IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PAULDING COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA JODY EBRIGHT TODD, PETITIONER CIVIL ACTION NO. vs. 14-CV-1201-TB GILBERT FREEMAN JR., RESPONDENT MOTION TO SET ASIDE- AMENDED (3) COMES NOW, Gilbert Freeman, Jr., Respondent, Pro se, and files this Motion to Set Aside- Amended (3) as follows: MOTION TO SET ASIDE 1 The above styled matter was brought before this Court on the Petitioner’s Petition for ex parte Petition for Stalking Temporary Protective Order, on or about April 10, 2014.2, The Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s Petition for Temporary Protective Order and Cross Claim for Temporary Protective Order- Corrected on April 17", 2014, 3. Based on her word alone absent any evidence (i.e. police reports, medical reports or other evidence submitted) and against opposing evidence, affidavits and witnesses available to both parties, the Petitioner was granted a Stalking Protective Order by this Court on April 30, 2014. 4. The issuance of the 12 Month Stalking Protective Order was appealed by the Respondent and dismissed by the Court of Appeals because the Respondent made a direct appeal rather than a discretionary appeal. 5. In ex parte communication, the Petitioner and Court discussed Facebook postings but did not include any reference to this discussion in the filed complaint for the Temporary Protective Order. If the Court deemed it important enough togive instruction to the Petitioner to bring the Facebook postings to court as the Petitioner has claimed, (emphasis added) it is unclear to Respondent why any reference to these postings would be allowed to be excluded from the Petitioner’s complaint for Temporary Protective Order. (T-59) 6. Failure to include the Court’s advisement to the petitioner or any reference of ex parte discussion of Facebook postings to the Petitioner’s complaint violates the Respondent’s right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This raises Respondent's concerns as to what else Petitioner may have discussed in ex parte communication with the Court and concealed from Respondent, (T-59). 1 The Court’s Order amounts to a blame the victim mentality as the Respondent (victim) had posted on Facebook about true, unedited and audio recorded events concerning verbal abuse he had suffered at the hands of the Petitioner to refute public statements made by the Petitioner. Postings included audio recorded statements made by the Petitioner that are effectively her admission that she frequently called the Respondent “nigger” and “nigga” inter alia racially insensitive statements that 3are psychologically and emotionally abusive to the Respondent. The Petitioner has also made similar references to the children the parties raised together as included in affidavits previously submitted to the Court by the adult children, Victoria Stewart and Allegra Freeman (Exhibits G and H). In addition the Petitioner has on numerous occasions made derogatory statements using the terms “ghetto” and “...in all of niggerdom”. The Respondent has never responded to the Petitioner in kind. That the Petitioner uses racial epithets is not new knowledge to this Court in Paulding County, Georgia as the Court has been informed of this previously to no avail and two motions for psychological evaluations of the Petitioner, and Respondent if necessary, have been denied by this Court. ‘The Petitioner has also complained about a separate and unrelated post, where Respondent had mentioned the Petitioner is a “name dropper”. The Petitioner, upon making a new acquaintance, appears to strategically insert the name of her boss, Brad Shaw, a Vice President and Senior Leader at The Home Depot Corporate, during conversation, in a manner that could be interpreted as attempting to influence.9 On her testimony alone, the Petitioner claims there have been past domestic violence incidents between the parties (R-6). The Respondent disputes this claim as any past domestic violence was inflicted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner brought no police reports, medical reports or evidence of any kind supporting the Petitioner’s claims. 10. As is known to this Court from the previous Action (12-CV-1077), the Petitioner had a stroke and is on regular medication for Chron’s disease. The medications the Petitioner has taken to treat these conditions cause the Petitioner to bruise with ease yet there are no pictures available to the Trial Court to substantiate any claims of abuse. These medications in addition to psychotropic drugs the Petitioner is prescribed for severe anxiety and other reasons unknown to the Respondent may cause violent mood swings in the Petitioner’s behavior or possibly cause the Petitioner’s feelings of paranoia.ll. This Action stems from a custody dispute Appealed to the Court of Appeals, Case No. A140644 and the Supreme Court of Georgia, Case No. $14C1902 (T-27). In bringing forth the current Action, the Petitioner successfully sought the assistance of this Court to modify its own existing order (at the time, under appeal), granting the Respondent parenting time. In gaining a Stalking Protective Order, the Petitioner could then violate the Respondent’s parenting rights as provided by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thereby completely severing and completely obstructing any ties between the Respondent, two older sisters, Victoria Stewart and Allegra Freeman, and the parties’ youngest minor child, LF. This action extends cyclic emotional and psychological parental alienation abuse of the minor child and adult children to the next generation as it has in the current and previous maternal generations. 12. The obstruction of parenting time by the Petitioner against the Respondent for nearly three years amounts to intentional emotional distress being placed upon the Respondent and the adult children the Parties’ have raised together but also are obstructed from seeing their minor sister at their leisure (emphasis added) 613. Two adult children, Victoria C. Stewart (married), and Allegra W. Freeman previously submitted Two affidavits each, signed on separate occasions, disputing claims made by the Petitioner of any acts of domestic violence by the Respondent in both their adulthood and in childhood (Exhibits G and H). They also refuted any claims that the Petitioner was in reasonable fear of the Respondent at any time. Both adult children were present at the time of Trial to be cross-examined. Victoria C. Stewart was called to and did testify contrary to the Petitioner’s claims. 14. The Respondent submitted public record documents from the custodian of records at the Paulding County Sherriff's Office that state there were only two reports filed with the sheriff's office (Exhibit I). Both of these reports were written. at the request of the Respondent. There were no reports on file written at the request of the Petitioner. Clearly the Petitioner had no reasonable fear if there is no written record of a report from the Petitioner. The Petitioner even mentioned she didn’t have time to submit a report when she states, “NO. THEY SAID I HAD TO GO THROUGH THE SHEPHERD CENTER AND I COULDN'T TAKE OFF FROM. WORK...” (T-23). Anyone in reasonable fear would make time to file a policereport. Especially someone such as the Petitioner, who practically sets her own work hours and has no less than four (4) weeks vacation not including sick time. 15. The Petitioner claims that she felt threatened by the Respondent saying “tick- tock”(R-6). This uttered three (3) times over four (4) months. After the first occurrence when the parties’ conversation deteriorated, the Respondent clarified that “tick-tock” meant the parties’ daughter was soon to be fifteen years old and the Petitioner would not be able to shut the Respondent out of her life indefinitely, as the Petitioner had been doing for nearly two years, since the minor child would be eighteen years old in a few short years (T-13). 16. ‘The Petitioner and Respondent alternated initiation of contact depending upon if the contact was for parenting time or child support. The Respondent had legitimate business in contacting the Petitioner in the form of parenting time ordered by this Court to be every other weekend (T-55) (R-81).17. The Petitioner never had “feelings of fear” prior to the Respondent insisting on receiving his parenting time with the minor child. The first instance of initiating parenting time came nearly six months after the Trial Court issued the Order due to the Petitioner’s continued obstruction and interference. The Respondent brought the two adult children Victoria Stewart and Allegra Freeman to ask for their sister at the home of the Petitioner as no place of exchange had been designated by the Trial Court (T-54). Because of the Petitioner’s frequent dishonesty, the Respondent didn’t feel comfortable going alone and the Sheri P's Department was unable to arrange a deputy for standby (T-54). 18. Two weeks after the first instance to initiate parenting time and a week or so after the time period listed in the complaint in the Temporary Protective Order, the Respondent again sought parenting time in compliance with the Trial Court’s Order. A Sheriff's Deputy was available for a standby and went to see if parenting time would be possible but no one answered at the Petitioner’s home (T-55) (R-65,66). Both incidents were video recorded by the Respondent. (Exhibits A and B)19. The Petitioner’s proverbial wounds are self-inflicted. As the hearing transcript reflects, Petitioner admits that she was blocked from viewing any Facebook posts by Respondent. This means the Petitioner had to create an alias or rely on others to provide her with the posts, third party. If others provided her undesirable glimpses at what she knows is the truth the Petitioner should have instructed her friends not to share the social media posts with her. 20. ‘As was brought to the attention of this Court previously, the Petitioner has badmouthed the Respondent on social media and to mutual friends. This badmouthing of the Respondent has led to the disassociation of a number of social media friends due to the Petitioner’s slanderous and or libelous accusations. 21. There was no intent of the Respondent to cause physical harm or duress to the Petitioner. In releasing truthful statements and supporting proof, the Respondent made the truth available to clear his name of any slanderous statements by Petitioner. With Two A ffiants present and available for cross-examination at the time of trial,both Affiants contesting the statements of the Petitioner, the concealment of ex parte communication in her complaint, reports from the custodian of records at the Paulding County Sheriff's Department reflecting no complaints filed by the Petitioner, and no medical records or other evidence to support her claims, the Petitioner’s Stalking Protective Order should have been dismissed for lack of evidence. 22. The Petitioner may continue her obstruction of Respondent’s parenting time at her own legal peril. Federal Courts have ruled in favor of Tort remedies to parental alienation and obstruction of parental rights. 23. Regrettably, the Petitioner (mother) seems intent on using this Court as a firewall between the minor child LF and the Respondent (father). If such is the case, how far and long the Court will allow this to continue is unclear. In summary, the Petitioner: 1. Failed to show a preponderance of evidence 2. Failed to show intent of the Respondent 13. Upon cross-examination, pled the Fifth Amendment as to whether she followed this Court’s Final Order regarding the Respondent’s legitimate business of visitation time concerning the parties’ minor child in the previous action (12-CV-1077-TB) (T-13). 4, Violated the “Unclean Hands Doctrine” in failing to abide by this Court’s previous order for visitation for the Respondent and Minor Child. 5. Failed to produce any supporting documentation regarding claims of domestic violence or complaints to the Paulding County Sheriff's Department. 6. Concealed pertinent ex parte instructions by this Court 7. It is unknown if the Petitioner concealed other pertinent ex parte communications without deposing the Court. 8. Did not dispute allegations of both affiants who were present at the time of trial to be cross-examined. 9. Was again dishonest with the court when she says the parties’ adult daughter pounded on her door, Exhibit A illustrates this dishonesty on video recording, (T-9) 10. The Petitioner admits in open court that the minor child is not in fear 12therefore the child should not have been separated from her father by the Court (T-28). ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY In Wright v. State, 292 Ga.App. 673, 676, 665 S.E.2d 374 (2008), “Verbal taunting by fire chief during working hours, including “ ‘cursing, threatening employees’ jobs, and belittling employees’ intelligence, personal life, weight, sexual inexperience or financial situation,’” was not sufficient to place employees in reasonable fear for their safety and did not fall within the statutory definition of stalking.” In Martin v. Woodyard, 313 Ga. App. 797, 799 (723 SE2d 293) (2012), “Woodyard did not meet his evidentiary burden and that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the protective order. Even construed to support the trial court's imposition of the protective order, De Louis v. Sheppard, 277 Ga.App. 768, 769, 627 S.E.2d 846 (2006).” 13OCGA § 9-11-60(4)(2) provides: “A motion to set aside may be brought to set aside a judgment based upon [f]raud, accident, mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant.” Stalking is defined in OCGA § 16-5-90(a)(1): A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person. [T]he term “contact” shall mean any communication. [T]he term “place or places” shall include any public or private property occupied by the victim other than the residence of the defendant. [T]he term “harassing and intimidating” means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety or the safety of a member of his or her immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, and which serves no legitimate purpose.“In order to obtain a protective order based on stalking, the petitioner must establish the elements of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. OCGA §§ 16-5-94(e). The cases interpreting the statute are clear, Evidentiary burden must be reached for the imposition of a 12 Month Stalking Protective Order. Whether deliberately or accidentally, the Court granted a procedural and tactical advantage by allowing the Petitioner to exclude and or conceal portions of ex parte communication in the Petition for ex parte Temporary Protective Order. The Petitioner discloses the communication in open court but did not include it in the Temporary Order request when Petitioner states, “I DID SUBMIT THIS TO YOU UPON REQUESTING THE T.P.O., AND YOU TOLD ME TO REMIND YOU OF THESE FACEBOOK POSTINGS WHEN I CAME TO COURT AND MAKE SURE THAT I HAD COPIES” (T-59). If Facebook postings were important enough for the Court to advise the Petitioner to bring them to the hearing, the postings should have been included in the Petitioner’s Petition. This action denied the respondent due process and equal protection in accordance with the 14'" Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15The concealment whether deliberate or negligent violates the “Unclean Hands Doctrine” based on OCGA § 23-1-10, which provides that "Who would have equity must do equity.” The concealment of ex parte communication further violates the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 3 Judges Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently 7a (i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and (ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond. The Order is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court of the United States “has [] stated that a statute will be found [unconstitutionally] overbroad if it prohibits, in addition to conduct which the states may in the exercise of their police powers justifiable prohibit, conduct which is protected 16by the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d 803,808(Pa. Super, 1976) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1973)). The Order is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech because it restricts speech based on content before it is spoken. A “prior restraint” on speech is defined as a content-based restriction on speech prior to its occurrence. Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.3d57,63 (3d Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has stated that prior restraints on speech constitute “the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,559 (1976). Although the government may arguably regulate constitutionally protected speech where such speech poses grave harm to a child, such orders are subject to strict scrutiny and can only be upheld if the government “chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Shepp y. Shepp A.2d 1165 (Pa.2006)(quoting Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) Further the 12 Month Stalking Protective Order is unconstitutional because it prevents all contact between Respondent (father) and the parties’ Minor Child. The 17Petitioner admits the Minor Child is not in fear of the Respondent (father) so there was no justification in obstructing the Respondent’ visitation ordered by this Court in the previous Action (T-28). The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14.” — Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985) ‘The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v. Massachusetts ... The Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” In these cases, the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to Constitutional protection ... “State intervention to terminate such a relationship ... must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause” Santosky v. Kramer 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745, 18(1982). A natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children free from undue state interference. As Justice White explained in his opinion of the Court in Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972) Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (First) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973). Clearly the Petitioner has “unclean hands” and should not be relieved of scrutiny. The Petitioner is frustrated because Respondent has audio recordings of statements she has made that refute the slanderous and libelous accusations she publicly makes about the Respondent. While the Petitioner's frequent insensitive use of racial epithets may be a breach of her fiduciary obligations as a gateway employee for a Vice President at The Home Depot Corporate, Brad Shaw, and a Direct Report for The Home Depot CEO, Craig Menear, she cannot disown her audio recorded 19words. As the Petitioner so frequently says, “You said it, you own if”. Further, Petitioner wishes to conceal her long term intimate relationship lasting from at least the period of the Spring of 2012, thru the Fall of 2014, with a married father and contractor, Demetrius Diego Willingham who may have bid on jobs with The Home Depot (Exhibit F). Whether this denotes an advantage over other bidding contractors and therefore a conflict of interest for a gateway employee of The Home Depot Corporate does not lessen the fact the Petitioner’s relationship with a married father was conducted in front of the minor child, LF, who has been deliberately alienated from Respondent. Whether the Respondent’s disclosure of this relationship was discussed in Petitioner's ex parte communication to garner sympathy from the Court is unknown to Respondent without deposing the Court. The ex parte communication between the Petitioner and the Court was improper and resulted in a procedural and tactical advantage for the Petitioner. Quite simply transparency of the process is an essential requirement of the court and parties to ensure justice is met. ‘As this Court has been notified by Respondent in a final letter written to the Court in the previous Action (12-CV-1077-TB), the Petitioner seeks to unjustly obstruct all contact between the Respondent and the minor child LF. This is also 20evident when the Petitioner objects to the guardian ad litem, Angela A. Woodall testifying and Respondent having any visitation during the hearing of that Action (Exhibits C, D and E), Attorney for Petitioner, Parisa N. Herrin: “... And that’s my whole problem with Ms. Woodall [guardian ad litem] giving her recommendation to this court and this court granting visitation.” The Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Herrin, also wrote an Order signed by this Court that included no visitation outside of every other weekend. The Respondent was granted no visitation for any holidays or School breaks by this Court. As predicted, this effective “parentectomy” has occurred under the supervision of this Court and or Agents of the Court (Ms. Woodall) since July 29, 2012. Ina recent Georgia Supreme Court decision, the Higher Court has settled that merely posting about someone on the internet does not satisfy the requirements of a stalking protective order. As the Petitioner has admitted, she was blocked from accessing internet postings, by Respondent, and could only access them through a third party. Without the third party, the postings were inaccessible to the Petitioner. Therefore, the Petitioner purposefully sought contact clearly not intended for her through postings that both she, the parties’ Minor Child and her family members were obstructed from accessing. 21Further, the Higher Court stated that: “An ordinary speaker of the English language typically would not say, for instance, that a popular author had “contacted” or “communicated with” the speaker simply because the speaker had read a book written by the author.” In the decision, the Higher Court also notes that in order to read the posts, Ellis had to visit Mr. Chan’s ELI website. This simple fact meant that it could not be said the communications were not made “without her consent”, the Higher Court continues: “This is not a case in which Chan sent a message to Ellis by electronic mail, linked commentary to her social media account, or posted commentary on her website. To the contrary, the commentary about which Ellis complains was posted on Chan’s website, and Ellis learned of that commentary — that is, it arguably was communicated to her — only as a result of her choice to discover the content of the website. The evidence shows that Ellis visited the website herself — it appears, in fact, that she registered herself as an authorized commentator on the website — and that she had others visit the website and report back to her about the commentary published there. Generally 22speaking, our stalking law forbids speech only to the extent that it is directed to an unwilling listener and even if Ellis did not like what she heard, she cannot be fairly characterized as an unwilling listener. Even then, if the speech is protected by the First Amendment, it is excluded from the scope of our stalking law. See OCGA § 16-5-92” Not only has the evidentiary burden had not been met but the Petitioner has repeatedly shown she is not in fear of the Respondent. Upon leaving the Court on the very day of the hearing, the Petitioner declined an escort to the parking lot by the numerous deputies on standby in the court for reasons that can only be interpreted as another instance of “confirmation bias” on behalf of the Court as the Respondent has no history of violence (emphasis added). The Petitioner was still in the parking lot when the Respondent and Adult Child Victoria Stewart departed. Allegations are no substitute for evidence. Having failed to satisfy requirements of a Protective Order and in light of the Higher Court’s most recent ruling, the Petitioner’s Petition and 12 Month Stalking Protective Order should be dismissed instanter. 23WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests: 1) the Court dismiss The Petitioner’s Petition and the 12 Month Stalking Protective Order, Instanter; 2) visitation between the Minor Child LF and Respondent (father) be allowed as ordered previously by this Court and obstruction of visitation by Petitioner be halted. 3) and for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted this_2¢% day of April, 2015. 24STATE OF GEORGIA COUNTY OF PAULDING VERIFICATION Personally appeared before the undersigned officer duly authorized to administer oaths, Gilbert Freeman, Jr., who after having been duly swom, on oath deposed and stated that the facts contained in the within and foregoing pleading, MOTION TO SET ASIDE AMENDED (3), are true and correct. A “Gilbert Freeman, Jr. Sworn to and subscribed before me ig SOU tay of April, 2015. NOTARY PUBLIC #Es Tents aes 3 My commis / see 8 egeemeny = eames z* “INS CONS “ “8, Sows 25IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PAULDING COUNTY ~» STATE OF GEORGIA JODY EBRIGHT TODD, PETITIONER CIVIL ACTION NO. vs. 14-CV-1201-TB GILBERT FREEMAN JR., RESPONDENT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that I have this day served the MOTION TO SET ASIDE AMENDED (3) upon alll parties in this matter, by Certified United States Mail and or FIRST CLASS US MAIL, with adequate postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Jody Ebright Todd Respectfully submitted this “Zy“* day of April, 2015. 2619 a 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 as 20 21 22 23 24 25 VISITATION EVERY OTHER WEEKEND. 1 GUESS OUR CONCERN TS THAT -- AND I APOLOGIZE. I DIDN'T LET YOUR HONOR PINISH, AND I DON'T KNOW WHERE YOU WERE GOING TO GO WITH THAT. MAYBE I SHOULD SIT DOWN AND LET YOU FINISH THAT. THE COURT: WELL IF WE WERE ALL CONCERNED ABOUT IT WE WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THIS LADY'S DIRECTIONS MONTHS, AND MONTHS, AND MONTHS, AND MONTHS AGO. MS. HERRIN: BUT HAD WE HAD A FULL TRIAL, YOUR HONOR, YOUR HONOR WOULD HAVE HEARD THE FACT THA’ MR. FREEMAN OFFERED TO PAY FOR THE THERAPY SESSIONS, BUT THEN WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR IT, HE WOULD NEVER GIVE MS. TODD THE HSA INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PAY FOR THE THERAPY. THE COURT: BUT I DIDN’T HEAR ANY OF THAT, DID I? MS. HERRIN: RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND THAT, BECAUSE HE DISMISSED HIS CASE. AND THAT’S MY WHOLE PROBLEM WITH MS WOODALL GIVING HER RECOMMENDATION TO THIS COURT AND THTS COURT GRANTING VISITATION. THE COURT: LET ME DIRECT YOU BACK TO YOUR ANSWER. DEFENSE’S ANSWER IN COUNTERCLAIM. AND YOUR PRAYERS, I'M DOING EXACTLY WHAT YOU ASKED FOR AND WHAT SHE RECOMMENDED IN YOUR DEFENSE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, “THAT THE DEFENDANT BE AWARDED TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY OP THE PARTY’S MINOR CHILDREN.” WE‘LL READ CHILD THRE SINCE ONE HAS AGED OUT, “WITH THE DEFENDANT HAVING PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF [F AND PLAINTIFF /RESPONDENT 39 EXHIBIT "C" 14-CV-1201-TB10 au 13 4 15 16 a7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NOT COOPERATE AND GO TO VISIT HBR FATHER, I CERTAINLY THINK THAT HER FATHER AND HER SHOULD BE GOING ONCE A WEEK TO A THERAPEUTIC VISIT WITH A PSYCHOLOGIST TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THEIR ISSUES, THAT MR. FREEMAN PAID FOR THIS AT A TIME THAT THE PSYCHOLOGIST RECOMMENDS THAT GREAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN DETERMINING OR COVERING LEONA’S. CONCERNS OR FEARS. THAT THE VISITATION THEN BE EVERY OTHER WEEKEND, A WEEK IN THE SUMMER, DIVIDE AND ALTERNATE THANKSGIVING, THREE OR FOUR DAYS AT CHRISTMAS, AND THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE DESIRES OF LEONA'S REGARDING HER SCHOOL AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES. THE COURT: MS. HERRIN, DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS YOU WISH TO ASK OF THE GUARDIAN REGARDING THAT MATTER? MS. HERRIN: IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT MR. FREEMAN HAS DISMISSED HIS ACTION NOW THOUGH, MS. WOODALL, IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION STILL THE SAME? MS. WOODALL: IT IS BECAUSE -- I MEAN, THAT’S JUST WHAT'S BEST FOR LEONA. AGAIN, LIKE THE JUDGE COMMENTED, I REALLY WOULD LIKE FOR MY RECOMMENDATION OR MY THOUGHTS REGARDING LEONA BE HEARD REGARDLESS OF THE LEGAL WHAT DO YOU CALL IT. MS. HERRIN: I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD LIKE YOUR THOUGHTS TO BE HEARD, BUT LOGISTICALLY, LEGALLY, SINCE MR. FREEMAN HAS DISMISSED HIS ACTION FOR VISITATION, HE'S 68 EXHIBIT “D" 14-CV-120T-TB20 uw 22 13 14 16 a7 18 19 20 21 22 24 2s DISMISSED HIS ACTION, TECHNICALLY UNDER THE LAW RIGHT NOW WE ALL UNDERSTAND THAT MS. TODD IS THE ONLY ONE THAT HAS SOLE LEGAL FULL PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF ‘- —, CORRECT? AND UNDERSTANDING THAT AND THE FACT THAT HE HAS NO VISITATION AND/OR CUSTODY OF HER, IS IT STILL YOUR RECOMMENDATION? MS. WOODALL: YES MS. HERRIN: OKAY. AND YOU HAVE MET WITH LEONA ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, CORRECT? MS. WOODALL: YES. MS. HERRIN: HOW MANY OCCASIONS? MS. WOODALL: PROBABLY SIX. ‘MS, HERRIN: AT LEAST SIX TIMES? MS, WOODALL: THREE OR FOUR IN MY OFFICE, ONE AT HER HOME. YES, IT’S PROBABLY BEEN AT LEAST SIX. MS. HERRIN: OKAY, AND THE ONE WHERE YOU MET HER AT THE HOME WAS THE ONE I WAS PRESENT AT, CORRECT? MS. WOODALL: YES. Ms. HERRIN: AND THAT WAS FOR AROUT TWO AND A HALF HOURS? IS THAT CORRECT? MS. WOODALL: THAT'S CORRECT. MS. HERRIN: AND ON THAT DAY SHE HAD SHARED WITH YOU -- NOT THE MOST RECENT ONE. THAT WAS APPROXIMATELY -- DO YOU REMEMBER THE DATE EXACTLY? MS. WOODALL: OF THE HOME VISIT? MS. HERRIN: THAT WAS ON AUGUST 21, WASN’T IT? 69 EXHIBIT "E" 14-CV-1201-TBVITAL RECORDS UNIT Marriage License cm. 2s STATEOF GEORGIA COUNTY OR..DDUGLAS To any Clergy or any other person authorized ts solemnize: You are hereby authorized and permitted to join the persons named below in Matrimony. Deneve Diego Witinghem nf AM of this State, and for doing so this shall i your rdisig to The Constitution ame Lee stent license. Given Under My Hard and Seathis 8 day eee 2 Demetrius Dlego Wilingham and? ac suf Thereby Certify, That. were joined together in 20 2¢__by me in the ‘ abel County of —24 a 4 Georgia. Sigume — “Tee igen ——— Ket. ee Segoe me oo u re Pha To [213 janes T. Baker rote ste he ne 6 308, in ge nr ra hint Pere may Oe: ¥ Ri See : EXHIBIT "E" 14-CV-1201-TBSTATE OF GEORGIA COUNTY OF Caroll CORE Before me this day personally appeared Allegra W. Freeman, who being duly swom, deposes and says: 1 My name is Allegra W. Freeman; I am 18 years of age and am competent to give this Affidavit. 1 give this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge. 2. 1 was raised by my parents under one roof until they separated in March of 2009, when my ‘mother purchased her own home. 3. ‘Throughout my childhood, my mother and father argued almost daily. Nearly every time, my mother, Jody Ebright Todd, started the argument and was the aggressor. She would often attempt to antagonize my father but he would not oblige her. She has no fear of my father at all and frequently got directly in his face, nose to nose, when arguing with him, On more than one occasion my mother has thrown solid objects at my father’s head. This includes an incident in September of 2003 when my mother threw a deodorant bottle at my father’s head and barely missed. My mother became very angry when the police arrived and J told them what happened. She applied an abusive tactic I now know from therapy celled the “silent treatment”, depriving me, as an eight year old, of any love and affection essentially for life. 4. My mother fears no one and frequently challenges other adults in public. She rarely has anything other than a hostile relationship with any of her neighbors no matter where she lives. From the time I was eleven years old, my mother would get into conflicts with other adults publicly and then attempt to Wolve me in the adult conflict as physical backup. I guess because I was always big for my age though 1 was never physically aggressive. 8. My mother is very insecure and characteristically unstable. My mother is also susceptible to spontaneous fits of rage when she doesn’t get her way. Usually these bursts of fury derive from relatively minor incidents such as a dish being left in the sink, couch pillows being left in disarray or walking barefoot on the wood floor after she has mopped it. Because of this scary behavior my sisters and I were exceedingly cautious in avoiding things that we knew would upset her. This was rarely effective because the things that trigger her behavior could also change from one moment to the next. It ‘was as if she was determined to find something wrong and there was nothing we could do to please her. Especially me and my sister Alex as my mother would frequently scapegoat us and say “it's always the “a's”, This was a frequent reference to her children whose names begin with the letter “A”, In social settings my mother is always polite with her peers. In authoritative settings she is very submissive to superiors and very dominant over those she perceives to be subordinates. She is very dismissive and frequently belligerent towards service industry workers. She rarely leaves a restaurant without a complaint and often amuses herself by getting her drinks or meals comped. If there is nothing she can gain from a person in a relationship she has no use for that person, including her own children. Afton’ tntals ANF Gar 20120778 Png Cou) Fini ein tr Sing Tonpory Protective Order Page 1 of 2 EXHIBIT "G" 14-CV-1201-TB (2 Pages)7 When my parents’ relationship ended, 1 elected to live with my father and would visit my mother. I recorded my mother’s behavior because my mother is very manipulative, fabricates stories and embellishes them to her own benefit. One such recording is included (See Attachment A-1) in full where she attempted to grab my phone out of my hand when I was 16, At the time she tried to wrestle my phone away from me she was driving at a high rate of speed on a two lane road. 8 1am in no way saying my Mom is all bad and my Dad is all good. Frequently my dad could be frustrating because he would enable my mother by refusing to stand up to her. He basically would go along to get along. He sometimes was even numb fo what she was doing which I don't believe helped in many situations. 9. 1 do believe my mother is in desperate need of a psychological evaluation. I do not believe it is healthy for my sister, Leona to be in the care of a person as emotionally unstable as my mother currently is. All attachments are true and correct copies described as follows: Atlachment A-T: Recording of my mother, Jody Ebright Todd, attempting to wrestle my phone uway while she was driving ina spontancons fit, This recording was made public FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT: This QS _ day of April, 2014. Swom to gnd subscribed before me this 23% day of April, 2014. C NOTARY PUBLIC My commission expires: oe ‘OAPN: 14-cV-1201-T8 (Paulding County) Plaintit's Potton or Staking Temporary Protective Order Page 2 of 2 EXHIBIT "G" 14-CV-1201-TB (2 Pages)STATE OF GEORGIA COUNTY OFAC 9 AFFIDAVIT OF VICTORIA Before me this day personally appeared Victoria C. Stewart, who being duly sworn, deposes and says rf My name is Victoria C. Stewart; I am over 18 years of age and am competent to give this Affidavit. I give this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge. 2, Lwas raised by Jody Ebright Todd and Gilbert Freeman Jr., hereinafter Mom/Dad/parents, under one roof until they separated in March of 2009, when my Mom purchased her own home. | initially chose to live with my Mom. After a few months of dealing with my Mom’s instability, I asked to move in with my Dad and he agreed. My mother intimidated and badgered me into staying with her. 3 Matters of my parents conduct during my childhood and into adulthood are as follows: 2) Mom argued frequently with Dad and usually got in his face by the end of it ) When angered, my Mom will get into a fighting stance with me and my sisters. c) My Mom has used the terms “nigga”, “nigglet” and “niggerdom” in a hostile manner when refecring to my sisters and me. ) Mom was so belligerent towards a pregnant doctor when I was hospitalized in 2012 she was OQ) deemed a physical threat and removed from WellStar Douglas Hospital by security escort. i, When I was transferred to my hospital room, my Mom had to receive permission to re-enter the hospital by administation ©) Thave no memory of any domestic abuse by my Dad in childhood or adulthood. ) My Mom fabricates and embellishes stories to her benefit. g) My Mom threatened my husband's Naval Career without justifiable cause. 4. Privately, Mom's personality is frequently belligerent and volatile, Because of this, in childhood and adulthood, my sisters and [ tried our best to avoid triggering her fury. Unfortunately, this is almost impossible to do. In times of medical emergency she either over-reacts or under-reaets. It is my opinion that my Mom needs anger management and psychiatric help. Dad is mild-mannered. FURTHE! Th FFIANT SAITH NAUGHT: 23 tay of April, 2014. Victoria C. Stewart Sworn to gnd subscribed before me “2 ZB jl, 2014. RPACHOON oTany PuBLic NOTARY PUBLIC acing County My commission expires: 03/20/29/6 | sy connote Seas “CAFR: TAEVADO-TB (Paulding County) Praitit’s Petition for Stalking Temporary Protective Order Page 1 of 1 EXHIBIT "H" 14-CV-1201-Tulding County Sheriff's Department 247 Industrial Way North Dallas GA 3013: 770-443-3010 RECORDS CERTIFICATION & DECLARATI BEFORE ME the undersigned Open Records Officer/Records Custodian, duly authorized by law to administer oaths, who after being duly swom, under oath, deposes and says: 1, Lisa Sheirling(print name), am the designated Open Record Officer, and Records Custodian for the Paulding County Sheriffs Department. J affirm that the attached documents are true, and correct copies of the entire file ‘maintain in the Records Department of Paulding County Sheriff's Department that involving the parties listed below Parties Involved: Gilbert Freeman, Jody Todd Dated: 04/04/2014, 07/29/2012 Case Number: 20140414143, 20120742374 bs Mut “Open Records Officer/Records Custodian April 25, 2014 DATE ‘Sworn to and subscribed before me this "14-CV-1201-TB (5 Pages) E 9 = < iSheriff Gary Gulledge Paulding County Sheriffs Office Emergeney (770) 445-2117 247 Industrial Way North Jail (70) 443-3030, Administrative (770) 443-3010 Dallas, Georgia 30132 Date April 25, 2014 Dear Gilbert Freeman ‘This letter isin response to your Open Records Act request dated April 25, 2014, and received by the Open Records Officer for the Paulding County Sheriff's Office on April 25, 2014. Your request seeks the following records Case Number: any Date of Incident: 03/2012 to present Incident Type: Domestic Party(s) Involved: Jody Ebright Todd, Gilbert Freeman Ir., Vitoria Stewart aka Todd ‘Additional Information: 173 Gatlin Ridge Run Dallas GA 30157 or 500 Whitby Drive Douglasville GA 30134 This office isin possession of records responsive to your request However, pursuant to Georgia law, the following categories of information have not been produced, via redaction or removal, tothe ‘extent a statutory exclusion is directly applicable exemptions that apply have been marked with an “X"; if no boxes are marked, no ‘exemptions have been claimed cquixitors sit | =~ DD Records of law enforcement. prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful no Mi Oconto ind © eas hee an ips sci soy wt nc lami, perc el ad clone D ne ya metho hh: OCG A$ 50187203200 & 12rd OCGA. 1511420) a C1 Cit abeercnt 066,549.54. Lo C1 Family vole pens O.CGA.§ 1742010 ia ‘The Open Resa Ae authorizes he Count npose a easonabl charge forthe search, rival redston, production. andr copying costs for this equet. As to disclosed documents, the following atutory fees mst be pad: i copyisacosis S (Aue ar Cagis“ Wies Per Copy Naar of ages [Coa —] “ Sencar Cas] so 1 t {0 = > i a = 1 hope you find! his responsive to your request. Sincerely Lisa Sheirling (Open Records Officer Paulding Counsy Sheriffs Office EXHIBIT "FRO PRI CIVIL pispore 173 GRILIN RIZE oN NARTTS, DAVID ALLE, Paro oe foa/aene Report Wo: 2024041414 IN NaNES Nave: FRESION, GILBERT JR 888 ane Type: COMPLATIANT Sex: Height: 50 Weight: 145 Hair: Doar ts/tefeess age: t## hones Address: 500 WATTBY DRIVE DOUGLASVILLE, CR 30138 eight 2 REPORT Report #: ‘Tine Reported: = 1740 Tire occured latest Poss Tine: Disposition Date: Donestic Violence: Rloobol/Orag Rel: seeesteenee Sh 4 17;30-05:30 KILGORE 44-CV-1201-TB (5 Pages) EXHIBIT "I(OFF munber: 09-020180814143-002 Narr Sfix ayony20.e T port T received a call to the Listed location about a custody dispute. When I ved, T net vith the caller Mr. Freenan at the entrance to the neighbor hoof. I wae advised that it was his veekend to pick his child up. I ws asked if 1 could meet with the sother of the child to see if there vas a ‘chance that he could take her for the veskend. I arrived at the residence and found that no one vas hone, Mc, Freeman was advised that no one houe he then asked for a report bout Deputy Martin EXHIBIT "I" 14-CV-1201-TB (5 Pages)CASE REDORT Report #: 970120742376 - 009 Stat $: 10218 Stolen Yeh But: § Danaged Prop Ant: 3 a abult/Owenile: 2 Disposition Donestic Violence Alostol/orag Report No: 020120742378 TNC HNIES Sane: FREDO, CILAERD oR u Sights 185 sajesjoer ager ot serteeeeneenes 500 WHITEY DRIVE DOUGLASVILIS , GA 30124 Employer: sescennssrsise adres ere: 000,000 seeennesies Sts ODL ane Type: PERSO IHVOLVED : ace: eight: 000 ‘Weight: 000 Byes DOB: HH/ea/sert age: #4 hanes taateoveaseess sdiess: 173 GATUIN RIDGE DALLAS 1G 30257 Baploger: seenesesseneet Address EXHIBIT "I" 14-CV-1201-TB (5 Pages)WAIN, TYLER REE Gi G7/A5/i2 at appreninately 1925, 1 vas Glapatched to 179 Gatlin Ridge Ran, in reference to a custody dispute. Upon arrival, T spoke vith lr. Gilbert, vio adviced he cane to drop off his daughter, but Ms. Jody Todd, the oirl's nother, refused the visit. ¥s. Todd advised her daugther would not Listen to ber, so she didn’t vant her there. Wr. Gilbert freeman vanted this documented. Deputy Nevada " 14-CV-1201-TB (5 Pages) EXHIBITIn the Supreme Court of Georgia we Decided: March 27, 2015 $14A1652. CHAN y. ELLIS, BLACKWELL, Justice. Matthew Chan has a website on which he and others publish commentary critical of copyright enforcement practices that they consider predatory. Linda Ellis is a poet, and her efforts to enforce the copyright in her poetry have drawn the ire of Chan and his fellow commentators. On his website, they have published nearly 2,000 posts about Ellis, many of which are mean-spirited, some of which are distasteful and crude, and some of which publicize information about Ellis that she would prefer not to be so public. At least one post is written in the style of an open letter to Ellis, referring to her in the second person, and threatening to publicize additional information about Ellis and her family if she continues to employ the practices of which Chan and the other commentators disapprove. It is undisputed that Chan never caused any of these posts to be delivered to Ellis or otherwise brought to her attention. But it also is undisputedthat Chan anticipated that Ellis might see the commentary on his website, and he may have even intended that she see certain of the posts, including the open letter to her. Ellis eventually did learn of the posts, and she sued Chan for injunctive relief under the Georgia stalking law, OCGA § 16-5-90 et seq., alleging that the electronic publication of the posts was a violation of OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1), which forbids one to “contact” another for certain purposes without the consent of the other. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed that the electronic publication of posts about Ellis amounted to stalking, and it entered a permanent injunction against Chan, directing him to, among other things, delete “all posts relating to Ms. Ellis” from his website. Chan appeals, contending that the evidence simply does not show that the publication of posts about Ellis on his website amounts to the sort of “contact” that is forbidden by OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1). With that contention, we agree, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.” | The stalking law provides that a court “may grant a protective order. . . to bring about a cessation of conduct constituting stalking.” OCGA § 16-5-94 (4). 2 Chan also urges several other contentions on appeal, including that the scope of the injunction is too broad, that he cannot be held responsible for the publication of commentary Zz1. We begin with the settled principles that inform our consideration of the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1). A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text. See Sentinel Offender Svcs. v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 328 (3) (a) (766 SE2d 456) (2014). When we read the statutory text, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant,” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and so, “we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” EDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 588 (2) (761 SE2d 332) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). The common and customary usages of the words are important, Hendry v. Hendry, 292 Ga. 1, 2-3 (1) (734 SE2d 46) (2012), but so is their context. Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 573-574 (3) (a) (731 SE2d 731) (2012). “For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the posted to the website by others, see 47 USC § 230 (c) (1), and that, in any event, the online publication of commentary about Ellis and her copyright enforcement practices is speech protected by the First Amendment. Although these other contentions may have some merit too, we need not resolve them to decide this appeal. We note, however, that the constitutional contention forms the basis for our exercise of appellate jurisdiction in this case. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1) (Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in “[a]]l cases involving the construction . . . of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law . . . has been drawn in question”).structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391-392 (761 SE2d 38) (2014) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the relevant statutory text. In pertinent part, OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of stalking when he or she . . . contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.” For purposes of the statute, one “contacts another person” when he “communicates with another person” through any medium, including an electronic medium. See OCGA § 16- > The same paragraph of the statute also forbids one to “follow” another or “place [another] under surveillance” without consent and for “the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person,” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1), and the following paragraph forbids one to “broadcast” or “publish” certain identifying information about another without consent, in violation of an injunction or other judicial decree, knowing that the broadcast or publication will “cause such person to be harassed or intimidated by others,” and “in such manner that causes other persons to harass or intimidate such person.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (2). In this case, the trial court said nothing in its permanent injunction about Chan having violated any other injunction or judicial decree, so the permanent injunction does not implicate paragraph (a) (2). As to paragraph (a) (1), the trial court found only that Chan committed stalking by “contacting” Ellis, and it said nothing about Chan having “followed” Ellis or “placed {her] under surveillance.” We are not, therefore, concerned in this case with the other ways in which one might commit the offense of stalking, We address only stalking by “contact.”5-90 (a) (1).4 See also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994) (as used in OCGA § 16-5-90, “[tJo ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘to get in touch with; communicate with” (citation and punctuation omitted). Although one may “contact” another for the purposes of the statute by communicating with the other person through any medium, it nevertheless is essential that the communication be directed specifically to that other person, as opposed to a communication that is only directed generally to the public.’ Common and customary usage suggests as * The statute defines “contact” in this way: “[T]he term ‘contact’ shall mean any communication including without being limited to communication in person, by telephone, by mail, by broadcast, by computer, by computer network, or by any other electronic device.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (I). Oddly enough, although the principal provision of the statute uses “contact” as a verb — “[a] person commits the offense of stalking when he or she contacts another person” — this definitional provision defines it as a noun. For that reason, we cannot simply substitute the statutory definition for the defined term. At the same time, of course, we cannot just ignore the statutory definition. Accordingly, we understand the definitional provision to mean simply that one “contacts another person” when he “communicates with another person,” irrespective of the medium through which the communication occurs. 5-To say that a communication must be directed specifically to another person is not to say that it must be directed exclusively to that person. Nor is it to say that the communication must be directed immediately to that person without intermediaries or relays. Cf. Murden v. State, 258 Ga. App. 585, 586 (1) (574 SE2d 657) (2002) (defendant “contacted” ex-wife for purposes of stalking law by calling and coming to her workplace to ask for her).much,’ as does another provision of the stalking law, which defines “harassing and intimidating” in terms of “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied). 2. That a communication is about a particular person does not mean necessarily that it is directed o that person. This principle is reflected in Collins y. Bazan, 256 Ga. App. 164 (568 SE2d 72) (2002), and Marks v. State, 306 Ga. App. 824 (703 SE2d 379) (2010), two cases in which our Court of Appeals addressed questions about how the stalking law applies to speech about another. In Collins, the trial court entered an injunction that, among other things, forbade the defendant to “discuss” a medical condition of his ex-girlfriend with others. Reversing that portion of the injunction, the Court of Appeals held that it could not be sustained as merely an injunction against stalking, inasmuch as “[p]ublishing or discussing a person’s medical condition with others obviously does not constitute. .. contacting that person.” Collins, 256 Ga. App. at 165 (2). In Marks, the defendant was prohibited as a condition of probation from “contacting” his ex-wife, and his probation was revoked after he “posted untrue An ordinary speaker of the English language typically would not say, for instance, that a popular author had “contacted” or “communicated with” the speaker simply because the speaker had read a book written by the author. 6statements about her on several websites.” The Court of Appeals reversed the revocation of his probation, citing Collins and holding that the defendant posting about his ex-wife on the Internet — posts that the ex-wife discovered only as a result of searching for her name on the Internet — did not amount to the defendant “getting in touch with or communicating with [her].” Marks, 306 Ga. App. at 826 (1). The limited evidence in the record shows that Chan and others posted a lot of commentary to his website about Ellis, but it fails for the most part to show that the commentary was directed specifically fo Ellis as opposed to the public. As written, most of the posts appear to speak to the public, not to Ellis in particular, even if they are about Ellis. And there is no evidence that Chan did anything to cause these posts to be delivered to Ellis or otherwise brought to her attention, notwithstanding that he may have reasonably anticipated that Ellis might come across the posts, just as any member of the Internet-using public might. The publication of commentary directed only to the public generally does not amount to “contact,” as that term is used in OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1), and most of the posts about Ellis quite clearly cannot form the basis for a finding that Chan contacted Ellis.3. To the extent that a few of the posts may come closer to “contact” — including, for instance, the open letter to Ellis, which Chan may actually have intended as a communication to Ellis — their publication still does not amount to stalking. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Chan “contacted” Ellis by the publication of any posts, the evidence fails to show that such contact was “without [her] consent.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1). This is not a case in which Chan sent a message to Ellis by electronic mail, linked commentary to her social media account, or posted commentary on her website. To the contrary, the commentary about which Ellis complains was posted on Chan's website, and Ellis learned of that commentary — that is, it arguably was communicated to her — only as a result of her choice to discover the content of the website. The evidence shows that Ellis visited the website herself — it appears, in fact, that she registered herself as an authorized commentator on the website — and that she had others visit the website and report back to her about the commentary published there. Generally speaking, our stalking law forbids speech only to the extent that it is directed to an unwilling listener,” and even if Ellis did not like 7 Bven then, if the speech is protected by the First Amendment, itis excluded from the scope of our stalking law. See OCGA § 16-5-92 (“The provisions of Code Sections 16-5-90 and 16-5-91 shall not apply to persons engaged in activities protected by the Constitution of 8what she heard, she cannot be fairly characterized as an unwilling listener. Ellis failed to prove that Chan “contacted” her without her consent, and the trial court erred when it concluded that Chan had stalked Ellis. See OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Melton, J., who concurs in Divisions | and 2 and in the judgment. the United States or of this state...)