Effective vs.

Compliant:
An Analysis of Consent Decrees in Police Reform

Jon Dunn, Marian West, Mathias Dallas, Nicholas Throgmorton,

Christopher Edling, Lorissa Montoya, Bria Sena,

Police are necessary for modern, democratic societies. But what happens when
the police commit crimes? What relief do citizens have from state injustice, or
discrimination? For the past two decades, police brutality victims and civil rights
organizations have turned to the Justice Department for justice. Section 14141 of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 gives the DOJs Civil Rights
Division the authority to investigate, oversee, and litigate police departments that violate
the Constitution or federal law. The DOJ is not authorized to investigate individual cases
but only systematic violations a pattern or practice of police misconduct. Most
departments targeted by the DOJ have chosen to negotiate, rather than the alternative,
costly litigation.
The DOJ has investigated local police departments, county and state agencies, and
most recently the Missoula County Attorneys office and The University of Montana
Office of Public Safety. The reasons for DOJ involvement are for improper use of force,
unlawful search and seizure, and discriminatory policing, which has included minority
groups, people with mental illness, and women. The most common types of reform are
over the use of force policy, early warnings system, citizen complaint protocol, officer
training, and management and supervision. Furthermore, the length of these agreements
has varied from 1 to 12 years, due to the time the court believes it will take to meet
compliance, or failures by departments to comply fully with the agreements. About half
of the cases have also required have a third-party to monitor the agreement to ensure
compliance.
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the consent decree mechanism for
substantive police reform. For this analysis, our group studied seven different case

studies: Pittsburgh, PA; Los Angeles, CA; Detroit, MI; Portland, OR; East Haven, CT;
Maricopa County, AZ; and New Orleans, LA. These agreements varied widely on issue,
length, compliance and effectiveness.

Case Study 1: Pittsburg (1997 - 2005)

During the 70s and early 80s, Pittsburg suffered a devastating economic decline, as the
one of the countrys largest steel production economies collapsed. Around 200,000 steel
jobs were lost resulting in rampant unemployment, with rates as high as 18% during the
mid 90s (Vera 2). The city also experienced a longstanding distrust between police and
the black community. In 1995, there were suspicious deaths of two black men: Jerry
Jackson was shot 51 times after a car theft, and Jonny Gammage was stopped by police,
while driving a family members car, and then beaten and suffocated (5). These incidents
were followed by an ACLU lawsuit on behalf of 66 individuals later that year.
Additionally, Pittsburg had a massive replacement of officers, during the early 90s, as a
large number of them were fired or encouraged to retire. As a result, half of PBP officers
were new hires in 1996, lacking experience and judgment (4).
The DOJ began investigating Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (PBP) in April 1996 to
determine if officers were engaging in a pattern or practice of violating individuals'
federal civil rights. The findings, which came out early the next year, found that there
were indeed systemic constitutional violations: 1) use of excessive force, false arrests,
and improper searches and seizures; 2) use of racial epithets or racially insensitive
language against African-Americans 3) failure to investigate citizen complaints; 4) failure

to discipline officers adequately; 5) and failure to supervise officers (City of Pittsburgh

Investigative Findings Letter).

Consent Decree
Pittsburgh became the first consent decree when it went into effect on April 1997. A fiveyear timeframe was set for reform process, which consisted of 66 tasks. The decree also
mandates that an auditor oversee the process, as well as requiring 20 quarterly reports to
monitor progress. The main sections of the consent decree:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION (tasks 12-30)

COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS, (tasks 31-32)
TRAINING (tasks 33-43)
COMPLAINT AND INVESTIGATION PROCESS (tasks 44-69)
AUDITOR (tasks 70-76)
COMPLIANCE (tasks 77-79)

The majority of the decree focused on complaint process reform (25 tasks) and
management and supervision (19 tasks), with the least emphasis on community relations
(2 tasks).

Political Atmosphere
Mayor Tom Murphy, who was elected in 1994 and oversaw the entire consent decree,
was initially hesitant to the process, but, as he realized the inevitability of the situation, he
became compliant. One human rights leader defined him as a big supporter of the
decree (Vera 10). Similarly, former Police Chief Robert McNeilly, hired in 2006,
overcame initial reluctance when he realized the consent decree was a better alternative
than a federal takeover. The court appointed-auditor for the Pittsburgh decree was the
Public Management Resources, which also oversaw New Jerseys decree and, most

recently, Albuquerques. (ABD Forward) Most regarded the role of the monitor as neutral
whose support was nearly universal among both city officials and civil rights leaders
(Vera 12).

Compliance
The auditors first quarterly report showed that the City of Pittsburgh and PBP were
committed to reform. The report stated, The City has recorded a primary compliance
rate of 87 percent, and an overall compliance rate of 33 percent, which is commendable
for a first- quarter performance (64). The monitor judged compliance on primary,
secondary, and operational goals, as well as the significance of compliance/
noncompliance to the success of the reform process.
The 19th quarterly report reveals that the city was noncompliant with 13 tasks that
quarter. All of the failed tasks were in regard to the Office of Municipal Investigations
(OMI), which handled investigations of civilian complaints. The report stated, OMI
performance this quarter deeply concerns the auditor, with problems evident in staffing,
training, and now oversight of the investigative process (71).
The following is an example of the chart used to demonstrate the compliance with
specific tasks. The red color of the bars reveals that Pittsburgh was noncompliant with
Task 61, and the timeline along the top reveals that this failure was consistent.

Due to the failure of the 13 tasks regarding OMI, Pittsburghs consent decree was
extended in 2002. Although the city was able to fulfill the remaining the task by 2003, the
DOJ required that substantial compliance, which the monitor defined as 95%, for a
period of two year. The decree was finally terminated in June 2005 after the city was able
to clear its backlog of citizen complaints. James Ginger, the CEO of Public Management
Resources, stated that "Currently, completed OMI investigations not only meet the
requirements of the decree, they far exceed those requirements," Ginger wrote (Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Federal control of Pittsburgh police lifted April 6, 2005).

Conclusion
Pittsburgh's experience with police reform and federal oversight is generally regarded as
a success, and represents the optimism behind DOJ intervention. In 2002, the Vera
Institute of Justice released a report, Turning Necessity Into Virtue: Pittsburgh's
Experience with a Federal Consent Decree, which claimed the success of the PBP
reform process. It is irrefutable that the consent decree has led to many positive changes
in Pittsburgh policing, they concluded (62). This conclusion is suspect, in part, because
the report was released in 2002, three years before the decree was officially terminated.
Additionally, although the consent decree was successful at changing some policies, like

the countrys first Early Warning System (EWS) in order to identify potential problem
officers, the survey of public perceptions outcomes may be more revealing. The report
admits that more than 43% of white people thought policing had improved in terms of
fairness and courtesy, this was true for just 24% of African-Americans (38). Worse yet,
42% of blacks surveyed believed that police abuse of force was more common in the
past five years, compared to 13% of whites (40).

And this reveals the largest failure, arguably, of the consent decree in Pittsburgthe
longstanding and unaddressed tension between the police and minorities (Chanin 52)
Later analysis further reveals that sustaining reform after the termination of a
consent decree may be problematic. Data demonstrates that once federal oversight had
ended, PMP rate of force and conduct unbecoming an officer increased, while
disciplinary action taken against the officers reduced significantly.

Case Study 2: LAPD (2001 - 2008)

The D.O.J. was brought into Los Angeles in 2001 primarily as a result of the Rampart
Division CRASH Scandal. The Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums was a
special operations unit created specifically to confront violent street gangs. These units
were independent, aggressive and known for racial profiling of suspected gang members.
The Rampart Division was the largest of these units. The scandal began in 1998 with
officer Brian Hewitt being accused of beating and choking a gang member during an

interview. Soon after, Rafael Prez was arrested for stealing six pounds of cocaine from
the Property Division. During his plea trial, he told of the division's patterns of abuse of
gang members, planting evidence, falsifying reports and covering up shootings.
Los Angeles also had decades of racially biased policing. In the 1970s, six
unarmed members of the Nation of Islam were killed. In the 1980s, Police Chief Daryl
Gates popularized the use of SWAT teams for non-lethal situations. Gates lifted the ban
on the use of chokeholds. In response to the deaths of multiple black men from the
technique, he is quoted saying "blacks might be more likely to die from chokeholds
because their arteries do not open as fast as they do in 'normal people.'" In the 1990s,
Rodney Kings beating was videotaped and the officers acquitted. This began the largest
riot in the United States since the 1960s.

Consent Decree
The Department of Justice sued the Los Angeles Police Department for engaging in a
pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrests and unreasonable searches and
seizures. The consent decree had 11 sections as follows:
1. Management and Supervisory Measures to Promote Civil Rights Integrity
2. Incidents, Procedures, Documentation, Investigation & Review
3. Management of Gang Units
4. Confidential Informants
5. Development of Program for Responding to Persons with Mental Illness
6. Training
7. Integrity Audits
8. Operations of the Police Commission & Inspector General
9. Community Outreach & Public Information
10. Independent Monitor

11. Term of Agreement & Housekeeping Provisions

Political Sphere
Then-Mayor Richard Riordan and then-Police Chief Bernard Parks opposed the consent
decree, but were forced to back down in the face of overwhelming support by the city
council (10 to 2 vote). In 2002, Riordan had reached his term limit and was succeed by
James K Hahn. Hahn facilitated Parks not seeking reelection. Hahn asked William
Bratton, from the Independent Monitor Kroll Associates team, to take his place. Bratton
continued as Police Chief until the closing of the consent decree in early 2009. He was
considered a valuable asset in making significant changes to the department. Hahn was
replaced by Antonio Villaraigosa in the next election in 2005. It was speculated to be a
direct result of the removal of Bernard Parks as Police of Chief. Villaraigosa was also a
supporter of the consent decree.
Compliance
Kroll Associates created a graphic matrix system for the assessment of compliance over
time for the LAPD in the eight years of the consent decree. This is a page example of the
eight pages of information. The entire graphic can be found at this web address;
http://www.kroll.com/media/pdf/reports/LAPD_FINAL-REPORT_Appendix_d_06-112009.pdf

LAPD had varied amounts of compliancy and non-compliancy over the consent
decree. A sampling of the tasks they were non-compliant for were:
-Role of Gang Area Managers
-Detention, Transportation, Arrest, Booking and Charging of Gang Arrestees
-Role of Gang Unit Supervisor
-Selection Process for Gang Unit Personnel
-Supervisory Oversight for Search Warrants & Search Warrant Logs
-Confidential Psychological Evaluation for Officers in Deadly Categorical UOF
Incident
A sampling of the tasks they were compliant for were;
-Civil Lawsuits Alleging Misconduct of LAPD
-Arrest/Litigation Involving Officer
-Complaint Investigations

-Officer History Considered for Non-Disciplinary Action in Categorical Use of

Force
-Tape Recording/Videotape Interviews
-Scheduled Integrity/Audit Reports
Conclusions
I found the tasks LAPD were found not to be compliant in were very telling. The
department came under investigation because of issues within the gang unit. The
department seems to not comply with important issues within the gang units such as the
selection process, supervision and management and general detention of gang arrestees.
The D.O.J. was focused on LAPDs use of force incidents, which had some level of
compliance. LAPD is known for the popularization of SWAT teams, which are now most
often used for search warrants. Supervisory oversight for search warrant is a task LAPD
was not compliant with. The police department did make efforts towards non-disciplinary
action and arrest or litigation of officers involved in use of force incidents. The police
department consistently did not comply with the task of psychological evaluations for
officers in these incidents.
Graphs were provided in the final report of the Independent Monitor as up-to-date
Crime Statistics. The monitor reports a significant decrease in reported homicides and
aggravated assaults over the time period of the decree. They report an insignificant
decrease in reported robberies.

Los Angeles Times cites conflicting statistics on whether or not they find the
decade under the consent decree a success. In successful statistics, they cite that there was
a 12% increase in approval rates of the police department from 2007, with 71%, to 2009,
to 83%. They note a significant decrease in use of force incidents per 10,000 arrests from

8.1 in 2004 to 6.2 in 2008. They find the Mental Evaluation Unit a great success for
training officers and having positive interactions with the mentally ill community.
Some statistics that suggest the consent decree was not a success lie primarily
with treatment of racialized groups. African Americans in 2008 were disproportionately
arrested as well as victims of excessive force. This racial group is one-fifth of the
demographic stopped by LAPD, by one-third of the population arrested and two-fifths of
the population reporting injury from excessive force. From 2003 to 2008, there was a
significant increase in both African American and Latino demographics who were asked
to exit their vehicles during traffic stops. The LA Times notes that pedestrian and motor
vehicle stops grew nearly 50% from 2002 to 2008 At the same time, the number of
stops resulting in arrests doubled. A majority of communities of color that report LAPD
as doing a good job in 2008, but there is significant minority who find that almost no
LAPD officers treat them and their friends and family with respect.
I find that the consent decree has had some overarching positive changes to the
Los Angeles Police Department. I believe that having an increased level of accountability
is a good step and factor in bettering the way a police department functions. Having
political and social focus on daily injustices faced in communities does make an impact.
Yet, a consent decree does not change or challenge the systemic racism that is a part of
the everyday culture of policing in general.
More information from the final report of the Independent Monitor can be found
at the following address: http://www.kroll.com/intelligence-center/reports/monitorshipreports/lapd

Case Study 3: Detroit Police Department (2003 - 2014)

The 1967 riots that took place in Detroit were the catalyst that determined the relationship
between the community and the Detroit Police Department. In the 1960s and 1970s the
Detroit Police Department was notorious for its violence. One police unit dubbed
STRESSStop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streetscarried out the execution-style
killings of more than a dozen black men in the space of a few years. Detroit became one
of the poorest cities in America due to mass layoffs and plant closures in the auto
industry, during the 1970s and. Coleman Young was the first black mayor who was
elected in 1973 and his main goal was to integrate the primarily white Detroit Police
Department. As social inequality rose throughout the 1980s as did the violations
committed by the Detroit Police Department. This trend would continue into the 1990s
and early 2000s.
Detroit had a rate of 0.92 fatal shootings per 100,000 residents, far higher
than New York and Los Angeles, two cities recently scandalized by revelations of
widespread police killings and brutality. Detroit, with nearly 1 million residents, averaged
nearly 10 fatal police shootings each year between 1990 and 1998. By comparison, New
York, with 7.3 million residents, averaged 28 fatal shootings a year during the same
perioda rate of 0.39[1]. Integrating the police force did nothing to improve policecommunity relations. The City of Detroit was primarily African-American; the police
force was primarily African-American. Yet the officer that caused public outrage was
African-American who killed three African-American men all in the name of the law.

That officer's name was Eugene Brown. Between 1991 and 2003, he cost the City
of Detroit $7.5 million in lawsuits. Most of that money stemmed from nine shootings he
was involved in, three of which were fatal. Despite his frequent use of lethal force,
Brown was cleared of wrongdoing by internal police investigations in all instances.
David Robinson, a former Detroit cop who's now an attorney, said the department's
protection of Brown was not out of the ordinary. "The average investigator would never
throw an officer to the wolves unless there was some impartial evidence," he said. "Police
investigators have always seen things through blue spectacles (2).
By 2000, community frustration with police had boiled over again. Police
watchdog groups formed, activists staged strikes, and there was strong pressure to
remove then-Police Chief Benny Napoleon, who regularly defended the department's
"shoot to kill" policy. Eventually, the US Department of Justice conducted what's known
as a "pattern or practice" investigation of Detroit police. The DOJ found Detroit PD to be
in violation of numerous laws. Most shocking was the state of the city's holding cells.
Between 1990 and 2000, numerous inmates died of drug withdrawals, heart attacks,
diabetic comas, and myriad other health issues. In many instances, inmate bodies were
found in a full state of rigor mortis meaning they had been dead for at least four to six
hours before being discovered. "For years and years," Robinson said, "Detroit's lock-up
was tantamount to a torture chamber." The sheer ineptitude of Detroit PD forced the
Department of Justice to write two separate federal consent decrees. These legal
agreements, signed by the City of Detroit, deal with police use-of-force issues and
address the deadly conditions in the city's holding cells (3).

Consent Decree
The Department of Justice sues the Detroit Police Department for engaging in a pattern
or practice of conduct of subjecting individuals to uses of excessive force, false arrests,
illegal detentions, and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The consent decree
had 7 sections as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

USE OF FORCE POLICY

INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION, INVESTIGATION, AND REVIEW
ARREST AND DETENTION POLICIES AND PRACTICES
EXTERNAL COMPLAINTS
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION
TRAINING
COMPLIANCE

Political Sphere
The consent decree process was plagued by sex scandals and political corruption going
through one mayor, a federal monitor, and multiple police chiefs. The consent decree was
implemented during the first term of Mayor Kwame Kilpartick who would go on to have
an inappropriate relationship with then federal monitor Sheryl Robinson Wood. Early
police chiefs such as Ella Bully Cummings and Warren Evans were not committed and
also plagued by the fallout from Kwame Kilpatrick. It was under the tenure of Mayor
David Bing and current Mayor Mike Duggan that the consent decree was taken seriously
and considered a top priority. This would not be possible without the help of current
Police Chief James Craig.

Compliance
The Detroit Police Department had varied amounts of compliancy and non-compliancy
over the consent decree. A sampling of the tasks they were non-compliant for were;

-Use of Force Policy

- Incident Documentation, Investigation, and Review
-Oversight-Auditing
-Video Cameras
A sampling of the tasks they were compliant for were;
-Arrest and Detention Policies and Practices
-Training
-External Complaints
-Risk Management Systems
-Disciplinary Administration
Conclusions
After eleven years, the consent decree was deemed a success in Robert Warshaws final
report. They have met the compliance requirements, yet some issues still remain such as
the use of force. Concerns still exist on how the Detroit Police Department documents,
investigates, and reviews the use of force. The following images shows improvements in
the compliance of use of force requirements; over the course of nineteen quarterly
reports.

Case Study 4: Portland (2012 - Current)

The City of Portland Police Bureau was under investigation calling started in 2009, three
years after James Chasse was beaten to death by police officers. Four people with known
mental health issues were killed in 2010 and Portland Mayor Sam Adams fired the police
chief Rosie Sizer. In 2011 two more people with known mental illnesses were killed.
That same year the official federal investigation of Pattern or Practice of civil rights
violations, particularly against people with mental illness, relating to officers' use of force
started. Dane Reister who shot from behind and unintendedly killed William Monroe in
2011 was the first Portland police officer indicted for use-of-force since the early 1960s.
He pled not guilty in June of 2012 and then eventually fired from Portland Police Bureau
in 2013. In September of 2012 there were reported problems with Portland Police
Bureau's policies, training and supervision, including a pattern and practice of harming

people with mental illness, including excessive use of Tasers. Both parties release a
preliminary agreement. October of 2012 U.S. v City of Portland announced a settlement
agreement of 187 items to be resolved over five years (2017). The following month
Portland city council approved the settlement. In 2012, two more people with mental
health issues were killed by Portland police. The same followed in 2013 as an additional
two more mentally ill persons were killed in 2014 by Portland police.

Consent Decree
The consent decree began in 2012 and is predicted to continue into the year 2017. The
main reason for consent decree is discriminatory practices against homeless and mentally
ill persons. The reasons were also because of improper use of force, misuse of power and
unjustified/excessive, and stun gun use against homeless individuals with known or
perceived mental illness. A total of 187 tasks in 11 sections are as followes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Use of force
Electronic control weapons
Compliance audits
Training
Community-based mental health services
Crisis intervention (Addictions and Behavioral Health Unit and Advisory
Committee)
7. Employee information system
8. Officer accountability
9. Community engagement and creation of community outreach Oversight Advisory
Board
10. Agreement implementation and enforcement
11. City reports and records
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ppb_proposedsettle_12-17-12.pdf

Political Sphere

The mayor that was there at the start of the consent decree was Sam Adams (2009- 2012).
Soon after the decree started, Charlie Hales (2013-present) took over in office. Both
mayors were in favor of this consent decree. the police chief that was originally in charge
was Michael Reese (2010-2015) and was replaced by Larry ODea early this year (2015present). Reese retired because of an uneasy relationship between Hales and himself.
Reese felt as if it would be best with DOJ settlement to have a fresh start with new
Police chief. Reese implemented better policy and proper training while as police chief.
Accountability complaints have dropped over the 4 years that he was chief. ODea
priorities are aligned with Hales. Diversity in leadership (culture and background) is
necessary in order to create a greater trust between police officers and the people of
Portland and ODea feels that this should be one of the first issues to address as police
chief.
The monitors of this consent decree are Paul J. DeMuniz, Geoffrey P. Alpert and
Dennis Rosenbaum. Their role as monitors are to ensure the Police Bureau follows the
settlement agreement, would oversee Police Bureau inspections and use-of-force audits,
and promote community outreach through a new community oversight advisory board.
DeMuniz announced his disenrollment in April of 2015 due to medical and personal
concerns.

Compliance
It was recommendation that the timelines for appeals be shortened from roughly 60 to 21
days. The report also included praise to specific officers going above and beyond with
assistance. There were also alks about setting up meetings with bureau personnel to

discuss issues with crowd control and use of deadly force. Overall community complaints
average is down from first quarterly report.

There are a total of 9 quarterly reports since settlement agreement in end of 2012. These
quarterly reports are done by an independent police review.
Conclusions
The consent decree is still ongoing and is expected to continue for at least 2 more years.
There has been many improvements have been made. A lot have been on paper and

complaints have gone down, but not significant enough to be a result of the changes.
There are still a lot of improvements that need to be made before the agreement can come
to a complete conclusion. I feel that there will need to be an additional few years added
onto the consent decree in order to fulfill the corrections that were declared.

Sgt. Bret Barnum and the photo of the hug he shared with Devonte Hart, a 12-year-old
African-American boy at a Ferguson-related protest rally in Portland.

Case Study 5; East Haven (2012 - Current)

In the fall of 2009 in East Haven, Connecticut, the United States informed the town and
the East Haven Police Department that there would be an investigation held by the Civil
Rights Division, Special Litigation Section. The reason for this investigation they said
was because of discriminatory policing, unconstitutional searches and seizures, and use
of excessive force.

Four officers from the East Haven Police Department, David Cari, Dennis
Spaulding, John Miller, and Jason Zullo were all involved in a conspiracy to target the
Latino population of East Haven. The allegations of these officers included unnecessary
force, using their arrest powers to cover up officers actions, falsifying reports, targeting
Latino owned businesses and arresting a New Haven priest known for his advocacy for
Latinos. The charges against the Roman Catholic Priest are what sparked the Department
of Justice to investigate the EHPD in which they found that the department, engages in a
pattern or practice of systematically discriminating against Latinos in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment ... in particular, we find that the EHPD engages in discriminatory
policing against Latinos. Not long after the investigation ended and the consent decree
was signed these former officers were arrested and sent to prison.

Consent Decree
The consent decree highlighted seven main areas that the EHPD needed to get corrected
and comply with. Those seven are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

General Policies and Training

Bias Free Policing, Stops, Searches, and Seizures
Use of Force
Civilian Complaints
Internal Investigations, and Discipline
Supervision and Management
Community Engagements and Oversight.

Compliance
In the first six-month report, everything seemed to be getting put into place; new policies
were being written by the required due dates, and new training programs were being set
up for existing officers and new officers joining the force. By the eighteenth month, when

the third report came out from the Joint Compliance Expert Kathleen OToole, the EHPD
and town had complied and remained consistent with the requirements set forth from the
consent decree. At the two year anniversary of the signing of the consent decree, it
looked like not just town officials were happy with the change but the citizens of East
Haven as well. Things have changed, said Chacon, speaking in Spanish. They have
returned to normal. This quote was taken from Marcia Chacon who owns a Mexican
Cuisine restaurant in East Haven and truly believes that the East Haven Police
Department has changed for the better.

Case Study 6; Maricopa County (2012- Current)

The DOJ originally arrived at Maricopa County to investigate in 2009. There were an
outstanding amount of reports of Maricopa County Sheriffs Office and the Maricopa
County Jails mistreating Latinos in the community. The police were targeting policing
latino communities, often stopping latinos for no reason and questioning them.
MCSO also created Immigration task forces which specialized in dealing with
illegal immigrants. The intended use of these forces was to find and turn over illegal
immigrants to the immigration department. But what they ended up using these task
forces for was detaining latinos that did not speak english well.

Consent Decree

The Department of Justice sues the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office for
Discriminationatory Police Practice, false arrests and unreasonable searches and
seizures. The consent decree has 6 sections:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Training for Deputies

Special Operations and Special Units
Data Collections and Risk Management
Complaint System and Internal Affairs
Language Access
Community Outreach.

Political Sphere
Then-Mayor Phil Gordon was all for the Consent Decree as he was one of people that
wrote the initial letter for the DOJ to come to Maricopa County. He has done everything
he could to work with the DOJ, even when they were in a 3-year long investigation with
MCSO. He Tried to get the Sheriff to cooperate with the DOJ. Sheriff Joseph Arpaio
opposed the consent decree, but were forced to back down after the DOJ decided to file a
lawsuit against him personally. As soon as the DOJ arrived to his department he did
everything in his power to hinder the DOJ investigation When Paul Chagolla took the
title of Deputy Chief, he helped the DOJ with getting the information they needed for
their investigation and for the monitors quarterly reports.

Compliance
Measuring compliance for Maricopa County Sheriff's Office is hard because there are
only two quarterly reports. MCSO has been complying with some parts of the consent
decree and not complying with other parts. For instance, they required that the whole

staff have more training on racial sensitivity. While they all complied with going to
training they were not really applying it out in the field. One thing they have been
complaint about is making reforms within the department. They had to rewrite some
Standard Operating Procedures and some other guidelines for the job. In both reports they
have been making great progress in that area.

Conclusion:
Although Maricopa County started off to a rocky start, they are somewhat complaint with
the consent decree. It seems like so far they are just going through the motions. Like
going to some trainings and not others, then not applying what they learned in training to
the field.

Case Study 7; New Orleans (2013-Current)

The D.O.J was brought into New Orleans in 2010 by the invitation of Mayor Mitchell
J. Landrieu. The Department of Justice began investigating the alleged patterns of civil
rights violations and many other unlawful actions or behaviors performed by the Police
Department of New Orleans. As a part of the investigation, the DOJ performed a detailed
fact-finding review. This included several trips to NOPD facilities, interviews with
NOPD command staff, New Orleans officials, supervisors, and police officers,
community groups, and residents. The DOJ also reviewed 36,000 pages of documents.
After each trip the DOJ conducted comprehensive exit interviews with the NOPD
officials.

The DOJ then issued its findings report on March 16, 2011. This report
documents all the DOJs findings of patterns and unconstitutional practices performed by
NOPD. The findings report lists a number of detailed concerns regarding NOPDs
policies.

The Consent Decree:

On July 24, 2012, the City, the NOPD and the DOJ entered into a consent decree which
was considered the nation's most expansive Consent Decree. The court approved the
consent decree on January 11, 2013. On August 9, 2013 Sheppard Mullin was appointed
to be the Consent Decree Monitor by the order of the United States District Court. The
consent decree had 18 sections as follows;
1.Policies and Training
2. Use of Force
3. Crisis Intervention Team
4. Stops, Searches, and arrests
5. Custodial Interrogations
6. Photographic Line-Ups
7. Bias Free Policing
8. Policing free of Gender Bias
9. Community Engagement
10. Recruitment
11. Academies and In-Service Training
12. Officer Assistance and Support
13. Performance Evaluations and Promotions

14. Supervision
15. Secondary Employment System
16. Misconduct Complaint Intakes, Investigation, and Adjudication
17. Transparencies and Oversight
18. Agreement Implementation and Enforcement

Compliance:
Sheppard Mullin published one quarterly report in November 2013, three quarterly
reports in May, August and December of 2014, and one quarterly report in April of 2015.
In November 2013 Mullins report covered August- October of 2013. The report stated
that the city has made significant progress revising its policies and procedures to
implement key aspects of the consent decree but work still needs to be done. He noted
that progress toward implementing it Secondary Employment program was happening
but still needed work as well. In May 2013, Mullins report covered November 1, 2013March 31, 2014. This report stated that NOPD continues to fully cooperate with the
Monitoring team and is committed to meeting the obligations of the Consent Decree.
Mullin noted that the monitor team is impressed with the overall progress and compliance
toward the Decree. In December 2014 Mullins report covered July 1, 2014- September
30, 2014. This report stated that NOPDs training academy continues to suffer from
serious deficiencies. Mullin noted that improvements arent occurring as fast as the
monitoring team would like. NOPD still has not met Crisis Intervention Team
Obligations and NOPD supervision and records keeping are insufficient in many areas.
Lastly in April 2015 Mullins report stated NOPDs revised Use of Force police meets
the requirements of the Consent Decree and the Canine Unit has showed compliance with

some but not all the requirements of the Consent Decree. The creation of the Crisis
Intervention Team Planning Committee is a way of showing compliance towards the
Consent Decree.
Overall NOPD has been compliant but there is still work to be done. Next quarter
the monitors are looking to provide Technical Assistance to the NOPD Academy to help
for various training courses. They plan to audit the Public Integrity Bureaus complaint
intake and administrative investigation process. They will also continue to perform in
depth analysis of NOPDs supervision.

Conclusion
Police brutality has dominated news headlines during the past year. The problem seems
obvious, but reform has proven challenging. During the past 2 decades, there has been
federal oversight of 31 police departments and other agencies, only 14 of which included
consent decrees. The majority of these decrees are ongoing, which makes examining
them difficult. An analysis of the early examples, however, and comparing them to later
cases is worthwhile. The seven case that were examined for this study are Pittsburgh, PA;
Los Angeles, CA; Detroit, MI; Portland, OR; East Haven, CT; Maricopa County, AZ;
and New Orleans, LAonly the first three are closed.

These case studies covered the full range of civil rights violations that the DOJ
has used to implement reform (except gender discrimination). The use of excessive force
was the main issue in Pittsburg, Los Angeles, Portland, and New Orleans; improper

search and seizure was also included in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles; discrimination based
on race was the primary reason in Maricopa County and East Haven; and bias of people
with mental illness was the cause of federal oversight in Portland.
The most obvious takeaway from this comparative analysis is that compliance is
different than effectiveness. This, however, does not mean that compliance is easy or
cheap. The majority of the decrees have been extended in order to meet substantial
compliance, usually determined by 95% compliance for a period of two years. While
most of the police departments have generally been compliant, with the exception of
Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, it is clear that police brutality and/or discrimination
has not ended in these cities.
Many scholars have discussed the problem with attempting to reform local police
departments with legal mechanisms, rather than substantive policy changes.
Another fundamental problem with DOJ oversight is the lack of focus on community
policing. Rather, the federalization of local police departments moves in the opposite
direction of that. While problematic police departments must be reformed, widening the
gap between the police and the communities they serve is not the answer.
Furthermore, the various consent decrees should address and resolve the unique
issues of a particular police department. Yet, the language, structure, and process of each
consent decree has been remarkably similar. The consent decree template has been
used repeatedly despite conclusive analysis of its results.
Another major problem is the priority of meeting arbitrary deadlines, over
achieving comprehensive reform. Additionally, sustaining reform has proven difficult
once the decree has been lifted. Complete police reform does not happen in five years,

and, although some changes are worthwhile, it is crucial to continue them after the decree
is lifted. The addition of Early Warning Systems and the restructuring of citizen
complaint protocol are promising, but trusting the police to continue to use these after a
decree lifts has proven unreliable.
The reality is that systematic police reform is difficult when it only occurs in a
very limited number of police departments spread all over the country. All the while, the
other 18,000 police departments continue to become more militarized, indoctrinate using
the us-vs-them mentality, and not hold officers accountable for unconstitutional actions.
Although much more research is needed to determine the best methods for police reform,
the DOJ consent decree method has not proven effective at stopping police brutality and
discrimination.