Method,JournalofLonerganStudies

Volume14,Number1,Spring1996,8598.

Kant'sAnomalousInsights
ANoteonKantandLonergan.
WilliamMathews,S.J.
Milltown Institute
Giovanni Sala's letter together with his book, Lonergan and Kant,1
hopefully will stimulate anew the question of the Kantian influence on Lonergan
and, equally, the potential contribution of Lonergan to Kant studies. For it is
becoming clear that Lonergan's roots in Kant run deeper than was previously
suspected. Sala has drawn our attention to the well known comment about the
judgeintheBPrefacetotheCritiqueofPureReason.2 Reasonmustapproachthe
studyofnatureinordertobetaughtbyit,notlikeapupillisteningtohisteacher
but more like a judge "whocompelsthewitnessestoanswerquestionswhichhe
hashimselfformulated."(Bxiii)Theroleofthejudgewillbetoevaluatecritically
theevidencesupportingthetruthorfalsehoodofthetheory.Thereseemsinvolved
inthissomethingmorethanKant'sanalysisofjudgmentintermsofapplyingrules
to situations. This poses thequestiondoes the actual performance ofajudgeor
jurysitwithinKant'sanalysisofunderstanding,judgment,orreason?Orincertain
respects is it an anomaly? Is it drawing our attention to a dimension of the
performanceofmindthatisoutsideofthescopeoftheanalysisintheactualtext?3
In the present note I would like to draw attention to a possible second
anomaly in the same BPreface. There, and elsewhere in his works, we find a
number of uses of the word, Einsicht, insight, by Kant which I believe deserve
attention.4 Thereisacertainshynessamongphilosophersofmindwhenitcomesto
1

"Note,KantandLonerganonInsightintotheSensible:ALetterofGiovanniB.Salaon
LonerganandKant," Method,JournalofLonerganStudies,Vol13,No1,Spring1995,pps8997
Lonergan and Kant, Five Essays on Human Knowledge, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press,
1994).
2
CritiqueofPureReason,translatedbyNormanKempSmith,(London,Macmillan1964).All
referencesaretothisversionwhichwillbeabbrevaitedas CPR.
3

Morespecifically,isKant'sanalysisofjudgment,A68,B93ffconsistentwithwhatajudgeor
jurymemberactuallydoeswhentheyperformtheirwork?SeeSala,opcit.,note1,xii,68,34.On
theotherhandthearticleonjudgmentinHowardCaygill, AKantDictionary,(Oxford,Blackwells
1995)267,assertsthatforKant"thetheoreticaljudgmentcontainsanisandanisnot,"suggesting
theneedforacarefulstudyofthefocaldifferencesbetweenLonerganandKantonjudgment.
4

DespitefrequentreferencestotheBPreface,Ihavenotbeenabletofindanyreferencetothe
occurrence of theword,Einsicht, inSala's book.Noris itlistedin theindex.Thisinpart isthe
reasonforthepresentnote.Thewordinsightdoesoccurinaquoteonpage104fromCassirer,E,
Kant'sLebenundLehre(Berlin:1918)139.Thesentencereads:"However,onecanhardlydefend
the view that 'all the fundamental insights that constitutetheKRVarealreadyexpressedhere.'"
Only one reference to the word is to be found in Register,to Kant Werke in Zwlf Bnden,

usingtheword,insight,orevenrelatedwordssuchasdiscovery.Grantedthatitis
interestingtofindaseminentaphilosopherasKantactuallyusingthewordinwhat
seems a significant place, his second Preface to the work. The uses pose the
question,towhatextentdidKantacknowledge,ornot,theeventofinsight.When
hewas writingthefinalPrefacetohisworkhadtheeventofinsightclickedforhim.
Ifso,mighthisrecognitionoftheeventofinsightresultinafurtheranomaly,inthat
ittoomightstandoutsidethebodyofthework.
I
The word, Einsicht, which Norman Kemp Smith translated as insight,
occursto myknowledgeseventimes in the B Preface to theCPR,B,xiiiBxiv
B,xxx (twice)B, xxxiB,xliii andB,xliv.Thequestionarises,onthebasisofhis
usageoftheword,whatisheactuallytalkingabout?
Kant'sfirstuseoftheterm,insight,occursinthecontextofdescriptionsof
mathematicalandscientificdiscoveries.Afterdescribingthosediscoveriesherefers
to them as the insights of reason. Early Egyptian mathematics was at a groping
stage.This gropingstagewastransformedduetoarevolutioninthemindofaman.
AnewlightflasheduponthemindofmanwhenThalesorwhoeverdemonstrated
the properties of an isosceles triangle for the first time in human history.(B, xi)
What exactly does hemeanby"anewlight",thelightofinsight?Thisshouldbe
readinconjunctionwiththelaterdiscussionoftheruleorlawofthetriangle,(B
7445)whichwaspresumablywrittenbeforethePreface.Aphilosopherleftwitha
trianglewillnotproduceanythingnew.Thegeometerontheotherhanddrawsa
triangle. He extends the base line beyond the boundary knowing that the sum of
anglesatthepointofextensionalongthelineistworightangles.Throughthepoint
ofextensionhedrawsalineparalleltotheoppositeside.Inthedisposedimagehe
comestounderstandthatthesumoftheinternalanglesistworightangles.Inhis
lectures,UnderstandingandBeing5 Lonerganactuallyusesthisasanillustrationof
insightintophantasm!UnlikeKanthedoes notfreezeinfrontoftheimage.Rather
herecognisesthatyoucannotgettothedefinitionofthetrianglewithoutstarting
withsomeinexactimageordiagramandsupposingitisexact.Heconcludes,again,
unlike Kant, that experience and the imagination is the source of mathematical
concepts.Imagesforhimcauseinsights.
IndescribingscientificdiscoveriesKantagaintalksabouthowanewlight
broke on the students of nature when Galileo caused the balls to roll down an
inclinedplane,whenTorricellimadetheaircarryaweightofmercury,andwhen
Stahlchangedmetalsintooxidesandoxidesbackintometals.Galileo'sexperiment
rests on the insight that the measured distance moved might stand in a fixed
Wiesbaden: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1958 (Kant, Complete Works in 12 Volumes). No references to
insightaretobefoundin AKantDictionary referredtoinn3.
5

Understandingand Being,(Toronto,UniversityofTorontoPress,1990)31.

correlation with the measured time taken to move that distance down the plane.
The experiment is concerned with filling out the expectations of that insight.
Torricelli's barometer is based on the insight that the measured weight of the
atmospherecanberelatedtothemeasuredweightofacolumn ofmercury.Stahlis
trying to understand combustion. He proposes that phlogiston is the property of
matter than makes it combustible. It is lost in the process but may be regained
through contact with coal, for instance. His insight was revised by Lavoisier and
Priestleywhoshowedthatwhenachemicalburnsitabsorbsoxygenandincreases
inweight.
Kant's first usage of the term, insight, refers back to these accounts ofa
newlightdawningonthehumanmind,accountsofnewmathematicalandscientific
discoveries.Hestatesthat"reasonhasinsightonlyintothatwhichitproducesafter
aplanofitsown,asitwere,andmustnotallowitselftobekeptinnature'sleading
strings...,(B,xiv).Althoughinneedofclarificationthissuggeststhatforhimthe
newlightofinsightdeterminesnatureapriori,putsaninterpretationintonature.
Lonergan,withAquinasandAristotle,holdsthattheimagecausestheinsight,that
our understanding, rather than reading something into the situation receives its
content from what we experience.6 So although Kant and Lonergan seem to be
talking about the same kind of event when they use the word, insight, in this
instancetheyexplainwhatitdoesquitedifferently.
Theseconduseofthewordinsightoccursinthecontextofmetaphysics,
(B, xiv). For Kant it is a speculative science of reason which soars above
experience. Unlike mathematics, which applies concepts to intuition, metaphysics
forhimrestsonconceptualanalysisalone.Itisstillatthestageofrandomgroping
asmathematicsandsciencewerebeforeThales,Galileo,ToricelliandStahl.Why
hasitnotbecomeascience?Heexplicitlyasks,issuchadiscoverypossible?Itisin
thiscontextthathetalksaboutmetaphysicsseekingtohavean aprioriinsight.As
withmathematicsandscience,metaphysicsneedsasingleandsuddenrevolution,a
changed point of view. He then goes on to propose his well known Copernican
revolution for metaphysics. By assuming that the stars rotate around us as
spectators Copernicus could not explain their movements. By adopting the new
viewpointthatthespectatorratherthanthestarsisrevolvingprogresswasmade.A
similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics asregardstheintuitionofobjects.
Ratherthanassuming thatintuitionmustconformtotheconstitutionofobjectswhy
notassumethatobjectsmustconformtotheconstitutionofintuition.ThisisKant's
basic metaphysical insight, his discovery.Inmanywaysitislikeaninsightintoa
heuristicstructure.Althoughitscontentisdistinctivelymetaphysical,asaninsight
or discovery it is quite similar to the discoveries or insights of mathematics and
science.InthefirsttwooccurrencesKantclearlyacknowledgesadiscoveryprocess
that is intellectual andso unlike sensible intuition. The question arises, howdoes
thisfitinwithhisanalysisofunderstanding,judgmentandreason?
6

ibid.

Thethirdandfourthusesoftheterm(B,xxx),dealingwiththeproblemof
God, freedom and immortality, talk about depriving reason of its pretensions to
transcendent insight: "For in order to arrive at such insight it must make use of
principles which, in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience.." There
follows his famous remark aboutdenyingreason in order to make way forfaith.
HereKantisprobingthequestion,aretheremysterieswhicharebeyondthepower
ofournaturalinsights?Aretherelimitstoourinsights?Thediscussionalsodraws
to our minds the possibility of mistaken or pretentious insights suchas those of
Stahl. Insights are a dime a dozen. Many are false, partial, incomplete, open to
revision,and needtocomebeforethejudgementofrationality.Lonerganwillrevise
Kant'smetaphysicalinsight, replacingintuition initbycognitionalstructure.
Kant's fifth and sixth uses (B xliii, xliv), clearly designate insight as the
quality of the enlightened and critical person. Critical philosophy is addressed to
those persons who combine "thoroughness of insight with a talent for lucid
expression," which he adds he does not possess. Finally, hetalks about "men of
impartiality, insight and true popularity" as necessary for the establishment of his
philosophy.Theseareinterestingusesinthattheyinviteustoopenupthehuman
image of the person ofinsight, they havean anthropological ring. Whatmust be
clearisthathoweverheinterpretswhataninsightis,inallsixinstanceswhatKant
iswritingaboutwhenhewritesaboutinsightisveryclose towhatLonerganmeans
byaninsight.
Twofurtheroccurrencesoftheterm,insight,withinthebodyoftheCPR
itselfareworthnoting.TowardstheendofA132,B171Kantstartsananalysisof
judgment.Understandingisafacultyofrules.Judgmentforhimisthefacultywhich
distinguisheswhetherornotsomethingstandsunderagivenrule.Kanthasinmind
aphysician,judgeorrulerwhohasathandmanyrulesbutwhomaynonetheless
stumbleintheirapplication.Althoughunderstandingiscapableofbeinginstructed
inrules,eventhoughexamplesare thegocartofjudgment,theapplicationofrules
tosituationscanonlybepractisedandcannotbetaught.Noschoolcanmakegood
thelackofmotherwititrequires.HethengoesonatA133,B172:"Foralthough
anabundanceofrulesborrowedfromtheinsightofothersmayindeedbeproffered
to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, the power of rightly
employing them must belong to the learner himself:.." In the next paragraph
suggesting that too great a study of illustrations of applying rules to situations
mightdullone'sintellectheadds:"Correctnessandprecisionofintellectualinsight,
on the other hand, they more usually somewhat impair." The phrase, intellectual
insight, makes clear that for Kant insight is nothing like intuition. What Kant is
clearlysayinghereisthatbetweentherulesandthesituationthereisachasmand
thatchasmcanonlybecrossedbyinsights.JohnMcDowellinhis"Wittgensteinon
FollowingaRule,"comestothesameconclusion.Noexplanationoftheuseofan
expressionisproofagainstmisunderstandingbecauseoftheinexhaustiblevarietyof
applications.Understandingtheuseofanexpressioninvolvesacottoningon,aleap
oraninspiredguessatthepatternofapplicationswhichateacheristryingtoget

across.Inordertoapplyaruletoasituationthereisneededtheleapofinsight.7
Thisseemstomeanillustrationoftheeventofinsightclickinginthetraditionof
analyticalphilosophy
OurfinalillustrationsofEinsicht,ofinsightinKantwillbetakenfromthe
ProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysics.8 PartIIaddressesthequestion,howisa
pure science of nature possible? Nature for Kant is related to rules. His answer
runs:
"It is only possible by means of the constitution of our
understanding,accordingtowhichalltheaboverepresentationsof
the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by
which the peculiar way in which we think (namely, by rules) and
hence experience also are possible, but must be clearly
distinguishedfromaninsightintotheobjectsthemselves.9
He is clearly denying that our understanding of nature is like an insight into the
objectsthemselves.Yetheseemstoacceptthatinsightsareintosomething,have
someobject.Discussingthemeaningofthecategorieshegoeson:
Suchaninsightintothenatureofthecategories,whichlimitsthem
atthesametimetousemerelyinexperience,neveroccurredeither
to their first author or to any of his successors but without this
insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or
deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of
names,withoutexplanationorrulefortheiruse.10
Kant is drawing attention to the distinction between an insightful use of the
categoriesanda blindorparrotlikeuse.Clearlyintheinsightfulusetheinsightsare
intosomething,intothemeaninganduseofthecategories.Sothequestionofthe
objectofinsightisontheagenda.

SeeMeaning andReference,editedbyA.W.More,(Oxford, OxfordUniversityPress,1992)

260. Lonergan deals with the same problem rather obscurely in his treatment of conversion to
phantasminVerbum,Wordand IdeainAquinas,(London,Dartman,LongmanandTodd1968)
15962.
8

PrologemonenatoAnyFutureMetaphysics,(NewYork,TheLibraryofLiberalArts,1950).
The term, insight does not occur in the index. I am indebted to Jeanne Belair for pointing out
occurrences ofEinsicht, insight, in this text. She has located some 14 occurrences in the Lewis
WhiteBecktranslation onpps6,7(threeoccurrences),23,37,65,70,72(twooccurrences),79,
125,126,and127.IamalsoindebtedtoPaulLennonandPatrickRiordan,bothoftheMilltown
Institute,forhelpwiththeGermantextsofKant.
9

op.cit.,n8,p65.

10

opcit,n8,p72.

In the Appendix to the Prologemenona Kant discusses a reviewer's

judgmentontheCPR.Itisanextremelyinterestingcasestudyofaphilosophical
judgment on a philosophical theory of mind. He describes an enlightened and
criticalreviewerwhoseunderstandinghasgonetotheheartoftheargumentofa
textandcritiquedit,possiblyharshly.Theauthormightbedispleasedwithwhatis
written about the work but cannot fault the understanding and criticism of the
reviewer.Thecontraryisthecasewhereareviewerreviewsatextwhichheclearly
doesnotunderstand.Thiscouldbebecauseofhisnarrowmindedness,impatience
at the demands made by the text on his understanding, his inability toappreciate
that one cannot review Euclid (or its philosophical equivalent) unless one
understandsgeometry,orhissenseofpersonalsuperiorityasaresultofwhichhe
keepshissuperiorinsightsordiscoverieshiddenfromtheworld.11 Theproblemas
Kantseesitisthatthestandardforjudgmentonmattersmetaphysicalhasyettobe
found. By this I interpret him to mean that the relevant significant questions
involved in such judgments are not known by individual reviewers or by a
communityofphilosophers.Whatistobedoneuntilthestandardisfoundinthe
matterofjudgmentonworksofmetaphysics?Inthiscontextthereisthefinaluse
oftheterm,insight,inthe Prologemonena:
If,however,theyarecriticalincharacter,notindeedwithreference
tootherworksbuttoreasonitself,sothatthestandardofjudgment
cannotbeassumedbuthasfirstofalltobesoughtfor,then,though
objectionandblamemayindeedbepermitted,yetacertaindegree
ofleniencyisindispensable,sincetheneediscommontousalland
thelackofthenecessaryinsightmakesthehighhandedattitudeof
thejudgeunwarranted.12
Philosophers, itseems,cannotavoidtheactivityofmakingphilosophicaljudgments
withrespecttotheirownworksandtheworksofothers.WhatKantdidnotseem
to realize is that it is in this unavoidable process that at least an element of the
sought standard of judgment in matters metaphysical resides. It is through the
processoftruejudgmentthatwecometoknowwhatis,whatexists,whatisso.
Overlookthisfactandyouarelostwhenitcomestothestandardsforjudgmentin
metaphysics.
Itisonethingforthesolutiontoacrosswordpuzzleorproblemsituation
suddenlytoclickforus,suddenlytofallintoplace.Itisquiteanotherforittoclick
withusthatwehaveinsightsandwhat,insomeprimitiveway,theydoandarelike.
Lonergan has clearly stated on a number of occasions that unless the event of
insighthasclickedwithuswewillgetnowherewithhiswork.13 Buthedoesnot
11

op.cit.,n8,p126.

12

op.cit.n8,p127.

13

OnanumberofoccasionsLonerganhasstatedthatKantwithAristotleandAquinasknewall
aboutinsight.Oneofthoseoccasionsoccursinhislecturenotes,"IntelligenceandReality,"notes

gooutofhiswaytobringaboutthatclickinhisreaders.Inhiswritingshetendsto
presumethatithashappened.ThepreviousanalysissuggeststhatastudyofKant's
usageoftheterm,Einsicht,insight,couldfacilitatetheclickingoftheinsightevent
instudentsofLonergan.ItwouldalsohavetheadvantageoflocatingLonergan's
workmorefirmlyinthephilosophicaltradition.
II
Salahasstatedthat"thereisnodoubtthatthe CritiqueofPureReason was
in Lonergan's mind when he wrote Insight."14 This I believe to be true. But it
challenges us to discover as precisely as is possible the details of how Kant
positively influenced Lonergan's thought.15 For what has become clear to me in
recentyearsisaprofoundandpositiveinfluenceofKantonLonergan.IntheA
Preface(xixii)thereisaclearinvitationtoreasontoundertakethemostdifficultof
all its tasks, namely selfknowledge. This seems quite similar to Lonergan's
invitationtoselfaffirmation.TheopeningpagesofthatsamePrefacerefertothe
endlesscontroversiesofmetaphysics,apassagethatisclearlyechoedinInsight.16
IntheBPrefacewefindtheterms,empiricalandintellectualconsciousness(B,xl),
andtheunconditioned.
More specifically thereis a need toexplorehowKantmighthavehelped
Lonergan to frame, not so much his answers as his questions. Lonergan was
educated in the scholastic tradition which, despite its neoKantians, was on the
wholecriticalofKantwhowasseenasanadversary.Whitesideintroducedhimto
Kant in Heythrop in 1926/7, commenting that his critical remarks were only pin
pricksandnottobetakenasa criticalrefutation.17 Inthescholastictraditionamain
madebyBernardLonerganforhiscourseatThomasMoreInstitute,Montreal19501.Thesenotes
areavailableatthe LonerganCentre, Toronto.Thelecturesweregivenwhenhewascomposing
Insight. The references to Kant in those notes are numerous and significant. On page 12,
paragraph 7 his headings suggests that analytic and synthetic a priori (judgments) presuppose
insightsandthat"...:analyticseemstobecovertinsights."InUnderstandingandBeing,p30he
sayssomethingsimilar:"Kant'ssyntheticaprioripresupposesthattheinsightalreadyexistsand
thattheconceptsarealreadyformed."WhenusingthewordintheBPrefaceandelsewherewas
KantadvertingtowhatLonergansuggestshehadpresupposed?Foranillustrationoftheeventof
insight clicking in the scientific community seeW.I.BBeveridge,TheArtof ScientificInquiry,
(London,Heinemann1974)ChapterVI.Inthatchapterthereisgivenoneofthebestaccountsof
howinsightsareexperiencedinthescientificcommunitythat Ihavecomeacross.Unfortunately
thechapterisentitledintuition.
14

opcit.,n1,xiv.

15

Seecommentsinn13on"IntelligenceandReality."

16

CollectedWorksofBernardLonergan,Vol3:Insight(Toronto,UniversityofTorontoPress
1992)410f.
17
CaringAboutMeaning,PatternsintheLifeofBernardLonergan,editedbyPierrotLambert,
CharlotteTansey,CathleenGoing,(Montreal,ThomasMoreInstitutePapers,1982)129.Forother
remarksonKantsee15f.

criticism seems to have been that if one takes Kant's turn one gets lost in
subjectivityattheexpenseofobjectivity.Abridgeisopenedupbetweenourmental
processes in here and the world out there, (CPR, A89/90, B 122/3). Liddy still
remembers quite vividly being told that the only answer to the bridge was
dogmaticallytoassertthatourknowledgedoescrossfrominheretooutthere.18
WhetherthiswasthebasisofWhiteside'scriticismsisalmostimpossibletoknow.
ButitishighlylikelythatLonerganwaseducatedinanenvironmentinwhichKant
would have posed the difficult question of uniting the subject and object of
knowledge.This,Ibelieve,influencedhissecondorepistemologicalquestionwhich
dealswiththemannerinwhichmentalactsgetbeyondthemselvestoknowledgeof
objectsintheworld.19
In the light of the movement of Lonergan's thought it is my belief that
during hisphilosophy studies and after,20 Kant, among others, posed for himthe
questionoftherelationbetweensensibilityandunderstandinginhumanknowing.
HeclearlydisapprovedofKant'sproposedanswerintermsofsensibleintutionand
thecategoriesoftheunderstanding.Duringhisphilosophystudieshedidnottake
toAquinas.ThischangedwhenhereadHoenen'sessaysontheoriginofthefirst
principlesofmathematics.21 ForHoenenthosefirstprinciplesarenotapriori,but
are worked out, following Aquinas, by insight into phantasm through which a
nexus between terms is apprehended in the phantasm, in the image. This
encouragedhimtothinkthatAquinasmighthavesomethingdifferenttoofferthan
Kantonthe relation between the sensible andtheintellectualinhumanknowing.
HealsofoundconfirmationinAquinasforNewman'spositiononassent.
AfurtherinfluenceofKantonLonerganistobediscernedin thestructure
of Kant's Copernican revolution for metaphysics. This I believe positively
influencedthestructureofthecompositionofboththe Verbum articlesand Insight.
There are direct references to the Copernican revolution inInsight(413), and in
MethodinTheology(96,264).Thereisalsoacovertreferencetoitinthe Verbum
articles, 456 where Lonergan explains why he began from the psychological
contentofThomisttheoryoftheintellectratherthanfromthemetaphysics.Itisa
18

RichardM.Liddy,TransformingLight:IntellectualConversionintheEarlyLonergan,
(Collegeville,TheLiturgicalPress1993)1023,175.
19

Verbum,66f., Insight,Chapters12and13.

20

ForLonergan'sreadingonKantintheearlythirties,seeLiddy,op.cit.,n18,7684.Centralat
thistimewashisexplorationsoftheobjectofinsight.TothisaddtheKantianelementofthenotes,
"IntelligenceandReality."Ontheproblemoftherelationbetweenthesensibleandtheintellectual
componentsinknowingsee CPR,A15,B29.
21

P Hoenen, "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae," (On the Origins of the First
Principles ofScience)Gregorianum:Volume141933,Pps 153184De Philosophiascholastics
cognitionis geometricae," (On the scholastic philosophy of geometrical knowledge) Volume 19,
1938, Pps 498514 De problemate necessitatis geometricae, (On the problem of necessity in
geometry)Volume20,1939pps1954.

thesisthatisrepeatedingreatdetailintheconclusiontothethirdarticlewherehe
insiststhataninterpretationofAquinasonmentalactsmustbeabletoreconcilehis
psychologicalandmetaphysicalstatements.Becauseofthescholasticenvironment
whichthoseessayswereaddressingLonergancouldnotdirectlystatehisKantian
presuppositions. But they are nonetheless there and guiding him. From Kant
Lonergan learned that our knowledge of the world must be consistent with our
knowledgeofourselvesasknowers,withknowledgeoftheprocessesbymeansof
whichweknowtheworld.ButunlikeKantheconsidersthatthemannerinwhich
ourmindsconnectwiththeworldisthroughcognitionalstructureasawholerather
thanthroughsensibleintuition.Theuniversecorrespondstoourmentaldesiresand
powers.Ourmentaldesiresandpowerscorrespondtotheuniverse.Anyattemptto
articulateavisionoftheuniversethatneglectsthecorrelationofsubjectandobject
or that simply ignores or truncates the subject will result in error. The Kantian
insightisalmosttotallyneglectedattheendofourcenturybythewholenewbreed
of scientific metaphysicians. Dennett, Dawkins and Hawking conjure up world
viewsin total disregard of their own cognitional powers and theirrelationtothe
structureoftheworld.
To conclude, the present study isof theform of notes towards a critical
studyofKant'suseoftheword,Einsicht,insightandofthemannerinwhichKant
influencedLonergan'squestionsandproject.