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go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from

doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure
management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of
justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to
submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for
approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the condition
of his docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately
preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all
cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to
Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the
Court, Justice Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSPT. MARLOU C. CHAN

and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O. FANG
G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the
private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275) creating the Zearosa Commission (Commission) which was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country
in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report
to the Office of the President.

Marynette Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte (PNP) conducted
surveillance operation against her and her aides, and classified her as a PAG
coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Commission, causing her inclusion in the
Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

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recent jurisprudence

Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different
forms of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to
privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from
the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against
her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right
to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data
saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by
the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioners
right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper
HELD:
Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to
the Commission is not an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It
also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope
and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance
of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence
of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant
to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions
accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted
their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the
data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information
by the PNP to the Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened
her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected
to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically

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created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force
in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter. The fact that the PNP released information to the
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her
the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat
to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted
that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information
on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Petition for writ of habeas data is not proper
In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media
was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa
failed to establish that PNP was responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any
event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to
her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper. Finally, the Court rules that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, Chan and Fang sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases
in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion
that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

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