Computing the RSA secret Key is Deterministic

Polynomial Time equivalent to Factoring

Alexander May
Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics

Crypto 2004

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
1 / 14

Outline

1 Introduction

Quick Overview
A more detailed description
Related topics and previous Results

2 Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Proof Overview
Main theorems
Remarks

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
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Introduction

Quick Overview

Main Result of the paper

The knowledge of the RSA public key secret key pair (e,d)
Factorization of N=pq in Polynomial Time

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
3 / 14

Introduction

Quick Overview

Main Result of the paper

The knowledge of the RSA public key secret key pair (e,d)
Factorization of N=pq in Polynomial Time
Assumptions
1

e, d < (N)

p,q are of the same bit-size

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
3 / 14

Introduction

Quick Overview

Main Result of the paper

The knowledge of the RSA public key secret key pair (e,d)
Factorization of N=pq in Polynomial Time
Assumptions
1

e, d < (N)

p,q are of the same bit-size

Technique used
Coppersmiths technique for finding small roots of bivariate integer
polynomials

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
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Introduction

A more detailed description

Common technique in public key Cryptography is to establish Polynomial

Time equivalence between:

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
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Introduction

A more detailed description

Common technique in public key Cryptography is to establish Polynomial

Time equivalence between:
The problem of computing the secret key from the public information
a well-known hard problem p (believed to be computationally

infeasible)

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
4 / 14

Introduction

A more detailed description

Common technique in public key Cryptography is to establish Polynomial

Time equivalence between:
The problem of computing the secret key from the public information
a well-known hard problem p (believed to be computationally

infeasible)

This establishes the security of the secret key (given that p is

computationally infeasible)
However IT DOES NOT provide security for the public key system itself.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
4 / 14

Introduction

Related topics and previous Results

Related Topics
Primality:Proven to be in P [AKS 2002]
Factoring:RSAs security is based on the hardness of factoriztion:
It is yet unknown if factorization is equivalent to RSA cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of RSA is at least as easy as factoring.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
5 / 14

Introduction

Related topics and previous Results

Related Topics
Primality:Proven to be in P [AKS 2002]
Factoring:RSAs security is based on the hardness of factoriztion:
It is yet unknown if factorization is equivalent to RSA cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of RSA is at least as easy as factoring.

Previous Results
Existence of probabilistic polynomial time equivalence between

factoring N and finding d.

Factors of N can be obtained from d under the Extended Riemann

Hypothesis (Miller , 1975)

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
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Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
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Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.
: trivial

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
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2004to Factoring
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Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.
: trivial
: (Reduction of factoring problem to d computation)
Input (N,e,d) output (p,q) under the assumptions:
(a) p,q have the same bitsize
(b) e d N 2

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
6 / 14

Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.
: trivial
: (Reduction of factoring problem to d computation)
Input (N,e,d) output (p,q) under the assumptions:
(a) p,q have the same bitsize
(b) e d N 2
Remarks on the assumptions
(a) This is usually the case

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
6 / 14

Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.
: trivial
: (Reduction of factoring problem to d computation)
Input (N,e,d) output (p,q) under the assumptions:
(a) p,q have the same bitsize
(b) e d N 2
Remarks on the assumptions
(a) This is usually the case
(b) Usually 1 < e, d < (N)

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
6 / 14

Main Results

Goal and assumptions

Goal
Knowledge of (e,d) knowledge of factors p,q of N.
: trivial
: (Reduction of factoring problem to d computation)
Input (N,e,d) output (p,q) under the assumptions:
(a) p,q have the same bitsize
(b) e d N 2
Remarks on the assumptions
(a) This is usually the case
(b) Usually 1 < e, d < (N)
Conclusion: The assumptions are not so restrictive

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
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Main Results

Proof Overview

Basic technique
Coppersmiths method for finding small roots of bivariate integer
polynomials
Previous application:factorization of N when half of the msb of p are
given.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
7 / 14

Main Results

Proof Overview

Basic technique
Coppersmiths method for finding small roots of bivariate integer
polynomials
Previous application:factorization of N when half of the msb of p are
given.
Steps
Proof for the special case where ed N 3/2 .

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
7 / 14

Main Results

Proof Overview

Basic technique
Coppersmiths method for finding small roots of bivariate integer
polynomials
Previous application:factorization of N when half of the msb of p are
given.
Steps
Proof for the special case where ed N 3/2 .
Generalization of the proof for the case where ed N 2

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
7 / 14

Main Results

Proof Overview

Basic technique
Coppersmiths method for finding small roots of bivariate integer
polynomials
Previous application:factorization of N when half of the msb of p are
given.
Steps
Proof for the special case where ed N 3/2 .
Generalization of the proof for the case where ed N 2
Experimental Results and conclusion

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
7 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

ed N 3/2
Wlog assume that p < q. Then p < N 1/2 < q < 2p < 2N 1/2 (1) which
gives p + q < 3N 1/2

N
2

(2) (for N 36) Thus,

(N) = N + 1 (p + q) >

N
2

(3)

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
8 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

ed N 3/2
Wlog assume that p < q. Then p < N 1/2 < q < 2p < 2N 1/2 (1) which
gives p + q < 3N 1/2

N
2

(2) (for N 36) Thus,

(N) = N + 1 (p + q) >

N
2

(3)

Theorem
Let N=pq be the RSA-modulus, where p and q are of the same bitsize.
Suppose we know integers e,d with ed > 1, ed 1(mod(N)) and
3
ed N 2
Then N can be factored in time polynomial to its bitsize.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
8 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

ed N 3/2
Wlog assume that p < q. Then p < N 1/2 < q < 2p < 2N 1/2 (1) which
gives p + q < 3N 1/2

N
2

(2) (for N 36) Thus,

(N) = N + 1 (p + q) >

N
2

(3)

Theorem
Let N=pq be the RSA-modulus, where p and q are of the same bitsize.
Suppose we know integers e,d with ed > 1, ed 1(mod(N)) and
3
ed N 2
Then N can be factored in time polynomial to its bitsize.
Proof.
dke:ceiling of k.
Z(N) : Ring of the invertible integers mod(N).
Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing
Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
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Main Results

Main theorems

proof (continued)
ed 1(mod(N)) ed = k(N) + 1 for some k N.

k = ed1
N . Then k dke
In addition k k = ... = (p+q1)(ed1)
(N)N
(2) and (3) give k k < 6N 3/2 (ed 1) (4) which gives
<6
by hypothesis k k < 6 k dke

Thus we only have to try dke + i for i=0,...,5 to find the right k.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
9 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

proof (continued)
ed 1(mod(N)) ed = k(N) + 1 for some k N.

k = ed1
N . Then k dke
In addition k k = ... = (p+q1)(ed1)
(N)N
(2) and (3) give k k < 6N 3/2 (ed 1) (4) which gives
<6
by hypothesis k k < 6 k dke

Thus we only have to try dke + i for i=0,...,5 to find the right k.
Complexity
The complexity of the algorithm is O(log 2 N).

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial TimeCrypto
equivalent
2004to Factoring
9 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

ed N 2
Theorem (Coppersmith)
Let f(x,y) be an irreducible polynomial in two variables over Z, of
maximuum degree in each variable seperately. Let X,Y be bounds on the
desired solutions (x0 , y0 ).Let W be the absolute value of the largest entry
2
in the coefficient vector of f(xX,yY). If XY W 3 Then in time
polynomial in logW and 2 we can find all integer pairs (x0 , y0 ) with
f (x0 , y0 ) = 0, |x0 | X and |y0 | Y .

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
10 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

ed N 2
Theorem (Coppersmith)
Let f(x,y) be an irreducible polynomial in two variables over Z, of
maximuum degree in each variable seperately. Let X,Y be bounds on the
desired solutions (x0 , y0 ).Let W be the absolute value of the largest entry
2
in the coefficient vector of f(xX,yY). If XY W 3 Then in time
polynomial in logW and 2 we can find all integer pairs (x0 , y0 ) with
f (x0 , y0 ) = 0, |x0 | X and |y0 | Y .
Theorem
Let N=pq be the RSA-modulus, where p and q are of the same bitsize.
Suppose we know integers e,d with ed > 1, ed 1(mod(N)) and
ed N 2
Then N can be factored in time polynomial in the bitsize of N.
Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing
Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
10 / 14

Main Results

Main theorems

Proof.
Again ed 1(mod(N)) ed = k(N) + 1 (5) for some k N.
Let k = ed1
be an underestimation of k. Using (4) we obtain
N
k k < 6N 3/2 (ed 1) < 6N 1/2
(dke:approximation

Let us denote x = k dke

of k, x: additive error) In
addition N (N) = p + q 1 < 3N 1/2
Thus (N) lies in the interval [N 3N 1/2 , N].
We divide the interval [N 3N 1/2 , N] into 6 subintervals of length 21 N 1/2
1/2 , i = 1, ..., 6 For the correct i we have
with centers N 2i1
4 N
|N

2i1 1/2
4 N

(N)| 14 N 1/2

1/2 e for the right i. Then

Let g = d 2i1
4 N
|N g (N)| < 14 N 1/2 + 1 (N) = N g y for some unknown y
with |y | 14 N 1/2

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
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Main Results

Main theorems

Proof (continued)
+ x)(N g y ) = 0
(5) yields ed 1 (dke
We define the bivariate integer polynomial :
dke(N

f (x, y ) = xy (N g )x + dkey
g ) + ed 1
p + q + 1 g ) over the integers.
with a known root (x0 , y0 ) = (k dke,
We now apply Coppersmiths theorem. We define
X = 6N 1/2 andY = 41 N 1/2 + 1 Then |x0 | X and|y0 | Y .
Let W denote the linf norm of the coefficient vector of f(xX,yY). Then
W (N g )X > 3N 3/2
2

144
Thus XY = ... < W 2/3 = W 3 (for N > (291/3
)
3)2
By Coppersmiths theorem we can find the root (x0 , y0 ) in time
polynomialin the bitsize of of W.
Finally the solution y0 = p + q 1 g yields the factorization of N.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
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Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
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Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
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Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in the bitsize of

N since W NX = 6N 3/2

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
13 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in the bitsize of

N since W NX = 6N 3/2

The previous theorem can be easily generalized for the case where
p + q poly (logN)N 1/2

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
13 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in the bitsize of

N since W NX = 6N 3/2

The previous theorem can be easily generalized for the case where
p + q poly (logN)N 1/2
(a) For the case where ed N 3/2 we only have to examine the values
+ i, for i=0,1,...,d2poly (logN)e 1
dke
(polynomialy bounded by the bitsize of N)

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
13 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in the bitsize of

N since W NX = 6N 3/2

The previous theorem can be easily generalized for the case where
p + q poly (logN)N 1/2
(a) For the case where ed N 3/2 we only have to examine the values
+ i, for i=0,1,...,d2poly (logN)e 1
dke
(polynomialy bounded by the bitsize of N)
(b) For the case where ed N 2 we just have to divide the interval
[N poly (logN)N 1/2 , N] into d2poly (logN)e intervals.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
13 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

Remarks

The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in the bitsize of

N since W NX = 6N 3/2

The previous theorem can be easily generalized for the case where
p + q poly (logN)N 1/2
(a) For the case where ed N 3/2 we only have to examine the values
+ i, for i=0,1,...,d2poly (logN)e 1
dke
(polynomialy bounded by the bitsize of N)
(b) For the case where ed N 2 we just have to divide the interval
[N poly (logN)N 1/2 , N] into d2poly (logN)e intervals.

Conclusion:Assumption (a) is not restrictive at all.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
13 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

From the cryptography point of view ...

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
14 / 14

Main Results

Remarks

From the cryptography point of view ...

Theorem
Let N=pq be the RSA-modulus, where p and q are of the same bitsize.
Furthermore let e Z(N) be an RSA public exponent.
Suppose we have an algorithm that on input (N,e) outputs in deterministic
polynomial time the RSA secret exponent d Z(N) satisfying
ed = 1(mod(N))
Then N can be factored in deterministic polynomial time.

Alexander May (Faculty of Computer Science,Computing

Electrical Engineering
the RSA secret
andKey
Mathematics)
is Deterministic Polynomial Time
Crypto
equivalent
2004 to Factoring
14 / 14