Philosophical Naturalism

Author(s): Michael Friedman

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 71, No. 2
(Nov., 1997), pp. 5+7-21
Published by: American Philosophical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3130938 .
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PRESIDENTIALADDRESSES
OF
THE AMERICANPHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION
1996-97

Michael Friedman
Philosophical

Naturalism

Stanley Cavell
Something Out of the Ordinary

Henry E. Allison
We Can Act Only Under
the Idea of Freedom

NATURALISM
PHILOSOPHICAL

MichaelFriedman,IndianaUniversity
AnnualCentralDivision
Addressdeliveredbeforethe Ninety-Fifth
Presidential
Association
in
American
of
The
PA,onApril25,
Pittsburgh,
Philosophical
Meeting
1996.
Iwant to discuss a tendency of thought which has been extremely widespread

withinAnglo-American
duringthelasttwentyyearsorso-but which
philosophy
now,if I am notmistaken,has reachedthe end of its usefullife. Thistendency
is characterized
of thought,whichI willcall "philosophical
naturalism,"
by two
of anyspecialstatusfortypesof knowledge
mainideas. Thefirstis the rejection
traditionally
thoughtto be a priori-knowledgein logicand mathematics,for
example-in that all knowledgewhatsoeveris now conceived as having
the same statusas thatfoundin the empiricalnaturalsciences.
fundamentally
ThusMichaelDevitt,in a recentbookdevotedto whathe calls a "naturalistic"
as theview
insemanticsandphilosophy
oflanguage,definesnaturalism
program
that"thereis onlyone way of knowing,the empiricalway thatis the basis of
a naturalistic
we shoulddenythatthereis any
science,"so that"from
perspective,
this
a prioriknowledge."1
behind
as
clear,
view, Devittmakesabundantly
Lying
is an holisticpictureof the relationship
betweenknowledgeandexperiencenow
associated with the names of Duhemand Quine. The totalityof human
knowledgeis picturedas a vast web of interconnectedbeliefs on which
experienceorsensoryinputimpingesonlyalongtheperiphery.Whenfacedwith
a "recalcitrant
experience"
standinginconflictwithouroverallsystemof beliefs
we thenhavea choiceofwhereto makerevisions.Thesecan be maderelatively
close to the peripheryof the system (in whichcase we makea change in a
relativelylow-levelpartof naturalscience),buttheycan also-when theconflict
is particularly
acute,forexample-affectthe mostabstractandgeneralpartsof
even thetruthsof logicandmathematics,
science, including
lyingatthecenterof
oursystem of beliefs. To be sure,such high-levelbeliefsat the centerof our
reluctant
to revisethem
entrenched,inthatwe arerelatively
systemarerelatively
or to give them up. Nevertheless,and this is the crucialpoint,no belief
whatsoeveris forever"immune
to revision."2
The second main idea of what Iam calling philosophical naturalism is the view
that philosophy, as a discipline, is also best understood as simply one more
part-perhaps a peculiarly abstract and general part-of empirical natural
science.
Thus David Papineau, in a recent book entitled Philosophical
Naturalism, characterizes such naturalism as the view that we should "set
philosophy within science," so that philosophical investigation as such "is best
conducted within the framework of our empirical knowledge of the world."3And
Quine's program of "epistemology naturalized," whereby "epistemology, or
something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of
natural science,"4 provides the best known example of how to realize this general
idea. Moreover, there is a close connection, as Quine himself explains, between
this idea of setting philosophy within natural science, on the one hand, and the
rejection of a priori knowledge on the basis of epistemological holism, on the

other. Ifall humanknowledgeis basicallyof the same type, and no knowledge,

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PRESIDENTIALADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION-

in particular, is forever immune to revision, then there is no higher or firmer type

of knowledge than that found in empirical natural science itself. There is no
Archimedean point from which philosophy could hope to justify natural science
from some better grounded and more certain perspective. The traditionaldream
of providing a philosophical justification for scientific knowledge must therefore
be given up, and thus there is no longer any reason for attributinga special status
and role to philosophy.
A version of this last argument is the centerpiece of Quine's "Epistemology
Naturalized." On the basis of the failure of Carnap's program for logically
reconstructing science out of sensory experiences in Der logische Aufbau der
Welt, Quine rejects the entire Carnapian enterprise of logical analysis or rational
reconstruction as such:
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make-believe?
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence
anyone has had to go on, ultimately, in arrivingat his picture of
the world. Why not just see how this construction really
proceeds? Why not settle for psychology? Such a surrender of
the epistemological burden to psychology is a move that was
disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning.
If the
is
of
validation
the
of
epistemologist's goal
grounds
empirical
science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other
empirical science in the validation. However, such scruples
against circularity have little point once we have stopped
dreaming of deducing science from observations.5
Given the failure of the Aufbau's program for logically translating all concepts of
empirical science into purely sensory terms, Quine continues: "[l]twould seem
more sensible to settle for psychology. Better to discover how science is in fact
developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect.6
In the context of Carnap's actual motivations for his own program of logical
reconstruction, however, this particular Quinean stratagem is extraordinarily
misleading. For, in the first place, neither in the Aufbau nor in his later works did
Carnap set himself the goal of grounding, justifying, or "validating"science from
some supposedly higher and more certain philosophical vantage point. Indeed,
Carnap himself was always perfectly happy to depend on the best results of
current empirical research (he explicitly depends on the results of Gestalt
psychology in the Aufbau, for example), so that the foundationally motivated
strictures against circularityQuine rejects here were never part of Carnap's own
motivations. And, in the second place, even after Carnap himself rejects the
Aufbau's program of logically reconstructing science from a purely sensory basis,
he nevertheless continues to emphasize, in even stronger and more insistent
terms, that philosophy as he conceives it is an a priorior formal discipline whose

Evenif
specialprovinceis logicalanalysisratherthanempiricalinvestigation.7
the particular
of science envisionedinthe Aufbaucannot
logicalreconstruction
in fact be carriedout, we can stilldevote ourselvesto articulating
the logical
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structure or logical framework within which empirical natural science proceeds.

Inthis way, what Carnap is now calling Wissenschaftslogik is itself a purely logical
or analytic discipline, wherein the correspondingly analytic formal scaffolding of
synthetic or empirical natural science is to be clearly and precisely delineated.
That the particular delineation attempted in the Aufbau cannot, for technical
reasons, be carried out in no way undermines the general possibility of

Wissenschaftslogikas such.

What does seriously challenge Carnap's characterization of philosophy as

Wissenschaftslogik is Quine's attack on the first of the notorious "twodogmas of
empiricism"-the doctrine, that is, that there is a clear and sharp distinction
between formal, logical, or analytic truth, on the one side, and factual, empirical,
or synthetic truth, on the other. The second "dogma of empiricism" is of course
the doctrine of what Quine calls "radical reductionism"-the doctrine that each
individual statement of natural science has its own particular range of
confirmational sensory experiences via an Aufbau-style logical translation. This

doctrineis ofcoursethreatenedbyDuhemian
holism,butitis not,
epistemological
inthe period
to
the
distinction.8
identical
Indeed,
pace Quine,
analytic/synthetic
andthe
distinction
whenCarnapputsthe mostweighton the analytic/synthetic
as
idea
of
Carnaphimself
philosophy Wissenschaftslogik,
accompanying
the namesof
with
holism
he
associates
(which
adoptsepistemological
explicitly
thatany
maintains
DuhemandPoincar6).Accordingly,
Carnaphimselfexplicitly
statementof science-even the statementsof logicand mathematics-canbe
revisedinresponseto problematic
evidence,andthusCarnaphimself
empirical
explicitlymaintainsthatno statementof science is foreverimmuneto revision.9
ItisjustthatforCarnap,incontrastto Quine,thereremains,nonetheless,a sharp
distinctionbetween revisionsof languageor linguisticframework,in which
analyticstatementsdependingsolelyon the meaningsof the relevanttermsare
in which
revised,and factualrevisionswithina givenlanguageor framework,
world
about
the
statements
contentful
assertions
empirical
expressing
synthetic
are revised.
NowQuine'sattackon the notionof analytictruth-on the notionof truthin
virtueof meaning-does (despiteitsconfusionwithhisattackon the doctrineof
of the
radicalreductionism)
pose a seriouschallengeto Carnap'sformulation
ontheone side,andfactual
distinction
betweenrevisionsof linguistic
framework,
revisionsof empiricalstatementsformulated
withina givenframework,
on the
other.10Quine'sattackon the notionof analytictruththus challengesboth
of the speciala prioristatusof logicandmathematics
(as
Carnap'sexplanation
and
truthsflowingsimplyfromthe adoptionof a given linguisticframework)
statusof philosophy(as a
Carnap'sexplanationof the special, non-empirical
branchof appliedlogic,as Wissenschaftslogik).
So itis thisattack-notthe idea
of epistemologicalholismand the doctrinethat no statementof science is
immuneto revision-that providesthe strongestsupportfor contemporary
holism
naturalism.Indeed,as we havejustseen, epistemological
philosophical
in
andtherejectionof allabsoluteunrevisability
is perfectly
compatible, Carnap's
own hands, with both a sharp distinctionbetween a prioriand empirical
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PRESIDENTIALADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION-

knowledge in general and a sharp distinction between philosophy and empirical

natural science in particular.
Quine's attack on the notion of truthin virtue of meaning culminates, as is well
known, in his doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation, wherein the very notion

of determinate
functionsinphilosophy,
is rejectedas
meaning,as ittraditionally
of
of
the
traditional
From
this
all
that
remains
point view,
scientifically
illegitimate.
notionof analytictruthis the franklyersatz notionof a "stimulus-analytic"
sentence-which receives community
wide assent no matterwhatthe given
from
stimulation.
this
And,
pointofview,itfollowsthat'Therehavebeen
sensory
blackdogs'is justas stimulus-analytic
to the doctrineof
as '2+2=4'.According
the indeterminacy
of translation,
notionof a
then,allthatis leftof the traditional
truthis the notionof relative(community
Itis inthis
priori
wide)entrenchment.11
sense thatQuine'sattackon the notionof truthinvirtueof meaningculminates
in philosophical
naturalism.
Butwhatis translation
underdetermined
by? Invirtueofwhat(moreprecisely,
in virtueof the lackof what)is the traditional
notionof meaningscientifically
illegitimate?Inresponseto a sharpchallengeon exactlythispointfromNoam
notionof
Chomsky,Quineexplainsthat translation,and thus the traditional
is
of
underdetermined
the
of
truths
natural
science:
meaning,
by totality
Thus,adoptfornowmyfullyrealisticattitudetowardelectrons
and muons and curvedspace-time, thus fallingin withthe
currenttheoryof the world... Consider,fromthis realisticpoint

of view, the totalityof truthsof nature,knownand unknown,

observableandunobservable,
pastandfuture.Thepointabout
of translation
is thatitwithstands
allthistruth,the
indeterminacy
whole truth about nature.12
Quine's attack on the notion of truthin virtue of meaning, his correlative rejection
of the Carnapian distinction between a prioritruth and empirical truth, and his
consequent articulation of philosophical naturalism, thus rests, in the end, on a
starkly physicalistic conception of modern natural science as the standard and

measureof alltruthas such. Anditis justthisconception,takenina looserand

more general sense, which then undergirds our current philosophical climate in
which philosophical naturalism appears to be all but intuitivelyself-evident. From
the point of view of modern natural science there can appear to be no room, as

itwere, foreithera special status forlogicand mathematicsor a special status for

philosophy. The only kindof truthit now appears possible to envision is just that

of empirical natural science itself, and any other putative type of truth now
appears to be shrouded in mystery.13

Let us consider this philosophical gloss on the preeminent status of modern

natural science more closely. And let us begin by considering those truths of
modern natural science given paradigmatic status by Quine-truths about
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didthe notion
andmuonsandcurvedspace-time."How,inparticular,
"electrons
to
Einstein's
is
central
is
well
of curvedspace-time,which,as
known,
general
actuallyariseanddevelop?
theoryof relativity,
of two
Thegeneralrelativistic
conceptionofcurvedspace-timeis the product
Felix
Klein's
in
mathematics:
late
nineteenth
fundamental
developments
century
of the classicalnon-Euclideangeometriesof
incorporation
group-theoretical
into
case of constantzerocurvature)
constantcurvature
the Euclidean
(including
of projectivegeometry,and BernhardRiemann's
the moregeneralframework
of a generaltheoryof manifoldsof arbitrary
even morerevolutionary
articulation
case ofspaces
thehitherto
dimensionandcurvature-including
uncontemplated
of variablecurvature.Itwas the firstset of developmentsthatled Hermann
as describinga
Minkowski
to interpret
Einstein's1905specialtheoryof relativity
world"-in
Minkowski's
an
"absolute
four-dimensional
language,
geometry-in
whichthe Lorentztransformations
linkinginertialreferenceframesin Einstein's
a Kleiniangroupof a geometryof zero
theoryare conceivedas constituting
curvature
radical
closelyanalogousto Euclidean
geometry.Inthisway,Einstein's
thesis of the relativity
of simultaneity,
whichrejectsNewtonianabsolutetime
of space and motion,is interpreted
as the assertionof a
existingindependently
newtypeof physicalreality:"Henceforth
fundamentally
space byitself,andtime
by itself,are doomedto fadeawayintomereshadows,andonlya kindof union
of the two will preservean independentreality."14
Yet such a Minkowskian
four-dimensional
as Einsteinsooncameto realize,is inadequatefor
framework,
a theoryofgravitation.
Therelativistic
Einsteinfinallybrought
theoryofgravitation
to completionin 1916 adds Riemann'sideas on arbitrary
manifoldsof variable
curvatureto the initialframework
of whatwe nowcall Minkowski
space-time.
Gravitation
is interpreted
as a perturbation
oftheunderlying
Minkowski
geometry
of matterandenergywithinspace-timeso that,inparticular,
bythe distribution
the trajectory
of a bodyina gravitational
fieldis nowconceivedas a maximally
curve
or
Minkowski's
straight
geodesic-in
language,a maximallystraight
"world-line"-in
a four-dimensional
of
geometry variablecurvature.
It is in this way thatthe notionof curvedspace-timefirstenteredmodern
physics. And,as is wellknown,this notionbecamegenerallyacceptedwithin
modernphysicson the basisof a smallnumberof experimental
tests-the most
famousof whichwas the confirmation
of Einstein'spredictions
forthe deflection
of lightina gravitational
fieldbyobservationsmadeduringa totaleclipseof the
sun bythe BritishSolarExpeditions
led byArthur
in 1919. Itis inthis
Eddington
notionof
way that the generaltheoryof relativity,
includingthe fundamental
curvedspace-time,firstfaced,inQuine'swords,the"tribunal
ofexperience."But
the crucialquestion,from our point of view, concerns the status of the
mathematicalmachineryof general relativityin such experimentaltests.
resultson the deflectionof lightcertainlyconfirm,orweretakento
Eddington's
Einstein's
fieldequationsgoverningthe relationship
between
confirm,
particular
and
curvature.
mass-energydensity space-time
(Moreprecisely,theyconfirm
the so-called Schwarzschild
of the sun,whichis
geometryinthe neighborhood
one particular
solutionto Einstein'sequations.) Butdo they also confirmthe
Kleiniantheory of transformation
groups and the Riemanniantheory of
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ADDRESSOF THECENTRALDIVISION
n-dimensional manifoldsconstitutingthe mathematicalbackgroundto general
relativity? Even if we are willingto speak in terms of differingdegrees of

"entrenchment"
here,does itreallymakesense toenvisiona processofempirical
somehowequallyfaces the
testinginwhicheven thismathematical
background
of experience"?
"tribunal
I submitthatthis way of lookingat the matterdoes not makesense-and not

woulddescribethesituation
simplybecauseno sane physicistormathematician
in this way. The fundamental
is not happily
problemis thatgeneralrelativity
viewedas somethinglikea largeconjunction,
suchthatone conjunctis givenby
Einstein'sfieldequations,anotherconjunctis givenby the Kleiniantheoryof
transformation
groups,anda thirdconjunctis givenbythe Riemannian
theoryof
manifolds-wherewe then view Eddington'sexperimentalresults, say, as
confirmation
overtheentireconjunction.15
Rather,
potentially
spreadingempirical
the mathematical
of
Einstein's
theoryfunctionsas a necessary
background
of thattheory,as a meansof representation
ora language,as it
presupposition

were, withoutwhichthe theorycould not even be formulatedor envisioned as a

possibilityin the firstplace.
To see this, let us firstconsiderthe situationinthe seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, during the heyday of the Newtoniantheory of gravitation. In this
context, the modern concept of space-time simply does not exist. Space is
representedby a three-dimensionalgeometry(Euclideangeometryis of course
the only possibility),time is an entirelyseparate independentvariableused to
parametrizethree-dimensionalspatialtrajectories,andgravitationis represented
by a three-dimensional force acting immediately across arbitrary
three-dimensional spatial distances. In this context, the general theory of
relativitycould not even be formulated,let alone be subject to empiricaltest. It
is not that Newton'stheoryis adopted in preferenceto Einstein'son the basis of
the then availableevidence; the lattertheorysimplydoes not yet belong among
the conceivable alternatives. Conversely,let us now considerthe situationfrom
the point of view of the space-time physics of the twentiethcentury. In this
context, we see that we can now formulateall the theories of interest to us
here-Newtonian physics, special relativity,general relativity-withinthe same
four-dimensionallanguage. Newtonianphysics, too, can now be representedas
a space-time theory, postulating a differentstructure for space-time-one
containing counterparts of absolute time and absolute space-from that
postulated by either special relativityor general relativity. Indeed, as the
mathematician Elie Cartan showed in the 1920s, we can even formulate
Newtoniangravitationtheoryusingvariablycurvedspace-time, justas ingeneral

relativity.Fromthis pointof viewit is thencrystalclearthatthe mathematical

withinwhichtheconceptofcurvedspace-timeis formulated
is partof
machinery
the meansof representation
or languageof generalrelativity
andnotpartof its

empiricalcontent. For all the theories in question here-which differwidely, of

course, in empirical content-are now formulated within the very same
mathematicallanguage.
Kant understood a prioriknowledge as supplyingthe presuppositionsor
conditionsof possibilityof empiricalknowledge-as thatwhichmakes it possible
12

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claimsaboutsensiblygivennaturein
andjustifyobjectiveempirical
to formulate
conditions
thefirstplace.AndKantmodelledhisparticular
theoryofthesea priori
mathematical
of objectiveexperienceontheNewtonian
of the possibility
physics
of hisday-on Newtonian
time,andtheNewtonian
conception
space, Newtonian
of matter,force, and interactionencapsulatedin the laws of motionand
exemplifiedin universalgravitation.Atone place,Kanteven comparesthisa
to a language-as thatwhichmakesitpossibleforus "tospell
prioriframework
We learned
outappearances,inorderto be ableto readthemas experience."16
inthe late nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,however,thatthe particular
envisionedby Kantis notthe onlypossiblesuchframework.
a prioriframework
And we learnedthis, of course, on the basis of preciselythe sequence of
inbothmathematics
andmathematical
developments
physicsbriefly
revolutionary
sketchedabove. We therebylearned,withouta doubt,thatsuch conditionsof
naturalscience shouldnot
or necessarypresuppositions
of empirical
possibility
be viewedas rigidlyfixedforalltime,as foreverimmuneto revision.Itdoes not
follow, however,that such mathematicalframeworksno longer have the
characteristic
"constitutive"
functionKantfirstarticulated-thefunctionof making
theoriesinnatural
therigorousformulation
andconfirmation
of properly
empirical
sciencefirstpossible.Onthecontrary,
as we havejustseen, thisis emphatically
stillthe case in the generaltheoryof relativity,
whereit is simplynot possible
eitherto formulateor empirically
to test Einstein'sfieldequationswithoutthe
newmathematical
framework
dueultimately
to RiemannandKlein.
revolutionary
Nowsuch a generalization
andrelativization
of the Kantian
a priori,
whereby
it loses its rigidlyfixedcharacterbutretainsits essential"constitutive"
function
with respect to empiricalknowledge,was in fact commoncoin withinlate
nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturyscientificphilosophy-mostimportantly,
forourpurposes,amongthephilosophers
nowknownas logicalpositivists.Thus
for
Reichenbach, example, distinguishedtwo meaningsof the Kantiana
priori-necessary and unrevisable,fixed for all time, on the one hand,
"constitutive
of theconceptoftheobjectof [scientific]
on theother.17
knowledge,"
He argued,inthiscontext,thatthe greatlesson of the theoryof relativity
is that
theformermeaningmustbe droppedwhilethe lattermustbe retained.Relativity
theory, that is, involves a prioriconstitutiveprinciplesas necessary
presuppositionsjust as much as does Newtonianphysics; it is just that
mathematical
inthetransition
from
physicshaschangeditsconstitutive
principles
the lattertheoryto the formerone. Anditwas Carnapwho broughtthis new,
relativized
anddynamical
to itsmostpreciseexpression
conceptionofthea priori
via his formallycharacterized
distinction,
brieflynotedabove,betweenrevision
of languageor linguisticframework,
on the one side, and revisionof empirical
statementsformulated
withina givenlinguistic
on the other.
framework,
As we also observedabove,Quineanconsiderations
aboutrevisability
and
holism
do
touch
this
new
of
not,bythemselves,
epistemological
conception the
a prioriintheslightest.Indeed,revolutionary
scientificchanges,whereinthevery
orlanguagewithinwhichempirical
framework
scientifictheoriesare
background
formulated
itselfundergoesradicaltransformation,
providethisconceptionwith
its primary
motivation
andits strongestcorroboration.
Inthe case of the radical
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inthetheoryof relativity,
forexample,we
conceptualtransformation
culminating
see thatbothmathematics
andmathematical
have
physics
undergoneprofound
revolutionary
changes. Nevertheless,althoughthese two sequences of
andphysical-indeedcometogetherina striking
developments-mathematical
anddramaticfashioninthe physicaltheoryof generalrelativity,
theystillremain
separateanddistinctsequences evolvingaccordingto theirowncharacteristic
aredrivenlargelybyconsiderations
dynamics.Themathematical
developments
ofconceptualgeneralization
andunification
internal
tomathematics,
togetherwith
fruitfulnew results obtainablewithinmathematicsby purelymathematical
methods-methods which of course involve no appeal whatsoever to
orobservational
inphysics,by
experimental
testing-whereasthedevelopments
are
results.Andinall
contrast, self-consciouslydrivenby preciseexperimental
thisthe mathematical
or
developmentsconstitutethe necessarypresupposition
conditionof possibility
of the physicaldevelopments,inthattheformulation
and
confirmation
of the latterwouldnoteven be possibleinthe
preciseexperimental
firstplace withoutthe former. It is no wonder,then,thatwe findin Thomas
Kuhn'stheoryof the natureandcharacterof scientificrevolutions-inthecentral
Kuhnian
distinction
betweenchangeof paradigm,
on the one side, and normal
of
distinction
science,on theother-an informal
counterpart Carnap'sformalized
between change of language or linguisticframeworkand rule-governed
operationscarriedoutwithinsuch a framework.18
AlthoughCarnap'sparticular
formalization
has notinfactsurvived,the historical
andphilosophical
relevance
of thisdistinction
forproperly
the natureandevolutionof modern
understanding
naturalscience has in no way beentherebydiminished.
We can deepen and generalizeour appreciation
of the characteristically
constitutiverole of mathematicswithinmodernnaturalscience, finally,by
ofthesixteenthandseventeenth
glancingbackbrieflyat thescientificrevolution
centurieswhichinitiated
it. Foritwas atthispoint,intheworkofsuchthinkersas
Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz, that the very idea of a
thoroughgoingmathematicaldescriptionof sensible nature first gained wide
currency. It was at this point,that is, that the previouslydominantAristotelian
idealof a largelyqualitativeand teleologicaldescriptionof ourexperience of the
naturalworldwas overturnedinfavorof the new ideal-constitutive of all modern
physics-of a mathematicallyexact descriptionbased on geometryand laws of
motion. This radicalconceptual revolutionprofoundlytransformedour idea of

whatitmeansforscientificstatementstofacethetribunal
of experience-forthis

idea was now interpretedas requiringthe deductionof precise mathematical

resultswhichcouldthen be subjecttocorrespondinglyexact proceduresof testing
and measurement. And, as I hope to have made amplyclear, in this meaning it

itself
simplymakesno sense at allto assertthatthe mathematical
background
also faces the tribunal
experience.19Blindnessto thissimpleyet fundamental
statusandfunctionof whatwe
point-and thus blindnessto the characteristic
call
the
constitutive
a
of a philosophical
the
basis
might
priori20-on
conception
thatpridesitselfon takingmodernnaturalscienceas theparadigm
of knowledge
ingeneral,is perhapsthemostpeculiar,
and,Iamtemptedtosay, mostperverse,
legacy of contemporaryphilosophicalnaturalism.
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We have seen that the idea of a special a priorirole for the mathematical
disciplinesinour naturalscientificknowledgeis aliveand well in post-Newtonian
mathematicalphysics and post-Kantianscientific philosophy. This idea has
nothing to do with a jejune obsession with epistemic certainty, unshakable

Onthecontrary,
itis motivated
orabsoluteunrevisability.
foundations,
throughout
for
an
of
the
manifold
possibilities development,growth,and
by appreciation
in both pure mathematicsand mathematicalnatural
radicaltransformation
andunexpectedways
science-and byan appreciation,
aboveall,ofthestriking
andevenmergewithone
inwhichthesetwotypesofdevelopments
caninfluence
anotherin the course of revolutionary
conceptualchanges such as those
It
in
the
of
nonetheless,to
exemplified
theory relativity. remainsimportant,
and
that
revolutions
mathematical
conceptual
physicalconceptual
recognize
are notthe same-and, inparticular,
revolutions
that,inpreciselysuchcases as
incontent,continues
thetheoryof relativity,
howeverrevolutionary
mathematics,
of possibility
tofunctionas a meansof representation
orcondition
forthephysical
tests. Wehavealso seen
whicharetherebysubjectto exactempirical
principles
thatallof these ideas are givenpreciselogicalexpressioninthe philosophyof
formallanguagesor linguisticframeworks
developedby Carnap,a philosophy
which,as we notedat the verybeginning,is in no way motivatedby traditional
concernsforcertainty,
or philosophical
"validation."
And,whereas
justification,
or
Carnap'srepeatedattemptsto fashionan explicitlogicalcharacterization
betweena prioriand empiricaltruthhave indeed
explicationof the distinction
fallenpreyto Quine'spenetrating
attackon the analytic/synthetic
it
distinction,
does notfollowthatwe shouldsimplyclose oureyes to the historical
realitiesof
holism.
scientificpracticeon behalfof a blandlyundifferentiated
philosophical
Ifpost-Kantian
scientificphilosophy
no longeraimsat supplying
a foundation
or "validation"
of scientificpractice,however,thenwhatroleremainsleftforit?
Arewe not faced, once again,withthe idea thatphilosophy,as a discipline,
shouldsimplybe absorbedintoempiricalnaturalscience-that it should,for
example,becomethat branchof the empiricalstudyof actualhumanbeings
of science as an
where, in Quine'swords,"[w]eare afteran understanding
orprocessintheworld,andwe do notintendthatunderstanding
institution
to be
Here,I believe,we can again
any betterthanthe sciencewhichis itsobject?"21
derivean important
clue fromthe Carnapiandistinctionbetweenchange of
linguisticframeworkand rule-governedoperationswithin a given such
inotherwords,betweenwhatCarnapcallsexternal
framework-thedistinction,
and internalquestions. For Carnapheld that it is the characteristic
fate of
to be entangledwithexternalquestions-withquestions,inparticular,
philosophy
aboutwhichlinguisticframework
shouldbe adoptedforthe totallanguageof
science. Such questions,Carnapfurtherheld, can in no way be settled by
theoreticalconsiderations,by either rules of evidence and confirmation
of factualor empiricalscience or rules of deductionand proof
characteristic
of formalormathematical
characteristic
science. External
questionsconsidered
in philosophy are therefore purelypracticalquestions, and, as such, they are
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answered, not by theoretical assertions, but by practical proposals to adopt one

or another form of language.
I would put the guiding thought behind this Carnapian characterization of the
peculiar role of philosophy as follows. In empirical natural science, as we have
seen, we proceed against a background of concepts and principles-typically,
mathematical concepts and principles-which constitute the framework or
language of our inquiry. In particular, these concepts and principles make the
rigorous formulation and testing of particularempirical hypotheses first possible,
and, in this sense, they help to define what success or failure within this inquiry
amount to. As such, the background framework in question contributes to the
norms and standards of the discipline-norms and standards which, in the normal
course of affairs, are generally taken for granted by the practitioners of the
discipline. (In Kuhnian language, then, we are here concerned with elements of
a paradigm definitive of a particularpart or episode of normal science.) In pure
mathematics, too, we typically operate against the background of generally
agreed upon definitional stipulations and methods of proof-which, in a
Carnapian-style rational reconstruction, would appear as primitivevocabulary,

primitiveaxioms,and primitiverules of inference. And, in bothcases, it is

precisely the presence of such a generally agreed upon and taken for granted
background that makes possible an inquirywe can honorificallycharacterize as
"scientific"-that is, as progressive, as problem solving, and as capable of wide
if not universal consensus.
It may also happen, however, that we have occasion to step back and reflect
upon such a taken for granted background of disciplinary norms and standards.
We may have occasion, that is, to call such norms and standards into question
and to ask ourselves why precisely these concepts and principles should govern

ourinquiry.Indeed,duringperiodsof deep revolutionary

changeitis justsuch
(inKuhnian
questionsthatcometo theforeground.Olderconstitutive
principles
are challenged,newconstitutive
(inKuhnian
terms,olderparadigms)
principles
aresuggested.As Carnapwouldputit,we arenowfaced
terms,newparadigms)
withanexternalquestionconcerning
ofone linguistic
framework
thereplacement
We
another.
can
we
such
a
decide
cannot,by
How,then,
by
question?
definition,appealany longerto a generallyagreeduponandtakenforgranted
foritisjustsucha background
constitutive
thathas nowbeencalled
background,
intoquestion.We are thusno longerdealingwithpurelyscientificquestionsin
the above sense-that is, we are no longeroperatingwhollywithinwhatKuhn
calls normal science-and it is precisely here that characteristically philosophical
considerations come into play.
Let us illustrate these ideas with a couple of examples. Consider first the
revolutionary conceptual changes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
which initiated modern natural science as we know it. These events certainly

success in providing
exact
involveda numberof instancesof strikingempirical
in
modern
mathematical
of
nature
the
representations
style-notably,Kepler's
newplanetaryastronomy(building,
to be sure,on a longmathematical
tradition)
andGalileo'smathematical
of projectile
motion(whichwas,initsown
description
right,almostentirelynew). Nevertheless,the ambitionsof thisnew intellectual
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movementfarexceeded its grasp. Forone hereaimedat nothingless thana

precise mathematical
descriptionof all of the phenomenaof nature,to be
achievedbyan atomisticorcorpuscular
theoryof matterthatreducedallnatural
changes to the motionsand mutualimpactsof the constituentparticles.And
was actuallyachieved
such an atomisticreduction
nothingeven approximating
untilthe late nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies-when,we mightadd, it
was achievedusingentirelynewandhitherto
entirelyunforeseenmathematical
andphysicalconcepts.So itwas notsimplyempirical
andmathematical
success
inthe modernstylethatmotivated
andsustainedthisintellectual
movement.On
thecontrary,
movementwhich
duringitsfirstfiftyyearsespecially,theintellectual
initiatedmodernnaturalscience supporteditself,aboveall,on the newsystem
of natural philosophy fashioned by Descartes-a
philosophy which not only
sketched a complete program for a new, geometrical physics, but which also
undertook the task of radically revising and reorganizing the wider system of
philosophical concepts and principles bequeathed to western thought by
Scholasticism (involving such concepts as substance, force, space, time, matter,
mind, creation, divinity). Virtuallyall of the importantthinkers of the period-for
example, Huygens, Leibniz, and even Newton-began their intellectual careers
as disciples of this new philosophical system. And, if they were later radically to

reviseoreven to rejectit,itstillcasta longandindelible

shadowacrosstheirown
intellectual
contributions-tosuchan extent,infact,thatthese contributions
are
almostimpossibleto conceiveexceptagainstthisCartesianbackground.
For a second example,consideronce again the relativisticrevolutionin
considerations
physicswroughtbyEinstein.Itiswellknownthatpurelyempirical
playeda decidedlysecondaryrolehere. NotonlydidEinsteinentirelyignorethe
celebratedexperimentof Michelsonand Morleyin his 1905 paperon special
buttherewas on the scene a fullydevelopedcompetitor
relativity,
theory-the
"aether"
toEinstein's
Lorentz-Fitzgerald
theory-whichwasempirically
equivalent
Einstein
himself
cites
a
of
influences
on his
theory.
variety philosophical
the
"critical"
and
of
thinking-including,
especially,
"skeptical"
philosophies Hume
and Mach.22Withthe benefitof hindsight,however,we can say that the
and mathematical
philosophicalideas of the great Frenchmathematician
physicistHenriPoincare(whowas of coursedeeplyinvolvedwiththe problems
in electrodynamicsaddressed by special relativityand who Einsteinwas
For
intensivelyreadingat the time)wereof perhapseven moreimportance.23
Poincar6hadarrived,onthebasisof hisownfundamental
mathematical
workon
non-Euclideangeometry,at the idea thatgeometryis neither(pace Kant)a
nor(pace Gauss and Helmholtz)
a
synthetica prioriproductof pureintuition
straightforward
empiricaldescriptionof what we can experiencein nature.
one or anothersystemof geometry,accordingto Poincare,rather
Establishing
requiresa freechoice,a conventionof ourowninorderto bridgethe irreducible
gulfbetweenourcrudeand approximate
sensoryexperienceand ourprecise
mathematical
of
nature.
There
is no doubtthatEinsteinfoundthis
descriptions
idea to be tremendouslyliberating,and itappears that itwas this idea, above all,

thatstimulatedhimto viewthe conceptof simultaneity,

notas a simpledatumof
immediateintuitionor experience, but ratheras something to be fixed
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axiomatically by definition as part of the frameworkof a new proposed
kinematics.24
AlthoughEinsteinwas later,throughhis workon the generaltheory,

of geometry,it
to movedecisivelybeyondPoincare'sconventionalist
philosophy
move
is, once again,almostimpossibleto conceiveEinstein'sinitialliberating
withoutthis philosophical
does
not
in
such
function,
background.Philosophy
cases of fundamental
as a firmeror morecertain
conceptualtransformation,
sourceof knowledgewhichwe can thenuse to justifyor"validate"
the scientific
of
changes inquestion.Nordoes it proceedinsplendidisolation,independent
the scientificdevelopmentsthemselves. Descarteswas motivatedin his new
system of naturalphilosophyby earlierscientificdiscoveries-notably,by
Copernicanastronomyand by his owndiscoveryof whatwe now call analytic
geometry. Poincare,as we just observed,was motivatedby his own purely
mathematical
workinnon-Euclidean
geometryandwas himselfdeeplyinvolved
withthe newlyemergingfoundationsof electrodynamics.Philosophyrather
functionshereat one levelremoved,as itwere,fromconceptualtransformations
within the sciences. It operates in an environmentwhere a new constitutive

framework
is notyet inplace,anditsuggests ideas,
(a newscientificparadigm)
and
of a less precisebutmoregeneral
concepts,principles, programs-typically
characterthan the scientificconstitutiveframeworks
themselves-whichcan
motivateandsupportthe pursuitof one suchconstitutive
framework
ratherthan
another.Inthissense, ifscientificconceptualrevolutions
takeplaceat one level
removedfromwhatKuhncallsnormalscience,philosophy
operatesratherattwo
levelsremoved.
Carnapcharacterizesthe answerswe mightreasonablyattemptto give to
andpurelypragmatic.Hethereby
philosophical
questionsas bothconventional
emphasizesthe elementof freedecision-thatwe are herenotboundby fixed
and antecedentlyagreed uponrules-as well as the fundamentally
practical
characterof such questions-that, as a consequence,we are governedby
standardsof utilityand expediencyratherthantruth.To this I wouldadd the
provisothatstandardsof utilityandexpediencyarethemselvesoftenat issue in
such cases-that the realproblemis oftento decidewhatwe willnowcountas
fruitfulor successful. Ourproblemis rationally
to negotiatenew standardsor
idealsof fruitfulness
andsuccess, andnotsimplyto estimatethe probabilities
of
clear
and
the
basis
on
of
achievingalready
agreedupongoals
acceptedempirical
results. I would also add a fundamentally historical dimension to our
new philosophicalideals
understandingof philosophicaltheorizing.Informulating
we typically react to, and operate against the background of, previous
philosophical ideals-as Descartes operated against the background of
Scholastic naturalphilosophyor Poincareoperated against the backgroundof
bothKantianismand empiricism.Philosophythus notonlyfunctionsat a different
level than the scientific disciplines, but also within its own characteristic
intellectualcontext.
Lyingat the basis of contemporaryphilosophicalnaturalismis the Quinean
pictureof the totalityof humanknowledgewithwhichwe began. Ourknowledge
is picturedas a vast web of beliefs, which responds as a total system to the
impactof sense experience along the periphery,and withinwhich, accordingly,
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the only relevantdistinctionswe can make involvedegrees of centralityand thus
of entrenchment. Let me suggest, as an alternative,the pictureof a dynamical
system of beliefs, concepts, and principlesthat can be analyzed, for present
purposes, intothree maincomponents: an evolvingsystem of empiricalnatural
scientificconcepts and principles,an evolvingsystem of mathematicalconcepts
and principleswhich frame those of empiricalnaturalscience and make their
rigorousformulationand precise experimentaltesting possible, and an evolving
system of philosophicalconcepts and principleswhichserve, especiallyinperiods
of conceptual revolution,as a source of suggestions and guidance in choosing
one scientific frameworkrather than another. All of these systems are in

continualdynamicalevolution,and it is indeedthe case that no conceptor

principleis forever immuneto revision. Yet we can nonetheless clearly
distinguishthe radicallydifferentfunctions,levels, and roles of the differing
componentsystems. Inparticular,
althoughthe threecomponentsystems are
in
interaction,
certainly perpetual
theynonethelessevolveaccordingto theirown
characteristic
dynamics. Onlyin the case of the empiricalnaturalscientific
system, for example, do precise experimentaltests functionas relevant
dynamicalfactors-only here do our beliefs,in this sense, squarelyface the
tribunal
of experience.Bothinmathematics
andinphilosophy,
bycontrast,freely
creative responses to precedingintellectualdevelopmentsare the primary
andinspiring
arethe
enginesofchange. Inallthis,however,whatis moststriking
where each of the three
periods of profoundconceptualtransformation
inthose revolutions
involvement
componentscontributesitsowncharacteristic
ofthoughtthatfigureamongtheveryhighestachievementsofourintellectual
life.
Notes
1. M. Devitt,Comingto OurSenses: A Naturalistic
Programfor Semantic
1996,pp.2, 49.
Localism,Cambridge,
2. See W.V. Quine,"TwoDogmasof Empiricism,"
inhisFroma LogicalPointof
View,Cambridge,
Mass.,1953,?6.
3. D. Papineau,Philosophical
Naturalism,
Oxford,1993,p. 5.
4. Quine,"Epistemology
in his Ontological
Naturalized,"
Relativityand Other
Essays, NewYork,1969,p. 82.
5. Quine, op. cit., p. 75-76.

6. Quine,op. cit.,p. 78.

7. Inthemostexplicitpolemicagainstpsychologism
Carnapeverwrote,"Vonder
Erkenntnistheorie
zurWissenschaftslogik,"
inActesduCongrdsinternational
du
philosophiescientifique,Paris,1936, Carnapdepictsscientificphilosophyas
from
goingthroughthreemainstages of development:thefirstis the transition
speculativephilosophyor metaphysicsto epistemology,the second is the
to an empiricist
rejectionof the synthetica prioriandthetransition
epistemology,
thethirdandfinalstage is thetransition
fromepistemology
to thelogicof science
Themainproblemhereis to realizethatepistemologyas
[Wissenschaftslogik].
mixture
practicedso far-includinginCarnap'sownearlierwork-is an "unclear
of psychological
andlogicalconstituents"
(p. 36).
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8. I thuscannotfollowQuinein his assertion,"TwoDogmas,"p. 41, that"[t]he

twodogmasare,at root,identical."
9. R. Carnap,TheLogicalSyntaxof Language,trans.A. Smeaton,London,
1937,?82.
10. CompareCarnap,"Empiricism,
in his Meaning
Semantics,andOntology,"
andNecessity,Chicago,1956,footnote5 on p. 215.
11. See Quine,WordandObject,Cambridge,
Mass.,1960,?14.
12. Quine,"Replyto Chomsky,"
in WordsandObjection:
Essayson the Workof
W.V.Quine,ed. D. DavidsonandJ. Hintikka,
Dordrecht,
1969,p. 303.
13. A good example of this more general physicalistictendencyis Paul
Benacerrafsinfluential
"Mathematical
Journalof Philosophy70 (1973):
Truth,"
which
raises
for
the
notion
mathematical
truthonthebasis
of
661-679,
problems
of a causaltheoryof knowledge:see especiallypp.671-72, whichmotivatethis
causaltheoryofknowledge
byreferencetotwentieth
centuryspace-timephysics.
14. H.Minkowski,
and
Addressdeliveredatthe80thAssemblyof
"Space Time,"
GermanNaturalScientistsand Physicians,1908, trans.W. Perrettand G. B.
of Relativity,
London,1923,p. 75.
Jeffreyin H.A. Lorentz,et. al., ThePrinciple
15. Sucha "conjunctive"
viewofempirical
confirmation
andtesting-wherelogic
and mathematicsare treatedsimplyas furtherconjuncts-is explicitin Quine,
Philosophyof Logic,EnglewoodCliffs,1970,pp.5-7.
16. I. Kant,Prolegomenato Any FutureMetaphysics,?30.
17. Reichenbachdeveloped thisanalysis inhis firstbook,Relativitatstheorie
und
Erkenntnis Apriori, published in 1920. For an English version see H.
Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativityand A Priori Knowledge, trans. M.
Reichenbach, Berkeley, 1965. For furtherdiscussion see my "Geometry,
Convention,and the RelativizedA Priori:Reichenbach,Schlick,and Carnap,"in
Logic,Language,and the Structureof ScientificTheories,ed. W. Salmonand G.
Wolters,Pittsburgh,1994.
18. It is well knownthat Carnap,for his part,was quite enthusiasticabout The
Structureof ScientificRevolutions.And,towardsthe end of his career, Kuhnwas
fond of characterizinghis viewpointas "Kantianism
withmovablecategories."

19. A fullertreatmentof thispointwouldneedto distinguish

puremathematics,
wherewe developtheoriesofvariousmathematical
structures
(e.g.,differentiable
manifolds),from applied mathematics,where we assert that some such
mathematical
fora givenphysical
structureprovidesa modelor representation
domain(e.g., that space-time events can be modelledor representedby a
relativisticdifferentiablemanifold). The claim in the text is clear and
I believe,forpuremathematics,
butthe appliedcase obviously
incontrovertible,
raises numerousadditional
am
to ElisabethLloydand
indebted
questions. (I
for
Leeds
me
to
make
this
distinction
Stephen
explicit.)
prompting
20. Forthisterminology,
setting,see G.
deployedina moregeneralphilosophical
De Pierris,"The ConstitutiveA Priori,"CanadianJournalof Philosophy,
Volume18 (1993):179-214.
Supplementary
21. Quine,"Epistemology
Naturalized,"
p. 84.
22. See A. Einstein,"Autobiographical
Notes,"inAlbertEinstein:PhilosopherScientist, ed. P. Schilpp,New York,1959, p. 53.

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23. For Poincare's influenceon Einsteinsee A. Miller,AlbertEinstein'sSpecial
Theoryof Relativity,Reading,1981, especiallyChapter2, "Einstein'sPhilosophic
Viewpointin 1905."
24. The passage fromEinsteincited in note 22 above states thatthe key insight
was to recognize the "arbitrariness"
of "theaxiom of the absolute characterof
time, viz, of simultaneity"-language which certainly sounds far more like
Poincar6than either Humeor Mach.

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