Abstract

This article analyses press coverage between July and October 2010 in three different
European Union (EU) member states (France, Romania and Bulgaria) of the French
government's expulsion of Roma in 2010. It asks what the international reaction to
France's actions tells us about the way in which Europe is deployed in debates over
discrimination, minority rights and freedom of movement in national media. The article
finds evidence in national public debates of a Europeanisation of normative discussions,
thanks to a willingness by a range of actors to use the EU in an instrumental way for
political gain. However, the representation of issues and actors by the press also
demonstrates the ways in which the prominence of supposedly European norms, and the
framing of the EU's role, can be associated with national political dynamics, both in
relation to the political environment and contemporary narratives regarding national
identity.
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Keywords

EU Free Movement,
Non-Discrimination,
Minority Rights,
Roma

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Abstract

This article analyses press coverage between July and October 2010 in three different
European Union (EU) member states (France, Romania and Bulgaria) of the French
government's expulsion of Roma in 2010. It asks what the international reaction to
France's actions tells us about the way in which Europe is deployed in debates over
discrimination, minority rights and freedom of movement in national media. The article
finds evidence in national public debates of a Europeanisation of normative discussions,
thanks to a willingness by a range of actors to use the EU in an instrumental way for
political gain. However, the representation of issues and actors by the press also
demonstrates the ways in which the prominence of supposedly European norms, and the
framing of the EU's role, can be associated with national political dynamics, both in
relation to the political environment and contemporary narratives regarding national
identity.

Keywords

EU Free Movement,
Non-Discrimination,
Minority Rights,
Roma

Introduction
Despite being presented as a public security measure, the French government's decision
to deport predominantly Roma populations in 2010 provoked widespread international
condemnation.1 The intervention of the European Commission (EC), and subsequent
high-profile spats with the French government, highlighted the growing role of the
European Union (EU) on the issue (Ram 2010; Dawson and Muir 2011; Vermeersch
2012).2 Racial and ethnic-based discrimination is forbidden by the Race Equality
Directive3 and the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. As the EU's executive body, the
Commission has powers to pursue EU members that fail to comply. In this instance, EU
institutions adopted a firm stance on the basis that the deportations challenged core
European rights relating to freedom of movement and represented discrimination against
a minority ethnic group. The eventshereafter referred to as the Roma Affairbegan
with policy announcements by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy in July 2010 and
continued with the actual dismantling of camps and deportation of individuals, through to
an escalating political conflict between France and the EU (Nacu 2012).4 The political
fallout enlarged significantly following the emergence of a circulaire5 apparently
proving there had been targeting of a particular ethnic groupsomething until that point
denied by the government. This amplified the European resonance of the debate and led
to personal attacks on (EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and
Citizenship) Viviane Reding by Sarkozy. The international political climax occurred at a
European summit with reports of dramatic clashes between the presidents of France and
the EC. Shortly afterwards the French government negotiated an end to the threat of EU
enforcement action with the Commission.
The case has implications for understanding the form, content and purchase of rights
across national contexts in Europe, the range of values which underpin them, and the role

of the EU in these matters. It gives an example of the tensions produced by the twin
forces of mobility and European integration, highlighting contradictions in the system of
rights associated with European citizenship (Aradau, Huysmans, and Squire 2010). This
has naturally prompted some to ask what the Roma Affair tells us about Europe itselfas
normative entity (Severance 2010) or liberal cosmopolitan force (Parker 2012). Yet,
academic accounts risk reifying the exclusionary dynamic of the expulsions themselves.
The focus tends to be on the meaning for the vertical (national/supranational) relationship
(France/EU), when this affair has a more obvious significance for the enlarged new
Europe including the countries that France was expelling toBulgaria and Romania.
Arguments over the ideational impacts and power implications of European integration
have a long history but pinning down these effects is challenging. Francois Duchne's
(1972) vision of Europe as a civilian power has been influential, emphasising
economics, interdependence and the ideational over traditional definitions of state
strength. Duchne also recognised that regional integration itself was productive of power
as states seek to join or emulate. Contemporary approaches have attempted to
conceptualise the process/form that ideational impacts have taken, differing along
theoretical, methodological and empirical lines. Neo-institutionalist scholars now
incorporate discursive factors in their attempt to track and explain policy change
(Schmidt 2008; Crespy 2010, for a review see Radaelli, Dente, and Dossi 2012). Ideas are
also central to studies of Europeanisation (e.g. Olsen 2002; Schmidt 2009; Ladrech
2010). But both remain largely at the meso-level of theorising, preferring a detailed,
granular analysis of governance, eschewing normative questions about what Europe is,
and what it should be.
Another group of scholars has addressed these questions in terms of what kind of soft or
normative power the EU has (Manners, 2002, 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Lerch and
Schwellnus 2006; Pace 2007; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007). Ian Manners (2002) initiated
this debate by arguing that the EU's power should not be seen as either civilian or military
but rather as normative exerting power over opinionas exemplified by its promotion
of the international abolition of the death penalty. Key to this is the normative
construction of the EU, formed through membership conditions that formalise certain
ideas and values. The response of some has been to doubt the existence of such power,
either due to the lack of coherence within the EU project (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006) or
with straightforward realist reasoning (Hyde-Price 2006) that asserts ideas as secondary
to national interests. Indeed, the long recession in the wake of the crisis over the Euro
means that liberal hopes for a normative Europe that transcends or moderates the nationstate are looking rather utopian (Eiermann 2012; Rogers 2012). Normative analyses stand
in stark contrast to the sober, technical quest of neo-institutionalists and the complex
interaction between intermediate variables and multilevel policy-making. Yet, they also
remain predominantly theoretical debates, with little empirical evidence about how ideas
actually travel in the contemporary European space.
In spite of the confident language of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental
rights, we know that the normative role of the EU inspires controversy across Europe.6
The challenge of explaining and understanding which values are European norms and
how such values can become Europeanised animates the remainder of this article. We
see the Roma affair, the reaction to France's actions and the intervention of the EC, as
revealing difficulties for attempts to cement common norms in the EU.

Our main question is: What does the reaction to the French government's expulsion of the
Roma in 2010 tell us about the ways in which Europe is deployed in national media?
We are particularly interested in the notion of a common language of rights and values
across Europe, and the role of the EU in propagating or even enforcing such ideas. In
analytical/empirical terms, we operationalise this via two objectives, first to explain the
presence/absence of specific European norms in national political debates as represented
in national print media, and second, to identify the dynamics of Europeanisation with
respect to these norms.
We aim to show how political context and national approaches to minority questions
affect the ways in which the Roma affair, and the role of the EU, are processed by
national media. This sheds light on the ways in which domestic opportunity structures
and liberal traditions interlink with processes of Europeanisation in the normative arena.
This approach is not without risksof resorting to a reductive/essentialist analysis based
on caricatures of the nation-state (Brubaker 1992; Bazin et al. 2006). A further problem
is the extent to which post-communist countries can be usefully inserted into a simple
typology of varieties of liberalism.
National differences can be instructive, however. One can link Republican ideals with
France's reluctance to recognise the existence of ethnic minorities within its borders
(Rechel 2008, 6467). For countries such as Bulgaria and Romania ethnic forms of
identity are more likely to be powerful due to the presence of significant minorities at the
creation of the modern versions of these nation-states in the early twentieth century. Postcommunism brought along a process of re-nationalisation (Brubaker 1996), which
exploited people's sense of helplessness brought about by the transition to capitalism
(Tismneanu 1992, 302). This has meant a sometimes painful re-visiting of these states'
approach to minorities and the rights they can be afforded. Post-communist countries are
often accused of simply paying lip service to minority rights (Budryte and PilinkaiteSotirovic 2009).
In both Bulgaria and Romania, there is a deep ambivalence towards the minorities issue
with some formal recognition of multiculturalism that is weakly enforced. Bulgaria's
1991 Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion and the right to ethnic
self-identification, but the existence of minorities is not explicitly stated. The term
minorities is substituted by the expressions citizens whose mother tongue is not
Bulgarian or who have a diverging ethnic identification (State Gazette articles 36.2 and
54.1, cited in Rechel 2008, 222). In addition, regional autonomy associated with ethnicity
is ruled out, and the formation of parties on ethnic or religious bases is forbidden (Bell
1999, 255).7 In Romania, despite the strong influence of the French Republican model in
electoral and judicial terms, these similarities end when it comes to minorities. The
constitution explicitly recognises equality among its citizens (Article 4) and the citizens'
right to the preservation, development and expression of their identity (Article 6) even if
it has demonstrated a reluctance to enforce or protect these rights (Iordachi 2010).
Although several ethnic political parties exist and all ethnic minorities are guaranteed at
least one parliamentary representative, there are strong historical sensitivities in relation
to regional autonomy on ethnic basis. Considering these historical trajectories, we would
therefore expect the Roma affair to prompt divergent responses in our case studies along
a spectrum of different perspectives regarding identity and minority rights.

Methodology
The rest of the article focuses on the political debates in France, Bulgaria and Romania as
represented in three national newspapersLe Figaro, Dnevnik and Adevrul. These
newspapers are selected as examples of quality press in the three countries. They offer
insight into the national political debates but are also inevitably illustrative of specific
political leanings. In all three cases, the choice of newspaper was made with the
following criteria in mind: widespread circulation; recognised quality of journalism
standards; and the presence of alternative views, occasionally contrary to the mainstream
editorial policy of the paper. This maximised the potential for the coverage to be
representative and comparative for all three countries. Le Figaro is the top-selling daily
newspaper in France (average circulation 330,000 according to Association pour le
Contrle de la Diffusion des Mdias (formerly Office de Justification de la Diffusion OJD)). We would expect Le Figaro to provide the most robust defence of the French
government's positionits then-editor (tienne Mougeotte) confirmed at the 2012
election that the paper would support Sarkozy.8 Dnevnik is a Bulgarian daily broadsheet
known for its independent editorial line and professional reporting standards (circulation
30,000).9 As one of the country's foremost quality papers it would be more likely to
enter into discussions regarding the moral/ethical dimension of the Roma Affair.
Adevrul is one of the oldest Romanian newspapers and the top-selling broadsheet
(average circulation in 2010 of 82,000). The newspaper was then owned by media mogul
Dinu Patriciu, whose financial difficulties subsequently threatened its survival. Although
considered left of the centre-right government of the time, Adevrul was known for frank
debate among columnists representing opposing sides of the political spectrum. 155
articles from Adevrul, 123 articles from Dnevnik and 127 articles from Le Figaro were
initially retrieved for analysis. These included news items, editorials, features and
commentaries.
Using the online archives of these newspapers a search (keywords: Roma and
Sarkozy) was carried out from the official start of the policy of expulsions until the
dropping of the case by the EC (21 July 2010 to 26 October 2010). After irrelevant
articles were removed, a qualitative analysis was conducted informed by three questions:
(1) How was the Roma affair represented in national political debates? (2) Which norms
emerged as axiomatic to these debates? and (3) How was the role of the EU in the Roma
affair framed/presented by various actors? The comparative findings for each of these
questions are presented below.

Representations of the Roma Affair in National Press

Coverage
In Le Figaro, the original policy announcements regarding expulsions by Sarkozy were
followed by reports of a rising chorus of domestic and international criticism in the public
debate. The commencement of deportation flights, the discovery of the circulaire and
the EU summit all became catalysts for a debate that was progressively more
internationalised and Europeanised. This was both in terms of the criticisms of the
expulsions (emanating from a wide range of international actors), and with respect to the

defence put forward by the government over the policy (where the EU became more
prominent). This was in parallel with a progressive deepening of discussions around how
the actions of Sarkozy related to the idea of the French state.
Initially, the respective debates in Dnevnik and Adevrul were simply a reporting of
foreign events, as their governments remained largely silent. For the Romanian
government press releases were left to the Embassy in Paris. The Romanian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs treated the deportations as voluntary repatriations10 and there was even
veiled sympathy for France's problems with Roma criminals,11 prompting the EU
Observer to accuse Romanian and Bulgarian public opinion of indifference.12 The
debate in Adevrul became neurotically obsessed with the confusion of Westerners
between Roma and Romanians.13 However, by the (September 2010) EU summit this
changed with the toughening of the position of the Romanian government, interpreted as
grasping an opportunity to attract more EU money for Roma integration projects.
The affair for Adevrul was therefore understood very much through the prism of
Romania's own issues around Roma integration. The Roma minority was described as
unmanageable, there was no reason why ethnic Romanians should also be affected by a
problem without solution.14 A minority of commentators even expressed contentment
that the Roma proved as difficult to manage abroad as in Romania, which had repeatedly
been criticised on the issue.15
The pages of Dnevnik reflected the measured response of the Bulgarian government.
Official discourse was that the number of Bulgarian Roma returned would be small (up to
150). The government readily announced that, with Romania, Bulgaria would accept
back those who had disrupted public order in France. The Foreign Minister made
assurances that freedom of movement for Bulgarians would not be restricted. The
underlying notion (also stressed in public) was to emphasise it as a French domestic issue
a social rather than political problem. As Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov said,
all Bulgarian citizens abroad have to follow the laws of the respective country and the
European requirements.16 PM Borisov went even further at a press conference following
an EU meeting, claiming there was no Roma issue at all.17 This position, clearly driven by
the prospect of Schengen membership,18 provoked surprise from foreign and local
commentators considering that citizens of the country were directly affected.
In Le Figaro and Dnevnik, the voice of those caught up in the drama was notable by its
absence. Adevrul meanwhile was torn between taking the stand of the victim by
protecting the rights of Romanian citizens, and indulging in institutionalised racism. This
was demonstrated by the dilemma over whether to report readers' often racist responses.
For instance, Adevrul editor in chief Grigore Cartianu, known for his colourful
vocabulary vis--vis the Roma,19 was forced to react on 23 August after a previous piece
sparked a racist feast online.20 Racist remarks were tolerated in most opinion pieces at
this time, but gradually, more substantial investigation features also began to appear, in an
attempt to contextualise the plight of the Roma, culturally and historically.21
Adevrul provided colourful investigations about the lives and adventures of the
returnees and the term Eurogypsy entered everyday vocabulary.22 Roma voices were
allowed to filter through, particularly complaints about double standards in the EU: we
are not treated as human beings became a commonly echoed claim.23 However, the
Roma issue was also securitised and criminalised in a language dominated by words such

as thieves, vandals, beggars and criminals (often directly reproduced from the
French press and the discourse of French politicians).24
Dnevnik maintained a distance throughout that matched the strategy of the Bulgarian
government, that emphasised the absence of a link with Schengen membership, and
avoided conflict with Romania, France and the EU.25 By comparison, Schengen
membership only seemed to play a marginal role in the pages of Adevrul, perhaps due to
myopia about the importance of Roma integration. However France did warn Romania
that it's future Schengen membership and the 2013 EU funding renegotiations were
linked to the solving of the Roma issue.26
Coverage in Bulgaria even appeared complicit with the French government position at
times. Several articles in Dnevnik presented the returns as voluntaryusing government
officials and the Bulgarian ambassador to France as sources. The arrival of every group
of Bulgarian citizens was reported on, alongside occasional interviews with the people
claiming they had been well-treated. The story was frequently repeated, alongside
statistics illustrating the small numbers of Bulgarian Roma compared to those from
Romania. The neuroticism here was over possible confusion between Bulgaria and
Romania (the terminology was of Romania and Romanian Roma). There was also
reference to the differing reactions of the two neighbouring countries: Bulgaria as
cooperative and Romania as critical. Despite this, the French ambassador in Sofia was
reported as critical of Bulgarian policy on the Roma, questioning how EU money for
integration was being spent.
By September Adevrul was reporting that none of those deported in the summer of 2010
from France had committed crimes.27 Moreover, this evidence was presented as
illustrating how France had bypassed EU normative frameworks and demonstrated the
illiberal nature of state policies towards the Roma. This defensiveness reflected the fact
that Romania was particularly exposed. In contrast to France and Bulgaria, Romania
already experienced the issue of intra-European deportations only a few years previously.
A number of articles in Adevrul recalled the Roma expulsion and segregation strategies
deployed by the Italian government in 20072008, which showed the formation of a
policy continuum of exclusion. Just like Italy before, France quickly called for the
presence of Romanian police officers to help with the removals.28
The press in France and Romania revealed a degree of hypocrisy regarding each country's
blame in the affair. Adevrul was quick to use President Sarkozy's own family
background (as the son of a Hungarian immigrant)29 to attack the politicisation of the
issue as an attempt to define a new French national identity through anti-immigration
policies. However, there was also the critique of the Romanian government for using the
Roma as economic pawns to milk the EU for more Roma integration funds.30

The Normative Dimension in Press Coverage of the

Roma Affair
In the debate between government and opposition which played out in the Le Figaro, a
fundamental tension developed between two norms: that of state sovereignty, and of nondiscrimination. These values became central to an increasingly polarised debate. There
was very little discussion of freedom of movement or minority rights or the context of

EU-level normative frameworks. For example, the preliminary statement on France by

the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was given broad
coverage. This heavily criticised the French government's actions over the Roma,
condemning a resurgence of racist incidents in the country.31 Applauded by nongovernmental organisations, the French government's response to CERD was robust,
questioning the committee's legitimacy and rejecting its findings: the committee is
wrong, we have a country which respects republican and democratic principles and the
rights of man it is beyond question.32
Rather than European norms, a key polarising issue for the French press therefore became
the security focus of Sarkozy's policy programme. De Villepin (Sarkozy's centre-right
rival) was reported as challenging this securitised discourse, demanding a republican
response to actions that have stained the French flag.33 He demonstrated particular
concern about how the foreign press perceive and judge Francethe birthplace of human
rights. It is notable that the de Villepin intervention did not include mention of Europe, or
European norms, or the role of Europe. It was very much an introspective issue of
national identity, reflected by French Immigration Minister Eric Besson complaint that
France is a champion of self-flagellation over unresolved issues around the Vichy
regime, and the colonial legacy.34
For Adevrul, the main normative issue emerged as freedom of movement, perceived as a
hard fought right, now under threat. Romanian commentators were reported as fearing the
collapse of the European project, lamenting the crisis brought about by Paris's rejection
of the Commission as guardian of the treaties.35 Public opinion in Romania was that the
Roma affair proved the meaninglessness of European values. For many, the case
demonstrated that the West had lost its democratic credentials since there was now clear
discrimination against a certain category of EU citizens.36
The distancing policy of the Bulgarian governmentreflected by Dnevnikspecifically
avoided the normative dimension, apart from confirming that those who were returned
had no complaints of human rights violations. There was normative debate, however,
through reports of opposition parties, along with then-President Parvanov (elected with
the support of the main opposition Bulgarian Socialist PartyBSP), who seemed keen to
talk about values as part of national political debate. The BSP sought to challenge French
policy and demanded the exact reasons for each expulsion. Dnevnik reported how
Bulgarian opposition parties saw the affair as an opportunity to criticise what they
labelled an attack on European freedoms. One notable example was the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (an ethnic Turkish party)which demanded the Parliament pass a
declaration condemning the expulsions and rejecting any restrictions of freedom of
movement in the EU and any breaking of international legal norms.37
The engagement with normative values also emerged from other non-government voices
in Bulgaria, such as sociologists and political experts. This way Dnevnik engaged with
and presented the claims that the act of expulsion of the Roma from France was antiEuropean. The arguments presented suggested that the European directive for freedom of
movement did not seem to apply to everyoneEurope was not following its own
directives.38
There were reports of public protests in Bulgariacalling for recognition of human rights
and European citizenshipin front of the French Embassy in Sofia39 by Bulgarian Roma
but also supported by other Bulgarians. In general, however, Dnevnik reported the

reactions and opinions of other countries and international organisations but spent little
time on reaction or response to the range of viewseither from the government or from
the journalists themselves. The link with public policy problems relating to the Roma
issue in Bulgaria was almost never made.
Returning to the debate in France, Le Figaro often avoided the explicit language of ethnic
discrimination or racism, instead reporting claims that the government was stigmatising
a societal group, by associating ethnicity (Roma), population (travellers) and criminality
(Malik Salemkour, Ligue des Droits de l'HommeLDH).40 This language was echoed by
opposition speakers (Parti Socialiste (PS), e.g. Benot Hamon), who described the action
as a stigmatisation scandaleuse.41 The government response was a strong rejection,
asserting the primacy of the rule of law, applying to all: Roma, travellers and French
citizens.42 As President Sarkozy was reported as saying: the laws of the Republic apply
to everyone present on national territory, and that includes nomadic populations'. Interior
Minister Brice Hortefeux was quoted as describing the expulsions as a discussion
between states.43
The discovery of the circulaire shifted the normative critique as reported in France.
Opposition politicians then emphasised how French and European norms are
synonymousas Harlem Desir (Member of European Parliament -- Partie Socialiste,
France) was quoted: This circulaire is absolutely contrary to numerous French, European
and international laws, contravenes many fundamental rights recognised by the EU and
Francenotably the principle of non-discrimination.44
Following the EU summit, Sarkozy himself was keen to underline the alignment between
French [republican] and European norms, saying that it would be in accordance with
European rules and that the existence of illegal camps was not appropriate for the
Republic or the European ideal.45 The national secretary for Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP)Eric Ciottirepeated the refrain that the problem of the Roma was
not a French problem, but a European problem.46 Following the summit, the final
denouement was negotiated with the Commission (no further action was taken against
France). Effectively France gave guarantees that its actions would be in accordance with
the (2004) Free Movement legislation.47
In the final phase of the affair, there remains little in Le Figaro about the underlying
norms of non-discrimination and free movement. Each side in the debate was reported
as firmly entrenched claiming the normative higher ground: the French government on
one side, and the Commission on the other. The summit itself transformed the debate
away from the normative intricacies of the actual issue, and towards France's
international affairs and the impact of Sarkozy's policies/behaviour.

Europe and the EU in National Press Coverage of the

Roma Affair
It is notable that the EC initially supported the French understanding of the issue: a
spokesperson for Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding confirmed: it is for the state to
decide.48 This despite the fact that these events were taking place within months of the
second Roma summit (April 2010) where non-discrimination and freedom of movement
were underlined as key European norms that facilitated policies of inclusion for Roma

(CEC 2010, 3). Yet, by the end of the events analysed here, the EC's role as defender
(successful or not) of the rules on free movement and non-discrimination was certainly
highlighted.
Pressure for an EU solution was strongest from the pages of Adevrul where there was
support for the government view that the EU has a duty of care. The newspaper also
lamented the cooling off France and Romania's historical friendship, their Latin bond
apparently not enough to dispel the crisis.49 While the Romanian government framed
the issue around a European responsibility, France proposed an intergovernmental
summit with selected European allies on immigration in its attempt to push for new
powers or instruments that could facilitate its policies against the Roma.50 The
consequence was that the EU was forced to enter the arena to clarify its normative
position. In the Romanian press, the emphasis was on freedom of movement, in France it
was all about state sovereignty,51 while the EC spoke the language of non-discrimination
and minority rights. The prevailing discourse for Adevrul thus began to revolve around
double standards: Easterners versus Westerners and Roma versus other EU citizens.
Journalists also deplored the apparent lack of adequate EU legal instruments.52
In the French context, Le Figaro reported aggressive responses to Commissioner
Reding's warning that France should respect the rules on free movement and freedom of
establishment.53 Foreign affairs spokesman Bernard Valero was quoted as saying the
measures completely conform with European rules, and do not undermine the free
movement of EU citizens as defined in the treaties.54 The French example, in contrast to
Romania, demonstrated a preference for selective Europeanisation. When the debate
turned to the question of Roma integration, French PM Francois Fillon suggested a
greater harmonisation of integration of Roma at the European level. However, this was in
parallel with criticism of Romania for making the same link, that is using the idea of free
movement and the Roma as a transnational minority to avoid taking responsibility at
national level for integration.55
Europe becomes the battleground for internal forces in the French state. A Vatican
spokesman was reported as saying the French government's actions were in
contradiction with the principle of free movement of citizens in the EU, and with the
established rule of criminal responsibility and must not constitute the reason for judging
of an entire group.56 However, the French response was to justify the policy via
foundational ideas associated with the Republic. Minister for Agriculture Bruno Le Maire
was quoted to remind the Vatican that in France, there is a separation of Church and
State.57
In Dnevnik and Adevrul, Europe was both solution and gatekeeper. The Bulgarian
government was reported as conceding the need to integrate the Roma in Bulgaria and to
use more efficiently EU funds provided for this purpose.58 The opposition was reported as
criticising current programmes and advocating a new European conversation about Roma
integration with Bulgaria playing a stronger role. The BSP rejected the implied
conditionality of linking the Roma issue to Bulgarian membership in Schengen
(something hinted by one of Sarkozy's ministers).59 The (opposition party) President
argued that the expulsion of Roma was against European values and rules established
before Bulgaria joined in 2007, particularly the attribution of guilt on the basis of
ethnicity.60 He also declared his position against the link between the Roma issue and the

entry into Schengen and the view that the problem is European as it affects European
citizens from a particular ethnicity.
It is notable that when criticism of France does arrive from the Justice Commissioner
Reding she framed her response poignantly within the arc of European history. Rather
than referring to EU competencies, she complained that: It is a situation that I thought
Europe would not witness after the Second World War. The general consensus expressed
in Le Figaro is that Reding went too far and jumped the gun.61 However, the
Commission president, and other Commissioners, were reported as unified in defending
her role in protecting the treaties vigorously.62
Reports of Sarkozy's reaction in Le Figaro suggest that he completely ignored or
dismissed the concept of a European role or functionreflected by the fact that he
perceived Reding as an advocate of her country of birth, rather than the EU Commission.
He suggested that Reding welcome the Roma in her home country of Luxembourg
(which prompted an angry counter-response from the Luxembourg government).63
We see a very particular kind of Europeanisation of the affair during the EU summit. The
meeting is dominated by the famous violent exchange between Sarkozy and Jose
Manuel Barroso, President of the EC. Rather than a discussion of the core European
values, in Le Figaro debate focused on the appropriate behaviour of the Commission, and
the various positions of the different players. Sarkozy attempted to contain and isolate the
Commission. In this sense, the EC was being treated by the French presidency rather like
another country. By personalising the issue (tagetting Viviane Reding) Sarkozy attempted
to present the institution as over-reaching and thereby gain automatic support from other
Member States for his position on the basis of state sovereignty.64 Angela Merkel's
spokesperson confirmed that the country supported France against the Commission and
the inappropriate tone of Reding's comments.
Ultimately, however, it was the bullying Sarkozy who was depicted as over-reaching,
even in Le Figaro, especially in his statement on the intentions of Merkel to begin
expulsions in Germany65 but also in his denial of the argument with Barroso. Pierre
Laurent, national secretary of Parti Communiste Franais was reported as saying Sarkozy
was damaging the country day by day. The summit revealed that France could not rely on
total support from its European partners. Each state has a nuanced position in regards to
the RomaItaly, Greece feeling the pressure, Romania seeking extra funding, but many
such as Germany, UK preferring to keep a distance from the French scandal. The only
overt support came from the Czech government which again emphasised the norm of
state sovereignty.66
Hypocrisy around treatment of the Roma within the EU was exemplified by Sweden,
whose European Affairs Minister, Birgitta Ohlsson, called for France to be sanctioned.
However, the minister was quickly reminded by the Swedish opposition of the expulsion
in July 2010 of 50 Romanian and Bulgarian Roma caught begging on the underground.67
For Adevrul, this signalled a return to the eternal issue: to whom do the Roma belong?
Who speaks or should speak for them? Neither EU member states nor EU institutions
seem to agree about whose problem they are and what solutions should be deployed.

Conclusions

This article explored the ways, and the extent to which, declarations about the EU and
European rights acquire real meaning in the context of a Europe of heterogenous nationstates. The language of normative Europe is increasingly ubiquitous in the rhetoric of
EU institutionsespecially since Lisbon declared a Europe of rights and valuesbut
how is this diffused throughout national political debates? As Flockhart (2010, 792793)
points out, the idea of the EU as central to the development of liberal rights and values in
Europe is very much a constructed narrative often at odds with a broader historical
analysis.
Interest in European rights has usually been the domain of legal scholars, or those
interested in European citizenship (Shaw 1997; Maas 2005). Interdisciplinary approaches
have recently started to emerge that examine the nascent European public sphere (see
Dressler et al. 2012), but relatively little is still known about the political dynamics of
European rights and values across different national contexts featuring divergent interests
and traditions. Our analysis of the Roma affair in three countries provides a snap-shot
through which to view the development of the so-called Europe of rights. The
comparative approach offers value because it shows how political dynamics operate
differently across national contexts. In this way, we can begin to identify in greater detail
how, and when, the Europeanisation/nationalisation of normative debates occurs.
What we find is evidence of two pronounced effects. The first is a politicisation of
normative Europea re-nationalisation of the EU qua normative powerwhere
integration's moral dimension is twisted or manipulated to suit national political domestic
struggles. The second, linked, effect is of a Europeanisation of normative discussions at
national level. Here the existence of Europe as an additional venue to contest national
decision making appears irresistible for opposition forces.
Our evidence shows how certain norms become more or less Europeanised as a
reflection of internal political dynamics. This confirms that European values, and the
framing of the EU's role in normative questions, can only be understood in relation to
national political dynamics. These are, in particular: political opportunity structures,
powerful narratives of national identity but also the EU's recent history of enlargement,
where more recent member states are likely to assume a different posture towards the
supranational institutions.
Domestic political concerns feature prominentlyin the vigorous confrontations with
Reding and Barrosoreflecting looming electoral pressures. The framing of these
conflicts also relate to France's confident position in the EU as a powerful founding
member state. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania as newcomers demonstrate their more
balanced relationship with EU institutions and the integration process, shaped by a
history of conditionality. While in 2010, they were full member states, the exclusion from
Schengen membership haunted the pages of the Bulgarian and Romanian press.
Becoming embroiled in the Roma affair had divergent implications for our countries.
France as a country at the heart of Europe could take its battle there, and the pages of Le
Figaro are full of the fight for French values. For Bulgaria and Romania, there was far
greater acceptance in press coverage of the European-ness of human rights. This can be
linked to the historical relevance of the EU in the constitution-building of these states
following Communism. We detect evidence of this with the repeated willingness of
political actors in these countries to emphasise the European dimension of the issue and
the principle of solidarity between member states.

Which Values? Which Europe?

What does our research say about perceptions of the role of the EU across Europe, and
how this relates to different ideas about what the EU is for? We see a differentiated role
for the EU across the spectrum of norms, which can be traced to the genesis and
development of the norms themselves.
The free movement of workers was one of the four fundamental freedoms (the others
being free movement of goods, services and capital) mentioned by the Treaty of Rome
(1957). It has since been developed by various EU regulations, culminating in the
directive of 2004,68 but has never been universalit has historically been limited or
conditional of the status of the individual (initially only enjoyed by workers and now by
those holding European citizenship). What does our evidence say about freedom of
movement as a common European value, and to what extent is Schengen synonymous
with such a value? The framing in the Romanian public debate was of freedom of
movement as foundational to the process of European integration itselfthis was much
less the case in France and Bulgaria. The evidence here is in line with analyses which
note the fragility of any notion of European solidarity (Carrera 2011). Norms such as free
movement do not emerge as an uncomplicated achievement of integration representing
fundamental European values and they appear particularly vulnerable to politicisation.
This is presumably because of complex tensions between sovereignty, immigration and
European integration. The EU has played a defining role over the notion of state
sovereignty as it has been transformed in Europe since the end of the Second World War
(Milward 1992). Immigration and free movement have been central to this story (Geddes
2000). The actions of the French government go to the heart of these debates.
Communitarian liberals would defend the right of the state to exclude non-members on
the basis of a political community's right to self-determination (Walzer 1983). The power
of Europe to define and limit this right with respect to European citizens might seem to
be in direct conflict with national sovereignty. What our analysis of Le Figaro's coverage
demonstrates is that Europe can also be productive of sovereigntyallowing politicians
to constantly rediscover their power vis--vis European rules.
The norm of non-discrimination is interesting as there is a more recent, but nevertheless
well-established EU roleoften in enabling and facilitating free movement. In the
French discussion, there is plenty of soul-searching around discrimination/racism, with
the fundamental question (albeit often left un-said) being: is France racist? One can point
to potential influence from the liberal tradition of French republicanism in preconfiguring the kinds of values which emerge in the public debate. Indeed the CERD
report, widely referred to, explores the French tradition of non-recognition of ethnic
minorities. It exposes a tension between contemporary European norms (of minority
rights), and France's historical development (reflected in the non-collection of statistical
data on ethnicity). Another tension emerges with the exchanges between Sarkozy and the
Commission in the French political debate. Here we have the more traditional norm of
state sovereignty challenged by the (relatively newer) role of the EU Commission in
protecting core EU values.
In the coverage in Romania and Bulgaria, the rather more interrupted development of
national liberal traditions and state sovereignty (when compared with France) could
explain the differences in terms of which norms are emphasised and why domestic

political considerations are viewed through the prism of European integration. Rather
than the universal value of non-discrimination, it is the European value of free movement
and the role of the EU that is centre-stage. The reporting of the Roma deportations in the
Romanian press is characterised by a crescendo in the amount of coverage and a
corresponding shift from mere objective reporting to emotive and colourful language. In
Romania politicians and journalists seem to embark on a journey of realisation, during
which initial indifference mixed with racism slowly makes room for an analysis of
normative issues and a general assessment of the state of EU's legal instruments.
Finally, what does our analysis tell us about a Europeanisation of minority rights, where
the Roma have potential to become a casus belli for EU intervention? The answer is
they emerge as the most ambiguous and contested norms, where variable impact reflects
the EU's internal power dynamics. This might derive from the fact that minority rights are
not as yet enshrined in the acquis communautaire (Wiener and Schwellnus 2004).
However, the EU has facilitated the expansion of concepts around minority rights, partly
due to a consensus (following the fall of Communism in 1989) in 19901991 that the
issue of minorities in post-communist regimes needed to be addressed (Kymlicka 2008,
3637). In the contemporary era, the EU has thus become central to these questions and
the recognition of minority rights has been part of the enlargement process itself since
Copenhagen (1993).
The outcry over France's actions, emanating from across the world, has more than an
echo of the (century-old) call from the international community led by Wilson's US to
support the minority cause. Here again the doctrine was only considered in relatively new
or weak states in central and south-east Europe while it was studiously ignored when less
convenient, or among allies or stronger states (Mazower 2012). The evidence here points
to a similar displacement in public debates, where the problem of minority integration in
the French debate becomes shifted onto Romania and Bulgaria. The game of EU
enlargement arguably feeds this by placing greater emphasis on minority protection
depending on the timing of membership (Grigoriadis 2008)newer countries enduring
far more scrutiny over this topic than the original member states. However, the multilevel
nature of Europe allows for a secondary displacement of responsibility for minorities in
the Bulgarian and Romanian debatesupwards towards the EU.
For the Roma themselves, the press coverage provides precious little insight into the
wider problematic of societal cohesion. Instead, we see several reasons why increased
attention at the European level seems to have had mixed results (Ram 2007). While the
norms of anti-discrimination and anti-racism appear to be embedded (at least formally)
by European integration, others such as minority rights and free movement are only
partially Europeanised, and the framework of European values in this area remains a
lofty rhetoric which can be adopted and adapted when it suits, and usually not for the
benefit of the marginalised, but for more prosaic domestic political interests.

Notes
[1] See for example, The Economist, 23/09/10: France v the world: How the Romani row
has dented France's international standing.

[2] Italy adopted similar policies against the Roma in 20072008 with forced closure of
Roma camps, mass fingerprinting (including that of children) and enforced repatriations
of those presenting a security risk (see Fekete 2009).
[3] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
[4] See for example September 2012 special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies.
[5] The circulaire was dated 5 August and signed by Michel Bart, Interior ministry.
[6] The meanings of rights, values and norms can be ambiguous. Here we use
values in its broadest sense (as ideas about moral questions). Norms are seen as values
which are commonly held across groups or societies; rights refer to those values which
have become legally codified.
[7] Although the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, founded in 1990, is seen as
representing ethnic Turks and has played a decisive role in Bulgarian politics.
[8] Le Monde (2 October 2010) Etienne Mougeotte n'entend pas changer la ligne du
Figaro http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2012/02/10/etienne-mougeotten-entend-pas-changer-la-ligne-du-figaro_1641966_3236.html.
[9] Since October 2011 the newspaper has switched to online-only.
[10] Adevrul (27 August 2010) Ministerul Muncii: romii venii din Frana nu au fost
expulzai, ci s-au ntors de bun voie
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/social/Ministerul_Muncii_romii_veniti_din_Franta_nu_au_fost_expulzati-ci_sau_intors_de_buna_voie_0_324568053.html.
[11] Sorin Ghica (20 August 2010) Adevrul S-au ntors euroiganii
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Sau_intors_eurotiganii_0_319768635.html.
[12] Adevrul (26 August 2010) Expulzarea iganilor romni, partea a doua: Ali 230 de
romi trimii joi napoi n Romnia
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/europa/Expulzarea_tiganilor_romanipartea_a_doua-_Alti_230_de_tigani_trimisi_joi_inapoi_in_Romania_0_323967952.html
[13] Viorica Marin (30 July 2010) Adevrul Nicolas Sarkozy ne trimite iganii napoi la
pachet
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Nicolas_Sarkozy_ne_trimite_tiganii_inapoi_la_pach
et_0_307169866.html#
[14] Adevrul (12 July 2010) VIDEO Cum au blocat hoii romni n Frana 120 de
TGV-uri
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Hoti_romani_mai_rapizi_decat_TGV_0_29
6370743.html.
[15] Florin Iaru (7 August 2010) Adevrul Mica iganiad european
http://www.adevarul.ro/florin_iaru__opinii/Mica_tiganiada_europeana_7_312638736.html.
[16] Dnevnik (25 August 2010) aeo: aa c poe e ce peca
pao o eeoa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/08/25/950994_nikolai_mladenov_situaciiata_s_ro
mite_ne_se_predstavia/.

[17] pa Hoaoa (16 September 2010) Dnevnik: opco: Hao ce eeo,

e poe ca oa, a oo pa a ce ae ooc a oa
Epoa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/novini_ot_es/2010/09/16/961652_borisov_naloji_se_mne
nieto_che_romite_sa_nomadi_na/.
[18] Dnevnik (17 September 2010) pac a o o: o a-cee c
aep coo
http://www.dnevnik.bg/sviat/2010/09/17/961928_jurnalist_na_lyo_mond_sofiia_naisetne_si_nameri/.
[19] Grigore Cartianu (22 August 2010) Adevrul Panarrames rromales
http://www.adevarul.ro/grigore_cartianu/Panarrames_rromales_7_321637836.html#.
[20] Grigore Cartianu (23 August 2010) Adevrul Am ntlnit i igani cinstii
http://www.adevarul.ro/grigore_cartianu/Am_intalnit_si_tigani_cinstiti_7_322237778.ht
ml.
[21] Adevrul (24 August 2010) Spirala nociv a urii mpotriva romilor
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/foreign_policy/Spirala_nociva_a_urii_impotriva_ro
milor_0_322168341.html.
[22] Adevrul (20 August 2010) Euroiganii din Bihor au fost repatriai joi din
Frana, fiind ateptai n localitile natale
http://www.adevarul.ro/locale/oradea/Eurotiganii-Bihor-repatriati-autoritatileintoarcerii_0_320368162.html.
[23] Sorin Ghica (20 August 2010) Adevrul S-au ntors euroiganii
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Sau_intors_eurotiganii_0_319768635.html.
[24] Adevrul (12 July 2010) VIDEO Cum au blocat hoii romni n Frana 120 de
TGV-uri
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Hoti_romani_mai_rapizi_decat_TGV_0_29
6370743.html#.
[25] pa Hoaoa (16 September 2010) Dnevnik: opco: Hao ce eeo,
e poe ca oa, a oo pa a ce ae ooc a oa
Epoa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/novini_ot_es/2010/09/16/961652_borisov_naloji_se_mne
nieto_che_romite_sa_nomadi_na/.
[26] Adevrul (28 July 2010) Romnia, pus la zid din cauza iganilor
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Romaniapusa_la_zid_din_cauza_tiganilor_0_305969973.html.
[27] Adevrul (1 September 2010) Europa, la vntoare de igani. La propriu
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Europa-la_vanatoare_de_tigani_La_propriu_0_326967895.html.
[28] Adevrul (29 July 2010) Guvernul francez: Ateptm poliiti din Romnia s
aresteze romii http://www.adevarul.ro/international/europa/Guvernul_francez-_Asteptam_politisti_din_Romania_sa_aresteze_romii_0_307169788.html#.
[29] Adevrul (19 August 2010) Francezul Sarkozy i iganul Sarkzi
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/Francezul_Sarkozy_si_tiganul_Sarkozi_0_3197686
06.html.

[30] Adevrul (26 August 2010) Soluie pentru igani: Romnia, ajutat de Frana, va
cere mai muli bani UE http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/social/Solutie_pentru_tigani_Romania-ajutata_de_Franta-va_cere_mai_multi_bani_UE_0_323968111.html.
[31] Le Figaro (12 August 2010) Discriminations/ONU: Paris doit rpondre
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/12/97001-20100812FILWWW00302discriminationsonu-paris-doit-repondre.php.
[32] Le Figaro (12 August 2010) ONU/Roms: vives attaques de l'UMP
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/13/97001-20100813FILWWW00280-onuromsvives-attaques-de-l-ump.php.
[33] Dominique de Villepin (23 August 2010) Le Figaro Une tache de honte sur notre
drapeau http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2010/08/23/villepin-une-tache-de-hontesur-notre-drapeau_1401652_3232.html#ens_id=1390910.
[34] Le Figaro (24 August 2010) Besson: 635 Roms ont t reconduits
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/24/97001-20100824FILWWW00577-besson635-roms-ont-ete-reconduit.php.
[35] Ovidiu Nahoi (19 September 2010) Adevrul Nu despre igani e vorba!
http://www.adevarul.ro/ovidiu_nahoi__editorial/Nu_despre_tigani_e_vorba_7_338436158.html.
[36] Adrian Halpert (28 July 2010) Adevrul iganii notri sunt i ai lor!
http://www.adevarul.ro/adrian_halpert__editorial/Tiganii_nostri_sunt_si_ai_lor_7_306639341.html.
[37] Dnevnik (13 October 2010) C ca apae a aca eapa
cpe eoppaeo a po o pa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/10/13/976158_dps_iska_parlamentut_da_glasuva_
deklaraciia_sreshtu/.
[38] Dnevnik (18 August 2010) MP: He ce oaa eopa a apc po
o pa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/sviat/2010/08/18/948422_mvr_ne_se_ochakva_deportaciia_na_b
ulgarski_romi_ot/.
[39] Dnevnik (18 September 2010) ap po ce cpa a poec pe
pecoo ococo
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/09/18/962304_bulgari_i_romi_se_subirat_na_prote
st_pred_frenskoto/.
[40] Le Figaro (21 July 2010) Sarkozy stigmatise les Roms (LDH)
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/07/21/97001-20100721FILWWW00364-sarkozystigmatise-les-roms-ldh.php.
[41] Le Figaro (26 July 2010) Roms: une stigmatisation scandaleuse
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/07/26/97001-20100726FILWWW00379-romsune-stigmatisation-scandaleuse.php.
[42] Le Figaro (26 July 2010) Roms: runion dcrie par la gauche
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/07/26/97001-20100726FILWWW00216-romsreunion-decriee-par-la-gauche.php.
[43] Le Figaro (27 July 2010) Roms: pas de stigmatisation (Hortefeux)
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/07/27/97001-20100727FILWWW00570-romspas-de-stigmatisation-hortefeux.php.

[44] Le Figaro (12 September 2010) Roms: une association prvoit un recours
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/09/12/97001-20100912FILWWW00165-romsune-association-prevoit-un-recours.php.
[45] Bastien Hugues (16 September 2010) Le Figaro Roms: Bruxelles, Sarkozy
maintient le cap http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2010/09/16/0100220100916ARTFIG00611-roms-a-bruxelles-sarkozy-maintient-son-cap.php.
[46] Le Figaro (17 September 2010) Ciotti approuve la colre de Sarkozy
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/09/17/97001-20100917FILWWW00315-ue-ciottiapprouve-la-colere-de-sarkozy.php.
[47] Le Figaro (19 October 2010) Roms: aucune procdure ne sera lance contre Paris
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/10/19/01003-20101019ARTFIG00308-romsaucune-procedure-ne-sera-lancee-contre-paris.php.
[48] Le Figaro (29 July 2010) Roms: l'UE approuve la position franaise
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/07/29/97001-20100729FILWWW00428-roms-lue-approuve-la-position-francaise.php.
[49] Grigore Cartianu (13 September 2010) Adevrul De la Allez, allez! la Ales
bules http://www.adevarul.ro/grigore_cartianu/De_la_-Allez-allez-_la_Ales_bules_7_334836515.html.
[50] Phillips, Leigh (24 August 2010) Prospect of French anti-Roma summit disturbs
EU presidency EU Observer http://euobserver.com/justice/30668.
[51] Ann Rovan (6 August 2010) Le Figaro Roms: Sarkozy ne plie pas face la gauche
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2010/07/28/01002-20100728ARTFIG00570-romssarkozy-ne-plie-pas-face-a-la-gauche.php.
[52] Mircea Vasilescu (14 September 2010) Adevrul Blbial pe franuzete
http://www.adevarul.ro/mircea_vasilescu/Balbaiala_pe_frantuzeste_7_335436454.html.
[53] Le Figaro (18 August 2010) Roms: Paris dfend ses mesures
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/18/97001-20100818FILWWW00431-romsparis-defend-ses-mesures.php.
[54] Le Figaro (18 August 2010) Roms: Paris dfend ses mesures
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/18/97001-20100818FILWWW00431-romsparis-defend-ses-mesures.php.
[55] Arielle Thedrel (9 September 2010) Le Figaro Roms : Paris et Bucarest veulent
calmer le jeu http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/09/09/0100320100909ARTFIG00663-roms-paris-et-bucarest-veulent-calmer-le-jeu.php.
[56] Le Figaro (27 August 2010) Roms: proposition du Vatican
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/27/97001-20100827FILWWW00505-romsproposition-du-vatican.php.
[57] Le Figaro (23 August 2010) Roms: sparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/23/97001-20100823FILWWW00279-romsseparation-de-l-eglise-et-de-l-etat.php?cmtpage=4.
[58] pa Hoaoa (16 September 2010) Dnevnik: opco: Hao ce eeo,
e poe ca oa, a oo pa a ce ae ooc a oa
Epoa
http://www.dnevnik.bg/evropa/novini_ot_es/2010/09/16/961652_borisov_naloji_se_mne
nieto_che_romite_sa_nomadi_na/.

[59] poApe (23 August 2010) Dnevnik C e pea aeo a

ap ee a ce opa c poc poe
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/08/23/950219_bsp_ne_priema_vlizaneto_na_bulga
riia_v_Schengen_da_se/.
[60] Dnevnik (15 September 2010) pao a aoa c c peepa: Toa e
ocpo apeee
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2010/09/15/960971_purvanov_za_dialoga_si_s_premier
a_tova_e_konstruktivno/.
[61] Le Figaro (23 August 2010) Roms: sparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/23/97001-20100823FILWWW00279-romsseparation-de-l-eglise-et-de-l-etat.php?cmtpage=4.
[62] Le Figaro (23 August 2010) Roms: sparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/08/23/97001-20100823FILWWW00279-romsseparation-de-l-eglise-et-de-l-etat.php?cmtpage=4.
[63] Flore Galaud (15 September 2010) Le Figaro Sarkozy enjoint Reding d'accueillir
des Roms http://recherche.lefigaro.fr/recherche/access/lefigaro_fr.php?
archive=BszTm8dCk78atGCYonbyztSSJv8nwz54rbFE4gstAGY2YlUEMuLmoHAn
%2BoV%2BERp6u2IGtjAq08M%3D.
[64] Jean-Jacques Mevel (16 September 2010) Le Figaro Paris veut europaniser le
dossier des Roms http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/09/16/0100320100916ARTFIG00723-paris-veut-europeaniser-le-dossier-des-roms.php.
[65] Le Figaro (16 September 2010) Merkel voudrait aussi vacuer des camps
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/09/16/97001-20100916FILWWW00650-merkelvoudrait-aussi-evacuer-des-camps.php.
[66] Le Figaro (16 September 2010) Roms: Prague soutient la France
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2010/09/16/97001-20100916FILWWW00677-romsprague-soutient-la-france.php.
[67] Adevrul (21 August 2010) Ministru suedez: Frana trebuie sancionat financiar
pentru expulzarea rromilor
http://www.adevarul.ro/international/europa/Ministru_suedez_Franta_trebuie_sanctionata_financiar_pentru_expulzarea_romilor_0_320968061.html.
[68] European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004.

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