Padilla vs.

Dizon
Facts: Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying
that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at
least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs
guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt
to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by
the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and
sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be
guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than
P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had
come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates,
and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were
handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his
business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in
the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign
exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial,
and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.

In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to
Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is
nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the
said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Griffith v. State
Leroy Griffith was convicted, based upon his guilty plea, of eight counts of forgery in the
second degree, a class C felony. AS 11.46.505(a)(1). As a third felony offender, Griffith was
subject to a three-year presumptive sentence on each count. AS 12.55.125(e)(2). Since Judge
Moody found no statutory aggravating or mitigating factors, he imposed the three-year
presumptive sentence on each charge. The sentences on Counts I through V, which occurred
on November 22, 1982, were made concurrent with each other. However, Judge Moody
made the sentences on counts VI through VIII, which occurred on November 23, 1982,
concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence imposed on counts I through V.
Thus, Griffith's sentence totalled six years. Griffith appeals his sentence to this court arguing
that the consecutive sentences were improperly imposed.
Griffith argues that Judge Moody erred in failing to find that Griffith's forgeries were part of a
single, continuous criminal transaction. He argues that Judge Moody should have made that
finding and then should have exercised his discretion to impose all concurrent sentences.
This contention turns on the interpretation of AS 12.55.025(g) which provides as follows:
If the defendant has been convicted of two or more crimes before the judgment on either
has been entered, any sentences of imprisonment may run concurrently if (1) the crimes
violate similar societal interests; (2) the crimes are part of a single, continuous criminal
episode; (3) there was not a substantial change in the objective of the criminal episode,
including a change in the parties to the crime, the property or type of property right
offended, or the persons offended; (4) the crimes were not committed while the defendant
attempted to escape *664 or avoid detection or apprehension after the commission of
another crime; (5) the sentence is not for a violation of AS 11.41.100-11.41.470; or (6) the
sentence is not for a violation of AS 11.41.500-11.41.530 that results in physical injury or
serious physical injury as those terms are defined in AS 11.81.900.
The statute is not well drafted and there are a number of possible interpretations of the
statutory language. Fortunately, the state and Griffith agree on an interpretation of the
statute. They agree that if a defendant's conduct falls within subparagraphs (4), (5) or (6), the
court may not impose a concurrent sentence. However, if the defendant's conduct falls
within subparagraphs (1), (2) or (3), the court is authorized to impose concurrent sentences.
We believe that the interpretation of AS 12.55.025(g) urged by the state and Griffith is wellfounded and is consistent with the legislative purpose and history of the sentencing statutes

in the revised code. We accordingly accept this interpretation of the statute. See Marks v.
State, 496 P.2d 66, 67 (Alaska 1972).
The state and Griffith agree that Judge Moody had authority to impose concurrent sentences
on Griffith because his conduct did not fall in subparagraphs (4), (5) or (6) of AS 12.55.025(g)
but did fall within subparagraph (1) since Griffith's crimes violated "similar societal
interests."[1] We cannot tell from the record, however, whether Judge Moody imposed
consecutive sentences on Griffith because he felt that the statute compelled him to do so or
whether he exercised his discretion to impose consecutive sentences. AS 12.55.025(g) is not
clear on its face, and the argument made by the state at Griffith's sentencing can be
interpreted as an argument that Judge Moody had to impose consecutive sentences for the
forgeries committed on different days. We therefore remand this case to Judge Moody for
resentencing in light of our interpretation of AS 12.55.025(g) on the issue of whether
Griffith's sentences should be imposed concurrently or consecutively.
This appeal presents two other issues which we must resolve to aid the trial court in
reimposing Griffith's sentence. Griffith contends that Judge Moody erred because he did not
make specific findings that "confinement of the defendant for the aggregate period of a
consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public." Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856,
862 (Alaska App. 1982). See Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 381 (Alaska 1977). The state
argues that Judge Moody did not have to make findings to impose a consecutive sentence
under Lacquement because AS 12.55.025(g) now provides a presumption in favor of
consecutive sentences. The state points out that Lacquement was decided under former AS
12.55.025(e) which created a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences.[2] We believe
that in those situations where the sentencing judge has discretion to impose concurrent
sentences he should make findings to justify the imposition of a consecutive sentence. It is
reasonable to assume that the legislature was aware of the Mutschler and Lacquement
decisions at the time AS 12.55.025(g) was enacted. We do not perceive any legislative intent
to overrule those decisions in *665 those cases where the court has the authority to impose
concurrent sentences.
The remaining issue raised by this appeal is the question whether Judge Moody has the
authority to impose Griffith's sentence partially consecutively or to impose consecutive
sentences and suspend some of the sentence. When Judge Moody imposed Griffith's
consecutive sentence it appears that he considered suspending a portion of the sentence. He
concluded that he probably did not have the authority to suspend any of the six-year
sentence.
AS 12.55.125(g) provides that:

If a defendant is sentenced [under the presumptive sentencing provisions of the code],

except to the extent permitted [through the application of statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors or by sentencing by the three-judge panel for extraordinary
circumstances]: (1) imprisonment may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080; (2) imposition
of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085; (3) terms of imprisonment may not
be otherwise reduced.
An argument can be made that this statute prevents a judge who imposes any presumptive
sentence consecutively from suspending any portion of the sentence or prevents him from
imposing the sentence partially consecutively. The state concedes, however, that a judge
who has authority to impose a sentence concurrently can also impose that same sentence
partially consecutively or can impose that sentence consecutively and suspend a portion of
that sentence. The state concedes:
In a case where the trial court has the authority to impose concurrent sentences under AS
12.55.025(e) & (g): (1) The trial court may impose presumptive sentences on a partially
consecutive basis, and (2) the trial court may suspend part of any presumptive sentence
imposed consecutively to the other presumptive sentences. The single proviso, however, is
that the defendant must be required to serve a term of imprisonment which is at least as
long as the greatest single presumptive sentence applicable.
We believe that the state's interpretation of the revised code is well-founded and we accept
that interpretation. Marks v. State, 496 P.2d at 67. We believe that since the legislature gave
Judge Moody the authority to sentence Griffith to concurrent sentences totalling three years,
it is sensible to assume that the legislature also gave him the authority to impose sentences
totalling greater than three years and to suspend a portion of the period of imprisonment as
long as Griffith has to serve at least a three-year period of imprisonment.[3]See Lacquement
v. State, 644 P.2d at 862-63.
The case is REMANDED for resentencing.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

PEOPLE vs TEMBLOR

FACTS:

The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder
in Criminal Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty
of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said
Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring, and confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and shoot with firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital
parts of the body thereby inflicting mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous
death of the said Julius Cagampang.

ISSUE:

CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.

Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was
convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. He appealed.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve
acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed willfully,
unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of
plunder is a malum in se.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30,
1980, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store
adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the
accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope
cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His
wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name
"Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior
of the store through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm.
"Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired
two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase)
where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after
inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police
station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the
man who killed her husband.

The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay
Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered
dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's
Army) were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with
other members- followers of the New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick
Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested
by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981 and
detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by
name. That circumstance allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the
perpetrator of her husband's killing, insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was
positively identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter
away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt flourescent lamp
and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another
prosecution witness a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal who was a long-time
acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He saw the accused in the store
of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the
gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim
sustained three (3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber
Company's Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of
Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his
father, but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00
o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this
piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the
deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the killer of
Cagampang? The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior

advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by
convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People
vs. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<re||an1w>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang
did not diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively Identified the accused
as her husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her
testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive
Identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse
him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a
defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong,
Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road
in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively Identified
him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232;
People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which
opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive
enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole
purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in
Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas"
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively
Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang
and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an
implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil
indemnity payable to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.