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possible referential failure of the subject of an assertion without contradicting his account of affirmation and denial in De Interpretatione v, vi,
and x.
According to Aristotle, those things which are true or false are not
propositions or statements (where these two terms have their modern
technical senses) but rather sentences. On his account, whereas every
sentence is meaningful, only certain sentences are either true or false.
Many, such as those in prayers, are neither true nor false and hence are fit
objects of rhetorical or poetic study only. Other sentences, by virtue of their
being either true or false, make assertions about the world. Aristotle calls
such literal fact-asserting sentences TOqX(OVTLXOL
Xo-yoi("assertions"; literally: "assertive sentences").
Aristotle's discussion of assertions makes clear the existential import
which he finds in them:
But of assertions,some such as those affirmingsomething of something or denying
something of something [TirZTt1 TLVosii Ti &rr6 T1V6o] are simple assertions, others
such as a composite assertionare compounded out of these.8
Each of these passages reveals that for Aristotle, affirmation and denial
indicate relationships holding between things. As his analysis of homonymy and synonymy,11 his discussions of the respective roles of words and
of things in our reasoning,12 and his view that ov andTL are coextensive
show, Aristotle's understanding of the relation of language to the world is
such that in the above texts 'Ti? must signify an actual thing.13 Though
every affirmation and denial is by means of a noun or indefinite noun and
a verb or indefinite verb, what is being asserted in the affirmation or denial
is not solely or even primarily a linguistic relationship. Rather, Aristotle's
concern is with what this linguistic vehicle indicates about the relation of
things in the world, namely that in an affirmation one thing is being
285
then should we predicate its opposite of the subject (e.g. "The man is
dead"), the assertion will always be false. The second alternative is the case
where, since neither opposite should inhere in the subject (e.g. being white
and being non-white), then predicating either opposite of the subject (e.g.
"The man is white") will not always be false. In other words, on the second
alternative, since we are merely predicating an accident of the subject, then
the assertion will sometimes be true and sometimes be false.
The reason why 21 a 24-25 is another way of saying what is said in the
preceding lines is that the point of the previous sentence was to note how
the adjective modifying the subject (e.g. "dead" in "The dead man is a
man" and "white" in "The white man is a man") was related to the subject.
In the first case, we had the adjective contradicting the essence of what it
modified, in the second it merely denotes an accident of the thing modified.
Thus Aristotle realizes that the key issue about which he should be concerned is predication of the essence and predication of an accident.
That 21 a 25-28 should be understood as an example relating to 21 a
24-25 and, in particular, as an explication of the second alternative, is
thereby
clearly implied by Aristotle's beginning his comment by WLarreop,
showing that he simply is illustrating what he has just said. Therefore the
aim of 2 Ia 25-28 merely is to provide us with an example of an assertion
which involves something which does not inhere in the subject, i.e. an
accident, and hence is "not always true." Thus the full passage reads:
In other words, whenever on the one hand one of the opposites should inhere
the assertionis always not true; whenever on the other hand neitherof
[Evu'n&PXB],
the assertion is not always true. As for
the opposites should inhere [ll ivvu1T&px-ql,
instance Homer is something, e.g. a poet. Well now, is he or isn't he? For of what is
accidentalis "is"predicatedof Homer, for it is the case that he is a poet, but not of to
what is essential is "is" predicatedof Homer.15
possess sight, then neither "Socrates has sight" nor "Socrates is blind" will
be true. Even were Socrates an animal of the appropriate sort, both assertions still might be false because he might not yet have reached the
appropriate stage of his development to acquire either the possession or its
privation. Only if Socrates is a sufficiently mature animal of a certain kind
will it be necessary for one of the pair of assertions "Socrates has sight" and
"Socrates is blind" to be true while the other is false. Finally, in 13 b 27-35
Aristotle would be noting that regardless of Socrates' being a living thing or
not being a living thing, either the affirmation "Socrates is sick" or the
denial "Socrates is not sick" will be true and the other will be false.
With these points in mind, I propose to translate 13 b 12-35 as:
It might, indeed, very well seem that such happens [i.e. necessarilyit will always be
the case that one assertionwill be true and the other assertionwill be falsel in the
case of those contrariessaid with combination- "Socratesis well" being contraryto
"Socratesis sick" - but not even as concerns these is it necessaryalways for one to
be true and the other to be false. For, on the one hand, of Socrates'being a living
thing, one will be true and one will be false, while, on the other hand, of Socrates'
not being a living thing, both will be false. For of Socrateshimself not being a living
thing at all, neither"Socratesis sick" nor "Socratesis well" will be true.
As for privation,andpossession,of Socrates'not being an animal which normallyis
sighted at all, neitherare true. Even of Socrates'being an animal which normally is
sighted,not alwayswill one or the other be true. For "Socrateshas sight"is opposed
to "Socratesis blind"as privationand possession.Even of Socrates'being an animal
which normallyis sighted, it is not necessaryfor one or the other to be true or false,
since until the time when it is naturalto have the possessionor its privation,both are
false. For of Socrates' not being an animal which normally is sighted at all, then
again both are false, both "he has sight"and "he is blind,"
As for affirmation and denial, always, if Socrates should be a living thing or if
Socratesshould not be a living thing, one will be false and the otherwill be true. For
consider"Socratesis sick"and 'Socrates is not sick."Of his being a living thing it is
evident thatone of them will be truewhile the otherwill be false and of his not being
a living thing "he is sick"is false while "he is not sick"is true.Thus only of these is it
distinctivethatalwaysone of these is truewhile the otherwill be false -just as many
as are opposed as affirmationand denial.
For example, take 'Homer is something'- 'a poet' will do for our purpose. But can
we say also 'he is'? Or will that be incorrectlyinferred?
However, then Cooke appears to adopt what I will argue is the correct reading of 21 a
26-28:
'Is' was used incidentallyhere. For our statementwas 'he is a poet,' and 'is' was not
predicatedof him in the substantivesense of the word.
So as to leave no doubt concerning the meaning of these lines, Cooke adds a footnote
claiming that by the substantivesense of "is" Aristotle "Otherwise[means] the sense of
existence. For the word 'is' expressesexists in addition to being the copula"(p. 154 n. a).
If "otherwise"here means "in other words,"then contraryto appearances,Cooke's view
is really the same as those which I have alreadycited. However,if "otherwise"means "in
other places"then Cooke (1) correctlyunderstoodthe real point of lines 21 a 26-28 but (2)
misunderstoodthe X1Y0'iv,T6("'essential")use of "is" since nowhere,despite what various
commentatorshave alleged, does the xoa'c,-r6use of "is" have the meaning of "exists".
On this last point, cf. below n. 7.
296
297
Alexander's ". . . ignoring problems ... about fictional or otherwise non-existent name-
ables" (op. cit., p. 154) but ratherstems from real philosophical disagreement between
Peripateticsand Stoics on the relationof language to the world.
14
De Interpretatione xi 21 a 24-25.
15 De Interpretatione xi 21 a 24-28.
16
298
299
22
23
dLvoL,
senses.
24 1 would like to thank Nicholas Smith for suggestingthis readingto me.
25 For severalof these implications,cf. my "The ExistentialPresuppositionsof Aristotle's
Logic" (forthcomingin PhilosophicalStudies).
26 1 am indebted to Marvin Fox and Robert Turnbull for their many helpful criticisms
and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Any errorsare, of course, my own
responsibility.
300