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QUINE ON MEANING
AND
EXISTENCE,
GILBERTHARMAN
I. The Death
of Meaning
philosophical
writings
are for the most part contained
\^Fuine's
a Logical
Point
in two collections
of essays, From
of View1 and
an
The
in
and
Paradox,2
book, Word
Ways
of
recently
important
The present
and Object.3
to views ex
survey will be restricted
in
three
these
work
in logic is
volumes,
Quine's
although
pressed
with his work
in philosophy.4
continuous
The present Part One
describes
and defends
ing Part
Two
does
especially ontology
a way to be explained
remarks.
of Quine's
philosophical
views
about
philosophical
If
almost
that
other
is
Quine
meaning.
linguistic
right,
everything
have said and say about meaning
is wrong.
Therefore
philosophers
to begin a discussion
it is appropriate
of Quine's philosophy
with an
an account
account of his theory of meaning,
in particular with
Some
position
that makes
the various
general
lies his
attack
on
At the heart
standard
Quine
attacks
*
people.
In writing
I have
benefited
from
this paper
with
discussions
many
to Richard
I am particularly
and Thomas
grateful
Rorty
Nagel.
1
Mass.
Harvard
1953.
Second
edition,
Press,
Cambridge,
University
New
York:
Random
House,
and New
1963).
1966.
York:
and Wylie,
M.I.T.
Press
1960.
Mathematical
1934).
Mass.,
Logic
(Cambridge,
revised
Mass.,
1940;
1947;
edition,
York,
1951).
(New
Cambridge,
revised
New
Cam
1941;
edition,
1965;
(Boston,
York,
Logic
Elementary
4
Cambridge,
A System
Mass,
of Logistic
bridge, Mass., 1966.) 0 Sentido da Nova L?gica (Sao Paulo, 1944). Methods
of Logic (New York, 1950, revised edition 1959). Selected Logic Papers
(New York, 1966).
125
scheme of translation
from that lan
ing apart from any proposed
such
two
that
if
of translating
the
guage,
quite different ways
are proposed,
one of these can be correct.
at most
The
language
second cluster may be offered in support of the first in the following
sense:
account
states,
Before
detailed
these
Quine's
argument
against
some
remarks.
thinks
that
views,
Quine
general
mean
have
been
almost
about
linguistic philosophers
totally wrong
will do any of the things
ing. He denies that appeal to meaning
these philosophers
have wanted
it to do for them. To a philosopher
at ease within
one or both of these clusters of views, Quine's
posi
tion is nearly tantamount
to disbelieving
in meaning.
For example,
when
there is an analytic-synthetic
he
Quine denies
distinction,
does not claim merely
that there is no sharp distinction.
He means
to say that nothing
is analytically
true.
For him the analytic
not
distinction
resemble
does
the
synthetic
red-orange
distinction,
a vague one.
which
is a distinction
It resembles
rather
although
the witch-nonwitch
which
fails to distinguish
distinction,
anything
since there are no witches.
He claims this because he holds that
describing
I must make
the ascription
of analyticity,
like the ascription
com
of witchcraft,
one to an incorrect
claim.
Some
explanatory
philosophers
believe that an analytic-synthetic
can be drawn without
distinction
claim ; but Quine would
appeal to a controversial
explanatory
argue
that this is no more
than
same
someone's
the
for
the
likely
doing
witch-nonwitch
distinction.
He would
that
the
distinction
deny
is already present
in ordinary
talk about meaning,
synonymy,
etc., and would
definition,
talk about
argue that philosophical
shows there is such a
than
analyticity no more
thing as analyticity
the former prevalence
of talk about witches
shows there were once
mits
126
GILBERTHARMAN
can be taught
the distinction
cases
of analytic and
of paradigm
through presentation
truths, just as he would
deny one can teach the witch
He would
witches.
ostensively
synthetic
nonwitch
there
worthy
also deny
distinction
to
is any way
of the name.
he
Furthermore,
or
expresses
meanings
that
in this way.
Thus Quine would
an analytic-synthetic
introduce
that a sentence
denies
a proposition,
in the
has
sense
deny that
distinction
a meaning
in which
or
lin
that an
is taken
meaning
general
proposed
account requiring
can be
existence
to be
an
he provides
substantial
issues,
without
in this sense.
and also of ambiguity,
appeal to meanings
he claims to show that there are no such "intentional
Therefore
as meanings
or propositions.
he argues that
Moreover,
objects"
accounts
of
translation,
attitudes,
adequate
psychological
ambig
distinction.
uity, etc., do not involve one in the analytic-synthetic
account
of the distinction
false.
between
Moreover
verbal
and
the postulation
of intensional
is not against
Quine
objects
because he has a "taste for desert landscapes."
It is not that he
or meanings,
are a queer
thinks intensional
objects, propositions
one
be a queer
kind of entity (as
believe that electrons must
might
as
is not that intensional
His complaint
of entity).
objects,
no
in
that
offend
his
sensibilities
the
way
abstract,
something
they
in
doubt offend the sensibilities
He believes
of Nelson Goodman.
kind
attacks
true
views
views
(and therefore
represent
that many
philosophers
not at all theoretical),
bad empirical
theories.
take
to
be
and he argues
He does not
to show
theories
of witchcraft,
that
these views
believes
127
(Quine
nothing
sarily, as philosophers
typically
or of intensional
Quine does not argue that a defender of analyticity
can
led
be
into
He
contends
instead that
objects
inconsistency.
such defenders
claims which
put forward substantial
explanatory
there is no reason to accept;
and he claims
that there is conse
as much
reason to reject those claims as there is to reject
quently
or the ether.
phlogiston,
says that there is no way
sense of
to make
Sometimes
Quine
the analytic-synthetic
is mean
distinction,
i.e., that the distinction
and this may seem to conflict with
the claim I ascribe to
ingless;
or
that
is
that
all
truth
him,
nothing
analytic,
falsity is synthetic.
But the conflict
is merely
if
that.
to say
Quine wants
apparent,
sense of the analytic-synthetic
that one cannot make
in
distinction
If someone
any way such that there turn out to be analytic truths.
that there are analytic
appears to believe
truths, but also agrees
with Quine's
that
the
lacks
argument
meaning
required explanatory
or postulates
or
intensional
power,
objects of belief, meanings,
no
that
but
also
there
is
agrees
power to
propositions,
explanatory
such postulation,
then an empiricist
like Quine will say this person
has made his view meaningless,
just as under certain circumstances
we might
someone
who
to believe
in
say this of
today continued
or
the
that
God.
witches,
ether,
(for
matter)
Quine's
phlogiston,
is that the analytic-synthetic
intensional objects
message
distinction,
of psychological
ing as conceived
this, is no better
and God is dead.
To
in short mean
all this, any of
or God;
phlogiston,
and propositions,
states, meanings,
certain
linguistic philosophers,
by
off than witches,
the ether,
summarize:
that there is no
Quine does not claim merely
distinction.
His
of
denial
the
distinction
is
sharp analytic-synthetic
based on his view that there are no analytic truths.
His main objec
or intensional
tion to meanings,
is not that
propositions,
objects
are
a
or
that they are abstract entities.
queer kind of entity
they
Finally,
he does
sistency
but
not
argues
the analytic-synthetic
Against
a "full blooded
theory of analytic
distinction.
truth"
takes
What
of
incon
theories.
I shall
the analytic
call
truths
GILBERTHARMAN
128
that hold
able
for
the
could
theory
is to make
clear what
sort
of
explanation
this
be.
seems to be this:
the full blooded
idea behind
theory
reason
a
a
is
of
the
sentence
expresses
meaning
always part
why
a
to
sentence
made
since
the
could
be
falsehood
truth,
express
by
to the words
that make
different meaning
up the sen
assigning
tence.
Some sentences
express a truth by virtue of their meaning
The
the world
is. Thus the sentence,
"Copper conducts
a
means
truth
it
what
because
it does and
expresses
electricity,"
were
is. If its meaning
because of the way the world
suitably dif
were
or
nature
in
laws
world
if
the
the
of
ferent,
suitably different,
to the full
not express a truth.
the sentence would
According
are
sentences
other
that
of
there
blooded
truth,
theory
analytic
and independently
express truths solely by virtue of their meaning
is. The sentences
and
of the way the world
"Copper is a metal"
plus
the way
"Copper is copper"
of their meanings.
would
That
solely by virtue
be said to have
Recent
statements
Kant's
Bennett,
Foundations
Philosophical
Jonathan
1966),
(New
of
the
full
blooded
theory
of analytic
267;
260,
pp.
see esp. p.
Haven,
1958),
6
and Logical
Quine,
"Carnap
423,
the
Truth,"
definition
in The
truth
include
p. 6; Rudolf
Carnap,
Gardner
(New York,
1966),
(Cambridge,
ed. by Martin
of Physics,
Semantics
and Arthur
Pap,
Analytic
and
of
Ways
Necessary
Truth
"broadly
analytic."
p. 106.
of Paradox,
129
as knowability
of meaning.
should it not count as
by virtue of knowledge
Why
to
the
know
about
world
that copper is ametal
knowing
something
or that copper is copper ? It is not sufficient
to reply that if some
A similar
arises
problem
if analyticity
is taken
solely by virtue
of meaning.
one
prevents
some sort
Perhaps
from denying
these
of psychological
compulsion
are claims that everyone finds
Or perhaps
claims.
they
were
so
to be denied we would
if
them
that
of
true,
any
obviously
have the
best
for thinking
the speaker either misunder
evidence
possible
in new senses.7 The problem
stands what he says or uses his words
a
to
is
defender
show how in certain cases such
for
of analyticity
a
or obviousness
is
sign of truth or knowability
by
compulsion
virtue of meaning.
One
argument
convention
to do this invokes
The
the notion of convention.
a
some
matter
of
that it is, in
sense,
begins by noting
that a given word means what
Our conven
it does.
attempt
tions might have been different and we can change them now
to. We might
"wood" as we
decide to use the word
want
use
the word
and
"copper"
vice
versa.
Such
in our
change
if we
now
con
like "Copper
affect the truth and falsity of sentences
and
"Wood
conducts
conducts
(From
electricity"
electricity."
now on I shall speak of a sentence as true or false.
If this offends,
sentences which
it may be taken as an elliptical way of describing
A conventionalist
truths or falsehoods.)
further
argues
express
ventions
would
that assign
adopted certain rules or conventions
like "Copper is ametal,"
truth or falsity to sentences
"Wood is not
a metal,"
of logic and perhaps mathe
the truths and falsehoods
etc.
determine
the meaning
conventions
of the
These
matics,
is that we
words
have
"copper,"
"not,"
"every,"
7
Ibid.,
pp.
"metal,"
etc.
105-106.
As
"wood,"
a result,
principles
like "if,"
("Copper
is
130
GILBERTHARMAN
metal"
tional
thereby
change
faces a major
technical
points out that conventionalism
to
account
it
is
for
if
all
truth
and
difficulty
logical
supposed
falsity.
An infinite number
of sentences
of logic require
conventional
Quine
of truth or falsity.
the conventionalist
assignments
Presumably
we
holds that
make certain general conventions
that together assign
truth or falsity to this infinite
set.
But the statement
of these
use
must
conventions
words
like
general
"if," "whenever,"
logical
"every," etc., and by hypothesis
the conventions.
To understand
are given
meaning
by
and apply the conventions
that
one would
already have to under
these words
to logical words
give meaning
stand some logical words.
Conventionalism
proves circular or leads to an infinite regress.9
But
there
in logic
thus
either
is amore
For
the relevant
the notion
notion
of convention
cannot be distinguished
from
one
can
of postulation.
If
assign truth and falsity to
conven
sentences
in logic, set theory, or mathematics
by general
that determine
the meaning
of one's words,
tions, i.e., postulates
the same is true in geometry,
The meanings
physics, or chemistry.
are
of "molecule,"
etc.
determined
"electron,"
"quantum,"
by the
same
in the
of one's physics
of "is
way as the meaning
postulates
a member
of" is determined
the
of
set
one's
postulates
by
theory.
8
ments
A.
and
Quinton,
Society
pp.
42
statement
classic
Mathematics,
A. J. Ayer
of
and
Knowledge
York,
1959).
conventionalism
of
More
recently:
Review
Rules,"
Philosophical
"The A Priori
and the Analytic,"
(New
(1963);
Michael
in H.
appears
Hahn,
in
Nature,"
Logical
Positivism,
Max Black,
"Necessary
LXVII
(1958),
pp.
Proceedings
of
"Logic,
ed. by
State
313-41;
the Aristotelian
(New York,
1966),
if.
9
and
"Carnap
detail
greater
pp. 96-8.
in
Logical
"Truth
by
Truth,"
Convention,"
p.
108.
Ways
The
argument
of Paradox,
pp.
is given
81-98,
in
esp.
every physical
theory is true,
the theory of the ether is not
true,
is
convention"
"truth
true,
one's
theory is not
Since
"truth by
Newton's
etc.
conventions,
i.e.,
postu
truth by convention
account
for truth.
lates,"
cannot
to
according
e.g.,
131
must
For
the meaning
is enough
for know
of meaning
its truth; knowledge
guarantees
a
or
the
of
the
and
either
truth;
(or
both) can
necessary
priori
ledge
a metal,"
is
The sentences
be identified with the analytic.
"Copper
of logic and mathe
various principles
is copper,"
and "Copper
truths and are said to be
etc., are said to express necessary
matics,
knowable
a priori;
Unfortunately
are not very clear.
be taken for granted and not questioned.
We could say such prem
a priori,
of the inquiry,
isses are known
i.e., at the beginning
in the course of the inquiry, come
while
other things, discovered
to be known
that we
But this would not mean
only a posteriori.
a
of
the premisses
of the inquiry in any sense
have
priori knowledge
usable
by the philosophical
isses need not be known
meaning.
10
p.
114.
"Truth
by
Convention,"
of analyticity.
For these prem
virtue
of
of their
knowledge
solely by
be known as the result of prior empirical
defender
pp.
93-95;
"Carnap
and
Logical
Truth,"
GILBERTHARMAN
132
inquiry.
They may not be known
known.
The defender of analyticity
a
He needs
priori knowledge.
ly
between
the former
laws of nature
the
latter
and necessary
truths is intended,
of nature do not
Laws
analytic.
synthetic,
of words used to express those
solely by virtue of the meaning
The point is, if you like, that laws of nature are not abso
laws.
that would
be) ; they need not
(again: whatever
lutely necessary
in which
There are conceivable
worlds
have been true.
they do
a priori knowledge
not hold.
The notions
of relatively
and of
are
nature
virtue
of
laws
of
clear
truths necessary
by
(relatively)
a
The notions
of absolutely
and of
notions.
priori knowledge
are
truths absolutely necessary
(no matter what the laws of nature)
hold
obscure.
of a view has
character
One test of the a priori or necessary
to hold, or
to conceive
it is possible
of its failing
been whether
to imagine circumstances
in which we would
it is possible
whether
seem that any simple basic assertion
that can
It would
give it up.
a priori,
not to hold cannot be necessary,
knowable
be conceived
a
or analytic
its meaning,
If, given
sense).
(in the full blooded
does not guar
fail to hold, its meaning
sentence could conceivably
of its meaning
suffice for
its truth, nor can knowledge
antee
of
of truth.
Now, Quine claims that we can conceive
knowledge
we
can
to
that
view
statement
hold
and
for
any
any
imagine
failing
in which we would
that
circumstances
give it up.12 He concludes
no
or
truths are
no truths are a priori
that
and therefore
necessary
analytic
We
sense.
11
12
have
Cf.
"Necessary
"Two Dogmas
Truth,"
Ways
of Empiricism,"
pp.
of Paradox,
a Logical
From
48-56.
Point
of View,
p.
43.
133
cannot
to hold.
of these principles
At best it
conceive
failing
cannot be false, that one cannot give
implies that these principles
one can refuse to
them up by simply denying
them.
However,
our
and
instead
that cannot be
accept
principles
adopt principles
into ours;
and we can conceive
of his principles
translated
being
correct.
the law of the excluded middle
(for all P: P or
Perhaps
A person who
fails to hold, even though
it is not false.
a
mean
this law may
different by
accepts
logic without
something
"not" from what we mean;
but his language may contain no prin
to such a person,
According
ciple we can identify with our law.
not-P)
our
rejects
middle
fails
to have
a truth
value:
he
13
notion
of
"not."
a truth value.
have
cannot both be true, for again one's logic may have nothing
as such a principle.
A similar point can be made
that qualifies
truth.
One may
about any putatively
necessary
give up even
to have any expression
"Copper is copper" by refusing
correspond
or by refusing
to
to
countenance
the "is" of identity.15
ing
"copper"
It is a familiar point in ethics that to reject certain principles
denial
sometimes
13
14
15
Pears
Cf.
P.
requires
us to reject certain
and
"Carnap
F.
Strawson,
Truth,"
Logical
Introduction
Ludwig
Wittgenstein,
and McGu'iness
(London,
Tractatus
1961),
terminology,
p. 102.
to Logical
Theory
Logico-Philosophicus,
5.53-5.534.
paragraphs
e.g.,
the prin
(London,
1952).
trans,
by
GILBERTHARMAN
134
to words
Per
like "nigger" or "queer."
that give meaning
same
to
true
the
is
the
the
of
that
give meaning
principles
haps
"witch."
"the
and
words
"God,"
ether,"
Again,
"phlogiston,"
no sense to deny the disjunction
of nonlogical
it makes
perhaps
of some set theory, since these postulates
give meaning
postulates
to "is a member
of." But one may reject the theory without
deny
as
has
Nelson
done.
Goodman
ing it,
ciples
the weaker
theory.
but
The notion of an explicit
logical truth is not in dispute;
of
virtue
the claim that two sentences can be equivalent
meaning
by
It may seem that there is no problem
requires further discussion.
if
are meaningful,
each has a meaning:
"If two sentences
here.
are equivalent
same meaning
the sentences
by virtue
they have the
assumes
that there are such
But such an argument
of meaning."
or may not "have" a
as meanings,
that a sentence may
things
one
has
sentence
the
that
may be the same as
meaning
meaning,
can account
same
the
of
and that the possession
another,
meaning
of mean
Notice that the postulation
in truth value.
for equivalence
by virtue of mean
ings can be related to the notion of equivalence
on which
is taken to explain
depending
ing in two different ways,
if e.g.,
to
is
used
the other . Meaning
explain meanings
equivalence
the
of
with
class
a
sentence
of
we
the
given
meaning
identify
of
virtue
to
it
sentences
Alternatively,
meaning.
by
equivalent
if
account for meaning
would
of
equivalence
meanings
postulation
135
have
that
equivalent
the
same
meaning.16
that
argue,
argu
Finally I shall present Quine's
that postulates
of
intensional
meaning
against any theory
etc.
objects, meanings,
propositions,
to remember
From the beginning
it is important
the following
are
When
that
truths
those truths
say
point.
philosophers
analytic
blooded
theory of analyticity.
ments
are synonymous
or mean
with
the same as truths of logic,
use
ex
and
the same" as technical
"mean
they
"synonymous"
use
not
do
these
in
their
pressions.
expressions
ordinary
They
sense.
in order
One has only to examine a dictionary
of synonyms
to appreciate
A
is
this point with respect to "synonym."
synonym
another
that can in certain contexts
the first
replace
expression
serve
our
as well,
at
and
in
least
purposes
expression
speaking
that
better.
another, we
often
And
indicate
means
with
ymous
the
same
as,
comes
to
in truth
equivalent
ation.
Philosophical
the
same
sentences
if the two
another
thing
as,
are relatively
or
is
synon
obviously
inform
value,
shared-background
given
differs
talk about sameness of meaning
from
to hold by
this ordinary
take synonymy
talk, since philosophers
alone and not by virtue of shared information.
virtue of meaning
who would
The same point tells against
those philosophers
dis
tinguish meaning
equivalence
16
cit.,
op.
Pap,
The
stronger
theory.
and P.
by H. P. Grice
LXV
Review,
of subtraction,"
(1956),
Word
from synthetic
equivalence
by appeal
this
seems
but
to accept
also
the
explains
theory
mentioned
in this paragraph
one
resembles
argument
F. Strawson,
"In Defense
of a Dogma,"
Philosophical
It embodies
what
calls
"the fallacy
pp. 141-58.
Quine
and
Object,
p.
206.
136
GILBERTHARMAN
a type of
assume
to dictionary
These philosophers
definitions.
that does not
distinction
between
dictionaries
and encyclopedias
a few random
to anyone who has examined
exist.
This is obvious
in any large dictionary,
and it will be supported
by the
of definition
So the important
is
below.17
question
or not philosophers
can give sense to their technical notion
whether
or meaning
of synonymy
equivalence.
are equivalent
The claim that two sentences
by virtue of mean
entries
discussion
is an explanatory
can be more
meaning
or necessity would
seem to give
virtue
of
than of
meaning
by
the weaker
believe
Some philosophers
theory of analyticity
can be set forth without
it is not easy to
claim;
any explanatory
see how.
I shall discuss
the possibility
of such nonexplanatory
truth for a moment
and then return
to the
theories
of analytic
weaker
theories.
explanatory
Quine
technical
and
others
terms,
a small
circle
(e.g.,
explained.18
have
distinction
have
"synonymous,"
"analytic,"
in terms
definable
otherwise
White)
Philosophers
not always
pointed
"necessary,"
of each
who
other
accept
thetic
appreciated
raises, since they have not always appreciated
acter of the terms used to state the distinction.
17
out
but
that,
etc.,
as
form
not
usually
the analytic-syn
the difficulty
this
the technical
Thus
char
it is irrel
and
"Definitions,
Scriven,
Theories,"
Explanations,
in
ed.
the Philosophy
II,
of Science,
by H.
Feigl,
104-5.
M. Scriven,
and G. Maxwell
Minnesota,
1958),
pp.
(Minneapolis,
18
"The Analytic
the Syn
"Two Dogmas,"
and
Morton
White,
Quine,
and
in John Dewey:
thetic:
An Untenable
Dualism,"
of Science
Philosopher
Minnesota
Cf.
Michael
Studies
ed. by
Freedom,
and
the Philosophy
1952).
Sidney
Hook
of Language,
in Semantics
1950);
(New York,
reprinted
ed. by Leonard
Illinois,
(Urbana,
Linsky
137
if followed
that definitions,
back, eventually
always become
terms
will
contain
Ordinarily
antecedently
but this is not the case with
terms used by
technical
understood;
who
distinction.
Per
accept the analytic-synthetic
philosophers
a
the
been
has
obscured
fallacious
of
identification
haps
point
by
circular.19
these
the circle
are
There
their more
terms with
technical
on
restrictions
this technical
distinction.
what
One
ordinary
can
cannot
counterparts.
as
count
claim
tinction
an
explanation
of
that a particular
dis
if there is no relation
is the analytic-synthetic
distinction
between
the
distinction
and what philosophers
have
ship
specified
to say about analytic
wanted
and synthetic
truth.
It would
be
a
to
true
sentence
more
call
and
if
it
is
if
pointless
"analytic"
only
ten words
an account of
not provide
and this would
long;
on
the analytic-synthetic
distinction.
Quine's
argument
depends
on such a distinction
the fact that the major
constraint
is that
A notion of "analytic truth" or "meaning
it must be explanatory.
than
that had no
equivalence"
use would
fail to resemble
explanatory
in
have
the past meant
philosophers
by those
anything
sufficiently
expressions.
Several philosophers
deny this.20 They argue that philosophers
new cases as either analytic or synthetic
tend to agree in classifying
on the use of the
and they claim that "where there is agreement
an
with
to
involved
there must
open class,
respect
expressions
be some kind of distinction
present."21
necessarily
They identify
this distinction
with
the analytic-synthetic
it
distinction,
taking
to be a further question whether
claims about this
philosophical
only
technical
generally
generally
19
20
thetic,"
Hilary
explanatory
can
power,
be
supported.
these philosophers
place on an account of the
distinction
is that on any adequate
account
truths
called "analytic" should turn out to be analytic and truths
called "synthetic"
should turn out to be synthetic.
For
restriction
Grice
and
Grice
Strawson,
and
of
op.
Strawson,
of the
Proceedings
"The
Putnam,
Philosophy
Minnesota,
21
its
about
e.g.,
disinction,
The
Science,
op.
Jonathan
Society,
1962).
Putnam,
cit.
op. cit.;
Aristotelian
cit.,
p.
360.
Bennett,
"Analytic-syn
LIX
163-88.
(1959),
pp.
Minnesota
Studies
in the
G.
Maxwell
(Minneapolis,
GILBERTHARMAN
138
these
one
the ascription
philosophers
to
an
explanatory
other
out
case
paradigm
there
that
"show"
would
fail
that witches
does
not
commit
case argument
to a paradigm
for the
than
and it is no more
convincing
of analyticity
claim.
argument.
are or were
to have
An
witches,
analogous
argument
it turns
although
There
is a
powers.
and truths that seem
supernatural
that seem analytic
and that distinction
(to those who accept the distinction),
synthetic
use
on
and "syn
the
of
"underlies"
agreement
"analytic"
general
But to call this distinction
thetic" with respect to an open class.
between
distinction
truths
the analytic-synthetic
with
witch distinction
who
people
witches)
One
do not
the witch-non
is like identifying
the distinction
between people who seem and
seem to be witches
in
believe
(to those who
distinction
.22
talk
to reflect on why philosophers
introduce
see
of
taken
to
have
that
ascription
they
generally
analyticity
to
the
power.
possess explanatory
Historically,
analytic
analyticity
or
an epistemological
reflected
has always
distinction
synthetic
we
or
"How
do
know
is
true?"
this
distinction,
"Why
metaphysical
In the twentieth
is this true?"
century one has only to mention
has
only
about
the introduction
of talk about analytic
or
to see the purported
epistemological
was supposed
to
of such talk. Phenomenalism
metaphysical
point
of the external world.
account
for our knowledge
some
to
for the relation
account
was supposed
by
and body;
supposed
between
mind
22
Quine
he
Behaviorism
of
on
course
agrees
the mechanism
are apparently
and
truths,
analytic
in Word
and
"intuitions"
analyticity
to identify
of analyticity
the notion
refuses
are blameless
in their
"The
intuitions
there
that
speculates
But he
66-67.
Object,
pp. 56-57,
with
that of apparent
analyticity.
be a mistake
it would
but
way,
of
to look to them
for a sweeping
epistemo
as by-products
of language
and
between
truths
dichotomy
analytic
on the world"
as reports
Cf.
and Object,
truths
(Word
p. 67).
synthetic
not
this would
in syntactical
"Even
truth were
if logical
terms,
specifiable
and Logical
it was
in language"
show
Truth,"
p. 119).
("Carnap
grounded
See also W.
V. Quine,
of Katz,"
Journal
"On a Suggestion
of Philosophy,
2 (February
LXIV,
2, 1967),
pp. 52-4.
logical
was
naturalism
the truth
Consider
139
intended
of ethical
furthermore
would
"All
animals,"
bachelors
to be analytic:
is
"Red
unmarried,"
etc.
color,"
to them, some
After having certain imaginary
situations described
no
not
will
of
these
take
these to be
(but
all)
longer
philosophers
After
what
like
if
it
would
be
those
analytic.
imagining
things
we call "cats" should turn out to be radio controlled
some
robots,
"
to "All cats are animals."
refuse to ascribe analyticity
philosophers
After imagining what
it would be like if a flaw in the divorce courts
had made
almost
no
ascribe
all recent
some
divorces
invalid,
to "All bachelors
philosophers
are unmarried."24
analyticity
it would be like to discover
After imagining what
that things look
red partly as the result of an extremely high pitched sound emitted
by red objects such that, if we were to go deaf, the objects would
no longer ascribe analyticity
look grey, some philosophers
to "Red
longer
is a color."
some philosophers
Given these and other examples,
all
of
give up
ascription
analyticity.
Consideration
of such examples
tends to destroy one's ability
to identify
as analytic,
sentences
just as careful study of certain
women
can destroy
as witches.
to identify people
one's
ability
one
cannot vindicate
Therefore
the weak
truth
theory of analytic
or
to
talk
about
by simple appeal
philosophical
meaning,
ordinary
and analyticity.
definition,
synonymy,
the
claim involved
justify
explanatory
a
moment
I shall discuss
In
meaning."
intensional
postulates
23
(October
34
Journal
goes
on
objects
(meanings
Cf. Putnam,
25,
Cf.
LXII,
of Philosophy,
to defend
the necessity
16
(August
of "Blue
So,"
and/or
Journal
Analytic
26, 1965),
is a color."
propositions).
of Philosophy,
and
pp.
LIX,
the Nonempirical,"
421-423.
Moravcsic
22
140
GILBERTHARMAN
I can think
of exploits
the notion
of explicit
to be more
is supposed
Such definition
than mere explication,
more
than
the
of
and
sufficient conditions,
i.e.,
necessary
provision
to provide what
since explicit conventional
definition
is supposed
are sometimes
called "logically" necessary
and sufficient conditions.
The claim is that when we introduce a new expression
by explicitly
an old expression,
it to be equivalent with
the
are thereby made equivalent
of
virtue
meaning.
by
defining
pressions
But
of
now,
our
course,
old
returns.
worry
two
ex
Conventional
is a kind of postulation,
of an equivalence.
the postulation
of
virtue
conventional
definition
is equivalence
Equivalence
by
to
of
one's
lies in
certain
The
according
postulates.
difficulty
definition
can
definitions
by virtue of conventional
as
with
the
the
full
equivalence,
just
corresponding
difficulty
to
blooded
one's pos
theory lies in seeing how truth according
seeing
ensure
how
tulates
can
equivalence
truth.
guarantee
will
Postulation
meaning
to describe
of
one's
often
terms
an old one,
truth.
itself guarantee
a way
provides
when
even
one
of partially
introduces
though
In particular,
a new
specifying
theory
such postulation
the postulation
the
or wants
does not by
of an equi
QUINE ON MEANING
valence
in a definition
terms
person's
AND
EXISTENCE,
can help
even
141
the meaning
of a certain
cannot
guarantee
postulation
the same
introduce
people may
to specify
such
though
two
Furthermore,
equivalence.
such
in
different
that "synthetic"
ways
theory
are true by definition
to the one presentation
statements
according
objects,
meanings
such
that
or
We
explanation.
postulate
propositions.
the
must
now
existence
of
we
have
When
is wrong
with
and have understood
such theories
native, we will be able to appreciate more fully what
distinction.
the analytic-synthetic
consider
intensional
seen
Quine's
is wrong
what
alter
with
intensional
is often used to express
objects.
Against
Language
a speaker's
some
this
attitudes.
To
psychological
philosophers
fact is incompatible with Quine's
rejection of the notion of meaning
are equivalent
say two sentences
equivalence.
They would
by
of meaning
if they express the same psychological
attitude,
same
the
if
belief.
e.g.,
they express
sen
If the same belief can be expressed
by several different
a
as
cannot
be
belief
construed
the
then
tences,
acceptance of
simply
a sentence.
some philosophers
Therefore
hold that psychological
virtue
states represent
attitudes
toward propositions,
that belief is
e.g.,
the acceptance
of a proposition.
Quine objects to this analysis and
of propositional
claims
that the postulation
attitudes
underlying
to offer an explanation
without
one's sentential
attitudes purports
really doing so. He agrees that there are such things as accepting
a sentence
a sentence
a
(as true), desiring
(to be true), thinking
25
Cf.
"Two
Dogmas,"
p.
35;
"Carnap
and
Logical
Truth,"
pp.
110-113.
142
GILBERTHARMAN
sentence
attitudes underly
(true), etc. but denies that propositional
sentential
In particular
attitudes.
he denies
that a person
a
a
or meaning
sentence
because
he
accepts
accepts
proposition
that
sentence.26
expressed by
these
that people
have noticed
often
Philosophers
identify beliefs
expressed by different sentences.
They infer that belief must be the
of something more basic than a sentence.
acceptance
They have
are ordinarily
two different
also noticed
that when
sentences
said
are also said to
to express the same belief, these sentences
same meaning.
So they have identified
the underlying
or meaning.
the acceptance
of a proposition
The fallacy in the argument
lies in a switch between
use of "means the same."
nary and philosophical
People
have
the
as
belief
the ordi
ordinar
are
if
ily say
they
relatively
in truth value by virtue of generally
obviously
equivalent
accepted
For example,
in 1966 the sentence
principles.
"Lyndon Johnson
has travelled to Vietnam" would be taken to mean
the same (in the
as
sense
sentence
of
the
"means
"The Presi
the
same")
ordinary
that
two
of the United
dent
mean
sentences
States
has
same
the
a
to Vietnam,"
although
are
to say these sentences
travelled
would
basic
different
the
such
attitude.
are
often
ordinarily
such problem.
that any more
assume
He
can observe
that
in ordinary
on
that depends
"identified"
is a shifting
postulation
thing
of something
behind
sentence.
offers
Translation
26
pp.
identification
of meanings,
"The
attitudes
sentential
but
speech;
context
a sentential
underlies
attitude
not
would
has no
Word
Problem
47-48.
since
and
another
translation
Object,
of Meaning
reason
for postulating
by some
is supposed
from
"Flight
in Linguistics,"
Intension,"
From
propositions
philosophers
220-221.
pp.
esp.
a Logical
Point
of
to
Cf.
View,
a sentence
in finding
or
meaning
the
expresses
in one
same
143
that
language
as
proposition
"has"
given
the same
sentence
in
the other.
Quine argues that this is not a correct account of trans
no sense to speak of the translation
because
it makes
of a
lation,
one
a
sentence
sentence
of
into
of
another
single
language
language
apart from other translations
that translation must
always
one would
That
make.
of "radical"
of the indeterminacy
For
translation)
of radical
are
there
example,
is indeterminate;
translation.27
various
ways
to
hence
translate
his
thesis
number
von Neumann
one may identify
Following
theory into set theory.
Fol
the set of all smaller numbers.
each (natural) number with
one
set
of
Zermelo
with
the
unit
each
number
may identify
lowing
its predecessor.
Either series of identifications
translation
permits
of number
and apart from some such
of all sentences
theory;
is the
it makes no sense to ask what
of translation,
statement
of an isolated
of number
theory or
what
is the correct way to identify number with
sets.28 Without
to a general
reference
scheme of translation,
the notion
of the
of an isolated sentence of number
translation
is
indetermi
theory
general
correct
scheme
translation
nate.
claims
that this kind of indeterminacy
holds
for
Quine
in
radical translation
general.
all reasonable
conditions
have been placed on possible
When
from number
general schemes of translation
theory into set theory,
several
schemes
tioned
can
above preserve
decide between
27
28
and
Word
Paul
chapters
"What
two
and
six.
Could
Not
Be,"
Philosophical
Structure
Goodman,
of Appear
"Constructional
Definition."
one,
(New York,
1966),
chapter
was
out
aware
see his
that Frege
of this
fact;
points
in Philosophy
of Number,"
in America,
ed. by Max Black
Concept
New York,
1965).
LXXIV
Review,
2nd ed.
ance,
Charles
Parsons
"Frege's
(Ithaca,
Object,
Benacerraf,
(1965),
pp.
47-73.
Numbers
Nelson
144
GILBERTHARMAN
Either
do
scheme
not
provide
for which
These
one
exactly
in number
value
for example
(Consider
into
translated
before
theory
a true
sentence
the
differ
by
even
sentence
sentence
Neumann's
value.
false
"The
receives
into
they
sentences
in truth
true nor
translation
von
are
There
This
member."
Yet
translations.
that
translations
they provide
are counted
sentences
neither
latter
has
translations.
equivalent
translation.
two
a set of acceptable
provides
before
number
no
truth
set theory.
scheme
of
It is
trans
that satisfy
In order
connection
all reasonable
between
e.g.,
desires
lation
only
of
translation
and
sentential
beliefs.
attitudes,
Some
e.g.,
explanation
one
can
requires
explain
postu
why
a particular
sentence by assuming
he is freely
sentence
the
he
has
uttered.
and
accepts
thoughts
has uttered
person
his
expressing
can agree that the evidence warrants
and his opponents
Quine
over the
of
attitudes.
sentential
such
postulation
They disagree
of
the radical translation
the sen
value of knowing
explanatory
one
tence toward which
the speaker has an attitude.
The more
must
knowr
psychological
a translation
in order to provide
good
more
the
explanations,
justified he is in postulating
that underlie
attitudes.
attitudes
sentential
about
such
propositional
The behavioral
evidence
relevant
to a particular
hypothesis
as
be
construed
the behavioral
evidence
translation
may
about the psychological
relevant to a particular hypothesis
explana
The issue then is whether
this evidence
tion of that behavior.
about
attitudes.
of propositional
Quine argues that
postulation
scheme of translation
in
do not need to know a very complete
warrants
we
145
a
i.e., that beyond
required
explanations,
serve equally well.
schemes of translation
behavior we may need to assume nonradical
we may need to assume
that there is some
order
to provide
the
certain point,
various
In order
to explain
i.e.,
translatability,
possible way to translate from his language to ours; but, according
to Quine, we do not need to assume that the speaker's sentence has
a particular
some
from
apart
i.e.,
meaning,
scheme
general
a particular
in this context
of
where
translation,
translation,
several
non
of people
our own
in similar
not make
an assumption,
there would
be strong indeterminacy.
In a
one
scheme
of
translation
certain
case,
represent
might
particular
to be about cats.
sentences
On this scheme
of the language
the
such
relevant
beliefs
scheme
native
and desires
would
these
represent
might
be
similar
sentences
to ours.
as
being
An
about
alter
dogs,
on this scheme the relevant beliefs and desires come out quite
from ours such that these people are taken to believe that
like what we call a "cat" is really a dog, such
something
looking
to be caught,
there are mice
that they want dogs when
such that
meow
someone
than
etc.
rather
that
believe
If
bark,
dogs
they
we
cited
the
and
beliefs
would
desires,
expressed
speaking English
we
mean
A good
say that he meant
by "dog" what
by "cat."
where
different
of
scheme
translation
ascribes
translated
arise
arise.
etc.,
desires,
beliefs,
in ways similar to the ways
29
29
sentential
Notice
that
attitudes,
that
possibility
if one
one
believes
should
that
attitudes
underlie
one's
propositional
out
bothered
of ruling
by the problem
such
Cf. with
the philo
beliefs.
strange
be
have
the
people
of the inverted
spectrum:
problem
sophical
mean
that I might
is the problem
by "green"
of discovering
is no way
there
although
pp. 78-79.
for
what
this.
certain
there
philosophers
etc.,
you mean
by "red,"
See Word
and
Object,
GILBERTHARMAN
146
generally,
some
construction
represents
particular
how a person comes to accept P,
struction and also accepts Q. The
tion may enable us to explain how
that
these
translations
in the
sentences
translations
like
"Here
is a rabbit,"
is an
"Here
instance
One
lated.
chemistry
chemical
the
translation
sentences
of
equivalent
sentences
by virtue
of
of
lation must
30
31
Ibid.,
pp.
57-61.
Ibid.,
pp.
40-46,
68-72.
there
provided
stimulation
147
that would
assent
encourage
to
either."32
the people
lan
(whose
Suppose on one scheme of translation
are assigned beliefs about numbers
is being translated)
and
Then
suppose we have reduced our number
theory to set theory.
guage
there will
assent to either
would
encourage
(no stimulation
truth values by the
; and it is assigned
contrary
it or its denial)
von
Neumann
and
Zermelo
translations.33
the possibility
of translation
to
from one language
Therefore,
the postulation
does not support
of intentional
another
objects,
or propositions.
ante
Translation
does not require
meanings,
sentences
relations
between
of
different
existing meaning
cedently
scheme of translation
from
apart from some presupposed
languages
A person's
of a sentence
the one language to the other.
acceptance
in another language does not represent an underlying
propositional
scheme of translation,
attitude such that, apart from a presupposed
our acceptance
the same attitude could be said to underlie
of a
sentence in our language.
view.
Further
that the
Quine believes
description
of Quine's
one
in
to
sentences
consists
has
attitudes
basic psychological
reality
32
73-74.
33 Ibid., pp.
Actually Quine envisions a slightly different possibility
cited,
either
In
since
translation
a better
would
he
example
sentence
two
S
that
no
to
than
stimulation
the
different
into
sentence
translations
argument.
and
would
translated
of
in the passage
encourage
as in this
assent
to
example.
one
into
another
theory
where
the new
theory
?7 respectively,
asserts
T if and only
but does not decide
which
of T and U
if not-U
an even
cited makes
the passage
In context
claim
than
stronger
to him;
but this extra
to the purposes
is irrelevant
attribute
strength
present
take
suggests
rather
is true.
that
of
I
the
GILBERTHARMAN
148
in one's
and
language
along with
these attitudes
between
their
these attitudes
among
causes
and effects
(e.g.,
must
agree that there are
His opponents
and speech).
and
causes,
connections,
observation
such
connections
and
attitudes,
effects;
but they
intensional
also
ob
meanings,
propositions,
seen that Quine argues that this postulation
is
with
of
is
the
it
radical
because
wrong
incompatible
indeterminacy
I shall now
translation.
In order to make his case more plausible,
postulate
jects, etc.
underlying
We have
about Quine's
of translation
theory
of meaning.
verbal
lation
He can do
to apply, call it the "identity
schemo."
the identity scheme ascribes to others roughly the same
the same methods
of belief formation
he has and roughly
scheme
this because
beliefs
for desires
(and similarly
there is no obvious
because
because of an epistemological
and
other
attitudes),
psychological
that does as well,
and also
that favors assumptions
conservatism
one has been making
there are reasons
all along.34
Occasionally
a relatively
this conservatism.
Sometimes
obvious
for overriding
of the identity translation will translate beliefs,
modification
etc.,
that appear to diverge from one's own beliefs, etc., into beliefs, etc.,
If so, one will accept the modified
transla
similar to one's own.
alternative
in belief to be
apparent
disagreement
no
there is
distinc
In general
real (underlying)
"merely verbal."
a difference
in view and a difference
in meaning.
But
tion between
tion
scheme
and
take
the
to override
is systematic
to a degree sufficient
if the disagreement
our conservative
to the identity scheme,
then we call
commitment
we call it a difference
in
otherwise
in meaning;
it a difference
belief.
in
this is to begin to see the mistake
involved
To understand
of
this
distinction
distinction.
the analytic-synthetic
Proponents
without
claim that one cannot give up basic analytic
principles
a real
This
one's
the
of
words.
presupposes
meaning
changing
to
one's
view
between
and
distinction
changing
only appearing
I shall
say more
about
this
conservatism
in Part
Two
of
this
paper.
149
the meaning
of words used to state
change one's view by changing
it. The trouble with
this is that any change
from one view to
it will tend to make
another tends to involve a change in meaning;
the identity translation
less good,
since one defect in a scheme of
too
translation may be that it ascribes to others beliefs diverging
can say that any change
in view repre
from ours. We
radically
in meaning,
sents some change
since a sufficient number
of small
we
as a
to
sort
will
lead
the
of
in
view
describe
change
changes
in meaning.
small successive
(To see this imagine
change
so
one
cats
in
one's
beliefs
and
about
that
dogs
changes
eventually
one
comes
cats
to believe
about
what
believes
about dogs and
clear
vice
versa.)
Given
a small
(or the
change in view the change in meaning
to change
in meaning)
is slight.
Should we
say that
tendency
our terms no longer mean
to mean?
This
what
they used
same
the question whether
resembles
is
still
the
if
color
something
can
its color has changed
of
Sameness
represent
meaning
slightly.
a strict
relation
equivalence
the latter.
represents
or a similarity
relation.
Ordinarily
it
true
other
we
may
GILBERTHARMAN
150
for
the
analytic-synthetic
distinction;
but
this probably
plays
role.
major
to be
Quine takes ambiguity
Finally a word about ambiguity.
a special case of the effect of context on acceptance
and rejection
a sentence
of sentences.
is ambiguous
if its
speaking,
Roughly
Here one may feel that some
changes with context.35
out
the difference
been
of
in
left
Quine's
thing
theory:
an
one
on
can
sentence.
A sentence
ambiguous
interpretation
place
on
come
true
such
be
out
all
still
may
yet
ambigu
interpretations
truth
value
has
ous.
one
in the speaker's
not sentences
language,
phrases will be sentences
or sentence substitutes
in some universal
of
language
propositional
attitudes.
The varying
what
the speaker
represent
paraphrases
35
Word
86
Ibid.,
and
pp.
p. 129.
Object,
129, 191-195.
151
(To be continued)
Princeton
University.