I.

Ukrainian, On holding of the all-Crimean referendum

a. Procedure
i. Consideration In Accordance with Article 39, 40 and 41 of the
Law of Ukraine
ii. Brought by constitutional petition of Acting President, Chairman
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Parliament
Commissioner for Human Rights
b. Background
i. Resolution No. 1702-6/14; go with Russia or Ukraine?
1. Includes the City of Sevastopol, which is not a part of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, has a special status
determined by the law of Ukraine.
ii. The subject of the right to constitutional petition the Acting
President of Ukraine, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine under Article 112, paragraph 2 of Article 137 of the
Constitution of Ukraine
iii. The subject of the right to constitutional petition the Ukrainian
Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights requested the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine to recognize the Resolution as
non-conforming with Article 73, paragraph 2 Article 85, Article
137, 138 of the Constitution of Ukraine and noted that the issue
of altering the territory of Ukraine must be resolved exclusively
by an all-Ukrainian referendum.
c. Substance
i. The Constitution of Ukraine proclaimed that sovereignty of
Ukraine extends throughout its entire territory; integral part of
sovereignty is integrity and inviolability of the territory of
Ukraine within its present borders; protecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine is the most important function
of the state and a matter of concern for all the Ukrainian people
(Article 2, part 1 of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine).
ii. Any changes to the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved
exclusively by the all-Ukrainian referendum (Article 73 of the
Constitution of Ukraine). Authority to call the all-Ukrainian
referendum on issues indicated in said Article of the Constitution
of Ukraine belongs to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (paragraph
2 of part 1 of Article 85 of the Fundamental Law of Ukraine).
Organization and procedure for conducting elections and
referendums shall be determined exclusively by the laws of
Ukraine (paragraph 20 of part 1 of Article 92 of the Constitution
of Ukraine).
iii. The Resolution, which provides pore accession to the Russian
Federation as its subject, addressing to the President and
Federal Council of the State Duma of the Russian Federation to
initiate the procedure of accession to the Russian Federation as
a subject of Russian Federation, putting to the referendum
mentioned questions, violated constitutional principle of
territorial integrity of Ukraine and exceeded its authorities, and

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III.

thus the Resolution does not comply with Articles 1, 2, 5, 8,

paragraph 2 of Article 19, Article 73, paragraph 3 of Article 85,
paragraphs 13, 18, paragraph 20 of Article 92, Articles 132, 133,
134, 135, 137, 138 of the Constitution of Ukraine.
German Court Constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty
a. Procedure
i. The Federal Constitutional Court examines whether legal
instruments of the European institutions and bodies keep within
the boundaries of the sovereign powers accorded to them by
way of conferral whilst adhering to the principle of subsidiarity
under Community and Union law. Furthermore, the Federal
Constitutional Court reviews whether the inviolable core content
of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law pursuant to Article
23.1 third sentence in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic
Law is respected.
b. Background
i. The Treaty of Lisbon is an international amending treaty like
the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Lisbon replaced
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
c. Substance
i. The argument advanced by the complainants re V. that
European economic policy is a purely market-oriented policy
without a social-policy orientation and that its functional
approach restricts the possibilities of the legislature in the
Member States to conduct their own social policy is incorrect.
The European Union is neither without any social-policy
competences, nor is it inactive in this area. At the same time,
the Member States have sufficient competences to take
essential social policy decisions on their own responsibility.
Canada (Reprimand)
a. Procedure
i. Kerfluffle. Lawyer is reprimanded. Punished. Appeals. Loses.
Appeals to highest court.
b. Background
i. Here, the decision to suspend D for 21 days was not before the
Court. The only issue was whether the Councils decision to
reprimand D reflected a proportionate balancing of the lawyers
expressive rights with its statutory mandate to ensure that
lawyers behave with objectivity, moderation and dignity in
accordance with art. 2.03 of the Code of ethics. In dealing with
the appropriate boundaries of civility for a lawyer, the severity of
the conduct must be interpreted in light of the expressive rights
guaranteed by the Charter , and, in particular, the public benefit
in ensuring the right of lawyers to express themselves about the
justice system in general and judges in particular. We are, in
other words, balancing the fundamental importance of open,
and even forceful, criticism of our public institutions with the
need to ensure civility in the profession.

IV.

V.

VI.

c. Substance
i. In assessing whether a law violates the Charter , we are
balancing the governments pressing and substantial objectives
against the extent to which they interfere with the Charter
right at issue. If the law interferes with the right no more than is
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, it will be found
to be proportionate, and, therefore, a reasonable limit under s. 1
. In assessing whether an adjudicated decision violates the
Charter , however, we are engaged in balancing somewhat
different but related considerations, namely, has the decisionmaker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a
Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is
an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the
purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are
not unreasonably limited.
ii. So our choice is between saying that every time a party argues
that Charter values are implicated on judicial review, a
reasonableness review is transformed into a correctness one, or
saying that while both tribunals and courts can interpret the
Charter , the administrative decision-maker has the necessary
specialized expertise and discretionary power in the area where
the Charter values are being balanced.
1. Essentially the stricter standard of correctness versus
the less strict reasonableness
iii. Reasonableness standard good. Group that censured lawyer
good. Appeal dismissed with cost.
Canada Case
a. Quebec challenged amendment that required all of country to vote on
the leaving of a particular province. Court of Appeals ruled against
them. Nothing was found to support such an unofficial convention.
Appealed again. Court can rule. Not moot/academic. Not political. The
Court of Appeals is right. If the amendment is constitutionally sound no
extra constitutional hurdle (e.g. Quebec veto) exists. Not found in
duality language. Not found in any records.
Wu Mei
a. During the second instance of a civil case in which the two parties
reach a settlement agreement and the peoples court [of second
instance] approves the withdrawal of the appeal, that settlement
agreement has [, therefore,] not been made into a bill of mediation by
the peoples court in accordance with law and belongs to [the class of]
agreements reached outside of litigation. If one party does not perform
the settlement agreement and the other party applies to enforce the
judgment of first instance, the peoples court should support the
application.
Wang Zhicai
a. In an intentional homicide case, brought about by a heated marital or
love conflict, in which the defendant commits the crime in a cruel
fashion; the guilt of the defendant is of such a nature that the death

VII.

penalty should be imposed; the defendant, however, has mitigating

factors such as that he frankly repents and actively seeks to provide
compensation; and, at the same time, the victims family requests that
stern punishment be meted out; the peoples court may, based upon
the nature of the case, the circumstances of the crime, the harm
occasioned, the subjective malice exhibited by the defendant, and the
dangerousness of the defendant, sentence the defendant to death with
a two-year suspension of execution and also decide to restrict the
commutation of sentence in accordance with law, so as to effectively
resolve social conflicts and promote social harmony.
Poland
a. Dont blow up civilian airliners.