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crash
On April 4, 1955, a United Airlines Douglas DC-6 named
Mainliner Idaho crashed shortly after taking o from
Long Island MacArthur Airport, in Ronkonkoma, Islip,
New York, United States. The aircraft, registration number N37512, was performing an instrument rating check
ight when it began banking to the right shortly after takeo. Seconds after climbing past 150 feet (46 m), the aircraft turned through 90 degrees, causing the nose to drop
suddenly, before it struck the ground. All three members
of the ight crew were killed on impact.
ployed by United Airlines since 1937, and had 9,763 ying hours experience, 549 of which were in a DC-6.[5]
He was training the two pilots, Henry M. Dozier, age
40, and Vernis H. Webb, age 35,[5] so they would be
able to retain an instrument rating qualication, allowing
them to y under instrument ight rules.[4] The aircraft
was a Douglas DC-6, registration N37512, serial number
43001. The airframe had own 22,068 ying hours, and
had undergone an inspection 105 hours before the accident. The aircraft was powered by four Pratt & Whittted with Hamilton Standard
A subsequent investigation found that the crewmembers ney R2800-CB16 engines,
[5]
43E60-317
propellers.
were simulating an engine failure, which involved a member of the crew pulling back the throttle lever for engine The weather on the day of the accident was clear, alNo. 4 prior to taking o. Investigators found that if the though there was a strong wind of about 20 knots (37
throttle lever was pulled back too far, it would cause the km/h) hitting the aireld from the southwest, with ocpropeller to reversea feature designed to slow the air- casional gusts of wind as fast as 30 knots (56 km/h).[4]
craft upon landing. Once the landing gear was raised, The aircraft made several circuits, taking o and landing
the crew would have to raise a metal ag in the cock- again, before eyewitnesses observed the aircraft standing
pit to bring the propeller blades back into the correct at the end of the runway and then taking o at about 15:50
position, since a safety device prevented electric power Eastern Standard Time.[4][3] Loaded with around 61,000
from operating the rotating mechanism at the roots of the pounds (28,000 kg), the aircraft was far below its maxblades unless the aircraft was on the ground or the ag imum permissible weight and the center of gravity was
was manually raised. Investigators from the Civil Aero- within the prescribed limits for the model of aircraft.[4][5]
nautics Board (CAB) concluded that one of the ight crew Between 1,500 feet (460 m) and 1,800 feet (550 m) down
applied full power to No. 4 engine, thinking this would
the runway, the aircraft reached take-o speed, lifted o
bring the aircraft out of the increasing bank. Because the the ground, and began climbing normally as the crew reblades were reversed and the ag was not raised, this dratracted the landing gear. Upon climbing through 50 feet
matically increased the reverse thrust causing the DC-6 (15 m), the aircraft began banking right. The climbing
to spiral out of control. The investigators also concluded
bank continued to increase at a rate which alarmed witthat the suddenness of the bank and dive meant the ight nesses, and soon after the aircraft rotated through 90 (at
crew had little chance to recover the aircraft before imwhich point the wings were vertical to the ground).[4][5]
pact.
At a height of around 150 feet (46 m), with all four enIn the aftermath of the accident, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) issued an Airworthiness Directive
ordering all DC-6 and DC-6B aircraft to be tted with a
manual device which could prevent the inadvertent reversal of the propeller blades. United Airlines also stated
they had begun installing reverse thrust indicator lights
in the cockpits of their DC-6 aircraft, which would warn
pilots when a propeller had reversed.
History
On April 4, 1955, a United Airlines check captain, Stanley C. Hoyt, age 45, was carrying out instrument rating
checks on two of the airlines pilots. Hoyt had been em-
2 Investigation
2.1
Wreckage examination
INVESTIGATION
sition in which they will provide reverse thrust.[7] Should If full left aileron was applied, the aircraft could be rethe crew need to perform a go-around, they could restore covered for a short period of time, but a violent turn to
2.4
Conclusions
2.4
Conclusions
The propellers of a Douglas DC-6 engine, similar to those installed on the engines of Mainliner Idaho
3
3.1
Aftermath
Technological advances
Following the accident, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) issued an Airworthiness Directive ordering all DC-6 and DC-6B aircraft to be tted with a sequence gate latch, known as a Martin bar. The device is
a metal bar which a crew would manually swing in front of
the thrust levers over the idle line, physically preventing
the thrust levers from being retarded into the reverse position. According to the CAB report, a United Airlines
engineer told investigators the Martin bar should make
propeller reversal a more reliable and safer device [than
the system tted to Mainliner Idaho] ... with its numerous
switches, relays, and automatic operation.[5]
REFERENCES
4 See also
1955 in aviation
3.2
Similar accidents
[2] Accident description. Aviation Safety Network. Retrieved October 22, 2010.
[3] L. I. Crash Kills 3 Veteran Airline Pilots On Take-O
During Routine Check Hop. New York Times. April 5,
1955. Retrieved December 26, 2010. (subscription required)
[4] Job 2001, p. 45.
[5] Accident Investigation Report; United Air Lines, Inc.,
MacArthur Field, Islip, New York. Civil Aeronautics
Board. 1955. Retrieved January 12, 2011.
[6] The Douglas DC-6. Airliners.net. Retrieved December
28, 2010.
[7] Job 2001, p. 46.
[8] Job 2001, p. 47.
Bibliography
Job, Macarthur (2001). A fatal propeller reversal.
Air Disaster 4. Aerospace Publications. ISBN 1875671-48-X.
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Text
6.2
Images
6.3
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