G.R. No.

18081

March 3, 1922

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.

MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a
marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the
Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect
marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the
Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to
give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5,
1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the
one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other
hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896
in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence
presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong
Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he
should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong
and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage
between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws
of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these
conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo
between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to the facts,
we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to the legal issues
submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can best be resolved under
two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the
Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was
married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the
Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a young lady
named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage
ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which in translation
reads as follows:
One hundred
years of life and
health for both.

Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully

answers the venerable Chiong Ing, father

of the bridegroom, accepting his offer of

marriage, and let this document serve as
proof of the acceptance of said marriage
which is to be celebrated during the
merry season of the flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish
for your and the spouses much
happiness, a long life, and prolific issue,
as noble and great as that which you
brought forth. I consider the marriage of
your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia as a
mandate of God and I hope that they
treat each other with great love and
mutual courtesy and that both they and
their parents be very happy.
Given during the second moon of the
twenty-first year of the reign of the
Emperor Quang Su.

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage
during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong
Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a
concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the
Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from documents presented in evidence, was
permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however,
never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife
or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the
claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a strong
inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect
the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His
Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was
supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not
disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go
to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son
Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of
Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted
without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]), 16 Phil.,
137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the
United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese
merchant, between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an
alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States
united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated
by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of
uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so
clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such

impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22
Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of
Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so
clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged
prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the
same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an
acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of Cheong
Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But we are not called
upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent
acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly
complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At
least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was married
to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the
Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is
established by one of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized
the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and another,
the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by
giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father
of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman asked the parents
if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by the groom
entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman
and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of
whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third
persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this
relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were
executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora
Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter,
Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent
among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially when they do not
swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of the
fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong,
according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very
beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the Philippines according to
the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order
No. 68) must be taken into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of
any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel
of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and only
considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of
this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation.
"Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a
divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service
is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the
worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means
all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a

particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In reReinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441;
Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel,"
and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the
ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The law is quite
correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the
marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter
element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or
repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any
doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the
priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the
Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did
thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which
have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is
controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any
person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on
account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the
parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the legislative
intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between Mohammedans. To
quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish
law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is not to be
presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages celebrated
during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing could be
clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all embracing words found
in this section:
"No marriage" Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" Could any
other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase? "Before any person
professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority" Could stronger
language than this be invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any
informality, irregularity, or omission" Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would
more effectively guard the marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the
belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married" What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the marriage, if it
was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to perform the same, and if
either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word
which would restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian
marriages? By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such
precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the
Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would ascertain from
other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines has, time
and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and executive proclamation.
The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The inhabitants of the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine
Commission imposed on every branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable
rule "that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and no

minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the Islands; that,
upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his
calling, and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute."
The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind
that the Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted
should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The
Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing
religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the same
path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain General of the
Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to the
Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which it will not
interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their customs." (See furtherDecree of the
Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine
Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the
peace deciding civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action
is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of
the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and
customs. . . ." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the
Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission;
Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible officials
have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere with the customs of the
Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired by the
governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages of the Indians, the
Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a marriage between two
Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the people at a place where such
customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a valid marriage. The rule as to the
Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be
recognized although they use no solemnization. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the
sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by members of that Church competent to
contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:"
(Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.
S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs.Guepangco, supra;
U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard
society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the
legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative
power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they
took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn,
209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will
mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage
of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion
and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows

that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to
local custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these
marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them
legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance
settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in the cases
of United Statesvs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil.,
285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to be controlling. In the first place, these were
criminal actions and two Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the
marriage in question was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the
marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In
neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the socalled unwritten law, was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General Order
No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine
announced in the two cases above mentioned.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan
marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages
performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is unnecessary
to decide. Inresume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and that the Chinaman
Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we find the Mohammedan marriage
to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the
rights accruing to them under the law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a partition of
the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-42581

October 2, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. MORA DUMPO,Defendant-Appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:

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Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according
to the rites and practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without
this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo contracted
another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived
together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and
convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty with a
maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and
minimum of two years, four months and twenty one days
of prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the
accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose
that it has been established by the defense, without the
prosecution having presented any objection nor evidence to the
contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused is null
and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her
father had not given his consent thereto.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

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We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites

necessary for the validity of a marriage between Moros according
to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which no judicial notice
may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular
case. In the case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of
Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize
marriages between Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent
of the bride's father or. in the absence thereof, that of the chief of
the tribe to which she belongs in an indipensable requisite for the
validity of such contracts. If the absence of this requisite did not
make the marriage contract between Mohammedans void, it was
easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's

testimony inasmuch as for lack of one there were two other

Imans among the State witnesses in this case. It failed to do so,
however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's testimony
for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that,
granting the absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit
compliance therewith may be presumed because it does not
appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to this
alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration.
But this presumption should not be established over the
categorical affirmation of Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's father, that he
did not give his consent to his daughter's alleged second
marriage for the reason that he was not informed thereof and
that, at all events, he would not have given it, knowing that
Dumpo's first marriage was not dissolved.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged

second marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It
appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by
the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan
being undissolved, cannot be considered as such, there is no
justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

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Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is

acquitted of the charges and if she should be in detention her
immediate release is ordered, with the costs of both instances de
oficio. So ordered.
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Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and

Imperial, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
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HULL, J., dissenting:

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Under section 25 of the Marriage Law Act No. 3613, "marriages

between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with
the rites or practices of their religion . . .," and as stated in the
majority opinion we cannot take judicial notice of such matters

but that they are subject to proof, as is any foreign law. The
person "learned in the law" who was presented as an expert
witness for the defense, did not know his age, but it was
estimated by the judgment as fifty-four years. He gave his
occupation as that of a fisherman and stated he had performed
two marriages. He does not know how to read. He was not asked
any questions as to whether there was a difference between the
marriage of a young woman living with her parents or a woman
who had been emancipated.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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In the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that the second

marriage was solemnized by an Iman, a Mohammedan religious
official, seventy years old, who was living in the vicinity of the
contracting parties.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

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There was no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials

of a marriage ceremony according to the Mohammedan religion,
and I agree with the trial court that the evidence relied upon by
the majority opinion, is not worthy of serious consideration. If
consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the
subsequent actions of the father of the girl. She left his house
and after the second ceremony lived openly with her second
husband, this with her father's full knowledge and at least tacit
consent, for many months.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

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I therefore believe that the sentence appealed from should be

affirmed.
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Vickers, Goddard, and Diaz, concurs.

G.R. No. L-21076

March 31, 1965

WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be
legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant.
This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July 12, 1961 of which petitioner
was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board. However, on
June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and
ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country. On August 9, 1962, petitioner filed a motion
for new trial requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same
was denied for lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner initiated the instant
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which incidentally was considered by it as a petition forcertiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted a written
stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus, the court declared valid the decision
rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 while it restrained respondents from excluding
petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June,
1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her
husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that
they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto

Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant; that this
decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the
Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered
by the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962 the
latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in
evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that said Board
further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23,
1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not
possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated
August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in
his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in
1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first
went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908
it must have been in 1912.
1wph1.t

In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband
Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration authorities concerning
their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact that the only
basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral
and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of
Commissioners motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the
country resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the
following comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a mass of
oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
She relies on the records of Perfecto Blas in connection with his cancellation case and
the testimony of the supposed children in the previous admission proceeding. But this
claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas himself, in the hearing conducted by a
Board of special inquiry in connection with his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was
married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say, Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there being in
1935; he could not therefore have been married to herein applicant in 1929.
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record. Indeed, not only is there
no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the
record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to doubt their
veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be
entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that
laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage
celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any
denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2).
Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village
leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section
19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside
of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also
valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was
presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the
general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed
that it is the same as our own.

The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same as any
other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In the absence of
pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same
as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46).
In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it will be
presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867).
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned
therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage, even if true,
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition
for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parentsin-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao,"
respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27
years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,

before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were
deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor,
Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought
some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken
home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her
father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the
house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous
of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in
Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez,
to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950,
a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church,
for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this
Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena
Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary,
as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of
Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the
marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of
the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of
said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared
invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if,
when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person

who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage
was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco
vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents
consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy
of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes
the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in
the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of

a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against
the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage
of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their
relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very
children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The
right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage,
that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind
are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his
wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her

conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have
been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at
such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not
due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.
That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the
recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute
in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money
while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to
live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of
rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the
liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A
parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as
where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is
not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his
child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in
the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet
or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford
him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her
spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this
suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face
of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent
to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to
the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and
with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena
Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the
same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not
guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other
to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce
on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property
nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil
and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo
Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already
been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the
date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing
of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his

capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as
possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such
when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in
cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a
civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying
that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance,
thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an

American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would
no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse
therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of
the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or
residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted
in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950
private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent
as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the
same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this

disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view
that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it
opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much
less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
jurisdiction," 2

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the

exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner
to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be
resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversybefore the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration
of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained
legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of
a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to

resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis
to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she
was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a
certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before
another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by
the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of
certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by
the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.