Silverio, Sr. v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109979; Mar. 11, 1999; 3rd Division; Purisima, J.
Short Facts: Beatriz Silverio died intestate. Her conjugal property was not settled.
Hence, her son EDGARDO sought to be appointed as an administrator by filing a
petition for letters of administration. He was appointed special, and later regular
administrator. Beatrizs husband RICARDO SR. opposed this, claiming that the RTC
should respect the order of preference in Rule 78, 6.
Held: A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the
surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person. However,
when the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court
may appoint another person. The determination of suitability rests on the sound
judgment of the appointing court.
A. Facts
1. 1987: Beatriz Silverio died intestate in Makati. She was survived by her
husband and 5 children.
2. 12/1990: EDGARDO, Beatrizs son, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with RTC Br. 57 (Makati), followed by an Urgent Petition
for Appointment of Special Administrator, alleging:
a. That Beatriz acquired undetermined real and personal properties
during her marriage;
b. That Edgardos brother, Ricardo Jr., took over the management of these
properties for his own benefit and advantage;
c. That he, EDGARDO, one of the heirs of Beatriz, was competent and
willing to act as administrator.
3. The petition was set for hearing and notices were published. Meanwhile,
Judge Velez of Br. 57 issued an Order appointing EDGARDO as special
administrator.
4. 01/1991: RICARDO SR., Beatrizs husband at the time of her death and
Edgardos stepfather, filed his Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
a. However, RICARDO SR. failed to appear in the hearings for the
reception of his evidence, claiming that he had a hearing in California.
b. When RICARDO SR. sought to postpone the hearing, it was opposed by
EDGARDO who essentially claimed that it was dilatory and harassing,
Ricardo Sr. being fully aware that Edgardo lived in Sydney.
c. Ruling on the motion to postpone, Judge Velez declared that RICARDO
SR.s failure to appear and adduce evidence on his behalf amounted to
a waiver of such right.
5. 10/1991: Subsequently, Judge Velez appointed EDGARDO as regular
administrator.
6. After another motion to postpone another hearing was denied by Judge Velez,
RICARDO SR. filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, Prohibition, and/or Restraining Order with the CA,
questioning the different orders of Judge Velez.
a. The CA dismissed this [on the same grounds appreciated by the
Supreme Court, infra].

7. In the SC proceedings, EDGARDO and RICARDO SR. exchanged several

pleadings.
a. EDGARDO raised Ricardo Sr.s moral unfitness to be an
administrator, since he (1) used funds of the conjugal partnership to
buy three properties in Forbes and Bel Air (Makati), and (2) fraudulently
caused these to be registered in the names of his 3 illegitimate
children with his admitted mistress Carmen Zuniga. He also raised the
(3) pendency of a cases against Ricardo Sr. for violation of the
Securities Act and tax evasion.
b. RICARDO SR. (1) claimed that the order of preference [in the
appointment of an administrator] in RULES OF COURT, Rule 78,
6 must be observed, and (2) raised Edgardos lack of business
acumen, greediness and avariciousness.
8. [During the pendency of the SC proceedings, Judge Velez allowed EDGARDOs
petition to allow the attorneys lien of his counsel (Atty. Uy) on 1/3 of the FMV
of the properties allegedly recovered in the lower court proceedings.
a. Hence, RICARDO SR. sought a TRO from the SC to stay the order while
the case was pending before the Supreme Court.
b. In response, EDGARDO claimed that under RULES OF COURT, Rule 109,
1(e), no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator, and therefore the certiorari petition filed by Ricardo Sr.
should not stay the order appointing Edgardo as special administrator.]
B. Issues
1. WON RICARDO was denied due process when he was not allowed to present
evidence. NO.
2. WON the order of preference in Rule 78, 6 was violated. NO.
3. WON the order allowing the annotation of the lawyers lien was proper. NO.
4. WON Judge Velez should inhibit. NO.
C. Held: Petition partly granted. CA decision affirmed, but order of Judge Velez
allowing the annotation of the lawyers lien is set aside.
1. RICARDO was not denied due process. He had an opportunity to be
heard, and his motions to postpone the hearings were not found to be
sincere.
2. The observance of the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.
3. Pending the validity of the appointment of the regular administrator, the
lower court ha sno power to order the special administrator to sell real
properties of the estate.
4. Mere allegation of partiality and bias without supporting facts is insufficient
for Judge Velez to be required to inhibit.
D. Ratio
2. The observance of the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.
a. General rule: A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a
deceased person.

a. Exception: When the person enjoying such preferential rights is

unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. (Sioca v.
Garcia (1923))
b. The determination of suitability rests on the sound judgment of the
appointing court.
a. Meanwhile, unsuitableness may consist of [a] adverse interest of
some kind, or [b] hostility to those immediately interested in
the estate. (Id.)
b. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the appointment shall not be
revoked on appeal.
3. The trial court had no power to order the sale of real properties.
a. The powers of a special administrator are set out in Rule 80, 2. Sales are
limited for the purpose of selling perishable and other property as the court
orders.
b. As a matter of courtesy and respect, the RTC should await the decision of the
SC on the propriety of appointment of the regular administrator.
c. However, the issue has become moot in view of the finding that the
appointment of the regular administrator was proper.