Professional Documents
Culture Documents
International Review
Volume 3, Number 1 Spring 2013
Staff
Editor-in-Chief:
Samir Kumar
Assistant Editor-in-Chief:
Andrew Ju
Editors:
Natalie Tecimer
Matthew Prusak
Dhwani Thapar
Taline Gettas
Rebecca Braun
Cristina Patrizio
The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdisciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international
studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the
University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like
to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.
Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between
theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.
SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates
valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.
ISSN: 1545-2611
Contents
1.
The Political Economy of Mad Cow Disease and U.S.-Japan Trade Relations
Daye Shim Lee
11
2.
Why Did the United States Enter the 1991 Persian Gulf War?
A Study of Psychological Theory and Offensive Realism
Leyla Tosun
27
3.
41
4.
63
Editors Note:
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fifth issue of the Southern California International
Review (SCIR). This bi-annual undergraduate research journal based at the University of
Southern California is a unique opportunity for students to spread their ideas to a wider
audience. By fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related
fields throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of the global
challenges facing our world today. The need to not only study, but also interrogate, international relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. Thus, this journal
desires to contribute fresh ideas to this fascinating and essential field of study.
The pieces contained in the journal are written by undergraduate students and were chosen
by our eight-member editorial board through a rigorous review process. The graphics, templates, and formatting were also done by our editorial board. In an effort to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety of topics in the
realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to interdisciplinary
learning.
The articles included in this issue span international studies, from a political economy perspective on the rising and trendy Myanmar to a multi-theoretical look at the 1991 Gulf
Crisis, the structure of the questions asked in these articles shows the breadth of the discipline we represent. As you read, ask yourself, Why is this article important? My hope is
that your question is answered, and you find yourself with a host of more incisive questions
that would incite enthralling answers. Keep an eye out for the authors you read, for they
might soon be in a position to influence the very issues that they have examined!
SCIR would not exist without the generous funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim
Memorial Endowment, and the support of the School of International Relations. Significant
appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert English, and the wonderful faculty and staff
that have assisted us over the past three years. I would particularly like to thank Linda Cole
for her unwavering support at each step of the journey.
Finally, we would love to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments,
questions, and suggestions at scinternationalreview@gmail.com, and we will take these into
account or offer a thoughtful reply.
Sincerely,
Samir Kumar
Editor-in-Chief
Since the first American case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow disease) in 2003, beef trade has been one of the most sensitive issues in U.S.-Japan trade relations.
Japan immediately banned the import of all U.S. beef and refused to resume the trade until
2006. Even then, Japan made the stringent age limit a prerequisite for the lifting of the ban.
However, following the discovery of mad cow disease in California last April, Japan voluntarily
announced that it would not suspend any U.S. beef imports. Moreover, Japan decided to ease
the age restrictions that had been in place for more than six years. This paper examines the
stark contrast between Japanese responses to U.S. Mad Cow cases in 2003 and 2012, and raises
questions about Tokyos underlying rationale for its trade policies. Based on the broader understanding of realist theory in international relations, this paper argues that Japans policies
on U.S. beef imports were motivated by specific national interests, and that Mad Cow disease
in the United States provided the Japanese government with political leverage to pursue those
goals.
Introduction
Japans policies on U.S. beef imports since the U.S. outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow disease) have been driven by factors beyond food safety
concerns. When the first American case of Mad Cow disease broke out in 2003, Japan
banned the import of U.S. beef entirely and refused to resume trade until the U.S. Congress
threatened to take retaliatory measures in 2006. Even then, Japan eased the ban only for
meat from cattle of twenty months or younger.1 Following the discovery of Mad Cow disease in California this April, however, Japan voluntarily announced not to suspend U.S.
beef imports.2 It also decided to ease the age restrictions that had been in place for more
than six years. The stark contrast between Japanese responses to U.S. Mad Cow cases in
2003 and 2012 raises questions about Japans underlying rationale for its trade policies. This
paper argues that the inconsistency in Japans policies on U.S. beef imports is often driven
by specific national interests, and that Mad Cow disease in the United States provided the
1 Stephanie Strom and Hiroko Tabuchi, A Break for Embattled Ranchers, The New York Times, January 29, 2013, accessed
March 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/global/japan-to-ease-restrictions-on-us-beef.html.
2 Aya Takada, Japan Has No Plan to Halt U.S. Beef Imports on Mad-Cow Case, Bloomberg, April 25, 2012, accessed
December 7, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-25/japan-has-no-plan-to-halt-u-s-beef.
12
Japanese government with diplomatic leverage to pursue those goals: the 2003 ban sought
to protect the Japanese beef industry in the aftermath of Japans own Mad Cow outbreak
in 2001, while the 2012 decision aimed to win the U.S. support for Japans bid to join the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In order to demonstrate these points, this paper examines
the effects of Mad Cow disease on U.S.-Japan beef trade and provides the political and economic analyses of Japanese responses in 2003 and 2012. It then concludes by discussing the
implications of Japans beef policies for the contemporary U.S.-Japan trade relations from a
realist perspective.
13
House of Representatives and an upper house called the House of Councilors. Furthermore,
Politicians from rural areas in the Diet often hold key agricultural policy positions.7
Due to these three factors, Japanese farmers and their determination to maintain the
governments agricultural protection policies play a critical role in Japans political economy. Yet, globalization and the increasing volume of international tradeespecially through
free-trade agreements (FTAs)have led the Japanese government to seriously consider
implementing measures of agricultural reform. This owes to the fact that with strict agricultural protection measures, the Japanese government cannot persuade other countries to
sign FTAs with Japan. Consequently, Japanese farmers tend to oppose any sign of free trade
talks as FTAs are designed to significantly reduce or eliminate tariffs and import quotas on
most goods and services traded between countries. They fear that the dismantling of Japans
high protective farming tariffs will open up the country to cheap foreign agricultural goods
and ultimately threaten their livelihood. According to the Japanese Agricultural Ministry,
90 percent of Japans rice cultivation would disappear, and wheat, sugar, dairy and beef production would also be harmed if the country joined the free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific.
This would cost Japan about 4 trillion yen (or $49 billion) in lost production, as well as 3.4
million lost jobs.8 The Japanese government therefore, faces a dilemma over whether to open
the countrys agricultural sector to the rest of the world and join the free trade movement,
or to maintain its traditional policy that would please its domestic farmers.
In response to these recent developments in Japans political economy, many international scholars and policymakers in the field of U.S.-Japan trade relations have debated
about the possibility of major agricultural reform taking place in Japan. Scholar Aurelia
George Mulgan, for example, wrote extensively on how Japans agricultural politics are in
transition from an old to a new model due to broader changes in the Japanese political
economy.9 According to Mulgan, these changes include efforts to rebalance electoral power
from rural factions and to strengthen the executive power of the Prime Minister over the
Diet. At the same time, she argues that the impact of these changes on Japans agricultural
policy has been modest as vestiges of the old system continue to complicate the outlook
for agricultural reform.10 It is, therefore, difficult to currently predict the speed and extent
to which the Japanese government will open up its agricultural sector to foreign competition. However, the general consensus in both academia and the policy-making world is
14
that the strong political influence of Japanese farmers over Japans trade policies will not be
exhausted anytime soon.
In the United States, the agriculture sectors political power remains strong despite the
decline in the farm population. Meat producers, in particular, maintain great political clout
because they exercise influence over both the legislative and the regulatory areas.11 Unlike
large corporations on Capitol Hill that spread their funds across many different groups of
lawmakers in attempts to gain more political influence, the meat industry targets a small
number of relevant legislators who have a direct impact on the industrys interests.12 The U.S.
meat industry, like its Japanese counterpart, is also represented by powerful trade and lobbying groups such as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Meat Institute;
the American Farm Bureau Federation spends between $2 million and $8 million per year
lobbying for its agenda in Washington.13 Given the substantial amount of power granted to
Congress by the U.S. Constitution and the important role that legislators play in American
politics, it is not an overstatement to say that lobbyists and interest groups representing the
U.S. meat industry indirectly exert significant influence on the formation of U.S. foreign
trade policy. Furthermore, these organizations often secure their influence by establishing
close ties with officials in the upper echelons of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The importance of politics in the U.S.-Japan beef trade is clearly reflected in the beef
and citrus case of the 1980s. At the time, the American agricultural sector was expressing
frustration over its failure to gain fair access to Japanese markets, and pressures were
building up in Washington for retaliatory measures.14 In 1982, the Reagan Administration
decided to push for new beef and citrus quotas that would allow American farmers to export
significantly more beef and citrus to Japan. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Congressional elections
were to take place in the same year, and President Reagan needed the support of the states
that produced beef and orangesFlorida and almost all states west of the Mississippito
win the seats in the Senate and the House.15 Yet, the U.S. government eased its pressure to
open Japans agricultural market in the first six months of 1983, especially after Japanese
Prime Minister Nakasone visited Washington in January of that year. Japans domestic elections were coming up in April and June, and Japanese voters were criticizing Nakasone
for giving in to American pressure and selling out Japans interests.16 In consideration
11 Steve Johnson, The Politics of Meat: A Look at the Meat Industrys Influence on Capitol Hill, PBS, April 18, 2002,
accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/politics.
12 Ibid.
13 Senate Office of Public Records, Annual Lobbying by American Farm Bureau, OpenSecrets.org, October 31, 2012,
accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021832&year=2010
14 C. Peter Timmer and Michael R. Reich, Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and Oranges, Challenge 26, No. 4,
(1983): 20-21.
15 Ibid.
16 Timmer and Reich, Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and Oranges, 22.
15
of the Japaneseleaderships difficult position amid domestic political turmoil, U.S. Trade
Representative Bill Brock made only one public reference to agriculture during his visit
to Tokyo in February, and this comment was in response to a question brought up by the
Japanese side.
This brief history demonstrates the deeply ingrained interplay between politics and
economics in the U.S.-Japan beef trade. It also provides a real-world example of how domestic politics play a critical role in shaping a countrys foreign policy. Domestic politics matter
even more in modern liberal democracies like the United States and Japan, where authority,
legitimacy, and the power of a national leader are derived from voters. Therefore, leaders
must pay close attention to the demands of their peopleespecially in the areas of economics and trade because these issues are directly affect peoples livelihoodsin order to win
elections. Domestic politics and elections thus influence the timing and the intensity of demands on international trade, and often set the tone of negotiations by affecting government
positions and defining acceptable limits of adjustment. Additionally, with globalization and
the arrival of the information age, it is no longer possible for national leaders to pursue an
entirely secretive, elite-driven foreign trade policy. Each of these factors combines to create
more cohesive ties between politics and economics in todays world.
17 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 113: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, November 2002, http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs113/en.
18 U.S. Congressional Research Service, BSE (Mad Cow Disease): A Brief Overview (RS22345; December 19, 2006), by
Geoffrey S. Becker, accessed December 7, 2012.
16
(OIE) recognized the United States as a controlled risk country for Mad Cow disease, meaning that U.S. beef from cattle of all ages could be safely traded.19
Despite various organizations safety assurances on American beef, U.S.-Japan beef
trade relations rapidly deteriorated after the outbreak of Mad Cow disease in the United
States. Prior to the first American Mad Cow case, Japan was the leading importer of U.S.
beef.20 Initially, the level of meat consumption in Japan was low as the Japanese had traditionally relied on fish for protein and avoided eating red meat for cultural and religious
reasons. However, the Japanese began to consume more beef when the U.S. occupied Japan
after the Second World War and started to import U.S. beef in significant quantities in the
1970s. During the occupation, the USDA played a critical role in supporting the Japanese
school lunch program, and this partnership between the USDA and the Japanese food sector
helped the U.S. beef industry gain more access to the Japanese market.21 As a result, Japan
alone accounted for 37 percent of U.S. beef export markets in 2003.22
In response to the USDAs announcement of the first American Mad Cow case, many
countries, including Japan, banned the import of U.S. beef. Although Canada and Mexico
resumed importing some U.S. beef in 2004, Japan and South Korea refused to reopen their
markets. Having lost more than 60 percent of its beef export markets, the United States went
from claiming 18 percent of the worlds beef market to only three percent.23 In October 2004,
Japan and the United States developed a new framework for their beef trade. Japan agreed to
admit low-risk U.S. beef if the United States could verify that it had come from cattle under
21 months old. Japan also demanded that the U.S. definition of specified risk materials
(SRMs) expand to include the entire head, and that these be removed before arriving in
Japan.24 However, Japan did not allow U.S. beef imports until December 2005 and abruptly
halted the imports again in January 2006, following the discovery of vertebral column bones
in several boxes of veal from New York. Despite U.S. apologies and promises of stronger
safety inspections, Japan did not reopen its market until July 2006, and even then, the U.S.
beef industry gained only limited access.
The Japanese governments reluctance to reopen its beef market sparked anger among
U.S. officials. In addition to signaling a financial disaster, this decision became a sensitive
19 U.S. Meat Export Federation, A Ruling by the World Organization for Animal Health, http://www.usmef.org/newsstatistics/press-releases/a-ruling-by-the-world-organization-for-animal-health-or-oie-adds-some-14313.
20 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Japan-U.S. Beef Trade Issues (RS22115; April 13, 2005), by Geoffrey S. Becker,
accessed December 7, 2012.
21 U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, The History of U.S. Beef Exports to Japan, Last Modified
April 30, 2009, http://www.thebeefsite.com/articles/1965/the-history-of-us-beef-exports-to-japan.
22 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade (RS21709; December 6, 2006), by Charles
E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker, accessed December 7, 2012.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
17
issue evoking strong emotions from both sides.25 President George W. Bush frequently
brought up the matter in his phone calls with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,
and Vice President Dick Cheney urged Japanese officials to lift the ban on U.S. beef imports during his visit to Tokyo in 2004; both the President and the Vice President had come
from the countrys biggest beef-producing states. Other American politicians also argued
that Japan should guide its decisions based on science, not politics.26 Frustration mounted
on both sides as the negotiations dragged on. In Washington, Congress passed resolutions
calling for retaliations against Japanese exports to the United States. In Tokyo, the politicians and consumer groups criticized U.S. pressure as a form of foreign intervention. In
both countries, Mad Cow disease and beef trade were no longer a mere glitch in U.S.-Japan
economic relations; the whole issue had become a symbol of national sovereignty and pride.
18
sales fall by as much as 50 percent due to concerns over Mad Cow disease.29 The price of
domestic beef dropped significantly, and 60 percent of Japanese consumers stopped eating
beef.30 To exacerbate the situation, a second infected cow was found in November 2001, followed by a third and fourth in the next month, further pressuring the Japanese government
to seek measures that would help the countrys beef industry recover as quickly as possible.
When the first U.S. Mad Cow case was found in 2003, Japanese beef industry was still
recovering from its own Mad Cow outbreaks. Japanese consumers willingness to pay higher
prices for higher quality domestic beef, which had traditionally served as the main driving force behind Japanese beef production, no longer existed to support the domestic beef
industry. Furthermore, a surge in the production of the famous Kobe beef in the United
States began to further threaten the Japanese beef industry.31 The U.S. exporters sold the
Kobe style beef in Japan at lower prices, which began to replace the BSE-threatened domestic Kobe beef. Until the Japanese government banned the import of U.S. beef in 2004,
many Japanese consumers preferred to buy Kobe style beef from the United States over its
authentic Japanese counterpart.32
The discovery of Mad Cow disease in the United States gave the Japanese government
both an incentive and an opportunity to pursue trade policies that would protect the crippled domestic beef industry, resulting in three big political advantages. First, it provided the
Japanese government a legitimate reason to ban imports of U.S. beef and preserve its strict
beef trade policies. With food safety at stake, no country could blame Japan for playing
tough against the United States, especially during the months that immediately followed
the December 2003 Mad Cow disease outbreak in the state of Washington. Rather, other
countries followed Japan when setting standards and implementing regulations on Mad
Cow disease for their own beef markets. For example, South Korea announced in 2004 that
it would not resume the import of U.S. beef until Japan did.33
Second, the 2003 U.S. Mad Cow case restored the Japanese governments diplomatic
power in negotiating with the United States by creating a level playing field for the two
countries. The Japanese government began to raise its voice about not just regulating U.S.
beef imports in Japan but also increasing Japanese beef exports to the United States. In fact,
before Japan finalized its decision to resume U.S. beef imports in December 2005, the United
States had agreed to permit Japanese beef to enter the U.S. market.34 Prior to this revision,
29 Hyun J. Jin and Won W. Koo, The Effect of the BSE Outbreak in Japan on Consumers Preferences, European Review of
Agricultural Economics 30, No. 2 (2003): 177.
30 Ibid.
31 Meghan Staley, Kobe Beef, American University TED Case Studies, No. 711, December 2004, accessed December 17,
2012, http://www1.american.edu/ted/kobe.htm.
32 Ibid.
33 Brad Glosserman, U.S.-Japan Relations: History Starts Here, CSIS Comparative Connections 7, No. 1 (2005): 1-3.
34 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade.
19
the U.S. government had banned Japanese beef imports due to animal disease outbreaks in
Japan, such as Mad Cow and foot-and-mouth diseases.
Third, the outbreak of Mad Cow disease in the United States bolstered some Japanese
beef producers claim that Mad Cow disease in Japan came from infected imported animals.
When the ninth Japanese Mad Cow case was confirmed in November 2003, a number of
Japanese meat companies started blaming imported beef as the source of Mad Cow disease. A farm ministry panel in Japan also announced that the source of the outbreak was
either cows imported from Britain in the 1980s or meat-and-bone-meal imported from Italy
before 1990.35 Although no one had directly pointed at the United States, its own outbreak
in 2003 strengthened Japans unproven argument that domestic beef is safe, while creating
the notion that Mad Cow is inherently a Western disease.36
These three points suggest that the primary goal of the Japanese government in restricting U.S. beef imports was to protect and revive the exhausted domestic beef industry.
It earned Japan both the justification and time to slow down the rate of beef imports into
the country. As the resumption of trade was delayed, however, the Japanese government
faced sharp criticisms from the United States for not satisfactorily explaining why Japanese
beef is safe to eat when U.S. beef may not be.37 Yet, the fear of Mad Cow disease in Japan
continued to be played out in favor of the Japanese government in protecting the countrys
endangered beef industry.
20
mediajust a day after the USDAs announcement of Mad Cow disease outbreak in
Californiathat Japan is importing beef from the United States under the rules agreed
between the two nations, and will therefore not halt imports merely because of the new
discovery in California.40 This starkly contrasts with Japans immediate closure of its borders
to U.S. beef after the 2003 discovery of Mad Cow disease in the state of Washington.
Japan also made another friendly gesture and announced its decision to further relax
the current Japanese restrictions on U.S. beef imports. The age restriction on importing
beef from cattle of 20 months old or younger had been in place since 2006 and faced widespread criticisms from U.S. exporters; the age limit meant that only 20 to 30 percent of U.S.
beef would meet the new Japanese standard.41 Yet, in September 2012, the Japanese Cabinet
Offices Food Safety Commission began to consider lifting the age restrictions. According
to the revised plan, imports will be allowed for U.S. beef from cattle of 30 months old or
younger.42 A November op-ed piece that appeared in The Yomiuri Shimbun praised this
decision as a realistic approach based on scientific knowledge and international trends in
connection with an important issue.43 What is this issue then, and why did it prompt the
Japanese government to deviate completely from its long-held protectionist trade policy
towards U.S. beef imports?
The biggest motivation behind the Japanese governments decision to ease the import
restrictions on U.S. beef was Japans potential entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Joining the TPP, a U.S.-led multilateral free trade agreement that encompasses the economies of the Asia-Pacific, has been one of the most important items on former Japanese
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Nodas agenda. The TPP not only promotes the elimination or
review of tariffs, but also seeks to liberalize services such as banking and insurance. This
was significant to Noda because Japans domestic service industries have remained largely
isolated from foreign competition and, as a result, the country has struggled to create new
opportunities for entrepreneurs and workers in the service sector.44
The United States, the country that holds the key to Japans future participation in the
TPP talks, has demanded the Japanese government to ease restrictions on the age of U.S.
beef imports. In a meeting with Prime Minister Noda in April 2012, President Obama reiterated that the beef issue was one of the most important preconditions for Japans entrance
40 Takada.
41 Glosserman, 1-3.
42 Unknown, Beef Move to Aid TPP Entry: Relaxing Controls on U.S. Imports Likely to Boost Japans Bid, The Yomiuri
Shimbun, September 7, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T12.htm.
43 Unknown, Easing Import Restrictions on U.S. Beef Justifiable, The Yomiuri Shimbun, November 3, 2012, accessed
December 20, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T121103002010.htm.
44 Unknown, A TPP Stimulus for Japan, The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2012, accessed December 20, 2012, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443819404577632953734008664.html#articleTabs.
21
into the TPP.45 Therefore, when Mad Cow disease broke out in California earlier that month,
it gave Japanese officials an additional political advantage to set the tone of negotiations regarding the countrys TPP entrance. Announcing their plan to not halt the U.S. beef imports
immediately after the Mad Cow disease outbreak in California meant that Japan was helping
the United States to convince other countries that U.S. beef was safe, and to maintain relative
stability in the Asia market. Since Japan had offered a helping hand first, it was then naturally
the United States turn to listen to Japanese demands. In fact, following the Japanese announcement regarding the continuation of importing U.S. beef, Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Max Baucuswhose committee has jurisdiction over trade including the TPP
mentioned in the official statement that he is encouraged by the steps taken by the Japanese
government, and that the United States and Japan were headed in the right direction.46
Japans decision to lower the level of restrictions placed on U.S. beef imports was thus
a political move to reassure Washington that Japan was making an effort to improve U.S.Japan trade relations, as well as a diplomatic maneuver to gain U.S. support for Japans entrance to the TPP. Additionally, it was an attempt to create a more diplomatic atmosphere
before the meeting between Noda and Obama, which was scheduled to be held at the end
of April that year.47
Concluding Remarks
Understanding Japanese Motives: A Realist Perspective
The above political and economic analyses of Japanese responses to the 2003 and 2012
U.S. Mad Cow cases imply that Japan has been, and is likely to continue, using Mad Cow
disease as a powerful political tool in pursuing its national interests. According to the realist
paradigm of international relations, states always act in accordance with their national interests, with self-preservation as their primary goal.48 In the absence of an international sovereignthat is, within the anarchic structure of the international systemit is also in a states
best interest to search for opportunities to gain more power over other states to guarantee
its national security.49 In todays world, economic prosperity and the capability to influence
international trade are important sources of state power. Unlike the liberal school of thought
in international relationsthat the increase in international trade results in growing inter45 Unknown, Japan to Ease Age Restrictions on U.S. Beef Imports, The Ashahi Shimbun, October 23, 2012, accessed
December 10, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201210230057.
46 Unknown, Japans Action on U.S. Beef Encouraging U.S. Senator, Reuters, September 5, 2012, accessed March 27,
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/05/us-usa-japan-beef-idUSBRE88415P20120905.
47 Ibid.
48 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
49 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
22
dependence among states, inducing them to seek mutual rather than national interests
inconsistent Japanese reactions to Mad Cow disease outbreaks in the United States in 2003
and 2012 confirm that states rarely operate based on trust. This is especially true considering
that Japan has been widely recognized as one of the most important U.S. allies in the world.
Based on this theoretical assumption, as well as evidence provided by the two case studies of Japanese responses to Mad Cow disease outbreaks in the United States, it is fair to conclude that the United States does not have as much control over the direction of U.S.-Japan
beef trade as it did prior to 2003. Washington may raise the issue of fairness and demand
that the U.S.-Japan trade relations operate based on trust, but Japan will make decisions that
best serve its national interest. Although Japan is currently willing to ease its age restrictions on U.S. beef imports, this is likely to be only a temporary improvement. Depending on
the intensity of Japans desire to join the TPP or the potential emergence of a new Japanese
political goal in the future, it remains possible that the Japanese government will develop a
very different approach to its beef import policy. Given the dramatic comeback of the rightwing LDP led by Shinzo Abe in the most recent Japanese election, as well as the increasing
share of Australian beef imports in the Japanese market that has been replacing U.S. beef,
there remain serious doubts as to how much U.S.-Japan beef trade relations can improve in
the years to come.
23
further liberalizing other Japanese economic sectors are likely to remain the top priorities
for the administration on the bilateral trade front. In that sense, Mad Cow disease will continue to be one of the biggest obstacles for the United States in pursuing its trade interests
with Japan. As demonstrated throughout this paper, Mad Cow disease is not simply an epidemic. Instead, it is an important element of political economy that greatly influences the
contemporary U.S.-Japan trade relations.
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Strom, Stephanie. Case of Mad Cow Disease Is Found in U.S. The New York Times. April
24, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/health/
case-of-mad-cow-disease-is-found-in-us.html.
Strom, Stephanie, and Hiroko Tabuchi. A Break for Embattled Ranchers. The New
York Times. January 29, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/29/business/global/japan-to-ease-restrictions-on-us-beef.html.
Tabuchi, Hiroko. White House Presses Japan to Reopen Market to U.S. Beef. The New
York Times. April 7, 2010. Accessed December 10, 2012. http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/08/business/global/08beef.html.
Takada, Aya. Japan Has No Plan to Halt U.S. Beef Imports on Mad-Cow Case. Bloomberg.
April 25, 2012. Accessed December 7, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201204-25/japan-has-no-plan-to-halt-u-s-beef.
Timmer, C. Peter, and Michael R. Reich. Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and
Oranges. Challenge 26, No. 4 (1983): 18-24.
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20, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044381940457763295373400
8664.html
Beef Move to Aid TPP Entry: Relaxing Controls on U.S. Imports Likely to Boost Japans
Bid. The Yomiuri Shimbun. September 7, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012. http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T12.htm.
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T121103002010.htm.
Japan to Ease Age Restrictions on U.S. Beef Imports. The Ashahi Shimbun. October 23,
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AJ201210230057.
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Why did the United States enter the 1991 Persian Gulf
War?
A Study of Psychological Theory and Offensive Realism
Leyla Tosun
This paper will use two international relations theories to explain the U.S. entrance into the
Gulf War in 1991. Yuen Foong Khongs psychological theory suggests that the 1938 Munich
agreement analogy weighed heavily upon President George H.W. Bush and ultimately influenced his decision to use aggressive military force rather than to appease Saddam Hussein.
John Mearsheimers offensive realism theory can also explain this event by evaluating the U.S.s
desire to intervene in response to Iraqs control of vast oil reserves, and its ambition to become
a regional hegemon. The merits of each theory in explaining this event in U.S. history will be
considered and potential weaknesses in both will be addressed. Ultimately, it is concluded that
both theories have strong explanatory value for the U.S. invasion of Iraq on January 17, 1991.
On August 2, 1990 Iraqi troops invaded neighboring Kuwait. In response, on January
17, 1991 the United States and coalition forces began an aerial bombardment of Iraq. This
paper will present two theories offering possible explanations for the United States invasion
of Iraq. First, psychological theory will demonstrate how the Bush administration employed
the 1938 Munich Conference analogy in justifying aggressive action against Iraq instead of
appeasement. Next, offensive realism theory will be presented as an alternative theoretical
explanation this second theory uses the Iraqi pursuit of regional hegemony and a decrease
in U.S. security to explain this involvement. Finally, this paper will examine any potential
weaknesses in these theories and evaluate their merits in explaining the U.S. entrance into
the Gulf War.
Background
To fully analyze the U.S. entrance into the Gulf War, the regional context behind the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait must first be examined. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the
U.S. provided billions of dollars worth of aid, weaponry of non-U.S. origin, military training, and military intelligence to Iraq. While not considered allies, the U.S. also provided
substantial diplomatic support for Iraq during this conflict. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also
provided additional monetary support, but resulted in Iraqs heavy indebtedness to the two
Gulf nations by the conclusion of the war. Although Iraq pressured Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
Leyla Tosun
28
to forgive the debt, the two countries refusal resulted in mounting tensions after the war
in addition to a continuing territorial dispute with Kuwait and conflicts over OPEC quotas.
This territorial dispute had its origins in the creation of two separate countries, Iraq and
Kuwait, by Britain in 1922. Since Kuwaits independence from Britain in 1961, Iraq has refused to recognize Kuwait as an independent state, viewing the land as legally a part of Iraq.
This dispute was compounded by a conflict over oil production, in which Iraq correctly accused Kuwait of overproducing above the OPEC approved rate. As supply increased, prices
declined, reaching prices as low as ten dollars per barrel in 1989, resulting in a loss of seven
billion dollars a year to Iraq.1 Additionally, U.S.-Iraqi relations began to spiral downwards
due to human rights abuses and Iraqi threats to use binary chemical weapons on Israel,
and Iraq became increasingly isolated.2 It was in this atmosphere that Iraq invaded Kuwait
on August 2, citing violations of the OPEC quotas.
Psychological Theory
In light of this historical context, this study begins with an examination of the psychological elements behind the policy decisions that lead up to the January 17 bombardment
of Iraq. Yuen Foong Khong, a scholar of psychological theory, studies the use of historical
analogies in policy decisions. In his book, Analogies at War, he explains the six diagnostic
tasks of an analogy: define the situation, stake an assessment, make an implicit policy prescription, predict the likelihood of success, assess the moral, assess the moral righteousness,
and warn of dangers associated with a decision.3 According to Khong, these analogies provide a framework for how leaders begin to understand the problems that they face, and can
significantly influence their policy decisions. The Bush administration employed a crucial
analogy in its decision to invade Iraq in January 1991. The administration found itself facing
the aggressive regime of Saddam Hussein, and it used the Munich analogy to ultimately
decide against a weak foreign policy of appeasement.
29
Leyla Tosun
power. By the time that the Allied Powers finally sought to halt German expansion with
a declaration of war in 1939, the Nazis had already taken control of Czechoslovakia and
invaded Poland. Their failure to deal firmly with Hitler in 1938 suggested an unwillingness to get involved and emboldened Hitler in his quest to conquer Europe.4 The Munich
Agreement is generally viewed as a failure of appeasement and of the international community to defend values of freedom and sovereignty against the rising power of a dangerous
dictator.
For decades following World War II, the Munich analogy was used as a warning against
the dangers of a weak foreign policy in response to an aggressive state. In the months leading up to the 1991 Gulf war, this analogy impacted the framework that President George
H.W. Bush used to understand the situation at hand. He was influenced by his meetings
with Margaret Thatcher and with the National Security Council, and ultimately adopted this
analogy. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Bush insisted that he was
not contemplating any type of military intervention. However, in the weeks that followed, it
is evident that his thinking changed. Later in the day on August 2, Margaret Thatcher flew
to Aspen, Colorado to meet with President Bush to discuss the conflict in the Middle East.
From her memoirs, Thatcher recounts that she cited the costs of appeasement in the 1930s
and told Bush that they needed to move quickly to stop Saddams aggression. She urged that
the United Nations had to enact a strict economic embargo upon Iraq until they withdrew
from Kuwait.5 Thatcher had no reservations as to the seriousness of the conflict or in her
belief that appeasement was not a viable option. Shortly after their meeting, the two leaders
held a press conference where Bush altered his earlier statement about the possibility of a
military intervention, instead insisting that he had not ruled it out as a policy tool. While
Bush did not specifically mention the Munich analogy in the closed-door meetings of the
next few days, it can be surmised that Thatchers argument had an impact on his thinking
for the remainder of the conflict, as the administration resolutely decided that appeasement
was not an option after the Aspen conference.
In a National Security Council meeting the next day, on August 3, President Bush said,
The status quo is intolerable language that proves that appeasement was not an option
for him.6 National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft supported this notion, stating
that, to accommodate Iraq should not be a policy option.7 He later announced that a military track was being considered in addition to diplomatic and economic ones. Secretary
of Defense Dick Cheney gave updates on possible military fronts and Chairman of the Joint
4 The Learning Network, Sept. 30, 1938 | Hitler Granted the Sudentenland by Britain, France and Italy, The New York Times,
September 30, 2011, Accessed March 10, 2013.
5 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: Visiting Aspen [memoirs extract], Accessed March 10, 2013.
6 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: National Security Council minutes [declassified 2000], Accessed March 10, 2013.
7 Ibid.
Leyla Tosun
30
Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell explained two possible options for using force in the
region. From these statements, it can be concluded that military intervention was already a
strong policy choice for the Bush administration.
Two days later on August 5, in another closed meeting of the National Security Council,
when Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady suggested that the administration have someone
talk to Saddam, General Scowcroft replied, We dont want to appear to be negotiating.8 The
President also responded: Our solidarity would crumble if we are seen talking to Saddam.9
Scowcroft talked about deterring Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia, while President Bush
inquired about using F-16s to destroy his tanks.10 The group of men meeting that day was
clearly not moving towards a policy of appeasement, but rather one of aggressive economic
sanctions and military force. There seemed to be a sentiment in the meetings that appeasing
Saddam was never really a credible policy option.
On August 6, in a press conference after meeting again with Margaret Thatcher in
Washington, President Bush made definitive declarations such as, These things will be
enforced, whatever it takes.11 While the decision to use force to intervene in Kuwait was
not publicly discussed for the first month of the conflict, it is evident from these statements
that it was a valid policy option being discussed behind closed doors. The administration
appeared convinced that appeasement would not suffice and that a coalition of forces had
to show a strong front against Saddams aggression.
31
Leyla Tosun
eventually global domination. These comparisons seemed to imply that both leaders were
evil tyrants with the potential to gain much more power if left unchecked.
The use of this analogy linking Hitler and Saddam was especially prevalent among pundits who drew upon the analogy to persistently advocate for military action. For example, in
The Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer-prize winning syndicated columnist
(who was generally considered to be a conservative commentator), criticized Bush for his
seeming hesitance in adopting the Munich analogy, saying that Saddam would get what
he wants [Kuwait and Saudi Arabia] because there is no one to stop him George Bush is
not eager to get bogged down in a land war in a God-forsaken patch of desert.13 On August
5, New York Times editor Abraham A.M. Rosenthal commented that it seemed that the
Western powers had failed in their duty to address the plainest threats of aggression
since Adolf Hitler.14 Prominent Democrats in Congress also criticized Bush for his disinclination towards military intervention. Senator Clairborne Pell, Democratic Chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the first American politicians to characterize
Saddam as the Hitler of the Middle East after the invasion of Kuwait, additionally citing
President Bushs earlier lack of resolve to head-off an invasion.15
While the media and politicians used this language to mount pressure upon Bush to intervene militarily in Kuwait, the administration also started adopting this analogy between
the two men. By August 8, it was obvious that the inundation of editorials and speeches
on the Hitlerian nature of Saddam Husseins invasion had influenced the Bush administration. The central image of President Bushs August 8, 1990 speech, Addressing the Iraqi
Invasion of Kuwait, was none other than the 1938 Munich conference. About four minutes
into the speech he said, If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression
or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s,
we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.16 This explicit
language indicated that the administration would no longer push for economic sanctions
alone, but that it was prepared to use force to resist aggression. Even prior to this public
speech, President Bush referred to Saddam as a madman who has shown he will kill, in a
National Security Council meeting on August 6.17 It is evident that the Bush administration
13 Charles Krauthammer, A Festival of Appeasement, The Washington Post, August 5, 1990: E19.
14 A.M. Rosenthal, Making a Killer, The New York Times, August 5, 1990: E19.
15 The Iraqi Invasion; Invading Iraqis seize Kuwait and its oil; U.S. condemns attack, urges united action, The New York
Times, August 3, 1990.
16 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address on Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait (August 8, 1990), George H. W. Bush, Accessed November 10, 2012, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5529.
17 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: National Security Council minutes [declassified 1999], Accessed March 10,
2013.
Leyla Tosun
32
was seeing similarities between Hitlers behavior in World War II and Saddams aggressive
actions.
In the weeks following President Bushs August 8 speech, the Munich analogy emerged
many more times in his rhetoric. In a speech to Department of Defense employees one
week later, Bush again invoked the World War II analogy saying, A half a century ago our
nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should and could have
been stopped. Were not about to make that same mistake twice.18 Just five days later on
August 20, in a speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars in Baltimore, Bush praised Mikhail
Gorbachev for condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He said that this showed that
nations which joined to fight aggression in World War II can work together to stop the aggressors of today.19
Leyla Tosun
33
choice was a military invasion. Therefore, as Khongs psychological theory would predict,
the Munich analogy clearly had an impact on President Bushs assessment of the situation
in the Gulf, and his decision to invade Iraq.
Weakness
While the psychological theory has great value, we must address a weakness in its explanation. It is reasonable to propose that Khongs psychological theory is uncertain as
to whether President Bush would have employed the Munich analogy without Margaret
Thatchers influence and pressure from media and politicians. However, this concern can
be remedied by examining George Bushs personal experiences. Bush had served as a fighter pilot during World War II and was shot down at one point. While in office as the Vice
President to Ronald Reagan, Bush spoke about the influence that his combat service had
on him. He is quoted as saying, Theres no question that today it has a real impact on me
as I give advice to the President.23 Khong theorizes that policy makers tend to latch onto
comparisons that are easily accessible in their mind, often due to personal experiences. He
quotes social psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross as saying, Objects and events in
the phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they were sui generis configurations but rather are assimilated into preexisting structures in the mind of the perceiver.24
Khong continues, Individuals will be strongly attached to historical lessons in which generational and personal effects reinforce one another.25 Applying this to George H. W. Bush,
it is evident that the generational effects of living through the destruction of World War II,
combined with his personal experience of being shot down as a naval aviator, would combine to create a strong historical lesson. This lesson leads the theory to predict that Bush
would have a proclivity towards using the Munich analogy, and so it is safe to assume that
his employment of the comparison was not wholly due to outside influences. However, another theory must additionally be considered to explain why the U.S. entered the Gulf war.
Leyla Tosun
34
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer discusses the effect that this system has
on state behavior. He argues that ultimately, states are trying to survive in a self-interested
world. The best way to ensure their security is to achieve regional hegemony because there
is a security dilemma in which an increase in one states power will decrease another states
security. However, Mearsheimer theorizes, Regional hegemons do not want peers.27
Therefore, a state will try to check a potential hegemons power, since they would prefer
that there be at least two great powers in another region. Mearsheimer labels this check on
power as offshore balancing.28 The two powers would balance one another and prevent a
potentially threatening hegemon from emerging. Offensive realism theory also suggests that
a state will have an incentive to strike preemptively because it can never be certain of another
states true intentions. This leads to an aggressive international system with big payoffs for
the state that strikes first.
The theory of offensive realism can help to explain the events in the Gulf in 1990-1991.
When Saddam invaded Kuwait and positioned troops capable of invading Saudi Arabia, he
created a potentially dangerous increase in Iraqs regional and global power. In his August 8
speech, President Bush acknowledged his concern over this possible regional power imbalance in when he said, Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the worlds
second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. Its the fourth largest military in the world.29 The invasion of Kuwait gave Iraq access to Kuwaiti oil and a further advance could put them in control of Saudi reserves. Bush spoke of the dangers of this move in
saying, An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power,
as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors neighbors who control the
lions share of the worlds remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be
dominated by one so ruthless.30 This kind of jurisdiction over the worlds largest oil reserves
would allow Iraq to monopolize a strategically important amount of oil. This created a potential threat to the economic and political security of the United States.
35
Leyla Tosun
states control, because rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies.31
This explains the U.S. concern that Iraqi oil revenue could be used to advance Iraqs military
capabilities. The U.S. saw this increase in military power as a threat to the balance of power
in the region. Also in accordance with offensive realism theory, it was clear that the Bush
administration did not want Iraq to become a hegemon in the Gulf. In numerous speeches,
President Bushs rhetoric emphasizing the need to keep the status quo in the region is clear.
In his August 8 speech he said that he was committed to the security and stability of the
Persian Gulf.32 In the same speech he continued on to say that Iraq cannot be allowed to
benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.33 He emphasized the importance of Saudi power in
maintaining this status quo in by saying, The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is
of vital interest to the United States.34 The U.S. did not want Iraq to become a regional hegemon because it would be a powerful foe in global relations. The U.S. much preferred that
Saudi Arabia retain its oil reserves and the accompanying influence and power in order to
preserve another strong power in the region to balance Iraq.
The fact that the U.S. was not invading Iraq to occupy them was important. In President
Bushs January 19 speech, he stated, Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation
of Kuwait.35 This emphasized the point that U.S. interest in the region was to prevent Iraq
from becoming a regional hegemon and therefore to restore the status quo. In his October 1
speech to the United Nations, President Bush used similar rhetoric to expand the perceived
security threat to the entire globe. He said, The present aggression in the Gulf is a menace
not only to one regions security but to the entire worlds vision of our future.36 Mearsheimer
notes that the balance-of-power logic, which theorizes that security increases when military capabilities are evenly distributed so that no one state is stronger than the others, often
causes great powers to form alliances and cooperate against common enemies. This can be
seen in the coalition of 28 countries that invaded Iraq in 1991. They banded together to
prevent an aggressive state from gaining a disproportionate amount of power by invading
Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia.37
Leyla Tosun
36
Economic Impact
Aside from the security threat that Iraq as a regional hegemon posed, there were also
economic concerns regarding oil. By invading Kuwait, Iraq became very close to Hama,
Saudi Arabias most valuable oil fields. Iraqi control of these fields would have given it an unprecedented monopoly, which could have caused a huge spike in the price of oil. Normally,
Saudi Arabia possessed such large oil reserves that it could increase or decrease production
levels to moderate world prices. However, if Iraq gained control over Saudi reserves, Saddam
would be able to force world prices up by restricting production.38 Even though the U.S. only
gets about 16 percent of its oil imports from the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC, Saudi
Arabia owns the second biggest oil reserves in the world, and so the world price of oil would
be affected by an Iraqi monopoly of these resources.39 An increase in the world price would
ultimately cause oil to become more expensive for everyone, including the United States.
Overall, the U.S. imports about 60 percent of the crude oil that it uses, so global price increases would definitely impact U.S. commercial interests.40 Oil is the most important source
of energy for the U.S. economy, as it is needed for production, fuel, and transportation. Iraqs
seizure of oil in Saudi Arabia could potentially cause an abrupt fall in the world supply if
they chose to restrict production, resulting in a surge in world prices, a disruption of U.S.
economic activity, and perhaps even a recession.41 These very real worries about dependence
on oil surfaced in President Bushs August 8 speech, as he stated, Our country now imports
nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence.
Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable
to Iraqi threats.42 Only a month later, he again acknowledged, Vital economic interests are
at risk.43 This kind of rhetoric showed how worried the Bush administration was about the
impact that Iraqi monopoly over oil reserves could have on the health of the U.S. economy,
as well as on the world economy as a whole.
37
Leyla Tosun
United States Military is the biggest single purchaser of oil in the world.44 The B-52 bomber
consumes 3300 gallons per hour, the F-16 Falcon burns 800 gallons per hour, and the KC-135
Statotanker (an aerial refueling tanker aircraft) consumes 2650 gallons per hour.45As an official U.S. report states, Out of the $20 billion the U.S. military spent on energy in 2008,
82.5% was to purchase crude oil.46 Additionally, a fleet of 500 Humvees would consume over
1,660 gallons of gas in just one hour.47 These figures show how crucial an affordable, reliable
supply of oil is to the U.S. military in being able to work effectively. An increase in the world
price of oil or a shortage could pose a huge risk to national security if the military does not
have access to the oil it needs to function properly.
Weaknesses
While Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism has great value, a weakness in its application to the present case must be addressed. Offensive realism explains the economic
threat that Iraqi control of Kuwait and/or Saudi oil reserves posed. However, due to the
cooperation among other oil producing countries to increase their exports to the United
States during this period, we cannot be certain that the potential long-term economic consequences would actually have been as dire as the theorys predictions. However, even though
the predicted devastations were only estimated, potential economic effects clearly still had
an impact upon the administrations thinking as can be judged by their rhetoric and documentation of conversations during closed meetings. This is not a detrimental weakness
underlying the theory, because as has been detailed in this paper, both major political and
military considerations were of importance in addition to economic effects. An increase in
Iraqi power and their potential regional hegemony were very plausible security risks to the
United States.
Leyla Tosun
38
Bushs lack of resolve to use military force in the Gulf. The theory also provided an applicable explanation for the Presidents behavior due to his personal and generational experiences with World War II. Offensive realism can also explain the U.S. entry into the Gulf
War, although based on different considerations. John Mearsheimers theory evaluated the
international system as being anarchical and driven by the security dilemma, resulting in
aggressive tendencies. This theory evaluated the increase in Iraqs regional power and what
this potential hegemony meant for the United States economic, political and military security. Examining the situation in the Gulf and noticing an imminent change in the status
quo led the Bush administration to see the necessity for offshore balancing. The events and
decisions leading up to the American invasion of Iraq can be told through more than one
story, so ultimately both these theories help us to explain this event in United States history.
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40
Leyla Tosun
-----. Address to the United Nations (October 1, 1990), George H. W. Bush. Accessed November 10, 2012. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3426.
-----. Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq (January 16, 1991), George H.W. Bush.
Accessed November 10, 2012. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3428.
The Munich Analogy - Reagan, Bush, and the Gulf War. Encyclopedia of the New American
Nation. 2012. Accessed 18 Nov. 2012. http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E- N/
The-Munich-Analogy-Reagan-bush-and-the-gulf-war.html.
Naval Historical Center. Vice President Bush Calls World War II Experience Sobering.
Accessed November 10, 2012. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq10-3.htm.
Rosenthal, A.M.. Making a Killer. The New York Times, August 5, 1990, E19.
Schwab, Orrin. The Gulf Wars and the United States: Shaping the Twenty-first Century. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009.
Simons, Geoff. Iraq: From Summer to Post-Saddam, 3rd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Smith, Jean Edward. George Bushs War. New York: H. Holt, 1992.
Top 5 Facts on U.S. Military Oil Consumption. Accessed November 18, 2012. http://www.
newlaunches.com/archives/top_5_facts_on_us_military_oil_consumptio n.php.
TreeHugger. 7 Gas Guzzling Military Combat Vehicles. Accessed March 12, 2013. http://
www.treehugger.com/cars/7-gas-guzzling-military-combat-vehicles.html.
William A. Dorman and Steven Livingston, News and Historical Content: The Establishing Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate in Taken by Storm: The Media, Public
Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War. Ed. by W. Lance Bennett and David L.
Paletz. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994, 63-64.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. How Dependent Is the United States on Foreign
Oil? Last modified July 16, 2012. Accessed November 18, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32.
1 Rudyard Kipling, Letters from the East, (London: Lovell Company, 1899).
2 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Myanmar, Accessed November 20, 2012.
3 Authors note: Burma and Myanmar are used interchangeably in this paper. While the name was officially changed from
Burma to Myanmar in 1989, President Obamas administration uses both terms to refer to the nation and we have followed
suit.
42
Figure 14
4 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, Asia Report No. 231 (2012): 3.
43
military juntas continued reign remains unclear. This lack of clarity about Myanmars present economic and political situation highlights the uncertainty of its future.
The notion of democracy is tantalizing, but a constantly mutating national identity has
so far translated into nationwide instability. This national identity continues to oscillate as
the trifecta of national symbolism (name, flag, and capital) have fallen to the whims of the
military junta. All three have changed under the military regime: the flag was redesigned in
1974 and again in 2010, the captial was moved from historical Yangon to the juntas citadel of
Napyidaw in 2005, and the name of the nation has been changed from Burma to Myanmar.5
This lack of clarity about even Myanmars present identity highlights the uncertainty of its
future.
The question then arises as to whether the nation can overcome its challenges to achieve
democracy and economic stability. Globalization left Myanmar economically disadvantaged
and isolated, a condition further compounded by the nations lack of established democratic
and economic institutions. When looking for comparisons throughout history, the development of Botswana may provide some insight into Myanmars predicament. To achieve the
rapid and consistent growth of a developing nation like Botswana, Myanmar must overcome the challenge of simultaneously attempting to establish both a democratic process
and also economic development. If Myanmar implements effective reforms it can leverage
its rich natural resources, emerging labor force, and proximity to dynamic economies such
as China and India. Myanmars current course is unprecedented both in its impact on the
global economy and on the nation itself. Nevertheless, hope remains for Myanmar. In these
uncharted waters, despite the risks of economic tremors, social unrest, and political uncertainty, Asias latest tiger may yet rise.
History
If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should have
to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.
Vladimir Lenin6
44
By 1886, the exportation of natural goods had dwarfed the rest of the economic output.
Burma became primarily a commodity exporter, dependent on the sale of teak, petroleum,
lead, gemstones, and rice.7 To facilitate these exports, the British allocated funding to the
resource-laden Burmese railways, a move which led to the deterioration of the countrys
road system and the development of the general infrastructure. Further consolidating imperial control, essential industries such as rice milling and the financial sector remained firmly
ensconced in British hands.8 At the end of World War I, the British imperialist system came
to an end, but the Burmese were left with little to show for over half a century of colonial rule.
Following colonial exploitation, the people of Burma were unsurprisingly xenophobic towards international trade and foreigners. This sentiment became a motivating factor
behind the post-colonial regimes, which quarantined the country and minimized the
impact of the world economy on domestic trade. Isolationist policies only compounded
the difficulties facing an independent Burma by adversely impacting its economic growth,
policy, and living standards.
45
correlation between international and domestic prices.11 Moreover, all of this regulated only
the import side of the economy.
In terms of free enterprise, the new policies were even more crippling for those hoping
to engage in export. The rice and teak industries became state monopolies, immediately
impacting the productivity of the agricultural sector. Rice cultivators lost their incentive to
produce marketable surpluses as the SAMB (State Agricultural Marketing Board) bought
output at a fixed price that was significantly lower than global market prices. Coupled with
the import-licensing regime, domestic prices of consumer goods soared well above world
prices, triggering rampant inflation.12 Myanmar had effectively hamstrung its own trade
policy.
Though misguided and counterproductive, Myanmars early economic policies were
typical of a newly independent Asian country.13 The economic model of primarily stateowned enterprises with limited private sector ownership rarely proved successful, and
Myanmars case was no different. Public sector management was a fiasco and state industries
fared terribly when pitted against their international competitors.14 The prospect of a liberalized market was thwarted by the nations bitter colonial experience. Consequently, commercial privileges were granted to Burmese firms on the basis of political and familial ties rather
than a reputation for economic competence. This further entrenched the stagnant economy.
As rice production fell, the economy continued to falter; by the 1960s, the government
began to recognize the major limitations of monopolizing industrial development. In search
of alternatives, the Pyidawtha Plan a blueprint for economic development and perhaps the
Burmese economys only hope of a free market without massive political change emerged.
However, it stalled due to a lack of funds. The measure proved too little, too late; profits from
the already crippled agricultural sector would have been required to subsidize any reforms.
The situation reached a point where economic change was inevitable.
Demographic issues also erupted concurrently. Ethnic groups demanded more power
in return for entering the Burmese Union under the post-colonial framework. Furthermore,
as large, sector-specific companies failed, different economic classes also began clamoring for greater societal equality.15 The growing power of labor unions, religious organizations, volunteer groups, and professional guilds alarmed the Burmese military, which had
assumed the dominant role among government factions amid the struggle for economic
dominance. Together, the twin forces of financial struggle and ethnic tensions triggered a
11 Kichi Fujita, Fumiharu Mieno, and Ikuko Okamoto, The Economic Transition in Myanmar after 1988: Market Economy
versus State Control (Singapore: NUS in Association with Kyoto UP, 2009): 1-4.
12 International Monetary Fund, Myanmar 2011 Article IV Consultation, No. 12/104 (2012): 3.
13 Peter John Perry, Myanmar (Burma) since 1962: The Failure of Development (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007): 3.
14 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, 3.
15 Kyi, Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy, 9-10.
46
military coup that installed the modern-day junta. In 1962, to ostensibly engineer national
stability, the Burmese Army wrested power from the hands of the business community and
the civilian population through a military coup dtat.16
47
through foreign trade and investment.20 However, the regimes attempt to cultivate an economically liberal yet politically authoritarian state backfired. To cultivate a democratic
image and assuage the concerns of world powers, the regime hosted an election expecting to
win in 1990; the junta was shocked and enraged when the National League for Democracy
(NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a decisive victory. In response to the election results, the junta placed her under house arrest and imposed severe restrictions on political
activities.
In protest over the draconian policies of the military regime, Western powers began
dissolving bilateral developmental programs and imposing economic sanctions in order
to pressure Myanmar to adopt formative political and human rights policies. As these actions began damaging an already fragile economy, General Thein Shwe attempted to install
discipline-flourishing democracy by restoring a market-based economy. Continued economic uncertainty and a lack of faith in the governments policies have thus far hindered the
development of the nations economy.
48
freedom, and equality while steadfastly shouldering the State[s] duties. At the same time
I would like to urge and invite all the people to work together with the government in the
interests of the nation.22 Myanmar has felt political and economic winds shift, and the pressure for transformation is imminent. The government yielded to this pressure by ending
many repressive policies and began to target economic growth.
Myanmar has begun to give positive indications of political reform following this
speech. Shortly after Thein Sein assumed the presidency, he signaled the transformation
of Myanmar by ushering in a host of political reforms, ranging from the release of political
prisoners to renewed ceasefires with separatist groups.23 In fact, Seins first reform decision was the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. She was subsequently granted
a seat in the lower chamber of the national legislature. This represents a marked shift from
the regimes prior treatment of the opposition. Moreover, a law to reduce print and online
censorship was passed in late 2012.24 While no single change would provide a complete solution, the speed with which all these changes are occurring may indicate an authentic era
of reform for Myanmar.
Increased freedom of the press has fueled hopes of improving relations with ethnic minorities who seek a voice in shaping national discourse. The current government has taken
significant steps in dealing with minority, environmental, and foreign interests. Though the
peace is fragile, leaders have arranged a ceasefire with ethnic minorities in the Kachin state,
and steps are being taken to address the factions grievances. The government has also halted
construction of the Myitsone Dam in the Kachin State due to unfavorable environmental
and social impactsa remarkable shift in policy from the harshly utilitarian focus of previous administrations.25
Political progress was further encouraged by President Obamas visit on November 18,
2012. During his stay, Obama assured American support for Myanmars transition towards
a more democratic process. While speaking at the University of Yangon, he remarked, Im
not somebody who thinks that the United States should stand on the sidelines and not want
to get its hands dirty when theres an opportunity for us to encourage the better impulses
inside a country.26 U.S. support of a free state that empowers the Burmese citizenry reinforces the strength and permanency of the political transformation, which appears to have
taken root at all levels of society.
22 Unknown, The New Light of Myanmar: President U Thein Sein Delivers Inaugural Address to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Burmanet News, Last modified 2011, Accessed November 10, 2012.
23 Rieffel, The Myanmar Economy: Tough Choices.
24 Lewis Macleod, More Press Freedom for Myanmars Media, BBC News (2012).
25 Rieffel, The Myanmar Economy: Tough Choices, 2.
26 U.S. Government, The White House, President Obama Speaks at the University of Yangon, Last modified 2012, Accessed
November 20, 2012.
49
As for its economic development, Myanmar continues to capitalize on a bounty of national resources. With a GDP of 51.9 billion USD, the state is already a major exporter of gas
and other natural materials including teak wood, oil, and precious and non-ferrous metals.27
At roughly 55 percent of Myanmars total export, energy and mining account for the majority of the countrys foreign revenue and 86 percent of its foreign direct investment.28 In addition to mineral and gas deposits, the renewable fisheries and agriculture sectors have the
potential for further trade development. Moreover, food production already exceeds selfsustaining levels and can be further cultivated to increase international sales of rice, palm
oil, and grains. Mechanization of an underdeveloped agriculture sector should expand job
opportunities in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector.
Despite these successes, the government is fostering economic reform through fiscal
policy changes. In early 2012 the government abandoned fixed exchange rates to the SDR
in favor of a floating market rate set at 818 K to 1 USD in order to reduce monetary arbitrage.29 The new floating rate will provide investor security and help solve the national deficit by eliminating deficit monetization. Other fiscal matters on the administrations reform
agenda include establishing clear regional and state budgets while streamlining income
taxes and taxing civil officers.3031 To reduce inflation, the government issued bonds to pay
down the fiscal deficit, eliminating expensive, endless refinancing. According to the World
Bank, sanctions lifted from the EU, the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Japan further simulated
business confidence and generated interest from multinational corporations contemplating
expansion into Myanmar.
The time has never been more opportune for foreign investors. The recent passage of
the Foreign Investment Law by the Thein Sein administration in November 2012 marks a
new era for international commerce. It clarified the nature of Burmese land leases, a notoriously byzantine process, and promised to restore nationalized businesses to their former
owners at current market value. Low caps on investment had previously stunted foreign
equity participation, but the new bill authorizes the Burma Investment Commission, a new
body independent of the older, corrupt system, to sanction foreign investments of up to
one hundred percent equity on approved projects. This rapid awakening has spurred the
foreign business community to invest in this untapped market. Announcing high hopes for
a profitable venture, Coca Cola returned to Myanmar following the suspension of Western
27 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Myanmar.
28 International Monetary Fund, Myanmar 2011 Article IV Consultation, No. 12/104 (2012): 4.
29 The World Bank, International Development Association and International Finance Corporation Interim Strategy Note for
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar FY13-14, Last modified 2012, Accessed October 30, 2012.
30 Jesse Oeni, Myanmar: Opportunities in Asias Last Frontier Economy, International Enterprise Insights 2 (2012): 10.
31 Rieffel, The Myanmar Economy: Tough Choices, 4.
50
sanctions in July, 2012.32 Clearly, the new rules not only encouraged foreign companies to
invest in Myanmar but also renewed interest in joint ventures with local businesses a good
omen for future international commercial success.
Myanmar is poised to benefit from the experience of its developing neighbors whose
comprehensive reforms and global engagement serve as models for development and partners for new economic opportunities. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
framework is the best example; it unites Southeast Asian countries through common goals.
Motivated by its need to modernize and industrialize, Myanmar can easily relate to nearby
regional economies, which provide blueprints for its own economic and political objectives.
Myanmars need to play catch-up has its advantages. Given the effects of the recent global
financial downturn, Myanmar has learned cautious restraint from the experiences of other
nations, where economic growth fluctuates quickly and market responses are beyond objective parameters. Because political and economic restructuring are intertwined, change
requires careful and balanced planning. With its political mandate still precarious, the state
faces challenges and runs the risk of failing to successfully juggle the many changes, but the
current of sweeping change portends well for a liberated Myanmar.
Botswana
Botswanas progression of economic growthmanship has become the envy of its neighborswhich they should consider emulating.
Dr. Nake M. Kamrany33
51
Figure 235
At first glance, the Republic of Botswana appears to be a distant stretch from Myanmars
political and geographical reality, but upon closer examination remarkable similarities
emerge. Botswana was ranked among the poorest countries in Africa when it gained independence from the UK.36 Saddled with an unskilled work force and only 12 kilometers
of paved roads, Botswana appeared hindered with little to offset its limitations aside from
diamond exports.37 Botswanas greenhorn government, like Myanmars, took a hands-on
35 Image Source: http://www.mapsharing.org/MS-maps/map-pages-state-map/27-botswana-map.html
36 Ibid.
37 Daron Acemoglu, An African Success Story: Botswana (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
2001): 3.
52
approach in coordinating a national development plan. In 1970, an official Batswana38 government report explained its rationale as follows: the countrys available resources were
few and the problems facing the country were so great that it was only by careful planning
that these resources could be put to their most effective use.39 In many ways this mirrors
the rhetoric the current Burmese administration uses to justify its centralized methods of
liberalizing the economy.
Botswanas incredible economic growth indicates that despite inexperience it is feasible
to devise a winning strategy for steering a resource-rich nation towards success. Numerous
economic scholars have concluded that Botswana achieved spectacular growth because it
adopted sound policies; this indicates Myanmars crucial need to develop coherent policy
action.40 Although fueled by the states mineral wealth, the driving force in Botswanas economic evolution was the governments bold decision to channel the resulting riches back
into the domestic economy. If Burmese policymakers want to chart a path to economic
success, they may wish to look to Botswanas policy formulations in order to manage more
effectively their abundant natural resources.
53
In striving towards these goals, Botswana successfully avoided two traps that Myanmar
must now avoid: Dutch disease and white elephant projects. The economic phenomenon
labeled Dutch disease infects an economy when the appreciation of the real exchange rate
caused by one booming (usually a natural resource) sector makes the goods of other sectors
uncompetitive in international markets.42 If the government had chosen to spend the windfall immediately rather than to implement fiscal discipline via the Revenue Stabilization
Fund, Botswanas domestic costs would have outstripped the rise of its neighbors; this would
have skewed the real exchange rate, harmed the manufacturing sector, and crippled export
diversification. Similarly, because the resource boom was well managed, Botswana deftly
sidestepped white elephant projects, structures constructed in prosperous conditions that
cannot be sustained after completion. If Myanmar is to succeed, it must be cognizant of
these two potential issues.
With regard to central planning, Botswanas methodology for creating its national plans
could serve as a roadmap for Burmese legislators. As a democracy,43 Botswanas policymaking environment has the advantage of being informed by a consensus-based process. This
constant collaboration between stakeholders allows for a multifaceted approach amenable
to the many involved parties. This consultative process is the fundamental technique used
to assess potential policy reforms, whereby the government chooses to undertake comprehensive studies to evaluate issues before taking a course of action.44 Though Myanmar does
not possess the same rich democratic heritage as Botswana, the approach demonstrates the
best practices undertaken by a state that dealt with similar problems. Cohesive policies
that take note of the various stakeholders would reduce the risk of involved parties working
at cross-purposes and splintering the economy by driving it in conflicting directions.
Although there are yawning gaps between Myanmars and Botswanas political history, this requirement of policy coherency addresses the challenges Myanmar faces. Though
countries were originally British colonies, Botswanas economy had the advantage of a democratic system already in place, while Myanmars history of political reform is only now
approaching the threshold of a democracy.45 The speed with which political and economic
reform is occurring, combined with the limitations, in experience and expertise, of current policymakers, has resulted in ad-hoc decisions instead of the meticulously planned
approach employed by the Batswana. Myanmar has chosen alacrity over clarity. While key
reformers such as President Thein Sein are keen on moving away from the old, counterproductive ways, it is unclear what exactly the new economic policy will be.46 This degree
42
43
44
45
46
54
Forecast
Our country has all sound foundations. So, if we try our best, without doubt,
we will achieve our goal.
47 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform,6.
48 Ibid.
49 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, Asia Report No. 231 (2012): 8.
55
50 The New Light of Myanmar: President U Thein Sein Delivers Inaugural Address to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
51 Banyan, Crawling Up Through the Wreckage, The Economist, Accessed November 10, 2012.
56
In addition, the IMF and World Bank are providing consultative support and economic encouragement that could lead to an expansion of private consumption.53 Such signals could
indicate the beginning of genuine change for the better.
Progress is not perfect, as changes take time and must be structural. Some government
officials had unrealistic expectations and were subsequently disillusioned by false hopes. As
the Economist described it, these officers have been persuaded to go along with it anyway,
consoled with the belief that with the lifting of sanctions a sudden rush of foreign investment will quickly boost the economy out of the doldrums, and with it millions people out of
poverty maybe even enough to save some of the armys contested seats in the 2015 general
election.54 According to The New York Times, the civilian population continues to believe
that the governments apparent changes are merely money-making schemes.55 This forecast
hopes current reformers continue to appease all involved parties in order to push their
agenda, somewhat emulating what Deng Xiaoping was able to accomplish in China during
the 1970s. Moreover, the entire outcome hinges on the administrations ability to implement sound policy and create strong institutions necessary to run a stable market economy.
Whether or not this is possible remains to be seen.
52 U.S. Government, The White House, President Obama Speaks at the University of Yangon.
53 The World Bank, International Development Association and International Finance Corporation Interim Strategy Note for
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar FY13-14.
54 Banyan, Crawling Up Through the Wreckage.
55 Myanmar, The New York Times, Last modified 2012, Accessed November 10, 2012.
56 Banyan, Crawling Up Through the Wreckage.
57
In the short term, prospects seem positive. The recent passage of a landmark investment reform bill may have drastic implications for FDI confidence. President Thein Sein and
other key reformers appear confident in the strength of their political positions, and strong
pushback from the junta and hardliners is unlikely.57 In a speech to the National Parliament
on March 1, 2012, President Sein mentions, The national development strategy of our government is not aimed at developing a class or a community but aimed at developing every
aspect of all walks of life, all classes or all the people of the Myanmar polity.58
Under this model, by 2015, Myanmars upward trajectory will be readily apparent.
Myanmar has already committed to regional economic integration with the rest of the
ASEAN Economic Community, a system that will transform ASEAN into a region with free
movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and freer flow of capital.59 ASEAN
engenders to become a union much like the European Unions, allowing it to hedge against
growing Chinese power and have economic and political clout in diplomacy with the US
and EU. The degree to which Myanmar is able to handle this shift will dictate its economic
progress for decades to come. In a Golden Age outcome, the Burmese economy may climb
to greater heights and trigger an era of economic prosperity as it assumes a prominent role
in regional trade and gains the strength to negotiate with the world market.
It is vital to keep in mind that this paints an incredibly optimistic picture of a complex
and unstable transition. Aung San Suu Kyi warns, The most difficult time in any transition
is when we think that success is in sight. We have to be very careful that were not lured by
the mirage of success.60 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to have doubt in this forecast. As
mentioned in scenario one, there is a recurrent fear among citizens about the rhetoric of
change being only empty promises. Moreover, to expect a country that has spent the past
half-century mired in economic doldrums to suddenly spring forward in its development
without any internal experience with the free market may smack of a Panglossian worldview
to skeptics.
58
will lose their mandate and forfeit all the political capital needed to effect real change. Some
academics have wondered whether Myanmar will fail to capitalize on its reform potential.
Political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote to this effect when he stated:
They [the Government] are aligned with the crony capitalists who got rich working
with the military government over the past decade, and they are now, among other
things, holding up a new foreign investment law that the country desperately needs
in order to kick-start economic growth once sanctions are lifted. Many of the current
economic elite fear foreign competition and have been using economic nationalist arguments to limit future foreign ownership.61
The egalitarianism in Myanmar has moved forward leaps and bounds from once where
the country used to be, but this could easily be reversed given the countrys fragile political state. The country may regress and fall back into the dark abyss of corruption and illicit
drug trade along the boarder as erratic insurgencies with ethnic minorities spur conflict. The
Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, said in a statement in October 2012
that the countrys fabric of social order could be irreparably damaged if the violence was
not curtailed. The statement also argues that transition to democracy would be in jeopardy
if vigilante attacks, targeted threats and extremist rhetoric were not stopped.62
Penurious regions where the Burmese government has little control remain the biggest
base of drug production in Southeast Asia. The underlying drug trade increases the challenges President Thein Sein faces as he tries to push foreword with reform.63 The President
treads a fine line where alienating ethnic groups could destabilize political and national
reconciliation.
Recent trends suggest the likelihood of this scenario prevailing is very small. Hoping to
shore up the progress that has been made already, the US recently indicated a willingness to
reestablish a USAID mission to the tune of 167 million USD a year in aid.64 Moreover, much
of the international community wants Myanmar to succeeda victory for democracy, capitalism, and development. Myanmar will chair ASEAN in 2014, so the international spotlight
will be on it to demonstrate the capacity to spearhead regional governance. The US wants
Myanmar to succeed, a foreign policy victory where North Korean and Iranian diplomatic
issues have both proved trying under Obamas administration. Even neighboring China, an
authoritarian regime itself, Myanmar would benefit from a country eager to trade natural
61 Francis Fukuyama, What Myanmar Needs, The American Interest, Accessed November 12, 2012.
62 Myanmar, The New York Times.
63 Thomas Fuller, Drug Surge Clouds Myanmar Reform Effort, The New York Times, Last modified 2012, Accessed November 12, 2012.
64 U.S. Government, The White House, President Obama Speaks at the University of Yangon.
59
resources for the fruits of the Middle Kingdoms industrial base, not to mention serve as a
potential client-state, able to provide deep-sea ports for Chinas naval vessels.
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The 1980s brought about a variety of key developments for regionalism in Europe, namely the conceptual boost of the Jacques Delors Commissions vision to create a stronger, more
federal European Community. This became especially important with the enlargement of the
Community to include states in Greece, Spain and Portugal in which regional disparities were
severe. These developments increased the importance of European regional policy. As regions
have become an important part of the discourse surrounding European integration, they have
worked within the given structural constraints to secure the most effective means through
which they can attain their interests. Although much of the post-1980s optimism regarding regionalism has subsided, this paper argues that an increased focus on European integration has
strengthened regionalism within Europe. Using studies of specific regions in Scotland, Belgium,
and Spain, this paper sets out to demonstrate the growing power and influence of regions,
especially in terms of nationalist-separatist movements. Taking this analysis one step further,
this paper also seeks to argue that regionalism has likewise strengthened the European project
through the principles of both multilevel governance and subsidiarity.
Introduction
The mid-1980s marked the beginning of increasingly meaningful interplay between
European regions and the European Union (EU), specifically with regard to European integration. The importance of regional policy increased with the entrance of Greece in 1981
and Spain and Portugal in 1986, which created a European Community that was characterized by economic and social disparities.1 As a result, the already existing European Social
Fund (ESF) and European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) became
critical regional policy tools in shaping a cohesive response to this transformation known as
the Structural Action Policy. These funds worked to combat unemployment and regularize
agricultural markets, respectively. With these key facets of the new cohesion policy, underdeveloped regions became the focus through joint mechanisms such as rural development
funding.
The focus of these policies brought regions into the forefront of European integration
discourse. This was coupled with the significant support European Commission President
Jacques Delors, a staunch supporter of European unity and supranational governance who
1
John Loughlin, Europe of the Regions and the Federalization of Europe, Publius 26 No. 4 (1996): 152-153.
M. Beau Feibus
64
strove for federalism and decentralization of member states.2 In response to the new policies, regional lines were drawn and regions began to lobby at the supranational level for the
newly available structural funds.3 During this period there was an enormous amount of optimism regarding the perceived ascending role of the regions. However, over the course of
history, the path of regionalism has been one of ups, downs, and confusing implications. On
the one hand, many interpreted the Maastricht Treaty as heralding the death of the regions,
while others saw the establishment of the Committee of the Regions as proof of regions resurgence in power and influence. This paper contends that continued European integration
has strengthened regionalism in Europe, specifically in the context of nationalist-separatist
movements. Moreover this new regionalism does not threaten the goals of European integration; on the contrary, it is argued that regionalism, based on the principles of multilevel
governance and subsidiarity, and its goals actually enhance the legitimacy of the European
project.
This paper will explore the experiences of three regions or groups of regions in Europe
(the Belgian regions, Scotland and the Spanish autonomous communities) in order to determine the impact of European integration on regionalism. Although regions have experienced varying degrees of success using very different mechanisms, this overview concludes
that they have adapted their strategies to reach newly possible levels of autonomy. This
argument will show that integration has in fact strengthened regionalism. This will be followed by a brief discussion of recently heightened separatist calls from some of the regions
explored in this paper. Finally, the argument will be made that improvements in regional
advocacy and capability have likewise strengthened the idea of integration.
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M. Beau Feibus
culture of the nation-state in which they find themselves.5 For the purposes of this paper,
there is overlap between these historical/ethnic regions and political regions, which have a
degree of autonomy and administration. Further, regionalism in this framework is an ideology and a political movement advocating for greater control by the regions over the political,
economic, and social affairs of their regions.6
To argue for the positive impact that regionalism has on European integration, it is
important to comment on two of its key principles: subsidiarity and multilevel governance.
Subsidiarity, codified by the Maastricht Treaty, signifies the EUs agreement to only act in
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence if the objectives of the intended
action cannot sufficiently be achieved by the Member States, either at the central level or
at regional and local level.7 In other words, the principle implies that actions should be
taken at the lowest possible level of governance to be effective. Multilevel governance here
indicates an approach to European integration in which the state is no longer the only actor
that has the ability to influence EU policy.8 The state can be seen as experiencing an attack
from above (from supranational EU institutions) and from below (from regional and subnational actors).
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 is often viewed as the turning point for the regions relationship with European integration. It created the pillar system consisting of the European
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
Moreover, the EU was given greater responsibilities in more policy areas and the European
Parliament was strengthened.9 Generally, it is seen as a momentous step in European integration because it laid the foundations for an Economic and Monetary Union and advanced
political unity. Maastricht also created the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The CoR is
significant in that it established an official European body through which the regions could
interface in an advisory capacity with the Commission and Council. Although its establishment was seen as the beginning of increasing regional importance in the EU, in hindsight
this new institution has been the high-water mark of progress for regionalists. This could be
a result of the lack of headway made by the CoR in gaining more capacities or a side effect
of the fact that enlargement has taken precedent both in EU discourse and on the agenda
(perhaps cementing the dominant position of states in the Union).10
5 Loughlin, Europe of the Regions and the Federalization of Europe, 148.
6 Ibid.
7 Umberto Rivolin, Cohesion and Subsidiarity: Towards Good Territorial Governance in Europe, The Town Planning Review
76.1 (2005): 97.
8 Janet Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 25.
9 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union: a concise introduction 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011):
63-64.
10 Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Europe, Regions and European Regionalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 2,
124.
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Belgium
The fact that Belgium is divided sharply along cultural and linguistic lines shapes how
various subgroups within the country have approached European integration. It also means
that regions have disparate interests and viewpoints from those of the state. Brussels, for
example, displays a higher trust in the European Parliament than it does in the Belgian
federal government. In contrast, the two most identifiable historical/ethnic regions within
Belgium, Wallonia and Flanders, have displayed a lower favorability for the European Union
institutions. In this environment, regional policy becomes very important.
The Flemish, for whom the right-wing party Vlaams Belang acts as the primary voice
of criticism, have historically worried that European integration would eliminate their gains
in autonomy. Since ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the Belgian regions have had their autonomy undermined in certain sectors by growing European capacities. Moreover, new,
unfamiliar frameworks have been imposed on the Belgian regions, such as the supremacy
of EU law and the regions responsibility to implement it. In Belgium, legislation like this
is kept to a minimum. However, as neither federal nor regional law is seen as carrying
more weight, dislike has been created for overarching supreme law. Furthermore, votes in
the Council cannot be split along regional lines, eliminating any diversity of opinion in the
Belgian position. Unsurprisingly, the Flemish region has been the most vocal in its concerns
about European integration meddling in its affairs.11
Conceptually, Flemish nationalists have worried about the negative impacts European
integration could have on their goals of sovereignty and separatism. Vlaams Blok, predecessor
11 Wilfried Swenden, The Belgian Regions and the European Union: Unintended Partners in Unravelling the Belgian State,
in Europe, Regions and European Regionalism, ed. Rogey Scully et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 16-21.
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M. Beau Feibus
to Vlaams Belang, had a hostile perspective on European integration as Maastricht was seen
to create obstacles to sovereignty and national identity. They saw the unelected bureaucracy of European institutions as preventing European citizens from being able to participate
in the policy decisions that impacted their daily lives. Vlaams Blok has specifically referred
to the permanent representatives in Brussels as being anational. By definition, this means
they do not belong to any nation and do not understand the demands of groups that take
pride in their unique ethno-cultural characteristics.12
The nature of the relationship between the Belgian regions and European integration
has evolved and changed over time. The regions saw positive gains in the 1980s when areas
of regional economic policy such as public investment, economic development, and land
use were delegated to the regions. Although the Belgian regions did not have the official
right to engage in matters regarding relevant policies in the foreign and European sphere,
they eventually negotiated with the European Commission in these areas as they claimed
the implied right to do so.13 This example serves as a microcosm for the overall Flemish
experience with European integration: initial hostility towards perceived negative impacts
evolving into utilizing it to their advantage.
Vlaams Blok envisioned a road to independence within Europe relatively early on. The
way in which this stance seemingly conflicts with the hostility discussed above reflects both
the challenges and opportunities offered by European integration. By 1995, the primary
aim of the party was indeed to seek independence within Europe. One reason Vlaams Blok
strove to work within European integration was that it drew parallels between the struggle
for a Flemish state and the European effort to protect its own culture (especially from Islam,
in the eyes of the Vlaams Blok). Moreover, common security policies were seen as the best
way to ensure the safety of Europeans.14 Rooted in its Flemish ethnic identity, Vlaams Bloks
vision for Europe conflicted with the overall theme of the EU, however. Vlaams Blok saw
integration as ideally consisting of a community of sovereign entities organized around historical/ethnic regions. In addition to the high importance placed on ethnicities, this vision
of the EU also would have allowed a Flemish state to exist as a state among equals.15
As the Belgian regions have been unable to establish their own independent states, they
have sought to increase their role in external relations in order to extend their influence in
an era of European integration. In attempting this, the Belgian regions were hampered by
the fact that international organizations traditionally only accept agreements between states,
and that Belgium must speak with one voice in EU institutions. To overcome these obstacles,
12 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 134-136.
13 Swenden, The Belgian Regions and the European Union: Unintended Partners in Unravelling the Belgian State, 16-21.
14 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 136-143.
15 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 130-134.
M. Beau Feibus
68
the regions have sought unity with other regions in Europe in order to promote subsidiarity
and a stronger Committee of the Regions. They have also managed to reach an agreement
with the state to make their voice heard in this framework. In council sessions pertaining to
regional issues, a negotiator from one region takes the lead with an assistant federal negotiator with the converse occurring when meetings pertain to federal issues. When meetings
exclusively apply to European regions instead of states, attendance is determined by issue
area. For example, the Flemish region represents the Belgian viewpoint on fisheries as they
are the only community with a coast. As is evident, the regions have worked within the
system to continue to espouse their ideals of sovereignty and autonomy. Compared with
regions within other member states, the Belgian regions have, in fact, secured the most tools
for European-level policy influence.
Despite these successes, the regions are not satisfied with the status quo. The Flemish,
for their part, seek greater regional autonomy and domestic policy influence and support the
further decentralization of the federal government. These desires, shared to a lesser extent
by the Walloons, manifest in calls for greater regional competences and for the federal government to represent their interests in the EU institutions. If they get their wish, the federal
government could end up being hollowed out, becoming little more than a regional power
broker in the EU and acting as a simple conduit for regional interests.16
Furthermore, Vlaams Belang successfully evolved its approach towards European integration in order to further its own nationalist-separatist ends by using the framework of
the EU to delegitimize Belgium. Vlaams Belang has taken the issue of the inherent flaws in
the Belgian state (its inability to represent constituent regions adequately), and has blown
them up to be visible at the supranational scale. This has worked to delegitimize the state in
areas pertaining to regions. Overall, Flemish nationalist-separatists have adopted a vision
of the EU as the protector of the values [they] cherish and have asserted themselves as the
only legitimate actor with which the EU can negotiate on Flemish issues.17 They have been
able to do this, and secure the other gains mentioned above, through the various modes of
cooperation and influence made available to regions by European integration.
Scotland
Scotland, another historical/ethnic region, has similar goals and has developed strategies in recent years to use European integration to its advantage. As a result of Scotlands
continued desire for more autonomy, along with its interest in exploiting the new opportunities afforded by the EU, the Scottish Executive laid out a new plan in 2004. This plan would
position Scotland as one of the leading legislative regions, with a thriving and dynamic
16
17
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M. Beau Feibus
economy and would increase the regions influence at the UK and EU levels in issues concerning Scotland. The plan had three main goals, the first of which was to promote Scottish
interests in the EU both indirectly through the UK and directly by establishing bilateral relations with EU institutions. Scotland also plans to join with other regions in organizations
such as Regions with Legislative Powers (REGLEG) to lobby for greater regional representation at the EU level. The plan also aimed to increase Scottish influence within the UK, as well
as to increase its profile in Europe to become more attractive to businesses and tourists.18,19
However, transnational obstacles have impeded the attainment of greater European
visibility for these regions. Under devolution (the Scotland Act which gave the Scottish
Parliament the right to legislate in areas outside the purview of Westminster), both Scottish
and UK ministers were granted powers for the implementation of EU law in Scotland. EU
policy is technically a UK responsibility as member states must speak with one voice, but
some areas of implementation within the UK have been ceded to Scotland. In other words,
the UK has general responsibility for EU diplomacy, while Scotland must comply with and
implement agreements reached on that level.20 Since devolution, it has been the responsibility of the UK governments to consult Scotland on certain policies, but this has been a mixed
bag as far as execution has been concerned. For example, the UK has consulted regularly
with Scotland in policy areas such as agriculture and rural affairs, while structural funds
have sometimes been determined without consultation. Moreover, as the UK minister must
present a unified UK position to the Council, the Scottish minister, when present, only has
a supplementary role.21 Put simply, the system forces the Scottish to exert their influence at
the state level. They must lobby for the state to represent them at the EU level to ensure that
Scottish interests are taken into account.
Therefore, in order to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by post-Maastricht European integration, Scotland would have to adapt and create new mechanisms to
secure its interests. Previously, Scotland had exercised most of its power through the UK, so
with powers being transferred to the EU, Scotland lost a degree of political autonomy. It was
therefore necessary that Scotland have a presence at the European level in order to lobby for
structural funds and to influence policies that would impact Scotland. With this in mind,
Scotland established the Scottish Executive EU Office (SEEUO) to work in Brussels. The
SEEUO works closely with the UK representative, improving EU-level representation for
Scotland. The SEEUO is an example of the region changing its strategies to fit the political
18
19
20
21
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M. Beau Feibus
Regardless of the nature of the incentives that European integration has provided the SNP
to call for independence in Europe, the SNP has taken an aggressive stance in increasing the
Scottish profile among Europeans. The party has even implied that the Scottish are much
more outward looking than the xenophobiclittle Englander.24 In this way, the party dissociated their separatism from separatism. In other words, European integration has provided the unique opportunity for the SNP and Scottish nationalists to assert their separatist
agenda without the negative consequences expected in that Scotland would break away from
the UK but find safety in the EU. This illustrates how the Scottish view of European integration has evolved from suspicion of the centralist project that took away the Scottish voice,
to the acceptance of the EU as the perfect framework in which to exist independently.25
Nonetheless, Scotland has been disillusioned by its seeming disenfranchisement in
Europe. The way in which the CoR has amounted to little more than a talking shop, along
with the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policys apparent ignorance of Scottish interests, has played heavily into anti-EU sentiments in Scotland.26 It might, therefore, be difficult
to sell the idea to the average Scot that entering the framework of an increasingly supranational EU would increase Scottish political autonomy. However, the fact remains that the
political elites see this as the best option and that autonomous desires are stronger than ever
throughout the region.
Spain
As in Belgium and Scotland, there has been significant concern among the Spanish
autonomous communities regarding the centralization of policy making throughout the
process of European integration. For example, some of the large competences nominally
given to autonomous communities within Spain actually fall under the jurisdiction of the
Spanish central government in EU policy decisions. Both Catalonia and the Basque Country
have been vocal in advocating for greater involvement at the EU level as a result. As in the
other regions explored in this paper, the Spanish autonomous communities have recognized
the obstacles and opportunities created by Spains accession to the EU and further European
integration in order to evolve their regional policies and mobilizations.27
The perceived threats and opportunities of European integration were clear early on to
the Spanish historical/ethnic regions, and, as in the other cases outlined above, the primary
response of these autonomous communities was to directly involve themselves at the systemic level of the European Union. As the Spanish government prepared to be welcomed
24 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 109-120.
25 Eve Hepburn, Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-level System, (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2010): 75-78.
26 Hepburn, Using Europe, 80-96.
27 Burrows, Scotlands European Strategy, 134-135.
M. Beau Feibus
72
into the EU in 1986, it began to take steps to increase domestic policy coordination so as
to better present a single voice to the EU as a whole. The Catalan government, at this time,
proposed that the autonomous communities be able to issue binding recommendations to
the central government in policy areas in which they had domestic purview. The Catalans
also proposed that a Delegation of the Autonomous Communities for European Affairs be
created in Belgium that included 6 members (3 from Catalonia, the Basque Country, and
Galicia) that would be full participants in the Spanish Permanent Representation. Both the
central government and the majority of regional governments rejected the proposal, however, because of the direct participation and the historical/ethnic region-favoring elements,
respectively.28 This pre-Maastricht effort by the historical/ethnic regions in Spain demonstrates how quickly these regions understood the challenges and opportunities of European
integration.
However, some mechanisms for regional influence were indeed adopted. In 1994, an
agreement established a manner of cooperation between the central government and the autonomous communities in which the autonomous communities would reach a consensus to
adopt a position on a given European Commission proposal. This position was non-binding
but it would be considered in a determinant way by the central government. The Sectoral
Conference for issues related to the European Communities (CARCE), created earlier, was
one of the main ways in which the two levels of government exchanged ideas. As a result
of regional lobbying, especially from Catalonia, the autonomous communities eventually
gained a greater role in influencing Spanish positions through the CARCE as well as the
creation of the Autonomous Advisor in Brussels.29
Although obstacles remain, one way in which the autonomous communities have had
success in increasing their political role has been through exploiting the need for presidents of the central government to form parliamentary majorities/minorities with regional
parties. The political activities of 2004 serve as an example of this amplified political clout
as regional ministers were added to the state delegation in four out of nine Council meetings. These Council configurations were in areas in which the autonomous communities
exercise competencies, like Agriculture and Fisheries or like Education. Excluded from
this arrangement, however, were configurations that dealt with competences that only pertained to Catalonia or to the Basque Country. Also in 2004, the autonomous communities secured the permanent presence of two advisors (with the possibility of a third if the
Catalans and Basques agreed to share their own) in COREPER I and the Special Committee
of the Common Agricultural Policy. Perhaps most significant here is the breaking of the
M. Beau Feibus
73
governmental monopoly in the representation of the state interests.30 The manner in which
these breakthroughs have occurred, however, illustrates some of the difficulties of working as regions within the EU. The autonomous communities cannot appeal to any court of
law; furthermore, some autonomous communities possess little motivation to act in areas
outside the bounds of Structural Policy. This makes policy convergence difficult among regions.31 These obstacles illustrate difficulties of regional participation in the EU framework,
even when those regions have made significant gains in establishing a profile at the EU level.
Catalonia has independently worked hard to secure EU-level representation. The
Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006 represents the manifestation of the principles of sovereignty and self-government in the era of European integration. It asserted that Catalonia
must participate in Spanish delegations to the EU in issue areas under its purview, be able
to implement EU law in its own jurisdiction, have the capability to demand the central government bring an issue to the European Court of Justice, and have the ability to establish an
official delegation to EU institutions. In addition to these areas, Catalans have been active
in other areas of regional mobilization within the EU. They have established regional offices and engaged in inter-regional cooperation, such as REGLEG, to push for regionalism
with a united front. Through these mechanisms, Catalonia has sought to reduce the central
government to a role of negotiator in the EU as the regions advise in the implementation
of policy.32
The Basque Country has similarly aimed to mobilize within the EU. Like Catalonia,
the Basques established a regional office in Brussels. The Basque Country also participated
heavily in the CARCE, but, again like Catalonia, continued to insist that bilateral mechanisms be added to the framework for region-state cooperation. The Basques argued that the
voices of the historical/ethnic regions (the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) could
not be represented adequately through consensus decisions with the other autonomous
communities. Such a Bilateral Commission was established to meet on EU issues concerning the Basque Country in 1996, but the body did not meet again after 1999. This suggests that the agreement only worked when good relations existed between the Spanish and
Basque ruling parties. In more recent years, Spanish presidents have formed minority governments through agreements with Basque (along with Catalan) parties. The regions have
used these arrangements to secure greater financial autonomy.
Furthermore, the Basques parties have also been active at the EU level. They have worked
within the CoR and have called for the enhancement of its powers in REGLEG. The Basques
have also used their regional office in Brussels to increase their EU profile. In fact, the Basque
Country won a case in the Constitutional Court against the central government in which its
30 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 141-143.
31 Ibid.
32 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 143-152.
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right to establish relations with EU institutions was upheld. The Basque Country, however,
has faced staunch resistance to its calls for direct historical/ethnic region Council participation. In the end, it seems regional Council participation directly correlates with central government reliance on regional parties to form coalitions. For example, the Spanish political
system was not as reliant on these regions to form a government from 2000 to 2004, but as
discussed above, the regions succeeded in securing stronger participation of autonomous
community ministers in 2004.33
It is therefore evident that the Spanish autonomous communities, particularly those
of the Basque Country and Catalonia, have worked to overcome challenges while taking
advantage of opportunities in European integration. Lower political autonomy as a result
of integration has been met with myriad efforts, many successful, to increase their regional
profile on the EU level, especially in influencing areas in which the autonomous communities have competences.
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permanent representative delegation to exert regional influences. Moreover, each has fought
to retain regional competences domestically and for the right to implement and advise on
EU law in those areas. The other main way in which regions sought to increase their profile
on the EU level was through the use of new mechanisms that emerged as Europe further integrated in order to influence policy. The historical/ethnic regions have established regional
offices in Brussels, engaged in the CoR and REGLEG to advocate for regionalism, and have
even entered into bilateral agreements with each other and with EU institutions. Having
demonstrated the way in which the regions have met the challenges of European integration
and have adapted to exploit the opportunities of the new framework, the argument can be
put forth that European integration has, in fact, strengthened regionalism.
This would be a surprising revelation for those who have heralded European integration
as the death of regionalism (or at least its stagnation). Some conclude that it is now counterproductive to advocate for independence as the nation-state loses ground to supranational
institutions.34 Others have concluded that the CoR is nothing more than a talking shop and
that its establishment was not the beginning of the age of the regions, but, in fact, as good as
it would get for regionalism.35, 36 One could also simply point to the decay of regions powers
after Maastricht to arrive at the obvious conclusion that European integration is detrimental
to regionalism.37 From reading these and many other analyses of the bleak state of regionalism in the EU, it would seem as if the hopes of the mid-90s for a Europe of the Regions
have sputtered, collapsing upon themselves like the impotence of the CoR.38 Taking all of
this negativity into account, the above findings are shocking.
The regions have done more than simply continue to seek political autonomy. They
have fundamentally evolved and adapted in ways that those prognosticators of the decline
of regionalism could not have predicted. They have collectively shifted their ideological base
from being grounded in the pursuit of sovereignty to the pursuit of the most sovereignty
possible.39 The SNP, as discussed above, changed its tune, for example, from the pursuit of
self-government, to the pursuit of the right to represent its own interests in at the EU level.
More than just the myriad options available in the EU framework, through which regions
can establish an extra-state profile, have convinced historical/ethnic regions of the advantages inherent to working within the context of European integration. These regions learned
to transform and adapt, essentially using these new forms of political activism to create legitimate political capital. This becomes especially important as regions have evolved, out of
34 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 5.
35 Hepburn, Using Europe, 96.
36 Wyn Jones and Scully, Europe, Regions and European Regionalism, 2.
37 lvaro Laiz, Contentious Regions in the European Union: Nationalist Parties and the Coordination of European Policies in
Federal Member States, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009): 26.
38 Loughlin, Europe of the Regions, 158.
39 Laible, Separatism and Sovereignty, 2.
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76
necessity, to conceive of statehood (the goal of separatism) not only in terms of achieving
politically isolationist nationalism, but also in terms of achieving legitimacy and authority
over their regions.40 This political capital, which has been referred to as an EU level profile
in much of the discussion above, gives these regions more legitimacy than they could have
ever hoped for sans-European integration. The abilities to engage in agreements with EU
institutions, to lobby for regional interests at the EU level, and to bilaterally deal with other
regions all would have been impossible outside of European integration, and all greatly
increase the visibility, political autonomy, and legitimacy of the participant region. In this
way, separatism, once an extreme manifestation of regionalism, has come to signify regions
ownership of the issues important to them at the EU level.
Furthermore, this discussion does not yet include some of the most basic attractive features of independence in Europe. Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country, and Catalonia all
perceive themselves as the rightful interlocutor between their populations and the EU and,
possibly incorrectly, assume that they would be able to immediately belong to the European
community if their separatist goals were to reach fruition. This has the obvious psychological impact of reducing the extremism of separatism. Moreover, the EU is also seen as being
ideal for small states in terms of financial gain for the historical/ethnic regions, as mentioned
above.
This paper cannot ignore, however, the failure of the inter-regional bodies within the
EU, namely the CoR, to make any real progress or impact on policy. The failure of any of the
three regional groups discussed, along with of dozens of others with similar trajectories, to
actually realize their goals of independence, also must be noted here. While the mechanisms
of regional power have yet to attain significant political clout, the argument can instead be
made that the regions have been bolstered by their increased extra-state profiles and have
been made aware of the possibilities that exist for greater political autonomy within the EU
framework. Although far from a Europe of the Regions, what is seen today is certainly a
regionalism strengthened by European integration.
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that the next logical step is separation. However, this is not the case as the trajectory for
independence through these means has certainly not been followed to its end. For its part,
Catalonia likely does not have the political solidarity to enact an independence referendum
at this point (even though nationalist/separatist parties claimed most of seats, the CiU
party of Catalan President Artur Mascomplicated the political process by failing to secure
a majority). Furthermore, Commission President Barroso specifically dispelled beliefs that
Scotland would be grandfathered into the EU, saying that they would have to wait in line
like anybody else.41,42
The question of why now? may have an answer in the eurozone crisis. It may be no
accident that Catalonia and Flanders are the richest regions in their respective countries.
Catalonia and Flanders make the argument that they give more than they receive in terms
of national funds, and these regions may simply be dissatisfied with subsidizing the poorer
sections of their countries. It may truly be that, in these cases, relative prosperity is further
empowering an already divergent people who wish to garner greater control of their economic destiny.43, 44 As noted above, the historical/ethnic regions see the EU as having enormous financial advantages for small states, giving further credence to this theory. Bolstered
by the regionalism-strengthening factors already set forth, it is possible that this economic
situation has driven some of these regions to advance their calls for separatism.
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application of subsidiarity, one can expect the result to be a Europe in which a system of
multilevel governance takes shape and where actors at each of the three levels deal with the
policy areas with which they are best suited to legislate. As a result, regionalism has the effect
of adding legitimacy to European integration.
Conclusion
Through the analyses of the evolution in regionalist principles in Scotland, the Belgian
regions (specifically Flanders), and the Spanish autonomous communities (specifically
Catalonia and the Basque Country) a varied sample is provided from which general arguments can be constructed regarding regionalism and European integration. Historical/
ethnic regions were deliberately examined as they best demonstrate significant gains and
losses in political autonomy and where the political will to progress regionalism exists. From
the analysis of these regions, this paper has been able to assess the impact of European integration on regionalism in Europe. It has been evident that, although regional responsibilities
were ceded to central governments as a matter of necessity in the immediate post-Maastricht period, the regions have worked within their states and within the European Union to
increase their influence, political autonomy, and profile. Developments such as these, along
with common positive regional perceptions of independence within Europe, indicate that
European integration has strengthened regionalism in Europe. Moreover, it has also been
posited that economic regionalism has recently been growing in wealthier regions, raising
an already bolstered foundation of separatism to new heights.
Finally, this paper has also put forth the argument that these two processes (regionalism
and European integration) have a reflexive relationship. In other words, regionalism also has
a significant impact on European integration. Working within the theoretical framework of
multilevel governance and the principle of subsidiarity, it seems likely that the strengthened
regional sovereignty and advocacy in Europe has a positive impact on the legitimacy (both
internal and external) of European integration.
The relationships established in this paper have significant impacts on larger debates
surrounding the EU, including the question regarding the presence of a democratic deficit.
The evidence explored here indicates that the increasing regionalism in Europe provides
a counterweight to some of the processes of supranationalism that many tout as being responsible for said deficit. Therefore, it may actually be beneficial for those concerned about
the loss of state sovereignty, to, albeit paradoxically, support the processes of growing competences and growing profiles for the regions. Although the discussion of what truly is the
most representative form of governance needs further research, the relationships and trends
established above suggest a convergence of supranationalism and regionalism that will result
in the efficient power sharing between the state, the EU, and the regions, either as states of
Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1
M. Beau Feibus
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their own or with a high levels of autonomy within the state and EU levels that have yet to
be reached.
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