The Development of Siege Warfare in Classical Antiquity

Author: Jesse Obert

Source: Ancient Planet Online Journal Vol. 5 (2013), 38 53
Published by: Ioannis Georgopoulos
Available at: http://issuu.com/ancientplanet/docs/ap_vol5

The Development of Siege Warfare in Classical Antiquity

Siege warfare has influenced human settlement since the dawn of civilization. Some of
the earliest human communities included fortification walls, and the evolution of these
fortifications directly correlated to the evolution of siege technology (Ferrill 27). The technology
of siege warfare followed a relatively linear progression through history. As invaders invented
new forms of aggression, new fortifications were needed to counter them. Nevertheless, old
techniques never went out of use. These developments had a profound impact on how cities
insured their citizens safety and how power shifted across the Mediterranean. In antiquity, siege
warfare progressed with the cultural ideals of the time and ultimately determined the physical
space that communities occupied.
Siege warfare in the Mycenaean Bronze Age, 1600 BCE to 1100 BCE, was relatively
simple. The light chariot was the preferred vehicle of war, but it was utterly useless in an urban
area. Most battles were fought on flat open ground where the chariots were free to maneuver.
Fortifications tended to be simple and to rely on the fortification wall itself as a vertical barrier
(Sage 108). The main purpose of the vertical fortification wall was to prevent infantry attacks.
This proved to be remarkably successful when facing the militaries of the Early Bronze Age, and
aggressors had to create organized and planned methods of assault.
If we can trust Homer, siege warfare developed two techniques of assault by the end of
the Bronze Age. The first method was to destroy or climb over the enemys vertical wall. Homer
reports that when the soldiers had to overcome a fortified position, they dismantled the walls
with their hands and their body weight (Homer 12.460-61). The dismantling of the wall worked
well against simple fortifications, but cities adapted to this aggression by building stronger stone
fortifications. The walls of Mycenae were constructed with stones weighing up to 100 tons,
which would have made dismantling them during a siege nearly impossible. In addition, these
walls were too tall for men to easily scale (Demand 60). Though one might see this tactic as an
easily prevented danger, scaling the defenders wall was important to the development of siege
warfare and it was used throughout history. Over 1200 years later, in the Gallic Wars, a Roman
officer at Gergovia was lifted up the wall by three of his legionaries and then pulled them up
after him (Lendon 216). Nevertheless, this siege tactic became relatively rare after the Bronze
Age as most Hellenic cities built sufficiently tall and strong walls to keep their enemies out.

The second and more common siege tactic of the Bronze Age was an assault of the
fortifications gate. Gates in the Bronze Age tended to be made of wood or bronze and could be
forced open with enough manpower. Homer described a mass of men using their weapons,
nearby stones, and their physical strength to force open the Achaean gate (Homer 12.526). The
gates of a wall were often the weakest parts of the fortification. Unfortunately for the attacker,
the defenders knew this and often extended their walls past the gated entrance so they could
shoot missiles at the flanks of their enemy. By the beginning of the Greek Archaic Age, around
750 BCE, these protruding walls evolved into fortified towers (Sage 108). Aggressors who
attempted to break through the gate sacrificed their defenses. The protruding fortifications
successfully countered the weakness of the gate, and it is probably fortifications like this that
enabled Paris to kill Achilles when he rushed the Trojan gate (Proclus 2). Achilles was famously
shot in the heel so he must have had his back or side to the enemy. In the Late Bronze Age, an
assault on a citys gate usually required the exposure of a warriors flank, but it was still a
popular siege tactic. In fact, this tactic would remain the most common aspect of siege warfare
throughout antiquity and even Caesars legionaries occasionally attempted to cut down gates
with their swords (Lendon 216).
In the 8th century BCE, Greek states began to rely on citizensoldier armies of heavy
infantry. Strangely, this shift in military preference seems to have neglected and almost
discouraged siege warfare altogether. However, the first siege revolution of antiquity was
occurring in the Near East. Battering rams and towers appeared as early as the 5th dynasty in
Egypt, about 2400 BCE, but they were misunderstood and improperly used (Ferrill 46). From the
10th century to the 7th century BCE, the Assyrians conquered vast territories with ruthless tactics
and powerful siege engines. The Assyrians professionalized the battering ram, the siege ladder,
the siege tower, ramps, and tunneling (Lendon 160). The Assyrians continued to use siege
warfare until they were conquered by the Persians, who quickly adopted and utilized it in their
own imperial conquests.
There is no concrete evidence to suggest that the Ancient Greeks used siege warfare from
1100 490 BCE. The first recorded siege battle in Greece occurred in the 5th century (Lendon
160), but this prolonged absence of siege warfare was rather unusual. The Ancient Greeks had
strong socioeconomic ties to the Persian Empire and the Greeks were surrounded by
communities that utilized siege warfare. Some scholars argue that siege warfare was never
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adopted because it failed to fit into the cultural identity of early Greek states. It is often argued
that the Greek ideas about equality and democracy were developed on a battlefield where every
man had to fight in a close ordered unit that did not allow for the display of individual prowess.
From this, cultural egalitarianism infiltrated every layer of a citizens social identity. The violent
seizure of a fellow Greek city created complicated questions and problems (Sage 115). What to
do with the non-combatants? The Spartan conquest of Messenia was the only significant land
seizure in Archaic Greece and it created radical changes to the socioeconomic structure of
society. The Spartans enslaved the population of Messenia, but, as the minority, the Spartans had
to keep their armies close to home and to practice somewhat counterproductive traditions such as
the annual declaration of war on the entire slave population (Plutarch 28.4)
Ultimately, siege warfare did not fit into the military traditions of the Dark and Archaic
ages of Ancient Greece, so it was never adopted and simply ignored. Lendon amusingly wrote
that the Peloponnesians glared angrily up at the walls of Athens and for years the Athenians
glanced scornfully down, both thinking the walls of Athens impregnable (Lendon 160).
Additionally, Sparta had no walls and when aristocrats proposed to build a wall around Sparta,
Lycurgus said that a wall of men instead of brick was best (Plutarch 19.4, Trans. McNamara
2010). Nevertheless, the Spartans were the first Classical Greeks to use siege warfare in the
historical record.
The first convincing example of siege warfare in Ancient Greece was the siege of Plataea
in 429 BCE. The aggressors were Spartans who joined with their Theban allies to seize the city
of Plataea, an Athenian ally. First, the Spartans built a ramp out of earth and logs to scale the
walls of the city, but to counter this, the Plataeans built fire proof wooden additions to the tops of
their walls. So the Spartans adjusted the angle of their earthen ramp. The Plataeans attempted to
thwart the ramp by tunneling through their own wall and building mines underneath the ramp to
dismantle it. Despite their effort, the Plataeans could not prevent the Spartans construction so
they built an inner wall. At this point, the Spartans brought battering rams to break a hole
through the Plataean fortifications. The Plataeans used lassoes and large logs to break off the tips
of the battering rams, and eventually this drove off the Peloponnesians. Frustrated by their failed
attempt, the Spartans filled the space between the wall and the inner wall with bundles of wood
and kindling, and lit it on fire. Luckily for the Plataeans, a freak thunderstorm soon extinguished
the flames and the fortifications remained intact. Defeated, the Spartans built a wall around the
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city to isolate the Plateans from the outside world and starve them into submission (Thucydides
2.75 78). This siege incorporates almost every aspect of siege warfare known to be in use by
the 5th century and perfectly exemplifies how most sieges occurred until the Hellenistic Era,
around 320 BCE. It also illustrates how familiar the Greeks actually were with siege warfare
despite their apparent ignorance. Clearly our sources are not revealing the whole picture.
Earthen mounds were a common and valuable aspect of siege warfare. A mound allowed
siege engines such as towers and rams to get to weaker parts of the enemys walls. It was a
common construction in sieges like Plataea, where the aggressor heavily outnumbered the
defender. The mound is used throughout antiquity: in the Judean Revolt, a massive earthen
mound was built to reach the mountain top citadel of Masada (Josephus 8.5). The massive
mound is still visible to this day.
Tunneling was also used throughout antiquity and well after. At Plataea, tunneling was
very simple and still fairly unusual, but by Alexander the Greats campaigns in the 4th century
BCE, it was well know and practiced. Tunneling could be used to undermine enemy walls by
destroying their foundations or it could be used to get into the city. In the 4th century BCE, a
military theorist argued that the best way to deal with enemy tunneling was to use counter
trenches, controlled fires, and even hornets (Tacticus 37.5). Aggressors attempted to keep their
tunneling work hidden from the defenders. This was achieved by creating a distraction to draw
defenders to other parts of their fortification or by moving large defensive siege machines above
ground to protect miners underneath (Tacticus 37.6). Like every aspect of siege warfare,
tunneling continued to be used up until the eastern campaigns of Emperor Julian, in 4th century
CE, and beyond (Lendon 297).
The construction of secondary, inner walls required huge amounts of space and material
but occurred several times throughout antiquity. Later complexes incorporated multiple
fortifications into the original city and fort plans. Eventually, this evolved into the heavily
fortified castles of the Medieval Age.
Battering rams were used throughout the history of siege warfare. They were among the
first siege engines built and are still used in modern military operations. Defenders invented
several ways to deal with rams such as eliminating the men operating the ram, incapacitating the
machine, or using kindling to set the machine on fire (Sage 108). Rams were usually used against
gates as they tended to be the weakest part of the fortification.
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Whenever the attacker did not assault the defenders fortifications, he could invest the
city or cut it off from the rest of the world. This was achieved with constant watch and frequent
patrols which prevented anyone from entering or exiting the city. These methods were not as
effective as a physical barrier as supplies would often reach the defenders: while Spartans were
isolated and surrounded by the Athenian fleet on the island of Sphacteria, food was carried in by
small boats and divers who swam under the Athenian blockade (Thucydides 4.26). Constructing
a physical wall around the defenders was a more effective method of investment. This was what
the Spartans did at Plataea, and three years later the Plataeans ran out of food and surrendered
(Thucydides 2.78, 3.52). Full encirclement proved to be lethal to most cities as the
circumnavigating walls could be resupplied and maintained by the aggressor. Ironically, invested
cities had to use siege machines to free themselves, or they could wait for allies to aid them.
Investment took time and allied armies often aided the besieged city by attacking the attackers.
The Athenians had promised the Plataeans that they would march to the city and help break the
siege, but the Athenians failed to keep their promise (Thucydides 2.73). The prospect of attack
by exterior forces made investment very risky for an invader. Many scholars argue that Hannibal
never attacked Rome in the second Punic War because he feared encirclement by Romes allies
(Polybius 3.86). Physical investment was sometimes prevented through the use of counter walls.
During the Athenian besiegement of Syracuse, the Athenians attempted to build walls around the
city to cut it off from the countryside. The Syracusians built two counter walls, the first of which
failed. Their second counter wall succeeded in preventing a full investment of the city and the
Syracusans maintained their connection to the countryside (Thucydides 7.6). Without siege
engineers and without reinforcements the Athenians were forced to retreat into Sicily. They were
pursued by the Syracusans and they were utterly and entirely destroyed (Thucydides 7.87).
Almost all the siege techniques used during the Peloponnesian War were adopted from
the Near East, but by the end of the war, the Greeks had invented their own siege machines. Fire
was frequently used to burn down large portions of the enemys town or fortifications. This
usually required physically placing kindling next to and around the target, but in 424 BCE the
Thebans invented an early version of the flamethrower. They built a large hollow iron tube with
a cauldron of embers just below one end and a bellow fixed over the other end. Then they
wheeled the long machine to a wooden structure and pumped air through the tube, starting a fire
from the embers and blowing the flames towards the fortification (Warry 62). This machine
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could have been cleverly manipulated to reach any wooden part of the defenders fortification.
Ultimately, this new adaption to siege warfare increased the risk and lowered the popularity of
wooden fortifications.
At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the ideals and traditions of Greek warfare were out
of date and abandoned. Siege warfare became a viable and popular tool. Ancient authors wrote
about and discussed the value of fortification walls and the complexities of siege craft. Despite
the massive influx of invention and technology, the ancients argued that the biggest threat to a
besieged city was betrayal from within (Sage 114). Treachery was the most common tool used to
capture a city in antiquity. In fact, only a small percentage of cities were ever captured through
investment or assault. The majority were betrayed by citizens within the city. Philip II of
Macedon is recorded to have said that any fortification could be taken as long as an ass loaded
with gold could reach it (Sage 158). Many people might have benefited from the social,
political, and economic reformation associated with the capture of a city, so the possibility of
betrayal was very real and dangerous. Tacticus wrote that the man in charge of a citys defense
should be someone who stood to lose the most in a sociopolitical upheaval (Tacticus 1.7). He
goes on to state that, in a siege, citizens should dedicate themselves to discovering and
preventing traitors (Tacticus 2.8). Defenders needed to eliminate any opportunity for messages
between civilians and besiegers as anyone could be a traitor when things got desperate (Tacticus
5.17). Tacticus speaks very little about how to defend against siege weapons or assaults, and
instead focuses his work on how to prevent betrayal and trickery. History shows that his focus
was justified. Frequently, by the time the enemy army marched up to the city it had been
betrayed.
Once the Greeks fully adopted siege warfare, they continued to develop siege technology.
In 399 BCE, Syracusan engineers invented the first catapults (Siculus 14.41). These early
inventions started as giant crossbows, but soon became torsion spring bolt shooters. Aggressors
used them on siege towers to clear walls of defenders, and defenders used them to damage siege
machines. This development is now referred to as the second siege revolution as artillery
radically changed siege warfare.
The next technological improvement in siege warfare occurred in 345 341 BCE in the
royal court of Phillip II of Macedon (Sage 158). His engineers developed rock throwing
catapults. These machines had a further range than the bolt shooting artillery. Additionally, while
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a single shot from the bolt shooters could kill one man, maybe two if they were in very close
order, a stone could kill several men. The first recorded use of stone-throwing artillery is at
Halicarnassus in 334 BCE, when Alexander used them against a sallied attack force (Arrian
1.22). Artillery was an essential aspect of siege warfare after the 4th century BCE, but artillery
was only used to kill and route combatants, not to destroy fortifications. Aggressors used artillery
to disturb and harass defenders while siege towers, ladders, and rams broke into the city.
Before the Roman period, artillery was dependent on other siege tactics and was never
used in pitched battle. Alexander used bolt artillery in a pitched battle once: to cover his advance
across a river into Scythian territory. His siege machines made a huge impact on the battlefield
and perfectly illustrated the potential of artillery (Arrian 4.7). Nevertheless, it was not used
outside of siege battles until the Roman Republic.
Trenches had been built in front of fortifications since the Neolithic, but they became
essential in the siege battles of the 4th century BCE. Trenches were very useful in slowing or
even stopping siege machines (Sage 160). Trenches became more frequent as siege towers
became larger and more powerful. Most trenches were filled by the aggressors before an assault,
but this delayed them and exposed them to them to the defenders missiles. Eventually trenches
became standard as their ability to disturb and stall towers and other wheeled machines was
essential. By Medieval times these trenches were filled with water and called moats.
In the period after Alexanders death, from about 330 220 BCE, siege warfare was so
highly practiced and perfected that siege technology advanced little afterwards (Lendon 241).
During this time both siege machines and fortifications became larger and stronger. Additionally,
siege warfare became more planned, organized, and subsequently rather infrequent. Sieges were
only performed on large cities that were strategically valuable, as the siege could lead to
destruction of the city. In the Hellenistic world, cities were besieged for their political or
geographic value, not for the economic gain of an enslaved or massacred populace (Sage 116).
This highly developed form of siege warfare was exemplified at Rhodes. The
independent city was a powerful trade center and controlled most of the trade fleets in the
Aegean. When the Antigonid Dynasty declared war on the Ptolemaic Dynasty, Antigonus I sent
his son Demetrius Poliorcetes to besiege and take Rhodes. Antigonus I wanted to make the island
a base of operations for his fleet, and, more importantly, he feared that Rhodes might ally with
Ptolemy I against him. He did not care about the massive wealth of Rhodes but rather its
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geopolitical significance. Demetrius Poliorcetes force camped just outside the range of the citys
artillery and built a large harbor for his fleet. The Rhodians gathered all those who were willing
to fight for their city and expelled the rest. After constructing his harbor, Demetrius sailed to the
tip of the Rhodian pier and fortified it, but this led to a massive artillery battle. The Rhodians
built a wall on their pier to prevent an infantry assault, but they took massive losses due to
Demetrius highly trained and accurate bolt artillerymen. Similarly, Demetrius could not march
down the pier as his troops would be slaughtered by Rhodian artillery. After several artillery
skirmishes and failed assaults on the port, Demetrius was forced to pull back his forces in order
to rebuild his damaged artillery and regroup with his land forces. This gave the Rhodians time to
refortify. Demetrius then used artillery on his fleet to kill anyone within range of the Rhodian
port, and used fire-arrows to set the entire Rhodian fleet on ablaze. After taking massive
casualties, he wanted to cut the Rhodians off from the sea so he could invest the city and starve
them out. Under heavy fire, the Rhodians managed to man their warships, engage Demetrius
artillery fleet, and regain control of their harbor (Siculus 20.82 88).
With the harbor under Rhodian control, Demetrius focused on taking the city by siege.
He constructed a massive siege tower with 24 doors which opened to both rock and bolt artillery.
It was over 40 meters tall and completely covered in iron plates (Warry 90). Additionally,
Demetrius attempted to dig under the defenders walls. The Rhodians built an inner wall and,
discovering the mining operation, built a counter mine. The mines were connected and
underground fighting became a regular occurrence. In a massive assault, Demetrius broke
through the outer wall but the Rhodians set his massive siege tower on fire. The Rhodians then
built a second inner wall and dug deep trenches to prevent any further tunneling. After several
more failed assaults and huge casualties, Demetrius made a compromise with the Rhodians and
ended the war (Siculus 20.91 99). This siege incorporated many ancient siege tactics, but
artillery played a huge role. The Roman sieges worked in similar ways, though they were
arguably more violent as the Romans relied on massed infantry assaults and indiscriminately
looted defeated cities.
Siege warfare in the Roman Republic was directly adopted from their Greek predecessors
and remained relatively unchanged throughout the republics history. The Siege of Syracuse in
214 BCE involved several strange siege tactics due to the engineering genius of Archimedes.
The assault on the city resembled the siege of Rhodes in that artillery dominated the battlefield.
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However, Archimedes apparently designed cranes that were capable of dropping large stones
onto ships and lifting ships out of the water to drop them again from a significant height
(Polybius 8.7 8). The existence of these machines is highly debated as they were never rebuilt
or used in siege warfare after Archimedes death.
The Romans were masterful engineers and constructors. They used a combination of
competition and discipline to construct their fortifications and siege engines, but they did not
invent new siege machines. They just made the Greek machines stronger and faster.
The next improvement in siege tactics was not developed until well into Roman history.
In 52 BCE, G. Julius Caesar invested the city of Alesia with a ten mile wall. The speed at which
these fortifications were constructed was astounding, but word soon arrived that another force
was coming to aid the besieged Alesians. Caesar did not withdraw, and instead he solved one of
the greatest risks associated with the investment of a city. He built a second wall facing
outwards. When the Gauls arrived they besieged the Romans who were besieging the Alesians.
Caesars second wall held out against Gallic assaults and the starved Alesians soon surrendered
(Lendon 222). Caesars ingenuity solved the problem that Hannibal had faced in the 3rd century
BCE and Caesar secured his victory.
Roman engineers greatly improved stone throwing catapults so that they could destroy
stone walls. Anti-fortification artillery, as opposed to its traditional use against defenders, was a
Roman development (Marcellinus 23.6). Some of these machines, referred to as Onagers, were
designed with bowl launchers, which could be filled with embers and launched onto enemy
rooftops. Ultimately, the Romans perfected traditional siege techniques. Similar improvements
would continue through the Medieval Era, but never to the same extent.
Siege warfare had an immeasurable influence on city construction in antiquity. The
development of siege warfare defined how a fortification should be constructed. Though pitched
battles were more common than sieges, the technology related to sieges had a profound impact
on the development of western warfare. In the Medieval Period trenches, protruding defensive
towers, and inner walls were standard aspects of a military fortification. Similarly, artillery,
tunneling, and assault machines were essential to any offensive attack. Siege warfare in
Antiquity influenced the way nations interacted, how empires formed, and how cities were built.

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Demand, N H. A History of Ancient Greece in Its Mediterranean Context. Cornwall-on-Hudson,
NY: Sloan Pub., 2006.
Ferrill, A. The Origins of War: from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1997.
Homer. The Iliad.
Josephus, F. Antiquities of the Jews. <http://www.ccel.org/j/josephus/works/JOSEPHUS.HTM>.
Lendon, J E. Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New Haven, Conn.:
Yale UP, 2005.
Livy. History of Rome.
Marcellinus, A. Res Gestae.
Polybius. Histories.
Plutarch. Life of Lycurgus.
Proclus. The Epic Cycle.
Sage, M M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. London: Routledge, 1996.
Siculus, D. The Library of History. Trans. C. L. Sherman. Vol. 7. Harvard UP, 1991.
Tacticus, A. How To Survive Under Siege.
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War.
Warry, J G. Warfare in the Classical World: an Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors,
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Oklahoma, 1995.

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