Professional Documents
Culture Documents
What happens to policy implementation when the process suffers from problems of
coordination? In this article, the focus is on how central-local relations create interorganisational coordination problems, which in the long run affect the implementation of
policies in urban governance. In the case of the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) in
Bangladesh, the central-local relationship is determined by the political identity of the mayor.
By virtue of his attachment with the party in power, the RCC receives more favours especially
in terms of the allocation of resources from the central government. These resources facilitate
the completion of many development projects.
Introduction
Modern societies suffer from various challenges, including environmental
protection, fighting poverty or reducing unemployment, which pose many
difficulties for a single authority to manage. This is why the concept of
"inter organisational coordination" has gained paramount importance in
the implementation research literature (Lund 2005: 3). Several scholars
consider that coordination between authorities is inherently good. What
has been learnt from game theory is that coordination among actors will
usually lead to the best mutual solutions (Ostrom 1990). This article
addresses how central-local relationship affect inter-organisational
coordination, which in the long run affects policy implementation in urban
governance in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent state in 1971, has not
yet developed appropriate strategies, policies, and institutions necessary
to cope with urban governance. The country has typically followed a
centralised system of policy making and resource allocation in which intergovernmental transfers are unstable, not well defined, and lack an adequate
system of incentives. In spite of having a legal-institutional framework of a
decentralised system of local government, in reality there has been little
decentralized governance at the local level. Besides, given the lack of fiscal
resources and limited decision-making power of local governments, the
level of decentralised government that exists has been largely ineffective
because of a lack of accountability, a concentration of power by the municipal
executives, obsolete laws and regulatory framework, limited administrative
41
2.
the framework of the constitutional state. The first model suggests that local
government, because of its closeness to citizens and their problems and
needs, should be highly autonomous. The second model suggests that the
state is the sovereign political institution, but that it can invest different
kinds of subordinated political institutions with delegated power. The clash
of these two sets of ideas may be referred to as "localism" versus
"integrationism"5 (Montin & Erik 2000: 12).
Empirically, local government can mean different things depending on
the perspective from which it is viewed. In the first perspective, it can be
defined as a politically autonomous sphere with different characteristics,
which depend on the particular system of local government. Page (1991),
for example, uses the concepts of "legal localism" and "political localism" in
order to contrast different ways in which local government politicians can
influence local decisions. The first broad method is to use their constitutional
or legal status. The second is to use their political authority as democratically
legitimated representatives of the locality (Page 1991 cited in Montin & Erik
2000: 12).
Another way of defining and measuring different types of autonomy is
to use a "resource perspective" in which local government has a greater or
lesser degree of control over different critical resources through the use of
constitutional-legal, financial, political and professional controls (Rhodes
1997; Elander & Montin 1990 cited in Montin & Erik 2000: 12). For example,
local governments may have at their disposal a number of constitutionallegal resources, but they might not have the political, financial or professional
resources for real policy-making (Montin & Erik 2000: 12). From an
integrational perspective, local government can be described as a semiautonomous political institution with a greater or lesser capacity for political
action. It can be defined, for example, as a "principal agency" or in terms of
"partnership" (Kjellberg 1995). Other types of integration of central and local
governments which can be found in related literature are "dual
subordination" (the former Soviet Union), "dual supervision" (France), "area
subsidiarisation" (Germany) and "functional regulation" (United Kingdom)
(Montin & Erik 2000: 13).
It is appropriate here to make a distinction between at least two
situations of central-local government relations. In the first of these, local
government is highly subordinated and local authorities may also be
functionally divided into different policy sectors. In the second, centrallocal government relationships could be defined in terms of a partnership
where there is a certain amount of room for negotiation and access to central
state power. Local government may depend on receiving resources from
central government, but the state may in turn depend on local government
to implement national policies (Sharpe 1970). The central government may
therefore be sensitive to pressure from local governments.
In the context of Bangladesh, central-local relations have always been
an issue. In statutory terms, central-local relationships have historically been
47
authoritative in nature. This may be due to the colonial legacy and the
absence of democratic government at the centre for a considerable period
of time. The central government primarily exercises its control over the local
governments through its field level functionaries such as the local chief
executive officers or secretaries and the heads of various offices of district
administration which are involved in the activities of local governments. In
addition, local governments are further controlled through a plethora of
intricate and complicated orders and circulars from different ministries and
agencies, which very often contradict the underlying legal framework.
Under the law, the central government is also empowered to carry out
inquiries into the affairs of local governments. After an inquiry, if the
government considers that a local government is unable to discharge its
duties, has failed to meet its financial obligations, and/or has exceeded or
abused its power, the government may declare the body to be suspended
for a period as specified by law (Huq 2001: 11-12).
The central government also exercises substantial financial and
administrative control over local governments in different ways. This is
especially the case in the allocation of resources. For the financing of
development projects, local governments depend fully on central
government grants. In the allocation of grants, the central government has
often acted beyond its power. The allocation of grants depends on the
existing relationship between a local government and the central
government. The central government, ignoring rules and norms, allocates
more grants to those local bodies which are administered by mayors
belonging to the ruling political party. The bodies with mayors from the
opposition suffer from various disparities accentuated by the central
government. In such situations, there is possibility of problems of
coordination among the various organisations involved, which in the long
run affect policy implementation at the local level.
Against this background, the following hypothesis is appropriate: the
more the access to central government, the lesser will be the problems of
coordination in policy implementation at the local level.
Policy Implementation
A policy is a broad guideline of actions designed to achieve some objective(s)
or goal(s). A policy can be transformed into several programs or projects in
order to realise the broader objectives as envisaged in the policy. It is said
to be "public" when it is concerned with the public interest and formulated
by legal government machinery. Jenkins (1978 as quoted in Howlett &
Ramesh 1995: 5) defines "public policy" as a "set of interrelated decisions
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals
and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those to achieve".
After a public problem has made its way onto the policy agenda, various
48
50
* Autonomy vs.
centralisation
* Problems in
fund
management
* Relations with
central
government
* Autonomy
Central-local
relations
Independent
variable
Inter-organisational coordination
Dependent variable
Outcome
* Satisfactory
public service
delivery
* Minimisation of
cost
* Unsatisfactory
public service
delivery
* Cost increases
Bad
* Delay in
project
completion
Policy implementation
Good
* Timely project
completion
Figure 1
Analytical Framework for the Study
Development and Cooperatives (LGRD & C). For the financing of its
development budget, the RCC depends largely on government grants,
although it has the power to levy taxes on people, the income of which is
negligible. All of the policies of the RCC are passed in the Corporation
Parishad that consists of the Mayor, thirty elected ward commissioners,
and ten elected women commissioners. The Corporation Parishad takes
decisions on various projects proposed by various departments. During
the later part of each financial year, every department makes their demands
in terms of various projects for the forthcoming financial year. The normal
process is that each department places its demands before the concerned
Standing Committee. Currently, there are eleven Standing Committees in
the RCC. Then, the demands of each department are considered and
recommended in their respective Standing Committee meetings. After the
demands are recommended, they are placed before the Corporation Parishad
meeting for approval. They are finally passed or otherwise by a majority
vote in the Parishad.
The immediate responsibility for infrastructure development rests with
the Engineering Department in the RCC. Every year, this department
proposes a number of projects relating to the development of infrastructure.
Once the projects have been approved, the department is responsible for
implementing them.
The RCC and its Engineering Department cannot independently
perform all of the construction work required. They need to liaise and
coordinate their activities with various central government organisations
with ownership or other interests concerning roads and drains. The main
organisations are the Roads and Highways Department (R&HD), the Local
Government Engineering Department (LGED), and the Rajshahi
Development Authority (RDA). The arrangements involved are depicted
in Figure 2.
Central-Local Relations and Inter-organisational Coordination
The question of autonomy is an important variable in the study of centrallocal relations. Although urban local government bodies in Bangladesh enjoy
a degree of operational autonomy, they are in no way independent of the
central government in the country's overall administrative system. As a
result, there are a number of areas of interaction between an urban body
and the government, covering legal, operational and financial matters
involving control and supervision by the government. Here, the concern is
to consider the types of central-local relations that exist for the RCC and
how these relations affect inter-organisational coordination on the basis
of answers from respondents in the RCC.
All but one of the seven respondents referred to there being a positive
relationship between the RCC and the central government. They attributed
52
53
E n g in e erin g
D e p a rtm e n t
S ta n d in g
C o m m itte e
C o r p o ra tio n
P a rish a d
P o licy fo rm u la tio n
M in istry o f L o ca l G o v e rn m e n t, R u ra l
D e v e lo p m en t a n d C o o p e ra tiv e s
E n g in e e rin g
D e p a rtm e n t
P o lic y
im p le m e n ta tio n
F ig u re 2
T h e R C C a n d In fra stru c tu re P o lic y
RDA
R &HD
LGED
In v o lv ed g o v e rn m en t
o rg an isa tio n s
the central government makes laws and rules for all local bodies,
including the RCC; and it can also control the RCC through so-called
standing orders;
b. the Mayor may be removed from office at any time, without assigning
any reason; the government may also supersede the entire RCC or
suspend a Department of the RCC;
c.
the government may assign any function to the RCC; similarly, it can
also take away any function from the RCC at any time;
f.
the government can inspect the RCC at any time; the RCC has to send
the central government an annual report on its activities;
g. for forming additional standing committees, the RCC must obtain the
permission of the government;
h. the schedule of posts in the RCC has to be sanctioned by the government,
and no appointment beyond the schedule is allowed;
i.
the RCC can not directly negotiate with foreign donors or private
investors; and
j.
References
Elander, I & Montin, S 1990, "Decentralization and Control: Central-Local
Government Relations in Sweden", Policy and Politics, 18.
Fayol, H 1916, General and Industrial Management (Original Published in French;
Translated 1949), London: Pitman Publishing.
Howlett, M & Ramesh, M 1995, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Huq, M et al 2001, Policy Brief on Administrative Reform and Local Government, CPD
Task Force Report, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue.
Jenkins, W I 1978, Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective, London:
Martin Robertson.
Khan, M M 1997, "Urban Local Governance in Bangladesh: An Overview", in Nazrul
Islam & M M Khan (eds), Urban Governance in Bangladesh and Pakistan, Dhaka: Centre
for Urban Studies.
Kjellberg, F 1995, "The Changing Values of Local Government", in H Teune (ed),
Local Governance Around the World, The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Lund, Martin 2005, Does Cooperation Improve Implementation? Central-local Government
Relations in Active Labour Market Policy in Sweden, Working Paper, Institute for Labour
Market Policy Evaluation, Uppsala.
McLaughlin, Milbrey W 1985, "Implementation Realities and Evaluation Design",
in R L Shotland & M M Mark (eds), Social Science and Social Policy, Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Meter, D S V & Horn, C L V 1975, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual
Framework", Administration and Society, 6(4).
Mohit, M A 1992, "Institutional Management for the Development of Dhaka
Metropolitan Area: Problems and Prospects", in N Islam & A I Chowdhury (eds),
Urban Land Management in Bangladesh, Dhaka: Ministry of Land, Government of
Bangladesh.
57
Montin, S & Erik, A (eds) 2000, Towards a New Concept of Local Self-Government?
Recent Local Government Legislation in Comparative Perspective, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Ostrom, E 1990, Governing the Commons, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Page, E C 1991, Localism and Centralism in Europe. The Political and Legal Bases of
Local-self Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rhodes, R A W 1997, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance,
Reflexibility and Accountability, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Robinson, D et al (eds) 2000, Managing Development: Understanding InterOrganizational Relationships, London: Sage in association with the Open University
Press.
Sharpe, L J 1970, "Theories and Values of Local Government", Political Studies, 18(2).
Siddique, Kamal et al (eds) 2000, Overcoming The Governance Crisis in Dhaka City,
Dhaka: The University Press.
Task Force on Urban Governance, National Policy Forum 2001, CUS Bulletin on
Urbanization and Development, Centre for Urban Studies (Dhaka), 41 (July-December).
The Daily Star (an English Daily), Internet Edition, 3 March 2003, Dhaka: http://
www.thedailystar.net/
The Holiday English (Weekly), Internet Edition, 26 September, 2003:
www.weeklyholiday.net/260903/count.html
The Independent (an English Daily), Internet Edition, 9 May 2003, Dhaka:
www.independent-bangladesh.com
The Rajshahi City Corporation Act 1987, Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, Ministry
of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.
Yin, R K 1994, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed), Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Pranab Kumar Panday is a PhD researcher in the Department of Public and Social Administration at
the City University of Hong Kong and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration
at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh.
58