Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

www.brill.nl/jemh

A Careful Management: The Borghese Family

and their Fiefs in Early Modern Lazio*
Bertrand Forclaz
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Abstract
This article investigates economic management of efs as well as social relationships between
lords and vassals in 17th- and 18th-century central Italy. Up to recent years, historians of
early modern Italy as well as other European countries have stressed the archaic features
of noble management, which would have prevented the emergence of a modern marketoriented agrarian economy, or have portrayed noblemen as market-oriented landowners
neglecting their seigneurial rights. I argue here that both dimensions were present in noble
management, as lords did not choose between them, but rather leaned upon one or the
other according to circumstances. I base my argument on the case of the Borghese, one of
the wealthiest papal families of the 17th century. Finally, this study shows that modern elements could be brought into a model characterized by strong seigneurial rights.
Keywords
Fiefdom, Southern Italy, seigneurial rights, Borghese

Introduction
Seigneurial rights played a key role in the economic and social life of several rural areas in early modern Europe, including Southern Italy. The
emergence of a new nobility, the regulation of the market for efs by public
magistracies, and changes in their management even led to a strengthening
* This article sums up part of my PhD Thesis, discussed at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes
en Sciences Sociales (Paris) in 2003 : Les Borghese et leurs efs aux XVIIe et XVIIIe sicles.
Gestion conomique, stratgies sociales et enjeux politiques. It was presented at the European
Social Science History Conference in Berlin in March 2004; I would like to thank the
chair of the session, Jan Luyten van Zanden, and the participants for their comments, as
well as Bas van Bavel, Maarten Prak and Gregory Hanlon for their comments on previous
versions of the text; a special thanks to Gregory Hanlon for correcting the English.
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008

DOI: 10.1163/138537808X334331

170

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

of seigneurial rights, in which conicts between feudal lords and communities became more frequent. In the 1960s, historians of Southern Italy
argued about the nature of these transformations. Rosario Villari proposed
the concept of refeudalization in the second half of the 16th and rst half
of the 17th century, whereby relations between feudal lords and their
subjects hardened as the former exerted economic pressure on the latter,
due to the renewal of the aristocracy and the nancial power of the new
lords. Giuseppe Galasso objected that this thesis implied a preceding
defeudalization which was unlikely to have taken place. Over time, this
debate lost its polemical component, although new empirical research has
conrmed the hardening of seigneurial rights.1 The refeudalization thesis
stressed the archaic features of noble management, which would have
prevented the emergence of a modern market-oriented agrarian economy.
In his 1978 essay on the Italian transition from feudalism to capitalism,
Maurice Aymard, while stressing the modern elements in the management of Southern Italian latifundia, such as production for the market and
the constitution of large estates, explained those features by the transformation of feudal lords into mere landowners. Later contributions to the
study of noble management reinforced the antinomy by insisting on feudalisms traditional features and reasserting the importance of seigneurial
rights against market-oriented production in poorer areas.2
If we consider other historiographic traditions, we will nd a similar
opposition between traditional seigneurial rights and modern economic management, the former being seen as the dead weight of the past
hampering economic growth and modernization. This vision is linked to
the idea of a bourgeois revolution erupting in the 19th century. One exception to that framework would be England. Noble landlords there have
been described as the main protagonists of the agricultural revolution
which took place in the 18th century, via the enclosure and the creation of
large estates, although recent research has questioned this view and stressed
the active role of leaseholders.3 In France, the nobility has been identied

See R. Villari, La rivolta antispagnola a Napoli. Le origini (1585-1647) (Rome, 1967);

G. Galasso, Economia e societ nella Calabria del Cinquecento (Naples, 1967).
2
See M. Aymard, La transizione dal feudalesimo al capitalismo, in R. Romano,
C. Vivanti (eds.), Storia dItalia, Annali, I, Dal feudalesimo al capitalismo (Turin, 1978),
1131-192; T. Astarita, The Continuity of Feudal Power. The Caracciolo di Brienza in Spanish
Naples (Cambridge, 1992).
3
See R.C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South
Midlands, 1450-1850 (Oxford, 1992).

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

171

as a source of agrarian backwardness, and the leaseholders of large noble

estates have been identied as the only element of modernization and
growth in a rural economy considered as conservative and stationary. Even
this model has been revised recently, as Philip Homan has pointed out
agents of growth within the local peasantry.4 Most recently, scholars have
tried to go beyond the opposition of feudalism to capitalism: while
acknowledging the importance of tradition in noble economic behaviour,
they have emphasized the concern of noblemen with prot and their care
for sound management. William Hagens book on Prussian Junkers showed
that heavy seigneurial rights did not preclude the efs from being protdriven enterprises, and that commercialized manorialism could generate
growth and enrichment.5
We thus need to get rid of an either/or alternative in which noblemen
are seen either as feudal lords who blocked any agricultural modernization
or as market-oriented landowners neglecting their seigneurial rights. In
this paper, I argue that both dimensions were likely present in noble management, as noblemen did not choose between them, but rather leaned
upon one or the other according to circumstances. The object of my
research is a papal family, the Borghese. I will explain the nature of their
authority and its impact on the economic life of the efs they owned in the
Papal States, and investigate their relationships with the inhabitants and
the transformation of these relationships over time.
The Borghese family belonged to the papal nobility.6 Marcantonio
Borghese came from Siena to Rome in the 1530s and worked as a lawyer
4
See P.T. Homan, Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 14501815, Princeton, 1996; concerning the nobility as a source of agrarian backwardness, see
J. Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre 1398-1789. Lordship, Comunity, and Capitalism in Early Modern
France (Berkeley, 1987), 285-86.
5
See W. W. Hagen, Ordinary Prussians. Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-1800
(Cambridge, 2002); for this historiographical shift, see P. Janssens, B. Yun-Casalilla (eds.),
European Aristocracies and Colonial Elites. Patrimonial Management Strategies and Economic
Development, 15th-18th Centuries (Aldershot, 2005).
6
On the Borghese family, see W. Reinhard, mterlaufbahn und Familienstatus. Der
Aufstieg des Hauses Borghese 1537-1621, in Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen
Archiven und Bibliotheken, 54, 1974, 328-427; W. Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus
unter Paul V. (1605-1621). Studien und Quellen zur Struktur und zu quantitativen Aspekten
des ppstlichen Herrschaftssystems, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1974; G. Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt.
I Borghese. Secoli XVIII e XIX (Rome, 1979); V. Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese
(1605-1633). Vermgen, Finanzen und sozialer Aufstieg eines Papstnepoten (Tbingen, 1984);
B. Forclaz, La famille Borghese et ses efs. Lautorit ngocie dans lEtat pontical dAncien
Rgime (Rome, 2006) (abridged and reviewed version of my PhD Thesis).

172

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

at the Roman Curia; he was able to develop important connections within

the Curiaand with the Roman nobility, for several of his children married
into patrician families. One of his sons, Camillo, embarked on an ecclesiastical career. Vice-auditor of the Apostolic Chamber from 1588 on, nuncio in Madrid in 1593, he was made cardinal in 1596 and was elected pope
in 1605, at the relatively young age of 53. He took the name of Paul V and
was to reign until 1621. This unexpected electionhe was a compromise
candidate between opposing factionsallowed his family to complete its
rapid social ascension into the high nobility. The mechanisms of this ascension are classic: Camillo appointed a cardinal-nephew, Scipione Borghese, as superintendent of the Papal States, entrusted with the care of the
familys clients. The Borghese multiplied their matrimonial alliances with
the old Roman nobility, such as the marriage between the popes nephew,
Marcantonio, and Camilla Orsini. They embraced a more aristocratic lifestyle, entailing the purchase of a suburban villa and enlarging the family
palace in Campomarzio. Not least, they acquired extensive real estate, both
feudal and allodial.
The case of the Borghese as lords is interesting for several reasons: did
their acquisition of efs lead to a strengthening of seigneurial rights during
the 17th century? Within the wide range of assets they held, which element proved more important, land ownership or seigneurial rights? The
answer to these questions might help us establish the particular place of
Lazio in early modern rural Italy. Was it a stronghold of seigneurial rights,
as in Southern Italy, or did nobles there adopt more modern forms of
landed property and management, as in Northern and Central Italy? Furthermore, the Borghese example can help us understand the management
style of noble landlords and their role in early modern rural economy.
Did they adopt management choices which were specic to new nobles
and which diered from those of the old nobility, as Volker Reinhardt has
suggested was the case for Paul Vs nephew, cardinal Scipione Borghese,
stressing his commercial acumen?7 Before we can answer those questions,
we need to show the importance of efs in the familys assets.

See Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

173

The Constitution of the Landed Patrimony

Thanks to the important donations by the pope, the family was able to buy
extensive domains in the Agro romano, the countryside around Rome,
together with efs across Lazio, the latter providing the Borghese with titles
of nobility. The purchase of these efs resulted from the debts of old noble
families, who were constrained to sell part of their estates from the second
half of the 16th century on.8 Papal authority proved central in these land
investments, for only the pope could authorize an entail to be broken.
Whereas the Apostolic Chamberthe institution managing the patrimony
of the Holy Seebought some of the estates brought onto the market, the
main purchasers were the popes relatives, who had privileged insider information. During his long ponticate, Paul V donated more than 3 million
scudi to his relatives, and several loans were made to them by the Apostolic
Chamber under favorable conditions.9 This policy was also followed by the
other popes of the 17th century, although from the late 1660s on, due to
nancial diculties of the Papal States, it became less routine. Such aggressive nepotism has been overlooked by the supporters of the thesis of a weakening of feudal nobility in the Papal State from the late 16th century on, in
the aftermath of pope Pius V prohibiting the infeudation of new lands in
1567. The practice of nepotism directly limited the relevance of this measure, since most popes sought to provide their relatives with efs sold by the
old nobility. Nepotism also limited the centralization of the Papal States
especially in the Lazio region, around Rome, where territories directly
depending on the Holy See were strewn with efs.10
See J. Delumeau, Vie conomique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde moiti du XVIe sicle,
vol. I (Paris, 1957-59), 459-485; F. Piola Caselli, Una montagna di debiti. I monti baronali dellaristocrazia romana nel Seicento, in Roma moderna e contemporanea, I, 1993, 2,
21-56; S. Raimondo, Il prestigio dei debiti. La struttura patrimoniale dei Colonna di
Paliano alla ne del XVI secolo (1596-1606), in Archivio della Societ Romana di Storia
Patria, 120, 1997, 65-165.
9
See Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus, vol. I, 119-138; Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, 196-98, 209, 219-26.
10
Historians traditionally insisted on the eciency of centralization in the Papal State
and on the limits of seignorial powers: see mostly P. Prodi, Il sovrano pontece. Un corpo e
due anime : la monarchia papale nella prima et moderna (Bologna, 1982); B.G. Zenobi,
Le ben regolate citt: modelli politici nel governo delle periferie ponticie in et moderna
(Rome, 1992). Recent scholarship, however, has considerably undermined this thesis: see
lately M.A. Visceglia (ed.), La nobilt romana in et moderna. Proli istituzionali e pratiche
sociali, Rome, 2001 ; C. Castiglione, Patrons and Adversaries. Nobles and Villagers in Italian
Politics, 1640-1760 (Oxford, 2005); Forclaz, La famille Borghese et ses efs.
8

174

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

Thanks to Paul Vs long papacy and the donations deriving from it, the
Borghese became one of the biggest landowners in Rome: between 1607
and 1621, Paul Vs brothers, Francesco and Giovan Battista, and his
nephew, cardinal Scipione, bought 12 efs scattered around the Eternal
City. The most prestigious efs were situated in Southern Lazio and had
belonged to old families: the Colonna, the Caetani and the Savelli. Scipione and his uncles did not adopt a territorial strategy but rather exploited
every protable occasion, purchasing efs in Northern Lazio and in Sabina,
to the north-east of Rome. In addition to feudal jurisdictions, they also
bought allodial properties in the Agro romano, the deserted Roman countryside, whose nancial return was a bit higher than that of efs (3,75-4%
against 2,5-3% of the value of the estate). They invested about 1,2 million
scudi in efs and 1,3 million in these allodial properties.11
Two features characterize the Borghese familys landed investments relative to other papal families of the 17th century: the importance of allodial
properties in their patrimonyin the middle of the century, they were the
second largest holder of such lands in the Agro romano, after the Chapter
of St. Peterand the continuation of their expansion after Paul Vs death.
Between 1621 and the late 1670s, the Borghese bought 19 more efs, so
that they owned 31 of them at the beginning of the 18th century, with a
total of 24 000 inhabitants. Only the Colonna, one of the oldest families
in the Roman nobility, had more subjects (31,000). The Borghese could
not buy any more efs in Southern Lazio, despite several attempts, since
the families of Paul Vs successors invested in that area, so they increased
their properties in Sabina instead, where they built up a compact territory.12 This continuing expansion is quite unique amongst papal families,
which normally stopped increasing their patrimony after the popes death.
The long duration of the Borghese ponticate explains it in part, since the
family had accumulated such extensive nancial power that they were the
only ones able to compete with new reigning families. They also had other
investments they could liquidate in order to buy new efs, such as shares
of the public debt. Above all, their great wealth allowed them to become
11

Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, 194-235.

Forclaz, Les Borghese, 33-58; for the number of vassals, see Archivio di Stato di Roma
(=ASR), Congregazione del Sollievo 1-2, fasc. 2/10; for the hierarchy of landowners in the
Agro romano, see M. Teodori, La propriet fondiaria a Roma a met Seicento. Le tenute
dellAgro romano, in D. Strangio (ed.), Studi in onore di Ciro Manca (Padua, 2000), 555600.
12

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

175

the creditors of other nobles, whose estates they would eventually seize.13
This policy shows the Borghese familys growing interest in efs after
Paul Vs death. While efs represented 46% of the value of the familys
landed properties in 1621, their share increased to almost 60% in 1658.
Although efs were less protable than allodial properties in the Agro
romano, the prestige and power derived from enjoying jurisdiction over
vassals made them attractive investments. Territorial considerations appear
in some investments: in 1633, Marcantonio Borghese exchanged the ef of
Rignano for the state of Canemorto, in Sabina, which consisted of four
villages, less protable than Rignano but situated next to Marcantonios
other possessions. After Marcantonios death 1658, his patrimony was
inherited by his grandson Giovanbattista. The latter continued Marcantonios policy and expanded the familys territories in Sabina, with three new
efs purchased in 1678, with money from the sale of other lands and
nancial investments. He even contracted debts in order to pay for the
new estates. These choices brought some changes to the structure of the
Borghese patrimony. Whereas the landed properties represented 76% of
the whole in 1658, their share had increased to 83% when Giovanbattista
died in 1717. The share of nancial investments shrank to a mere 5%.14
After 1717, there were very few purchases or alienations. Throughout the
17th century, there was thus a double shift in the structure of the assets:
from nancial investments to landed properties and, among the latter, from
allodial to feudal estates. Several motives explain these modications: the
decreasing return from shares of the public debt after 1650, the extension
of the familys territories in Sabina, and possibly a desire to diversify crops.
The most important motivation appears to be the Borghese insistence on
their aristocratic rank on the Roman social scene following Pope Pauls
death. But while other papal familiessuch as the Barberiniput their
survival in the nobility at risk through excessive purchases during their
ponticate, the Borghese followed a more careful and gradual investment
policy, which allowed them to consolidate their status.
The Borghese acquired efs in Lazio in two districts, primarily. To the
northeast of Rome, the family owned a compact territory in Sabina, most
13
They lent for example 40,000 scudi to the Anguillara family in the 1620s and bought
the latters lordship Stabia in 1660 (ASV, AB 23/36, f. 23); they also lent in the 1630s
30,000 scudi to the Savelli family, which were refunded with the purchase of Castelchiodato and Cretone in 1656 (AB 27/138; AB 301/1).
14
Forclaz, Les Borghese, 81-82.

176

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

of which was bought between 1630 and 1660. In Bassa Sabina, a region of
hills close to Rome, the main rural specializations were wheat and livestock
raising, but also vines and olive trees. In Eastern Sabina, situated in the
mountains near the border with the kingdom of Naples, vineyards and
olive trees were rare. The main activities there were wheat-growing and
livestock-raising, complemented with hemp and chestnuts. The other area
where the Borghese owned several efs was Southern Lazio; but unlike in
Sabina, these efs were scattered.15 In the Monti Albani, wine was the main
production; in the hills of the Monti Prenestini, dierent crops were grown:
wheat, vines, olive and fruit trees; in the Monti Lepini, stock breeding and
cereals were dominant. To summarize, two typologies are important from
the geographic and economic point of view. In the efs located in the hills,
various crops were possiblecereals, vineyards, fruit and olive trees
whereas in the mountain areas, the economy was founded on grain, pasture and the exploitation of forests. Moreover, the proximity of roads in
Bassa Sabina and Southern Lazio allowed the commercialization of part of
the production in Rome or in the lesser towns of Lazio. As we shall see,
these dierences are also related to variations in the structure of the feudal
revenues.

Geography and Typology or the Feudal Rights

Which rights did the Borghese possess in their new efs? Ill focus here on
the banalits, manorial rights and property rights and, leaving aside rights
of justice (these proved to be very signicant in Lazio, since the Borghese,
like other families belonging to the high nobility, held penal and civil jurisdiction as well as the right to hear appeals and to pronounce the death
penalty). Apart from its relevance in terms of authority and prestige, which
was stressed by the possesso, a ceremony during which the inhabitants
had to take an oath of allegiance to their new lord, jurisdiction authorized
the lord to collect a variety of dues.16 What did these consist of ? First, there
15

About Lazio and its geography, see ASV, AB 3018; P. M. C. De Tournon, tudes
statistiques sur Rome et la partie occidentale des tats romains, Paris, 1831; F. NobiliVitelleschi, Relazione del Commissario Marchese Francesco Nobili-Vitelleschi . . ., in Atti della
Giunta per la Inchiesta agraria e sulle condizioni della classe agricola, vol. XI (Rome,
1883-84).
16
On this issue, see D. Armando, I poteri giurisdizionali dei baroni romani nel Settecento: un problema aperto, in Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica, 1993, 2, 209239; Forclaz, Le relazioni complesse.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

177

were property rights, rents and levies paid by the inhabitants who cultivated the lands owned by the lord. They were generally paid in kind and
amounted to 1/6th-1/4th of the crops. This deduction was extremely high,
since in the Kingdom of Naples, it generally amounted to 1/10th of the
crops.17 Next there were banalits, mainly the seigneurial monopolies (of
the mill, the oven, the inn or the oil press), to which the whole population
of the ef was subject. In some efs, tolls existedtaxes on merchandise
or passengers travelling through the jurisdiction. There were also contributions in kind (such as Christmas dues). Finally, the few manorial rights
consisted of personal labour contributions, the corves, which were in some
cases substituted by a monetary contribution.
The balance among these rights varied from one district to another. In
pastoral Eastern Sabina, feudal rights were diverse and heavy. Some manorial rights existed: the vassals were obliged to bring every year the dues in
kind to the lords storehouses in Rome for a very low salary. In some of the
efs, there were still corves (that is, unpaid labour details)one or two
days a year. As for banalits, the lord generally possessed the monopoly of
the oven; furthermore, he inherited the belongings of the inhabitants who
died without an heir. In Canemorto and the bordering efs, the owners of
animals had to pay a fee. Finally, the vassals had to pay contributions in
kind to the lord at Christmas or Easter. With respect to property dues, the
levies varied between 1/6th and 1/4th of the crops, a considerable share.18
In Bassa Sabina, the situation was quite dierent. In the ef of Palombara,
there were many fewer rights, for example no corves, and no contributions
in kind. Banal rights included the monopoly of the oven and of the oil
press, and a toll on transiting merchandise. The levies paid by the tenants
of feudal lands amounted here to 1/5th of the crops.19 In southern Lazio,
the situation was comparable to Bassa Sabina. In Montefortino, Olevano
and Norma, the property dues were dominant, and the levies were very
high1/4th of the crops. There were some contributions in kindfor
example in Norma, where all inhabitants had to give two chickens every

17

See G. Curis, Usi civici, propriet collettive e latifondi nell Italia Centrale e nellEmilia
con riferimento ai Demanii comunali del Mezzogiorno, Napoli, 1917; Pescosolido, Terra e
nobilit; for the Kingdom of Naples, see M.A. Visceglia, Territorio feudo e potere locale. Terra
dOtranto tra Medioevo ed Et Moderna (Naples, 1988), 121; Astarita, The Continuity of
Feudal Power, 82.
18
ASV, AB 2764.
19
ASV, AB 732/9, 732/141.

178

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

year to the lordand some fees, but on the whole the banal rights were
fewer than in Eastern Sabina, and there were almost no corves. As for the
monopolies, the lord held that of the oven or of the millbut there were
dierences between the single efs.20
The division of landed property ownership conrms these sub-regional
divisions. According to the general cadastre of the Papal State of the late
1770s, in Eastern Sabina, the Borghese owned about 1/3 of the land. In
Bassa Sabina, their share amounted to 40%, and in southern Lazio, the
situation was more diverse: in the Monti Albani, the portion of the land
directly owned by the lord was very low, whereas in the Monti Lepini, it
came to more than the half of the land.21 We should emphasize that manorial and banal rights were important where the lords share of the land
ownership was low, whereas elsewhere, property rights brought in higher
income and manorial dues proved less important. Areas where seigneurial
land ownership was low were also poor villages situated in less fertile
mountain areas, where landed incomes were lower. In these regions, the
lords sought to maintain their banal rights, which aected the whole population and depended less on agricultural productivity.
How can we explain these dierences? The lack of research on seigneurial
dues in 16th-century Lazio makes it dicult to know the previous history
of the efs, although the few studies available seem to indicate that the
lords tried to impose new rights upon their vassals in the 16th century.22
One could also relate the hardening of landlord pressure in Eastern Sabina
to a lack of municipal statutes, for such laws regulated the relationships
between the lords and their subjects as well as the political and judicial
organization of the communes. There is a signicant dierence between
the regions where the Borghese owned their efs in this regard: whereas in
Southern Lazio and in Bassa Sabina, nearly all of the communes were provided with statutes, in Eastern Sabina, most villages lacked them. It seems
likely that these communities, which were small and isolated, found themselves in a weaker position with respect to the bigger villages. Historical
factors also testify to the strength of the communes in the former regions:

20

ASV, AB 579/12, 582/101, 703/22, 715/42bis.

Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt, 70-77.
22
C. Iuozzo, Feudatari e vassalli a Vignanello. Un caso di lotta politica e giudiziaria nella
seconda met del Cinquecento (Viterbo, 2003), 25, 110-11, 119-20, 151-52.
21

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

179

in Bassa Sabina, there were some free communes in the late Middle Ages,
whereas in Southern Lazio, the cities were more numerous.23

The Growth of Feudal Rights in the 17th Century

Upon acquiring new efs, the Borghese tried to increase their right.
Paul Vs reign represented a favorable period, as the family wielded papal
authority over the communes. In 1613, Paul V provided his nephew, cardinal Scipione Borghese, with the monopoly of the mill in all his efs. The
Borghese also bought some new rights from indebted communes in Sabina,
mainly monopolies, in the years 1611 and 1612. This policy continued
after 1621, but new opportunities presented themselves less often.24 In
several efs, in the 1620s and 1630s, the Borghese also tried to impose new
banal rights, in particular the monopoly of the oven, by forbidding private
ovens. In other efs, where there was no monopoly, the lords stewards
tried to force subjects to use the seigneurial mill by forbidding them to
grind their cereals outside the village.25 In all these situations, jurisdiction
was an essential tool to this policy, as the lord promulgated edicts and local
tribunals prosecuted the oenders.26
This policy of hardening the feudal rights was also extended to the
landed dues: in 1633, in Montecompatri, the Borghese introduced a levy
on fruit production, but after a petition of the commune, the familys
administrators stepped back.27 In some cases the Borghese tried to force
the inhabitants to lease their lands right after the purchase of the ef. At
the end of the 17th century, when some communes in Sabina were heavily
indebted to the lords, they agreed to cultivate the lords lands in exchange
for the cancellation of their debts.28

23

Forclaz, Les Borghese, 113.

See Reinhard, Papstnanz und Nepotismus, vol. I, p. 26; ASR, Segretari e Cancellieri
della Reverenda Camera Apostolica, vol. 367, . 430r-431v, 451r/v, and vol. 393, . 362r365v; ASV, AB 150/1 and AB 2879, f. 4; AB 702 /24, 722/443 and 736/258.
25
ASV, AB 327/73; ASV, AB 579/12, letter of Francesco Eusebij, 10 November 1634;
ASV, AB 582/18, edicts of 1637 and 1638; ASV, AB 582/88.
26
Forclaz, La famille Borghese, 78-81.
27
Archivio storico del comune di Montecompatri, Archivio preunitario, 1/2, Consiglio
1616-1647, f. 216v.
28
ASV, AB 648/16, 648/64, 648/79; ASV, AB 2876, . 24-27.
24

180

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

Such forceful initiatives led to conicts with the inhabitants, and especially with the communesjust as in the Kingdom of Naples.29 Interestingly, conicts about monopolies concerned mainly the efs of Southern
Lazio, where property rights were predominant, while in Eastern Sabina
the antagonisms focused around manorial rights. After they purchased
Canemorto, the Borghese sought to increase the quantity of wheat the
commune had to transport every year to Rome.30 Whereas the communes
had opposed previous lords in several lawsuits before the papal tribunals in
the late 16th and early 17th century, after the acquisition of the efs by the
Borghese the number decreased sharply. The new lords acted carefully and
backed up their claims by buying new rights, signing agreements with the
communes or imposing a monopoly only gradually. Their dominant position within the Curia, during Paul Vs reign, also forestalled the intervention of Roman magistracies against them.

Growing Conicts in the 18th Century

The situation changed for the Borghese in the early 18th century. Some
communes contested seigneurial rights, and the central magistracies were
bent on verifying their extent. In 1704, Pope Clement XI taxed the properties of lords in their efs and subjected communes to the jurisdiction of the
Congregazione del Buon Governo, in charge of supervising local nances.31
This decision led to surveys of the communes by Roman prelates, who
wanted to check possible seigneurial abuses, such as undue fees required
from the communes. The Congregations major concern was to reduce
communal debt. In the Borghese efs in Eastern Sabina, communal ocials
complained to the prelates about a number ofseigneurial rights (such as the
obligation to transport wheat to Rome and the taxes paid by the owners of

29

M.A. Visceglia, Comunit, signori feudali e ociales in Terra dOtranto tra XVI e
XVII secolo, in Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, CIV, 1986, 259-85; Astarita,
The Continuity of Feudal Power, 147-50; M. Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini. La signoria rurale
nel Regno di Napoli attraverso lo studio dei feudi dei Tocco di Montemiletto (XI-XVIII secolo),
Bari, 1997, 210-15.
30
ASV, AB 167/3; ASV, AB 151/66.
31
S. Tabacchi, Tra riforma e crisi: il Buon Governo delle communit dello Stato della
Chiesa durante il ponticato di Clemente XI, in Ph. Koeppel (ed.), Papes et papaut au
XVIIIe sicle. VIe colloque Franco-Italien organis par la Socit franaise dtude du XVIIIe
sicle (Paris, 1999), 51-85.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

181

animals) and about the monopolies sold to the Borghese by the communes.
The prelates then put together a list of the rights at issue and asked the
Borghese to justify them.32
In the years following these surveys, several lawsuits pitted inhabitants
of communes against the lord or the leaseholder. The new policy of the
papal authorities revealed the existence of a local elite whose interests
diverged from those of the Borghese. These lawsuits led to a fundamental
questioning of seigneurial rights. In Canemorto, for example, the commune in 1709 appealed to the Buon Governo against a decree ordering
inhabitants to carry wheat to Rome for the second time that year. Not only
did the commune refuse to do it, but it also identied carriage as a regalian
rightand therefore not due to the lord. These arguments did not convince the Congregation, which conrmed the controversial right.33 A similar evolution occured in Bassa Sabina, especially concerning property
rights. In Palombara, a long lawsuit opposed the commune to the lord
about levies on olive production. It all started in 1720, when the leaseholder, Gregorio Fargna, claimed dues on olives, cherries and other pitted
fruits produced in the vineyards belonging to the lordamounting to
1/5th of the production. The commune appealed to the Buon Governo
and claimed that there had never previously been any levy on olives. The
adversaries based their assertions on contradictory juridical texts: the commune referred to the statutes, which did not mention any dues on olives,
whereas the lord quoted the purchase contract for the ef, which did. The
suit went onwith some interruptionsfor half a century. Dierent
magistracies dealt with it, deciding alternately in favor of the commune
and the Borghese. At stake were around 10% of the total incomes of Palombara for the Borghese, and the commercialization of the olive oil produced by the vassals, who brought it to market in Rome. Eventually, the
commune won the case in 1770, when prince Marcantonio Borghese
withdrew from it.34 The defeat was not only material for the prince, but
also symbolic, especially after a fty-year struggle. But what were the origins of these growing conicts?
This evolution is clearly related to the development of peasant property
in the 18th century: due to demographic growth, wastelands belonging to

32
33
34

ASR, BG, IV, 980, . 4v, 13r, 5v/6r, 8r, 9r, 13r, 15r, 233r/v, 594r.
ASR, BG, II, 667; Forclaz, Les Borghese, 134-36.
ASR, BG II, 3321, 3323; ASV, AB 754-760; Forclaz, La famille Borghese, 349-52.

182

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

the lord were rented out to the peasants, and intensive crops were cultivated, such as olive trees, fruit trees or vineyards.35 Since investment was
necessary, these lands were only accessible to the upper and middle strata
of peasants. The conditions of the leases changed: the lord rented out these
lands at longer terms and commuted rents in kind into money payments.
This also transformed the relationships betweens the lord and his subjects,
as autonomous farmers emerged in the efs, who were able to commercialize part of their production on the Roman market. In Palombara, we nd
distinct features of this process. In the 18th century, more olive trees were
grown in orchards, and farmers tried to escape the levies by claiming that
they had never been collected on olives. They reinterpreted history according to the present situation, while clinging to the letter of the communal
statutes, which did not mention olive trees.36 The Borghese and their managers, on the other hand, tried to enforce traditional leviesone fth of
the harvestson a modern production, but they were not able to overturn the juridical arguments of their opponents. In other efs, though, the
Borghese adapted to the new situation by adopting new leasesin money
and not in kind. It is likely that the polarization of the conict made such
an evolution impossible in Palombara.
Thus, there was clearly an intensication of conicts in Lazioa trend
opposite to the one unfolding in the Kingdom of Naples, where conicts
lessened in the 18th century.37 Whereas in the 16th century, lawsuits were
mere reactions to feudal abuses, in the 18th century the vassals questioned seigneurial dues altogether. Once more, regional dierences are evident: whereas in Eastern Sabina, the conicts concerned taxes and transport
services, in Bassa Sabina, land rental dues were at stake. An emerging
autonomous rural elite sought to free itself from the lords grasp on the
local economy, by cultivating intensive commercial crops and developing
contacts with the Roman market.

35

Id., Les Borghese, pp. 151-155; the phenomenon is also testied to in the Kingdom of
Naples: Visceglia, Territorio feudo, 240-41; Astarita, The Continuity of Feudal Power, p. 86;
Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini, 349-52.
36
As did the inhabitants of the efs owned by the Barberini in a similar conict: see
Castiglione, Patrons and Adversaries, 164-66.
37
Astarita, The Continuity of Feudal Power, 151-54; Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini,
226 -27.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

183

Structure and Evolution of the Revenues

It is important to consider to what extent the elements described so far
regional dierences, increasing feudal rights in the 17th century and growing conicts in the 18thinuenced incomes brought in by the efs. Did
those incomes drop after 1700? And was the hardening of feudal dues
subsequent to a crisis of the revenues? In order to evaluate the importance
of feudal incomes, it is rst of all necessary to assess their monetary value
by comparing them with prices in 17th century Lazio. A team of oxen, for
example, cost about 50 scudi in the 1650s, whereas a rubbio of wheat,
which fed an adult for a year, cost in the same period between 7 and 8
scudi.38 At that time, the twenty-three efs held by the Borghese yielded
almost 40,000 scudi a year, a sum inconceivable for a local farmer. However, there were signicant dierences between efs: Palombara brought in
about 7500 scudi, but Vallinfreda only 650 scudi. This gap was related to
demographic and geographic variables; in order to explain it, it is worth
examining rst the structure of the incomes. In Eastern Sabina, the share
of land-use payments in the overall revenues was rather low:39 in 1637, in
Canemorto, it constituted only 32.9% of the income, in Vivaro 41.2%, in
Scarpa 32.5%. The monopolies, on the other hand, represented an equal
or more important share of the revenues: 34.5% in Canemorto, 45% in
Vivaro, 53.4% in Scarpa. The other banal and manorial rights (corves,
various taxes and contributions) brought in 28.8% in Canemorto, but
only 7% in Scarpa and 5.4% in Vivaro, as did the pastures (4% in
Canemorto, 8.3% in Vivaro, but 20.9% in Scarpa).
Table 1: Revenues of Eastern Sabina, 1637 (in scudi)

Levies
Monopolies
Other banal rights
Pastures
Total

38
39

Canemorto

Vivaro

Scarpa

353.8
372
310.9
42.8
1079.5

301.5
330
40
61.1
732.6

240
341.5
22.5
160
764

Ago, Un feudo esemplare, 54; ASV, AB ASV, AB 8567, f. 418 v/r.

ASV, AB 2764.

184

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

The situation was quite dierent in Bassa Sabina:40 the levies and incomes
from pastures and forests represented the principal part of the revenue. The
former constituted 45.3% of the total incomes of Palombara, 50.3% of the
incomes of Moricone and 37.8% of those of Mentana, while the latter
brought in respectively 37 (Palombara), 29.1 (Moricone) and 45.2%
(Mentana). Accordingly, monopolies and other banal and manorial rights
represented a low share of the revenue: 17% in Palombara, 18.7% in Moricone and 17% in Mentana. Whereas in Mentana, the agricultural incomes
came almost exclusively from wheat, in Palombara and Moricone, they
also included vine and olive oil production (10-15% of the total rent). In
these efs, the land-use payments (levies and rentals of pastures) amounted
to 80% of the revenues.
Table 2: Revenues of Bassa Sabina, 1649/56 (in scudi)
Palombara
(1649)
Levies
Monopolies
Other banal and
manorial rights
Pastures, exploitation
of forests
Total

Moricone
(1654)

Mentana
(1656)

3442.5
1114
244.91

142.1
484.6
44.6

2413.2
1086
0.5

2802.5

823.1

2890.8

7603.9

2827.6

6390.5

In Southern Lazio, the revenue structure is similar to that of Bassa Sabina,

with the predominance of land-use fees more pronounced (63% in Montecompatri and Monteporzio, 52.6% in Montefortino, 70% in Norma);
rentals of pastures and forests represented 23.6, 35.3 and 21.4%, while
monopolies brought in only13, 8.4 and 7%. There was ample agricultural
specialization between the dierent efs: in Montecompatri and Monteporzio, vineyards were dominant (40% of the rent), whereas in Montefortino and Norma, the production consisted mainly of wheat.41

40
41

ASV, AB 8566, f. 169, 223; ASV, AB 8567, f. 213, 394.

ASV, AB 327/60; 703/23; 8566, f. 165, 238.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

185

Table 3: Revenues of Southern Lazio, 1635/1650 (in scudi)

Levies
Monopolies
Other banal and
manorial rights
Pastures, exploitation
of forests
Total

Montecompatri/
Monteporzio
(c. 1635)

Montefortino
(1650)

Norma
(1630s)

3791
725
60

3390.3
551
225.4

1863
180
65

1413

2280.9

575

5989

6447.5

2683

On the whole, then, we observe a striking diversication of income between

the dierent regions: whereas in Eastern Sabina, the share of monopolies
and other banal rights was important (around the half of the revenue),
in Bassa Sabina and in Southern Lazio, revenue mainly consisted of payments for the use of land. And in these regions, there was also a greater
diversication of crops: in Bassa Sabina, incomes from vineyards and olive
trees represented a signicant part of the total, whereas in Southern Lazio,
some efs were specialized in wine production and others in wheat and
livestock breeding. Thus, as in Southern Italy, the Borghese familys feudal
investments in dierent regions appear to have hedged against the variations in production, as not all crops would have bad harvests the same
year.42 Furthermore, in most efs, levies and other land-use payments constituted the main share of the revenue. Banal and manorial rights were
only important in the poorer efs of Eastern Sabinaa conclusion which
conrms Tommaso Astaritas results for the efs of the Caracciolo di Brienza
family in the Kingdom of Naples.43 In richer regions of Southern Italy
like Sicily or Pugliathe latter were not signicant for seigneurial income.
This does not mean, as many assumed in the 1970s and 1980s, that feudal
42

That behavior follows the model that has been established by Witold Kula for Poland:
see W. Kula, Thorie conomique du systme fodal. Pour un modle de lconomie polonaise
16 e-18 e sicles (Paris-La Haye, 1970), 42; for Southern Italy, see M. A. Visceglia, Lazienda
signorile in Terra dOtranto nellet moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), in A. Massafra (ed.),
Problemi di storia delle campagne meridionali nellet moderna e contemporanea (Bari, 1981),
44-45, 63.
43
Astarita, The Continuity, 78-80.

186

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

lords in the early modern period became mere landowners deprived of

jurisdictional or political power in their efs.44 What subsequent research
has shown is that land-use income became the principal origin of their
revenues.
With such dierences in the structure of the revenues, the question of
their evolution over time and of the overall conjuncture becomes important. Did the raising of the charges for manorial and banal rights in the
17th century have consequences for the seigneurial income overall, or did
it just compensate for a previous diminution? And did the conicts of the
18th century lead to a decreasing of overall income? Finally, can one discern similar uctuations of revenues in the dierent regions? As to the rst
question, we lack evidence for the revenues from the efs in question at the
beginning of the 17th century, before purchase by the Borghese family. In
some cases, there was a revenue increase: in Eastern Sabina, in the years
after the purchaseas the new lords bought some monopolies from the
communesthe income went up by 25 to 33%.45 In Southern Lazio, revenue remained stable in the rst half of the 17th century.46 The incomes of
the monopolies increased, though, mainly in Montefortino (from 78 to
515 scudi between 1615 and 1649),47 but this did not aect the overall
income.
Did increasing incomes from monopolies represent an answer to a
reduction of landed incomes? In fact, they were a consequence of the rural
crisis in 17th-century Italy. For Rome as well as for Southern Italy, the
starting point of the crisis can be dated back to the middle of the century,
thus later than in north-central Italy, where the crisis began in the 1620s.
Although it can best be described as a deation rather than a Malthusian
crisis, it started in a classical way with a demographic catastrophe, the epi-

44

Aymard, La transizione, 1191-192; Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt, 50-51; critics to this

position in Astarita, The Continuity, p. 71. On the political and jurisdictional powers of the
lords, see, for the Kingdom of Naples, Astarita, The Continuity; for the Papal State, see
Armando, I poteri giurisdizionali; Forclaz, Le relazioni complesse; Forclaz, La famille
Borghese.
45
Percile and Civitella, rented out 1000 scudi in 1610, are rented out 1300 scudi in
1613; the revenues of Vivaro increased from 450 (1612) to 680 scudi (1616), while those
of Scarpa went from 800 to 1000 scudi between 1612 and 1620 (Reinhard, Papstnanz und
Nepotismus, vol. I, . 122, 124, 126).
46
Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, . 204-09, 220-21.
47
ASV, AB 582/101; ASV, AB 8566, f. 165r.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

187

demic plague in 1656, which aected rst the Kingdom of Naples, then
the Papal States and Genoa. Due to this severe mortality, rst demand and
then supply shrank. Consequently, feudal incomes lessened, as land-rents,
grain prices and incomes from monopolies and other banal rights all contracted. Signicantly, the revenues rst crashed in Eastern Sabina, which
bordered on the Kingdom of Naples: they shrank at least one third between
1654 and 1659, and in some cases by 50%.48 In 1680, the revenues were
one-quarter lower than in the early 1650s.49 In Bassa Sabina, the diminution took place later than in Eastern Sabina. In 1680, the income regressed,
although less than in Eastern Sabinaprobably due to the diversity of
crops and to the weaker eects of the plaguebut at the beginning of the
18th century, the contraction of revenues was pronounced there too. In
Southern Lazio, nally, although incomes remained high throughout the
17th century in Montecompatri and Monteporzio (the efs that were specialized in vineyards), other efs registered an evolution similar to Bassa
Sabina: levies diminished, while the relative share of monopolies increased.
The regression was less than in Eastern Sabina.
The response of the Borghese assumed dierent forms: on one hand,
they increased their pressure on local communities. In Eastern Sabina they
bought monopolies from some communes and forced the inhabitants of
other efs to cultivate seigneurial lands, probably where the population had
regressed after the plague. Incomes from monopolies remained constant
and increased in some cases, following population growth. It is possible
that the Borghese and their leaseholders, in order to cut down production
costs, abandoned grain cultivation in elds that were converted to grazing
lands. Another policy, starting in the last decades of the century, conceded
lands to peasants for long-term monetary rents. In many efs, when the
population increased again, monetary incomes grew from planting new
intensive crops such as vineyards and olive trees. Incomes from pastures
and forests lessened proportionally, because of land reconversion. This latter policy spurred the growth of peasant property in the 18th century and
gave greater autonomy to the farmers, creating the conditions for future
48

ASV, AB 8567, f. 622v, 624v.

ASV, AB 8572, f. 853, 860, 873-74. About the rural crisis, especially in north-central
Italy, see G. Hanlon, Early Modern Italy, Basingstoke, 2000, 217-19; for Tuscany, see lately
G. Hanlon, Human Nature in Rural Tuscany: an Early Modern history, Basingstoke, 2007,
chapter 4; for grain prices in Rome and the Papal State, see Reinhardt, berleben in Rom,
311-331.
49

188

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

conicts between the lords and their subjects. It is not possible to examine
the further evolution of the revenues, as we do not know their composition
after the Borghese rented out their efs in the 18th century. Nevertheless,
we observe a slight revenue increase from 1720 onwards.
Beyond the question of the evolution of revenues, we must keep in mind
the protability of the efs as compared to other assetsallodial estates
and nancial investments. Around 1600, the income from efs has been
estimated at between 2.5 and 3% of their value, whereas in 1660, it
dropped to only 2.1%; similarly, the income of allodial estates fell from
3.5-4% circa 1615 to 3% in the 1660s.50 Financial investments were more
protable, as the shares of the public debt yielded between 4.5 (for the
transmissible bonds) and 7.5-9% (for the non-transmissible bonds) around
1600.51 However interest rates later went down to 4% for transmissible
bonds in 1656, and to 3% in 1683. Although the protability of efs and,
more generally, of landed properties was not very high, their attractiveness
competed by default with that of nancial assets.

Management Choices
How did the Borghese collect their revenues? Two options were available:
leasing or direct management. As the Borghese lived in Rome and not in
their efs, they needed intermediaries for both. In most efs, the prosecutor of the feudal tribunal was in charge of collecting dues, selling grain and
leasing out the seigneurial lands. Each individual ef was part of a bigger
structure, however: in Sabina, general superintendents based in Canemorto
and Palombara supervised the management of the other efs, gathered in
two feudal states. In Southern Lazio, a superintendent living in the
Borghese summer villa of Frascati managed the neighboring efs of Montecompatri and Monteporzio, while further south, the steward of Montefortino also ran Norma and Olevano. While prosecutors generally belonged
to the local elites, superintendents often came from other efs.

50
For the following gures, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, p. 194; M. Teodori,
I parenti del papa. Nepotismo ponticio e formazione del patrimonio Chigi nella Roma barocca
(Padua, 2001), 174, 198.
51
The transmissible shares could be inherited at the death of the owner, whereas the
non-transmissible shares went back to the state.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

189

Revenues of the efs between 1650 and 1763 (in scudi)

45 000
40 000
35 000
30 000
25 000
20 000
15 000
10 000
5 000
0,00
1650'

1680

Southern Lazio

1700'
Bassa Sabina

1720

1744

Eastern Sabina

1763
Total

If seigneurial assets were rented out, however, a leaseholder managed them.

Since rental contracts generally lasted six or nine years, the leaseholder was
undoubtedly a key gure in the ef. The major dierence between direct
management and leasing is that when the efs were rented out, the leaseholderand not the lords stewardshad to take care of leasing the lands,
collecting the rents and commercializing the dues collected in kind. Stewards and leaseholders had to respect several constraints: rst, they were
obliged to rent out the lands to the farmers of the village, since only the
latter had the right of cultivating them. Every third or fourth year, according to crop rotation schedules, seigneurial lands were distributed among
the owners of oxen. Likewise, the inhabitants held access rights to pastures
and forests owned by the lord.52
What made the Borghese choose between direct management or leasing
out? Several factors made leasing an easier option. First, the lord and his
stewards did not have to worry about leasing the lands, or about collecting
dues or debts from peasants, which were important in the Ancien Rgime.
52

See Curis, Usi civici, pp. 473-485, 528-567, 732-739; Pescosolido, Terra e nobilt;
R. Ago, Un feudo esemplare. Immobilismo padronale e astuzia contadina nel Lazio del 700
(Fasano, 1988).

190

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

Even in bad years, the leaseholders always had to pay rent to the Borghese.
On the other hand, direct management could bring in more prots by
eliminating the middleman, but one has to consider the costs it entailed.
At the end of the 17th century, expenses (salaries of the feudal ocers,
maintenance of mills, expenses for the harvest) often represented more
than 20% of the incomes, whereas they constituted only 10% of the rent
in the leased efs.53
In Lazio as in Southern Italy and elsewhere in Europe, the lords rented
out their efs from the second half of the 16th century on. By then many
leaseholders were Roman commercial farmers, the mercanti di campagna;
sometimes even bankers took part in the lease. As soon as they bought
their efs, the Borghese rented out almost all of them. After Paul Vs death,
this remained the preferred option. Until the middle of the 17th century,
most efs were leased out, excepting the most desirable of themMontefortino, Palombara and Mentana. During the second half of the century,
the Borghese rented out fewer efs, since the prots lessened for leaseholders.
Many of the latter discontinued their lease, and by the 1680s, only ten of
thirty-two efs were leased outthis time the most protable ones. How
can we explain this evolution? In the 1650s, it was possible for the farmers
and their stewards to sell the wheat for high prices. Thirty years later, the
cultivated areas had declined and so had the production, which explains
the loss of interest on the leaseholders side and the fact that only the bigger
efs were rented out. In 1650 direct management of the bigger efs was
lucrative for the Borghese, but after 1680 it ceased to be attractive.54
At the beginning of the 18th century, two-thirds of the efs remained
rented out.55 The decline of revenue was probably due to the bankruptcy
of several leaseholders in the late 17th century. The Borghese then consolidated the contracts until only ten leaseholders rented twenty-one efs.
During the 18th century, direct management became quite exceptional,
and businessmen holding long-term leases managed the efs. In Southern
Lazio, the Tuschi family leased Norma uninterruptedly from the 1720s to
the end of the century.56 Who were the other leaseholders? During Paul Vs
53

Forclaz, Les Borghese, 204.

About the leaseholders in the Papal State, see Delumeau, Vie conomique, vol. I, 48182; for the early 17th century, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese; in Southern Italy,
see Aymard, La transizione, 1141-42; Astarita, The Continuity, 67.
55
ASV, AB 23/33, 25/54, 29/240, 7650.
56
ASV, AB 327/103, 582/33, 705/253, 705/240, 705/246.
54

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

191

reign, some of them were Roman bankers, but the latter seemed to take
less interest in farming in the second half of the century; some leaseholders
were merchants active in the capital. Others came from the lesser towns of
Lazio, where they had other activities. In the 1650s, the leaseholders of
Norma also leased the oven of the neighboring city of Velletri. Finally,
many emerged from the elites of the efs themselves: they leased in particular the smaller ones, especially in Sabina.57
Although the Borghese preferred renting out their efs, they demonstrated an interest in management nevertheless, taking part in negotiations
with potential leaseholders and keeping informed about prices of wheat.
One of the main problems of direct management was the sale of dues collected in kind. Due to their centralized administrationthe stewards of
the bigger efs supervised the management of the smaller ones, especially
in Sabinathe Borghese often sold wheat from one ef to another, or to
the Roman market and to bakers of lesser towns. The Borghese and their
administrators seemed to prefer reliable buyers, able to buy large quantities. An important part of the grain was also sold to the inhabitants of the
efscommunes and bakers for supplying the population, peasants for
seeds. The inhabitants, as small-scale purchasers, often had to buy it at a
more expensive rate than foreign buyers: in 1644 for example, the baker of
the city of Tivoli bought wheat for 6.5 scudi a rubbio, while the baker of
Palombara paid 8 scudi.58 There were important commercial movements
on a regional scale, within Sabina, and from efs situated in Sabina to
those in Southern Lazio. The Borghese attention to the commercialization
of their revenues in kind diers from the policy of lords belonging to the
old nobility, who preferred to sell their wheat to the communes of their
efs.59 It seems that, while the Borghese respected the moral economy,
i.e. the duty of supplying their subjects with their own produce, they put
their economic interest rst, especially in years of shortages, as regards to
both the buyers and the prices.

57

Forclaz, Les Borghese, 206-08.

ASV, AB 737; other examples in AB 326/42; AB 8566, 141, 271, 350, 352, 699; AB
8567, 204, 245, 405, 539, 549.
59
Astarita, The Continuity, 92; Benaiteau, Vassalli e cittadini, 299; Raimondo, Il prestigio, 125.
58

192

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

Conclusion
The management of the Borghese clearly displayed traditional features:
they made few investments and their main goal was to guarantee a stable
income. Moreover, they followed an aggressive policy to increase their
incomes during Paul Vs ponticate through the imposition of new
monopolies. Towards the end of the 17th century, again, they tried to
squeeze their vassals in order to oset the decline of their incomes. However, it is legitimate to emphasize their commercial acumen too.60 Several
elements indicate this: the purchase of efs in the later 17th century showing distinctions in the structure of the revenues, and a diversication of
crops; and more generally the ability of the Borghese to adapt to the situation and to take advantage of it. In Eastern Sabina they enforced banal and
manorial rights; in Bassa Sabina, they tried to improve revenues by extending traditional levies to new crops, like olives. They also proved to be careful managers in the commercialization of wheat. As they collected a wide
range of dues and owned an important share of the lands, their power over
vassals was extremely strong, especially in Bassa Sabina and in some efs of
Southern Lazio. In the 18th century, though, there was a substantial shift
and the lords position weakened. This was due to the development of
peasant property, strengthening relations between the peasants and the
Roman market, and the diminution or stagnation of the feudal revenues.
However, the Borghese still owned an important part of the land and collected important incomes from their efs. This evolution shows the importance of legal conicts over the long duration, and the active role of the
communes in changing the balance of power.
Seigneurial rights in Lazio thus proved to be extremely signicant
throughout the early modern period and the lords position was comparable to that of lords in Southern Italy. The renewal of the feudal nobility in
the 17th century allowed a signicant hardening of seigneurial rights, and
more research is needed on the transition from the 16th to the 17th century. Did this only apply to the papal families, or did new lords belonging
to curial or patrician families exert a similar pressure on their efs? Were
seigneurial rights hardened as well in efs retained by the old nobility? It
would also be interesting to determine whether the Borghese management

60

For the denition of a traditional management, see Astarita, The Continuity, 69-70;
about the commercial elements, see Reinhardt, Kardinal Scipione Borghese, 129-31.

B. Forclaz / Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008) 169-193

193

resembled that of other feudal lords, especially among the newcomers. But
even conceding this, it would be an oversimplication to put this pattern
of estate-management into a generic framework of traditional rural
economy. This study shows that the opposition traditional / modern
needs to be softened, as modern elements could be brought into a model
characterized by strong seigneurial rights. In the 17th century, the Borghese created vast estates and centralized the management of their efs, especially as regards the commercialization of revenues in kind. The choice
between management optionswhether direct or renting outwas based
upon considerations of prot. In this, the Borghese were similar to French
or Prussian noble families. Traditional seigneurial rights remained in all
cases important throughout the early modern periodand to some extent
they were even consolidated; yet the lords also showed a concern for commercialization of assets and for a rigorous management of their efs.61
Another modern element is agricultural innovation: although the Borghese did not initiate it directly, they cleared lands, brought in new kinds of
leases, and allowed the farmers to introduce intensive crops. This led to the
growth of peasant property and the development of new productions. In
Lazio as well as in other Western European countries, innovation and productivity growth came from small and medium exploitations, but the lords
encouraged a certain degree of specialization and might have given the
local farmers a model for the commercialization of their own production.
In the early modern economy, commercial and feudal features, far from
being mutually exclusive, were therefore intertwined.

61

See Hagen, Ordinary Prussians; Janssen, Yun-Casalilla (eds.), European Aristocracies.