Latest Jurisprudence - Rem 1

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
vs.
FEDERICO A. SERRA,
G.R. No. 203241
July 10, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) is the owner of a parcel of land. On 20 May 1975,
Serra and petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a Contract
of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years.
Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property) within 10
years from the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
On 4 September 1984, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the
property. However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling the property. On
14 March 1985, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against
Serra (Specific Performance case) in the RTC Makati. The RTC Makati initially dismissed the
complaint. However, in an Order dated 5 January 1989, the RTC Makati reversed itself and
ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.
Serra appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the appeal, Serra
donated the property to his mother, who in turn sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok). A
new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao
and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC.
Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the
Specific Performance case. In a Decision dated 4 January 1994, this Court declared that the
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. On 15 April 1994,
the decision in the Specific Performance case became final and executory upon entry of
judgment.
On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in
favor of Ablao and the subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision dated 28
September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Masbate decision. The CA held that the donation
to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serras obligation to RCBC. Since
Ablao had no right to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good faith, the
subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void.
Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182478, while Serra
and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182664, before this Court. In
separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final and
executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,8respectively, this Court found neither
reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific
Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the
decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to
execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. On 22
September 2011, Serra filed his comment and opposition to the motion. Serra insisted that
the motion for execution was already barred by prescription and laches, and that RCBC was
at fault for failing to register as lien in the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy.
In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for execution.
The RTC Makati opined that "[RCBC] should have asked for the execution of the deed of sale
and have the same registered with the Registry of Deeds, so that even if [Serra] sold or
transferred the subject property to any person the principle of caveat emptor would set in." 9
In an Order dated 26 July 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for reconsideration.
Thus, RCBC filed this petition.
In a Resolution dated 3 December 2012, this Court granted RCBCs Temporary Restraining
Order against the implementation of the questioned Orders upon RCBCs filing of a bond.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its
05 January 1989 decision executed through motion, considering that under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by the respondent from enforcing the
said decision.
Held:
The petition has merit.
The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion
within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and
before prescription sets in.11 This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be
made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common
denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.12
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that where the delays were occasioned by the
judgment debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment
creditors control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which
became final and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and
deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC,
Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras
action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the
decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment
case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in
the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on
3 March 2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion
is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.
This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY.
G.R. No. 198680
July 8, 2013
Facts:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as
Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to
their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, 7 to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. 8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a)
his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true
copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners
have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs. 10
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean that they could
already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory
heir through the documentary evidence he submitted.
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Petitioners sought
direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.
Held:
The petition has no merit.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged
that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer
certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v.
CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot
make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination
of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil
case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
A determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light,
it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as
herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding.
CITY OF CEBU,
vs.
APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR.,
G.R. No. 172852
January 30, 2013
Facts:
The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil Case for eminent domain over two (2) parcels
of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.
During the pendency of the case, or on December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses
Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with the
ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the former in consideration of P1,786,400.00 as
provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of
commissioners.
Forthwith, the panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC recommending
the sum ofP20,826,339.50 as just compensation. The report was adopted and approved by
the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996. The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and
then by the Court.
When the said decision became final and executory on September 20, 2002, the case was
remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4, 2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted
the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ.
The Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted in the case by herein
respondent. On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum
of P19,039,939.50 which is the difference between the just compensation due and the
provisional payment already made.
On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order
the petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual
taking of the lands.
On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer amend a final
and executory judgment that did not specifically direct the payment of legal interest. Adamant,
the respondent sought recourse before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a)
12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation computed from the time of
actual taking of the property up to the date of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12%
legal interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation became final and
executory on September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.
In its Decision dated November 30, 2005, the CA rejected the respondents first claim since
the issue was belatedly raised during the execution stage and after the judgment of just
compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, the CA found the respondents second
contention meritorious. The CA awarded legal interest accruing from the time the RTC Order
dated December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was affirmed with finality by the
Supreme Court up to the time of full payment thereof in line with the ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals6 that when a court judgment awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, it shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned
from such finality until satisfaction.
The CA effectively reiterated the above decision when it denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents entitlement to 12% legal interest awarded is barred by res
judicata.
Held:
The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of
judgment.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness
of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner
who can no longer question the respondents entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded
by the CA. The Courts determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12%
legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew
through the present recourse.
Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter
is inextricably related to the ruling in the former.
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR.,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos. 172476-99
September 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July
1998.[3]
During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS
approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for
development as housing projects.[4]
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as
attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, [5] executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale
over the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner
forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00
per square meter of the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square
meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September
1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of
sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.[6]
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the
first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit[7] against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for
(1) violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
(2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The
case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,
found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of
public documents, thus:
[8]
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so

holds that the following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose
names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
xxxx
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO
FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public
documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
xxxx
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO
twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing
the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to
AFP-RSBS;[9]
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations[10] for

violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations [11] for falsification of public
documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999, [12] with a
supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999, [13] of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause
against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order,[14] the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioners first
motion for reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which
to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof
dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within
the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the
action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the
Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001,
recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature
on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and
checks for the purchase of the subject property.[15]
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office
of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the
OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of
petitioners name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the
recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military
was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion
for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors[16] was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough
review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his
signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers,
and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The
panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the
unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square
meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioners
continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum, [17] the panel of prosecutors
recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises
recommend the following:
considered,
undersigned
prosecutors
1.
The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the
Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2.
Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
be filed against Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing damage to the
government when it caused the payment of the amount of Php 10,500.00 per
square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be Php
3,000.00 per square meter.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors.
Upon
receipt
of
the
final
findings
of
the
Ombudsman,
theSandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for
reconsideration[19] of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea,
the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed
a motion to set aside his arraignment [20] pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading.
The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should
be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution,
theSandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the
informations. He claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior findings of
the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that
heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there
should be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to
sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioners motion to set
aside his arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioners motion for reconsideration,
filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment,
violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended. Respondent court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors
finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 15, Series of 2001,[22] sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper
court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five
(5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper
Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in
cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not
bar
the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of
the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the
motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause
cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment
of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of
the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.[23]
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, [24] otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act
of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the
filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which
the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment
and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall
be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from
the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in
which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493,
provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court
circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA
8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears
before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party,
the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that
the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.[25]
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no
error when it proceeded with petitioners arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution,
petitioners motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The
Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioners first
motion for reconsideration,[26] impugning for the first time the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration
questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end
to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners defenses are evidentiary in nature
and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioners claim that the
Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him is
baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases
against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of
prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises
recommend the following:
considered,
undersigned
prosecutors
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the

Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Ramiscal be DENIED;[27] (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause. [28] The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude
of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon
criminal complaints.[29] As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:[30]
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory
and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court
to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service. [31]
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,[32] the Court explained the rationale behind this policy,
thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way
that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.[33]
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been
filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full
control of the case.[34]
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners
motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[35]
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it.
TheSandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.
[36]
There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should
continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Courts ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan,
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
[37]
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which

the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioners
motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 203335
February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE
TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers
and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs
for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the
general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read
postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks,
stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and
schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the
need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is
not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance,
avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by
posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the illmotivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the
computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the
laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by
sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems,
networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to
prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5,
2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier
issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing
the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that
regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions
that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of
the RPC on the crime of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of
laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
construct,1 useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 2 Later, the strict scrutiny
standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. 4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers,
professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither
damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target systems
security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions
for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors
who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records. 5
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as
to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is
referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
systems:
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without
right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on
these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and
private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect9 or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who
are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. 10 Here, the chilling effect that results in
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish
and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of ones constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. 11 Petitioner has failed to discharge
this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
systems:
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a
domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in
case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer
the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any
other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionairephilanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the
person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another
who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that,
considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the
difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real
name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that
the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of
the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the
penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, 14 it
ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself
fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of
Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"
but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches16 and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b)
the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In assessing the challenge that
the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his
residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if
any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show
how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold
water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like
speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse
or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire
anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the
news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of
identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity
information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of
theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation,
has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is
required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or
indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a
computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution.21 They express fear that private communications of sexual character between
husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal
code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common
usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or
conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This meaning
given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite
law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show
a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private persons x
x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." 23 The understanding of those who
drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to
constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white
slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive
prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activityis
not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain
or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography." 26 The law defines prostitution as
any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration. 27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials
that serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The
Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if
containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in
sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be
balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of
women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the
bounds of obscenity.30 The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it
stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

xxxx
xxxx
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic
Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer
system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that
provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography
already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to
"produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography" 33 clearly relates to the
prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to
punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a
sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one
who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on
Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a
cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed
elsewhere below. For now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is
not successfully challenged.
xxxx
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for
sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known
as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy
games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."
The term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying
"Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a menu. 35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass
to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without
prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never
been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is
that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with
spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. 36 The
State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part
of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
xxxx
xxxx
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means
which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code 37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of
the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the
latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis
for conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds
defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be
overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People 39 even where the offended parties
happened to be public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement
with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even
extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. 43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances
where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice,
even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a
public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal
(the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal
code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a
defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Societys interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. 44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded
the higher standard of actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of
committing libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the
presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory
imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial,
convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the
article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill
against complainants during the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against
public figures in the above case, cinema and television personalities, when it modified the
penalty of imprisonment to just a fine ofP6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the
presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement.45For his defense, the accused must show
that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act
violate the countrys obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines, 47 the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal
defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should
constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a
defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement
by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to
decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure
that they do not stifle freedom of expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although
everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be
necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech
and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation.
Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of
the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when
the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. 50 In
a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory
statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the
line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the
internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law
punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be
held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person
who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on
aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude
that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect
the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times
sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.51 The legislature is not
required to define every single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When
a person aids or abets another in destroying a forest, 52 smuggling merchandise into the
country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of laborers, 54 his action is essentially physical
and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of aiding or
abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is
somewhat blurred. The idea of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the
heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have
accessed the internet within a year, translating to about 31 million users. 55 Based on a recent
survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged countries for social
networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for example,
share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections. 57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion
people with shared interests use Facebook to get in touch. 58 Users register at this site, create
a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. 59 A user can post
a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,

depending on the users privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends,
anyone on Facebook can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences
on the programs screen such as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the
reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or views
about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the
original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to
his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that
enables its users to send and read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These
are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of digital content
which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other mediaon the
internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this
particular users posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this
particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter
user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is
available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just
reposting or republishing another persons tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT,
Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf that may have provided the computer used for
posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the
person who posts a link to the blog site. 60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog
on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she
subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public
official has an illicit affair with a movie star. Linda, one of Marias friends who sees this post,
comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral." Marias original post is then
multiplied by her friends and the latters friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost
ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it
interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account.
Nenas "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons "Retweet" of Nenas original tweet
and posts this on her Facebook account. Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends start
Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A lot of them even press the Share
button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds, thousands,
and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement,
"Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel
in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says,
"Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster,
writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur,
passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he
merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a
reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and
"Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of
cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting
cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like,
Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or
haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting?
And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding
"Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as
to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round
hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes
into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect
on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union,61 a case involving the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.
The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device,
of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the
knowing use of an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under
18 years of age or to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age
communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendments guarantee of
freedom of speech for being overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a
matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of
speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In
addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators
with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of
criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even
arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this increased deterrent
effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater
U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those implicated by certain civil regulations.
xxxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, presents a great threat
of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours
of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages
would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for insisting
that the statute not be overly broad. The CDAs burden on protected speech cannot be
justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives,
and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly
sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. 62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.64Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded
on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be
carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability
of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as
these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal statutes not involving free
speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right
can raise any constitutional ground absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one
from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against thirdparty standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills
him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication.
It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the
medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the
great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social
media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively
enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the
internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal
conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether
or not one netizens comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did
not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an
altogether new defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then
that should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code
and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake,
libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy
relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between
social or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their
relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and
indexes child pornography and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the
dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google and its users aiders and abettors
in the commission of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American
law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law lacksthe exemption of a provider or
notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as
follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or

speaker of any information provided by another information content provider and cannot be
held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it
whether wittingly or unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of
child pornography? When a user downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may
give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way, certain information is
forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial communication could be disseminated
on the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the
distribution of this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve
users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors
in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. 71 In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5)
on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computerrelated Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computerrelated Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on
the exercise of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not
objectionable. A hacker may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access
another partys computer system but the security employed by the systems lawful owner
could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and
passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is alerted. 72 If
Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is
not upheld, the owner of the username and password could not file a complaint against him
for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability simply
because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the
innocent.73 While this may be true with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the
area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1),
Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)
(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and
abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty
through adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of
course be spared.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or
special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a
single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special
law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same
fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court
would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print,
said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the
subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that
online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article
353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of
publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands
the ACPAs scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a
fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of
reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this
Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this
Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "AntiChild Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a
computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be
punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be
punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the
offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses
Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on
Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under
4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or
Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards
as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The
power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because
at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just
have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and
apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the
legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of
the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about
to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be
obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record
traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official
abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are,
and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before
they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a
law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon
showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is
a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. 80 In
assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns
of the State against constitutional guarantees. 81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do this, it is
within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to
enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part,
aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing,
and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed,
as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires
signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or
record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And this is
precisely what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to
collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been
committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for
that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer
system without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual
activity for favor or consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade
detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or
laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafs, from kindred places that provide free internet services, and
from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid
arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither
be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their
tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law
enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time
traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and
seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not
provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the peoples right
to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v.
Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy
wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an independent
constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning
of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court
classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the
latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who oppose government collection
or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. 91 In determining whether or not a
matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of
privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of
privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to
a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who
use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the
expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without
reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication
through a service provider, must of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic
data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who
writes a text message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his
cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message
sent. It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to
putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through
the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the
information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the internet in packets and in a way
that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data
is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of these
packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells
computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call,
video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going,
and how the packet fits together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent
through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet
protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another where their
contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service providers
communications system will put his voice message into packets and send them to the other
persons cellphone where they are refitted together and heard. The latters spoken reply is
sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the sender
reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his call through. He also
reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating
electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that telephone users in the 70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone
numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that even if
there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such expectation
is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data
with one another over cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must
submit certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The
conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation to
privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as

reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits
of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of
activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With
enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a persons close associations,
religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely
beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected
by the right to privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn
narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase
"due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or
not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts that
Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But
the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the
phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just
reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this
meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will
the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack?
Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be used to
prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data,
such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies
holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and
what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or,
worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition,"
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in
real time" because it is not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the search of
what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police officers
determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity
for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be
searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection
to internet users and that the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served by
providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law enforcement authorities
will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to
track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations
must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-forvagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been
consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own
neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred
institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x x x
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society." 96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be
preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content
data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from
law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months:
Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is
used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and
its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the
right to property. They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are
to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such
order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially
belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their
authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that
a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its
system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service
providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services
for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for
at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he
was so minded. The service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or
deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by
reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper
the normal transmission or use of the same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court
warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit
subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially
docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena.
Petitioners objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is wellsettled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. 98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant,
a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their
executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful
search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence.
Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure
warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following
powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act,
and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium;
and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or
computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge
about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the
computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no
case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search
and seizure procedures. On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of
law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of
computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of
these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely
supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in
Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be,
shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination,
destroyed or deleted upon the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies
this as necessary to clear up the service providers storage systems and prevent overload. It
would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or
examination violates the users right against deprivation of property without due process of
law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the
service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.
If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated
the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is
deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima
facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this
provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the
Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as
files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy
discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data,
produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while
stored in their personal computers or in the service providers systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in
effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a
warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all
forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain
kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be
unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such
content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled
into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests:
the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present
danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found
prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not
take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof
specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period
or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the
mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations
where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1829,102 Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined
therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it
would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or
willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor
General assumes, defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus,
Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck
down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies
and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x
x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the
law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users assets. 104 This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of
law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard. 106 Hence, Sections 24 and
26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in realtime; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of
viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over
the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying
information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined
under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and
communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service
providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified
content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a courtissued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer
data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer
data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime
investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes
libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)
(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1wphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of
Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in
respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 192123
March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of

reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the
surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an imperforate
anus.1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out through the abdominal wall, 3 enabling him to excrete through a colostomy
bag attached to the side of his body.4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation.5 Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was
assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The
anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando
Solidum (Dr. Solidum).6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, 7 and went into
a coma.8 His coma lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a
month.10 He could no longer see, hear or move. 11
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians. 12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum,13alleging:
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked
to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO,
represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an
imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull
through operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to
use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance,
by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications,
causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic
encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to
his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the
RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), 15 where
it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, 16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor
as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional
as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So
and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of P500,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby
CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, 18 the
RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to
one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to
indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay
the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled. 19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20 pertinently stating and
ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major
operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were
conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate
anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was
suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was
not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally
led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the
accident to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in
this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have
occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be
drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony
to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no
other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for
injury suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the
injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual
findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness
or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso
349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates
a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is
afforded the opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no
criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURTS OPINION, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A
CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT
TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS
BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST
PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT
THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO
OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY
ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN
ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES

IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT
JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER.
ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT
SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH,
THE AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for
criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The
doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care."24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may
justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality
causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere
occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to
the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a
breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. 27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was
significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 28 where the Court said
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves
of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The
application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it
is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of

law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that
a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical
procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by
non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the
aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how
and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a
nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy
part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part
of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was
under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff
was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis,
among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily
used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed
the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon
is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any
particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or
treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the
process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in
such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average
man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first
be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were
present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the
control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation,
could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably
wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pullthrough operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind
at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the
operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the
insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through
operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not
prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists,
had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course
of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex,
prompting them to administer atropine to the patient. 30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v.
Brigham,31 relevant portions of the decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat
and some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and
at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage
revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The
doctor ordered that oxygen be administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten
minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor that the patient
was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be administered, and he departed for
the hospital. When he arrived, the physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun
attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m.
and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also
found that the air passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to
death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The
fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by
someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a
bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42
Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case Res Ipsa Loquitur
24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary
for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute closing of the patients air passage and
his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under these
circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was
no palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that death
would not be expected without negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create
an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines
whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists
of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results
by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and
properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100%
halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and
conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has
become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information
regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he
made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should
have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit
1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked
Exhibit 3A. 3B Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient
was noted to have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately
administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off,
and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg
was given. However, the patient did not respond until no cardiac rate can be
auscultated and the surgeons were immediately told to stop the operation. The patient
was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of
epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage still with no cardiac
rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45 secs, patients
vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins.
The surgeons were then told to proceed to the closure and the childs vital signs
throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 2022 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated
with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one
reason or another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia
record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly note I cant
understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the
anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the
patient under general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole
anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation began, bradycardia
occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with
100% oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be
read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after something went amiss in
the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut off.
The key question remains what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set
in?
The implication of Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic
agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He
made the assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the
operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the
other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that
he administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella
whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that she assisted in the operation
and was therefore conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that they were using
a machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidums interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes
the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the
quantity of halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of
15 minutes. He studiedly mentions the concentration of halothane as reflected in the
anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) The
numbers indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1%
halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his entire operation; The
amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one percent cannot be summated
because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
xxxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face
of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not
really validate the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was
not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the implications of the change
in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child
as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT
Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of
consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are
manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why would there be deprivation of oxygen if
100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or
halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are
incontestable, and they can only be led to one conclusion if the application of anesthesia
was really closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt
because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had
been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic
agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals 35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this
Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will
employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to
use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that
expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but
also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further,
inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only
in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainants wife and
newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the
plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the
duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to
act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the
breach of the duty by the physicians failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard
of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection
between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered
by the patient.36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against
unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to
act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular
physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly
technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the
knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical
care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in
the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist
is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under
similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for
negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any
individual physicians own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court
may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the
testimony of all medical experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in
anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It
would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who
served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society
of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly
focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation. 39 Even then, the report of his
Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum,40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pullthru operation and was administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents.
The patient, at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it
down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing
that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to
block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the
records show, prompt resuscitative measures were administered and spontaneous cardiac
function re-established in less than five (5) minutes and that oxygen was continuously being
administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest, patient suffered permanent
irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the
committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards
of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the
anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of
the physical examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following portions
of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and
in this case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and
45 minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate,
now as a doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the
slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time
because is some reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, were
talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart
rate, now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is
when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral
part of the neck, when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce
bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply
of oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or
there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not
a bradycardia but a to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).
xxxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications probably were contributory to the production of
hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the
anesthesia record and the factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia,
viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this
Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory
to the production of Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly
look at this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at
this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this
representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just
call me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by
one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA Im asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100
figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS Im trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily,
because this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the
Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that this
portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and
then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many
factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what you
call hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors
that might lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to
operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done might
also contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a
possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.

Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Geralds operation
for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of
suffering the same condition.43 He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had
been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications."45However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude
the probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not
necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and
had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report,
instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in
the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit
him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable
doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt;
not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or
a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree
of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs
of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from
civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for
validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no
firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of
the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge
Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not
allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address
the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng
Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and
in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. 48 It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental
right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would
be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of
industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital
ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work. 50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng
Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely
was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil
liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P.
Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and
MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 191240
July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision 1 dated February 11,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil
aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of
estafa. Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information 2 which
reads:
That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent
to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the amount of
US$100,000.00 in the following manner, to wit: Respondents convinced the complainant to
invest into the remittance business in the name of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR in
Hongkong, representing to her that they will personally take charge of the operations and
marketing of the said business, assuring her with huge profits because of the popularity of
accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing very well that the said
manifestations/representations and fraudulent manifestations were false and were intended
only to exact money from the Complainant, and by reason of the said false representations
made by both accused, the Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount of
US$100,000.00 as seed money to start the operations of the business and the said accused,
once in the possession of the said amount of money, misappropriated, misapplied and/or
converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
Complainant in the aforementioned amount of US$100,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother Ramon pleaded not guilty 4 to the offense
charged.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business.5 She met respondent through a common friend in
December 2000 and became close since then. Respondent had told her that his friends,
Jinggoy Estrada and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and remittance business
and that Jinggoy even brought him toHong Kong and Singapore to promote the former's
business.6 Petitioner eventually met respondents brother and manager, Ramon Salvador, to
whom she volunteered to financially help respondent in his bid for the Vice-Mayoralty race in
Mandaluyong.7 It was also in the same meeting that they talked about the matter of engaging
in a freight and remittance business.8Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong to
see for herself the viability of such business and Ramon suggested to use respondents name
to attract the overseas contract workers.9
In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with respondent and a certain Virgilio
Calubaquib wentto Hong Kong and they witnessed respondents popularity among the Filipino
domestic helpers.10 In April 2001, the same group, with Ramon this time, went to Bangkok
where respondents popularity was again shown among the overseas Filipinos. 11 In both
instances, respondent promoted their prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid for all
the travelexpenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong
Kong trip and another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip. 12 Her accountant introduced her to
a certain Roy Singun who is into the freight and money remittance business. 13 In August
2001, respondent initiated a trip to Palau, to observe Singuns business thereat to which
petitioner acceded.14 Petitioner paid for the travel expenses and even gaverespondent
US$20,000.00.15 In October 2001, she and respondent had a training at Western Union at
First World Center in Makati City.16
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and since she trusted him very much
as heeven acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business. In December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother,
Zenaida G. Bondoc (Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador
Freight and Remittance International Limited registered on December 27, 2001. 17 A
Memorandum of Articles of Incorporation and a Certificate of Incorporation were
issued.18 They also rented an office space in Tsimshatsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong which they
registered as their office address as a requirement for opening a business in Hong Kong,
thus, a Notification of Situation of Registered Office was also issued. 19 She agreed with
respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided
among them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong
Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and
she would be financing the business. 20
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. 21 When petitioner already had the money,
she handed the same to respondent in May 2002 at her mothers house in Las Pias City,
which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico). 22She also gave
respondent P100,000.00 in cash to begiven to Charlie Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong,
as payment for the heart-shaped earrings she bought from him while she was there.
Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002. However, the proposed business
never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor three days. When she asked
respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was
deposited in a bank.23 However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the
money to pay for his other obligations.24 Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at
all.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell deeply in love with respondent and was
convinced thathe truly loved her and intended to marry her once there would beno more legal
impediment;25 that she helped in financing respondents campaign in the May 2001
elections.26 As she loved respondent so much, she gave him monthly allowances amounting
to hundreds of thousands of pesos because he had no work back then. 27 She filed the
annulment case against her husband on November 21, 2001 and respondent promised her
marriage.28 She claimed that respondent and Ramon lured her with sweet words in going into
the freight and remittance business, which never operated despite the money she had given
respondent.29 She raised the US$100,000.00 by means of selling and pawning her pieces of
diamond jewelry.30
Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent which made her follow all the
advice given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e., to save money for her and respondents
future because after the annulment, they would get married and to give the capital for the
remittance business in cash so as not to jeopardize her annulment case. 31 She did not ask for
a receipt for the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent as it was for the operational
expenses of a business which will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get
married.32She further testified that after the US$100,000.00 was not returned, she still
deposited the amount ofP500,000.00 in respondents UCPB bank account33 and also to
Ramons bank accounts.34 And while respondent was in the United States in August 2003,
she still gave him US$2,000.00as evidenced by a Prudential Telegraphic Transfer
Application35 dated August 27, 2003.
Petitioners mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughters testimony that she was with her
and Ramon when they went to Hong Kong in December 2001 to register the freight and
remittance business.36 She heard Charlie Chau, her daughter's friend, that a part of his office
building will be used for the said remittance business. 37 Enrico Tan, also corroborated her
sister's claim that she handed the money to respondent in his presence. 38
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love
and had an affair.39They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how
popular he was among the Filipino domestic helpers, 40 which led her to suggest a remittance
business. Although hesitant, he has friends with such business. 41He denied that petitioner
gave him US$10,000.00 whenhe went to Hong Kong and Bangkok. 42 In July 2001, after he
came back from the United States, petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon for a
meeting.43 During the meeting, petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but
Ramon told her that they should make a study of it first. 44 He was introduced to Roy Singun,
owner of a money remittance business in Pasay City.45 Upon the advise of Roy, respondent
and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau in August 2001. 46 He denied receiving
US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner who paid for the plane
tickets.47 After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the First World
Center in Makati City.48 It was only in December 2001 that Ramon, petitioner and her mother
went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care of petitioners children
here.49 In May 2002, he and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the
amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount
of P100,000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces
of diamond jewelry she got from him,50 which Chau had duly acknowledged.51 He denied
Enricos testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mothers
house.52 He claimed that no remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no
license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the same. 53 Upon his return to the
Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business as she never gave him such
amount.54 In October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong Kong again
to buy some goods for the latters boutique.55 He admitted that he loved petitioner and her
children very much as there was a time when petitioners finances were short, he gave
her P600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. 56 It is also not
true that he and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips. 57
Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced petitioner to him. 58 He
learned of petitioners plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and even told her that they
should study it first.59 He was introduced to Roy Singun who operates a remittancebusiness in
Pasay and who suggested that their group observehis remittance business in Palau. After
their Palau trip, petitioner decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him
who suggested to use respondents name because of name recall. 60 It was decided thathe
would manage the operation in Manila and respondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong, while petitioner would be in charge of all the business finances. 61 He
admitted that he wentto Hong Kong with petitioner and her mother to register said business
and also to buy goods for petitioners boutique. 62 He said that it was also impossible for Chau
to offer a part of his office building for the remittance business because there was no more
space to accommodate it.63 He and respondent went to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine
the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also
offered to help.64 He then told Chau that the remittance office should be in Central Park,
Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong Kong live there. 65 He concluded that it was
impossible for the business to operate immediately because they had no office, no personnel
and no license permit.66 He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to him about the
US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent,67 and that he even traveled again with petitioner to
Bangkok in October 2002, and in August 2003. 68 He denied Enricos allegation that he saw
him at his mothers house as he only saw Enrico for the first time in court. 69
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision, 70 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime ofEstafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prisyon (sic) correctional (sic)maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximumas maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine
currency. With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence. SO ORDERED.71
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed their respective pleadings,
after which, the case was submitted for decision.
On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of the RTC, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of the RTC of Las
Pias City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused
appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa. 72
Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN
IF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST
RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONER.73
We find no merit in the petition.
To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the
civil liability of the accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x. 75
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person
is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all
the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not
even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to
convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in
venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis
case indicate the weakness of her submissions.76
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc.,77 we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 78
The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of US$100,000.00 is factual.
While we are not a trier of facts, there are instances, however, when we are called upon to reexamine the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after
considering the records of the case, which of the conflicting findings is more in accord with
law and justice.79 Such is the case before us.
In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002,
the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2)
petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried
toHong Kong; (3) petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a
receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and
(4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with
the actuation ofsomeone who had been swindled.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.
Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given to respondent. She
testified that from December 2001 to May 2002, she was raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as the capital for the actual operation of the Phillip Salvador Freight and
Remittance International Limited in Hong Kong, 80 and that she was ableto raise the same in
May 2002.81 She did so by selling82 or pawning83 her pieces of diamond jewelry. However,
there was no documentary evidence showing those transactions within the period mentioned.
Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where she got the money, she then said
that she had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong Kong and Bangkok to shop
for her boutique in Glorietta and Star Mall.84 Such testimony contradicts her claim that she
was still raising the money for 5 months and that she was only able to formally raise the
money in May 2002.
There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by petitioner to
respondent.1wphi1 Petitioner in her testimony, both in the direct and cross examinations,
said that the US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the actual expenses for setting up
the office and the operation of the business in Hong Kong. 85 She claimed that she treated the
freight and remittance business like any of her businesses; 86 that she, respondent, and the
latters brother even agreed to divide whatever profits they would have from the
business;87 and that giving US$100,000.00 to respondent was purely business to her.88 She
also said that she kept records of all her business, such that, if there are no records, there are
no funds entrusted89 . Since petitioner admitted that giving the money to respondent was for
business, there must be some records ofsuch transaction as what she did in her other
businesses.
In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some documents evidencing the
latter's receipt of money for the purpose of business as this was done in her previous
business dealings with respondent. She had asked respondent to execute a real estate
mortgage on his condominium unit90 for the P5 million she loaned him in August 2001. Also,
when petitioner gave respondent an additional loan of P10 million in December 2001, for the
latter to redeem the title to his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to sign an
acknowledgment receipt for the total amount of P15 million he got from her.91 She had done
all these despite her testimony that she trusted respondent from the day they met in
December 2000 until the day he ran away from her in August 2003. 92
Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt from respondent,
because the latter told her not to have traces that she was giving money to him as it might
jeopardize her then ongoing annulment proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would
belie such claim of respondent being cautious of the annulment proceedings. She declared
that when she and her husband separated, respondent stood as a father to her
children.93 Respondent attended school programs of her children, 94 and fetched them from
school whenever the driver was not around. 95 In fact, at the time the annulment case was
already pending, petitioner registered the freight and remittance business under respondents
name and the local branch office of the business would be in petitioner's condominium unit in
Makati.96 Also, when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon to Hong Kong to register the
business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children. She intimated that it was
respondent who was insistent in going to their house.
Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of P500,000.00 to respondent's
account with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July 2003. 97 Also, when respondent
was in New York in August 2003, petitioner sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by
telegraphic transfer.98 Petitioner's act ofdepositing money to respondent's account
contradicted her claim that there should be no traces that she was giving money to
respondent during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's check in US dollars from
the bank orsend the money by bank transfer, but she did not do so on the claim that there
might be traces of the transaction.99However, the alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be
given to respondent because of the freight and remittance business; thus, there is nothing
wrong to have a record of the same, specially since respondent had to account for the valid
expenseshe incurred with the money.100
The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was present when petitioner
gave respondent the US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico testified that when petitioner filed
the instant case in September 2004, another case was also filed by petitioner against
respondent and his brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office in Las Pias where
Enrico had submitted his affidavit. Enrico did not submit an affidavit in this case even when he
allegedly witnessed the giving of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he could
just testify for the other case. However, when the other case was dismissed, it was then that
petitioner told him to be a witness in this case. Enrico should have been considered at the
first opportunity if he indeed had personal knowledge of the alleged giving of money to
respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness only after the other case was dismissed
would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175256
August 23, 2012
LILY LIM, Petitioner,

vs.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LILY LIM, Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific
performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal
case for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate Decisions of the
Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lims (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20, 2005 Resolution2 of the Second
Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie Co filed the
instant motion to dismiss [Lily Lims] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim
violated the rule against forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present.
This Court agrees.3
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
On the other hand, Charlie Cos (Co) Petition for Review 5 assails the April 10, 2007
Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue
in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge. The elements of litis
pendentiaand forum-shopping were not met in this case. 7
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. This case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement
manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities 9 for the account of cement dealers
and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number
of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal
authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless
revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold
the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P 3.15
million or P 63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to
Lim allegedly at the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of P 3.2 million.11
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered
basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the
withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags
covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once
Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim
objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price
fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with
the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before
Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof
reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim,
with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash
money in the amount of P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under
obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with
his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and
benefit the said amount of P 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite demands, the accused failed and
refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount
of P 2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.12
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her
damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to P 2,380,800.00, foregone
profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order 14 acquitting
Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal courts Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article
315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not
established by the prosecutions evidence.
xxxx
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused
is being charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to
dismiss the case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence. 15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the
accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under the present
information for insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the
reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 oclock [sic] in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of
civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the
accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to the private complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented
preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21, 2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal 21 on the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the
CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch
21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the
withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La
Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two
causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
xxxx
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of P 64.00 per
bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15,
1999. Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co P 3.2 Million while Charlie Co
delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder
thereof to withdraw within a six-month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated
therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23
February 1999. The Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement
Center which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal
Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim
acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement
earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by
Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the
Withdrawal Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw
the remaining bags of cement on account of FR Cements unjustified refusal to honor the
Withdrawal Authorities. x x x
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement.
If he cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as
indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to
impose price adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the
Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be
honored. They are liable to make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Cos acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the
cement from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was
made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty
and good faith, all violative of the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporations unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued
also caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporations act of withholding the
37,200 bags of cement despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment
because FR Cement Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by another
or any other means at the expense of another without just or legal ground in violation of
Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borjas false assurances that Lily Lim would be able
to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and
losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of
cement, thus they are deemed to have come into possession of money at the expense of Lily
Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags
of cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay
for their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the
damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages
they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights. 23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed
motions to dismiss the said civil case24 and Lims appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case
or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which
is Cos liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement, 26 and should be
dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Cos motion and dismissed Lims
appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the
CA Second Division held that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims
appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the
payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. 27 Thus, the CA Second Division
dismissed Lims appeal for forum shopping. 28 The CA denied29 Lims motion for
reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an Order 31 dated December 6,
2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action
invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on
an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the
appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate
court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. 33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the civil complaint to the
trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC
that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings
because they do not share the same cause of action. 34
The CA denied35 Cos motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.
Upon Cos motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions. 38
Kou Co Pings arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of
action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Cos violation of her right to receive
37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is, for
Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different
methods of presenting her case a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific
performance and damages should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate
the same cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According
to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the
two cases arising from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going
over the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute
res judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CAG.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
(which dismissed Lims appeal from the trial courts decision in Criminal Case No. 116377). 42
Lily Lims arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they
arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission
does not always make a single cause of action. 44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2)
independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat
provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows her two independent causes of
action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them. 46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her
cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lims
right to be protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200
bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation
because Co knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver
what he promised.47 On the other hand, Lims cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is
based on contract. Co violated Lims rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the subject of
the sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition. 49 In G.R. No. 175256, she prays
for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not
guilty of forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377
to the CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages
during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender 51 (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,-52 and
(2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the
Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort 53). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action.
For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. 54 If
the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." 56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and
may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which
state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia,
or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must
be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains
separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being
deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of
the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases
against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by

[the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however,
based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal
while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be
no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. 59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations
are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present
issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such
that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the
criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the
complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct
(abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale
contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate
of P 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal
authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal
authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then
maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale
contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to
pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P 64.00 per
bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the
withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale
contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is
evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual obligations, given that she has
already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the
contract or pay for the damages that their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such
manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public
policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under
the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from
tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising
from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" 62 from each other. Both cases can proceed
to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED.
The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lims appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals isDIRECTED to RESOLVE the
same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
Charlie Cos Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172060
September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action
for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch
223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against
him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if
the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City
ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon
City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22
August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage
is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on
the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and
trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after
the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. 16 At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court
ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court
declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No.
04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 197788
February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution
dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the
prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City
Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around
3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that
he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and
so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out
to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September
2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of
planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain
shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving
and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court
required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its
Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was
not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by
Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance
requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga
and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In
other words, the accused, being caught inflagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. 8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of
other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation
of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver
to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from
the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule
is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument
with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized
merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the
only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
"almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length
whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop
should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of
time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of
action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most
States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against selfincrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.,
at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and
brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists
expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end
he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to
an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist
feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an
armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond
to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,"
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in
our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive
aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant
to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects
freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v.
Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to
modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither
can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal
arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his
traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner,
the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant
of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may also
be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling
pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the
individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas
he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a
moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk"
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15None of the above-mentioned
instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. 16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution
claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does
not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket. 18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person
for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest"
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales
for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty,"
x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234,
n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.
S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no
formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while
the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and
even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe
need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and
issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No
further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the
offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. 26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February
2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground. SO ORDERED. MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice
G.R. No. 180661
December 11, 2013
GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the
police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.
On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the
accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in
Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in
absentia. 3
The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1
Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol
on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number
107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from
where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1
Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him
was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner.
They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the
house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. 4
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop
a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets
with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of
aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation
and testing.5
A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them
positive for traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6
Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he
and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he
went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them
shoved him and said, "Dyan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone instructed
two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to
the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a
box that the police said had been recovered from his house. 7
On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty
of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one
day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 each and the costs of the
suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught
accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their
possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the
court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of
Antiquera.
The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihans credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and
Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police
officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision 10 on September 21, 2007 affirming
in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied
it.11 The accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence
of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
Ruling of the Court
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the
door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the
officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus
seize the paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they
were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That
the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime
charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of
dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused
was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not
guilty.12
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two
fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after
the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the
house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:
THE COURT:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door,
how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only
open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped
inside it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may
Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can
search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the
interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the
house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside
the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through
its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the
arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering
that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found
in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 18
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21,
2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for
lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1 The Court
further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional
liberty.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200304
January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald
Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs
under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams
and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETYEIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, 5 which was said to be committed in this
manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without
being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1.61
grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24
grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four
point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent
plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof. 6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon
motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal
Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. 8 On arraignment, the appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held on July
27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of
facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo, 11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3)
Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13 Thereafter, the defense presented in court the
testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan, 14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3)
Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to
their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity.
This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if
he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the
information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of
their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buybust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself, PO2
Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo
was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with
alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindys Restaurant
located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet alias Don that night but she
decided to bring the team along for security reasons. 17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place with
the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside the
restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She
asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative.
They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu forP250,000.00.
They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00
p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She
brought five genuine P500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money
to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias
Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take
place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Dons apartment at 765
Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD)
Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing
before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for
P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated
and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address
given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles
they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant
walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around
1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded
to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias
Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof.
Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline
substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was
indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to
signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a
narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from
doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter
had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her
initials "JSF" on the genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest
of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects
rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked. 20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald
Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being
booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellants companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo
explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the same
to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon receiving
the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof
and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to
the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante.
She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp.
Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug
specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the specimen again.
P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination. 21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust
operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown
envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials
"JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read
"DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were
for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she
found out that the same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also
learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets she
also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested,
PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more
plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were
contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the
envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by
PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo
testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them about
the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form
a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindys
Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp.
Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she
convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second
meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay
about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was
furnished with five genuine P500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo
placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the
team left the office. When they arrived at Cindys Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was
waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time,
they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal
would take place in front of alias Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila.
After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then
proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo
conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up
arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to
indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other
members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998.
P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons apartment,
while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the
apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street perpendicular to
Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias
Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that
she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope,
which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag
containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw
this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able
to recover the buy-bust money from alias Dons male companion. Upon frisking alias Don,
PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of suspected drugs. The same were
placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo
marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then
informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort
Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained
possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline
substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress of their
operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the required
documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for Laboratory
Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who
brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug specimens. 25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of the
drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially
examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another office. The
results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No.
D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook RD17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline substance
from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2,"
"A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos examination revealed that the white crystalline
substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 26She also examined the
contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline
substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline
powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
P/Insp. Dequitos findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98. 27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1)
photocopies of the five original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2)
Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory
Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for examination tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order 31 dated September
2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-98 32 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit
I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small
white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical
Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12)
Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 35(Exhibit GG); (14) Request
for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit
II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses counterstatement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the
NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk,
receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to have their
specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and during
regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the
specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there
is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the
courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00
to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo.
From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 oclock that evening, where he
saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant of the narcotics
agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia Caredo,
who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard
a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men entered,
poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to Donalds room
was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp.
Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room,
picking up what they could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in
[Donalds] possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two
(2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-931303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the
policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet containing P2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and
apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace. 40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form 41 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan 42 (Exhibit 2); (3)
Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter 45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A.
Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence 46 taken by Donald
Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave
more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court
held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in
this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely
testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this
case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal
possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the
possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the
illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police, the
trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help
from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox
copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17,
1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director,
Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting
Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was indeed
authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court
as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges against those police officers who
were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same. Further,
the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated
March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could
not be given weight and credence considering that the said persons were not presented in
Court to identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to crossexamine the same, thus, it has no probative value. 47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN

@ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in
Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No.
98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec.
16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND
(P4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor
of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause
the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the
finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate court
ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust
operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any
evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge
the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases
No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period,
as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two
grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police
officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him. 51 He
argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time
he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample
time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the
appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As
the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an
employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring
drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve to
deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants
are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon
their voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction." 53 Be that as it may, the fact of the
matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an
undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of
Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is
likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan 55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest,
for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
(Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest
and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what
is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a
buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the
appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who
sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price
of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the appellant. When subjected
to laboratory examination, the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested
positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardos testimony on the events that transpired
during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward. She was also
consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsels crossexamination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens
seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the
appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was arrested,
P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This
search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also
tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2
Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the formers narration of events. Both police officers
also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the
appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the
incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less satisfactorily prove,
any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely
incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any
misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not
know them at all.60In the absence of evidence of such ill motive, none is presumed to exist. 61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to
criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for
selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for
the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant
could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to
extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were
mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug
specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the testimonies of the signatories
thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellants case. To the mind
of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and
categorical testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed
selling and possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust
operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not
disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the
RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled
too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court
are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments
of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after
public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the
appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of
shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the
imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial courts imposition of
reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the appellant is also in
accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, the
Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira 64 in determining the proper
imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams
147.76 grams to 199 grams
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
prision correccional
prision mayor
reclusion temporal
reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant
amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in
this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional,
as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the
proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering
that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty
only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a
regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be
taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance
with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. 66Such a special aggravating
circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for
the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus,
the same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEOARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 185128

January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben
del Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3
o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud
St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from
the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure
of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the
second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they
will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently,
the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to
laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation
of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information 5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and control four (4) packs of white
crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or prescription from any
competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not
guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3
Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit
Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo,
Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the
electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at
Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the
evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was
able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his
wife that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small
structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was
owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas
Boy Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum
of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31
gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated
and shall be destroyed in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with
this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS

OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF
WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE
NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT
IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR
COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO,
PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY
THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
"POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT
PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN
ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009,
enumerated the following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of
Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence
against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering
that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal
knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to
the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner,
aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and
convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or
representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters
away from his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the
police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa
hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found
the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited
and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search
warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 13 A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. 14 The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to
him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. 18 A review of the records shows
that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized
in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant No. 5709-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to
be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters
away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG
argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government
authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they
asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his
shop, so we searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named
Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo
Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric
shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were
actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by
PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took
place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon
saw that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his
house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that
store and furthermore the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other
persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded
paper which contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small. 22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence
of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in
authority and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of
a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in
each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and
charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any
barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were
acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of
the regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter
has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, 24 unless attended with
arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal 25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A.
6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b)
the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. 26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession
or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control
and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. 28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellants control or possession. 29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. 30 The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor
was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as
to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct
testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that
the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you
proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical
shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side
is a structure rented by a couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence
of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. 35 With
the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and
dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of
those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.371wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No.
27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172035
July 4, 2012
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 1 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel
(petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions 2 of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioners suspension from public office
and (ii) denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials 3 of Koronadal
City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman)4 charging the petitioner, among others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the
engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed
Koronadal City public market (project). 6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his
counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit.7 In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against
the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan.9 The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official
functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official
position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in the
prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and
Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without
causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification. 10 (Emphases and
underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-accused, 11 the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August
21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation,
which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10)
days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked 13 the Sandiganbayan for a
thirty-day extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension
requested, the petitioner asked14 the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file his counteraffidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew
for a twenty-day extension period.15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to
submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution. 16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of
the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals. 17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003,
the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the
petitioners continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit. 18 The petitioner did not question
the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal
cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June
27, 2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect
of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages
was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 20
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution 21 suspending
the petitioner pendente lite
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions Motion is GRANTED. As
prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City
Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His
suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only.22
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.23 The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion,24 prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension
order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and
"manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, 25 rendering the
information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing
Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,26 he claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the
[case] can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended." 27 For the petitioner, the
requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered
an actual hearing to settle the "defect" in the information.
THE OSPS COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense
under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These
elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time
material to the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited
only his co-accused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of
consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation;
and
3. The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted
benefits and advantages to his co-accused. 28
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase "acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality" when the petitioner quoted the "relevant" portions of the
information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the
purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing i.e., basically, to determine the validity of
the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation both by
the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the
Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved
to quash the information, although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived
his right to submit countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.30
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders
invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.
THE COURTS RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of
the assailed resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him,31 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and
for the court to pronounce judgment."33
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of
the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends
on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase
"acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly
reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was
actually omitted in the information35 when, in his reaction to the OSPs comment, what the
petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrases position, in relation with the
other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being
qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of
the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an
information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. 36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,37 the suspension
requires a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information" 38 filed against him,
"taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an
elective public official even before his conviction." 39 The accused public officials right to
challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes
the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an
information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that
(c) upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper
notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should
not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.
Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is
that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in
the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of
the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised
Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of
the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided
in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan
before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano
considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion,
seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution,
as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of
the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the
case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.1wphi1That hearing is
similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him,43 Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.44 With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual
hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecutions motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to
actually set the prosecutions motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan
v. People,46 where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of
the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous
pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to
due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by
the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused
public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against
the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted. 47 It is well settled that "to be heard" does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the
Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him,
and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. 49 Given this
opportunity, we find that the petitioners continued demand for the conduct of an actual presuspension hearing based on the same alleged "defect in the information," 50 which we have
found wanting has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioners position relates to the nature of Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in
favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the State. 51 The
suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension. 52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive
measure53 that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue
a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in
no case exceed ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of
the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the
defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual
hearing. An opportunity to be heard on ones defenses, however unmeritorious it may be,
against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process
right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that a public office is a public trust. 56 In light of the constitutional principle
underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid
information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing
in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and
speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 199877
August 13, 2012

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision 2 dated October 1, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with
the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified
person who is still at-large, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to P 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Laras plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren
Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
(San Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the
amount of P 230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries
of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista);
(d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at
around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was
seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the
bag in Bautistas direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up
and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance
to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he
went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by
one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when
barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought
to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay
Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel,
Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police
station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastians money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police
station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police
officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police
station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and
subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig
City Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the
corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other
police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police
officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty
shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he
was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident. 7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San
Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while
his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the
morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening,
while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he
was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to
go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol
car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in
another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station and not the
barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h)
when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police
challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the
police officers told them to come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up
holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na
tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be
subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes.
She testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working
on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. 9 Lara also presented his
sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the whole day of May
31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision, 11 the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00
as civil indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecutions witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the
person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31,
2001 at around 10:30 oclock in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave.,
Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on
the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused
must show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for
him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime" (People
versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance between the place of
the incident and the residence of the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of
May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same
barangay. The positive identification of the accused which were categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259). 13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that
he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest
rendered void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not
assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses
for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up
is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached. Third, the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely
presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him.
The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one
he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot
Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his
conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the
testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper motives
in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve.
While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the
existence of bias or impair their credibility.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may
not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its
belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been
raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is
deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside
conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellants avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a
plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person,
accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from questioning the
validity of his arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash
the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless
arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the
conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to
counsel was violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel
during a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.
Appellants assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in
a police line-up and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our
jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police
line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to
this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof
that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from
him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellants hollow cry that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during the police line-up, the accusatory
process had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the
police line-up, it does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on
his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions failure to present a witness who
actually saw him commit the crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an
eyewitness to prove that he shot the victim and took the money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellants assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot
Bautista, the victim. Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words
spoken by this person?
A There was, sir.
Q What did he say?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag
so I immediately threw away the bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the
vehicle, what did that person do?
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also
saw somebody shoot a gun?
Q Who was firing the gun?
A The one who held-up us, sir.
Q By how, do you know his name?
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the person
you saw holding you up at that time is in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom
wearing yellow t-shirt and black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara
(sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with
it, what did the accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you
stepped down from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?
A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to call
your office by phone, that is correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this
gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that is
correct?
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista
and shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er
followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was
holding the gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of
appellant is beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding
from him to produce the bag containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the
backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty
shells.16 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused,
where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies
are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the
place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed
to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the
perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stones throw
(about three minutes away) from the crime scene.17(Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty
imposed was reclusion perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their
supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt the
allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Laras conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following
issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police lineup is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Laras supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal
for the purpose of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Laras alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime
charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process
such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders
to the police or to the court.19 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea
and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that
may have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set
aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without
error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a
police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the
police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulongs identification of
Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment
custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting
point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v.
Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more
recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only
during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a
police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives
a statement in the course of the line-up. 23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is
based on circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only
direct and not circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the
only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the
absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute
an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. 24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial
evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony
would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the
community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicate Laras guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and
Bautista were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at
the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong
who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the bag
containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who
was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and
ran towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his
gun at Bautistas direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautistas
blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain
must itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the
physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be
shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the homicide was
perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to
implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary
to realize such intent.
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs positive narration that it was Lara
who pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over
to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by
Sumulongs testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who was
running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against
the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally
accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by
improper or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious
charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy
of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with the
crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former. 28
IV
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Laras alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a
weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to
disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to
its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi.
Assuming as true Laras claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench
on the day of the incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving
and returning given that the distance between his house and the place where the subject
incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply
put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 151258

February 1, 2012
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO
LIM, Jr., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. 1 Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a
special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. 2 The intent of the
law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority,
fraternity, organization, or association.3 Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites
by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita. 4
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.5 Within a
year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick
Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe
Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval
Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.6
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental
principle in our criminal justice system "[N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so
by law."7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of
the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside
emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the
elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People),
and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) 8 and the trial court,9 are as
follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III,
Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites
included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged
the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with
the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the
"Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the
fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit
on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to
the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours,
the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members 10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by
the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11 On
the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340
was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first. 12
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 A few weeks after the
trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.14
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) 15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of
the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away,
so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted,
as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were
also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P 50,000 and to pay the additional amount
of P 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. 16 Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. 17 On 25 October
2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 18 reversed the trial courts Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial. 19
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated
10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. 20
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice
of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13
March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when
the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that
he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi
that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused." 22
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date
since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of
the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original
pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted,
like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were
not tainted by evil motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the
official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation
so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling." 24 Further, petitioner echoes the argument of
the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have
resulted in Lennys death."25 The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary,
Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim." 26
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did
not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss
of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the "psychological initiation."
He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted
knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up." 27
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to
switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of
compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally
liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.29 The said article provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability of all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 89060 and 90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and
Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other
accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the
trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29
November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert
their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence
were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and
adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal
penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, 31 while the term
"pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, 32 including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). 33 However, civil
liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused
and is recoverable through a separate civil action. 34
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of
October 1993.35 The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and
that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at
all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present
evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence." 36
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his
client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already
testified.37 Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties
"should be ready at all times down the line," the trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates.
The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September
1993.38 Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date.
To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had
to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on
the dates originally assigned to his clients. 39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the
same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the threeday-notice rule under the Rules of Court. 40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure
of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right. 41
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the
trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25
August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to
present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to
him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that
he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court.
Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional
right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, 43 as well as the right to be
present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings. 44
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was
cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayans Second
Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22
June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very
same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo
and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his
right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterdays and todays
scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present
for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxx
xxx
xxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed
as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to
present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the
court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence
without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty
is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x
x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of
the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his preassigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court. 47 In People v. Bodoso,
we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a
result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the
judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. 48
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at
bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the
law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the
hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of
the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the
official activity of the fraternity."49He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the extension
and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned." 50
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or
justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding
the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice
on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long
overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we
shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should
not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the
trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca,
Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for
the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may
require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals." 51
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. 53 The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. 54 In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. 56 Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant. 57
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. 58 As a consequence, an appeal
or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy.59 As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof. 61 Rather,
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.62
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy
trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
xxx
xxx
xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
xxx
xxx
xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete
records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not
stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5,
2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was
made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January
29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which
the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon
x x x.63(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion,
and De Vera.64 On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial trial
of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment. 66
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of
the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to
an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of cases.67 Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of
cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by
the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for
a decade already.68 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that
when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense. 69 This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in
idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United
States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, 72 viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
provides as follows:73
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law
under Rule 45 of the same Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court;
(c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or
the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants
express consent.75
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following
an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.
And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the
hope of securing a greater penalty." 76 We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal." 77
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; 78 (2) where there is a finding of
mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. 80
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 81 Here, the party asking for the
review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the
court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to
the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x." 85 Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 86 The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing. 87
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. 88 In People v. Maquiling, we held
that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application
for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are
constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. 91 We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.92 The present case is one of those instances of
grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the
CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of
the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the
death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a
prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty
depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise
be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged
[People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is
absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De
los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is
constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and
Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature. 93 (Emphasis supplied and citations
included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa 94 in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the
death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or medical attendance required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of
that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not even serious.98 Since
Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death,
the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment
undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa." 99It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
"multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites. 100 Considering that the CA
found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature," 101 it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is
a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person
is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the
legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction
of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that
the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs. 102
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From
proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all
those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries
on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give
due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo
found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted. 104
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been
no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were
liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight
physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously,
or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man
driven by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in
order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law,
we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping
intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. 105 The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for
wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 107 The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with
reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. 108 They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame
of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. 111 Thus, it is not enough to do
what the law prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
be committed by means of dolo or "malice."113
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with
power to choose between two things.115The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability
to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit
and an illicit act.116 The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain
act.117
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. 118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and
the resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act. 120 While motive is the "moving
power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a
particular means to produce the result.121 On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter
alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. 122 With these
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious
intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission
be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. 124 As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.125
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article
8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it" is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The
phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause
injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or
criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being
simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. 126 Here, a person
performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. 127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by
means of culpa.128
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. 129 Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo 130 immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.131 Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.132 Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural
cause, or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide. 134
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout
history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from
military groups to indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back
to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked
as servants for upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,138 where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to
demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle. 139 Modern
fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or
"ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the
organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing. 141
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join
an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular
chapter.142 The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long. 143 During the "program,"
neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to
learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified
grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and
respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni
members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts
during the entire neophyte stage.145
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte,"
"initiate," "applicant" or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person
is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial,
silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities. 147 It encompasses different forms of conduct
that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.148 These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.149
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation). 150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church. 151 The Katipunans ideology
was brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual. 152 It is said that
initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked
a series of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. 153 They
were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or
"[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow
of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." 155 As a final step
in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the
his own blood.156
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat
or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves. 157 In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy
during his second year at West Point.158
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.159 The ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick." 160 It
required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected
mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb. 161 Members of
Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en
route to the barrel.162
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto
the neophyte paratroopers chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain
as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims. 164
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program. 165 The fraternity members
subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at
the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to
the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their
hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in
which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the
ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of
physical abuse.167
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama. 168 The hazing
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3)
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans,
and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the
fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of
hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit
as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs. 169
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity. 170 He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and
torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment. 171
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites. 172 Kenner and the other initiates
went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for
more than 200 times.173
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174 The
pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned
on his face and buttocks.175 In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks. 176 During the last two days
of the hazing, the rituals intensified. 177 The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during
the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other candidates passed out. 179
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth. 180 Some
organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process
enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include leadership
opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and
common cause.182
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the
military.183 The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that
Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not. 184 It was not until 1901 that
Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains
an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."185
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing. 186 As of 2008,
all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing. 187 Most anti-hazing
laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for
even the most severe situations.188 Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as
a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs. 189
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three
years.191 Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.192
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon. 193 As an
element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death
falls under the category of "serious bodily injury." 194 A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.195 Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
becomes a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.197
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of
not more than two years or not less than 180 days. 199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.200 A person who has been
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed
five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a
felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor. 202 In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another. 203 A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years,
or both.204
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no
hazing statute.205This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,
wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no
anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994. 206
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not
there is a contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for
intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception
of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this
finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that
the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had
apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father.207 As to Villareal, the court said
that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have
had a hand in the death of Villareals brother.208 The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the
death of Villa, appellants Dizon andVillareal must and should face the consequence of their
acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide. 209 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of
witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to
expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their
batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van
and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of
Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then
the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the
van, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion
Patay ka" and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices,
sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what
were the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking
of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was
there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging
others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some
of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan,
kayang-kaya pa niyan."
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could
not really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol
Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say
that and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn
sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would
jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this
guy, his father stole the parking space of my father," sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain
on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family
have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he
said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he
kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole
the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when
that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who
heard from time to time, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny
Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and
he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made byDizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this
Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his
family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it
was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued
inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was
on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking
beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw
yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what
to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during
the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be
mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms
like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your
body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat,
terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his
brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you
did not believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this
is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those
things was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered
by one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered
by another master on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
Villareal were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is
no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words
uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the
fraternity members during their initiation rites." 214
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal.
Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for
finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the
intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as
reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez;
Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was
"Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung
pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs
while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony
clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based
solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony
of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked,
ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka,
Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo,
patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect. 215 While beating the neophytes,
Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed
Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor
General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.216
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories,
so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were
untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during
the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke
as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."
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So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing
the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or
recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization
or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to
jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made
to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological
tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.217 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with
each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of
Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it
was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up." 218 Even the trial court did not give
weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the
accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x." 219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent.220 Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as
it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa. 221
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since
all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and
death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code,222the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus.
As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury
arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is
no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries
per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. 223
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.
In Bagajo v. People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability
for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal
intent the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by illwill, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that "as
a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil."
In People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" plunged the
head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest
with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective
acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we
reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain
on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v.
Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external
acts of the accused.227 What persons do is the best index of their intention. 228 We have also
ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which
the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.229 The Court shall
thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of
the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On
their first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run,"
"Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies Privilege Round." The beatings were
predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation
rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the
neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who
were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates. 230 It was their
regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their
legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give
them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. 231 A few days before the "rites," he asked
both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that Lenny
would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days. 233 The CA found as
follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to
the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that
before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were
made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they
wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that
"after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes. 234 (Emphasis
supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present
in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of
inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying
the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that
was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional
"rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the
initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were
performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict
injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The
designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific
purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites,
further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went
through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was
specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized
that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.235 The totality of the circumstances
must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may
also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 AntiHazing Law is enlightening:
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of
the crime of hazing?
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
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Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are
already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing,
but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because
these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or
group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the
intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these
specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one
files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing
is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts
of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need
to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay
pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin
natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
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Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the
acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the
accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation
where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no
one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact
of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or
the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise,
the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say,
"We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do
not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
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Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of
sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished.
However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by
the phrase "without consent" for purposes of this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is
only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of
concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it
can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical
hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity
is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a
fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the
victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was
consent on the part of the victim.
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Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman
from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores,
traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when
they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They
can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the
mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even
be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the
consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with
the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense
of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not
going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.237
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala inse or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is
the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We
will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President. 238(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of
mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of
mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the
act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that
Lennys parents would not have consented239 to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation
rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior
to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the
trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background
of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. 241 In this
case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. 243 Here, the threatened
harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued?
If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results
of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. 246
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved.247 If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another
person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is
bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the
danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort." 250The duty of the person to employ more or less
degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. 251
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.252 The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart
to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood. 253 In the
present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. 254 The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of
the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins,
venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the
formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas were wide, thick,
and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the
victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. 257Repeated blows to those areas
caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so
markedly diminished as to produce death. 258 The officer also found that the brain, liver,
kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the
thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the
thighs and forearms.259 It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would
indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease. 260
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes
of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different
objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs
or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were made to play rough basketball.264 Witness
Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine." 265 The NBI medico-legal
officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries
suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased
Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair
for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part. 267
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.268
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims
death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all
those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in
the end, as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities the
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation.
We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation
rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment
of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase
the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing
and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and
to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations. 270 Another
initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because
he felt he did not have a choice.271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the
Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they
left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives
were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been
in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the
crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). 272 Since there was no
law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to
existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical
injuries upon Lenny Villa.273As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the
Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from
slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with
respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P 50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and P 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P 30,000 as indemnity to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1wphi1
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim. 274 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, 275 we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the
amount of P 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by
tangible documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that
actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor
General does not interpose any claim for actual damages. 277
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victims death.278This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount
of P 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and set
aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of P 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing
Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 185230
June 1, 2011
JOSEPH C. CEREZO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE
AFULUGENCIA,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the
July 11, 2008 Decision1 and the November 4, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which reversed and set aside the October 24, 2006 3 and the
February 26, 20074 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.
The RTC Orders revived Criminal Case No. Q-03-115490, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia," after the same
was dismissed in an earlier Order.
The Facts
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against
respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well
as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).5
Finding probable cause to indict respondents,6 the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC)
filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the RTC. 7
Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate
Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC.8
In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information. 9 Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening
period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a
"not guilty" plea.10
In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed
in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.:
Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with
the Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this
function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that
there is reasonable ground to do so. x x x.
More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutors discretion to determine
probable cause or the propriety of pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet
filed in Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has been filed in Court
already, the Public Prosecutor can still interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In
the case of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it has been settled
in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in court,
nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case, even if
without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only
after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss or continue with the
prosecution of the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can
dismiss the case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the
same. As in this case, the Court finds merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.11
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November
20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the
subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). 12 The RTC
deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. 13
On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting
aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier
Information for libel.14
On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for
reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, thus:
Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City
Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. In the same
manner as discussed in arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March 2004, the Court gives
more leeway to the Public Prosecutor in determining whether it has to continue or stop
prosecuting a case. While the City Prosecutor has previously decided not to pursue further
the case, the Secretary of Justice, however, through its resolution on the Petition for Review
did not agree with him.
The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to
the picture. The order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet
final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court[,] therefore, can
still set aside its order. Moreover, there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one.
The case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the
Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the Order dated 17 March
2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
Let the arraignment of accused Oscar Mapalo and pre-trial [of] the other accused be set on
06 December 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.15
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTCs second
assailed Order dated February 26, 2007.16
Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated their
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of the case. The CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders, ruling that all the
elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and
substance filed before a court of competent jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded,
and that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents; hence,
the same could not be revived or refiled without transgressing respondents right against
double jeopardy.
The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of the Petition for
Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223 mandates that no appeal shall be
entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during
the pendency of the appeal, the same shall be dismissed. 17
Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision was denied.18
The Issues
Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was Double Jeopardy,
specifically on the alleged existence of the requisites to constitute Double Jeopardy;
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that there was NO refiling
of the case nor the filing of a new one in arriving [at] its conclusion that Double
Jeopardy sets in to the picture;
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was 1.) a valid
termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated 17 March
2004, and allegedly 2.) without the express consent of the respondents. 19
The assigned errors will be subsumed into this issue:
Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of
double jeopardy.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests
on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.20 It is the courts bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion.21 While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of
the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal
case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a
prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and
recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and
judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the
prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict
respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case.
The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the
DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the
following portion thereof:
As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it
depending on the outcome of the Petition for Review. Considering the findings of the
Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives
favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. 22
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and
violated the complainants right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever.23
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the
merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.1awphil
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the
following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.24
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was
committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there
a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires
the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval
of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the assailed July 11, 2008
Decision and the November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
99088, and the October 24, 2006 and the February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, are hereby ANNULLED andSET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Quezon City RTC, Branch 92, for evaluation on whether probable
cause exists to hold respondents for trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 149588
September 29, 2009
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition captioned as "Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary
Injunction," petitioners assail, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the trial courts decision
convicting them of "other form of swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedent facts and proceedings that led to the filing of the instant petition are
pertinently narrated as follows:
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of "other forms of swindling" in the Information, 1 docketed
as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1978, in the municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No.
4869, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all
liens and encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned
property for the sum of P12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned amount of P12,895.00.
Contrary to law.2
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 3 on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of P18,085.00 each.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision 4 in CA-G.R. CR No.
18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its December 22, 1999 Resolution, 5 the
appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court, on
February 11, 2000, their petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 141208. 6 The Court,
however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material
dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on June 28,
2000,7 the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, 8 the
police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month
jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he
was nowhere to be found.9
On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest,
raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged.10
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on
September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate
courts decisions.
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001
Resolution,11 but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001
Resolution.12
After a thorough evaluation of petitioners arguments vis--vis the applicable law and
jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition.
In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot
be availed of in criminal cases, thus
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
judgment to the following:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.a1f
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in
a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such
recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18,
Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of
Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal
cases. As we explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing
for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed x x x. 14
Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a criminal
case. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or
in the rules.
In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which rendered the assailed
decision had jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 15 In
this case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129,16 approved on August 14, 1981, which pertinently provides:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
xxxx
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
Article 316(2) of the RPC, the provision which penalizes the crime charged in the information,
provides that
Article 316. Other forms of swindling.The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance be not recorded.
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which has a duration of 1 month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than
the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value. Here, as alleged
in the information, the value of the damage caused, or the imposable fine, is P12,895.00.
Clearly, from a reading of the information, the jurisdiction over the criminal case was with the
RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the information, its
jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 184760
April 23, 2010

vs.
PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October 2005 Decision 2 promulgated
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93,
finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.3
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accused-appellant Paterno
Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions thereof reading.
Criminal Case No. 6992
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession, direct custody and control a total of 2.04 grams of white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which gave positive
result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 4
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
sell, deliver and give away to another 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance contained in
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 5
The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different Information,
which case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused of possessing
illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the
Information containing the following averments:
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
have in his possession, direct custody and control of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance
contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the
test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered NOT GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P. Pineda, who
was a member of the buy-bust team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September 2003, upon a
series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo was
peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of PO3 Pineda embarked on a
buy-bust operation against said drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3 Pineda
prepared two (2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust money. At around
10:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1 Arellano and
PO3 Tougan, proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly met with their confidential
informant. According to the confidential informant, he had not seen Lorenzo and raised the
possibility that he was not in the area at the time. Assessing the situation, the police officers
instructed the confidential informant to continue with his surveillance of the area and to inform
them immediately if he comes across Lorenzo.
At around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003, while PO1 Pineda and his
companions were waiting at Gen. Luna Street, the confidential informant reported that
Lorenzo was already at the Daangbakal, Dulongbayan I area and was selling prohibited
drugs. Riding an unmarked vehicle, the team proceeded to where Lorenzo was. On their
arrival, Lorenzo was talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and Daangbakal. PO3
Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid in a place where he was not visible to Lorenzo.
PO3 Pineda stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then hiding inside a tricycle near
Lorenzo. While this was happening, the confidential informant approached Lorenzo for the
transaction. Lorenzo and the confidential informant were approximately four (4) meters away
from PO3 Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda knew who Lorenzo was and considering the place
was illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The confidential informant and Lorenzo
were talking for about one minute, after which the informant gave the marked money to
Lorenzo. After taking the marked money, Lorenzo handed the shabu to the informant. PO3
Pineda and SPO1 Arellano alighted from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and
introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested Lorenzo.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was able to retrieve the
marked money and 2 other sachets of shabu from him. Seeing what had happened to
Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a certain Estanislao, attempted
to escape the police officers and ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of
his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police station where
the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20
grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D1741-03E showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu.6
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and
Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the facts.
Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to Dulongbayan sometime between 12:00
oclock in the evening and 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003. Estanislao, who
was also with him at the time, was riding in his motor cross style bike and was supposed to
buy food at said place after playing tong-its.
While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos Angeles Street, the chain on
Estanislaos bike went loose. During the time Estanislao was repairing his bike, PO3 Tougan,
PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were then on board an owner type jeepney, arrived
and arrested Lorenzo and Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were to be
brought to the Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested, claiming not having done
anything wrong but the police officers continued with the arrest. It was later that they were
informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal possession
and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, first paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal
Case No. 6993) or illegal selling of 0.20 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Section 11, second paragraph, No.3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Criminal Case No. 6992) or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as
maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation of Section 11, second
paragraph, sub paragraph 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GUILTY for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from detention at the San
Mateo Jail unless detained for some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered forfeited in favor
of the government and the Officer-In-Charge of the Court is hereby ordered to safely deliver
or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper disposition.7
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other
evidence presented during trial, the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecutions version
that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a
buy-bust operation. The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence in accordance
with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to police
officers. According to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the seller, object and consideration,
including the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of the buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, questioning
the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence
against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the
RTC, disposing to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby dismissed and the assailed October 5,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case
Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended
by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15,
2004. This judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of Appeal, 8 adopting the same
arguments raised before the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165; AND
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional
principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense.
In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the presumption of
innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the
presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to be determined.
Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual
findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully
reviewed and evaluated the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the appellate
courts decision convicting accused-appellant.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt. The defense
anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to adopt the required procedure under
Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. According to the defense, this alleged failure to
follow proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises
doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court
were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also faults the police operatives
for not having coordinated with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution discharged its
burden of proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
We rule in the negative. The prosecutions case fails for failure to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug with moral certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must
be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 9 Material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had
actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. 10 The
term corpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug
must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession
or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place
is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same
degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation is
susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to be extra vigilant in trying
drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific procedures relating to the seizure and
custody of drugs have been laid down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecutions burden to adduce evidence that these
procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of the offense.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
which implements said provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with
the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
In People v. Sanchez,11 we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.
Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no photographing of the drugs took
place. Non-compliance by the police operatives with the foregoing requirements in the instant
case is fatal to the prosecutions case. Although the prosecution recognized its failure to
coordinate with the PDEA because of the urgency of the situation, it ignored the issue of
specifically identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation. There is absolutely
nothing in the records to show that the inventory and photography requirements, or their
credible substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary value, were ever followed.
In People v. Lim,12 this Court held:
xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or
paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure and confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether
what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered
from the appellants. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the PAOC-TF agents.
In Bondad, Jr. v. People,13 where the prosecution did not inventory and photograph the
confiscated evidence, this Court acquitted therein accused reasoning that failure to comply
with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized.
In People v. Ruiz,14 this Court acquitted accused due to the failure of the prosecution to
comply with the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR as no physical inventory
was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances
required.
In People v. Orteza,15 the Court explained the implications of the failure to comply with
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe
the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court
thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.
To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 is coupled with the
proviso that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.
Thus, in Malillin v. People,16 the Court explained that the "chain of custody" requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling,
storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the
time it is offered in evidence.17 Failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from accused is fatal to the prosecutions
case. There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined
and established to be the prohibited drug. 18
PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from
accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said informant. He further testified that he
marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu that were
allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking
was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had
personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters
away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was
impossible for him to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and the poseurbuyer.
The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp
Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. We therefore find that this failure to
establish the evidences chain of custody is damaging to the prosecutions case. 19
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accusedappellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165,
since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02184, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant PATERNO
LORENZO y CASAS is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he
is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the
Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.
SO ORDERED.JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice
G.R. No. 185209
June 28, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.
REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG" BARGO, Accused.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with
his co-accused in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury could not be sustained
because there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his escape that
compelled him to take part in the commission of the offense charged.
Factual Antecedents
On July 19, 1995, an Information1 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 60, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima
(Villatima), and alias "Dedong" Bargo (Bargo) with the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information contained the following
accusatory allegations:
That on or about 9 oclock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident
premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and
take away the following:
1) sidecar of the tricycle which costs P16,000.00;
2) motorcycle described as Kawasaki HDX colored black with Engine No. G7E-088086
and Chassis No. HDX-849776 which is worth P103,536.00;
3) wallet with cash money of P1,250.00;
4) wrist watch and ring worth P3,800.00.
and inflicting upon the person of Juanito Berallo the following injuries, to wit:
1. Gaping incised wound, shallow at the extremeties and deeper at the middle portion,
7 cms. long, from right lateral aspect of the neck going slightly downward and to the
left of anterior neck.
2. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 14 cm. deep, directed slightly upward and to the right,
located on the upper chest below wound # 1.
3. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 12 cm. deep, directed to the right, located at the left
chest, level of 3rd rib.
4. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long 20 cm. deep, directed slightly downward and to the left,
located at the middle of the chest, level of 5th rib.
5. Incised wound 1 cm long, right cheek.

6. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 6 cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial
aspect of the upper back, right.
7. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 10 cm. deep, located at the upper outer quadrant of
the back, right.
8. Incised wound, 2 cm. long, located at the middle of the upper quadrant of back,
right.
9. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 4 cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial
aspect of upper inner quadrant of back, left.
10. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 5 cm deep, directed downward, located at the middle
of upper quadrant of back, left.
11. Incised wound, 2 cm long, located 2 cm to the left of wound # 10.
12. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 7 cm. deep, directed downward located at the
middle of lower back, left.
13. Incised wound, 6 cm. long, distal third left forearm.
14. Incised wound, 3 cm. long palmar surface left hand.
15. Incised wound, 5 cm. long palmar surface left hand, 2 cm. below wound # 13.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple Stabbed wounds,
which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victim in the amount, to wit:
P 50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.
P 150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such amount to be
fixed by the court.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date. Appellant
entered a plea of "not guilty" when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference,
trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as
follows:
On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle
driver, was having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies
Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the
bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his
companions to Hacienda Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called
Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.
Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino
and Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle
while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and
asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However,
Berallo replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and
take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallos
tricycle.
On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide
incident. Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City,
where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters away from the
highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle
sidecar in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of
Berallo. She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage
due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused the
immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by
more than one person.
The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects.
After having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took
Berallos tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle
to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of
Villatimas aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).
Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together
with the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her
house in Kabankalan.
Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the
one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value
of the personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00
for the purchase of the burial lot.
The Version of the Defense
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around
7 oclock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to
the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two passengers passed by and
its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and told the
driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up
to Segundo Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching
Bangga Doldol, however, the passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the
passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed.
Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and dragged him towards the
sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver since he remained in the
tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two passengers.
Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle.
They then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the
premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two passengers even
accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the
incident to the police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his house and
asked where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and
insisted that he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two passengers
whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime committed.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision 2 finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused RENE BARON Y
TANGAROCAN (detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information and there being the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of treachery hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of indemnity for the death of the victim, Juanito Berallo and the amount of P5,050.00 for
the cash and the value of the wrist watch and ring of the victim plus the amount of P2,400.00
for the purchase of the burial lot by way of reparation and in addition the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The sidecar and
the motorcycle are hereby ordered returned to the heirs of the victim.
The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for
service of his sentence.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this
case together with the Decision of this Court to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
The case against Rey Villatima and alias "Dedong" Bargo [both of whom are] at-large is
hereby ordered archived and [to] be immediately revived upon their arrest.
Cost against accused Rene Baron.
SO ORDERED.3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as
charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force
and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded
by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances were lacking. The appellate
court found that the alleged threat, if at all, was not real or imminent. Appellant had every
opportunity to escape but did not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the
tricycle as if he was one of the malefactors. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision 4 reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 12, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No.
1675-C finding accused-appellant Rene Baron y Tangarocan guilty of robbery with homicide
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua without
parole conformably with R.A. 9346 and reducing the award of moral damages
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Still aggrieved, the appellant comes to us for a final review of his case. In his brief, he assigns
the following correlated errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTABLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF
AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 5
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent
to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective
of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. 6
In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
real intention of the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and
his companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to
their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun point, tied the hands of
the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. The
victim was divested of his wallet containing P1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from
the sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached the sidecar and
dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the
accused. They proceeded to BarangayOringao, Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the
house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad.
Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated
in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence,
which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 7 Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8 A judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.9
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery
with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to them and no one else
as the culprits. We thus agree with the observation of the trial court that:
A careful examination of the records of this case reveals, [that] no eye witness was presented
by the prosecution pointing to the three accused to be actually responsible in the perpetration
of the crime charged except the extra-judicial narration of the accused Rene Baron but who
also tried to exculpate himself from the commission of the crime by denying his [complicity] in
the crime.
Despite this finding however, this Court found from the records of this case, numerous and
cumulative material circumstantial evidence from which one can derive a logical and
necessary inference clearly showing the three accused to be responsible for the crime
charged and these are the following; to wit:
1. The fact that at about 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 1995 witness Ernesto Joquino,
Jr. while in front of Julies Bakeshop saw the victim Juanito Berallo [park] the latters
tricycle in front of the bakeshop when accused Rene Baron hired the tricycle of the
victim in going to Hda. Caridad and whose companions were Rey Villatima and
"Dedong" Bargo (TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10). Thus, the excerpts of the
Transcript of the Stenographic Notes has this to reveal in vivid fashion, to wit:
"Q. Mr. Joquino, on June 28, 1995 at about 8:30 in the evening where were
you?
A. I was in front of Julies Bakeshop.
Q. Where is this Julies Bakeshop located x x x?
A. At Magsaysay Street, Cadiz City.
Q. What were you doing at Julies Bakeshop at that particular date and time?
A. I was x x x having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros.
Q. While you were x x x in front of Julies Bakeshop, was there anything that
transpired?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Can you tell us what was that?
A. I saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle in front of Julies Bakeshop.
Q. When you saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle x x x in front of Julies
Bakeshop, what transpired after that?
A. Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked him if he can conduct
Rene Baron to Hda. Caridad.
Q. By the way, do you know Rene Baron before June 28, 1995?
A. Yes, maam, I know him because we are all drivers of the tricycle.
Q. What about this Juanito Berallo, do you know him before June 28, 1995?
A. Yes maam.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. Because he ran as councilor in Cadiz City.
Q. So going back to the incident where you said Rene Baron approached
Juanito Berallo and asked Berallo if the latter would conduct him to Hda.
Caridad, what was the answer of Juanito Berallo to Rene Baron?
A. Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how much he will pay [to] him and then
Rene Baron said that he will pay Juanito Berallo the amount of P30.00 and then
again Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how many x x x will ride on the tricycle
and Rene Baron said that there were three of them.
Q. By the way, how far were you from where Juanito Berallo and Rene Baron
were talking?
A. From here up there. (Witness pointed to a distance of about four (4) meters.)
Q. After Juanito Berallo agreed with Rene Baron and his companions to conduct
them to Hda. Caridad, what did Rene Baron do if there was any?
A. Rene Baron called his companions who were just across the street.
Q. Were you able to recognize x x x the two companions whom Rene Baron
called from across the street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And who were they if you know?
A. Rey Villatima and Dedong Bargo."
(TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10)
2. The fact the Rey Villatima was wearing a fatigue jacket when the latter boarded the
tricycle of the victim and proceeded to Hda. Caridad (ibid, p. 12) and it was the same
fatigue jacket recovered by the police from the sidecar of the tricycle at the scene of
the crime and this was the last time that the victim was seen alive;
3. The fact that witness Pacita Caratao corroborated the testimony of Ernesto Joquino,
Jr. and Berallo sitting on the latters tricycle parked near Julies Bakeshop and saw
Rene Baron sitting behind Juanito Berallo and the witness even asked the former if he
will be going to Lag-asan to which the victim Juanito Berallo refused because he has
some passengers to be conducted (TSN-Tan, March 13, 1997, pp. 3-4) and has
referred to the accused Rene Baron and his two companions (TSN-Tan, March 13,
1997, pp. 4-5) as his passengers;
4. The fact that the during the police investigation witness SPO2 Jude de la Rama
found the dead body of the victim inside the sugarcane plantation in Hda. Sta. Ana and
found many traces of footsteps inside the sugarcane fields (TSN-Tan, July 8, 1997, p.
4) indicating that more than one person conspired and co-operated with each other in
killing the victim;
5. The fact that the witness De la Rama found the sidecar of the tricycle beside the
Martisan Bridge which is just beside the scene of the incident and also beside the
sidecar of the tricycle they found a fatigue jacket and has recovered inside its pocket a
used soap (ibid, p. 5);
6. The fact that when the police officers invited Rene Baron for interview, Rene Baron
pointed to his co-accused, Rey Villatima as the one who was wearing the fatigue jacket
the police officers recovered as well as had named his (Baron) other companion as
alias "Dedong" Bargo (ibid, p. 7);
7. The fact that after the three accused had detached the motorcycle from its sidecar,
Rey Villatima was pointed to by the accused Rene Baron as the one who drove it while
he (Rene Baron) and "Dedong" Bargo rode behind and all of them immediately
proceeded to the house of the aunt of Rey Villatima in Brgy. Oringao, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental (ibid);
8. The fact that it was accused Rene Baron who had guided the police investigators to
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, a city in the southern portion of Negros
Occidental which is about 150 kilometers away from Cadiz City in the north, the scene
of the crime; and with the cooperation of the Chief of Police of the former place
proceeded to the house of a certain Natividad Camparicio, the aunt of accused Rey
Villatima (ibid, pp. 7-8);
9. The fact that Natividad Camparicio affirmed that the stolen motorcycle was brought
to her house at around 1:15 in the morning of July 1, 1995 by her nephew, Rey
Villatima together with the latters companions and pinpointed to accused Rene Baron
as one of them (ibid, p. 9);
10. The fact that prosecution witness, Police Insp. Eduardo Berena also confirmed
they were able to recover the stolen motorcycle which was kept in the ground floor of
the house of Mrs. Camparicio (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 8-15);
11. The fact that the stolen motorcycle was positively identified by witness Nemia
Berallo as the same motorcycle driven, owned and registered in the name of the
victim, Juanito Berallo (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 9-10);
12. The fact that accused Rene Baron admitted during his testimony that he rode in the
tricycle driven by the victim together with the two passengers in going to Segundo Diez
but reached only the area of Bangga "Doldol" where the actual robbery and killing took
place (TSN-Tan, May 11, 1999, pp. 9-12);
13. The fact that when the two hold-up men brought the driver inside the sugarcane
field, accused Rene Baron who was left on the road outside the sugarcane field (ibid,
p. 11) did nothing and instead of escaping and seeking help, accused Rene Baron
leisurely stayed in the tricycle as if everything [was] normal and nothing [happened],
thus indicating that he (Baron) [was] in conspiracy to rob and kill the victim since as the
facts are depicted x x x Rene Baron would clearly appear that he (Baron) acted as a
"look out" while the two companions were killing the victim and to make matters worse,
he (Baron) even went along with the two other accused up to Oringao, Kabankalan
City where they hid the stolen motorcycle (ibid, pp. 12-13);
14. The fact that the accused Baron was left unharmed by the killers of the victim in
spite of the fact that he (Baron) is a potential witness to the serious crime of Robbery
with Homicide; and when they were in Oringao, ate breakfast with them then rode a
passenger jeep with many passengers; alighted in Kabankalan proper from Barangay
Oringao; stood and waited in a public place at the Ceres Bus Terminal; rode a public
transportation bus to Bacolod City for three (3) hours then alighted in Libertad Street in
Bacolod City; and again rode a passenger jeepney going to a place known as
"Shopping" to take another passenger bus in going back to Cadiz City (ibid, pp. 2130).1avvph!1
From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion
is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the
motorcycle as the combination of these numerous circumstantial evidence [is] enough to
produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced] mind to safely
conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to perpetrate the crime as
clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was unity of purpose, concurrence
of will, and that they all acted in concert towards the same end, the accused being together
with a group when they rode the tricycle of the victim; all of them were together at the scene
of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao,
Kabankalan City; all of them were together in hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house of
Natividad Camparicio; and they were together as a group going to Cadiz City from
Kabankalan City passing [through] and stopping [at] various cities and municipalities. 10
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime
showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. 11There was no
evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus,
regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and
applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," the appellant is
guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his coaccused are one and the same.12
The appellants attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this
exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable
fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than
or at least equal to that committed.13 A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape. 14
We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellants insistence that he was under duress
from his co-accused in participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary.
Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim towards the sugarcane field and left the appellant
inside the tricycle that was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had every opportunity
to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear.
Surprisingly, he opted to wait for his co-accused to return and even rode with them to
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the victims motorcycle in the house of Villatimas
aunt.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for
more than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to
escape or at least request for assistance from the people around him.
Robbery with Homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. We find that the trial court
correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery, which exists when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof that tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 15 The evidence points
that one of the co-conspirators tied the hands of the victim before dragging him to the
sugarcane field.16 Thus, he was unable to defend and protect himself against his malefactors
who were superior in number and armed with knives and guns.
As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr.,17 treachery is not a qualifying circumstance
but "a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is
classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime". 18 Corollarily, "Article
62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the
penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However,
aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by
law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty". 19 In the case at bar,
"treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide". 20 Neither is it "inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide".21 As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing the
penalty for crime.
In this case, the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have
merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines," we are mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.22
In line with current jurisprudence, if the death penalty would have been imposed if not for the
proscription in RA 9346, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00.23 As
compensatory damages, the award of P2,400.00 for the burial lot of the victim must be
deleted since this expense was not supported by receipts. 24 However, the heirs are entitled to
an award of temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00.25 The existence of one
aggravating circumstance merits the award of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is proper. However, it must be
increased from P25,000.00 toP30,000.00.26 Moral damages must also be increased
from P25,000.00 to P75,000.00.27 Moreover, the appellant is ordered to return the stolen
items that were not recovered. Should this no longer be possible, there must be restitution in
the total amount of P5,050.00 representing the cash contained in the victims wallet, as well
as the value of the wrist watch, the ring, the motorcycle and sidecar taken by the appellant
and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00638 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Actual damages isDELETED, and
in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The appellant is also ordered to return the cash of P5,050.00 taken from the victims wallet
and the other pieces of personal property also taken but not recovered, more particularly his
wrist watch, ring, his Kawasaki HDX motorcycle and its sidecar. Should restitution be no
longer possible, the appellant must pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 174654
August 17, 2011
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA
ALONTO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still
be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution 2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and
acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual
because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through
falsification of a public document.4 However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable. 5
Factual Antecedents
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto
(spouses Alonto),6secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472
located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in
Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto
appearing before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to
his name and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,9 an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with intent to
defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before Notary Public Gines N.
Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latters
Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto sold their parcel of
land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in favor of accused by
imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the signature[s] of
spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names in said document
as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B.
Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the
signature[s] appearing in said document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear
that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto participated in the execution of said
document when they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did
then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified
document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the
amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land .
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 12 After the termination of the pretrial conference, trial ensued.
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was
whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.13 Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that
petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their
obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually
signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto
personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the trial court concluded that
petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual
under Article 172(1)14 in relation to Article 171(2)15 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not
estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY
of the crime of falsification of public document by private individuals under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of
the real properties in question in favor of private complainants. After private complainants
shall have acquired full ownership and possession of the aforementioned properties, they are
directed to pay the accused the sum of P130,000.00 [with] legal interest thereon reckoned
from the time this case was instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private
complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period of six (6) months from the
time this decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to pay said complainants the
sum of P1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of the private
complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:
1. P15,000.00 for nominal damages;
2. P20,000.00 for attorneys fees;
3. P50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. P30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.16
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime
charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged
and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in
its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the negative. 17 It held that petitioner who was
charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public document under Article
171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private
Individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the
falsification committed in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting,
signature or rubric while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it
to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such
person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.18Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial courts finding with respect to petitioners
civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CAs February 22, 2006 Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it
found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in the Information. The
civil liability determinations are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated August
15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his
acquittal by the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 20 In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 21 When
the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the
same criminal action.22 In other words, the "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist." 23
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense
different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was
charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the
spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before
the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of
falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be
sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.24 The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of
petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same. 25
We do not agree.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,26 we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his
exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the
same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable
to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the
spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner
did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses
Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of
the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties respective
evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto
indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary
public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify
or render void ab initio the parties transaction.27 Such non-appearance is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. "To
overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to
exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such
proof, the deed must be upheld."28 And since the defective notarization does not ipso
facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto
to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of new ones
under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the
spouses Alonto.1avvphi1
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to
institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual
and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial courts finding
that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not
forged. Second, "[s]entences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law
which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative." 29 While a judge has the
discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. 30 "He
must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty." 31
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and
the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject
properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the
properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar
as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of falsification of public
document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the
restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of P1,103,000.00 representing the
value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 173089
August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright
its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.
From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 oclock in the morning,
respondent Jaime Abordo(Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met
by private complainants Kennard Majait(Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose
Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212
and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the
Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery
and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision, 2 the RTC held Abordo liable
only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with
regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of
Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a
supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For
said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its
supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion for reconsideration while
Calvezs motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez
appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos Indorsement 3 of the October 11, 2005
letter4 of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following grounds:
GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD
NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND
ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212, RESPECTIVELY,

AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR (4) MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.5
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate
court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was
questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the
remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorariplaced the accused
in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:
x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. In
view of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any
party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the
Philippines is assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty of
lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of acquitting him in another. It
appears to us that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private
complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the latters Notice of Appeal dated
October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor General is
allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this
petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse
is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express
injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy.
We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether
to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would
place him in double jeopardy. Hence,this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of
wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the
ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.6[emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45
presenting the following:
GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE
JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM.
CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED
AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF
BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213. 7
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to
submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.
We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of
acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to
the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. 8 The
rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, 9the Court has entertained petitions
for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,10 the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr.,11 where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer
to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not
result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate
court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was
improper.1wphi1 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the
CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.
As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari
were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.
A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for
appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records,
would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is
bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the
disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the
interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends
of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case." 12
The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice."13 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,14 presents an instructive exception to the
rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law.
"The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently,
there is no double jeopardy."15
A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the
prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not
mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the
prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the
defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both
parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of
evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it
and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial.
The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a
recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full
faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:
In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge
thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses
Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the
evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.16
It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion." 17 Subsequently, in its memorandum, it
merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the
evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial
courts judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.
The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the
trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his
part.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be
resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy.
An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a
writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of
grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, 18 it was written:
Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside
of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former
abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of
the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the
evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she
considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public
respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the
decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed
upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be
attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
[Emphasis supplied]
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the
remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due
course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY
the same for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 193217
February 26, 2014
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner Corazon
Macapagal of the crime of Estafa;2 the Order denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June 29, 2010 denying her Notice of Appeal, 5 in Criminal
Case No. 98-166722.
For a proper perspective, a brief statement of the factual and procedural antecedents of the
case follows:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the
value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.6 Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an
Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29,
2010 for having been filed out of time. 8
Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONERAPPELLANT.
II.
CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA.
III.
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED BY
THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9
We deny the petition.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities
which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It appears that petitioner
assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal
of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to
fail, because of petitioners complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the
Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the
rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the
appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of
a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned
Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may
be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an
order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter
through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in
this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits
an outright dismissal.12
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow
the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in
compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause. 13
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible
for violation of the hierarchy of courts. 14 Although the Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as
granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an
application will be directed.15 Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special,
important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are
not present in this case.16
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of
the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this
Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of
estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of
procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her
notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must
contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.19
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of
the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions,
pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to
the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court. 20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the Rules and
the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15, 2010, the Court
required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on the
RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid certification of
non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat
showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as
required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended
by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her
counsels contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No.
07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice. x x x 22
Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her
counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance.
Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondents Comment to
the petition.
On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and
asked for more time within which to comply with the Courts resolution, because of heavy
workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred residence. In a
Resolution23 dated
August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished
petitioners counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the
required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsels explanation why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners counsel claimed that he could not prepare the
required reply because the documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He,
likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so
at that point.24 After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Courts resolutions, and since his efforts to
communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his
duties and responsibilities as counsel on record.25 In a Resolution26 dated December 10,
2012, we required petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no such compliance was made
to date.1wphi1
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. 27 It is the duty of the counsel to
make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has
appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. 28 Any error in compliance may be
fatal to the client's cause.29 It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise.30 The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are
clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in
order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 172873
March 19, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal
procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not
condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his
guilt.1 Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has
borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt
standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching
certitude of the facts in issue.2
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in applications of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty.3
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.4
On appeal is the Decision5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006
affirming in toto the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103
finding appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and sale of
dangerous drugs.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:
Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero
three (0.03) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous
drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or
act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges read in
Filipino, a language known and understood by him. 9 On motion of the City Prosecutor, the
cases were consolidated for joint trial.10Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera)
were presented by the prosecution:
PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on duty at Police
Station 9 where he made a pre-operation report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted on
the herein appellant that same afternoon.11He then proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon
City with PO3 Rivera for the operation.12 At a point near Jollibee, they met the informant who,
upon seeing the subject appellant, went with him to meet PO1 Roy.13 After being introduced to
the appellant as a buyer of "piso" worth of "shabu", appellant immediately produced a sachet
containing the alleged drug. When appellant received the marked money amounting
to P100.00,14 PO1 Roy raised his left hand, at which point his back-up officer, PO3 Rivera
appeared and immediately arrested the appellant. 15 The appellant was immediately brought to
the Police Station for investigation, while the two sachets of "shabu" and aluminum foil
discovered on the said appellant were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. 16
PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer in the buybust operation conducted against the appellant in the afternoon of January 2, 2003. 17 In
preparation for the said operation, he conducted a short briefing and recorded the particulars
of the operation they were about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the
parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the
preparation of the buy-bust money to be used. 18 With respect to the buy-bust money, he
prepared oneP50.00 bill, two P20.00 bills and one P10.00 bill, by making the appropriate
marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their respective serial numbers. 19 Later
that afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place. PO3 Rivera positioned himself
in a parked vehicle20 about 20 meters from the situs of the transaction. 21He thus had a clear
view of the appellant with the informant and PO1 Roy.22 Shortly thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy
make the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the appellant to arrest him. 23 He
recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded to frisk the latter.24 Upon
conducting the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and
two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the items
seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. 25The two sachets
tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil sheets
tested negative of the aforementioned substance. 26
Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during their
respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the buybust operation.27
The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia Morales and the
appellant:
Appellant denied the charges against him.28 He testified that he is a resident of Dolores,
Quezon where he worked in a fertilizer store. 29 He was in Manila at that time to bring money
for his parents who live at Cruz na Ligas.30 As his mother did not give him enough money for
his fare back to Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the
balance of his bus fare.31 However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian
clothes suddenly approached him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen
and poked their guns at them.32 The said policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk
them.33 He averred that nothing was found on him and yet the policemen still brought him to
the police station.34 He denied the allegation made against him that he sold, much less
possessed, the "shabu" subject of this action.35 He further testified that in the tricycle on the
way to the police station, PO1 Roy took out a plastic of "shabu" from his (PO1 Roys) pocket
and once at the station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer and claimed that the
plastic sachet was found on the appellant. 36
He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that the P50.00 bill and
the two P20.00 bills, totaling P90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to
Quezon.37 He disclaimed any knowledge of the P10.00 bill.38 He further testified that he
personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a
quarrel which he had no involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was PO3 Rivera
who arrested him.40
Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the appellant in his
agricultural and poultry supply store in Babayan, Calamba, Laguna. 41 He further stated that
he allowed the appellant to go on vacation on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the New Year
with his family in Manila.42 However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of
the New Year.43
Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of her son that she
gave him P90.00, consisting of one P50.00 bill and two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to
Laguna where he worked.44 Thinking that her son was already on his way home, she was
surprised to receive a call from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was
arrested for possession and sale of "shabu".45
On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case No. Q-03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug pushing
[of] zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and
to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos.
The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256 for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
[No.] 9165 for drug possession x x x of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline
substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to Thirteen (13) Years and to pay
a fine of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos.
The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition after this decision becomes final.
SO ORDERED.46
The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the
person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during
the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003. 47 The trial court found
that from the evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the
following: (1) the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003
at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the
corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the two sachets of white substance which
was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"),
found in the possession of and sold by the appellant. 48
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations
of the appellant, there was no instigation that took place. 49 Rather, a buy-bust operation was
employed by the police officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully
selling drugs.50 The appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for
illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. 51 Stripped of non-essentials, the
CA summarized the antecedent facts of the case as follows:
PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted
against appellant at Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City upon an informants tip that
appellant was selling "shabu" in the said area. On the other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz
Rivera recorded the briefing, summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust money to
be used in the operation consisting of one (1) fifty peso bill, two (2) twenty peso bill[s] and one
(1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who acted as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up
proceeded to University Avenue corner Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente,
Quezon City together with the informant.
PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee restaurant while PO3
Rivera positioned himself at the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of
the three. After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to the appellant as a buyer of
"shabu", the latter immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and
handed the same to him. PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated. Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the area, introduced himself
as a police officer and frisked appellant from whom he recovered the marked money and a
matchbox, where the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They
informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station while the
two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing the suspected prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for examination, and which [was] later,
found to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as "shabu"). 52
Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.53
Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In our Resolution dated July
12, 2006, we resolved to accept the case and required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. 55 Both
parties adopted their respective appellants and appellees briefs, instead of filing
supplemental briefs.56
Our Ruling
Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has
not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 57 In support of his contention,
appellant alleges that the arresting officers did not even place the proper markings on the
alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust
operation.58 Appellant hence posits that this created serious doubt as to the items and actual
quantity of shabu recovered, if at all.59
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of the
two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession
of shabu.60
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the
appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.61 On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal.62 However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight
and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.63 After due consideration of the records of this
case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls
under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 64
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 65 Similarly, in
this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 66
With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Partoza,67 we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In the said case, the apprehending policeman did not mark the seized
drugs after he arrested the appellant in the latters presence. Neither did he make an
inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant.
There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory
of seized items and be given copies thereof. Hence, we held in the afore-cited case that there
was no compliance with the statutory safeguards. In addition, while the apprehending
policeman admitted to have in his possession the shabufrom the time the appellant was
apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the
seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of the said police officer.
We declared in People v. Orteza,68 that the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 implied a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish
the identity of the corpus delicti:
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe
the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court
thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.
Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69 we acquitted the appellant due to flaws in the conduct of
the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from the appellant,
together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the
whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed.
The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures
despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law.
The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police officers
presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.
PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant.
Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of
adherence to the procedural mandate of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony, to wit:
Fiscal Jurado
x x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is that?
Witness
A- Raising my left hand.
Q- And what happened next?
A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.
Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?
A- He arrested Morales.
Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?
A- I put the informant away from the scene.
Q- And what happened next after that?
A- We brought him to the police station.
Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?
A- We brought it to the crime lab.
Q- How did you send it to crime lab?
A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the suspect.
Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?
A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.
Q- What are the paraphernalia?
A- Foil, sir.
Q- How many foil?
A- I cannot recall.
Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?
A- He was investigated.
Q- Do you know the accused?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- What is his name?
A- Roldan Morales.
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to
identify the said items?
Witness
A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu"
Atty. Mosing
I will object because that would be leading on the part of the prosecution because he
could not identify on what shabu.
Court
That question is overruled.
Fiscal Jurado
I am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?
Court
Fiscal showing several shabu.
WITNESS
A- This one.
Fiscal Jurado
Q- There is another plastic sachet?
Witness
A- Recovered.
Q- How about these two?
A- I was not the one who confiscated that.
Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?
A- Positive, sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
xxxx
Q- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?
Witness
A- My companion brought that.

Q- What was your participation in the case?
A- Poseur buyer.
xxxx
Atty. Mosing
xxxx
Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the station?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?
A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.
Q- You have presented the buy bust money a while ago, was that buy bust money
suppose to be turned over to the investigator?
A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received it. 70 (Emphasis supplied)
The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further confirms the failure of
the buy-bust team to observe the procedure mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:
Court
Q- Where did you position yourself?
Witness
A- Parked vehicle.
Fiscal Jurado
Q- What did you notice?
Witness
A- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the suspect and after a
few conversation I waited and I saw the pre-arranged signal. And when he raised his
left hand that is the signal that the transaction is consummated.
Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?
A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.
Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?
A- Roldan Morales
Q- And what did you do with him?
A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed] him.

Q- And what did you do with him?
A- I frisked him.
Q- And what was the result of your frisking?
A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another suspected shabu.
Q- Where did you find that on his body?
A- Front [pocket of] pants.
Q- How about the match?
A- The same.
Q- What else did you find?
A- Aluminum foil.
Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the accused?
A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the station.
Q- How about the items you recovered?
A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.
Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?
A- Request, sir.71 (Emphasis supplied)
Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other
witnesses. Hence, the investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one
who took delivery of the seized items, was not identified nor was he presented in court.
More importantly, the testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized
drugs immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latters presence.
Neither did they make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in
the presence of the appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who
participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized
items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.
Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the
confiscated shabu, to wit:
Fiscal Jurado:
Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to
identify the said items?
Witness
A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu". 72

The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items
collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same
items that were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA
9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the siezed items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team,73 these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was
offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we
cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a
PDEA operative74and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the
procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is
serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the
appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity
of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the
person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending
presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody
which is fatal to its cause.1avvphi1
In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions
case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the
prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of
prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24,
2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt,
and is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any
other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 170289
April 8, 2010
ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips in favor of the milder
form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accuseds liberty. We apply these principles
in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) July 22, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed with modifications the
March 11, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-080.
Factual Antecedents
On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and
Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of
Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio
Tubo, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, x x x and [sic] helping one another, taking
advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to facilitate the commission of the offense
with the use of sharp pointed x x x instruments which the accused conveniently provided
themselves did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab one
Jimmy Tagarda thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as
a consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case
No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew),
arising from the same incident, viz:
That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and with the use of sharp
pointed x x x instrument, and x x x conspiring, confederating and helping one another, and
taking advantage of the night [in] order to facilitate the commission of the offense, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Andrew Tagarda
thereby hitting his left chest and nose, the accused having performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence except for reason or cause
independent of the will of the accused that is, the stab was deflected by the victim.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code.4
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-080
(frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide), Taban entered a
voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their innocence. Accordingly, on
June 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a partial judgment 5sentencing Taban to imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of Jimmy P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.6 Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On October 19, 1991, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Jimmy, Andrew, Edwin
Balani7 (Balani), and Rolando Mabayo (Mabayo) visited a friend in Sitio Punta, Looc, Salay,
Misamis Oriental. Along the way, they saw Taban, together with petitioner and Tubo, come out
of the house of one Tomas Osep (Osep). Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew on the chest with a
knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing Taban. Jimmy tried to pacify Andrew and Taban but the
latter stabbed him in the abdomen. Taban then immediately fled.
Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw a drinking glass at Andrews face while
petitioner boxed Andrews jaw. Tubo stabbed Jimmy who was then lying face down on the
ground twice on the back with an ice pick after which he fled. Petitioner then boxed Jimmys
mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmys aid and boxed petitioner who retaliated by
punching Balani. Thereafter, petitioner left the scene. Mabayo was unable to help Jimmy or
Andrew because he was shocked by the incident.
After the incident, Jimmy was brought to the clinic of Dr. Precioso Tacandang (Dr.
Tacandang). Jimmy was then in critical condition, thus, Dr. Tacandang advised the relatives of
Jimmy to bring him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital. Upon arrival at the
aforesaid hospital, Jimmy was declared dead by the attending physician, Dr. Cedric Dael (Dr.
Dael). Jimmy sustained a vital or mortal stab wound at the epigastric area four centimeters
below the cyphoid process and another stab wound on the left lumbar. Andrew, who
sustained minor injuries, was treated by Dr. Dael.
Version of the Defense
On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban, Tubo and petitioner were drinking liquor in the
house of Osep. Taban left the group to urinate on a nearby coconut tree. Outside Oseps
house, he was suddenly boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy causing him to fall near a
fishing boat. There Taban found a fishing knife with which he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in
order to defend himself. After which, he fled for fear for his life. Meanwhile, petitioner went out
to look for Taban. As he was stepping out of Oseps house, he was boxed by Balani.
Petitioner fought back. Andrew tried to help Balani but petitioner was able to evade Andrews
attacks. Instead, petitioner was able to box Andrew. Petitioner then called out to Tubo to come
out and run. When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban nor petitioner was present
but he saw a person being lifted by several people. Upon seeing this, Tubo, likewise, fled for
fear for his life.
On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of
homicide8 and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide, viz:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, accused Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo are hereby
sentenced, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, to the
penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR with its medium
period as minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its
medium period [as maximum] under the same law.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080 for Frustrated Homicide, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present, this court hereby sentences all the accused
[Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo] in this case to an Indeterminate
Sentence [Law] of FOUR (4) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium
period as the minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to TEN (10) YEARS OF
PRISION MAYOR in its medium period as the maximum under the same law. With
costs.
3) To pay jointly and severally the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda in the sum of P50,000.00 for
Criminal Case No. 92-079;
4) And likewise to pay solidarily the heirs of the victim Andrew Tagarda the sum
of P10,000.00 for committing the crime of Frustrated Homicide. 9
The period of preventive imprisonment during which the accused were detained pending the
trial of these cases shall be credited in full in favor of all the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the
accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of
the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with modifications, the
judgment of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision is herebyAFFIRMED with the following modifications: (a) That in Criminal Case No.
92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b) the civil indemnity in the amount of ten
thousand (P10,000.00) pesos which was awarded to the heirs of Andrew Tagarda be deleted
as the same has not been fully substantiated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy was duly
established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on
Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the accused are liable for
frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the
accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected
the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven
days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted
homicide.
The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the same
was not fully substantiated.
Issue
Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other
accused (Taban and Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with
law and/or jurisprudence.12
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner claims that the evidence merely established that: (1) Taban went out of Oseps
store while petitioner and Tubo remained inside; (2) a commotion took place between Taban
and Andrew; (3) after this altercation, petitioner and Tubo stepped out of Oseps store; and (4)
petitioners participation in the incident is limited to boxing Andrew after the latter had already
been stabbed by Taban, and boxing Jimmys mouth after the latter had been stabbed by
Taban and Tubo in succession.
Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and design as
Taban and Tubo. His participation was not necessary to the completion of the criminal acts
because by the time he boxed Andrew and Jimmy, the stabbing had already taken place. The
evidence further established that the stabbing incident was purely accidental and that the
accused had no grudge against the victims. Also, petitioner was unarmed negating his intent
to kill.
Petitioner also cites People v. Vistido13 where it was ruled that conspiracy was not established
under facts similar to the present case. In Vistido, the accused was merely convicted of slight
physical injuries.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent contends that conspiracy was duly established. Petitioner was not merely
present during the commission of the crime but he aided Taban and Tubo by inflicting blows
on Andrew and Jimmy after the latter were stabbed. The simultaneous movement of the
accused towards the victims and their successive escape from the crime scene clearly evince
conspiracy. Respondent also stresses that the factual findings of the trial court should be
accorded respect for it is in a better position to evaluate testimonial evidence.
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is
criminally liable only for his individual acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.14 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose.15 Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when
said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests.16 However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the
attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of
the assailants.17 What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated
by one and the same purpose.18
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the
testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the
right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot
be lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. In
particular, the CA noted:
[T]his Court HOLDS that there was conspiracy. x x x
With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-080 (for frustrated homicide), it was revealed that after
Andrews chest was stabbed by Taban, Tubo also threw a drinking glass at Andrews face
while [petitioner] boxed Andrews jaws.
From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused acted in solidum in trying to
inflict injuries to Andrew. Had it been otherwise, Tubo and [petitioner] would have just left the
scene of the crime.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-079 (for homicide), it was revealed that after Andrew
was stabbed by Taban using a double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently stabbed Jimmy
before fleeing from the crime scene. Moments later, while Andrew was recovering from fist
and glass blows from [petitioner] and Tubo, Tubo [straddled] Jimmy and stabbed him twice
with an icepick before [he] left. [Petitioner], on the other hand, delivered a fist blow to Jimmys
mouth notwithstanding the fact that Jimmy was already stabbed by Taban and Tubo.
From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused in Criminal Case No. 92-079
confederated and mutually helped each other to insure the killing of Jimmy Tagarda. Hence,
conspiracy was present in the cases at bar.19
We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the
inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing
incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which militate against the
finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.
First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or enmity
against Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well
as the three accused were one in testifying that there was no misunderstanding
between the two groups prior to the stabbing incident. During the testimony of
prosecution witness Balani, the trial court itself grappled with the issue of motive:
COURT: (to the witness)
Q- [W]hen you saw Feliciano Taban and Tubo stabbing Jimmy Tagarda, you
mean to tell this court that they were enemies?
A- No sir.
xxxx
Q- Now, was there any information that you received that the reason why the
accused Taban and Tubo stabbed Jimmy Tagarda and Andrew Tagarda was x x
x of some previous misunderstanding?
A- No, I did not know.
Q- Until now, you cannot tell this court the reason why the stabbing took place
except the fact that the group of the accused were having [a] drinking session
and your group also had a [prior] drinking session somewhere?
A- Yes, sir.20
Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental
encounter between Tabans and Andrews groups with both having had a drinking
session. On direct examination, prosecution witness Andrew testified that Taban, Tubo
and petitioner successively went out of Oseps house to engage their group. This
version of the events made it appear that the three accused laid in wait to carry out the
crimes. However, on cross-examination, Andrew contradicted himself when he stated
that it was only Taban who their group initially saw with a knife outside Oseps house
and who suddenly stabbed Andrew.1avvphi1 After he was stabbed, Andrew stated that
he retaliated by boxing Taban and it was only then when he (Andrew) saw Tubo and
petitioner come out of Oseps house.21 The records of the preliminary investigation of
this case confirm this latter version of the events when Andrew stated that it was only
after the commotion between him and Taban that Tubo and petitioner stepped out of
Oseps store to help Taban defend himself in the ensuing fight. 22 Significantly, when the
defense on cross-examination confronted Andrew with this inconsistency between his
statements on direct examination and the preliminary investigation, Andrew answered
that at the time of the incident it was only Taban that he saw.23 The same observation
can be made on the testimony of the prosecutions second eyewitness, Balani. While
on direct examination Balani claimed that the three accused successively came out of
Oseps house, on cross-examination, he modified his stance by stating that it was only
Taban who initially accosted their group and that petitioner and Tubo were inside
Oseps house prior to the commotion.24 This material inconsistency in the testimonies
of the prosecutions eyewitnesses belies the prosecutions theory that the three
accused had a pre-conceived plan to kill Jimmy and Andrew.
Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus,
negating his intent to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses account,
petitioners participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and
Tubo had stabbed the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable to
the commission of the crimes as they were done after the stabbing. Thus, petitioners
act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy to or
camaraderie with his two co-accused.
Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in
order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with petitioner that this case is similar to People
v. Vistido25 and the ruling there applies with equal force here. In Vistido, we held thus
There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where,
between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission
of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that "to establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to
prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if there is proof that the malefactors have acted
in consort and in pursuance of the same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the
same must be positive and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to
maintain in full strength the substance of the time-honored principle in criminal law requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction."
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic
requirement. To begin with, there is no evidence that appellant and his co-accused had any
enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of the deceased,
Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not have any
quarrel with them. In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it can
not safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime involved herein.
Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were together
drinking wine, at the time and place of the incident, they were there purposely to wait for and
to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised beforehand that between 3:00 and
4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, the deceased and his cousin after
coming home from their work at the cemetery would go to the Marzan Restaurant, and
thereafter, would take a taxi for home, and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The meeting
between the appellant's group and the deceased appears to be purely accidental which
negates the existence of conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused.
Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montao and one
John Doe) were armed with daggers. If he (appellant) had really conspired with his coaccused to kill the deceased, he could have provided himself with a weapon. But he did not.
Again, this fact belies the prosecution's theory that the appellant had entered into a
conspiracy with his co-accused to kill the deceased.
Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of simultaneity
in attacking the deceased, nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove conspiracy. The rule
is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will
nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more
individuals." To establish common responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and
simultaneous; it is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose.
In the case at bar, the appellant Raymundo Vistido and the accused Pepito Montao, did not
act pursuant to the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to kill as shown by the
fact that he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the deceased which caused his
death. On the other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the deceased one fist blow after
the latter was stabbed by the accused Pepito Montao an act which is certainly
unnecessary and not indispensable for the consummation of the criminal assault does not
indicate a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely to "show off" or express his sympathy or
feeling of camaraderie with the accused Pepito Montao. Thus, in People vs. Portugueza, this
Court held that:
"Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in
attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. (People vs.
Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary, from the nature and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on the deceased, it can be said that the appellant and the other defendant did not act
pursuant to the same objective. Florentino Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased, as
shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound which almost severed the left arm. The
injury inflicted by the appellant, merely scratching the subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate
a purpose to kill the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the assault
made by his co-defendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime charged. He
must have also made the criminal resolution of his co-accused his own. x x x." and, in People
vs. Vicente, this Court likewise held:
"In regard to appellant Ernesto Escorpizo, there seems to be no dispute that he stabbed
Soriano several times with a small knife only after the latter had fallen to the ground seriously
wounded, if not already dead. There is no showing that this accused had knowledge of the
criminal intent of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all likelihood, Escorpizo's act in
stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in furtherance of Vicente's aim, which is
to kill, but merely to 'show off' or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente.
x x x."
By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of conspiracy
which, according to the settled rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the defendants is separate and
individual, each is liable for his own acts, the damage caused thereby, and the consequences
thereof. While the evidence shows that the appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however,
silent as to the extent of the injuries, in which case, the appellant should be held liable only for
slight physical injuries.26
We reach the same conclusion here. For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt, petitioners liability is separate and individual. Considering that it
was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent
of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for
two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages
to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew.27 Actual damages
arising from said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly
modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated
homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not lifethreatening.28 Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the
appellate courts judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their
prison terms.29 The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.30
Anent the award of damages for which Taban and Tubo should be made solidarily liable, in
Criminal Case No. 92-079, the trial court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jimmy. Civil indemnity is automatically granted to the heirs of the
deceased victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the
crime.31 In addition, the trial court should have awarded moral damages in the sum
of P50,000.00 in consonance with current jurisprudence. 32 As to actual damages, the
prosecution was able to prove burial-related expenses with supporting receipt 33 only to the
extent of P5,000.00. In People v. Villanueva,34 we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less thanP25,000.00, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. We explained that it
was anomalous and unfair that
the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less
than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would be entitled toP25,000.00 temperate damages.35 Accordingly, an
award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages is proper under the
premises. As to loss of earning capacity, the same cannot be awarded due to lack of proof
other than the self-serving testimony of Jimmys mother. In Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA
correctly ruled that Andrew is not entitled to an award of actual damages for failure to
substantiate the same. However, he is entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 for the pain, trauma and suffering arising from the stabbing incident. 36 It may be
noted that the afore-discussed higher indemnities are not favorable to Taban and Tubo who
did not appeal, but in line with our ruling in People v. Pacaa,37 they shall be held solidarily
liable therefor since these amounts are not in the form of a penalty.38
Finally, the records indicate that the three accused were placed under preventive
imprisonment prior to and during the trial of this case. This can be surmised from the motion
to grant bail filed by petitioner which was subsequently granted 39 by the trial court. It is not
clear, however, for how long and under what conditions they were put in preventive
imprisonment. The trial court should, thus, determine the length and conditions of the
preventive imprisonment so this may be credited, if proper, in favor of the accused as
provided in Article 2940 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto
menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P5,0000.00 as moral
damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs
of Jimmy Tagarda P50,0000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
andP25,000.00 as temperate damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted the sentence of four
(4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to four (4) years
of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered to solidarily
pay Andrew Tagarda P30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen
(15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda P5,000.00 as moral
damages
3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and
Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what
distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who
appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with
frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25,
2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way,
Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked
behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter.
Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by
the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right
temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino
to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 2 showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense.
He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of
Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias
then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter
picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias
saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid
the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house.
On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the
night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw
the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the
penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for
lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court
on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor
General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed
only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional,
as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in
case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The
language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.
The Courts Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted
in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally
justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements
of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious
deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that
the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the
offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation. 5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough.
The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon. 6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He
alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias
tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it.
Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a
heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to
prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. 7
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it.
Compared to Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent
with reality, hence deserving credence.8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for
frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and
could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.9And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among
other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he
inflicted on his victim.10
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it
knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the
location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he
intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
In Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown
by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because
of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the
victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of
the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very
serious,"12 he could not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal
on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that
case the patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the
wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the
frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not
measure the depth.13
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds
were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight
days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and
antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
xxxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go
home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the
Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed
from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that
the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional,
as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the
state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides:
"That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 15Since Arnel appealed his conviction
for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If
the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the
trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account
the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment
of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and,two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation
law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled
to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the
Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also
have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And,
worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the
forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 16 that the probation law
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave
oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and
eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask!
Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for
probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of
course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws
the element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appeal
that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch
thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction." 17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position
to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the
trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to
now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound
ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed
on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel
sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow
him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault
of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions.18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation
Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal
law but to achieve its beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to
"provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who
appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in
excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the
Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum
penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty,
it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply
for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right
had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since
the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply
for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated
July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount
of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within
15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

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RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR.,

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so

On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations[10] for

1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which

G.R. No. 203335

February 11, 2014

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or

privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as

March 10, 2014

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,

This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of

ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES

is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of

A That is a possibility sir.

G.R. No. 191240

July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 175256

August 23, 2012

LILY LIM, Petitioner,

simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 197788

February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180661

December 11, 2013

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 200304

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN

G.R. No. 185128

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS

A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

G.R. No. 172035

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 199877

August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Q What did he say?

G.R. No. 151258

G.R. No. 185230

JOSEPH C. CEREZO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 149588

September 29, 2009

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 184760

April 23, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 185209

June 28, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

5. Incised wound 1 cm long, right cheek.