Intersectionality and Feminist Theory: Reflections on the Current Debate in Europe

2009 APSA Annual Meeting in Toronto, September 3-6

Ina Kerner, Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin
(ina.kerner@sowi.hu-berlin.de)

Intersectionality is one of the most prominent topics of current feminist theory in Europe. It is
also one of its most serious challenges, for it presses us to acknowledge that European nations are
no homogenous entities and calls for very complex accounts of gender relations and of genderrelated forms of injustice. One might even say that the intersectionality paradigm is in the process
of transforming European gender studies to something like diversity studies a process that is
applauded by some and criticized by others. Compared to the North American academy, this
development seems to take off rather belated, though. While feminist theory west of the Atlantic
has been described as focusing on multiple intersecting differences since around 1990 (cf.
Fraser 1997: 180), for Europe, the same can be said only fifteen to twenty years later. And even
now, it is far from clear what this new emphasis means and implies.
According to Cathy Davis, for instance, intersectionality in Europa is so far merely a
buzzword; but it is precisely the vagueness and open-endedness of the term, she suggests,
that was the the very secret to its success: for it encouraged complexity, stimulated creativity,
avoided premature closure, tantalized feminist scholars to raise new questions and explored
uncharted territory (Davis 2008: 69, 79). While I do agree that at least with regard to the
European feminist theory mainstream the intersectionality paradigm currently does have these
effects, in this paper I want to go a step further than Davis and focus on the content, rather than
the open and dynamic structure of the ongoing discussion that is connected to intersectionality.
So in what follows, I will concentrate on two aspects of current theoretical debates on
intersectionality in Germany and other German speaking countries. The first one is the whatquestion of intersectionality, asking what it is, which forms of inequality it is that we focus on as
intersecting. And the second one is the how-question of intersectionality, focusing on how we
should conceptualize what is happening when forms of inequality intersect.1

Other interesting issues currently debated or even waiting to be debated include the ways in
which the disciplinary specializations of researchers engaged in the transdisciplinary project of
intersectional studies influence what and how they look at when undertaking these kinds of
1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459024

1. The What-Question of Intersectionality

When people think of the concept of intersectionality, the editors of the critical perspectives
section of the June 2007 edition of Politics & Gender write, they generally think race, gender
and class. In many studies, however, the class part of this tryptich is invisible, silent,
acknowledged as important but rarely systematically addressed. (Politics and Gender 3(2) 2007:
231). That the origin of intersectional analyses is to be found in U.S. as well as in British
black feminism and its focus on the interplays of racism, sexism and social inequality, is
acknowledged in the German debate, as well. The term is usually traced back to Kimberle
Crenshaws famous quote in which she compares discrimination to traffic at an intersection;
additionally, the Combahee River Collective Statement and authors like Hazel Carby, Patricia
Hill Collins, bell hooks and Nira-Yuval-Davis are often mentioned. (cf. e.g. Klinger/Knapp 2007:
34f.; Walgenbach 2007: 27f.; Kerner 2009: 345ff.; Winker/Degele 2009: 11f.). Nevertheless,
intersectionality in its current use is rather an almost technical term that is denoting the
relationality of different forms of inequality than a concept referring to a particular form of
feminism, namely black feminism. The notions most important insight is usually seen in the
conceptual complexity that it promises, a complexity that seems to allow us to capture the central
aspects of the somewhat simpler and, in its core, additive concept of triple oppression
(Viehmann 1993) without having to reproduce the shortcomings of this conceptual precursor.2
So, borrowing from Ange-Marie Hancock, one might say that in Germany, intersectionality as a
research paradigm has started beyond a content specialization that emphasizes the subjectivity of
women who are multiply marginalized, rather than evolving there, like in the U.S. (cf. Hancock
2007: 249). It should therefore come as no surprise that in Germany, the what-question is highly
contested. And the ensuing debate does not only stem from the fact that German feminist theory
can look back at an intense love-hate-relationship with the category of class (cf. Marx Ferree
2008: 240ff.). Another important factor might be connected to timing. For the import of the
research, and the extent to which intersectional analyses should be tailored to political practice,
e.g. processes of gender and diversity mainstreaming.
2
There is a particular German concept of triple oppression that, having being developed in
West Germanys radical left engaging with U.S. black feminism, had a certain prominence there
for a while. It had reached feminist theory in that country, or rather its margins, long before the
current intersectionality discourse ever started. In its core, the concept is constructing parallels
between the three forms of oppression, despite the use of the multiplication metaphor. For a more
detailed critique, see Kerner (2009: 348ff.).
2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459024

idea of intersectionality more of less coincided with the passing of Allgemeines

Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG), German antidiscrimination law, in compliance which EU
regulations. This legislation aims at preventing or abolishing discrimination related to six
different categories or rather sets of categories, namely race or ethnicity, gender, religion or
belief, disability, age and sexual identity (cf. http://bundesrecht.juris.de/agg/). It thus clearly goes
beyond the before mentioned trias of race, class and gender and it does so in an agendasetting way. Furthermore, the import of intersectionality took place at a time when various forms
of minority studies, or rather: critique-of-normality studies like queer theory, disability studies
etc. had already started proliferating and people engaged in these projects also address issues
beyond race, class and gender, while at the same time assessing all sorts of relations between
different categories and forms of differentiation, including those of the triptych. And to mention a
third factor, there is no consensus about on what kinds of differentiations German forms of
racism rely most. Even the term race has only recently been reintroduced into liberal public
discourse; so scholars who are interested in assessing and criticizing racism dont only and
often not even predominantly look at race, but at ethnicity, nationality and religion as well.
So, given this background, what is it that is debated concerning the what-question of
intersectionality? To my mind, the most interesting open question right now concerns the criteria
for the selection of those sets of differences that are held to be the most relevant to intersectional
analyses. Let me mention two opposing positions here. Cornelia Klinger and Gudrun-Axeli
Knapp, on the one hand, attempt to identify the most relevant structural causes of inequality
through historical analysis and reflection (cf. Knapp/Klinger 2008: 7). To this end, they have so
far identified class, race and gender or the structural categories capitalism, patriarchy and
nationalism (including ethnocentrism and colonialism/imperialism) as those forms of inequality
that at least within social theory should be central to every intersectional analysis (Klinger/Knapp
2008: 42, 54; cf. Knapp 2008). Katrin Meyer and Patricia Purtschert, on the other hand, are
highly skeptical of such an attempt to write an intersectional grand theory of European modernity
and, by this means, to answer the what-question academically instead of leaving it to constant
political contestation. They conceptualize categories of difference as power effects that emerge in
the interplay of oppression and its critique. Therefore, to them, the openness of the whatquestion, which implies the continual opportunity to introduce new categories into the realm of
the political, is something like a strategic end in itself. Since it furthermore allowed the constant
construction of new political alliances, they see the openness as rather helpful for the fight
3

against the various forms of injustice than detrimental to it (cf. Meyer/Purtschert 2008;
Purtschert/Meyer 2009). But even without such an activist agenda it can be questioned whether
the what-question can really be answered through empirical research. If you use, for instance, a
framework that, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, focuses on processes of normalization
(cf. e.g. Waldschmidt 2004), issues of gender, sexuality, health and ability are likely to be the
most relevant but these clearly differ from those on the list that Knapp and Klinger have
produced. So I hold that even if we claim to rather have academic than political reasons for
undertaking intersectional analyses and for developing theories of intersectionality, the normative
and meta-theoretical underpinnings of our projects matter considerably with regard to how we are
likely to answer the what-question. Of those underpinnings, there is a great variety, or in other
words: it is not at all self-understood what we are interested in when we are interested in
intersectionality. It might even make sense to consider the what-question as essentially contested
(cf. Gallie 1956). But if it was, any attempt to answer it once and for all would disqualify itself.
What would in that case seem much more forward-looking was a vivid debate on why each of us
engages in intersectionality and to which end. This way, the conceptual openness of the whatquestion would invite, or lets say: push us to have an ongoing methodological discussion. And
such a discussion we all might agree is seldomly a bad thing.
2. The How-Question of Intersectionality
What exactly is happening when different forms of inequality intersect? And how can we
conceptually grasp what we take to be happening? This is the how-question of intersectionality,
and interestingly, in the German debate, there are several attempts to answer it that go in a similar
direction. Of those, I will present two. In both cases intersectionality is conceptualized in a
multilevel way, roughly distinguishing a micro-, meso- and a macrodimension; for the U.S.
context and referring to the social construction and the institutionalization of gender and race,
Evelyn Nakano Glenn, who distinguishes the levels of representation, micro-interaction and
social structure, has developed such a framework (cf. Glenn 1999). The first answer to the howquestion that I want to mention has been developed by Nina Degele and Gabriele Winker.
Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, they have suggested to differentiate the intersectionality
of classism, heteronormativity, racism and bodyism, (Degele/Winker 2008: 195) or, in a later
version, of class, gender, race and body in a praxeological way and to analyze it on the levels of
identity construction, social structure as well as representation (cf. Winker/Degele 2009). The
4

second answer to the how-question that I briefly want to refer to is from my own work on racism
and sexism (cf. Kerner 2009). Using Michel Foucaults analytics of power as a starting point, I
have suggested a three-dimensional account that heuristically differentiates an epistemic, an
institutional and a personal dimension of racism, sexism as well as of their intersections holding
that the three dimensions interrelate and can mutually reinforce and reproduce each other. The
epistemic dimension refers to discourses and knowledge, but also includes images and symbols.
The institutional dimension refers to institutional settings that cause structural forms of
discrimination and hierarchization and affect the distribution of structural privileges. The
personal dimension, finally the term personal rather referring to person than meaning
private refers to attitudes and/or perceptions, but also to the identity and/or subjectivity of
people both of those who belong to dominant and those who belong to minoritized social
groups along the spectrum of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, nationality and religion;
furthermore, it refers to interpersonal actions and interactions.3 So how can this distinction be
applied to intersections of racism and sexism?
Concerning the epistemic dimension, intersectionality can be said to imply the existence of
gendered racial norms and of racialized gender norms so here, intersectionality means the
pluralization and internal differentiation of common diversity categories. Stereotypes and gender
norms that, for instance, black or Muslim women might have do deal with, usually differ from
both those pertaining to women of other racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds and from those
pertaining to black or Muslim men.
With regard to the institutional dimension intersectionality amounts to a complex interplay of
institutional settings, for instance concerning the labor market, migration regulations and family
life. Its effects include, for instance, that despite rising labor market participation even of middle
and upper class women, in many societies housework has so far remained highly feminized. Even
in

those

economically

well-off

heterosexual

families

that

dont

reproduce

the

Let me explain what I mean when suggesting that the three dimensions interrelate and possibly
reinforce and reproduce one another. Gendered racist discourse, for instance, can be inscribed in
institutions, which then might produce discriminating effects; it can also have effects on
processes of subject formation, which might lead to the reproduction of more racist discourse, or
to racist acts with effects on subjects, but also on institutions etc. Among the effects of holding
that the relation between the three dimensions is one of multiple interrelations, is the
impossibility to grasp racisms and sexisms by looking at or attempting to change only
phenomena relating to one dimension by itself; even though I would not argue that such looks
and attempts cannot be of major value.
5

breadwinner/housewife-model, but follow dual-career paths, housework often doesnt get

internally redistributed but rather externalized and those who get employed to do it, often under
precarious conditions, are usually female migrants.
Concerning the personal dimension, finally, intersectionality among other things means processes
of subject or identity formation with multiple intersecting reference points processes that
Encarnacin Gutirrez Rodriguez, has helpfully called gendered ethnicization (Gutirrez
Rodrguez 1999: 205). Studying processes of identity formation of women who have migrated to
Germany, Gutirrez Rodrguez has shown that the personal formation of a gender identity always
implies processes of ethnicization because gender norms dont come in ethnically neutral
forms. Whether individuals experienced their ethnicization as such, would furthermore depend on
their societal position; members of ethnic minorities would be perceived as more ethnic, or
ethnically distinct, than members of ethnic majorities. What is relevant about this for thinking
about the personal dimension of intersections of racism and sexism is the fact that we cannot
clearly separate processes of gender identity formation from processes of racial or ethnic
identity formation they are intertwined.4
So what do such multi-dimensional accounts of intersectionality entail with regard to the howquestion? I would argue that the most important implication is that we shouldnt attempt to come
up with a single, one-dimensional answer to it. Rather, we should seek multi-dimensional and
thus more nuanced answers. When thinking about how, for instance, intersections of racism and
sexism can be conceptualized, I suggest to focus on pluralized difference categories and norms,
forms of institutional interlocking with differencializing effects, as well as on multifaceted forms
of identity formation.
3. Conclusion
That the intersectionality paradigm has served to encourage complexity, to stimulate creativity, to
discourage premature closure and to lead the way towards new questions and research areas
within feminist theory and beyond already, is probably without doubt. And I would go as far
as agreeing with Cathy Davis that this suffices to talk about a success story here. Nevertheless, I
dont think that success should necessarily be considered as an end in itself especially not in
4

This is not to imply that in processes of identity formation racist and sexist norms are
necessarily adopted by individuals rather, these norms are in the background of those processes.
Ascriptions and self-definitions can, but dont have to correspond.
6

scholarship. We should know, or at least want to know, what we are interested in when we are
interested in intersectionality.5 For when we do, we can start to think about which direction
exactly it is that we want take when undertaking our innovative research. Furthermore, we can
think about which questions it is that can be answered empirically, which ones that can be
answered conceptually and which ones that should indeed remain open.
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In her essay Intersectionality as Buzzword, Davis sets out to investigate the seeming paradox
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generates among feminist scholars about what it actually is and how to use it (Davis 2008: 69).
She is clear about that she will not be providing suggestions about how to clarify the ambiguities
surrounding the concept, nor how to alleviate uncertainties about how it should be used (ibid.)
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concept, which she celebrates for, as already paraphrased above, encouraging complexity,
stimulating creativity, avoiding premature closure and tantalizing feminist scholars to raise new
questions and explore new territory (cf. ibid. 79).
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