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E-Filed

02/02/2010 @ 02:56:45 PM
Honorable Robert Esdale
Clerk Of The Court

No. ________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

JOHN M. TYSON, JR., SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FOR TASK FORCE ON ILLEGAL


GAMBLING,

Appellant,

V.

MACON COUNTY GREYHOUND PARK INC. D/B/A VICTORYLAND,

Appellee.

APPELLANT JOHN M. TYSON, JR.’S OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE’S


MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF

On interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon


County
(The Honorable Thomas F. Young Jr.)
(No. CV-2010-09)
_____________________________

John M. Tyson, Jr.


Martha Tierney
Edgar Greene
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY
600 Dexter Avenue
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
(334) 242-7120
(251) 574-8400 (fax)
(334) 242-2335 (fax)

Attorneys for Appellant John M.


Tyson, Jr., Special Prosecutor
TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND


MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF ......................... 1 

BACKGROUND ................................................ 1 

REASONS THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED ............ 6 

I.  The Undersigned Attorneys Have Authority to


Prosecute This Appeal. ........................... 6 

A.  Tyson and Tierney have the authority to


prosecute this appeal. ...................... 7 

B.  Tyson has the right to appeal the order


entered against him to this Court. ......... 10 

C.  Greene has explicit statutory authority


to appear before this Court ................ 13 

II.  A TRO is Appealable As An “Injunction” Under


Alabama Law. .................................... 14 

CONCLUSION ............................................... 18 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................... 19 

i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases 

Allen v. Barbour County


981 So. 2d 1072 (Ala. 2007) ............................. 14

Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach


Nos. 1080805, 1080806, __ So. 3d __ , 2009 WL 3805712
(Ala. Nov. 13, 2009) ..................................... 4

Barber v. Houston Econ. Dev. Ass’n


No. 1090444 (January 15, 2010) ................... 1, 14, 18

City of Bessemer v. McClain


957 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2006) ............................. 12

Evans v. State
2008 WL 2737050 (Ala. 2008) .............................. 8

Ex parte Ala. Dept. of Transp.


990 So. 2d 366 (Ala. 2008) .............................. 13

Ex parte Branch
980 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 2007) .............................. 14

Ex parte McCormick
932 So. 2d 124 (Ala. 2005) ............................... 8

Ex parte Weaver
570 So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1990) .............................. 11

Hartley v. State
991 So. 2d 191 (Ala. 2008) ............................... 8

Higdon v. McDuff
172 So. 636 (Ala. 1937) ................................. 18

In re Stephenson
21 So. 210 (Ala. 1897) ................................... 9

Stiff v. Ala. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.


878 So. 2d 1138 (Ala. 2003) .............................. 6

ii
Surles v. Ashville
Nos. 1080826, 1081015, __ So. 3d. __ (January 29,
2010) .................................................... 4

Watson v. Watson
910 So. 2d 765 (Ala. 2005) .............................. 17

Weedon v. Crowell
540 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1989) ......................... 16, 17

Statutes 

ALA. CODE § 12-17-184(10) ................................ 2, 7

ALA. CODE § 12-17-216 ................................. 13, 14

ALA. CODE § 13A-12-20(10) .................................. 4

ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 ........................................ 8

ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 ............................... 10, 12, 13

ALA. CODE § 36-15-1(2) .................................... 11

ALA. CODE § 36-15-14 ...................................... 10

ALA. CODE § 5644 (1923) .................................... 9

Rules 

Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) ........................... 15, 16

ALA. R. CIV. P. 65 ......................................... 15

Other Authorities 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) ........................ 16

First on WSFA 12 News: Victoryland's Gaming Center


Closed
http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=11916692 (Feb.
1 2010, 10:15 p.m.) ...................................... 5

iii
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Faced with the daunting task of defending a Temporary

Restraining Order entered in direct violation of this

Court’s January 15, 2010, order in Barber v. Houston Econ.

Dev. Ass’n, No. 1090444 (January 15, 2010), Appellee

Victoryland has resorted to a motion to dismiss this appeal

as a last-ditch effort to keep its illegal slot machines up

and running. The same willingness to ignore reality that

has led Victoryland to insist that its slot machines

somehow play “bingo” has now led it to erroneously contend

that this appeal should be dismissed because (1) the

undersigned attorneys supposedly “lack the authority to

appear before this Court and prosecute the Emergency Motion

to Vacate or Stay Injunction and Notice of Appeal” and (2)

“a temporary restraining order ... is not an appealable

injunction or final order.” Mot. at 1. These contentions

are without merit and need not detain this Court for long.

BACKGROUND

As this Court is well aware, Governor Riley created his

Task Force on Illegal Gambling out of the concern that some

gambling interests were trying to evade Alabama’s

longstanding prohibition on gambling by asserting, falsely,

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that their slot machines play legal “bingo.” On January

25, 2010, the Governor appointed Mobile County District

Attorney John M. Tyson, Jr. Commander of the Task Force

pursuant to ALA. CODE § 12-17-184(10) and Executive Order

Number 44, as amended (attached hereto as Tab A). See Jan.

25, 2010 Appt. Letter (attached hereto as Tab B). In his

letter appointing Tyson, the Governor requested that Tyson

“serve as Special Prosecutor and counsel for the Task Force

in all cases involving the Task Force.” Id. Specifically,

the Governor appointed Tyson to represent the Task Force in

“the trial and appellate courts and before all magistrates

and judges in all cases or proceedings involving the

Governor's Task Force ... or its law enforcement activities

regardless of where in the State of Alabama the cases or

proceedings may occur or be initiated,” including in the

“appellate courts [that] may hear appeals or petitions for

writs in such cases.” Id.

On January 28, 2010, the Governor appointed Assistant

District Attorney Martha Tierney as “Special Prosecutor for

the Governor’s Task Force” pursuant to ALA. CODE § 12-17-

184(10) and Executive Order Number 44, as amended. See Jan.

28, 2010 Appt. letter (attached hereto as Tab C). In his

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letter appointing Tierney, the Governor requested that

Tierney perform the same functions as Tyson, including

representing the Task Force in “the trial and appellate

courts and before all magistrates and judges in all cases

or proceedings involving the Governor's Task Force.” Id.

Likewise, on September 22, 2009, the Governor appointed

Edgar W. Greene to serve on the Task Force. See Sept. 22,

2009 Appt. Letter (attached hereto as Tab D). “Based upon

[his] position as a supernumerary district attorney,” the

Governor requested that Greene “provide assistance to [the

Governor] as a special prosecutor in the investigation and

prosecution of illegal gambling activity throughout the

State of Alabama pursuant to Section 12-17-216 of the Code

of Alabama.” Id.

On January 29, 2010, undercover law enforcement agents,

under the Task Force’s direction, entered the public areas

of Victoryland and observed illegal gambling activity

occurring in plain view. The agents found that

Victoryland’s machines are video terminals that look and

play exactly like Las Vegas-style slot machines. The

players insert money, place a bet, and press the

“play/daub” button. The machines are thus illegal slot

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machines under ALA. CODE § 13A-12-20(10). The agents also

discovered that Victoryland’s machines do not fully satisfy

any of the six mandatory but nonexclusive elements of

traditional bingo as required by Barber v. Cornerstone

Community Outreach, Nos. 1080805, 1080806, __ So. 3d __ ,

2009 WL 3805712, *17-*18 (Ala. Nov. 13, 2009), and Surles

v. Ashville, Nos. 1080826, 1081015, __ So. 3d. __ (January

29, 2010). Not only do the machines fail to use a “card,”

just like the machines in Surles failed to, but they can be

played blindfolded.

In accordance with their duties to uphold Alabama law,

law enforcement agents attempted to halt the illegal

gambling activity at Victoryland and confiscate the illegal

contraband in use therein. The agents’ attempts were

thwarted, however, when Victoryland’s attorney made

statements which the Task Force Commander understood to

mean that he had secured a TRO against the police action.

Tyson, therefore, interrupted the investigation and seizure

and traveled to Evergreen, where at approximately 5 a.m. in

a locked courthouse Circuit Court Judge Young held a

hearing and actually entered an oral order, and then a

written order, directing the Task Force to stop its

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investigation and seizure of contraband. The Task Force

immediately appealed the entry of that order to this Court

on an emergency basis. Despite language in the order

directing Victoryland to preserve evidence, during the

overnight hours last night, Victoryland closed and began

mass “upgrades” of the software that runs its machines. See

First on WSFA 12 News: Victoryland's Gaming Center Closed,

http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=11916692 (Feb. 1

2010, 10:15 p.m.).

To continue its dilatory tactics, Victoryland has now

moved to dismiss this appeal on meritless grounds. First,

it asserts that the undersigned attorneys do not “have the

authority to independently initiate and maintain an action

or proceeding before the appellate courts of this state.”

Mot. at 4. That authority, Victoryland incorrectly claims,

“rests solely in the office of the Attorney General, who

has not appeared on behalf of the Appellant.” Id.

Victoryland also erroneously contends that this appeal

should be dismissed because “[a] temporary restraining

order is not a final judgment or an injunction that will

support an appeal under Alabama law.” Id. This Court should

reject both contentions.

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REASONS THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED

I. The Undersigned Attorneys Have Authority to Prosecute


This Appeal.

There is no merit to Victoryland’s claim that the

undersigned attorneys lack authority to challenge the trial

court’s invalid TRO in this Court. Before considering the

merits of that argument, however, it is worth noting that

Victoryland has no standing to raise that argument here. If

the Attorney General had exclusive authority to represent

the Task Force in this action, the Attorney General alone

would have standing to make that claim. See Stiff v. Ala.

Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 878 So. 2d 1138, 1141 n.6

(Ala. 2003) (plaintiff asserting prudential standing must

“demonstrate that her interests are arguably within the

zone of interests intended to be protected by the statute

... on which the claim is based”).

Setting standing questions aside, Victoryland’s lack-

of-authority argument fails for two reasons. First, the

Attorney General is not the only person with authority to

appeal an adverse ruling for a state officer in a civil

case. Here, Tyson, as the sole named defendant in this

action, has the right to appeal the order entered against

him to this Court. Second, there is no question that Greene

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has explicit statutory authority to appear before this

Court because he has been appointed as a supernumerary

district attorney.

A. Tyson and Tierney have the authority to prosecute


this appeal.

Tyson and Tierney have the authority to prosecute this

appeal. The Governor appointed Tyson to lead the Task Force

and Tierney to serve on the Task Force pursuant to ALA. CODE

§ 12-17-184(10). That statute authorizes Tyson and Tierney

“[t]o go to any place in the State of Alabama and prosecute

any case or cases, or work with any grand jury, when called

upon to do so by ... the Governor ..., and to attend

sessions of courts and transact all of the duties of the

district attorney in the courts whenever called upon by ...

the Governor to do so.” ALA. CODE § 12-17-184(10).

In accordance with that authority, the Governor has

authorized Tyson and Tierney to represent the Task Force in

“the trial and appellate courts and before all magistrates

and judges in all cases or proceedings involving the

Governor's Task Force ... or its law enforcement activities

regardless of where in the State of Alabama the cases or

proceedings may occur or be initiated,” including in the

“appellate courts [that] may hear appeals or petitions for

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writs in such cases.” See Tab B; Tab C. Tyson and Tierney,

thus, plainly have authority to appear before this Court

and prosecute this appeal.

There is no merit to Victoryland’s contention that

Tyson’s position as district attorney of Mobile County and

his state-wide appointment as Task Force Commander under

ALA. CODE 12-17-184(10), and Tierney’s position as an

Assistant District Attorney, limit their authority to

representing the Task Force in Alabama circuit courts. See

Mot. at 6-7. Victoryland simply has it wrong with its

contention that “[o]nly the Attorney General is authorized

to represent the interests of the state before the

appellate courts.” Mot. at 6-7 (citing ALA. CODE § 36-15-1).

Victoryland’s contention is easily negated by considering

this Court’s practice. Recently, district attorneys have

represented the State in this Court on numerous occasions.

See, e.g., Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 125 (Ala.

2005) (mandamus petition in which “M. David Barber,

district atty.,” filed initial petition for “State of

Alabama”); Evans v. State, 2008 WL 2737050 (Ala. 2008)

(mandamus petition filed on behalf of State by DA); Hartley

v. State, 991 So. 2d 191, 191 (Ala. 2008) (same).

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Contrary to Victoryland’s suggestion, see Mot. at 7-8,

this Court’s current practice comports with In re

Stephenson, 21 So. 210 (Ala. 1897), which held that the

Attorney General, rather than the now-defunct office of

county solicitor, was required to petition for mandamus in

a criminal case. Stephenson’s holding applies only to that

defunct office, a long-superseded statutory scheme, and to

criminal cases (in which the State is always a party). In

fact, at the time of Stephenson, the Code expressly allowed

an attorney to initiate civil proceedings upon “the written

direction of the governor of the state to the attorney of

record.” ALA. CODE § 5644 (1923). This Court’s current

practice confirms that, even in criminal cases, district

attorneys may appear before this Court.

Moreover, Victoryland is off-point when it cites old

cases that hold that criminal defendants who wish to seek

certiorari review of their convictions must serve the

Attorney General’s Office with a copy of their brief. See

Motion at 8-9. Here, of course, the State did not initiate

a criminal action below. It was prevented from doing so by

the improper TRO, and instead, this lawsuit was brought by

Victoryland against Tyson. In addition, the appeal and

9
petition in this Court were not filed against the State,

but by Tyson from an adverse ruling specifically against

him.

B. Tyson has the right to appeal the order entered


against him to this Court.

Even if there were some doubt regarding Tyson’s or

Tierney’s statutory authority to appear before this Court,

certainly there’s no question that Tyson, the lone

defendant in this case, can appear and defend himself

against the invalid TRO entered against him. Victoryland’s

contrary contention is based on an overreaching

interpretation of ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 and of this Court’s

caselaw discussing the Attorney General’s power to

superintend litigation involving the State. See Mot. at 5-

12.

This Court has never held that a civil appeal must be

dismissed simply because, as here, the Attorney General is

aware of the litigation but has chosen not to appear.

Although the Attorney General has the power to appear in

litigation involving a state officer, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §

36-15-14 (the AG “may at any time he sees proper ...

superintend ....” (emphasis added), the Alabama Code cannot

logically be interpreted to allow parties adverse to the

10
State to raise the issue, or to require a ruling against a

state officer or agency if the Attorney General does not

appear. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-15-1(2) (“He or she shall

attend ... to all civil actions in which the state is a

party in the Supreme Court or Court of Civil Appeals.”).

“Attend to” is not the same as “appear in.” The point of

these statutes is not to force state officers to concede

defeat in a suit, like the one at issue here, brought by a

private plaintiff should the Attorney General not appear.

Rather, these statutes are simply to ensure that the

State’s interests will be represented. A rule that private

plaintiffs win all lawsuits against state officers unless

the Attorney General specifically represents them would

defeat that purpose.

Likewise, Victoryland’s reliance on Ex parte Weaver,

570 So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1990), is misplaced. To be sure, this

Court held in Weaver that in certain circumstances the

“attorney-general has power ... to make any disposition of

the state’s litigation that he deems for its best

interest,” including dismissing an appeal filed by a state

agency when the Governor has not appeared. 570 So. 2d at

677. Clearly, no Weaver-issues are presented here, however,

11
because the Governor is not a party and the Attorney

General has not attempted to superintend.

Finally, Victoryland places undue reliance on § 36-15-

1, which says that “no attorney shall represent the State

of Alabama, or any agency, department, or instrumentality

of the state in any litigation in any court or tribunal

unless the attorney has been appointed as a deputy attorney

general or assistant attorney general.” Mot. at 5. That

statute says nothing about cases involving state officers,

so on its face it does not apply in this case. Moreover,

under Victoryland’s cramped reading, district attorneys

could not represent the State –- even at criminal trials.

Because Victoryland’s “construction would produce an absurd

and unjust result that is clearly inconsistent with the

purpose and policy of the statute,” it “is to be avoided.”

City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1074-75 (Ala.

2006). Just as district attorneys may represent the State

at criminal trials, they may represent the State on appeal.

In the very least, when officeholders like Tyson are sued

instead of the State itself, they are not precluded from

defending themselves.

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C. Greene has explicit statutory authority to appear
before this Court

In addition, the Alabama Code specifically gives Greene

authority to represent Tyson and the Task Force. This is so

because the Governor, without limitation, appointed Greene

as a supernumerary district attorney to investigate and

prosecute “illegal gambling activity throughout the State

of Alabama,” Tab D, and the Alabama Code authorizes

supernumerary district attorneys to “perform duties as

those prescribed for assistant attorneys general.” ALA. CODE

§ 12-17-216; see also id. (a supernumerary district

attorney “shall have all the powers and authority of an

assistant attorney general”). Victoryland concedes that

assistant attorneys general can appeal adverse judgments to

this Court. See Mot. at 11; ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 (“[N]o

attorney shall represent the State of Alabama, or any

agency, department, or instrumentality of the state …

unless the attorney has been appointed as a deputy attorney

general or an assistant attorney general.”). Indeed, deputy

and assistant attorneys general appeal adverse civil

judgments all the time. See, e.g., Ex parte Ala. Dept. of

Transp., 990 So. 2d 366, 366 (Ala. 2008); Ex parte Branch,

13
980 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. 2007); Allen v. Barbour County,

981 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (Ala. 2007).

Victoryland attempts to dodge this fatal flaw in its

lack-of-authority argument by simply ignoring the plain

language of ALA. CODE § 12-17-216. There is no other way to

interpret its meritless contention that “a supernumerary

district attorney such as Mr. Greene ... is not authorized

to represent the interests of the state before the

appellate courts of the state.” Mot. at 6. The Alabama

Code, however, speaks for itself. Under ALA. CODE § 12-17-

216, Greene has “all the powers and authority of an

assistant attorney general,” which include the power to

bring appeals to this Court. Victoryland’s contention to

the contrary is baseless.

II. A TRO is Appealable As An “Injunction” Under Alabama


Law.

Likewise, there is no merit to Victoryland’s contention

that “[a] temporary restraining order is not a final

judgment or an injunction that will support an appeal under

Alabama law.” Mot. at 4. That argument is squarely

foreclosed by this Court’s decision Barber v. Houston Econ.

Dev. Ass’n, No. 1090444 (January 15, 2010), where less than

three weeks ago this Court vacated a TRO and ordered the

14
dismissal of the civil suit in which it was brought,

emphasizing that courts lack jurisdiction to “interfere

with a criminal proceeding by civil action.” The gambling

interests in that case asserted the very same arguments

that Victoryland asserts here in their efforts to dismiss

that appeal and delay the Task Force’s enforcement of

Alabama law. This Court easily rejected that motion to

dismiss and quickly vacated the invalid TRO. It should do

the same here.

To be sure, this Court’s holding Barber v. Houston

Econ. Dev. Ass’n that a TRO is reviewable on appeal is

consistent with well-settled Alabama law. It is undisputed

that Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate

Procedure gives this Court jurisdiction to review “any

interlocutory order granting ... an injunction.” Thus, the

only question this Court needs to answer to reject

Victoryland’s argument is whether a TRO is an injunction.

The answer is certainly yes.

Indeed, it is beyond dispute that a TRO is an

injunction. The very Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure that

creates the procedure for obtaining a TRO, ALA. R. CIV. P.

65, is entitled “Injunctions.” Black’s Law Dictionary says

15
that a TRO is a type of “Interlocutory Injunction[].”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990). It also defines

“injunction” more generally as a “court order prohibiting

someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone

to undo some wrong or injury.” Id. A TRO easily fits that

bill.

Although Victoryland places great weight on the fact

that TROs are generally not immediately appealable in

federal court, that reliance is misplaced. This action is

not pending in federal court, and the federal rules do not

apply. Whatever “rationale” the federal courts may have in

applying the federal rule regarding TROs is irrelevant to

this Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R.

App. P. This Court’s prior decisions make clear that TROs

are reviewable by this Court, and this Court should reject

Victoryland’s invitation to ignore those decisions and

interpret Rule 4(a)(1)(A) “according to federal precedent.”

Mot. at 19.

Contrary to Victoryland’s contention, Weedon v.

Crowell, 540 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1989), does not advance its

argument. In that case, after discussing the federal rule,

this Court noted that it was not clear that the order at

16
issue in that case was a TRO or a preliminary injunction.

Then, critically for present purposes, this Court stated,

“A second reason for not dismissing the appeal is Rule

4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P.” Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).

This Court noted that whether the order at issue there was

a TRO or a preliminary injunction, “[t]he order appealed

from is an injunction of some kind.” Id. at 1378. “So,”

this Court concluded, “technically, it can be argued that

it is appealable under A.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(A).” Id.

Even prior to this Court’s recent holding in Barber v.

Houston Econ. Dev. Ass’n, this Court’s post-Weedon case law

made clear that TROs are, in fact, considered “injunctions”

under Rule 4(a)(1)(A). The Court has held that “[t]he trial

court's denial of the second emergency motion for a

temporary restraining order is an interlocutory order

refusing an injunction, which was appealable pursuant to

Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P.” Watson v. Watson, 910

So. 2d 765, 769 (Ala. 2005). That holding definitively

establishes that a TRO is an “injunction” under Rule

4(a)(1)(A).

Try as it might, Victoryland cannot avoid clear Alabama

law that provides this Court with the power to review TROs

17
on appeal and, most importantly, the responsibility to

vacate any such orders that enjoin the seizure of illegal

gambling devices in the complete absence of any

jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g., Barber v. Houston Econ.

Dev. Ass’n, No. 1090444 (January 15, 2010); Higdon v.

McDuff, 172 So. 636, 637 (Ala. 1937).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny

Victoryland’s Motion to Dismiss.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Edgar Greene

Supernumerary District
Attorney and Special
Prosecutor on behalf of
Appellant John M. Tyson, Jr.

John M. Tyson, Jr.


Martha Tierney
Edgar Greene
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY
600 Dexter Avenue
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
(334) 242-7120
(251) 574-8400 (fax)
(334) 242-2335 (fax)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document


has been served on this the 2nd day of February, 2010, to
the following by e-mail:

Fred Gray William M. Slaughter


Stanley Gray Peter J. Tepley
P.O. Box 830239 Patricia C. Diak
Tuskegee, Alabama 36083 1400 Park Place Tower
By email: 2001 Park Place North
fgray@glsmgn.com Birmingham, Alabama 35203
sgray@glsmgn.com By email:
WMS@hsy.com
John M. Bolton, III PT@hsy.com
Charlanna W. Spencer pcd@hsy.com
Doy Leale McCall, III
425 South Perry Street J. Mark White
Montgomery, Alabama 36204 August S. Dowd
By email: William M. Bowen, Jr.
jbolton@hillhillcarter.com Massey Building, Suite 500
cspencer@hillhillcarter.com 2025 Third Ave. N.
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
By email:
mwhite@whitearnolddowd.com
adowd@whitearnolddowd.com
wmbowen@whitearnolddowd.com

s/ Edgar Greene
OF COUNSEL

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TAB A
TAB B
TAB C
TAB D