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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, GALLIA COUNTY, OHIO

GENERAL DIVISION

State of Ohio,

Case No. II CR 4
Plaintiff,
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Ricky L. Gleason,
Defendant.

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Now comes the Court to consider "Defendant's Motion For Court To Accept Defendant'~
Plea Change And The Plea Agreement Signed By The Defendant And Recommended By The
Prosecuting Attorney".
The Court is unable to speak to much of what is included in said motion because it
includes numerous statements regarding alleged conversations defense counsel had with
Defendant and advice given, impressions Defendant allegedly had, alleged "conflicts" Defendant
had, together with various and other sundry matters concerning which the Court has no
knowledge and which is not in evidence.
What the Court can speak to, and by way of background, is that this mailer originated in
the Gallipolis Municipal Court when it was filed for preliminary mailers on January 7,2011. It
was set for arraignment on January 10, 2011 and on that date scheduled for preliminary hearing
on January 12, 20 II with bond being set at $300,000.00 - 10%. On that date Defendant waived
the preliminary hearing, bond was reduced to $100,000.00 - 10% and Defendant was bound over
to this Court.
On February 11,2011 a True Bill of Indictment was rendered by. a Grand Jury charging
Defendant with: (I) "Burglary", a third degree felony; (2) 'Tampering with Evidence", a third
degree felony; (3) 'Trafficking in Counterfeit Controlled Substance", a fifth degree felony; and,
"Trafficking in Drugs", a fifth degree felony. He was arraigned the same date on all charges and
since he was indigent. the Court appointed Allorney Angela L. Ferneding to represent him. A
jury trial was scheduled for June 7, 2011. The case proceeded in normal fashion. On May 9,
2011 Ms. Ferneding moved to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict which was just discovered.
The Court permilled the withdrawal and appointed Allorney Barbara A. Wallen to represent
Defendant.
Ms. Wallen then moved the Court to continue the jury trial as well a~other
scheduled dates. The Court granted said motion with the trial being continued to July 19, 2011.
On June 30, 2011, after discovering she represented a co-defendant, Ms. Wallen requested to

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withdraw as counsel due to that conflict. On July 7, 2011 the Court granted Ms. Wallen's
request and appointed Attorney Robert W. Bright (current counsel) to represent Defendant with
the then existing case schedule. The Court, then upon its own motion enlarged the case schedule
by allowing any negotiated written plea agreement to be filed by August 15,2011 with the jury
trial continued to September 12,2011.
On July 15,2011 a negotiated written pica agreement wa~ filed, dated July 14,2011 and
signed by Defendant, Mr. Bright and Jeff Adkins, the Prosecuting Attorney. The filing of this
document advised the Court that the matter had been resolved so on July 20,2011 the Court filed
its entry scheduling the matter for plea change and sentencing on July 25, 2011 at 10:45 a.m.
Copies of this entry were furnished to the Prosecuting Attorney and Defense Counsel.
On July 25, 2011 at about 11:17 a.m. and after Mr. Bright had had an opportunity to
counsel with Defendant, Mr. Bright advised the Court that Defendant did not wish to enter a plea
change. Whereupon the Court stated: "Very well. We'll just set it for a jury trial then. It's not a
problem. Thank you very much". Then Defendant, through Mr. Bright indicated he wanted to
enter his plea. The Court then indicated we can't be flip-flopping and indicatcd its concern with
any plea being made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently at that juncture.
The Court
indicated again that the matter would be scheduled for a jury trial.
Regardless of any reasons given a~ to why Defendant changed his mind and announced to
the Court that he did not want to go forward with a plea change, it should be pointed out that at
no time from July 20,2011 when the entry was filed scheduling this matter for plea change and
sentencing to July 25, 20 II, when the plea and sentencing were to be conducted or even during
said scheduled hearing did Defendant ever file or make a motion to continue the matter. By
counsel's own account Defendant "expressed reservations" or "hesitations" more than once
concerning going forward and then finally told counsel that he would not go forward, and then
when the Court indicated that was not a problem and ,that the matter would be set for a jury trial,
Defendant then wanted to "flip-flop" again. Despite all this alleged uncertainty which was
known by Counsel and despite no motion being made by Defendant to continue the matter,
Defense Counsel critici7.es the Court where he states: "the Court ... could have rescheduled the
plea change hearing for later that day or for the following day in order to give the Defendant time
to sort out his thoughts .... ". At no time was the Court requested to continue the matter, yet
Defense Counsel criticizes the Court for not doing so.
Defense Counsel is critical of the Court throughout this motion. The Court was advised
that Defendant was not willing to go forward with the plea change. Then when the Court
indicated that wa~n't a problem and it would schedule the case for a jury trial, the Defendant then
wanted to "flip-flop" and change his plea. Counsel is critical of the Court for not asking any
questions of the Defendant after the Court was advised that he did not wish to go forward.
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Defensc Counsel is critical of the Court regarding matters which are not even involved in this
plea changc and sentencing which he titles under the heading: "THE COURT'S ARBITRARY
BLANKET POLlCIESIPRACTICES"
wherein he discusses what he refers to as the Coun's
"drop dcad datc" and wherein hc states: "The Coun's position on this matter and the mattcr of
thc "drop dead date" constitutes an abuse of discretion because the Coun's position and attitudc
is unreasonable and/or arbitrary and/or unconscionablc".
He is further critical of the court
"based on his understanding" regarding Alford and no contest pleas. Defense Counsel then
discusses mattcrs concerning community control violations which has nothing to do with the
matter at hand. Hc states: ", this Coun has a "one strike and you'rc out" policy on community
conlrol violations ... " wherein he refers to it as "one other arbitrary rule and practice" indicating
that it is an "abusc of discretion". He is critical of the Coun throughout his motion rcgardless of
whether or not they involvc the matter of plea change and sentencing which is currently bcforc
the Coun in this motion. Hc accuses the Coun multiple times of acting arbitrarily, unreasonably,
unconscionably and of abusing discretion. He is critical of when the Court set the jury trial.
This was easily resolved whcn a motion was made for a continuance which the Court granted.
The Coun finds that while Defense Counsel's attitude toward the Coun as expressed in
the instant motion may not rise to the level of Professional Misconduct or to the level of being
contemptuous, it cenainly is not acceptable behavior. By such conduct he has creatcd conflict
with the Coun whereby in this case or for that matter any other case in the future, when hc docs
not agree with a decision or ruling by thc Coun, instead of being critical by accusation of being
arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable or of abusing discretion, hc simply may accusc the court
of being bias or prcjudice as it relatcs to him. The Court must not only avoid any impriority, bias
or prejudice but must avoid any appcarance of such. The expressions and attitudes of Dcfcnsc
Counsel as cxhibited and announced in the instant motion toward this Court compromises the
Coun's ability to avoid any appearance of bias, prcjudice, or to be fair and impartial as it relates
to Defcnsc Counsel regardless how hard it tries or what strides it makes toward guaranteeing that
there would bc no bias, prejudice and that it would be ,fair and impartial.
The Court finds in this case due to the conflict Defense Counsel has created with this
Court and to protect thc rights of Defendant, that Defense Counsel, Robert W. Bright should be
relieved 'of further rcsponsibility for representation of Defendant and that substitute counsel
should be appointed.
The Coun further finds that Defendant's instant motion should be overruled.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that "Defendant's Motion for Court to Accept
Defcndant's Plea Change and the Plea Agreement Signed by the Defendant and Recommended
by the Prosecuting Attorney" bc and same is hereby overruled.

It is further ordered that Robert W. Bright be relieved of further representation

Defendant in this matter and that William D. Conley be appointed as counsel for Defendant.

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It is further ordered that this matter be scheduled for status conference on Wednesday.
August 17, 2011 at 8:30 a.m.
All of the above SO ORDERED.

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D. DEAN EV ANS. JUDGE

The Clerk is directed to furnish a copy of the foregoing enlry to C. Jeffrey Adkins, Prosecuting
Attorney, Gallia County Courthouse, Locust Street. Gallipolis, alI 45631: Robert W. Bright.
Attorney for Defendant, 530 Second Avenue, 2nd Floor, Ste. A Gallipolis, OH 45631: and
William D. Conley. 537 Second Avenue. Gallipolis, alI 45631.