>Homepage

>Decisions

>Orderof14January20142BvR2728/13

ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:rs20140114.2bvr272813
FEDERALCONSTITUTIONALCOURT

INTHENAMEOFTHEPEOPLE
Intheproceedings
I.

ontheconstitutionalcomplaint
ofDr.G,

authorisedrepresentatives:

RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.WolfRdigerBub,
Promenadeplatz9,80333Munich,
Prof.Dr.DietrichMurswiek,
against
1.

theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof
6September2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andthe
continuedpurchasesofgovernmentbondsonthebasisofthisDecisionandofthe
predecessorprogrammeforSecuritiesMarkets(SMP),

2.

theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringanactionagainsttheEuropean
CentralBankbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniononaccountofthe
DecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September
2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andonaccountofthe
purchasesofgovernmentbonds.

2BvR2728/13,
II.

ontheconstitutionalcomplaint

1.

ofDr.B,

2.

ofProf.Dr.H,

3.

ofProf.Dr.N,

4.

ofProf.Dr.S,

5.

ofProf.Dr.Dr.h.c.S,

authorisedrepresentativefor1.to3.and5.:

Prof.Dr.KarlAlbrechtSchachtschneider,
Treiberpfad28,13469Berlin
against
1.

theactsbytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankstosavetheeuro,inparticular
thepurchaseofgovernmentbondsoftheMemberStatesoftheeuroareaforthe
purposeofindirectfinancingofstatesonthesecondarymarket,

2.

theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringproceedingsforannulmentpursuant
toArt.263sec.1andsec.2TFEUbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropean
UnionagainstthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesoftheeuro
areabytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandtheEuropeanCentralBank,
andagainsttheacceptanceofgovernmentbondsascollateralforCentralBank
loansifthoseactsservethefinancingofstates.

2BvR2729/13,
III.

ontheconstitutionalcomplaint
ofMrH,

andofanother11,692complainants,
authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristophDegenhart,
Burgstrae27,04109Leipzig,
RechtsanwltinProf.Dr.HertaDublerGmelin,
ofthelawfirmSchweglerRechtsanwlte,
UnterdenLinden12,10117Berlin
Prof.Dr.BernhardKempen
Rheinblick1,53424Remagen/Oberwinter
against
1.

theFederalGovernmentsomissiontoworktowardsarepealoftheDecisionofthe
GoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerning
theunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaon
thesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,

2.

theFederalGovernmentsomissiontotakeeffectiveprecautionstoensurethatthe
FederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthepurchaseofbondsasa
consequenceoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentral
Bankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsof
individualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaonthesecondarymarketbythe
EuropeanCentralBank,anditsliabilityarisingfromtheTreatyestablishingthe
EuropeanStabilityMechanism,willnotexceedthesumofitspaymentobligations
underArticle8section5sentence1oftheTreatyasstipulatedinitsAnnexII,

3.

theGermanBundestagsrefusaltoexerciseitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityby
onlyconsentingtothemacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammesestablished
withintheframeworkoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismasarequirementfor
thepurchaseofbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankifithadpreviouslybeen
comprehensivelyinformedaboutthenatureandscopeoftheEuropeanCentral
Banksbondpurchases.

2BvR2730/13,
IV.

ontheconstitutionalcomplaint
ofProf.Dr.vonS,

andofanother17complainants,

authorisedrepresentativefor1.to6.and8.to18.:

RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.MarkusC.Kerber,
HackescherMarkt4,10178Berlin
against

theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof
6September2012.

2BvR2731/13,

and
V..

ontheapplicationforarulinginOrganstreitproceedingsthattherespondent

1.

isobliged,inordertoprotectitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,toworktowardsa
repealoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6
September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMember
StatesoftheEurosystemonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,
becauseitcircumventstheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingpursuanttoArticle123
oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andthattherespondentmust
refrainfromallactsordecisionswhichservetoimplementthisDecision

2.

maygrantitsapprovaltotheadjustmentprogrammeswhichwereestablishedas
conditionsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankonthe
secondarymarketwithintheframeworkoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityor
theEuropeanStabilityMechanism,anapprovalintheformofaconstitutive
parliamentarydecision,whichisrequiredunderArticle38section1sentence2,
Article20section1andsection2,andArticle79section3oftheBasicLawtoprotect
itsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,onlyifitreceivessufficientinformationaboutthe
nature,scopeanddurationoftheEuropeanCentralBanksbondpurchases,aswellas
abouttheirassociatedliabilityrisks,andifitisguaranteedthrougheffective
precautionsthattheFederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthesebond
purchaseswillnotexceedtheamountofitspaymentobligationsunderArticle8
section5sentence1oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism
(TESM)asstipulatedinitsAnnexII.

Applicant:

ParliamentarygroupDIELINKEintheGermanBundestag,
representedbyitsChairmanDr.GregorGysi,MdB,
PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.Dr.h.c.HansPeterSchneider,
Drosselweg4,30559Hanover,
Prof.Dr.AndreasFisahn,
GrnerWeg83,32130Enger
Respondent:

GermanBundestag,
representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,
PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,

authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,
Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,
Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,
Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,
Horemer13,72076Tbingen,
2BvE13/13
joinedtheproceedingsItoV:

GermanBundestag,
representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,
PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,
authorisedrepresentatives:

Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,
Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,
Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,
Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,
Horemer13,72076Tbingen,
joinedtheproceedingsItoIV,inproceedingsVonthesideoftheGermanBundestag:

FederalGovernment,
representedbytheFederalChancellorDr.AngelaMerkel,
Bundeskanzleramt,WillyBrandtStrae1,10557Berlin,
authorisedrepresentative:

Prof.Dr.UlrichHde,
Lennstrae15,15234Frankfurt(Oder)
theFederalConstitutionalCourtSecondSenatewiththeparticipationofJustices

PresidentVokuhle,
LbbeWolff,
Gerhardt,
Landau,
Huber,
Hermanns,
Mller,
KessalWulf
heldon14January2014asfollows:
I.Theproceedingsaresuspended.

II.PursuanttoArticle19section3letterboftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandArticle267section1lettersaandbof
theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,thefollowingquestionsarereferredtotheCourtofJusticeofthe
EuropeanUnionforapreliminaryruling:

a)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnical
FeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewithArticle119andArticle127sections1and2of
theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andwithArticles17to24oftheProtocolontheStatuteof
theEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank,becauseitexceedstheEuropean
CentralBanksmonetarypolicymandate,whichisregulatedintheabovementionedprovisions,andinfringes
thepowersoftheMemberStates?
DoesatransgressionoftheEuropeanCentralBanksmandatefollowinparticularfromthefactthatthe
DecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012
aa)islinkedtoeconomicassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropean
StabilityMechanism(conditionality)?
bb)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonlyofselectedMemberStates(selectivity)?
cc)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesofthe
EuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?
dd)mightunderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancial
StabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?
b)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnical
FeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewiththeprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing
enshrinedinArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion?
IsthecompatibilitywithArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionprecludedin
particularbythefactthattheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September
2012
aa)doesnotenvisagequantitativelimitsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbonds(volume)?
bb)doesnotenvisageacertaintimelagbetweentheemissionofgovernmentbondsontheprimarymarket
andtheirpurchasebytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksonthesecondarymarket(marketpricing)
cc)allowsthatallpurchasedgovernmentbondsmaybeheldtomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?
dd)containsnospecificrequirementsforthecreditratingofthegovernmentbondsthataretobepurchased
(defaultrisk)?
ee)envisagesequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasother
governmentbondholders(debtcut)?

InthealternativethattheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniondoesnotconsidertheDecisionofthe
GoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutright
MonetaryTransactionstobeanactofaninstitutionoftheEuropeanUnionandthusnotaqualifiedobjectfora
referencepursuanttoArticle267section1letterboftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion:
a)AreArticle119andArticle127oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionandArticles17to24
oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBanktobe
interpretedinsuchawaythattheyalternativelyorcumulativelyallowtheEurosystem
aa)tomakethepurchaseofgovernmentbondscontingentontheexistenceandadherencetoeconomic
assistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism
(conditionality)?
bb)topurchasegovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatesonly(selectivity)?
cc)topurchasegovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropean
FinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?
dd)tounderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStability
FacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?
b)Regardingtheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing:IsArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningofthe
EuropeanUniontobeinterpretedinsuchawaythattheEurosystemisallowedalternativelyorcumulatively

aa)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutquantitativelimits(volume)?
bb)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutaminimumtimelagaftertheiremissionontheprimarymarket
(marketpricing)?
cc)toholdallpurchasedgovernmentbondstomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?
dd)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutminimumcreditratingrequirements(defaultrisk)?
ee)toacceptequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasothergovernment
bondholders(debtcut)?
ff)toinfluencepricingbycommunicatingtheintenttobuyorinotherways,coincidingwiththeemissionof
governmentbondsbyMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyarea(encouragementtopurchasenewlyissued
securities)?

Reasons:

A.FactsoftheCase
Inareasonableassessmentoftheirapplications,thecomplainantsandtheapplicantchallenge,complainantsItoIV
1
viaconstitutionalcomplaintspursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.4aoftheBasicLaw(GrundgesetzGG),13no.8a,90
etseq.oftheFederalConstitutionalCourtAct(BundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetzBVerfGG),andapplicantVvia
Organstreitproceedings[proceedingsrelatingtodisputesbetweenconstitutionalorgans]pursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.
1GG,13no.5,63etseq.BVerfGG,first,interalia,theparticipationoftheGermanBundesbankinthe
implementationoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012on
TechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions,andsecondly,thattheGermanFederalGovernmentandthe
GermanBundestagfailedtoactregardingtheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6
September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions(hereinafter:OMTDecision).
I.SubjectMatteroftheProceedings
TheOMTDecisionenvisagesthatgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatescanbepurchaseduptoanunlimited 2
amountif,andaslongas,theseMemberStates,atthesametime,participateinareformprogrammeasagreedupon
withtheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.ThestatedaimoftheOutright
MonetaryTransactionsistosafeguardanappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandtheconsistencyorsingleness
ofthemonetarypolicy.TheMinutesofthe340thmeetingoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankon
5and6September2012inFrankfurt/Mainreadinthisrespectasfollows:

[]
WithregardtoOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),onaproposalfromthePresident,theGoverningCouncil:
(b)approvedthemainparametersoftheOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),whichwouldbesetoutinapress
releasetobepublishedafterthemeeting(Thursday,6September2012)
Thepressreleasewhichwaspublishedonthissubjecton6September2012hasthefollowingwording:

6September2012TechnicalfeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions
Asannouncedon2August2012,theGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)hastodaytakendecisions
onanumberoftechnicalfeaturesregardingtheEurosystemsoutrighttransactionsinsecondarysovereignbond
marketsthataimatsafeguardinganappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandthesinglenessofthemonetary
policy.ThesewillbeknownasOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMTs)andwillbeconductedwithinthefollowing
framework:
Conditionality
AnecessaryconditionforOutrightMonetaryTransactionsisstrictandeffectiveconditionalityattachedtoan
appropriateEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility/EuropeanStabilityMechanism(EFSF/ESM)programme.Such
programmescantaketheformofafullEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammeoraprecautionary
programme(EnhancedConditionsCreditLine),providedthattheyincludethepossibilityofEFSF/ESMprimary
marketpurchases.TheinvolvementoftheIMFshallalsobesoughtforthedesignofthecountryspecificconditionality
andthemonitoringofsuchaprogramme.
TheGoverningCouncilwillconsiderOutrightMonetaryTransactionstotheextentthattheyarewarrantedfroma
monetarypolicyperspectiveaslongasprogrammeconditionalityisfullyrespected,andterminatethemoncetheir
objectivesareachievedorwhenthereisnoncompliancewiththemacroeconomicadjustmentorprecautionary
programme.
Followingathoroughassessment,theGoverningCouncilwilldecideonthestart,continuationandsuspensionof
OutrightMonetaryTransactionsinfulldiscretionandactinginaccordancewithitsmonetarypolicymandate.
Coverage
OutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbeconsideredforfuturecasesofEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustment
programmesorprecautionaryprogrammesasspecifiedabove.TheymayalsobeconsideredforMemberStates
currentlyunderamacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammewhentheywillberegainingbondmarketaccess.
Transactionswillbefocusedontheshorterpartoftheyieldcurve,andinparticularonsovereignbondswithamaturity
ofbetweenoneandthreeyears.
NoexantequantitativelimitsaresetonthesizeofOutrightMonetaryTransactions.
Creditortreatment
TheEurosystemintendstoclarifyinthelegalactconcerningOutrightMonetaryTransactionsthatitacceptsthesame
(paripassu)treatmentasprivateorothercreditorswithrespecttobondsissuedbyeuroareacountriesandpurchased
bytheEurosystemthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactions,inaccordancewiththetermsofsuchbonds.
Sterilisation
TheliquiditycreatedthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbefullysterilised.
Transparency
AggregateOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandtheirmarketvalueswillbepublishedonaweeklybasis.
PublicationoftheaveragedurationofOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandthebreakdownbycountrywilltake
placeonamonthlybasis.
SecuritiesMarketsProgramme
FollowingtodaysdecisiononOutrightMonetaryTransactions,theSecuritiesMarketsProgramme(SMP)isherewith
terminated.TheliquidityinjectedthroughtheSMPwillcontinuetobeabsorbedasinthepast,andtheexisting
securitiesintheSMPportfoliowillbeheldtomaturity.
TheOMTDecisionhasnotyetbeenputintoeffect.

II.HistoryoftheProceedings
1.SubmissionsoftheComplainantsandtheApplicant
ThecomplainantsandtheapplicantarguethattheFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagareobligedto
5
worktowardsarepealoftheOMTDecision,oratleasttopreventitsimplementation,andthattheGerman
BundesbankmaynottakepartiftheDecisionisputintoeffect.Theygivethefollowingreasonsforthisview:TheOMT
Decisionisasocalledultraviresact.ItisnotcoveredbythemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBankpursuantto
Art.119,127etseq.oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)apartfromthis,itviolatesthe
prohibitionofmonetaryfinancing(Art.123TFEU)andtheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thepurchase
ofgovernmentbondsisonlypermittedwithintheframeworkofmonetarypolicy.Foranumberofreasons,however,
theOMTDecisionisnotanactofmonetarypolicy.Ittransgressestheboundariesofmonetarypolicyandviolatesthe
prohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetbytheEuropeanCentralBankbyenvisagingthatonlybondsof
selectedstateswillbepurchased,thatgovernmentbondswillbepurchasedforwhichnobuyersexistonthemarket,
andthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondswillbemadecontingentonpoliticalconditions,specificallyonthe
participationoftheMemberStatethatbenefitsinaprogrammeoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityorofthe
EuropeanStabilityMechanism.Monetarypolicymustrelatetotheentireeurocurrencyareaandmustbefreefrom
discriminationwithregardtoindividualMemberStatesoftheEurosystem.Atthesametime,linkingOMTpurchases
todecisionsoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismandtothe
conditionalitiesagreedtothereincollideswiththeindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thereareinfactno
upheavalsonthegovernmentbondmarkets,whicharerequiredforaninterventionoftheEuropeanCentralBank.The
OMTDecisionamountstoasuspensionofthemarketmechanismswhichviolatestheTreaties.TheEuropeanCentral
Bankdoesnothaveamandatetodefendtheeurobyanymeans,includingthosethatleadtolargescaleredistributions
betweenbanksandtaxpayersandbetweentaxpayersofdifferentMemberStatesinthisrespect,itdoesnotenjoy
sufficientdemocraticlegitimation.ThetransferofsovereignpowerstotheindependentEuropeanCentralBankhas
onlybeenpoliticallyauthorisedandconstitutionallyapprovedundertheconditionthatitwouldbelimitedtothearea
ofmonetarypolicy.SincetheOMTDecisioncancreateliabilityandpaymentrisksaffectingthefederalbudgettosuch
anextentthattheoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityoftheGermanBundestag,andthusalsoitsbudgetaryrights,canbe
impaired,thedecisionalsoviolatestheprincipleofdemocracyenshrinedinArt.20sec.1and2GG,andimpairsthe
constitutionalidentityoftheBasicLaw,whichtheeternityclauseofArt.79sec.3GGprotectsnotonlyagainst
amendmentsoftheConstitutionbutalsoagainstanerosionintheprocessofEuropeanintegration.
2.StatementsSubmittedbytheEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbank
IntheproceedingsbeforetheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbank
havesubmittedstatements.

a)AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,theOMTDecisioniscoveredbyitsmandateanddoesnotviolatethe
7
prohibitionofmonetaryfinancing.ItsmonetarypolicyisnolongerappropriatelyimplementedintheMemberStates
oftheeurocurrencyareabecausethesocalledmonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisdisrupted.Inparticular,
thelinkbetweenthekeyinterestrateandthebankinterestratesisimpaired.Unfoundedfearsofinvestorswith
regardtothereversibilityoftheeurohaveresultedinunjustifiedinterestspreads.TheOutrightMonetary
Transactionswereintendedtoneutralisethesespreads.Therequirementforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthe
basisoftheOMTDecisionisthatthebenefittingMemberStatehasenteredintoagreementswiththeEuropean
FinancialStabilityFacilityorwiththeEuropeanStabilityMechanismonmacroeconomic,structural,budgetaryand
financialpolicyreforms,andcomplieswiththeagreements.TheOutrightMonetaryTransactionsareonlyintendedto
cutoffunjustifiedinterestratehikes.IfaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligations,thepurchasesweretobe
stopped,evenifthiswillresultinmajoreconomicdifficultiesfortheMemberStateconcerned.Anotherconditionis
thattheMemberStatehas,orregains,accesstothebondmarketsothatthefiscallydiscipliningeffectoftheinterest
ratemechanismisupheld.
TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthattheEurosystemwillnotclaimpreferredcreditorstatuswithregardto
thegovernmentbondspurchasedonthebasisoftheOMTDecision.WhiletheEuropeanCentralBankobjectsto
agreeingtoadebtcutandtocompletelyorpartiallywaivingclaimsagainsttheMemberStatesconcerned,itwould
acceptequaltreatmentwithotherownersif,inameetingofcreditors,amajorityvotedinfavourofadebtcut.

TheEuropeanCentralBankarguesthatconsideringtheSpanish,Italian,IrishandPortuguesebondsonthemarket,
9
thepotentialvolumeofpurchasesonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionwouldcurrentlyamounttoapproximatelyEUR
524000000000(statusof7December2012).TheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksdoesnot,however,intendto
purchasethemaximumpossibleamountofthesebonds,butcannotpublishtheenvisagedamountfortacticalreasons.
10

TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthatimmediatelybeforeandaftertheemissionofgovernmentbonds,there
shallbenopurchasesonthesecondarymarketsothatamarketpricecanbeformedanappropriatetimelagofsome
dayswillbeobservedforthis.Theexactlockingperiodwillbedeterminedinaguideline,butnotbepublished.
TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherarguesthattheOMTDecisioncanbebasedonArt.18.1.oftheProtocolonthe
11
StatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank(hereinafter:ESCBStatute).The
purchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketdoesnotservetofinancethebudgetsoftherespective
MemberStatesindependentfromthefinancialmarkets,anditisnotaimedatrenderingmarketincentives
ineffectiveitisaimedatadaptinginterestratelevelstonormalmarketactivities.Moreover,theEuropeanSystemof
CentralBanksiscalledupontosupportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheEuropeanUniontotheextentthatthis
doesnotconflictwithmaintainingpricestability.However,theEuropeanCentralBankisindependentinthisrespect
(Art.130TFEU,Art.7ESCBStatute)andwillalwaysundertakeanautonomousanalysisoftheoverallsituation.
AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,thereisnoliabilityriskforthenationalbudgetsbecausetheEuropean
SystemofCentralBankshasensuredsufficientriskprevention,mostlythroughprovisionsandreserves.Iflosses
occurnevertheless,theycanbecarriedforwardandbalancedwithrevenuesinthefollowingyears.

12

b)IntheviewoftheGermanBundesbank,theassumptionofadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmission
13
mechanismisquestionableanddoesnotjustifytheOMTDecision.AccordingtotheGermanBundesbank,interest
spreadsongovernmentbondscannotbesplitintoeitherjustifiedorirrationalcomponents.Apoorereconomic
developmentinaMemberStatejustifiesahigherinterestspread.Thefactthatadisruptiontothemonetarypolicy
transmissionmechanismshallbetoleratedifaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligationsunderagreements
withtheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanismshowsthattheOMTDecisionisin
factnotabouttheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.
TheGermanBundesbankarguesthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketcanalso
14
disconnectthebenefittingstatesfinancingtermsfromthefinancialmarketifthemarketparticipantscanrelyon
beingabletoselltheirgovernmentbondstotheEurosystematanytime.Thesoonersuchpurchasesaremadeafter
issuing,andthehigherthepurchasevolume,thelowertherisk.Moreover,alargescalepurchaseofgovernmentbonds
carriesconsiderableriskandcanleadtoaneverincreasingamountofaMemberStatesdebtsbeingassumedbythe
Eurosystem.
TheGermanBundesbankfurtheraddsthateverylossitincursburdenstheGermanfederalbudget,sothattherisks
ensuingfrompurchasesofgovernmentbondsbytheEurosystemarenodifferent,ineconomicterms,fromthoseof
theEuropeanStabilityMechanism.UnliketheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,theEurosystem,however,lacks
parliamentarymonitoring.

15

III.RelevantLegalProvisionsandJurisprudence
1.LegalProvisions
TherelevantArticlesoftheBasicLawfortheFederalRepublicofGermanyof23May1949,mostrecentlyamended
bythe59thActAmendingtheBasicLaw(59.GesetzzurnderungdesGrundgesetzes)of11July2012(Federal
LawGazette,BundesgesetzblattBGBlIp.1478)readasfollows:(AtranslationoftheBasicLawprovidedbythe
FederalMinistryofJusticeandConsumerProtectioncanbefoundonline:
http://www.gesetzeiminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html[http://www.gesetzeim
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html]
.)
Art.20
(1)TheFederalRepublicofGermanyisademocraticandsocialfederalstate.
(2)Allstateauthorityisderivedfromthepeople.Itshallbeexercisedbythepeoplethroughelectionsandothervotes
andthroughspecificlegislative,executiveandjudicialbodies.
(3)Thelegislatureshallbeboundbytheconstitutionalorder,theexecutiveandthejudiciarybylawandjustice.
(4)
<
Art.23

16

(1)WithaviewtoestablishingaunitedEurope,theFederalRepublicofGermanyshallparticipateinthedevelopment
oftheEuropeanUnionthatiscommittedtodemocratic,socialandfederalprinciples,totheruleoflaw,andtothe
principleofsubsidiarity,andthatguaranteesalevelofprotectionofbasicrightsessentiallycomparabletothatafforded
bythisBasicLaw.[]TheestablishmentoftheEuropeanUnion,aswellaschangesinitstreatyfoundationsand
comparableregulationsthatamendorsupplementthisBasicLaw,ormakesuchamendmentsorsupplementspossible,
shallbesubjecttosections(2)and(3)ofArticle79.
(1a)to(7)
Art.38
(1)MembersoftheGermanBundestagshallbeelectedingeneral,direct,free,equalandsecretelections.[]
Art.79
(1)...
(2)AnysuchlawshallbecarriedbytwothirdsoftheMembersoftheBundestagandtwothirdsofthevotesofthe
Bundesrat.
(3)AmendmentstothisBasicLawaffectingthedivisionoftheFederationintoLnder,theirparticipationon
principleinthelegislativeprocess,ortheprincipleslaiddowninArticles1and20shallbeinadmissible.
Art.88
TheFederationshallestablishanoteissuingandcurrencybankastheFederalBank.Withintheframeworkofthe
EuropeanUnion,itsresponsibilitiesandpowersmaybetransferredtotheEuropeanCentralBank,whichis
independentandcommittedtotheoverridinggoalofassuringpricestability.
2.JurisprudenceoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt
a)Initsestablishedcaselaw,theFederalConstitutionalCourtinterpretstheseprovisionssothattheyimposelimits
ontheFederalRepublicofGermanysparticipationinEuropeanintegrationtheFederalConstitutionalCourtcan
reviewwhethertheselimitsarerespected,alsouponcomplaintslodgedbyindividualcitizens.Accordingtothe
jurisprudencewhichwasestablishedin1993withtheMaastrichtjudgment,theindividualsrighttovoteunder
Art.38sec.1sentence1GGhasalsoasubstantivecontent:

17

BVerfGE89,155<171and172>:Art.38GGdoesnotmerelyguaranteethatacitizenhastherighttoelecttheGerman
Bundestagandthattheconstitutionalprinciplesofelectorallawwillbecompliedwithintheelection.Theguarantee
alsocoversthefundamentaldemocraticcontentofthisright:Germansentitledtovoteareguaranteedasubjective
righttopartakeintheelectionoftheBundestagandtotherebycontributetothelegitimationofstateauthoritybythe
peopleatthefederallevelandtoinfluencetheexerciseofthisauthority.(...)Art.38GGexcludesthepossibilitythat,in
theareaofapplicationofArt.23GG,thelegitimationofstateauthorityandtheinfluenceonitsexercisewhichan
electionprovidesisdepletedbyatransferoftheBundestagsresponsibilitiesandpowerstosuchadegree,thatthe
democraticprincipleisviolatedtotheextentthatArt.79sec.3GGinconjunctionwithArt.20sec.1and2GGdeclares
itinviolable.
TheFederalConstitutionalCourthasaffirmedandfurthersubstantiatedthisinlaterdecisions(cf.onlyBVerfGE
123,267<330etseq.340etseq.>129,124<167etseq.>).

18

Thissubstantivecontentofwhatisguaranteedbytherighttovoteisviolatedonly,butalwaysso,ifthisrightisin
19
dangerofbeingrenderedineffectiveinanareathatisessentialforthepoliticalselfdeterminationofthepeople,i.e.
ifthedemocraticselfgovernmentofthepeoplethroughtheGermanBundestagispermanentlyrestrictedinsuch
awaythatcentralpoliticaldecisionscannolongerbemadeindependently(cf.BVerfGE89,155<172>123,267
<330>129,124<168>).However,Art.38sec.1sentence1GGdoesnotextendthisrightanyfurtheranddoesnot
grantcitizensarighttohavethelawfulnessofdemocraticmajoritydecisionsreviewedbytheFederalConstitutional
Court.Therighttovotedoesnotservetomonitorthecontentofdemocraticprocesses,butisintendedtofacilitatethem
(cf.BVerfGE129,124<168etseq.>BVerfG,OrderoftheFirstChamberoftheSecondSenateof17April20132
BvQ17/13,NeueZeitschriftfrVerwaltungsrechtNVwZ2013,p.858<859>).
b)TheactionsoftheinstitutionsandagenciesoftheEuropeanUnionaredemocraticallylegitimatedasfaras
GermanyisconcernedinthelegislativeActsofAssenttotheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanUnionandthe
TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,whichwereenactedonthebasisofArt.23sec.1GG,andinthe
programmeofintegrationsetouttherein.Anessentialelementofthisprogrammeofintegrationistheprincipleof
conferral.

20

Againstthisbackground,actionsofinstitutionsandagenciesoftheEuropeanUnionhaveabindingeffectinthe
FederalRepublicofGermanyonlywithincertainlimits:

21

BVerfGE89,155<187and188>:SincetheGermansentitledtovoteexercisetheirrighttoparticipateinthe
democraticlegitimationoftheinstitutionsandorgansentrustedwithsovereignauthoritymostlyviatheelectionofthe
GermanBundestag,theBundestagmustalsodecideontheGermanmembershipintheEuropeanUnion,its
continuedexistence,anditsdevelopment.(...)WhatisdecisiveisthatthemembershipoftheFederalRepublicof
GermanyandtheensuingrightsandobligationsespeciallythelegallybindingdirectactsoftheEuropean
CommunitieswithinthenationallegalspherehavebeendefinedintheTreatysoastobepredictableforthe
legislature,andhavebeenenactedbyitwithsufficientcertaintyintheactofassent(cf.BVerfGE58,1<37>68,1<98
and99>).ThisimpliesthatsubsequentsubstantialchangestotheprogrammeofintegrationsetoutintheUnion
TreatyandtoitspowerstoactarenolongercoveredbytheActofAssenttothisTreaty(cf.BVerfGE58,1<37>68,1
<98and99>Moslerin:HandbuchdesStaatsrechts,Vol.VII[1992],sec.175,n.60).Thus,ifEuropeanagenciesor
institutionsweretoadministertheUnionTreaty,ordevelopitbyjudicialinterpretation,inawaythatisnolonger
coveredbytheTreatyasitunderliestheActofAssent,theensuinglegislativeinstrumentswouldnotbelegallybinding
withintheareaofGermansovereignty.Forconstitutionalreasons,theorgansoftheGermangovernmentwouldbe
preventedfromapplyingtheseinstrumentsinGermany.TheFederalConstitutionalCourtthusexamineswhetherthe
legislativeinstrumentsofEuropeanagenciesandinstitutionsremainwithinthelimitsofthesovereignpowers
conferreduponthemorwhethertheytransgressthoselimits(cf.BVerfGE58,1<30and31>75,223<235,242>).
c)TheFederalConstitutionalCourtspowersofreviewcovertheexaminationofwhetheractsofEuropean
institutionsandagenciesarebasedonmanifesttransgressionsofpowers(aa)oraffecttheareaofconstitutional
identity,whichcannotbetransferred(Art.79sec.3inconjunctionwithArt.1andArt.20GGcf.BVerfGE75,223
<235,242>89,155<188>113,273<296>123,267<353and354>126,286<302>BVerfG,Judgmentofthe
FirstSenateof24April20131BvR1215/07,NJW2013,pp.1499etseq.<1501>n.91)(bb),whichmeansthat
constitutionalorgans,authoritiesandcourtsareprohibitedfromtakingpartinputtingthemintoeffect(cc).

22

aa)Followingtheadmissiblechallengeofanultraviresact,theFederalConstitutionalCourtmustreviewthe
applicabilityandbindingeffectofactsofinstitutionsandotheragenciesoftheEuropeanUnioninGermanyinsofar
astheseactsprovidethebasisofactionstakenbyGermanauthorities.

23

TherequirementsforanultraviresreviewhavebeenfurtheroutlinedintheHoneywelldecision:

24

BVerfGE126,286<303and304>:Ultraviresreviewmayonlybeexercisedinamannerwhichisfriendly
towardsEuropeanlaw(seeBVerfGE123,267<354>).()TheUnionunderstandsitselfasalegalcommunityitisin
particularboundbytheprincipleofconferralandbyfundamentalrights,anditrespectstheconstitutionalidentityof
MemberStates(seeindetailArt.4sec.2sentence1,Art.5sec.1sentence1andArt.5sec.2sentence1,aswellasArt.6
sec.1sentence1andArticle6sec.3TEU).AccordingtothelegalsystemoftheFederalRepublicofGermany,the
primacyofapplicationofUnionlawistoberecognisedanditistobeguaranteedthatthepowersofcontrolwhichare
constitutionallyreservedfortheFederalConstitutionalCourtareonlyexercisedinamannerthatiscautiousand
friendlytowardsEuropeanlaw.ThismeansfortheultraviresreviewathandthattheFederalConstitutionalCourt
mustinprinciplecomplywiththerulingsoftheCourtofJusticeasabindinginterpretationofUnionlaw.Priortothe
acceptanceofanultraviresactbyEuropeanbodiesandinstitutions,theCourtofJusticeisthereforetobeaffordedthe
opportunitytointerprettheTreaties,aswellastoruleonthevalidityandinterpretationofthelegalactsinquestion,in
thecontextofpreliminaryrulingproceedingsaccordingtoArt.267TFEU.()UltraviresreviewbytheFederal
ConstitutionalCourtcanmoreoveronlybeconsideredifitismanifestthatactsofEuropeaninstitutionsandagencies
havetakenplaceoutsidethetransferredpowers(seeBVerfGE123,267<353,400>).Abreachoftheprincipleof
conferralisonlymanifestiftheEuropeanbodiesandinstitutionshavetransgressedtheboundariesoftheirpowersin
amannerspecificallyviolatingtheprincipleofconferral(Article23.1oftheBasicLaw),thebreachofpowersis,in
otherwords,sufficientlyqualified(seeonthewordingsufficientlyqualifiedasanelementinUnionliabilitylaw,for
instance,ECJCaseC472/00PFreshMarine,judgmentof10July2003,<2003>ECRI7541n.2627).Thismeans
thattheactofauthorityoftheEuropeanUnionmustbemanifestlyinviolationofpowersandthattheimpugnedactis
highlysignificantfortheallocationofpowersbetweentheMemberStatesandtheUnionwithregardtotheprincipleof
conferralandtothebindingnatureofthestatuteundertheruleoflaw(seeKokott,DeutschlandimRahmender
EuropischenUnionzumVertragvonMaastricht,ArchivdesffentlichenRechtsAR1994,p.207<220>:
erheblicheKompetenzberschreitungen(considerabletransgressionsofpowers)and<233>:drastische
(drastic)ultraviresacts(...)).
Thisappliesnotonlyifindependentexpansionsofpowersaffectareaswhicharepartoftheconstitutionalidentityof
theMemberStatesorparticularlydependontheprocessofdemocraticdiscourseintheMemberStates(see
BVerfGE123,267<357358>),thoughtransgressionsofpowersweighparticularlyheavyhere(BVerfGE126,286
<307>).

25

WithregardtoArt.20sec.1and2GG,thisreviewcannotbewaived.Otherwise,thepowertodisposeofthe
26
fundamentalaspectsoftheTreatieswouldbeshiftedinsuchawaytotheinstitutionsandotheragenciesofthe
EuropeanUnionthattheirunderstandingofthelawcouldresultinanamendmentofaTreatyorinanexpansionof
powers(cf.BVerfGE123,267<354and355>126,286<302etseq.>).Itisinevitableandduetothefactthatinthe
EuropeanUnion,MemberStatesareinvariablythemastersoftheTreaties,thatconstitutionalandUnionlaw
perspectivesdonotcompletelymatchinthemarginalcasesofpossibletransgressionsofpowersbyinstitutionsand
otheragenciesoftheEuropeanUnionwhicharetobeexpectedrarelyaccordingtotheinstitutionalandprocedural
precautionsofUnionlaw(cf.BVerfGE75,223<242>89,155<190>123,267<348and349381etseq.>126,286
<302and303>).Unliketheprimacyofapplicationoffederallawinafederalstate,theprecedenceofUnionlaw,
whichisbasedonnationallegislationgivingeffecttoit,cannotbecomprehensive(cf.BVerfGE73,339<375>123,
267<398>126,286<302>).
bb)IfanactofaninstitutionorotheragencyoftheEuropeanUnionhasconsequenceswhichaffectthe
27
constitutionalidentityprotectedbyArt.79sec.3GG,itis,fromtheoutset,inapplicableinGermany.Suchanact
cannotbebasedonprimarylawbecauseeventhelegislaturethatdecidesonintegrationwiththemajorityrequiredby
Art.23sec.1sentence3GGinconjunctionwithArt.79sec.2GGmaynottransfersovereignpowerstotheEuropean
UnionwhoseexercisewouldaffecttheconstitutionalidentityprotectedbyArt.79sec.3GG.Ifconferralswhich
originallyhavebeeninaccordancewiththeConstitutionwereexpandedinsuchaway,thiswouldamounttoultra
viresacts.WhethertheprincipleswhicharedeclaredinviolablebyArt.79sec.3GGareaffectedbyanactofthe
EuropeanUnionissubjecttoreviewbytheFederalConstitutionalCourtviaareviewofidentity(cf.BVerfGE123,267
<353and354>).InsuchacasetheFederalConstitutionalCourtwilltaketheinterpretationwhichtheCourtofJustice
givesinapreliminaryrulingpursuanttoArt.267sec.2and3TFEUasabasis.Intheircooperativerelationship,itis
fortheCourtofJusticetointerprettheact.Ontheotherhand,itisfortheFederalConstitutionalCourttodetermine
theinviolablecorecontentoftheconstitutionalidentity,andtoreviewwhethertheact(intheinterpretation
determinedbytheCourtofJustice)interfereswiththiscore.
Identityreviewcan,inparticular,affectthesafeguardingoftheoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityoftheGerman
Bundestag:

28

BVerfGE132,195<239n.106>:ThereisaviolationofArticle38sec.1oftheBasicLawinparticulariftheGerman
BundestagrelinquishesitsparliamentarybudgetresponsibilitytotheeffectthatitorafutureBundestagcanno
longerexercisetherighttodecideonthebudgetinitsownresponsibility(BVerfGE129,124<177>).Thedecisionon
publicrevenueandpublicexpenditureisafundamentalpartoftheabilityofaconstitutionalstatetodemocratically
shapeitself(seeBVerfGE123,267<359>).TheGermanBundestagmustthereforemakedecisionsonrevenueand
expenditurewithresponsibilitytothepeople.Insofar,therighttodecideonthebudgetisacentralelementofthe
democraticdevelopmentofinformedopinion(cf.BVerfGE70,324<355and356>79,311<329>129,124<177>).
BVerfGE132,195<240n.109and110>:Anecessaryconditionforthesafeguardingofpoliticallatitudeinthesenseof
thecoreofidentityoftheconstitution(Article20sec.1and2,Article79sec.3oftheBasicLaw)isthatthebudget
legislaturemakesitsdecisionsonrevenueandexpenditurefreeofheteronomyonthepartofthebodiesandofother
MemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnionandremainspermanentlythemasterofitsdecisions().()Itfollowsfrom
thedemocraticbasisofbudgetautonomythattheBundestagmaynotconsenttoanautomatismofbondsorbenefits
thatareagreeduponintergovernmentallyorsupranationallyandthatisnotsubjecttostrictspecificationsandwhose
effectsarenotlimited,andwhichonceithasbeensetinmotionisremovedfromtheBundestagscontroland
influence(BVerfGE129,124<180>).
Moreover,nopermanentmechanismsmaybecreatedunderinternationaltreatieswhicharetantamounttoaccepting
liabilityfordecisionsmadefreelybyotherstates,abovealliftheyentailconsequenceswhicharehardtocalculate.The
BundestagmustindividuallyapproveeverylargescalefederalaidmeasureontheinternationalorEuropeanUnion
levelmadeinsolidaritythatresultsinexpenditure.(cf.alreadyBVerfGE129,124<177etseq.>).
SinceArt.79sec.3GGalsosetsanultimatelimit(BVerfGE123,267<348>)totheapplicabilityofUnionlaw
29
withintheGermanjurisdictionundertheBasicLaw,theprincipleswhicharestipulatedthereinmaynotbe
balancedagainstotherlegalinterests(cf.BVerfGE123,267<343>).Thus,theidentityreviewperformedbythe
FederalConstitutionalCourtisfundamentallydifferentfromthereviewunderArt4sec.2sentence1TEUbythe
CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.Art.4sec.2sentence1TEUobligestheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionto
respectnationalidentities.Thisisbasedonaconceptofnationalidentitywhichdoesnotcorrespondtotheconceptof
constitutionalidentitywithinthemeaningofArt.79sec.3GG,butreachesfarbeyond(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof22
December2010,CaseC208/09,SaynWittgenstein,ECR2010p.I13693,n.83LawontheAbolitionofthe
Nobilityasanelementofnationalidentity).Onthisbasis,theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniontreatsthe
protectionofnationalidentity,whichisrequiredaccordingtoArt.4sec.2sentence1TEU,asalegitimateaimwhich
mustbetakenintoaccountwhenlegitimateinterestsarebalancedagainsttherightsconferredbyUnionlaw(cf.ECJ,
Judgmentof2July1996,CaseC473/93,CommissionvLuxembourg,ECR1996,p.I3207n.35Judgmentof14

October2004,CaseC36/02,Omega,ECR2004,p.I9609,n.23etseq.Judgmentof22December2010,CaseC
208/09,ECR2010p.I13693,n.83Judgmentof12May2011,CaseC391/09,RunevicVardynandWardyn,ECR
2011,p.I3787,n.84etseq.Judgmentof24May2011,CaseC51/08,CommissionvLuxembourg,ECR2011,p.I
4231,n.124Judgmentof16April2013,Case.C202/11,Las,ECR2013,p.I0000,n.26,27).However,asaninterest
whichmaybebalancedagainstothers,therespectofnationalidentitywhichisrequiredaccordingtoArt.4sec.2
sentence1TEUdoesnotmeettherequirementsoftheprotectionofthecorecontentoftheBasicLawaccordingto
Art.79sec.3GG,whichmaynotbebalancedagainstotherlegalinterests.Theprotectionofthelatterisataskofthe
FederalConstitutionalCourtalone.
cc)Theabovementionedprinciplesconcerningtheprotectionoftheconstitutionalidentityandofthelimitsofthe
30
transferofsovereignpowerstotheEuropeanUnioncanalsobefound,withmodificationsdependingonthe
existenceornonexistenceofunamendableelementsintherespectivenationalconstitutions,intheconstitutionallaw
ofmanyotherMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion(cf.forinstancefortheKingdomofDenmark:Hojesteret,
Judgmentof6April1998I361/1997,para.9.8.fortheRepublicofEstonia:Riigikohus,Judgmentof12July2012
341612,sec.no.128,223fortheFrenchRepublic:Conseilconstitutionnel,Decisionno.2006540DCof27July
2006,19threcitalDecisionno.2011631DCof9June2011,45threcitalforIreland:SupremeCourtofIreland,Crotty
v.AnTaoiseach<1987>,I.R.713<783>S.P.U.C.(Ireland)Ltd.v.Grogan,<1989>,I.R.753<765>fortheItalian
Republic:Cortecostituzionale,Decisionno.183/1973Decisionno.168/1991fortheRepublicofLatvia:Satversmes
tiesa,Judgmentof7April200920083501,sec.no.17fortheRepublicofPoland:TrybunalKonstytucyjny,
Judgmentsof11May2005K18/04,n.4.1.,10.2.,of24November2010K32/09,n.2.1.etseq.of16
November2011SK45/09,n.2.4.,2.5.,withfurtherreferencesfortheKingdomofSweden:Chapter10Art.6
sentence1,FormofgovernmentfortheKingdomofSpain:TribunalConstitucional,Declarationof13December2004,
DTC1/2004fortheCzechRepublic:stavniSoud,Judgmentof31January20122012/01/31Pl.S5/12,para.
VII.).Atnationallevel,theyhaveconsequencesnotonlyfortheFederalConstitutionalCourtbutalsoforotherpublic
authorities.Germanauthoritiesmaynottakepartinthedecisionmakingprocessandtheimplementationofultra
viresacts(cf.BVerfGE89,155<188>126,286<302etseq.>)andarenotentitledtoparticipateinmeasures
affectingtheconstitutionalidentityprotectedbyArt.79sec.3GG.Thisappliestoallconstitutionalorgans,authorities
andcourts.Itresultsfromtheconstitutionalprinciplesofdemocracy(Art.20sec.1andsec.2GG)andtheruleoflaw
(Art.20sec.3GG),aswellasfromArt.23sec.1GG,andissafeguardedunderEuropeanUnionlawbytheprincipleof
conferral(Art.5sec.1sentence1andsec.2TEU)andtheobligationoftheEuropeanUniontorespectthenational
identitiesoftheMemberStates(Art.4sec.2sentence1TEU,cf.BVerfGE123,267<352>).
BesidestheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion,Germanconstitutionalorgansarealsoresponsibletomakesurethat
theprogrammeofintegrationisobserved.Inthisrespect,thejudgmentontheTreatyofLisbonreadsasfollows:

31

BVerfGE123,267<352and353>:IfintheprocessofEuropeanintegrationprimarylawisamended,orexpansively
interpretedbyinstitutions,aconstitutionallyimportanttensionwillarisewiththeprincipleofconferralandwiththe
individualMemberStatesconstitutionalresponsibilitywithrespecttointegration.Iflegislativeoradministrative
powersareonlytransferredinanunspecifiedmannerorwithaviewtofurtherdynamicdevelopment,orifthe
institutionsarepermittedtoredefineexpansively,filllacunaeorfactuallyextendpowerstheyrisktransgressingthe
predeterminedprogrammeofintegrationandactingbeyondthepowersgrantedtothem.Theyaremovingonaroad
attheendofwhichthereisthepowerofdispositionoftheirfoundationslaiddowninthetreaties,i.e.thecompetence
offreelydisposingoftheircompetences.Thereisariskoftransgressionoftheconstitutiveprincipleofconferralandof
theconceptualresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationincumbentuponMemberStatesifinstitutionsofthe
EuropeanUnioncandecidewithoutrestriction,withoutanyoutsidecontrol,howeverrestrainedandexceptional,how
treatylawistobeinterpreted.Itisthereforeconstitutionallyrequirednottoagreedynamictreatyprovisionswitha
blanketcharacteroriftheycanstillbeinterpretedinamannerthatrespectsthenationalresponsibilitywithrespectto
integration,toestablish,atanyrate,suitablenationalsafeguardsfortheeffectiveexerciseofsuchresponsibility.
Accordingly,theActapprovinganinternationalagreementandthenationalaccompanyinglawsmustthereforebe
capableofpermittingEuropeanintegrationcontinuingtotakeplaceaccordingtotheprincipleofconferralwithoutthe
possibilityfortheEuropeanUnionoftakingpossessionofKompetenzKompetenzortoviolatetheMemberStates
constitutionalidentity,whichisnotopentointegration,inthiscase,thatoftheBasicLaw.Forborderlinecasesofwhat
isstillconstitutionallyadmissible,theGermanlegislaturemust,wherenecessary,takeprecautionsinitslegislation
accompanyingapprovaltoensurethattheresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationofthelegislativebodiescan
sufficientlydevelop.(cf.alsoBVerfGE129,124<180and181>132,195<238and239,n.105>).
d)Finally,withregardtotheconstitutionalfoundationsofGermanysmembershipinthemonetaryunionandto
thetransferofpowerstotheEuropeanCentralBank,theFederalConstitutionalCourtheldasfollows:
BVerfGE89,155<207etseq.>:TheBundestags,andthusthevoters,possibilitiestoinfluencetheexerciseof
sovereignpowersbyEuropeaninstitutionshave,however,beentakenawayalmostcompletelyinsofarastheEuropean
CentralBankhasbeenprovidedwithindependencevisvistheEuropeanCommunityandtheMemberStates

32

(Art.107EC).Anessentialpolicythatsupportsindividualfreedomthroughthemaintenanceofthemonetaryvalue
andthatdeterminesthroughthemoneysupplyalsopublicfinancesandthepoliticalspheresdependentthereon,is
excludedfromtheregulatorypowerofsovereignauthorities,andalsounlessthereisatreatyamendmentfromthe
legislaturescontroloffieldsoffunctionsandmeansofaction.Placingmostofthetasksofmonetarypolicyonan
autonomousbasiswithanindependentcentralbankdisconnectstheexerciseofgovernmentalauthorityfromdirect
governmentalorsupranationalparliamentaryresponsibility,inordertofreethemonetarysystemfromtheaccessof
interestgroupsandholdersofpoliticalofficewhoareconcernedabouttheirreelection(asstatedintheGovernment
DraftoftheBundesbankAct,Bundestagdocument,BundestagsdrucksacheBTDrucks.2/2781pp.24and25).
Thislimitationofdemocraticlegitimation,whichisderivedfromthevotersintheMemberStates,affectstheprinciple
ofdemocracy,butiscompatiblewithArt.79sec.3GGasamodificationofthisprinciplethatisenvisagedinArt.88
sentence2GG.TheadditiontoArt.88GG,whichwasmadewithaviewtotheEuropeanUnion,allowsatransferof
powersfromtheBundesbanktoaEuropeanCentralBankifitmeetsthestrictcriteriaoftheMaastrichtTreatyand
theStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandthepriorityofastablecurrency(Recommendationand
ReportoftheSpecialCommitteeonEuropeanUnion[MaastrichtTreaty]of1December1992,BTDrucks.12/3896p.
21).TheintentionofthelegislatureamendingtheConstitutionwasthusclearlytocreateaconstitutionalbasisforthe
monetaryunionenvisagedintheUnionTreaty,buttorestrictthegrantingoftheensuingabovementioned
independentpowersandinstitutionstothatcase.Thismodificationoftheprincipleofdemocracyinordertoprotect
theconfidenceplacedinthevalueofacurrencyisjustifiablebecauseittakesaccountofthespecialfeatureofmonetary
policytriedandtestedintheGermanlegalorder,andalsobythescientificcommunitythatanindependentcentral
bankismorelikelytosafeguardthemonetaryvalue,andthusthegeneraleconomicbasisforgovernmentalbudgetary
policiesaswellasforprivateplansandtransactionsinexerciseoftheeconomicfreedoms,thanstatebodieswhose
optionsandmeansforactiondependonmoneysupplyandmonetaryvalueandwhichneedtorelyonshortterm
approvalbypoliticalforces.Tothatextent,placingthemonetarypolicyonanautonomousbasisunderthesovereign
jurisdictionofanindependentEuropeanCentralBank,whichcannotbetransferredtootherpoliticalareas,satisfies
theconstitutionalrequirementsaccordingtowhichtheprincipleofdemocracymaybemodified(cf.BVerfGE30,1
<24>84,90<121>).

B.OntheValidityoftheOMTDecision
(FirstQuestionReferredforaPreliminaryRuling)
I.RelevancetotheDecision
ThefirstquestionreferredforapreliminaryrulingisrelevanttotheFederalConstitutionalCourtsdecision.Itis
33
relevanteventhoughtheOMTDecisiondoesnotyethavelegaleffectsonothers(1.).Theapplicationswouldbe
successfuliftheOMTDecision,transgressingtheEuropeanCentralBanksmandate,encroacheduponthepowersof
theMemberStatesforeconomicpolicyand/orviolatedtheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudget.According
toGermanconstitutionallaw,theOMTDecisionwouldthenhavetobequalifiedasamanifestandstructurally
significantultraviresact(2.).Inthiscase,theGermanconstitutionalorganswould,becauseoftheirinactivity,not
havemettheirresponsibilitywithrespecttointegration(Integrationsverantwortung),andtheywouldthushave
violatedthecomplainantsconstitutionalrightsaswellasthelegalpositionsoftheGermanBundestaginvokedbythe
applicantintheOrganstreitproceedings(3.).
1.PreventiveLegalProtection
TheadmissibilityoftheconstitutionalcomplaintsdoesnotdependonwhethertheOMTDecisioncanalreadybe
34
understoodasanactwithanexternaldimensionwithinthemeaningofArt.288sec.4TFEU,oronlyasthe
announcementofsuchanact.ItisalsoirrelevantforthepresentproceedingswhethertheOMTDecisionaffectsthe
complainantsandtheapplicantdirectlywithinthemeaningofArt.263sec.4TFEU(cf.EGC,Orderof10December
2013,CaseT492/12,vonStorchandOthersvECB,ECR2013,p.II0000,n.35etseq.).Neitherthescopenorthe
conditionsoflegalprotectionundernationallawagainstactivitiesoromissionsbynationalauthoritiesregardingthe
OMTDecisionarepredeterminedbythis(cf.EGC,Orderof10December2013,loc.cit.,n.46and48).Accordingto
Germanlaw,therequirementsforgrantingpreventivelegalprotectionaremet.ThecaselawoftheFederal
ConstitutionalCourtrecognisesthatpreventivelegalprotectioncanalsobewarrantedinconstitutionalcomplaint
proceedingsinordertoavoidconsequencesthatcannotbecorrected(cf.BVerfGE1,396<413>74,297<318ff.>97,
157<164>108,370<385>112,363<367>123,267<329>BVerfG,OrderoftheThirdChamberoftheSecond
Senateof11March19992BvQ4/99,NJW1999,p.2174<2175>).
ThecomplainantscomprehensiblystatedthattheexecutionoftheOMTDecisioncouldleadtosuchconsequences
thatcouldnotbecorrected.Itistruethatthepurchaseprogrammerequiresfurtherimplementingmeasures(cf.
EGC,Orderof10December2013,loc.cit.,n.38).However,ithasbeensufficientlyspecifiedbytheDecisionof6

35

September2012and,accordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,onlyrequiressomefurtherspecificationregardingits
details,whichastheEuropeanCentralBanksrepresentativeexplainedattheoralhearingcanbedoneatanytime
andwithinaveryshorttimeframe.
2.UltraViresAct
IftheOMTDecisionviolatedtheEuropeanCentralBanksmonetarymandateortheprohibitionofmonetary
financingofthebudget,thiswouldhavetobeconsideredanultraviresactinthesenseoftheabovementioned(n.
23)Honeywelldecision.

36

a)Asufficientlyqualifiedviolationoftheintegrationprogrammerequiresthattheviolationismanifestandthatthe 37
challengedactentailsastructurallysignificantshiftintheallocationofpowerstothedetrimentoftheMember
States(cf.BVerfGE126,286<304and305withfurtherreferences>).Transgressionsofthemandatearestructurally
significantespecially(butnotonly)iftheycoverareasthatarepartoftheconstitutionalidentityoftheFederal
RepublicofGermany,whichisprotectedbyArt.79sec.3GG,oriftheyparticularlyaffectthedemocraticdiscoursein
theMemberStates(cf.BVerfGE126,286<307>).
b)Itwouldhavetobeconsideredamanifestandstructurallysignificanttransgressionofitsmandateifthe
EuropeanCentralBankactedbeyonditsmonetarypolicymandate(aa),oriftheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing
ofthebudgetwasviolatedbytheOMTprogramme(bb).

38

aa)IftheEuropeanCentralBankexceededitsmonetarypolicymandatewiththeOMTDecision,itwouldthus
39
interferewiththeresponsibilityoftheMemberStatesforeconomicpolicy.AccordingtoTitleVIIIoftheTreatyon
theFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionandnotwithstandingthespecialpowersexpresslyassignedtotheUnion(e.g.
Art.121,122,126TFEU),theresponsibilityforeconomicpolicyliesclearlywiththeMemberStates.Inthisfieldof
economicpolicy,theEuropeanUnionisapartfromindividualexceptionsthatareinparticularregulatedinPart
ThreeoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionessentiallylimitedtoacoordinationofMember
Stateseconomicpolicies(Art.119sec.1TFEU).TheEuropeanCentralBankmayonlysupportthegeneraleconomic
policiesoftheMemberStates(Art.119sec.2,Art.127sec.1sentence2TFEUArt.2sentence2ESCBStatute).Itisnot
authorisedtopursueitsowneconomicpolicy.IfoneassumessubjecttotheinterpretationbytheCourtofJustice
thattheOMTDecisionistobequalifiedasanindependentactofeconomicpolicy,itmanifestlyviolatesthis
distributionofpowers.
Suchanactwouldalsobestructurallysignificant.ThisderivesinparticularfromthefactthattheOMTDecision
40
functionallyequivalentinthisregardcouldbesuperimposedontoassistancemeasureswhicharepartoftheEuro
rescuepolicyandwhich,duetotheirsignificantfinancialscopeandgeneralpoliticalimplications,belongtothecore
aspectsoftheMemberStateseconomicpolicyresponsibilities(cf.Art.136sec.3TFEU).Decisionsonthechoiceof
instrumentsforthestabilisationofthemonetaryunionoronthecompositionoftheeurocurrencyareasubstantially
dependonthedemocraticprocessintheMemberStates.Inaddition,actionsbytheEuropeanCentralBankinthis
areacouldmakedivergingdecisionsbytheMemberStatespoliticallynolongerfeasibleorsensible.
ActsofthekindthatwereannouncedintheOMTDecisionarestructurallysignificantespeciallybecausetheyleadto
aconsiderableredistributionbetweenthebudgetsandthetaxpayersoftheMemberStates,andcanthusgaineffects
ofasystemoffiscalredistribution,whichisnotentailedintheintegrationprogrammeoftheEuropeanTreaties.On
thecontrary,independenceofthenationalbudgets,whichopposesthedirectorindirectcommonliabilityofthe
MemberStatesforgovernmentdebts,isconstituentforthedesignofthemonetaryunion(cf.Art.125TFEUECJ,
Judgmentof27November2012,CaseC370/12,Pringle,ECR2012,p.I0000,n.135BVerfGE129,124<181and
182>).

41

bb)ShouldtheOMTDecisionviolatetheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudget,this,too,wouldhavetobe
consideredamanifestandstructurallysignificanttransgressionofpowers.

42

TheviolationwouldbemanifestbecausetheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionstipulatesanexplicit 43
prohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetandtheTreatythusunequivocallyexcludessuchpowersofthe
EuropeanCentralBank(cf.Art.123sec.1TFEU).Theviolationwouldalsobestructurallysignificant.Thecurrent
integrationprogrammedesignsthemonetaryunionasacommunityofstability.AstheFederalConstitutionalCourt
hasrepeatedlyemphasised(cf.BVerfGE89,155<205>97,350<369>129,124<181and182>132,195<243>,n.
115),thisisthebasisfortheparticipationoftheFederalRepublicofGermanyinthemonetaryunion.Theprohibition
ofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetisoneofthefundamentalrulesthatguaranteethedesignofthemonetaryunionas
acommunityofstability.Apartfromthis,itsafeguardstheoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityoftheGerman
Bundestag(formoredetailscf.BVerfGE129,124<181>132,195<243and244>n.115and116).
3.ObligationstoActandnottoActofGermanAuthorities

AnultraviresactasunderstoodabovecreatesanobligationofGermanauthoritiestorefrainfromimplementingit
andadutytochallengeit(aandb).ThesedutiescanbeenforcedbeforetheConstitutionalCourtatleastinsofaras
theyrefertoconstitutionalorgans(c).

44

a)IfaninstitutionorotheragencyoftheEuropeanUnionactsultraviresintheabovementionedsense,German
constitutionalorgans,authorities,andcourtsmayneitherparticipateinthedecisionmakingprocessnorinthe
implementationoftheact.ThisalsoappliestotheGermanBundesbank.

45

b)Moreover,theGermanBundestagandtheFederalGovernmentmaynotsimplyletamanifestorstructurally
significantusurpationofsovereignpowersbyEuropeanUnionorganstakeplace.

46

aa)TheMemberStatesandtheirconstitutionalorgansnexttotheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionhaveto
ensurethattheintegrationprogrammeisobserved(responsibilitywithrespecttointegration,cf.BVerfGE123,267
<352etseq.,389etseq.,413etseq.>126,286<307>129,124<181>132,195<238and239>n.105).Inthe
FederalRepublicofGermany,itisthetaskofallconstitutionalorganstomeetthisresponsibilitywithrespectto
integration.

47

Amongotherprovisions,thespecialconstitutionalrequirementoftheenactmentofastatute(Art.23sec.1sentence 48
2GG),accordingtowhichsovereignpowersmayonlybetransferredbyalawandwiththeapprovalofthe
Bundesrat,servestoprotectthisresponsibilitywithrespecttointegration(cf.BVerfGE123,267,355).Neitherdoes
theBasicLawauthorisetheconstitutionalorganstotransfersovereignpowersinsuchawaythattheirexercisecould
independentlyestablishotherpowersfortheEuropeanUnion.Itprohibitsthetransferofsovereignpowerstodecide
onitsownpowers(KompetenzKompetenz)(cf.BVerfGE123,267<349>132,195<238and239>,n.105).Forthis
reason,Parliamentmaynotcedethepowertodecidewhetherandtowhatdegreesovereignpowersaretobe
transferred,anditmaynottransferthispowertotheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion.Itis,infact,obligedtodecide
onitsownandinformalproceedingsaboutthetransferofpowersinthescopeofEuropeanintegration,inorderto
avoidthattheconstitutionallyrequiredprincipleofconferralisundermined.
bb)ItisderivedfromtheresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationthattheGermanBundestagandtheFederal
49
Governmentareobligedtosafeguardcompliancewiththeintegrationprogrammeand,incaseofmanifestand
structurallysignificanttransgressionsofpowersbyEuropeanUnionorgans,tonotonlyrefrainfromanyparticipation
andimplementation,buttoactivelypursuethegoaltoreachcompliancewiththeintegrationprogramme.Tothisend,
theycanretroactivelylegitimisetheassumptionofpowersbyinitiatingacorrespondingchangeofprimarylawthat
adherestothelimitsofArt.79sec.3GG,andbyformallytransferringtheexercisedsovereignpowersinproceedings
pursuanttoArt.23sec.1sentences2and3GG.However,insofarasthisisnotfeasibleorwanted,theyaregenerally
obligedwithintheirrespectivepowers,topursuethereversalofactsthatarenotcoveredbytheintegration
programmewithlegalorpoliticalmeans,andaslongastheactscontinuetohaveeffecttotakeadequate
precautionstoensurethatthedomesticeffectsremainaslimitedaspossible.
c)Aviolationoftheseduties,whichfollowfromtheresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationoftheGerman
BundestagandFederalGovernment,alsoviolatesindividualrightsofthevotersthatcanbeassertedwitha
constitutionalcomplaint(aa).ItcanalsobeasubjectofOrganstreitproceedings(bb).

50

aa)AccordingtotheestablishedjurisprudenceoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theindividualsrightunder
51
Art.38sec.1sentence1GGtoelecttheGermanBundestagisnotlimitedtoaformallegitimationof(federal)state
power,butalsoentailsthefundamentaldemocraticcontentoftherighttovote(cf.BVerfGE89,155<171>129,124
<168>).Thisgrantstheindividualtherighttoinfluencethepoliticalformationofopinionswithhisorhervoteandto
haveanimpactonthem.WithinthescopeofArt.23GG,citizenswhoareentitledtovotearethusprotectedfrom
beingdeprivedoftherighttoalegitimategovernmentandtoinfluencetheexerciseofpublicauthority,whichan
electionprovides,bytransferringtheresponsibilitiesandpowersoftheGermanBundestagtotheEuropeanlevelto
suchanextentthatitviolatestheprincipleofdemocracy(cf.BVerfGE89,155<172>123,267<330>).
Thesubstantivecontentofthatrightisviolatediftherighttovoteisindangerofbeingrenderedineffectiveinan
52
areathatisessentialforthepoliticalselfdeterminationofthepeople,i.e.ifthedemocraticselfgovernmentofthe
peopleembodiedinparticularintheGermanBundestagispermanentlyrestrictedinsuchawaythatvital
politicaldecisionscannolongerbemadeindependently(cf.BVerfGE89,155<172>123,267<330>129,124
<168>).Ontheotherhand,Art.38sec.1sentence1GGdoesnotentailarightthatreachesbeyondsafeguardingthe
abovementionedrightsandthatwouldletcitizenshavethelegalityofdecisionstakenbyademocraticmajority
reviewedbytheFederalConstitutionalCourt.Therighttovotedoesnotservetomonitorthecontentofdemocratic
processes,butisintendedtofacilitatethem(cf.BVerfGE129,124<168etseq.>BVerfG,OrderoftheFirstChamber
of17April20132BvQ17/13,NVwZ2013,p.858<859>).
53

VisvismanifestandstructurallysignificanttransgressionsofthemandatebytheEuropeaninstitutions,this
safeguardagainstanerosionofthelegislaturessubstantialscopeofactionconsistsnotonlyofasubstantive,butalsoof
aproceduralelement.InordertosafeguardtheirdemocraticinfluenceintheprocessofEuropeanintegration,citizens
whoareentitledtovotegenerallyhavearight,derivingfromArt.38sec.1sentence1GG,tohaveatransferof
sovereignpowersonlytakeplaceinthewaysenvisagedinArt.23sec.1sentences2and3,Art.79sec.2GG.The
democraticdecisionmakingprocess,whichtheseregulationsguaranteeinadditiontothenecessaryspecificityofthe
transferofsovereignpowers(cf.BVerfGE123,267,351etseq.),isunderminedwhenthereisaunilateralusurpation
ofpowersbyinstitutionsandotheragenciesoftheEuropeanUnion.Acitizencanthereforedemandthatthe
BundestagandtheFederalGovernmentactivelydealwiththequestionofhowthedistributionofpowersentailedin
thetreatiescanberestored,andthattheydecidewhichoptionstheywanttousetopursuethisgoal.
bb)ThesameappliestoOrganstreitproceedings.Theresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationenshrinedin
54
Art.23GGincludesrightsandobligationsoftheGermanBundestag,theviolationofwhichparliamentarygroups
canassertintheirownname,onbehalfoftheBundestag(64sec.1BVerfGG),alsovisvisParliament(cf.BVerfGE
123,267<337>132,195<247>,n.125).TheGermanBundestagmaynotwaivethoserightsandobligationsthatit
holdsinthecontextofEuropeanintegration,anditmaynotremainpassivewhenfacinganimminenterosionofits
freedomtoactbecauseofanusurpationofpowersbyinstitutionsandagenciesoftheEuropeanUnion.Ifthe
Bundestagdoesnotmeetitsresponsibilitywithrespecttointegration,parliamentarygroupscanonbehalfofthe
Bundestagtakeactionagainstthis.
II.InterpretationofUnionLawbytheFederalConstitutionalCourt
TheOMTDecisionistobeconsideredasadecisionaboutpurchasesofgovernmentbondsofindividualMember
55
Statesoftheeurocurrencyarea,whicharenotlimitedexante,andwhicharepoliticallymotivatedtheprimary
objective(oratleastthenecessaryintermediateobjective)ofthepurchasesisthereductionoftheinterestratesthe
MemberStatesthatbenefithavetopayonthecapitalmarketsfornewgovernmentbonds.Subjecttothe
interpretationbytheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion,theFederalConstitutionalCourtconsiderstheOMT
DecisionincompatiblewithArt.119andArt.127sec.1and2TFEUandArt.17etseq.oftheESCBStatutebecauseit
exceedsthemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBankthatisregulatedintheseprovisionsandencroachesuponthe
responsibilityoftheMemberStatesforeconomicpolicy(1.).Italsoappearstobeincompatiblewiththeprohibitionof
monetaryfinancingofthebudgetenshrinedinArt.123TFEU(2.).TheEuropeanCentralBanksreferencetoa
disruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisnotlikelytochangetheassessmentofthesetwopoints
(3.).Accordingly,theapplicationswouldprobablybesuccessful.Anotherassessmentcould,however,bewarrantedif
theOMTDecisioncouldbeinterpretedinconformitywithprimarylaw(4.).
1.TransgressionoftheEuropeanCentralBanksMandate
Art.119and127etseq.TFEUandArt.17etseq.ESCBStatuteincludeinprincipleamandatethatislimitedto
56
monetarypolicyfortheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksingeneralandtheEuropeanCentralBankinparticular
(cf.BVerfGE89,155<208and209>)(a).Inaddition,theEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksisonlyallowedto
supportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheUnion(b).Followingtheseprinciples,theOMTDecisiondoesnotappear
tobecoveredbythemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBank(c).
a)TheprincipleofconferralappliestothepowersoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanks(aa).Accordingtothe
TreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,theEuropeanCentralBankis
responsibleformonetarypolicy(bb).Theresponsibilityforeconomicpolicy,however,rests,apartfromindividual
cases,withtheMemberStates(cc).

57

aa)ThedivisionofpowersbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheMemberStatesisgovernedbytheprincipleof
58
conferral(Art.5sec.1and2TEU).ThisalsoappliestofunctionsandpowersthatareassignedbytheTreatiestothe
EuropeanSystemofCentralBanks,whichconsistsoftheEuropeanCentralBankandthenationalcentralbanks
(Art.282sec.1sentence1TFEU).Inordertomeetdemocraticrequirements,thismandatemustbeshapednarrowly
(1).Thecompliancewithitslimitsisfullysubjecttojudicialreviewthisreviewfirstandforemostfallswithinthe
responsibilityoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion,whosetaskitistoensurethatthelawisobservedinthe
interpretationandapplicationoftheTreaties(Art.19n.1TEU)(2).
(1)TheindependencewhichtheEuropeanCentralBankandthenationalcentralbanksenjoyintheexerciseofthe
59
powersconferreduponthem(Art.130,Art.282sec.3sentences3and4TFEU)divergesfromtherequirementsthe
BasicLawstateswithregardtothedemocraticlegitimationofpoliticaldecisions.ForGermany,theFederal
ConstitutionalCourthasexpresslyheldthatthedemocraticlegitimationwhichemanatesfromthevotersinthe
MemberStatesisrestrictedbythetransferofmonetarypolicypowerstoanindependentEuropeanCentralBank,and
thatthisaffectstheprincipleofdemocracy.Nevertheless,thisrestrictionisstillcompatiblewithdemocraticprinciples
becauseittakesthetestedandscientificallydocumentedspecialcharacterofmonetarypolicyintoaccountthatan

independentcentralbankismorelikelytosafeguardmonetarystability,andthusthegeneraleconomicbasisfor
budgetarypolicies,thanstatebodieswhoseactionsdependonmoneysupplyandvalueandwhichneedtorelyon
shorttermapprovalbypoliticalforces.TheconstitutionaljustificationoftheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentral
Bankis,however,limitedtoaprimarilystabilityorientedmonetarypolicyandcannotbetransferredtootherpolicy
areas(cf.fortheGermanConstitutionArt.88sentence2GGBVerfGE89,155<208and209>97,350<368>).
(2)TheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBankdoesnotprecludejudicialreviewwithregardtothe
60
delineationofitsmandate(ECJ,Judgmentof10July2003,CaseC11/00,Commissionv.ECB,ECR2003p.I
07147,n.135etseq.).TheindependenceguaranteedbyArt.130,Art.282sec.3sentences3and4TFEUonlyrefersto
theactualpowers(andtheirspecificcontent)thattheTreatiesconferontheEuropeanCentralBank,butdonotreferto
thedeterminationoftheextentandscopeofitsmandate.Itwouldbeincompatiblewiththeprincipleofconferral
(Art.5sec.2TEU)ifaninstitutionoftheEuropeanUnioncouldautonomouslydeterminethepowersassignedtoit.
Moreover,thedelimitationofpowersoftheEuropeanCentralBankcannotbeexemptfromjudicialreviewbecausethe
EuropeanCentralBankwouldotherwisehavetheopportunitytoexpanditsmandateatwill.
bb)PursuanttoArt.3sec.1lettercTFEU,theEuropeanUnionhastheexclusiveresponsibilityinthefieldof
61
monetarypolicyfortheMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyarea.TheTreatiesdonotdefinethetermmonetary
policy(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,CaseC370/12,Pringle,ECR2012,p.I0000,n.53).The
responsibilityinquestionis,however,substantiatedbytheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionandthe
ESCBStatute.
TheprimaryobjectiveoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksistomaintainpricestability(Art.127sec.1
62
sentence1,Art.282sec.2sentence2TFEU).ThebasictasksoftheSystemare,pursuanttoArt.127sec.2TFEU,to
defineandimplementthemonetarypolicyoftheUnion(firstindent),toconductforeignexchangeoperations(second
indent),toholdandmanagetheofficialforeignreservesoftheMemberStates(thirdindent),andtopromotethe
smoothoperationofpaymentsystems(fourthindent).TheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandthe
EuropeanCentralBankspecifies,inChapterIV,themonetaryfunctionsandoperationsoftheEuropeanSystemof
CentralBanksandauthorisesittoopenaccounts(Art.17ESCBStatute),toconductopenmarketandcreditoperations
(Art.18ESCBStatute),todefineminimumreserves(Art.19ESCBStatute),andtouseotherinstrumentsofmonetary
control(Art.20ESCBStatute).PursuanttoArt.22ESCBStatute,theEuropeanCentralBankandthenationalcentral
banksmayalsoprovidefacilities,andtheECBmayissueregulations,toensureefficientandsoundclearingand
paymentsystemswithintheUnionandwithothercountries.Art.23ESCBStatuteauthorisesthemtoenterinto
externaloperationswithothercountriesandinternationalorganisations,andArt.24ESCBStatuteauthorisesthemto
enterintootherauxiliaryfiscaloperations.
cc)Themonetarypolicyistobedistinguishedandtherebyfurtherdefinedaccordingtothewording,structure,
andpurposeoftheTreatiesfrom(inparticular)theeconomicpolicy,whichprimarilyfallsintotheresponsibilityof
theMemberStates.Relevanttothedelimitationaretheimmediateobjectiveofanact,whichistobedetermined
objectively,theinstrumentsenvisagedtoachievetheobjective,anditslinktootherprovisions(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof
27November2012,CaseC370/12,Pringle,ECR2012,p.I0000,n.53etseq.<summarisingatn.60>).

63

Asfarastheclassificationfromthepointofviewofthedistributionofpowersisconcerned,itisthuscrucial,first,
64
whethertheactdirectlypursueseconomicpolicyobjectives.InthePringlecase,theCourtofJusticehasaffirmed
thiswithregardtotheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,becauseitsaimisthestabilisationoftheeurocurrencyareaas
awhole.TheCourtofJusticehasheldthatsuchanactcouldnotbetreatedasequivalenttoanactofmonetarypolicy
forthesolereasonthatitmighthaveindirecteffectsonthestabilityoftheeuro(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November
2012,loc.cit.,n.56and97).Onthebasisofthiscaselaw,purchasesofgovernmentbondsmaynotqualifyasactsof
monetarypolicyforthesolereasonthattheyalsoindirectlypursuemonetarypolicyobjectives.
However,whatisrelevantisnotonlytheobjective,butalsotheinstrumentsusedforreachingtheobjectiveand
theireffects.AccordingtothecaselawoftheCourtofJustice,actsofmonetarypolicyare,forinstance,thedecision
onkeyinterestratesfortheeurocurrencyareaandthereleaseoftheeurocurrency(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27
November2012,loc.cit.,n.95and96).Incontrast,thegrantoffinancialassistanceclearlydoesnotfallwithin
monetarypolicy(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,loc.cit.,n.57).TothedegreethattheEuropeanSystemof
CentralBanksthusgrantsfinancialassistance,itpursuesaneconomicpolicythattheEuropeanUnionisprohibited
fromconducting.

65

Finally,itisrelevanthowtheactinquestionrelatestootherprovisions.Inparticular,referencesofanacttoother
66
provisionsandtheembeddingofanactinanoverallregulationthatconsistsofseveralindividualmeasurescan
indicateitsadherenceeithertotheeconomicorthemonetarypolicy.Thus,theCourtofJusticehasdecided,with
regardtotheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,thatDecision2011/199oftheEuropeanCouncilof25March2011,which
aimsattheconclusionoftheESMTreaty,becauseofitsreferencetotheeconomicprovisionsoftheTreatyonthe
FunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionaswellastothesecondarylegislationofthesocalledsixpack,hastoberegarded

asanadditionalpartofthenewregulatoryframeworktostrengthentheeconomicgovernanceoftheUnion,andthat
thisindicatesthattheEuropeanStabilityMechanismbelongstotheareaofeconomicpolicy(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27
November2012,loc.cit.,n.5860).
Thecontrolofbudgetarypolicyis,inanycase,notpartofmonetarypolicy.TheTreatiesenvisagetheintegrationof
67
theSystemofEuropeanCentralBanksintotheeconomicandbudgetarypolicyonlytoaverylimiteddegree,namely
duringahearinginanexcessivedeficitprocedure(Art.126,sec.14,subsec.2TFEU).Thesameappliesinsofaras
duringthefinancialandsovereigndebtcrisisprovisionshavebeenadoptedinsecondarylaw(cf.Art.11sec.3
Regulation(EU)No1175/2011oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof16NovemberamendingCouncil
Regulation(EC)No1466/97onthestrengtheningofthesurveillanceofbudgetarypositionsandthesurveillanceand
coordinationofeconomicpolicies,OJEUNoL306of23November2011,p.12<23>Art.13sec.3Regulation(EU)No
1176/2011oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof16November2011onthepreventionandcorrectionof
macroeconomicimbalances,OJEUNoL306of23November2011,p.25<31>Art.10asec.3CouncilRegulation(EU)
No1177/2011of8November2011amendingRegulation(EC)No1467/97onspeedingupandclarifyingthe
implementationoftheexcessivedeficitprocedure,OJEUNoL306of23November2011,p.33<39>)andoutsidethe
frameworkofEuropeanUnionlaw(cf.Art.12sec.1sentence2oftheTreatyonStability,CoordinationandGovernance
intheEconomicandMonetaryUnion)whichenablearepresentativeoftheEuropeanCentralBanktoparticipatein
monitoringmissionsofthesocalledTroika.This,however,hasobviouslynoeffectontheallocationofpowersbetween
theUnionandtheMemberStatesunderprimarylaw.
b)Rather,theresponsibilityforeconomicpolicyunderTitleVIIIoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropean
68
UnionliesifitreachesbeyondthespecialpowersexpresslyassignedtotheUnion(e.g.Art.121,122,126TFEU)
withtheMemberStates.Theyareresponsible,inparticular,fordefiningtheobjectivesandchoosingtheinstruments
ofeconomicpolicy(Art.5sec.1,Art.120etseq.TFEU).PursuanttoArt.2sec.3andArt.5sec.1TFEU,theroleofthe
Unionisrestrictedtotheadoptionofcoordinatingmeasures(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,loc.cit.,n.64).
TheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksisonlyauthorisedtosupportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheUniontothe
degreethatthisispossiblewithoutcompromisingtheobjectiveofpricestability(Art.119sec.2,Art.127sec.1
sentence2,Art.282sec.2sentence3TFEU).TheauthoritytosupportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesoftheMember
StatesatUnionlevel(Art.127sec.1sentence2TFEU)doesnotjustifyanysteeringofeconomicpoliciesbytheSystem
ofEuropeanCentralBanks.
c)Accordingtotheseprinciples,itislikelythattheOMTDecisionifonebasestheassessmentonitswordingis
69
notcoveredbythemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Basedonanoverallassessmentofthedelimitation
criteriathattheFederalConstitutionalCourtconsidersrelevant,itdoesnotconstituteanactofmonetarypolicy,buta
predominantlyeconomicpolicyact.Thisissupportedbyitsimmediateobjective(aa),itsselectivity(bb),the
parallelismwithassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStability
Mechanism(cc),andtheriskofunderminingtheirobjectivesandrequirements(dd).Therefore,itislikelythatthe
OMTDecisioncanalsonotbejustifiedasanacttosupporttheUnion'seconomicpolicy(ee).Againstthisbackground,
thereareconsiderabledoubtsconcerningitsvalidity.
aa)TheOMTDecisionaimstoneutralisespreadsongovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatesoftheeuro
currencyareawhichhaveemergedinthemarketsandwhichadverselyaffecttherefinancingoftheseMember
States(thusECB,MonthlyBulletinSeptember2012,p.7ECB,MonthlyBulletinOctober2012,pp.7and8).

70

AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,thesespreadsarepartlybasedonfeardeclaredtobeirrationalof
71
investorsofareversibilityoftheeuro.However,accordingtotheconvincingexpertiseoftheBundesbank,such
interestratespreadsonlyreflectthescepticismofmarketparticipantsthatindividualMemberStateswillshow
sufficientbudgetarydisciplinetostaypermanentlysolvent.PursuanttothedesignoftheTreatyontheFunctioningof
theEuropeanUnion,theexistenceofsuchspreadsisentirelyintended.AstheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion
haspointedoutinitsPringledecision,theyareanexpressionoftheindependenceofnationalbudgets,whichrelieson
marketincentivesandcannotbeloweredbybondpurchasesbycentralbankswithoutsuspendingthisindependence
(cf.withregardtoArt.125TFEUECJ,judgmentof27November2012,loc.cit.,n.135ECB,Statement[filedwiththe
FederalConstitutionalCourt]of16January2013,p.13:Theprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing<...>prohibits<...>
thesuspensionoftheindependenceofthenationalbudgetswhichreliesonmarketincentives).Inanycase,according
toexplanationsgivenbytheBundesbank,onecannotinpracticedivideinterestratespreadsintoarationalandan
irrationalpart(cf.alsoJahresgutachten2013/2014desSachverstndigenratesAnnualEconomicReport2013/14of
theGermanCouncilofEconomicExperts,n.200,onthesignificanceofessentialfactorsforyielddifferenceson
governmentbonds).
AsfortheEuropeanCentralBankclaimingtosafeguardthecurrentcompositionoftheeurocurrencyareawiththe
72
OMTDecision(cf.ECBPressReleaseof26July2012),thisisobviouslynotataskofmonetarypolicybutoneof
economicpolicy,whichremainsaresponsibilityoftheMemberStates.PursuanttoArt.140TFEU,thedecisionsonthe
compositionoftheeurocurrencyareaaretheresponsibilityoftheCouncil,theEuropeanParliament,theCommission

andtheMemberStatestheEuropeanCentralBankonlyhasarighttobeheardinthedecisionmakingprocess
concerningtheabrogationofthederogationspursuanttoArt.139TFEU,i.e.fortheaccessionofnewMemberStatesto
theeurocurrencyarea(Art.140sec.3TFEU).Followingthisdivisionofpowers,theMemberStateshavetakena
varietyofmeasuresinrecentyearstosafeguardtheeconomicandpoliticalconditionsforthelastingcohesionofthe
eurocurrencyarea.Theyhavegrantedeachotherbilateralassistance,setuptheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility
(cf.BVerfGE129,124<133and134>),andfinallycreatedtheEuropeanStabilityMechanismonthebasisofthenew
Art.136sec.3TFEU.ItsfundamentalobjectiveistopreventthereversibilityoftheEuroviaacombinationof
assistancemeasuresandreformrequirementsforindividualMemberStates(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November
2012,loc.cit.,n.56,60,96BVerfGE132,195<249>,n.130).TheEuroPlusPact(ConclusionsoftheEuropean
Councilof24/25March2011,EUCO10/11,annex1)andtheTreatyonStability,CoordinationandGovernanceinthe
EconomicandMonetaryUnion(BGBlII2012p.1006,pp.1008etseq.)servethispurpose,too.
bb)TheconclusionthattheOMTDecisionhasnomonetarypolicyobjectiveisfurthersuggestedbyitsselectivity.
73
UndertheguidelinesadoptedbytheEuropeanCentralBank,themonetarypolicyframeworkoftheEuropean
SystemofCentralBanksdoesgenerallynothaveatargetedapproach,whichwouldnecessarilydifferentiatebetween
individualMemberStates(AnnexIno.1.1oftheGuidelineoftheEuropeanCentralBankof20September2011on
monetarypolicyinstrumentsandproceduresoftheEurosystem<ECB/2011/14>,OJEUNoL331of14December
2011,p.1,asamendedbytheGuidelineoftheEuropeanCentralBankof26November2012amendingGuideline
ECB/2011/14onmonetarypolicyinstrumentsandproceduresoftheEurosystem<ECB/2012/25>,OJEUNoL348of
18December2012,p.30).Monetarymeasuressuchasthefixingofkeyinterestratesorthereserveratioare
applicabletoallMemberStatesandtheresidentcommercialbanksalike.Differenteffectsthatderivefromthese
measuresareaconsequenceoftheopenmarketeconomy,whichUnionlawpresupposes(Art.127sec.1sentence3
TFEU),andanindirecteffectthatcanbecontrolledbytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksonlytoalimiteddegree.
BecausetheOMTDecisionenvisagesatargetedpurchaseofgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStates,however,
thespreadsongovernmentbondsissuedbythesestatesarelevelledbychangesinmarketconditions,andthe
governmentbondsofotherMemberStatesareeventuallyplacedatadisadvantage.
cc)ThefactthattheOMTDecisionlinksthepurchaseofbondstotheeconomicpolicyconditionalityofassistance
74
programmesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)is
anotherargumentagainstcountingtheOMTDecisionamongthepowersassignedtotheEuropeanSystemofCentral
BanksbyArt.119sec.2,Art.127sec.1and2TFEU.
PursuanttotheOMTDecision,apurchaseofgovernmentbondsshallonlybeundertakenundertheconditionthat
75
theMemberStatethatbenefitsfullycomplieswiththeobligationsofanassistanceprogrammeoftheEuropean
FinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,whichenvisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbonds
ofthatMemberStateontheprimarymarket.Therespectiveobligationsoftheassistanceprogrammerelatenotonlyto
thegeneraleconomicandsocialpolicy,butespeciallytothefiscalpolicyoftheMemberStates.AsfollowsfromArt.126
TFEU,itis,however,fortheCommission(Art.126sec.2sentence1TFEU)ortheCouncil(Art.126sec.5tosec.14
TFEU)tomonitorthis.
ItparticularlyspeaksagainstacompatibilityoftheOMTDecisionwiththemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBank
thattheEuropeanCentralBankplanstoengage,withtheintendedpurchases,inanactivitywhichboththe
EuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility(Art.2sec.1letterb,Art.3sec.1,Art.10sec.5letteraoftheEFSFFramework
Agreement)andtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(Art.18ESMTreaty)performandwhichisastheCourtof
JusticeoftheEuropeanUnionhasheldinthePringlecase,becauseofitsobjectivesandmechanisms,anactivity
thatbelongstothefieldofeconomicpolicy(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,loc.cit.,n.60).

76

BytyingthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatestofullcompliancewiththerequirementsof
theassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityandtheEuropeanStabilityMechanismand
thusretainingitsownconscientiousexamination,theEuropeanCentralBankmakesthepurchaseofgovernment
bondsonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionaninstrumentofeconomicpolicy.Thisisalsoconfirmedbythefactthatit
planstorefrainfrombuyinggovernmentbondsiftheMemberStateconcerneddoesnotmeettheeconomicpolicy
conditions(anymore)(aslongasprogrammeconditionalityisfullyrespected,andterminatethemoncetheir
objectivesareachievedorwhenthereisnoncompliancewiththemacroeconomicadjustmentorprecautionary
programme).

77

ThepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatesthatisenvisagedbytheOMTDecision,andwhichis
unilaterallytiedtoeconomicpolicyconditionsoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStability
Mechanism,appears,inthiscontext,asthefunctionalequivalenttoanassistancemeasureoftheabovementioned
institutionsalbeitwithouttheirparliamentarylegitimationandmonitoring.

78

79

dd)TheapproachplannedbytheEuropeanCentralBankislikelytobypasstheconditionsandconditionalities
envisagedbythetworescuepackagesforpurchaseprogrammesofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarket
(bypassing).TheEuropeanStabilityMechanismcanonlyadoptasecondarymarketsupportfacilitywhenboththe
generalrequirementsforthegrantingofstabilitysupportunderArt.12sec.1oftheESMTreatyaremet
(indispensabilitytosafeguardthefinancialstabilityoftheeurocurrencyareaasawholeandofitsMemberStates),
andincaseofexceptionalfinancialmarketcircumstancesandriskstofinancialstability(Art.18sec.2oftheESM
Treaty,Art.1oftheGuidelineontheSecondaryMarketSupportFacility).Thereisalsoastricterconditionality
towardsthestatesconcernedcorrespondingwiththis:While,forinstance,anEnhancedConditionsCreditLineis
alreadyanoptioniftheMemberStatetakescertaincorrectivemeasures(cf.Art.2sec.4oftheGuidelineon
PrecautionaryFinancialAssistance),aSecondaryMarketSupportFacilityrequiresthattheMemberStateeither
subjectsitselftoamacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammeoratleastmeetsanumberofstrictcriteria(cf.Art.2ofthe
GuidelineontheSecondaryMarketSupportFacility).Thus,pursuanttoArt.18oftheESMTreaty,theEuropean
StabilityMechanismmayonlypurchasegovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketinanacutecrisisandwithin
narrowlimits,whileprecautionaryfinancialassistanceunderArt.14oftheESMTreatyismeanttopreventprecisely
suchcrisesandisthusgrantedunderconsiderablymoregenerousterms.TheOMTDecisiondoesnotenvisagesimilar
conditionsforactionsbytheEuropeanCentralBank.
ee)IntheviewoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,thepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthebasisoftheOMT
DecisionexceedsthesupportofthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheEuropeanUnionthattheEuropeanSystemof
CentralBanksisallowedtopursue(Art.119sec.2,Art.127sec.1sentence2TFEU).

80

First,thevolumeofassistancemeasures,whichisakeyaspectforthedecisionsoftheEuropeanStability
81
Mechanism,coulddefactobeconsiderablybroadened,andpotentiallyevenmultiplied,throughparallelpurchasesof
governmentbondsbytheEurosystem.IfthemembersoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismagreeonacertainvolume
ofassistanceanditsconditions,thisdecisioncouldbethwartediftheEurosystemunilaterallyincreasedtheassistance
volumesignificantly.Thiscannotbequalifiedassupport.
Ontheotherhand,duetotheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBankaslaiddowninArt.130TFEU,the
82
CounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankwantsto,andmust,decideindependently,andultimatelywithoutbeingtied
tothedecisionsoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,whether,towhat
extent,andunderwhichconditionsitmaypurchasegovernmentbondsinselectedcases(Decisionof6September
2012:infulldiscretion)and/ortostopapurchasingprogrammethatithadstarted.Thisinevitablyrequires
independenteconomicassessmentswhichmustnotmerelyretracethedecisionsoftheCommission,thesocalled
Troikaorotherinstitutions,andwhich,forthisreasonalone,extendsbeyondameresupportoftheeconomicpolicy
intheUnion.
TheFederalConstitutionalCourtholdstheviewthatthepurchasesenvisagedbytheOMTDecisioncouldonlybe
83
consideredassupportofeconomicpolicyassistancemeasuresundertheresponsibilityoftheMemberStateswithin
theframeworkoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityandtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(Art.119sec.2,
Art.127sec.1sentence2TFEU),iftheirvolumesweresolimitedthatparallelassistanceprogrammesoftheMember
Statesandtheirunderlyingpoliticaldecisionscouldnotbethwarted.Thefactuallimitationofthevolumeofbond
purchasesbytheamountofthegovernmentbondsissuedalreadyinthecurrentlyscheduledmaturityspectrumofone
tothreeyearshighlightedbytheEuropeanCentralBankintheproceedingsbeforetheFederalConstitutionalCourt
isnotlikelytosufficientlyensureanadequatequantitativelimitation.Bychangingtheirrefinancingpolicies,the
MemberStatesthatbenefitcanincreasethevolumeofgovernmentbondsthatarecurrentlycoveredbytheOMT
DecisionitisunclearwhatwouldfollowfromtheEuropeanCentralBanksintentiontoobservetheemission
behaviourofindividualMemberStates.Inadditiontothis,thepurchaseswouldalsohavetobeapprovedonthe
meritsandlegitimisedbytheMemberStates.
2.ViolationoftheProhibitionofMonetaryFinancingoftheBudget
TheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetenshrinedinArt.123TFEUalsoincludesaprohibitionof
bypassing(a).TheOMTDecisionislikelytoviolatethisprohibitionaswell(b).

84

a)Art.123TFEUandArt.21.1.ESCBStatuteforbidthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsdirectlyfromtheemitting
85
MemberStates,i.e.thepurchaseontheprimarymarket.Thisprohibitionis,however,notlimitedtothis
interdiction,butisanexpressionofabroaderprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudget(cf.Borger,German
LawJournal2013,p.113<119,134>deGregorioMerino,CMLR2012,p.1613<1625,footnote36,1627>
Lenaerts/vanNuffel,EuropeanUnionLaw,3rded.2011,n.11037).Unionlawrecognisesthelegalconceptof
bypassingasdothenationallegalsystems.Itisultimatelybasedontheprincipleofeffectiveness(effetutile)andhas
repeatedlybeenalludedtointheCourtofJusticesjurisprudence(cf.mostrecentlyECJ,Judgmentof20June2013
CaseC259/12,RodopiM91,ECR2013,p.I0000,n.41).

b)Alsointhepresentcontext,theCourtofJusticehas(inthePringlecase)largelyfocusedontheobjectivepursued 86
bytheprovisionfortheinterpretationofArt.125TFEU(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,CaseC370/12,
Pringle,ECR2012,p.I0000,n.133)andthusconductedateleologicalinterpretation.Itseemsobviousthatthismust
alsoapplytotheinterpretationofArt.123TFEU,andthattheprohibitionofthepurchaseofgovernmentbonds
directlyfromtheissuingMemberStatesmaynotbecircumventedbyfunctionallyequivalentmeasures.Council
Regulation(EC)No3603/93(7threcitaloftheCouncilRegulation(EC)No3603/93of13December1993,OJECNoL
332of31December1993,p.1),whichisprimarilyaddressedtotheMemberStates,andtotheEuropeanCentralBank
itself(ECB,MonthlyBulletinOctober2012,p.8),doesassumethis,too.
c)Inadditiontotheabovementionedaspects,namelytheneutralisationofinterestratespreads(n.67etseq.),
87
selectivity(n.70),andtheparallelismwithEFSFandESMassistanceprogrammes(n.71etseq.),thefollowing
aspectsatleastwhentakentogetheralsoindicatethattheOMTDecisionaimsatacircumventionofArt.123TFEU
andviolatestheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudget:Thewillingnesstoparticipateinadebtcutwith
regardtothepurchasedbonds(aa),theincreasedriskofsuchadebtcutregardingthepurchasedgovernmentbonds
(bb),theoptiontokeepthepurchasedgovernmentbondstomaturity(cc),theinterferencewiththepriceformation
onthemarket(dd),andtheencouragementofmarketparticipantstopurchasethebondsinquestionontheprimary
market(ee).
aa)IftheEurosystem(partially)waivedsecuritisedclaimsagainstindividualMemberStatesoftheeurocurrency
88
areathatarecontainedingovernmentbonds,thiswouldamounttoanillegalmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetof
thesecountries.ItisnotplannedfortheEurosystemtomaintainapreferredcreditorstatuswithregardtothe
governmentbondsthataretobepurchasedonthebasisoftheOMTDecision.Thisessentiallymeansthatthe
Eurosystemwouldhavetoparticipateinadebtcutadoptedbythemajorityofcreditors(Art.12sec.3oftheESM
Treaty),andthatitwouldhavetorenouncea(substantial)partofthesecuritisedclaimscontainedinthepurchased
governmentbondsinsuchacase.ThisisnotlikelytobecompatiblewithArt.123TFEU.Atleastifapurchasecontains,
fromtheoutset,theprospectofsubsequentlybecomingpartofapotentialdebtcut,onecannot,consideringthe
regulatorypurposeofArt.123sec.1TFEU,establisharelevantdifferencebetweenwaivingtherepaymentobligation
fromaloanandprovidingfundsthatareaprioriirrevocableandnottiedtoanyperformance.
bb)Apurchaseofgovernmentbondsthatcarryanincreasedriskoffailureorevenofadebtcutislikelytoviolate
89
theprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing,too.AsthepredecessorprogrammeSMPalsoindicates(Decisionofthe
EuropeanCentralBankof14May2010establishingasecuritiesmarketsprogramme<ECB/2010/5>,OJEUNoL124
of20May2010,p.8),itisplannedthat,basedontheOMTDecision,theEurosystempurchasesgovernmentbonds
whichcarryanincreasedriskoffailurebecauseoftheirlowercreditratingatthesametime,thebanksinthe
participatingstatesshallbeabletodischargetheseriskysecurities.Indoingso,theEurosystemwouldnotonlytake
overthefunctionofabadbankforthebanksintheparticipatingstatesitwouldalsoindirectlycontributetothe
financingoftheirbudgets.ThoughtherearenoprovisionsunderUnionlawthatcompletelyprohibittheEurosystem
fromenteringintopotentiallylossmakingmonetarypolicyoperations,theprovisionsconcerningthecompensationof
lossesoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankssuchasArt.33.2.ESCBStatuteshowthattheiractivitiescanalways
entaillossesandthatthelegislaturehasgenerallyapprovedofthispossibility.However,this,accordingtothe
considerationsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,doesnotincludetheauthorisationtotakelargeandunnecessary
risksoflosses.
cc)Toholdgovernmentbondstomaturitymay,undercertainconditions,alsocollidewiththeprohibitionof
90
monetaryfinancingofthebudget(Art.123sec.1TFEUinterferencewiththemarketlogic).ItistruethatArt.18.1.
firstindentESCBStatuteallowstheEurosystemtheoutrightpurchaseofmarketableinstruments.Apurchaseof
governmentbondsthataremostlyheldtomaturitybytheEurosystemcan,however,haveanimpactonmonetary
financingofthebudget.Inparticular,ifasubstantialamountofthegovernmentbondsissuedbyselectedMember
Statesispermanentlyremovedfromthemarket,certaineffectsthatresultfromthesaleofthebondspriortomaturity
cannotoccur.TheEurosystemwouldinsuchacasenotonlypreventanunbiasedpricedeterminationitwouldalso
contributetothefinancingoftherespectivebudgets.Ifgovernmentbondsareheldtomaturity,thisresultsinanycase
inashortageofthesupplyofbondscirculatingonthesecondarymarket,whichmayamounttoacircumventionof
Art.123TFEU.
TheOMTDecisionrelatestogovernmentbondswithamaturityofonetothreeyears.Itcontainsnoprovisions
91
regardingthequestionofhowlongthebondsacquiredundertheprogrammearetobeheld,andthusdoesnot
excludethepossibilitythattheyaretakenfromthemarketuntilmaturity.ThatthisisanoptionundertheDecision,
especiallyinordertopreventoratleastdelaythedisclosureoflossesactuallyincurredonthebalancesheet,follows
fromtheaccountingrulesenactedbytheCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBank,whichrequirethatthepurchasecosts
andnotthecurrentmarketpricesareusedwhenincludinggovernmentbonds(cf.recital1andannexIV,balancesheet

itemassets7.1,oftheGuidelineoftheEuropeanCentralBankof17July2009amendingGuidelineECB/2006/16on
thelegalframeworkforaccountingandfinancialreportingintheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanks<ECB/2009/18>,
OJEUNoL202of4August2009,p.65).
dd)Itcanbeanotherindicationforacircumventionoftheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetif
governmentbondsarepurchasedonthesecondarymarkettoaconsiderableextentandshortlyaftertheiremission
bytheEurosystem(marketpricing).

92

ee)SimilareffectscanalsobecausedbyannouncementsoftheCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankonthisissue
(encouragementtopurchasenewlyissuedsecurities).Theannouncementofimminentpurchasesofgovernment
bondsofselectedMemberStatespriortoanewemissioncanindependentlyofmarketconditionscauseprivate
andinstitutionalfirsttakerstodowhatArt.123sec.1TFEUdoesnotallowtheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksto
do.ByprovidingfirsttakerswiththeprospectthattheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankswillassumethefinancial
riskassociatedwiththisacquisition,abypassingofArt.123sec.1TFEUseemsobvious.

93

TheOMTDecisionandtheaccompanyingcommunicationoftheCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBank(cf.ECB
PressReleaseof26July2012,PresidentoftheEuropeanCentralBankMarioDraghi,

94

http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
[http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html]
)encouragethirdpartiestopurchasethegovernmentbondsatissueontheprimarymarketbyprovidingtheprospect
ofassumingtheriskassociatedwiththeacquisition.Itistruethatnodetailsareprovidedregardingthevolumeof
potentialpurchasesortherequiredtimelagbetweentheemissionandthepotentialacquisitionsbytheEurosystem.
YetitseemedalsoclearattheoralhearingbeforetheFederalConstitutionalCourton11and12June2013,thatthe
announcementneverthelessgavethemarketparticipantstheimpressionthattheEurosystemwouldinanycasebe
availableasalenderoflastresortforthegovernmentbondsinquestion.Thisisnotlikelytobecompatiblewith
Art.123sec.1TFEU.
3.IrrelevanceofaReferencetoaDisruptiontotheMonetaryPolicyTransmissionMechanism
IntheviewoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theobjectivementionedbytheEuropeanCentralBanktojustifythe
OMTDecision,namelytocorrectadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanism,canneitherchange
theabovementionedtransgressionoftheEuropeanCentralBanksmandate,northeviolationoftheprohibitionof
monetaryfinancingofthebudget.

95

Thefactthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondscan,undercertainconditions,helptosupportthemonetarypolicy
96
objectivesoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksdoesnotturntheOMTDecisionitselfintoanactofmonetary
policy.Inthisrespect,italsoappliesviceversawhattheCourtofJusticehassaidregardingtheallocationofassistance
measuresoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(cf.ECJ,Judgmentof27November2012,CaseC370/12,Pringle,
ECR2012,p.I0000,n.56).The(economic)accuracyorplausibilityofthereasonsfortheOMTDecisionareirrelevant
inthisrespect.
Moreover,onecanexpectasignificantdeteriorationofthemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanisminvirtually
97
everydebtcrisisofastate.Acriticaldeteriorationofthesolvencyofastatetypicallycoincideswithacorresponding
deteriorationofthesolvencyofthenationalbankingsector(socalledbankstatenexus).Asaresult,inthissituation,
thelendingpracticesofthebankstendtohardlyreflectthereductionsinthekeyinterestrateanymorethemonetary
policytransmissionmechanismisdisrupted.Ifpurchasesofgovernmentbondswereadmissibleeverytimethe
monetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisdisrupted,itwouldamounttograntingtheEuropeanCentralBankthe
powertoremedyanydeteriorationofthecreditratingofaeuroareaMemberStatethroughthepurchaseofthatstates
governmentbonds.Thiswouldsuspendtheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudget.
Finally,itseemsirrelevantinthisregardthattheEuropeanCentralBankonlyintendstoassumeadisruptiontothe 98
monetarypolicytransmissionmechanismiftheamountoftherefinancinginterestofaMemberStateoftheeuro
currencyareawereirrational.Spreadsalwaysonlyresultfromthemarketparticipantsexpectationsandare,
regardlessoftheirrationality,essentialformarketbasedpricing.Tosingleoutandneutralisesupposedlyidentifiable
individualcauseswouldbetantamounttoanarbitraryinterferencewithmarketactivity(cf.aboven.88).Ultimately,
thedistinctionbetweenrationalandirrationalismeaninglessinthiscontextandcaninanycasenotbe
operationalised.
4.PossibilityofanInterpretationinConformityWithUnionLaw
TheFederalConstitutionalCourtbelievesthattheseconcernsregardingthevalidityoftheOMTDecision,basedon
theinterpretationusedhere,couldbemetbyaninterpretationinconformitywithUnionlaw.Thiswouldrequire
thatthecontentoftheOMTDecision,whencomprehensivelyassessedandevaluated,essentiallycomplieswiththe

99

abovementionedconditions.
IntheviewoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theOMTDecisionmightnotbeobjectionableifitcould,inthelight 100
ofArt.119andArt.127etseq.TFEU,andArt.17etseq.oftheESCBStatute,beinterpretedorlimitedinitsvalidity
insuchawaythatitwouldnotunderminetheconditionalityoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancial
StabilityFacilityandtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(cf.n.72etseq.7779etseq.),andwouldonlybeofa
supportivenaturewithregardtotheeconomicpoliciesintheUnion(cf.n.68etseq.7179etseq.).Thisrequires,in
lightofArt.123TFEU,thatthepossibilityofadebtcutmustbeexcluded(cf.n.86and87),thatgovernmentbondsof
selectedMemberStatesarenotpurchaseduptounlimitedamounts(cf.n.81),andthatinterferenceswithprice
formationonthemarketaretobeavoidedwherepossible(cf.n.88etseq.).Statementsbytherepresentativesofthe
EuropeanCentralBankintheproceedingsbeforetheConstitutionalCourtconcerningtheframeworkforthe
implementationoftheOMTDecision(limitedvolumeofapossiblepurchaseofgovernmentbondsnoparticipationin
adebtcutobservanceofcertaintimelagsbetweentheemissionofagovernmentbondanditspurchasenoholdingof
thebondstomaturity)suggestthatsuchaninterpretationinconformitywithUnionlawwouldalsomostlikelybe
compatiblewiththemeaningandpurposeoftheOMTDecision.

C.IntheAlternative,QuestionsReferredforaPreliminaryRulingontheInterpretationof
VariousProvisionsofUnionLaw
ConsideringtheobligationoftheFederalConstitutionalCourttograntpreventivelegalprotection,the
101
interpretationofUnionlawisalsorelevantfortheoutcomeofthelegaldisputeathandshouldtheCourtofJustice
notqualifytheOMTDecisionasasuitablesubjectforareferralunderArt.267sec.1letterbTFEU.Theresponsibility
withrespecttoEuropeanintegrationoftheFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagwouldalsoapplywith
regardtoultraviresactsthathavemerelybeenannounced,butthecontentofwhichisalreadysufficientlydefined.
TheFederalConstitutionalCourtwouldthenhavetoanswerthepreliminaryquestionwhetherimplementationofthe
OMTDecisionwouldbecompatiblewithUnionlaw.Tothisend,theFederalConstitutionalCourtsubmitstotheCourt
ofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniontheabovementionedauxiliaryquestionsontheinterpretationofArt.119,123,and
127TFEU,andofArt.17to24oftheESCBStatute.

D.
WhetherthebudgetaryautonomyoftheGermanBundestag,whichisguaranteedbyArt.20sec.1and2in
102
conjunctionwithArt.79sec.3GG,anditsoverallbudgetaryresponsibilitycanbeaffectedbytheOMTDecisionor
itsimplementationwithregardtopossiblelossesoftheBundesbank,isnotclearlyforeseeableatpresent.TheOMT
DecisioncouldviolatetheconstitutionalidentityoftheBasicLawifitcreatedamechanismwhichwouldamounttoan
assumptionofliabilityfordecisionsofthirdpartieswhichentailconsequencesthataredifficulttocalculate(cf.
BVerfGE129,124<179etseq.>),sothat,duetothismechanism,theGermanBundestagwouldnotremainthe
masterofitsdecisionsandcouldnolongerexerciseitsbudgetaryautonomyunderitsownresponsibility(cf.
BVerfGE129,124<177>132,195<239>).WhetherthisisthecasedependsonthecomplianceoftheOMTDecision
withthemandateassignedtotheEuropeanCentralBank,andonitscontentandscopeasinterpretedinconformity
withprimarylawincompliancewiththismandate.TheSenatewillhavetodecideonthisonthebasisoftheanswers
giventothequestionsitreferredforapreliminaryruling.
Atpresent,itisnotforeseeablewhetherinadditiontothis,throughindividualimplementationmeasuresofthe
103
OMTDecisionandwithregardtopossiblelossesoftheBundesbankandensuingeffectsonthefederalbudget,
consequencesforthebudgetaryautonomyoftheGermanBundestagcouldariseinawaythataffectsArt.79sec.3GG.
Ifnecessary,theSenatewouldhavetoexaminethisonthebasisoftheCourtofJusticesinterpretationoftheOMT
Decisionwithoutanotherquestionreferredforapreliminaryruling,anditwouldhavetodeterminethe
inapplicabilityoftherespectiveactofimplementationinGermany,becausetheidentityreviewisnottobeassessed
accordingtoUnionlawbutexclusivelyaccordingtoGermanconstitutionallaw.

E.
Pursuantto33sec.BVerfGG,theproceduresshallbesuspendedpendingthedecisionoftheCourtofJusticeof
theEuropeanUnion.Aftercompletionoftheproceedingsforapreliminaryruling,theFederalConstitutionalCourt
willresumetheproceedingsexofficio.

104

F.
Thedecisionwastakenwith6:2votes.

105

Vokuhle

LbbeWolff

Gerhardt

Landau

Huber

Hermanns

Mller

KessalWulf

DissentingOpinion
ofJusticeLbbeWolff
ontheOrderoftheSecondSenateof14January2013
2BvR2728/13
2BvR2729/13
2BvR2730/13
2BvR2731/13
2BvE13/13
Inanefforttosecuretheruleoflaw,acourtmayhappentoexceedjudicialcompetence.Inmyview,thishasoccurred
here.Themotionsshouldhavebeenrejectedasinadmissible.

I.
Iskipmydoubtsastothewhetherthesummaryinterpretationofthepresentactionsasbeing,allofthem,atleast
2
interaliadirectedagainstparliamentaryandgovernmentalinactionwithrespecttotheECBsOMTdecisionis
correct,astowhethertheiradmissibilitycanbejudgedsufficientlyonthebasisofthissummary,generalising
interpretation,andastowhethertheSenatecomplieswithitsobligationtostatereasonsintreatingthemotions
insofarastheyaredirectedagainstparliamentaryandgovernmentalinactionasadmissiblewithoutpresenting,and
dealingwith,therelevantobjectionsraisedbyBundestagandFederalGovernment.
Atanyrate,whattheplaintiffs,insofarastheyturnagainstfederalinactionwithrespecttotheOMTdecision,petition
theFederalConstitutionalCourttoordergoes,inmyview,beyondthelimitsofjudicialcompetenceunderthe
principlesofdemocracyandseparationofpowers.

Thedemarcationoftheselimitsisopentodebate.Theremayalsobegoodreasonsforcontroversyoverthequestion
whichofthevarioustechniquestoavoidoverstrainingjudicialpower(politicalquestiondoctrines,othercriteriaof
admissibility,recognitionofmarginsofappreciationorapplicationofotherrestrainedstandardsofreview)is
applicableinagivencase.UnderGermanlaw,whichhassofarbeeninterpretedasnotcontainingapoliticalquestion
doctrine,suchcontroversywillconcernthechoicebetweenadmissibilitycriteriaandreducedintensityofreviewas
instrumentsofjudicialrestraint.

Ajudgeconsideringthelimitsofjusticiabilitytransgressedwillthereforetypicallynotbeabletoinvokeclear
standardsinsupportofthatclaim.Imustadmitthatthisissointhepresentcase,butIdothinkthatsomeguidelines
canbederivedfromtheprinciplesofdemocracy,separationofpowersandtheruleoflaw.Tomentiononlythose
whichhaveabearingonthecaseathand:

1.Thelimitsofreasonablegovernancebyrulesmustberespected,becauseundertheprinciplesofdemocracyand
separationofpowers,decisionsbyjudgesatwhomthecitizenscannot,eitherdirectlyorindirectly,comebackby
exercisingtheirrighttovotearejustifiableonlyasdecisionsaccordingtolegalrules.

2.Theneedfordeterminativelegalstandards,eveniftheybejustjudgemadestandardsfromearliercaselaw,grows
withtheimportanceofthedecisiontobemade.Thejudicialbranchofgovernmentwillnotworkwithoutacreative
element.Butthemorefarreaching,themoreweighty,themoreirreversiblelegallyandfactuallythepossible
consequencesofajudicialdecision,themorejudicialrestraintisappropriatewhere,duetovagueness,the
legitimatingforceofexistinglegalrulesappearsfeeble.

3.Indeterminingthereachofjudicialcompetence,thereachofjudicialpowertoimplementshouldbeconsidered.
Thisisnotjustapragmaticmaximservingtoavoidlossesofauthoritythatmightendangertheproperfunctioningof
acourt,butalsoalegalimperative,sincefromthemeansofpowervestedornotvestedinacourtorinthecourtsin
generalbyconstitutionalandotherstatutoryrules,inferencescanbedrawnastointendedcompetences.

4.Themorejudicialrestraintisrequired,themorepreferableisittoexercisesuchrestraintbywayofrefusaltogo
intothemerits(politicalquestiondoctrine,criteriaofadmissibility)ratherthanbywayofapplyingrestrained
standardsofreview(recognitionofmarginsofappreciation,substantiveobviousnesscriteriaandthelike).Thatis

becausetheformerpathisthepathofgreaterrestraint.Dealingwiththesubstanceofthecaseisaltogetheravoided
here,whilethemereapplicationofrestrainedstandardsofreviewwilltypicallyresultinsomekindofbenediction,
althoughreducedinscope,oftheobjectofjudicialreview.
5.Itshouldbekeptinmindthatthelimitsofjusticiabilityarenotnecessarilythesamefornationaland
10
transnationalcourts,butmaydivergeinvaryingdirections,dependingonthenatureofthecasebecause
nationalandtransnationalcourtsdifferinthesourcesoflegitimacyoftheiroperation,notablyinthelegalbasesoftheir
competenceandimplementingpower.
II.
Theseguidelinessuggestinadmissibilityofthepresentmotions.Theydosoregardlessofthefactthatsofar,nothing
11
butareferralofsomequestionsandproposedanswerstotheCourtofJusticehasbeeneffected.Bytreatingthe
motionsasadmissible,atleastinthegeneralisinginterpretationgiventothem,theSenatedeclaresitselfcompetent
andobligedtomakeadecisiononthemeritslater,beitafterthereferredquestionshavebeenansweredbytheCourt
ofJustice,orbeitaftertheCourtofJusticehasrejectedtheSenatesofferofdialoguebyholdingthereferral
inadmissible.ThelatterpossibilityisnottoberuledoutsincebecauseofthelastwordclaimedbytheFederal
ConstitutionalCourtundercertainconditions(cf.n.21etseq.,27etseq.),theanswersgivenbytheCourtofJustice
wouldbeonlypotentiallyrelevanttotheFederalConstitutionalCourtsfinaldecision.
1.HowBundestagandFederalGovernmentaretoreacttoaviolation,martialornonmartial,ofGermansovereign
rightsisaquestionthatcannotreasonablybyansweredbyrulesmakingcertainpredeterminedpositiveactions
mandatory.Selectingfromthevarietyofpossiblereactions(see2.below)canonlybeamatterofpoliticaldiscretion
(cf.dissentingopinionofmycolleagueMichaelGerhardt).

12

2.Accordingly,itcomesasnosurprisethatnosuchrulesaredetectableeitherinthetextoftheconstitutionorinthe
caselawinterpretingit.Thatwouldalreadyseemawkwardinmoreinnocuouscases.Giventheenormousstakesin
thepresentcase,adecisiononthemeritsisunacceptableonsuchanairybasis.

13

Theotherwisenotorioustendencyoftheoverburdened,reliefseekingFederalConstitutionalCourttocultivateand
extendadmissibilityhurdlesinconstitutionalcomplaintcasesisgenerallyabsentinmattersofEuropean
integration.However,theSenatesreadinesstohearcomplaintsinthisfieldhasneverbeenextendedasfarasinthe
presentcase.

14

Accordingtoanoriginallybold,nowestablisheddoctrineoftheCourtscaselaw,everysingleGermancitizencan,
15
subjecttocertainconditions,seizetheFederalConstitutionalCourtonthebasisofArt.38sec.1GG(righttovote)
withachallengeoflegislationwhichpositivelytransfersGermansovereignrightstotheEuropeanUnion(cf.BVerfGE
89,155<171etseq.>123,267<330etseq.>).Withoutadmittingtoanyinnovation,itwasrecentlyheldthatthesame
appliestolegislationoninternationaltreatiessubmittingtheexerciseofsovereignrightstootherbondsandinfluences
(cf.BVerfGE129,124<168>).
Itisnotinconsistentthatwhile,sofar,onlyadiminutionofcompetencesoftheBundestagthatwouldruncounterto 16
theprinciplesprotectedbytheeternityclauseofArt.79sec.3GG(socalledconstitutionalidentity)hadbeen
16
consideredaschallengeableonthebasisofArt.38sec.1GG(cf.BVerfGE129,124<167etseq.>132,195<234et
seq.>cf.also,forcorrespondingclaimsofparliamentarygroupsinOrganstreitproceedings,BVerfGE123,267<338
etseq.>),theSenatenowholdsthatArt.38sec.1GGalsoallowstoaddresstheFederalConstitutionalCourtwiththe
assertionofaqualifiedultraviresact(n.44etseq.,53)whichdoesnotnecessarilyincludeaviolationofconstitutional
identity.Theearliercasesmentioneddidnotraisetheultraviresquestionbecauseonlylegislativetransfers,or
approvalsofconventionaryrestrictions,ofsovereignrightshadbeensubmittedtoscrutiny.However,theadmissionof
challengesofultraviresactsbasedonArt.38sec.1GGisanoveltywithoutabasisinearliercaselaw.
AnevenmoreblatantinnovationforwhichtheCourtcannotrelyondeterminativestandardsfrompreviouscaselaw 17
liesintheassumptionthatunderspecifiedconditionsnotonlyactsofGermanfederalorganswhichpositively
transferorrestrictsovereignrights,butalsomereinactioninthefaceofqualifiedtransgressionsonthepartofthe
EuropeanUnioncanbechallengedonthebasisofArt.38sec.1GGor,iftheapplicantisaparliamentarygroup,onthe
basisoftheconstitutionalrightsoftheBundestag.
Withthisassumption,theSenatedepartsfromearliercaselaw,justrecentlycorroborated,accordingtowhich
18
parliamentaryorgovernmentalinactioniscontestableinconstitutionalcomplaintproceedingsonlyifthe
complainantcanrelyonanexplicitconstitutionalmandatesubstantiallyspecifyingthecontentandreachofthealleged
dutytoact(cf.BVerfGE129,124<176>,withfurtherreferences).WithrespecttoOrganstreitchallengesofinaction,
too,theSenatehasjustrecentlyrepeatedthattheyareadmissibleonlyifdirectedagainstaspecificomission(cf.

BVerfG,decisionoftheSecondSenateof17September20132BvE6/08,2BvR2436/10juris,n.158BVerfGE
131,152<190>121,135<151>118,244<257>),i.e.againsttheomissionofaspecificactionwhichcanarguablybe
presentedasconstitutionallyimperative.
Interpretableastherequirementsofexplicitnessoftheconstitutionalmandateandofspecificityofthe
constitutionallyimperativeactionmaybe,theyarecertainlynotmetinthiscase.Indeed,thepresentorderfor
referralshiesawayfromclearlyspecifyingtheactionthatwouldbeduewithrespecttotheOMTdecisionshouldthis
decisionturnouttobeultraviresortoviolatetheGermanConstitutioninitscorecontent(identity).

19

Possiblereactionsrangefrommoreorlessinconsequentialcommunicativebehaviour,forinstanceexpressionsof
20
disapprovalofthekindChancellorAdenaueronceusedtocommentonwhathedeemedanarrogationof
competencebytheFederalConstitutionalCourt(Thataintwhaweimagined!),viaactionbeforetheCourtof
Justice(aspostulatedbycomplainantI.),negotiatingeffortsofallkindsorapartialblockadeofOMTactionbymeans
ofESMandEFSFvotingrights(asadvocatedbyapplicantV.)toanexitfromthemonetaryunion(forthelatter
possibilityseeBVerfGE89,155<204>97,350<369>123,267<350,396>129,124<181and182>132,195<236
and237>,n.215).Evenifthechoicefromthisarrayofoptionswerereasonablydeterminablebylegalrules,whichitis
not,suchruleswouldatanyratebemissinginGermanconstitutionallaw.
Moreover,thenotionthatamereomissionofcertaingovernmentalbehaviourontheUnionlevellikee.g.the
omissiontoworktowardsachangeoftreatythatwouldadaptthelawtoECBbehaviour(cf.n.49)canbeaproper
objectofconstitutionalcomplaintwouldseemtostandinstrangecontrasttorecentcaselawaccordingtowhicheven
positiveactsofgovernmentalcooperationinEUdecisionsorinintergovernmentaldecisionsrelatedtotheUnionwill
notbeexamined(cf.BVerfGE129,124<174and175>).

21

Accordington.53oftheorderforreferral,theSenateholdsitactionablethatBundestagandFederalGovernment
22
dealwiththequestionofhowtheallocationofcompetencescanberestored,andcometoapositivedecisioninthis
matter.Idoubtthatanyofthemotionscanbeinterpretedasbeingdirectedagainsttheomissionofanopenended
governmentalorparliamentarydebate.Inrelationtothespecifiedobjectsofchallenge,thisisnotaminusbutanaliud
.Apartfromthat,wheretheFederalConstitutionalCourtfindsitselfunabletoidentifyspecificdecisionsasmandatory
undertheConstitution,itisinmyviewnotentitledtoorder,asanalternativeorasapreliminarytofurtherobligations
notyetspecified,thatparliamentorothersupremeorgansconductadebate.UnderGermanconstitutionallaw,certain
welldefinedtypesofdecisionscanonlybemadebyparliament(cf.BVerfGE131,88<121>130,318<345etseq.>
126,55<69f.>,eachwithfurtherreferences),butthereisnorequirementofparliamentaryorgovernmentalbluesky
debate.
TheSenateprobablydoesnotenvisagesuchdealingwiththematterastheonlyreactionthatBundestagand
23
FederalGovernmentcanbesuedtodisplayinreactiontoqualifiedultraviresactsorviolationsofconstitutional
identitybytheECB.Notes44and50suggestthatotherreactionsmaybedemandable.Itremainsunclear,however,
whatfurtherstepscanbeclaimed(exitfromthemonetaryunion,too?)andhowtheyhavetobetaken(alternatively?
cumulatively?successively?inwhichorder?).Thisisonlytoounderstandableinviewofthelackoflegalsourcesfrom
whichanswerstothesequestionsmightflow.Butthenoneoughttorefusebeingsentongranddeserttoursthatwill
notleadtoanyspring.
3.Evenifthiscasewerenotaparticularlyinappropriateoccasionfortwistsinthecaselaw,thepresentdifficulty
24
theproblemthatthestepstobetakenbyBundestagandFederalGovernmentintheeventofaqualifiedviolationof
Germansovereignrightsarenotreasonablydeterminablebylegalrulescouldnotbeoutrunnedintojusticiable
terrainbydroppingtheabovementionedcriterionofspecificityoftheactthatshouldhavebeenperformed,i.e.by
admittingconstitutionalcomplaintsandOrganstreitmotionsagainstinactionwithoutthatprerequisite.Thisappears
tobetheSenatescoursewhen,positinganunspecifieddutytoworktowardsrecoveryofasovereignrightthathas
beenviolated(n.49),itleavestheactwhoseomissionissupposedtobeobjectionablelargelyindeterminateand,
apparently,holdsthecorrespondingunspecifiedmotion(no.1,firstpart)ofapplicantV.admissible.Theproblemof
indeterminatenessandindeterminabilityofwhatispositivelyduewillnottherebybespiritedaway.Itwillremain
virulentasaproblemofindeterminatenessand,accordingly,unenforceabilityofwhattheCourtdecides.
EveniftheCourtweretoidentifycertainwelldefinedreactionsofsomeavailaslegallydue,enforceabilitywouldnot
bemuchimproved.Theobjectofsuchdutieswouldbetoocomplexandtheproperwayoffulfillingthemwould
againbetooineptforguidancebyrulestobereasonablygovernablebylegalimperatives,letalonebyjudicial
enforcementorders.

25

4.Anawarenessofthis,butnoreadinesstodrawthenecessaryconclusions,becomesapparentinthattheSenate
26
growsmorecautious,oratleastmoreconspicuouslycautious,asitapproachesthepossiblecontentsofitsfinal
decision.Alreadywhentheobjectivedutieswhichincaseofaqualifiedviolationofsovereignrightsfollowingfromthe
responsibilitiesconcerningintegrationarepresented(n.49),nomentionismadeofexitingtheEuropeanUnionor

themonetaryunionasanultimaratio.Rather,theSenatereferstotheoptionoflegitimisingthetransgressionby
adaptingthetreaty,andstatesthatifthissolutionisnotwantedornotpossible,BundestagandFederalGovernment
areinprincipleobligedtouselegalorpoliticalmeansinordertogetatacancellationoftherelevantactofthe
Union,andmeanwhiletocontainitsdomesticconsequencesasbesttheycan.Later,wheretheSenatedeclaresthese
dutiesactionableinabstractoandundertakessomespecification(n.50etseq.),theonlyactionableclaimbroughtup
inconcretoistheclaimthatadebateleadingtosomepositivedecisionbeconducted.
Judicialcompetencesdonot(atleastnotdejure)dependonthegreaterorlessercourageofthejudges.Butwhere
forreasonsoflawthejudgescouragemustdwindlewhenitcomestothesubstance,theyoughtnottogointothe
substanceatall.ItisthereforenotanargumentinfavourofthepresentorderthatitleavestheSenatewithmany
optionstoexercisetalkativejudicialrestraintinitsfinaldecision.Inconstellationswhichforeseeablydonotpermit
effectivejudicialintervention,judicialrestraintoughttobedisplayedinsilence.

27

5.AstheSenateacknowledges,actsofEUinstitutionsarenotdirectlysubjecttothejurisdictionoftheFederal
28
ConstitutionalCourt(cf.BVerfGE22,293<295etseq.>58,1<26etseq.>118,79<95>129,124<175and176>)
butcomeintoplayasanobjectofscrutinyonlyindirectly,i.e.insofarastrespassesmayhaveconsequencesforthe
powersanddutiesofGermaninstitutions(n.23etseq.).Eventheresultofsuchindirectscrutinymay,however,have
implicationsthatstretchfarbeyondGermany.Apartfromtheabove,thefollowingoughtthereforetobeconsidered:A
judicialdecisionfromwhichthefutureoftheeuromaydependisperseanawkwardmatter,evenifonly
consequencesfortherespectivecountryaretakenintoaccount.Inaperspectivebeyondthenationalbox,thedecision
ofanationalcourtwithsuchfarmorethannationalimplicationsappearsparticularlyprecarious.Thedemocratic
legitimacywhichthedecisionofanationalcourtmaydrawfromtherelevantstandardsofnationallaw(ifany)willnot,
ornotwithoutsubstantialdetriment,extendbeyondthenationalarea.Inastrictlynationalperspective,thismayseem
irrelevantontheassumptionthatasaconsequenceoftheECBsbehaviour,theintegrityofthenationalconstitutional
orderisatstake,andifablindeyeisturnedtothepossibleconsequencesofalternativescenarios.Thequestionis,
however,whetherthenationalperspectivewhichisproperlyheldupagainsttheUnionperspectiveincertaincasesof
conflict(cf.BVerfGE89,155<188>123,267<253etseq.>126,286<302etseq.>)isstilltheappropriateandthe
constitutionalonewhereadecisionmayhavelegalandfactualconsequencesofthemagnitudeandreachatissuehere.
ThatsomefewindependentGermanjudgesinvokingtheGermaninterpretationoftheprincipleofdemocracy,the
limitsofadmissiblecompetencesoftheECBfollowingfromthisinterpretation,andourreadingofArt.123etseq.
TFEUmakeadecisionwithincalculableconsequencesfortheoperatingcurrencyoftheeurozoneandthenational
economiesdependingonitappearsasananomalyofquestionabledemocraticcharacter.Nosuchanomalywould
impendifthepresentdecisionweretobereadasnotenvisaginganyseriousconsequences.Inthatcase:see2.and4.
LbbeWolff

DissentingOpinion
ofJusticeGerhardt
ontheOrderoftheSecondSenateof14January2014
2BvR2728/13
2BvR2729/13
2BvR2730/13
2BvR2731/13
2BvE13/13
Tomyregret,Iamunabletosupportthedecision.Iholdthattheconstitutionalcomplaintsandtheapplicationinthe
Organstreitproceedings,insofarastheyrelatetotheOMTDecision,areinadmissible.Thus,theoutcomeofthe
SenatesdecisiondoesnotdependontheanswerstothequestionsthataccordingtotheSenaterequireclarification
thisistherequirementforareferraltotheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionforapreliminaryruling.

1.TheFederalConstitutionalCourtisnotresponsibleforgeneralconstitutionalsupervision.Instead,itspowersare
enumerated,andcomprehensivelyregulated,inArt.93GGandinthefederallawsissuedinconnectionwiththis
provision.TheseprovisionsdelimitthepowersoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtinparticularagainstthoseofthe
otherconstitutionalorgansandspecifythesystemoftheseparationofpowersinthisrespect.Thenecessarylegal
certaintyisachievedbystronglyformalisingtherequirementsforturningtotheFederalConstitutionalCourtthe
influenceoftheadmissibilityrequirementsonthesystemmaynotbeunderestimated.Itthusrequiresincreased
justificationiftheFederalConstitutionalCourtfurtherdevelopslegalrulesinawaythatresultsinanexpansionofits
powerstoreviewanddecide.

2.a)OneofthemostnobleobligationsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtistodefendtheholdersoffundamental
rightsagainstviolationsoffundamentalrightsbypublicauthoritywhicharechallengedthroughconstitutional
complaints.Inaccordancewiththismandate,whereinterferenceswithfundamentalrightsarisefromanactofthe
EuropeanUnion,theFederalConstitutionalCourtmustexaminewhethertheFederalRepublicofGermanyhas
providedtheEuropeanUnionwiththenecessarylegalbasis(Art.23sec.1GG).Inthisreview,thesocalledultravires
review,theassessmentunderEuropeanUnionlawbytheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionisofoverriding
importanceaccordingly,theFederalConstitutionalCourtexercisesultraviresreviewinamannerthatisopento
Europeanlaw,andonlysubjecttostrictrequirements.SinceaccordingtotheconceptoftheEuropeanTreaties,
KompetenzKompetenzwithregardtothescopeofpermissibleEuropeanUnionactscannotrestwithaninstitutionof
theEuropeanUnionsuchastheCourtofJustice,thelastword,however,remainswiththeFederalConstitutional
Court(cf.BVerfGE126,286<300etseq.>).
b)Adistinctionmustbedrawnbetweencasesinwhichasubstantivefundamentalrightisaffected,and
4
constitutionalcomplaintsinwhichthecomplainantchallengesaviolationoftherighttotakepartintheelectionofthe
MembersoftheGermanBundestagunderArt.38Abs.1GG,withtheaimofpreventingtheerosionofthepowersof
Parliament,andthusthedevaluationoftherighttovote.Inviewofthedangersforthedemocraticprocesswhichsuch
arightofchallengeentails,theSenatefoundthatcitizensmusthavetheopportunityofturningtotheConstitutional
CourttodefendthemselvesagainstaParliamentthatrelinquishesitspowersinamannerthatisincompatiblewith
Art.23sec.1,Art.79sec.3GG(socalledidentityreview),andthattheBasicLawdoesnotprovideamoreextensive
rightofchallenge(cf.BVerfGE129,124<169and170,177,183>132,195<234and235,238etseq.>).Whilethe
SenateheldthatbudgetaryautonomyisoneofthepowersofParliamentwhichareinalienablepursuanttoArt.79sec.
3GG,itrespectedtheprimacyofassessmentthatisduetothelegislatureinthisrespect(cf.BVerfGE129,124<182
ff.>132,195<239and240>).
3.NowtheSenateextendsthepossibilitiesoftheindividualtoinitiateviaArt.38sec.1GGareviewoftheactsof
5
UnioninstitutionsbytheConstitutionalCourt.First,thestandardsdevelopedforultraviresreviewwithregardto
actsofinterferencewithsubstantivefundamentalrightsaretransferredtothisarea.ThismeansthattheSenate,
withouttherebeingaconnectiontoasubstantivefundamentalright,claimsthepowertoreviewwhetheraninstitution
oftheEuropeanUnionhasmanifestly,andinastructurallysignificantmanner,usurpedpowersnotconferredupon
ititisnotdecisiveherewhethertheconstitutionalidentitypursuanttoArt.79sec.3GGisaffected.Ifsucha
transgressionofpowersexists,itisintendedthattheinindividualcandemandoftheBundestagandtheFederal
Governmentthattheyactivelydealwiththequestionofhowthedistributionofpowerscanberestored,andthatthey
decidewhichoptionstheywanttousetopursuethisgoal.Icannotgoalongwiththis.
a)Identityreviewisabouttherespectofultimatelimits,whichcannotbeshiftedeventhroughanamendmentofthe
Constitution.Itisplausible,notleastwithaviewtothecitizensrighttodemocracy,whichisanchoredinhuman
dignity(cf.BVerfGE123,267<341>),togranteverycitizenanenforceablerighttothiseffect,eveniftheensuing
promiseoflegalprotectionrisksraisingfalseexpectations.Byadmitting,however,anultraviresreviewthatisbased
ontheallegationofaviolationofArt.38sec.1GG,thedoorisopenedtoageneralrighttohavethelawsenforced
(allgemeinerGesetzesvollziehungsanspruch),whichtheBasicLawdoesnotcontain(cf.BVerfGE132,195<235>
withfurtherreferences).

Theactiopopularischaracterofthisactionisnotchangedbythefactthatonlyspecificallyqualifiedtransgressionsof
7
powerscanbechallenged.Moreover,therelevantcriteria(manifestnatureconsiderableweightandstructural
significanceoftheassumptionofpowers)stronglydependonhowtheyareassessed,andtheyinvitecontroversy,so
thattheywillhardlybeabletochannelaccesstotheCourteffectivelyandintheinterestofacleardelimitationof
powers.Viathepossibilityofdemandingpreventivelegalprotection,whichisprovidedasaconsequence,individuals
entitledtovotecanbringintoplaytheFederalConstitutionalCourtatatimewhenthepoliticalprocessisstill
ongoing.TheensuingdangerofdemocraticresponsibilitybecomingblurredcancertainlybecounteractedIwould,
however,prefersuchadangernottoariseinthefirstplace.Whatmustalsobeseencriticallyisthepossibleconflict
withthevaluesoftheEuropeansystemoflegalprotection,whoserequirementsregardingactionsbroughtagainstacts
ofEuropeaninstitutions(Art.263TFEU)canbecircumventedviaanultravirespopularactionbasedonArt.38sec.1
GG.
b)Thecentralquestion,however,iswhytheindividualshouldhaveajudiciallyenforceablerighttoGerman
constitutionalorgansbecomingactivevisvisactsoftheEuropeanUnionthattransgresstheirpowers,or,toputit
differently,whyitisnotsufficienttoworkviathemeansthatdemocracyprovidesthroughtheformationofpolitical
opinionswithinandoutsideParliamentandthroughelectionstowardsthesystemofpowersbeingrespected,orto
demandthattheconsequencesofatransgressionofpowersbeaccepted.

aa)TheconsiderationthatiftheindividualcanchallengeessentialpowersbeingrelinquishedbyParliament,a
9
correspondingcompetencewillexistallthemorevisvistheusurpationofpowersbytheEuropeanUnion,isa
considerationthatcouldatmostapplytothepossibilityofidentityreview,which,however,isnotwhatthisdecisionis

about.Eventhoughultraviresreviewhasbeenlargelyassimilatedtoidentityreview,theSenateisnotlikelytosee
thisdifferentlythedifferenceofcategorybetweenthetwocannotbelevelledoutinanyway.
bb)Instead,theSenatesrecognisableintentionistodealwiththeparticularsituationthattheEuropeanCentral
10
bankhassufficientdemocraticlegitimationonlyforitscoreobligations(Art.88sentence2GG),andthattherefore,
ifitactsoutsidethisarea,thishappenswithoutconnectiontothedemocraticformationofopinionstheSenateholds
thatthecurtailmentofthecitizensrighttodemocraticparticipationcomesclosetoaviolationofidentity,anditmust
thereforebepossibletobecounteredbythecitizenswiththehelpoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtaccordingtothe
Senate,itcannotbeconveyedtothecitizensthatgivensuchademocraticdeficit,andwithaviewtothepossible
significanceoftheOMTDecision,thereisnolegalprotection.Idonotfindthisconvincing.
(1)ThedecisiononhowtheFederalRepublicofGermanyreactstoviolationsofitssovereigntyisgenerallywithinthe 11
politicaldiscretionofthecompetentconstitutionalorgans,particularlyoftheFederalGovernmentandtheGerman
Bundestag.Itisexclusivelyforthemtodecidefirstwhetherthereisaviolationofinternationallaw,andwhichweight
ithastobeaccordedifthereisone.Nothingdifferentappliestothefurtherdecisionaboutwhichmeasureare
expedient.Inthisrespect,thereexistnorightsofindividualswhichcanbederivedfromArt.38sec.1GG,andclearly,
theyarenotclaimedeither.
(2)TheEuropeanUnionisalegalcommunitybyvirtueofthetransferofsovereignpowersoftheMemberStates(cf.
Art.23sec.1GG,Art.4,5TEU).Accordingly,theGermanconstitutionalorgansareobliged,interalia,towork
towardstherevocationofactsoftheEuropeanUnioniftheyarenotcoveredbytheintegrationprogramme,andto
limitdomesticconsequencesentailedbysuchacts.

12

(a)Thisresponsibilitywithrespecttointegrationexistsvisvisthegeneralpublic,andyieldsnothingforthe
constructionofasubjectiverightofanypersonentitledtovotetohaveconstitutionalorganstakeaction.

13

(b)TheSenatedemandsoftheFederalGovernmentand/ortheBundestagto(publicly)establishamassive
transgressionofcompetencesbyaninstitutionoftheEuropeanUnionhere,bytheEuropeanCentralBank,from
whichensuesageneralobligationtoeliminateit.Here,intheviewoftheSenate,thedecisivefactorisnotthe
assessmentoftheconstitutionalorgansbutwhethersuchaviolationofpowersobjectivelyexists.Undersucha
perspective,politicalactsandomissionsaresubjectedtoaninappropriatelegalstandard.

14

(aa)Withregardtothequestionofwhetherthereexistsaqualifiedultraviresact,theFederalGovernmentandthe
15
Bundestagmusthaveamarginofappreciationanddiscretion,whichthecitizenneedstoaccept.Suchamarginis
indispensableifonlybecauselegalclarificationwilloftenrequireconsiderabletime,whereaspoliticalneedforaction
canarisesoonthepresentcase,inwhichtheannouncementofactsanticipatesanessentialeffectofsuchacts,which
makesitpossibletoinfluencethe,sotospeak,stretchedenforcement,isprobablyatypical.Incontrasttoconventional
obligationstoact,whoseviolationcanbejudiciallyestablishedexpost,whatisatissueherecanonlybeactsbythe
FederalGovernmentandtheBundestagwhicharespecifictocertainsituationsandcertainfindings.Forsuchacts,an
(objectivised)exanteperspectivemustapply,thelegalstructureofwhichiscomparabletoariskassessment.Ifthe
ultraviresviolationisnotobvious,butifasprobablyinmostcases,andhereaswelltheactionoftheinstitutionof
theEuropeanUnionissituatedatthemarginofthepowersassignedtoit,theFederalGovernmentandtheBundestag
mustactinrecognitionofthisandarenotcompelledtoassumeanassumptionofpowersthatismanifestandshifts
establishedstructures.
(bb)Theobjectionthatonlymanifesttransgressionsofpowersestablishanobligationtoactwouldonlybecorrect
ifthismeantviolationsofthedistributionofpowerswhichareobviousfromtheoutsetandwhichsuggest
themselveswithoutfurtherlegalanalysis.This,however,isnottheviewoftheSenate.Instead,itisalsoconsidered
possiblethatatransgressionofpowerscanbemanifestifitisprecededbyalengthyclarificationprocess.

16

(cc)Thiscaseshowsinabundantclarityhowdifficultitistohandlethecriterionmanifest.TheSenates
17
assessmentthattheOMTprogrammemanifestly,andwithashiftofstructures,transgressesthepowersassignedto
theEuropeanCentralBank,canbeobjectedtowithgoodreasons.Monetaryandeconomicpoliciesrelatetoeachother
andcannotbestrictlyseparated.ThedelimitationoftheobjectivesanddutiesoftheEuropeanSystemofCentral
BanksinArt.127TFEUcorrespondstothis.Areviewwithregardtowhethertheprincipleofconferralhasbeen
adheredtomusttakeintoaccountthat,inconsiderationofthenatureofindependentcentralbanks,thedelimitationof
theirassignedpowershasonlybeenmadewithaviewtotheirfunctionsthisassignmentofpowersmust,toacertain
extent,includetheauthorisationtodefineonesownlimitsofaction.Asregardsthedesignofpurchasesaccordingto
theOMTprogramme,andtheeffectsthatcanbeexpectedofthem,itseemsverylikelythat,duetoitsselectivity,itcan
leadtoanimpermissiblemonetaryfinancingofthebudget.However,notleastduetoalackofsufficient
understandingofhowtheprogrammeisembeddedintheoverallactsoftheEuropeanCentralBankforinstance

withregardtothedeterminationofthekeyinterestrateitseemstomethattheclaim,thattheobjectiveoftheOMT
Decisionisfirstandforemostthereestablishmentofthemonetarytransmissionmechanism,cannotbecontradicted,
atleastnotwiththenecessaryunequivocalness.
(c)IalsoconsidertheSenatesrestrictionofthepoliticaloptionstoreacttoultraviresactsofEuropeaninstitutions
18
andagenciesinappropriateandincompatiblewiththedistributionofpowersundertheBasicLaw.Itisobviousthat
assumptionsofpowersmustbeopposed.Howthiseffectivelyhappens,however,dependsonvariouscircumstances.It
canbeconsiderablymoreeffective,andwise,tofirstwaitandtointerveneonlyatapointthatappearsfavourable,beit
vianegotiationsatapromisinglevel,beitviaproceedingsforannulment(Art.263TFEU).Thisalso,andparticularly,
appliesinthecontextofEuropeanintegration,sincetheGermanconstitutionalorgansmustexerciseresponsibility
withrespecttointegrationaccordingtotheprincipleofsincerecooperation(Art.4sec.3TEU).Ifindthatthe
argumentthattheroomformanoeuvreoftheGermanconstitutionalorgansisreducedinthecaseofmanifestand
seriousviolationsofpowersissimplyincorrect,becauseespeciallyinsuchasituation,particularpoliticalskilfulnessis
required.
cc)TheSenatedoesnotignorethattheindividualcitizencannotclaimarightunderArt.38sec.1GGtoparticular
19
actsoftheFederalGovernmentandoftheBundestag.TheSenatethereforederivesfromtheclaimtopolitical
participationaclaimtohavetheFederalGovernmentandtheBundestagdealinaqualifiedmannerwithcertain
subjectmatters.However,whenthedecisionsaysthatacitizencandemandthattheBundestagandtheFederal
Governmentactivelydealwiththequestionofhowthedistributionofpowerscanberestoredandthattheyactively
decidewhichoptionstheywanttousetopursuethisgoal,thisclaimis,infact,nothingelsebutaclaimofthecitizenon
themerits.
TheSenaterecognisablyintendstosecurethepublicnatureoftheparliamentaryprocessincasesofsevere
assumptionsofpowersbyinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion,andtothuspreventthatessentiallossesof
competenceoftheGermanBundestagaretacitlytolerated,disregardingtheformalrequirementssetoutinArt.23
sec.1GG,orevenbroughtaboutbywayofcollusion.

20

(1)Indisputably,itisacentralelementofthedemocraticdevelopmentofopinionsthatessentialissuesofthe
21
EuropeandistributionofpowersaredealtwithbytheplenarysessionoftheBundestag.However,ajusticiable
rightoftheindividualthattheinvolvementofParliamenttakeplaceinaspecificmannerappearsneitherrequirednor
atallcompatiblewiththespecialcharacterofthedemocraticprocess.Thecitizenscaninfluencethewayandobjectives
ofthepoliticalprocessthroughpetitions,thepoliticalpartiesandMembersofParliament,andinparticularthrough
themedia.That,withthehelpoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,anindividualmaysteertheBundestagsrightof
initiativeintoaspecificdirection,doesnotfitintotheconstitutionalframeworkofparliamentarywork.Inparticular,
Parliamentdoesnotowethecitizensanexpressreasoningtotheeffectthatitmakesitspoliticaldecision(even)in
viewofcompetencerelatedconcernsaboutEuropeanactsinthiscase,theOMTDecisionstilllessdoesParliament
owethecitizensapromisetoproceedinaspecificmannerforthecasethatsuchanactconstitutesaqualifiedultra
viresact.
(2)Theconstitutionalrequirement,whichhasbeenrepeatedlyemphasisedintheSenatescaselawinrecentyears,
thattheGermanBundestagmaynotrelinquishitspowerstoasignificantextent,doesnotcontainanystatements
concerningthemannerinwhichtheBundestagdealswithamatterthisrequirementisalsonotviolatedhere.

22

IftokeeptothepresentcasetheFederalGovernmentapprovestheOMTprogrammeandmakesitoneofthe
foundationsofitsownacts,andiftheGermanBundestagacceptsallthiswithopeneyesagainstthebackdropof
anintensivepublicdebate,afterhavingheardthePresidentoftheEuropeanCentralBank,and,accordingtothe
informationprovidedbyamemberoftheBudgetCommitteeintheoralhearing,onthebasisoftheBundestags
observationandassessmentoftheactsoftheEuropeanCentralBankthisistheexerciseofitsdemocratic
responsibility.TheBundestagcouldreadilyhavecriticisedtheOMTDecisionbypoliticalmeans,threatened,if
necessary,tobringproceedingsforannulmentbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion,waitedforthe
reactionsoftheEuropeanCentralBankandthefinancialmarketsandthentakenfurthersteps.Thefactthatitdid
noneofthisdoesnotindicateademocraticdeficit,butisanexpressionofitsmajoritydecisionforacertainpolicy
whenhandlingthesovereigndebtcrisisintheeurocurrencyarea.

23

4.TheapplicationintheOrganstreitproceedingsisinadmissibleforcorrespondingreasons.Itistheveryown
24
obligationofthepoliticalgroupsoftheGermanBundestagtoinvolvetheBundestagwithcontroversialissues,and
topressfortheseissuestobedealtwithinamannerthatisappropriatetotherespectiveproblem.Ifthisapproachis
pursuednotatall,insufficientlyorunsuccessfully,thiscannotbecompensatedbyconstructingarightforParliamentto
beinvolvedthatgoesbeyondadherencetothelawregulatingParliamentsinternalorganisation.
Gerhardt