.P.A. the lesson it had taught the P.P.P. in 1964: control of the Disciplined Forces was the key to
neutralising the efficacy of strikes as mobilization weapons.

Finally, on June 13th, 1980, Burnham had Rodney assassinated. 107 Burnham understood the
significance of leadership on a revolutionary movement - the W.P.A. has ceased to be a force or threat
since.

101
, Cheddi Jagan. Report to P.P.P. Congress. Freedom House, Georgetown, 1969.
102
See generally, the Report of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Something to Remember, London,
1980. Also Barber, supra, p. 32, quoting Burnham, “…it is not a question of who votes and how, but of who counts
the vote.”
103
. This process started in 1966 with the defection from the PPP of George Bowman and Mohammed Saffee through
1978 with Vincent Teekah, Lallbachan Lallbahadur and Rangji Chandisingh et al.
104
. Rai, Kemraj, supra; Hintzen, supra.
105
. Hintzen, supra.
106
. id. p. 344.
107
. U.S. Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practise in Guyana. (1982) p. 4.

15
Trade Unions
The Trade Union movement was the incubator for the nationalist movement during the 1950’s: it
provided the most important institutional links to the lower classes. 108 Unions can serve as powerful
mobilizes of opposition when the interests (which, especially in a plural society, are not only economic)
of their members are threatened. Burnham fully appreciated their potential after being swept up by the
urban-based Creole and African dominated T.U.C. into violent opposition against the P.P.P. government
in 1962.
These unions were rewarded handsomely with Government positions; influence on policy formation; a
tremendously increased membership base (with the increase in the bureaucracy); and a close working
relationship with the Government - soon the dominant employer in the country.
Once safely ensconced in office Burnham moved to curb the powers of this group, as with every
other group. He achieved this by:
(i) Co-opting the leadership of key unions, such as the Guyana Bauxite Union and rigging their
elections to ensure compliant leadership. Unions became “company unions” with
Government being the “company”. 109
(ii) Collective bargaining was placed in the hands of the central T.U.C. The Government
controlled this body through its control of union leadership, as above, and by the creation of
“paper” unions, paying their dues, and granting them voting rights far out of proportion to
their membership.110
(iii) Enacting anti-union legislation such as the Labour (Amendment) Bill (1984). 111
(iv) Intimidation of neutral and anti-government union leaders. 112
(v) Labelling strikes “political” and using force, scabs and dismissals to break strikes and
unions.113

Religious Organisations

Religious organisations threaten totalitarian regimes for two reasons. Firstly, they invariably
present a different “ideology” or world view to the populace and secondly they conceive of a sphere of
activity with which the state is not supposed to interfere. 114 In Guyana, the established Anglican and
Roman Catholic Churches were originally bastions of upper class, White and Creole privilege. They had
played a crucial role in the destabilization of the P.P.P. government in 1961-62, when they waged a very
energetic “anti-communist” campaign.115 “Guyanization” of these churches coincided with Burnham’s
consolidation of power and it was not until the dictatorship was firmly established that the new Creole
leadership of these Churches protested the transgressions by the PNC. The Catholic Church in particular,
took a stand against human rights abuses. 116 Burnham attacked the “established” churches as “elitist” and
encouraged the proliferation of smaller Black/foreign “fundamentalist” churches that offered him
enthusiastic support. Two notorious examples were the “House of Israel” and the “Peoples’ Temple”. 117

108
. Jeffery & Barber, supra, 108-115.
109
. Jeffery & Barber, supra quoting the T.U.C. General Secretary’s Report, 1984, p. 112.
110
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 56-57.
111
. Also Constitutional Amendment Act (1988) voiding pro-labour decision in Guysuco v. Teemal. [1983].
112
. One union leader, Gordon Todd, head of the Clerical and Commercial Workers’ Union (CCWU) was taken in a
helicopter and dangled over the Atlantic Ocean after opposing the Government. See Burnham’s taunt in Report on
the Third Biennial Congress of the P.N.C. Sophia, Georgetown, 1979
113
. Rai, Khemraj, Peripheralizing the Guyanese Working Class, Transition Issue 8. Georgetown, Guyana [1983].
The author also addresses the other issues mentioned in reference to trade unions.
114
. Schapiro. supra, 63.
115
. Jeffery & Barber. supra.
116
. Id.
117
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra.

16
 The Hindu and Moslem faiths of the majority Indian community were never as institutionalised
nationally on hierarchical lines as were the Christian bodies. The individual temples and mosques
addressed community, rather than national, concerns and preached an expressive religion rather than an
instrumental one. Their national organisations were more “social” than “religious” and led by laymen
rather than religious leaders. Not having access to independent sources of financing, the priests and
moulvis were quickly co-opted by Burnham through control of the licensing procedure for priests. Even
conceding their low institutional development, the lack of protest activity by the Hindu and Moslem
communities is still remarkable in view of their major constituency’s status as a most oppressed group in
Guyana.

Social and Cultural Organisations

The three levels of Burnham’s ideology - the control of the state for the Creole/African sections,
the Marxism-Leninism in an instrumental sense for these groups, and his all consuming drive for absolute
power - were exemplified most clearly by his relationship with the Association for Social and Cultural
Relations with Independent Africa (A.S.C.R.I.A.). Founded by Eusi Kwayana in 1964, the organisation’s
goal was to assist Africans “to develop a sense of worth and self confidence in order to deal with other
races in a positive rather than a defensive manner”. 118 This was to be achieved by encouraging an
appreciation of African culture and achievement, and fostering economic independence by advocating a
return to the land by Africans.119
This goal was congruent with the first level of Burnham’s ideology and Kwayana became an
advisor to Burnham on domestic and economic policy as well as being appointed Chairman of the
Guyana Marketing Corporation (GMC). In the latter position he became the dispenser of jobs to
thousands of young Africans; in the former, he is widely credited with being the architect of “co-
operativism”. This movement had the triple merit of possessing affinities with African heritage;
advancing Burnham’s Marxism-Leninism; and most importantly could assist lower class Africans in line
with ASCRIA’s and Burnham’s goals.
However, when Kwayana demonstrated his independence by sympathizing with African Bauxite
workers striking against the Government (1971) and more to the point, when Ascria demonstrated the
tremendous influence it commanded amongst the workers he became a threat to Burnham’s third and all
transcending level of ideology: his obsession with absolute control. 120 Kwayana broke with the P.N.C.
declaring later that it had become “a unity of the black political leaders with the Portuguese and Indian
exploiting classes”.121
Burnham exploited the ineffectual/impotent political leadership, and the poor strategic
occupational niches, of Indians to peripheralize them further by co-opting their socio-cultural leaders.
Even though political influence was denied to these individuals, the economic and social arena were left
open on the condition they publicly support the P.N.C.
The major Indian socio-cultural organisations were subverted and brought under control by
similar tactics used on the trade unions:
(i) The leadership, frequently economically dependent on the benevolence of the State, were
either coerced into cooperation, or opportunistically chose to do so, voluntarily.
(ii) Election rigging was encouraged to ensure complaint leadership.
(iii) New, frequently “paper” organisations were established under the leadership of P.N.C.
supporters. These organisations became the beneficiaries of the Government’s largess while
neutral or anti-government groups were ostracized.

118
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 50. Hintzen. supra, 337.
119
. Id.
120
. Hintzen. supra, 337.
121
. ASCRIA, 1974, quoted in Hintzen, supra, 337.

17
The Leader, Education and the Media
The educational system and the media are combined by the totalitarian leader into an all-
pervading monolith, dedicated to the dissemination of his official ideology, as he “moulds the destiny of
his people”. The three functions of ideology - to legitimise the leader’s rule, to mobilize the population,
and to anesthetize (rationalize) the excesses and atrocities of the leader - are ideally served by these
vehicles.122
In 1973, Burnham created “Kuru Kuru Cooperative College” to disseminate the mechanics of
“co-operativism” and the next year the Guyana National Service (GNS) was launched. The goal of this
paramilitary organization was to create a “new Guyanese man and woman”. The “Workers Education
Unit” was organised in 1975 to spread the ideology to workers at their places of employment; while the
school system was nationalized (from the religious bodies) in 1976 and ideological orientation made part
of the curriculum. The “Cuffy Ideological Institute” a residential facility, was inaugurated in 1977 under
the direction of the former chief Marxist theoretician of the P.P.P. 123 Burnham’s emphasis on
indoctrinating the young reached its zenith when he launched the “President’s College”; the first boarding
school in Guyana, where the top students in the nation would be consigned, to be groomed into the future
leaders of the nation.
Education in Guyana was valued in terms of the “better” jobs it was expected to deliver. With the
rampant discrimination against Indians in the Government bureaucracy and in the eighty-percent of the
economy the Government controlled, the incentive for education withered in that community. Numerous
Indian youths dropped out of the school system, further aggravating the demobilization of this group.
In addition to operationalizing the functions of ideology, the media can also act to create a
“vacuum of information”.124 The absence of factual information serves to prevent the official ideology
from being challenged, or a competing ideology from being formed. Burnham explained his control over
the Guyanese media by a “development-support communication theory”, which postulated that only
information supportive of the Government’s development program should be transmitted to the
populace.125
In 1970, Burnham acquired the national newspapers, the “Daily and Sunday Chronicle”; in 1973,
and the “Daily and Sunday Guyana Graphic” and merged them as the “Guyana Chronicle” in 1976.
During that year “Radio Demerara” was purchased and merged with the already state-owned “Guyana
Broadcasting Corporation”. In conjunction with the sycophantic treatment of Burnham, the P.N.C. and
the ideology, the media was used to viciously attack the opposition. The anti-Indian line that Burnham
and the P.N.C. could not overtly espouse (being protective of their “progressive” third world reputation)
was delegated to the House of Israel. This group fanned the Creole/African fears of being dominated by
Indians, by violently attacking them while predicting an imminent racial “Armageddon” in Guyana. 126
The independent media became vestigial: a weekly four page tabloid (P.P.P.’s Mirror) and three
“eight by seventeen” mimeographed newsletters (two - W.P.A.’s-‘Open Word’ and ‘Dayclean’ together
with “Catholic Standard” of the Catholic Church). Even these vestiges were harassed continuously by
libel suits,127 intimidation of journalists,128 and non-delivery of newsprints. The last was explained as due
to a “lack of foreign newsprints”, yet gifts from aboard were refused entry in the country. 129
The “vacuum of information” and the constant bombardment of the population with the “big
lie”130 created even in the minds of doubters a sense of omnipotence concerning the dictator and
122
. Schapiro, supra, 55.
123
. Jeffery & Barber, supra.
124
. Schapiro, supra, 51.
125
. Jeffery & Barber, supra, 123.
126
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra.
127
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 58.
128
. Fraudulent Revolution, supra 53.
129
. Burrowes. Supra, 304.
130
. This technique was perfect by Goebells and the Nazis; see Curtis, supra, 50.

18
impotence concerning the opposition. Eventually, even if the “ideology” is not accepted by all, the
disbelievers reject all ideologies. This secular agnosticism contributes to the disintegration of any all-
effective opposition.

The Leader, the Terror and the Legacy

The terror in Burnham’s totalitarian state was generated essentially from two sources. First, there
was the physical violence meted out by organised bands of P.N.C. thugs, the police arrests in the night
and the rapes and murders of the ‘kick down the door’ bandits. Secondly there was the psychic violence
emanating from the breakdown in the legal order; the destruction of the societal values, and the pervasive
lawlessness, which the regime extended into every facet of the lives of the citizens.

Organized Terror
In a bifurcated state, where the exclusionary one-party state has decided to maintain its rule by
subjugating the excluded group, violence against this group is inevitable, and from the perspective of the
rulers, salutary. The message is inculcated into the dominated group: the wages of rebellion is
extermination. Violence as a political tactic was introduced into Guyanese politics during 1962-63 by the
C.I.A/T.U.C/P.N.C./U.F. alliance against the P.P.P. Government. 131 It quickly escalated into a racial civil
war due to the racial support-base of each political party. The P.P.P. attempted to reciprocate in 1964 but
soon learnt that the success of the tactic of violence depended on whose group controlled the coercive
apparatus of the state and it was not the P.P.P.’s. 132 Burnham was fond of informing his audiences, “the
P.N.C. had brought peace to Guyana” and that if they were removed, violence would return. The
Guyanese people understood his message.133
During the seventies, the House of Israel (H.O.F.), comprised of young African Guyanese, was
Burnham’s personal “goon squad” and was used indiscriminately against Indians and other opposition
figures. In 1979 the group was provided with automatic rifles and other weapons. 134 During the same year
a member of H.O.F. murdered a Catholic priest in public, while the latter was photographing an
opposition demonstration.135 “Kick-down-the-door” bandits were small bands of armed hoodlums (some
claimed they included members of the H.O.F.) who preyed on the Indian population; Eusi Kwayana
labelled their activities racial ‘genocide’ 136. These individuals, who robbed, raped and murdered, were
generally known to their victims and the police; no action was taken because of their P.N.C. connections.
Their activities were, and remain, so pervasive that few Indians families have not resulted to “keeping
watch” during the night. The “Preventive Detention Act” empowers the Police to arrest anyone suspected
of “subversive activities” without the need for evidence. The extensive network of police informers
recruited in every village and district provide a steady stream of detainees – but not from the kick-down-
the-door- fraternity.137

The Pervasive Lawlessness

Even more insidious than the direct violence; the cumulative effect of Burnham’s control, his
arbitrariness, his destruction of every independent institution in the country, engendered amongst the
people, first the Indians and towards the end the Africans, a feeling of helplessness – anomie - and a
131
. Richard Barnet. Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. N.Y. Mentor Books
(1972) revised. p. 278-284. For Burnham’s role, see ‘Report of a Commission of Enquiry into Disturbance in
British Guiana in February, 1962.’ London HMSO, Colonial No. 354, (1962), 82.
132
. Burrowes. supra, 234.
133
. Jagan Cheddi. Speech at Casa de Las America, N.Y. October, 1987.
134
. Fraudulent, Revolution, supra.
135
. Id.
136
. Eusi Kwayana. Forward to the Democratic Republic. (1985) WPA Georgetown Guyana.
137
. Danns, supra, (1978)

19
belief that nothing or no one could change the situation. This “atomisation” and fatalism of the population
is the goal of the totalitarian dictator. The immiseration of the population further contributed to the
atomisation. As Aristotle observed, when the people have to scavenge for food all day, they have very
little time or inclination to plot rebellion or revolution against the dictator. 138 They are impelled towards
individual solutions, which are the “fight, flight or submit” responses of cornered animals.
The individual who elects to fight the system is easily contained and defeated by the bureaucracy,
the police, the judiciary and other state forces arrayed against him. The conflict is not allowed to escalate
to higher levels. This existential reality has forced Guyanese to opt for the other two solutions of “flight”
(emigration) and “submission”. These options have provided the dictatorship with its major safety valves.
Emigration increased steadily from the early sixties and at this point (1988) it is estimated that at
least 200,000 Guyanese, one quarter of the population, have fled the country. These emigrants include the
majority of the middle class and intelligentsia - the groups from which most revolutionary movements
have sprung. Burnham has consequently never discouraged emigration, although from a developmental
perspective, the country was losing most of its qualified personnel. Most Guyanese remaining in the
country are either “waiting for their papers” (visas) or “hoping for their papers”. All eyes are cast aboard.
Submission to the system in Guyana, and surviving, implies acceptance of corruption as a way of
life. The wreckage of the economy created a corresponding ravaging of the standard of living of the
bureaucratic class, the police and every party or state official who maintained Burnham in power. Taking
their cues from Burnham and his top lieutenants, who had corrupted every institution to maintain power
and their ostentatious lifestyle, the lower echelons demanded ‘bribes’ from the citizenry for the
performance of their legally require tasks. While Burnham railed against corruption, effective action was
never taken for two reasons. Firstly the transgressors were the same individuals who were rigging the
elections, harassing the opposition and generally guaranteeing his control. Secondly, Burnham understood
that corruption can be a substitute for violence: when the citizen offers the bribe and official accepts, both
satisfy their immediate wants but more importantly, the citizen tacitly accepts the status quo. The Citizen
boasts of having ‘lines’-connections. He who corrupts a system’s officer is more likely to identify with
the system than he who storms the system’s police stations. 139 Burnham reversed Lord Acton’s famous
dictum: in Guyana “corruption was power and absolute corruption was absolute power”.

The Product: Burnham the Constitutional Totalitarian Dictator

The culminating act in Burnham’s consolidation of absolute power and control was the
promulgation of the “Socialist Constitution” in 1980. 140 As Stalin had done in 1937 in the U.S.S.R., the
new constitution enumerated numerous “rights” of the people while the few they actually possessed were
being abrogated. Similarly, as Stalin had enacted his constitution in the midst of a bloody purge of his
opponents, Burnham introduced his constitution after he had purged the bureaucracy and the disciplined
forces and assassinated his only credible opponent - Walter Rodney on June 13 th,1980 (151)141.
The Constitution articulated the constitutional and legal basis for Burnham’s Marxist-Leninist
ideology but more importantly gave the legal recognition, which he always insisted on, to the existential
reality of his supremacy over all men and all institutions in Guyana. With his enumerated powers,
Burnham had a greater claim than Louis XIV to declare, “I am the State.”
Burnham had the following powers and positions:
(i) Head of State to complement his position as head of the paramount party. 142
138
. Aristotle, Politics, quoted in Schapiro, supra, 36. Additionally, ‘when the question of terror in the Totalitarian
polity is considered, it become an effective substitute for physical terror.’ 41.
139
. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven. Yale Univ. Press.[1968]
140
. Burnham had a fetish, as had Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini, for insisting that his excesses had the mantle of
‘legality’. – see Schapiro, p. 28. Democratic institutions and guarantees “were a ‘façade to deceive the credulous
foreigner.”
141
. U.S Human Rights Violations in Guyana, p. 4 (1982).
142
. Guyana Constitution, (1980) Art. 89.

20
 (ii) Head of the Disciplined Forces and Chairman of the Defence Board which appoints and
reviews every officer;143
(iii) could not be prosecuted for any crime or civil offence committed in or out of the office; 144
(iv) appointed the Chief Justice, Chancellor of the Judiciary and all Judges. The stipulation that he
“consult” with various identified individuals and bodies was gratuitous since, if ignored, his
decision “shall not be enquired into any court”; 145
(v) appointed the chairman of the Elections Commission at his sole discretion. This individual
was the final arbiter of the validity of elections since “no question as to the validity of the
election shall be enquired into any court”;146
(vi) could dismiss most officers of the Public Service Commission that controlled the bureaucracy
“in the public interest”; which interest he, at his sole discretion, determined;
(vii) could serve as President for as many terms as he could ‘win’ in the elections;
(viii) had veto power over legislation introduced by the party of which he was the head; 147
(ix) could dissolve the assembly if it overrode his veto, which in any event, could not be re-
presented to him for approval until six months after his veto; 148
(x) could be removed for misconduct or mental illness only by the decisions of individuals he
had appointed, and who could be dismissed by him before their decisions were announced. 149

The End
In the bifurcated society, when the leader is permitted by his Constitution, to erect institutions and
engage in practices designed to subjugate in perpetuity, the excluded group, there is the omnipresent
danger the leader will direct the repressive institutions against his erstwhile supporters after he achieves
enough “control”. In Guyana, the dictatorship did not creep, like a thief in the night, upon the Guyanese
people: it was erected in broad daylight by hundred of thousands of helpers. Each helper had his own
goal and motivation: the U.S. - a non-Soviet Guyana; the Creoles – control of the state; the Africans - the
preclusion of Indian domination. No one gave Burnham’s motivations and goals the prominence they
deserved.
The Burnham era, 1964-1985, has graphically and tragically exposed the dangers of permitting
any man or group unchecked power. Yet Guyana is caught in its historic dilemma. The call for “free and
fair” elections would in all probability lead to the permanent control of the State by an Indian dominated
political group. The Indians have now increased their majority to over fifty percent of the population and
the African and Creole sections have to be concerned as to whether this would be a vengeful majority. 150
There can be no lasting political solution in Guyana until the legitimate security concerns of the
African and Creole sections are addressed along with the need for the full and equal participation of the
Indian and other excluded sections, in the life of the nation.

Epilogue: The P.N.C. in the Post Burnham Era

143
Guyana Constitution Art. 89.
144
. Guyana Constitution Art. 182
145
. Guyana Constitution Art. 127, 231.
146
. Guyana Constitution Art. 226.
147
. Guyana Constitution Art. 170.
148
. Guyana Constitution Art. 170.
149
. Guyana Constitution Art. 179.
150
. 1980-1981 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean Guyana, Vol. 3: Caribbean Community
Secretariat (1985).

21
 Burnham’s attempt to fuse the Marxist-Leninist goal - elimination of the bifurcated society (based
on class) and the creation of a homogeneous “dictatorship of the proletariat”, with the exclusionary one-
party goal - perpetuation of the bifurcated society (based on any social cleavage) to create a two-caste
society ruled by the dictatorship of the dominant group’s leader, ultimately failed. The economy, which
was to be plundered for the benefit of the mobilized elite, crumbled under the combined, conflicting
demands of a bastardised ideology, the demobilization of the Indian fifty percent of the population, and a
megalomaniac dictator. This destruction, in tandem with the ambiguities and incongruities of the
mobilization process, precluded the formation and retention of any large core of committed Marxist-
Leninist within the institutions of Burnham’s power base. 151 Upon the dictator’s death, the elite that
retained control of these institutions were obsessed more with economic rationality than with ideological
purity.152
The problem of succession is one of the most severe that confronts one–party dictatorships since
the tyrant’s usual paranoia of palace revolutions usually makes him wary of designating successors. The
smooth transfer of power after the demise of Burnham demonstrated the deep institutionalisation and
strength of the P.N.C., and its pre-eminence among the ruling triumvirate institutions- the party, the
bureaucracy and the military. The confirmation by the elite, of the constitutionally defined order of
succession and the election of Hoyte as leader of the P.N.C. preserved the party’s control over the
political system.
Burnham’s lieutenants, while locked in a power struggle for ultimate control, have confined the
battle within the party. Desmond Hoyte, the constitutional successor on account of his obsequiousness,
‘apparatchiki’ skills, and unswerving loyalty to his mentor Burnham, is the favourite of the bureaucratic
Creole elite who consider him “pragmatic” but more importantly, “one of their own”. 153 Hamilton Green,
commanding vast support in the party’s rank and file as well as the army 154, is biding his time, expecting
the party to turn to him when Hoyte inevitably founders in the morass of “economic dynamism”. Both
have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the system and it is unlikely either will be impetuous in his
effort to capture power. Each will focus on consolidating the forces immediately available to him; here
Hoyte obviously has the advantage of incumbency and has not been tardy in seizing the initiative.
Hoyte understands and accept the forces that have maintained the P.N.C. in power. The concerns
of the U.S. have been addressed: Hoyte has indicated his “abandonment” of Burnham’s Marxist-Leninist
innovations and shown his willingness to accept foreign investment, privatisation, and the I.M.F.
prescriptions. The survival of the P.P.P. will be guaranteed to permit Hoyte, as it did Burnham,
“flexibility” in his domestic politics.
Burnham’s exclusionary one-party State has been preserved with some important modifications.
In addition to the Marxist-Leninist ideology being jettisoned, the increased participation of the remaining
Indian elite in the economic and social sphere is assiduously pursued. Political power is retained in the
hands of Hoyte, and the Creole elite of the bureaucracy, party and army. As an adjunct to the latter policy,
the lower class African section is being further demobilized to join the already peripheralzed Indian
section. The Fascist implications of Hoyte’s strategy should not be ignored. The lower class, the present
excluded group, will be exhorted to accept their deprivations by appeals to patriotism and the need to
rebuild the country.
While there is an element of political and economic rationality in Hoyte’s actions, they are more
indicative of a Burnhamite drive for absolute personal power. The dynamics of power leads to its
concentration unless external forces impinge upon and counteract it. Hoyte inherited a party that was
severely decimated by Burnham; a bureaucracy that was debilitated by a crumbled economy and state; an
151
. Hintzen. supra, 277-306.
152
. id, 285.
153
. Hoyte, a lawyer from Burnham’s law firm, was introduced into politics in 1967 with his appointment as the
P.N.C.’s representative on the Elections Commission. From this role at this critical juncture before the 1968
elections where the functions of the Commission were in effect transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs, he
“proved” his usefulness to Burnham and was rewarded with a series of Ministerial positions.
154
. Jeffery & Barber. supra, 185.

22
army that was purged a mere six years before, and a nation demoralized and terrorized. Other forces were,
and are, in no position to counter attack Hoyte who possesses the full panoply of powers accumulated by
Burnham and who fully understands their use having been a major architect of the constitutional
dictatorship.155
Within the P.N.C., Hoyte identified the Burnhamite Marxist faction as the weakest and has
already severely disseminated its ranks through “deployments”, demotions and dismissals. The remnants
such as Viola Burnham (widow of Burnham and head of the WRSM) and Ranji Chandisingh (ex-PPP
Marxist ideologue) are symbolic and serve to maintain the continuity and legitimacy of P.N.C. to the
Burnhamite rank and file. Chandisingh’s occupancy of the General Secretary and Deputy Leader
positions in the P.N.C. pre-empts the utility of these positions as incipient power bases. Chandisingh, as
an Indian and ex-P.P.P.’ite, will be incapable of mustering wide support. Under the guise of
“democratizing” the party, Hoyte will facilitate the increase of “moderates”, supportive of his policies,
and will dilute Green’s support base in the process.
Hoyte’s developmental strategy has the enthusiastic support of the bureaucracy. As a group, they
have the most to gain from the managerial and administrative efficiency, technical rationality and
stringent labour discipline presently demanded. The policies, a replica of the Puerto Rican model
introduced in 1964-1968 (revival of the free market, encouragement of foreign investment and generous
tax concessions) is even more guaranteed of failure this time. The now vestigial private sector and the
moribund massive public sector will be impelled, to a greater extent than previously, into acceptance of
the stagnation and inefficiencies implicit in the demobilization of the majority lower class Africans and
Indians.
Hoyte’s first official act as President was to promote the two top ranking officers of the
Disciplined Forces. Greater certitude of loyalty is actively pursued through the policy of the
“professionalisation” of the Disciplined Forces’. It is understood that, the ex-policemen present head of
the Combined Forces will be retired within two years and an Indian, Joe Singh will be his replacement. In
addition to being a “professional”, it is unlikely that Singh will be capable of mobilizing an eighty percent
African army against Hoyte. To consolidate his control further, Hoyte as Chairman of the Defence Board
has been promoting officers loyal to him.
In an effort to rehabilitate the unsavoury image Burnham created for the regime he bequeathed,
immediately upon taking office Hoyte initiated a campaign designed to convince the world there was a
“new beginning” in Guyana. However, Hoyte’s “perestroika” paralleling Gorbachev’s, is centred on
reforms in the social and economic arenas. Provided that these reforms are confined within the present
political system, they will be tolerated. Suggestions or activities which question the legitimacy of the
political power relations are anathema and will be rejected or crushed outright. Official responses to
“Armenian nationalism” in the U.S.S.R. or a “plural party system” in Guyana must be evaluated from this
perspective. Agitators, therefore, who choose to operate within the rules of the one-party dictatorship
tacitly accept the legitimacy of the system.
Hoyte, by his actions since he acceded to power, has demonstrated that he will brook no
challenges to the supremacy of the P.N.C. as the pre-eminent force in Guyana. The rigging of the 1985
general elections; harassment of church, opposition, and trade union leaders; persecution of the press
through libel suits; enacting ex-post facto laws; and circumventing judicial review through use of its legal
parliamentary plurality to amend the Constitution, are only a sample of his fundamentally anti-democratic
nature.
At this juncture, it appears there are three possible scenarios in the evolution of the political
system. Firstly, if Hoyte’s economic program is successful, the system might evolve as much as
Trinidad’s under the P.N.M. The Creole and the Indian elites (there are no Whites in Guyana) will share
the economic power, while political power is retained by former group. Secondly, and more probably, the
economy will continue its disintegration, and Hamilton Green will articulate the grievances of the
dispossessed African lower class. In his attempt to wrest control from Hoyte, he could demonstrate

155
. Report on the Third Biennial Congress of the P.N.C., Sophia, Georgetown, (1979) Vol. 1.

23
Hoyte’s betrayal of the historic mission of the PNC. to wit exclusion of East Indians including its elite.
Thirdly, acounter elite might attempt to mobilize the disenfranchised lower class Indian and African
sections, by addressing and resolving the ethnic security dilemma of the latter group together with the
demands for political participation by the former.
The constant in each scenario will be Hoyte and the point he is allowed to reach on the path to the
Burnhamite totalitarian dictatorship he is reconstructing in his image.

24