Nat Res Cases and Special Laws Part 3

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty.
Christina Tan) 1
2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
IGTIBEN v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158449 October 22, 2004
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. NO. 158449
October 22, 2004
LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES

IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and
THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,1 which set aside the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo Cavite in LRC
Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787)2 and dismissed
petitioners application for registration of a parcel of land.
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an
application for registration of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of
land with an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in
Barangay Malabag, Silang, Cavite, and more particularly
described as Lot 5442, Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04007007 (hereinafter referred to as the Subject Property).
Petitioners alleged that they acquired the Subject Property
by purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the
Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that 30
years.3
No opposition was filed against the application and so
petitioners proceeded with the presentation of their evidence.
The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr.4
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented, the trial court traced the history of possession of
the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject
Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina
Hintog.5
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject
Property in 1968. In the same year, the Subject Property was
transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog.
Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property

from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo
Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted
the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano
and other fruit bearing trees. After the demise of Agatona
Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo
and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and
Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.6
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject
Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.7
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related
above, was supported by tax declarations in the name of
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to
1998.8
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
approving petitioners application for registration of the
Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in
approving the application for registration despite petitioners
failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12
June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover,
petitioners also failed to produce muniments of title to tack
their possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in
compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.9
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision finding the appeal meritorious, setting aside the
decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for
registration of petitioners.10 The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated
22 May 2003.11
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the
trial court, approving petitioners application for registration of
the Subject Property, be reinstated.12
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial
court, they claim that they are entitled to confirmation and
registration of their title to the Subject Property in
accordance with Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, although they had not identified under which specific
paragraph of the said Section.13
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 2

registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner,
by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, for
a given period of time, it can be logically presumed that their
claim to the right to register the Subject Property was based
on Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and
respondent Republic before the Court of Appeals and this
Court, discuss mainly the Public Land Act, thus, establishing
that the application for registration filed by petitioners before
the trial court is essentially an application for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over the
Subject Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the
Public Land Act.
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act are the same in that both are against the
whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings,
and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive
and final. They differ mainly in that under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the
court only needs to confirm. On the other hand, under the
Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the land
applied for still pertains to the State, and that the occupants
and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the
two laws arrive at the same goal, namely, a Torrens title,
which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of
rights adverse to the record title.14
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title under the Public Land Act must
be able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land;
and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act.15
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property
is alienable public land is undisputed. What is to be
determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with
the period of possession and occupation required by the
Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly
relevant to petitioners application is Section 48(b). Through
the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been
amended several times. The case of Republic v.
Doldol16 provides a summary of these amendments, as
follows
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No.
1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation
of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
petitioners have failed to comply with the period of
possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as
required by both the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held
that
Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim
ownership over the property is in 1958, which is the earliest
date Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared
the property for taxation purposes. This is far later than June
12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the applicants
possession under claim of ownership should have begun at
the latest.17
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on
28 March 1990, has repealed by implication Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and has

effectively reduced the required period of possession and
occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing of the
application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
Petitioners arguments are without merit. This Court has
already laid down the standard for repeals by implication, as
follows
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by
implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless
it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a
doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is
deemed to exist, that it be shown that the statutes or
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be
a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character.
The language used in the latter statute must be such as to
render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted.
An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal.18
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
provisions of RA No. 6940 do not even address the same
subject matter.
In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may
dispose of agricultural lands is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
separate chapters of the Public Land Act since the specific
requirements and application procedure differ for every
mode. More particularly, the confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a)
administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII
of the Public Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter
VIII of the same Act. Having filed their application before the
courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or
judicial confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the

amendment by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the Public Land
Act, to read as follows
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is
not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for
at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a
tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition,
who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the
same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled,
under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to
exceed twelve (12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year
period of occupation and cultivation of the land, Section 44 of
the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to which
Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public
Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,19 in which he discussed
the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine
legal system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land
Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession
for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the
Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of
imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of
the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections
44 and 47 of the Public Land Act by extending the periods for
filing of applications for free patents and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, respectively, to
31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing
of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the other
provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, such as
Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period provided therein.
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court
on repeal by implication, there can be no conflict or
inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
and the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise to a
repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January
2001 does not affect the position of this Court on the issues
discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only
provision under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act amended
by RA No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or

incomplete titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions
of the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176, such as
Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free patents under
Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and the prescriptive period
provided therein still remain unchanged.
G.R. No. 156117
May 26, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No.
6940, which provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30)
years possession, applies only to applications for free
patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property
covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the
continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or
earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Court AFFIRMS the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the
decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA
Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land
title of petitioners. No cost.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1which affirmed the
Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2granting the application for
land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto
brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23
September 1998, a single application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They
claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which
they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. 3Together with
their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No.
8423, in the name of respondent David;4
SO ORDERED.
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for
Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on
the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that
the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;8
REPUBLIC v. JEREMIAS
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property

(ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias,
covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423,
also issued in 1994;9 and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the
Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No.
8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents'
application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that:
(1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation.11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at
8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots
were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A copy of
the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous
place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of
the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the
Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the Notice was also
published in the Official Gazette on 02 August
199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December
1999.16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC
issued an Order of Special Default, 17 with only petitioner
Republic opposing the application for registration of the
Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of
Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and
to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on
02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. 19 The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land
sought to be registered has been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively
provides that "All things which are within the commerce of
men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription"
and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables

also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their
parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands,
subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21,
1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or
their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed
the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only
from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone,
still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable
since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23,
1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of
Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled
to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of
P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963,
the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels
of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner,
for 35 years already when they filed the instant application
for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court
finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the
petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to
25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of possession required by law.
The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also
alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling
in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased,
requires that possession of land of the public domain must
be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two
parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in

the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended,
that the application for registration of title to land shall be
filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a
single application only in case they are co-owners. While an
application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only
when the subject parcels of land belong to the same
applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land
are co-owned) and are situated within the same province.
Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by
a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed
to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before
the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over
it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that
the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the
application for registration filed by the respondents but for
reasons different from those presented by petitioner
Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners.
Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity
committed by the respondents was fatal to their case,
depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear
their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on
this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the
authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in
this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the
respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the
Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and

expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a
single application by several applicants for as long as they
are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for
registration of several parcels of land provided that the same
are located within the same province. 25 The Property
Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present
situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for
two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and
individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for
such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court
to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the
Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules
of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in
strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a
single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application
for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC
constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties.
Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should
have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with
the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the
case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against
said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in
case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu
propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
misjoinder when the application for registration was still
pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner
Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by
filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and
parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the
publication requirements mandated by the Property
Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with
jurisdiction as a land registration court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over
the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has
discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to
hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and
service of notice.29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that
the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section
23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides
that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still
affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to
validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements
of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of
the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential
and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the
compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette
as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published

therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC,
and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially
released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The
Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu
City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in
the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December
1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date
of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and
ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published
in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject
Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late
for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial
hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration,
and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimantoppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred
from contesting respondents' application for registration and
even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant
thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special
Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no
publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to
constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02
February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999
final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to
issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both
null and void for having been issued by the MTC without
jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of
possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or
legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not
have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of
possession for acquiring title to public land.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or

incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,40 may
be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which reads
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only
alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by
purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in
his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner
since 1950.32
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted

by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are "within
Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC
Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed
Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932
dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly
part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can

be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government;34 and it is indispensable that
the person claiming title to public land should show that his
title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands,
and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36 It
explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may
be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are
specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application
before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that
they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of
their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section
48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition,
the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on
25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date
when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not
have complied with the period of possession required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals
was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents
were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property

Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the
Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land
in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the
respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since
25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their
application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by
extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to
Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is

REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion,
Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and
its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND
VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the

Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under
the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title
which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land
Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors
only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43 As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the
Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000
However, it must be clarified herein that even though

respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the
Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for
judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in
accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for
Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any
lands or interest in lands under the provisions of
this chapter, must in every case present an
application to the proper Court of First Instance,
praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and that a certificate of title be
issued to them under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial
requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
the procedural requirements under the Property Registration
Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of
ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types
of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands
of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public
Land Act may be considered a special law 45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
established rule of statutory construction that between a
general law and a special law, the special law prevails
Generalia specialibus non derogant.46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. DE GUZMAN

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137887
February 28, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE
GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO,
NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA
MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAO,
ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases
No. TG-362 and TG-396.2
The facts are simple:
Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title
were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent
Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang,
Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as

follows:
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the
application for registration of the parcels of land mentioned
therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual
and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the
petition for registration and thus places under the operation
of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the

Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square
meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now
forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners Damian
Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao De Guzman,
Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman
and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with
residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street,
Carmona, Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors
Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres,
Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and
Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled "Waiver of
Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which
are hereby ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back
of the certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners
pursuant to the judgment of this Court.
SO ORDERED.3
As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said
judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of
private respondents over the subject parcels of land was
approved.
Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following
assignments of error
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR
FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER
AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO
JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE
PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES.4
We find merit in the instant Petition.
It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were
released as agricultural land only in 1965 5 while the petition
for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private
respondents only in 1991.6 Thus the period of occupancy of
the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the
application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years,
four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period
possession
requirement
under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 andR.A. No. 6940.
In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject

property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned
out that
(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and
disposable only in December, 1965, however, records
indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees'
predecessor-in-interest, was already in possession of the
property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It
follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing
of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitao's
possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years
period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has
been converted to private property.7
We disagree.
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of
possession prior to the time the subject land was released as
agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement
in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,8 to wit
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private
respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land
while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was
declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain
on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership,
and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year
open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It
accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
151 SCRA 679).
Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410
[1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
(emphasis ours)
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case
of Director
of
Land
Management
vs. Court
of
Appeals9misplaced. There, while the period of possession of
the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own
possession to comply with the required thirty year period

possession requirement, the land involved therein was not
forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in
the case before us, the property subject of private
respondents' application was only declared alienable in
1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable
of private appropriation. It was not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert
it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. 10
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable
land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot
be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession
requirement. This is in accord with the ruling inAlmeda
vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 11
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63)
years at the time of the application of their petition, our
hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in
giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the
time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of
their application, private respondents' occupation thereof
was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their
thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of
the land as alienable because absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in
good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him
remained classified as forest or timberland,which he could
not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is
replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private property. Possession of the land by private
respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could
never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to
abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex". 12
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the
February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are
both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC
Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply
with the thirty year occupancy and possessory requirements
of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement
as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
MARTINEZ v. CA
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170409
January 28, 2008
GREGORIA MARTINEZ,1, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MELANIO
MEDINA, SR., MELANIO MEDINA, JR., NORBERTO
MEDINA, ERMITANO MEDINA, ALBERTO MEDINA,
SENEN MEDINA, ANTONIO MEDINA, MANOLO MEDINA,
and ARTURO MEDINA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The present petition originally stemmed from a
Complaint2 filed
by
private
respondents
against
petitioner,3seeking the cancellation of titles over the parcels
of land involved.4 Subject of the complaint are three (3)
parcels of land with areas of approximately 10,064; 48,000;
and 5,784 sq m, all situated in Bangkal, Carmona, Cavite
and covered respectively by Original Certificates of Title
(OCT Nos.) No. P-5518, No. P-5519, and No. P-5482.5
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr.
who during his lifetime inherited the properties from his
mother, Rosa Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them
from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The
complaint alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, whose
real name as appearing in her birth certificate is Gregoria
Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as
thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that
name applied for free patents over the properties with the
Community Environmental and Natural Resources Office of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the
corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of
Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an
application for land registration over the same properties,
petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private
respondents to file the instant complaint.6
The complaint was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.7 The only issue raised at the trial
was whether the free patents and land titles should be
annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their
procurement.8
After weighing the evidence of both sides, the trial court
rendered a Decision9 ordering the cancellation of petitioners
titles. It found that the true surname of petitioner Gregoria is
Merquines and not Martinez, a surname which petitioner
used for the first time when she applied for the free patents.
The RTC observed that no other document was presented to
show that petitioner used the surname Martinez in any of her
previous transactions; that the surname indicated in her birth

certificate is Merquines; that she was born on 17 November
1924 to spouses Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona; and
that the records of marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite recorded the marriage of Gregoria
Merquines, daughter of Pablo Merquines and Bartola
Cardona, to Jose Restrivera on 13 July 1941.
The trial court further endeavored to trace the lineage of
petitioner. The baptismal certificate of her father, Pablo
Merquines, showed that he was born on 26 June 1897 to the
spouses Faustino Merquines and Juana Sarmiento, while
the baptismal certificate of her mother, Bartola Cardona,
showed that she was born on 28 August 1898 to spouses
Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon. Even the birth
certificates of petitioners siblings, Crispina, born on 20
January 1920 and Dominador, born on 4 October 1931,
showed that they bore the surname Merquines. Moreover,
the birth certificates of the children of petitioner and her
husband Jose Restrivera namely, Norberto and Jaime
Restrivera, showed that the surname of their mother is
Merquines and not Martinez.10
The trial court observed that notwithstanding the
misrepresentations of petitioner in her free patent
applications, private respondents were not necessarily
entitled to the automatic reconveyance of the subject lots. 11 It
simply disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the cancellation of OCT Nos. P-5518, P5519 and P-5482 issued in the name of defendant.
Cardona and Antonia Realon. These documents indubitably

show that neither of appellants parents is the child of
Celodonia Martinez and she is not in [anyway] related by
blood to the latter. Thus, not only was her application for
patents tainted with fraud, she also committed perjury in this
case when she lied bold-faced about her lineage which was
disproved by the documentary evidence relative to her
ancestors.14
Petitioner also assigned two other errors which, however,
were neither raised in her answer as defenses nor otherwise
litigated during the trial. She argued in the main that the trial
court erred in adjudicating the case although an
indispensable party in the person of the State through the
director of lands was not impleaded, 15 and that the titles
secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one
year from the issuance of the titles.16
Sustaining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals remarked that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In their
complaint, private respondents asserted private ownership
over the subject lands as they had been in possession of
and had been cultivating the same for more than 60 years.17
The appellate court also noted that the issues were not
raised in the petitioners answer and in the subsequent
proceedings.18
SO ORDERED.12
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to

petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is
untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of the free patents and the titles.19
Only petitioner interposed an appeal from the trial courts

decision to the Court of Appeals.
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates the same two issues

previously raised for the first time before the appellate court.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenged the

findings of fact of the trial court concerning the fraud and
misrepresentations which she committed. The appellate
court made short shrift of the challenge as follows:13
We sustain the Court of Appeals.
From the evidence extant on record, it is at once apparent

that appellant committed fraud and misrepresentation in her
application for free patent which later became the basis for
the issuance of the certificates of title in her name. More than
the issue of the use of the surname "Martinez," her
fraudulent act consists essentially in misrepresenting before
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
of Bacoor, Cavite that she is the heir of Celedonia Martinez
whom she admitted in her Answer as the original absolute
owner of the subject parcels of land. She testified in open
court that Celedonia Martinez is her grandmother, being the
mother of her father Pablo Merquines.
The documentary evidence adduced by appellles, however,
particularly her fathers baptismal certificate plainly shows
that he is the son of spouses Faustino Merquines and Juana
Sarmiento. Her mother Bartola Cadona was also shown in
her baptismal certificate to be the child of spouses Gaspar
It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues

and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the
trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered
by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal20 because this would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.21 On this point
alone, the petition could be denied outright. Nonetheless, like
the Court of Appeals, we deign to decide the case on the
merits.
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only by homestead patent, sale, lease, judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and
administrative legalization or free patent. 22 One claiming
private rights as basis of ownership must prove compliance
with the Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as
well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public
lands.23 Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
a separate chapter of the Public Land Act. There are specific
requirements and application procedures for every mode.24

The confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain may be
done in two ways: judicial legalization or judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII, and
administrative legalization or free patent under Chapter VII of
the Public Land Act.
Any citizen of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply with the RTC of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of his/her claim and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Property
Registration Decree.25 Such applicants must by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain,26 under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since 12 June 1945,27 except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant.28 At present, such applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles must be filed prior to 31
December 2020; and must cover an area of up to 12
hectares only.29
When the conditions specified in Section 48(b)30 of the Public
Land Act are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceased to be of the public domain, and beyond the
authority of the director of lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 31 For all legal intents
and purposes, the land is segregated from the public
domain, because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."
Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act provides that
the applicant for administrative confirmation of imperfect title
must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not
the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30
years prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940
amending the Public Land Act,32 has continuously occupied
and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessorin-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject
to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by any
person shall be entitled to a free patent over such land/s not
to exceed 12 hectares.
Turning again to the first issue raised by petitioner, it is
apparent that her insistence that the State through the
director of lands is an indispensable party flows from her
failure to recognize that private respondents action is one for
declaration of nullity of title which is different from an action
for reversion of title to the State. In the latter case the

director of lands needs to be impleaded, unlike in the first.
Thus, we reiterated in Evangelista v. Santiago:33
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action
for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty
whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion,
the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land. Hence, in Gabila v.
Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint
admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendants title because even if the title
were canceled or amended the ownership of the land
embraced therein or of the portion affected by the
amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that
the action was for reversion and that the only person or
entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity
of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations
of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as
the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefore is consequently voidab initio. The real
party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a
pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in
question even before the grant of title to the defendant.34
In an earlier case,35 in reversing the dismissal of the
complaint by the trial court, this Court stressed that the
allegations of the complaint present an action for nullification
of free patent and title, not an action for reversion of title
which has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.
It is true that the trial court opined that the next step following
the cancellation of petitioners titles is an action for the
reversion of the disputed lands back to the public
domain.36 Said observation, found in the body only and not in
the dispositive portion of the decision, does not detract from,
but in fact even bolsters, the real nature of the complaint as
an action for nullification of title.
Now, the second issue. Petitioner claims that her titles are
already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse
of one year following their issuance.
In Apuyan v. Haldeman,37 also cited by petitioner, it was held
that a certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent
procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be
cancelled, as such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

It was likewise held in Meneses v. Court of Appeals38 that the
principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where fraud
attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 70458 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who
became Australian citizens on 9 February 1984. 4 They seek
to have the subject property registered in their names.
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable
on 31 December 1925, as established by a
Certification5 dated 14 August 2000 issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City.
Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in the
possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective
spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names under Tax
Declarations No. 8035 (1952),6 No. 15247 and No. 1523
(1955).8
TAN v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 177797 December 4, 2008
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177797
December 4, 2008
SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO TAN, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated 28 February 2006
and Resolution2 dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated 9
May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro
City, in LRC Case No. N-2000-055, and ordered herein
petitioners, spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (spouses Tan), to
return the parcel of land known as Lot 1794, Ap-10-002707,
Pls-923, with an area of 215,698 square meters, located in
Calingagan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental (subject property)
to herein respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied the
spouses Tans Motion for Reconsideration.
The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio

and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly
notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate
Property9 dated 26 June 1970. The spouses Tan took
immediate possession of the subject property on which they
planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They
declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their
names, as evidenced by Tax Declarations No. 501210 (1971);
No.
11155,11 No.
10599,12 No.
1059813 (1974);
No.
14
15
11704 (1976); No. 01224 (1980); No. 0631616 (1983); and
No. 94300017 (2000); and paid realty taxes thereon.
However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a
portion of the subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to
file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the
RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-204. On 29 August 1989, the
RTC rendered a Decision18 in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring
the spouses Tan and declaring their title to the subject
property thus "quieted." Casio appealed the said RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 26225. In a Resolution 19dated 15 November
1990, the appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 26225
for lack of interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to
this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as
UDK-10332. In a Resolution20 dated 13 March 1991 in UDK10332, the Court denied Casios Petition for being
insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution
became final and executory on 3 June 1991.21
Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free
Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of
Lands.22 On 8 December 1999, Casios application was
ordered cancelled23 by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENRCENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein
petitioner Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject
property pursuant to the 29 August 1989 Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 88-204. Similarly, survey plan Csd-10002779 prepared in the name of Casio was also ordered

cancelled24 by the Office of the Regional Executive Director,
DENR, Region X, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.
in open, continuous and notorious possession of subject

property for the period required by law.
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for

Registration of Title25 to the subject property before the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39, where it was docketed
as LRC Case No. N-2000-055. The application of the
spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 49626 and/or
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,27 as amended. In
compliance with the request28 of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000, the spouses Tan filed
on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for Registration
of Title29 to the subject property.
II. The trial court erred in granting the application for land
registration despite the fact that there is a disparity between
the area as stated in [the Spouses Tans] application and the
tax declarations of Juanito Neri, Lucio Neri, and [herein
petitioner Pedro Tan].
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its

appearance in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 on behalf of the
Republic, but failed to submit a written opposition to the
application of the spouses Tan.
When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan
was filed by the time of the initial hearing of LRC Case No.
N-2000-055, the RTC issued on 23 April 2001 an order of
general default, except as against the Republic. Thereafter,
the spouses Tan were allowed to present their evidence exparte.
After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts, the RTC
heard the testimony of John B. Acero (Acero), nephew and
lone witness of the spouses Tan. Acero recounted the facts
already presented above and affirmed that the spouses Tans
possession of the subject property had been open, public,
adverse and continuous.30
After Aceros testimony, the spouses Tan already made a
formal offer of evidence, which was admitted by the court a
quo.31
On 9 May 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in LRC Case
No. N-2000-055 granting the application of the spouses Tan,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, [Spouses Tan] having conclusively
established to the satisfaction of this Court their ownership of
the [subject property], Lot 1794, Pls-923, situated in
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, should be as it is hereby
adjudicated to the [Spouses Tan] with address at #166
Capistrano Street, Cagayan de Oro City.
Once this judgment becomes final, let the Order for the
issuance of decree and corresponding Certificate of Title
issue in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended.32
In its appeal of the afore-mentioned RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71534, the
Republic made the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in ruling that [herein petitioners
Spouses Tan] and their predecessors-in-interest have been
III. The trial court erred in granting the application for land
registration despite the fact that [the Spouses Tan] failed to
present the original tracing cloth plan.
IV. The trial court erred in relying on the Decision dated [29
August 1989] by the RTC-Branch 24, Cagayan de Oro City
which declared [the Spouses Tans] "title" on the subject
[property] "quieted."
V. The trial court erred in not finding that [the Spouses Tan]
failed to overcome the presumption that all lands form part of
the public domain.33
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 granting the appeal of
the Republic, and reversing and setting aside the 9 May
2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses
Tan failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires
possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12
June 1945.34 Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses
Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Decision of the Court of Appeals. To refute the
finding of the appellate court that they and their
predecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject property
by 12 June 1945 or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to their
Motion a copy of Tax Declaration No. 4627covering the
subject property issued in 1948 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to
the statement in Tax Declaration No. 4627 that it
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948. Unfortunately, no copy
of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was available even in the Office
of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The
spouses Tan asserted that judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that land assessment is revised by the government
every four years; and since Tax Declaration No. 4627 was
issued in the year 1948, it can be presupposed that Tax
Declaration No. 2948 was issued in the year 1944.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007.
The spouses Tan now come before this Court raising the
sole issue of whether or not [the Spouses Tan] have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject [property], under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or earlier,

immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title.35
The Court rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present
Petition devoid of merit.
To recall, the spouses Tan filed before the RTC their
Application for Registration of Title to the subject property in
the year 2000 generally invoking the provisions of Act No.
496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended.
The Public Land Act,36 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073,37 governs lands of the public domain, except
timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State.38 It explicitly enumerates
the means by which public lands may be disposed of, to wit:
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(a) By judicial legalization.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).39
separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are
specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.40 Since the spouses Tan filed their application before
the RTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are
seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the subject property.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be
availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073,41 which reads
to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,

confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
spouses Tan may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073,
amending the Public Land Act, clarified Section 48,
paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically declaring that it applied
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, based on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, the two requisites which the applicants
must comply with for the grant of their Application for
Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable
and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
12 June 1945.42
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.43
In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification
from the DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, dated 14
August 2000, to prove the alienability and disposability of the
subject property. The said Certification stated that the subject
property became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable
and disposable is sufficient to establish the true nature and
character of the property and enjoys a presumption of
regularity
in
the
absence
of
contradictory
evidence.44 Considering that no evidence was presented to
disprove the contents of the aforesaid DENR-CENRO
Certification, this Court is duty-bound to uphold the same.
Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to
sufficiently prove that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as early
as 31 December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily

establish compliance with the second requisite for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has
been amended several times. Republic v. Doldol45provides a
summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A.
No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has
already been amended by Presidential Decree 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b)
now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No.
1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation
of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
(Emphasis ours.)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession
for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be
shown, too, that possession and occupation had started
on 12 June 1945 or earlier.46
It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan
do not dispute that the true reckoning period for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title is on or
before 12 June 1945. They also admit that based on the
previous evidence on record, their possession and
occupation of the subject property fall short of the period
prescribed by law. The earliest evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject property can be traced back to a
tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-ininterest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now
asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take into account
Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948, which they had
attached to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court
of Appeals but which the appellate court refused to consider.
Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals, the

spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was not
newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and
should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that tax
assessments are revised every four years, then Tax
Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was
issued as early as 1944.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
On the basis thereof, it is clear that evidence should have
been presented during trial before the RTC; evidence not
formally offered should not be considered. In this case, it
bears stressing that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only
submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals. The reason given by the Spouses Tan why
they belatedly procured such evidence was because at the
time of trial the only evidence available at hand was the 1952
tax declaration. More so, they also believed in good faith that
they had met the 30-year period required by law. They failed
to realize that under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, a mere showing of possession for thirty
years or more is not sufficient because what the law requires
is possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945.
This Court, however, finds the reason given by the spouses
Tan unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their application for
registration of title to the subject property under the
provisions of Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended. It is incumbent upon them as applicants to
carefully know the requirements of the said law.
Thus, following the rule enunciated in Section 34, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, this Court cannot take into
consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627 as it was only
submitted by the Spouses Tan when they filed their Motion
for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the
appellate court.
And even if this Court, in the interest of substantial justice,
fairness and equity, admits and take into consideration Tax
Declaration No. 4627, issued in 1948, it would still be
insufficient to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
by the Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since
12 June 1945 or earlier.
Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three
years after 12 June 1945, the cut-off date under the law for
acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to public land. For the
Court to conclude from the face of Tax Declaration No. 4627
alone that the subject property had been declared for tax
purposes before 12 June 1945 would already be too much of
a stretch and would require it to rely on mere
presuppositions and conjectures. The Court cannot simply

take judicial notice that the government revises tax
assessments every four years. Section 129 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence provides particular rules on which matters
are subject to judicial notice and when it is mandatory47 or
discretionary48 upon the courts or when a hearing is
necessary.49 It is unclear under which context this Court must
take judicial notice of the supposed four-year revision of tax
assessments on real properties. Moreover, the power to
impose realty taxes, pursuant to which the assessment of
real property is made, has long been devolved to the local
government units (LGU) having jurisdiction over the said
property. Hence, the rules pertaining to the same may vary
from one LGU to another; and regular revision of the tax
assessments of real property every four years may not be
true for all LGUs, as the spouses Tan would have this Court
believe. Given the foregoing, Tax Declaration No. 4627 is far
from the clear, positive, and convincing evidence
required50 to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
by the Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since
12 June 1945 or earlier.
In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proofs of ownership of the property for which taxes
have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.51They may be good
supporting or collaborating evidence together with other acts
of possession and ownership; but by themselves, tax
declarations are inadequate to establish possession of the
property in the nature and for the period required by statute
for acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to the land.
As a final observation, the spouses Tan purchased the
subject property and came into possession of the same only
in 1970. To justify their application for registration of title, they
had to tack their possession of the subject property to that of
their predecessors-in-interest. While the spouses Tan
undoubtedly possessed and occupied the subject property
openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously, by
immediately introducing improvements on the said property,
in addition to declaring the same and paying realty tax
thereon; in contrast, there was a dearth of evidence that their
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject property in the same manner. The possession and
occupation of the subject property by the predecessors-ininterest of the spouses Tan were evidenced only by the tax
declarations in the names of the former, the earliest of which,
Tax Declaration No. 4627, having been issued only in 1948.
No other evidence was presented by the spouses Tan to
show specific acts of ownership exercised by their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject property which may
date back to 12 June 1945 or earlier.
For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements
prescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, this Court has no other option but to deny their
application for judicial confirmation and registration of their
title to the subject property. Much as this Court wants to
conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting
the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic

growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our
hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against
registering imperfect titles.52
The Court emphasizes, however, that our ruling herein is
without prejudice to the spouses Tan availing themselves of
the other modes for acquiring title to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain for which they may be
qualified under the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 28 February 2006 and
Resolution dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 are herebyAFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. RIZALVO, JR.
G.R. No. 172011 March 7, 2011
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172011
March 7, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647 which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bauang, La
Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving
respondents application for registration of an 8,957-square
meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La
Union.
The facts are undisputed.
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr.
filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, an application for the registration 3 of a
parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu200706,4 located in Bauang, La Union and containing an
area of 8,957 square meters.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the
subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by
virtue of a Deed of Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and

that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of
his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No.
222066 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of
Payment7 of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the
time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed an Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the
tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. The OSG
also asserted that the subject property was a portion of
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
and hence not subject to private acquisition.
At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came
forth. Consequently, the trial court issued an Order of Special
Default against the whole world except the Republic of the
Philippines and entered the same in the records of the case.
At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject
property by purchase from his mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as
evidenced by a Deed of Transfer dated December 31,
1962.8 He also testified that he was in adverse, open,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property;
that no one was questioning his ownership over the land;
and that he was the one paying the real property tax thereon,
as evidenced by the bundle of official receipts covering the
period of 1953 to 2000. He also stated that he was the one
who had the property surveyed; that no one opposed the
survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete
markers on the boundaries of the property. Further, he stated
that he was not aware of any person or entity which
questioned his mothers ownership and possession of the
subject property.
Respondents mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also
presented during the trial. She stated that she purchased the
lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as evidenced by the Absolute
Deed of Sale9 dated July 8, 1952. She confirmed that before
she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner
of the subject property and was in possession thereof,
without anyone questioning her status as owner. She further
stated that she was the one paying for the real property
taxes at that time and that she even installed improvements
on the subject property.
After conducting an investigation and verification of the
records
involving
the
subject
land,
Land
Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San
Fernando, La Union submitted a report10 on July 17, 2001.
Aside from the technical description of the land, the report
certified that indeed the subject parcel of land was within the
alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was
indeed in actual occupation and possession of the land.
On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any
evidence.
As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a
land registration court, rendered its Decision11 on November
29, 2001, approving respondents application. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads-WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special
Default, hereby approves the application and orders the
adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey
Plan No. PSU-200706 (Exh. "A") and the Technical
Description of the land (Exh. "B") situated at Brgy. Taberna,
Bauang, La Union containing an area of Eight Thousand
Nine Hundred Fifty Seven (8,957) square meters.
Once this decision becomes final and executory let the
corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines
through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. In its Brief, 13 the
OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the
applicant proved a registrable title to the property. However,
the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the
assailed Decision14 on March 14, 2006, affirming the trial
courts decision.
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes
to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to seek relief.
In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the
Philippines has dominion over all lands of public domain and
that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the
Republic over its alienable and disposable lands is a mere
privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is strictly
construed against the grantee/applicant.15
The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show
indubitably that he has complied with all the requirements
showing that the property, previously part of the public
domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of
possession in the manner and length of time required by law.
The OSG maintains that respondent and his predecessorsin-interest failed to show convincingly that he or they were in
open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the
land of the public domain as required by law. The OSG
points out that there is no evidence showing that the property
has been fenced, walled, cultivated or otherwise improved.
The OSG argues that without these indicators which
demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation, the
application for registration cannot be allowed.16
On the other hand, respondent counters that he has
presented sufficient proof that the subject property was
indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. He also asserts that his title over the land can be

traced by documentary evidence wayback to 1948 and
hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition of an
imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied.17
Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of
ownership, tax declarations and official receipts of payment
of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real
property. In addition, he highlights the fact that since the
occupancy and possession of his predecessors-in-interest,
there has been no question about their status as owners and
possessors of the property from adjoining lot owners,
neighbors, the community, or any other person. Because of
this, he claims that his possession of the land is open,
continuous, adverse, and public -- sufficient for allowing
registration.
Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the
manner and length of time required by law as to entitle
respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
We answer in the negative.
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance
with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 18 or
the Property Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of
Section 14 provide:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
xxxx
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The
certification and report19 dated July 17, 2001 submitted by
Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San
Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land area in
question is within the alienable and disposable zone,

certified as such since January 21, 1987.
In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, 20 we
have ruled that a certification and report from the DENRCENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient
proof to show the classification of the land described therein.
We held:
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic, 21 we ruled
that said Certification is sufficient to establish the true nature
or character of the subject property as public and alienable
land. We similarly ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals 22 and
intoned therein that the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a
positive government act, an administrative action, validly
classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the
petitioner, the classification or re-classification of public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department of the government.
Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving
the alienability of the subject lot.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to
ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both
agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence to show that he and his
predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent
any showing that the lower courts committed glaring
mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual, 23 we
reiterated,
Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment
is based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court,
having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor
and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the
question of their credibility. Hence, the findings of the trial
court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by
this Court. x x x.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been
satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership
and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy
of the Deed of Absolute Sale 24 dated July 8, 1958 between
Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax
Declaration No. 1107825 for the year 1948 in the name of
Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in

1952.26 In Llanes v. Republic,27 the Court held that tax
declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.28]However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax
Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax
payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a
claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of
occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or
earlier. What is categorically required by law is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.29
But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the subject land since
1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of
title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529? To this question
we likewise answer in the negative.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of
prescription under existing laws.1avvphil The laws on
prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It
is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership and that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty years.30
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for
application for registration because his claim of ownership
and possession over the subject property even exceeds
thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the
thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of
acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment
the State expressly declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial.31 In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled,
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)32, and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.33
In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a
certification and report from the DENR-CENRO dated July
17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls

within the alienable and disposable zone since January 21,
1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that
it does not encroach any area devoted to general public
use.34 Unfortunately, such certification and report is not
enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no
evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by
the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth. Thus,
there appears no basis for the application of the thirty (30)year prescriptive period in this case.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO
certification and report is enough to signify that the land is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration
because the land was certified as alienable and disposable
in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on
December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far
short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.
Although we would want to adhere to the States policy of
encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice35 we are constrained by the clear and
simple requisites of the law to disallow respondents
application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29,
2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, in
LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents application for registration is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally

A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the
petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had
not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial
a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting

Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that
the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could
not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period
of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in
the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered

judgment granting Malabanans application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of

Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject
of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application

for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-040173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.

Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason
of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to them,
what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the
time of the application without regard to whether the property
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No.

9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio
Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing
an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on
the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his
part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that
the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable
should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De
Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of
the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in
good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had
been the real owners of the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code,
in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed
the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership. 11Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for

public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the
State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17
Classifications
of
according to alienability
public
lands
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and

disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The
identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of

the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will
be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
or national park, or when public land is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit
of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares
that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by
a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
viz:
to wit:

disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or
national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership,
are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the
law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive
phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage
of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public
domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-ininterest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
must
be
open,
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide

claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.
xxxx
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification

of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,

because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or
by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been
classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility
for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally
or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for
as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land
Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary
only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the

courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands
in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in
the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated
back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring

ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior
to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig

City (RTC), in LRC Case No. N-5811 that denied the
application for confirmation and registration of title filed by
the petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
(RCAM).
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient

evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth.1wphi1
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two

parcels of land Lot 1 with an area of 34 square meters and
Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meters- covered by
amended Plan PSU-2239195 property), both located in what
used to be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On
September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as a land
registration court, an application for registration of
title6 (application) of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act
C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land Act).7On October 4, 1974, the
RCAM amended its application8 by reducing Lot 2 to 760
square meters (from 1,832 square meters).
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for

Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ROMAN CATHOLIC v. RAMOS
G.R. No. 179181 November 18, 2013
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The Factual Antecedents
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned

the property; that it acquired the property during the Spanish
time; and that since then, it has been in open, public,
continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an
owner. It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief,
no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the
property, and that no person has any claim, legal or
equitable, on the property.
The RCAM attached the following documents to support its
application: amended plan Psu-223919; technical description
of Lots 1 and 2;9 surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration
No. 9551 issued on September 6, 1966.11
On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Director of Lands, filed an opposition 12 to the
application. The Republic claimed that the property is part of
the public domain and cannot be subject to private
appropriation.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179181
November 18, 2013
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF

MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS, assisted by her
husband PONCIANO FRANCISCO, Respondent.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa

Ramos, through her husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her
opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that the
property formed part of the entire property that her family
owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from
the time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to
the
present.
Cresencia
submitted
the
following
documents,14 among others, to support her requested
confirmation of imperfect title:
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the challenge to the April 10
2007 decision2 and the August 9, 2007 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA
decision affirmed, with modification, the January 17, 2005
1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia

Sta. Teresa Vda. de Ramos (Cresencia's parents);
2.) her marriage certificate;
3.) their children's birth certificates;
4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;

5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child
while standing on the property and showing the location of
the RCAM' s church relative to the location of the property;
6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for
their gravel and sand business) on the property;
7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on
the property;
8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by
ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline
products in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal;
9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store
standing on their titled lot adjacent to the property;
10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to
Ponciano by a Tobacco company for his dealership in
Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and
11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet
manufacturing
business
situated
m
Bagumbayan,
Taguig,15 Rizal.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents,
in addition to those already on record:16 tax declarations
issued in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and
1999;17 the certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title
No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which
adjoins the property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia
confirming the RCAM's ownership of the property.18 It
likewise submitted several testimonial evidence to
corroborate its ownership and claim of possession of the
property.
The ruling of the RTC
In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC denied the
RCAM's application for registration of title. The RTC held that
the RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership
of the property applied for. The RTC pointed out that the
RCAM's only overt act on the property that could be
regarded as evidence of actual possession was its
construction of the bahay ni Maria in 1991. Even this act,
according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual
possession requirement of the law as the RCAM did not
show how and in what manner it possessed the property
prior to 1991. The RCAM's tax declarations were also
inconclusive since they failed to prove actual possession.
In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted
by Cresencia and her family on the property, the various
pieces of documentary evidence that she presented, and the
testimony of the RCAM' s own witnesses convinced the RTC
that she and her family actually possessed the property in
the manner and for the period required by law.
This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance

of the title in Cresencia's name. The RTC held that
Cresencia failed to include in her opposition a prayer for
issuance of title.
The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA.
The CA ruling
In its April 10, 2007 decision,20 the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC's January 17, 2005 ruling. The CA
confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect title to the
property, subject to her compliance with the requisites for
registration of title.
The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence
on record unquestionably showed that Cresencia was the
actual possessor and occupant, in the concept of an owner,
of the disputed property. The CA held that Cresencia s use of
the property since the Spanish time (through her
predecessors-in-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s
witnesses, clearly demonstrated her dominion over the
property. Thus, while she failed to register the property in her
name or declare it for taxation purposes as pointed out by
the RCAM, the CA did not consider this non-declaration
significant to defeat her claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely
tolerated the RCAM s temporary use of the property for lack
of any urgent need for it and only acted to protect her right
when the RCAM applied for registration in its name. Thus,
the CA declared that Cresencia correctly waited until her
possession was disturbed before she took action to vindicate
her right.
The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations
that the RCAM presented in support of its application. The
CA pointed out that these documents hardly proved the
RCAM s alleged ownership of or right to possess the
property as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the
CA held that it was bound by the findings of facts and the
conclusions arrived at by the RTC as they were amply
supported by the evidence.
The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its
motion for reconsideration.21
Assignment of Errors
The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely
abused its discretion in:22
1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the
oppositor when the magnitude of the parties evidence shows
that the oppositors merely had pretended possession that
could not ripen into ownership;
2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open
and notorious possession of the property in the concept of
an owner for a period of thirty (30) years prior to the filing of
the application; and

3. confirming the oppositors incomplete and imperfect title
despite her failure to comply with the substantial and
procedural requirements of the Public Land Act.
The Issue
In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the
RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No.
141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation
and registration of imperfect title.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s

confirmation of Cresencia's title over the property although
she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in
the present confirmation and registration proceedings.
Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the law
and jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title
over the property? This, in part, is a question of law as it
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
recognized facts.
The Court s Ruling
Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the

merits.
Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factualissue-bar rule
Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect

and incomplete title under C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the

present petition essentially questions the CAs appreciation
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who
attested to her actual, public and notorious possession of the
property. She argues that these are questions of fact that are
not proper for a Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of
the RTC were well supported by the evidence, had been
affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court.
C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of

lands of the public domain. Section 11 of C.A. No. 141
provides, as one of the modes of disposing public lands that
are suitable for agriculture, the "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand, enumerates
those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or
incomplete title over public lands and, therefore, entitled to
confirmation and registration under the Land Registration
Act.
We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what

Cresencia pointed out.
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over
petitions for review on certiorari is limited to the review of
questions of law and not of fact. "A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence x x x as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."24
An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the
claimed errors indeed primarily question the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that
Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the period required by
law. When the presented question centers on the sufficiency
of the evidence, it is a question of fact25 and is barred in a
Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to
the settled rule. When the lower courts grossly
misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when
correctly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a
review of the lower courts' findings may be made.26 This, in
our view, is the exact situation in the case as our discussions
below will show.
The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A.

No. 141 under which it anchored its application for
confirmation and registration of title. Nevertheless, the
allegations in its application and amended application readily
show that it based its claim of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141. As amended by P.D. No. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 currently
provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
chapter. [emphases and italics ours]

Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, then operated under the Republic Act
R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957) amendment which reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphases and italics ours]
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966
and its amended application on October 4, 1974, Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which
then required possession of thirty years), governs.
In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree
P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree specifies
those who are qualified to register their incomplete title over
an alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens
system. P.D. No. 1529, which was approved on June 11,
1978, superseded and codified all laws relative to the
registration of property.
The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [italics
ours]
Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title may register their titles upon a
showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, 27 since June 12, 1945, or earlier
(or for at least 30 years in the case of the RCAM)
confirmation of title. The burden of proof in these cases rests
on the applicants who must demonstrate clear, positive and
convincing evidence that: (1) the property subject of their
application is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) their alleged possession and occupation of
the property were of the length and of the character required
by law.28
On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits

of C A No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the
RCAM now argues that it actually, continuously, openly and
notoriously possessed the property since time immemorial. It
points out that its tax declarations covering the property,
while not conclusive evidence of ownership, are proof of its
claim of title and constitute as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.
For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to
discharge its burden of proving possession in the concept of
an owner. She argues that the testimonies of the RCAM s
witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and betray the
weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia adds that at
most, the RCAM s possession was by her mere tolerance
which, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
She also points out that the RCAM s tax declarations are
insufficient proof of possession as they are not, by
themselves, conclusive evidence of ownership.
We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions.
The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the
RCAM s application for its failure to comply with the second
requirement possession of the property in the manner and
for the period required by law.
We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on
this point. They had carefully analyzed and weighed each
piece of the RCAM s evidence to support its application and
had extensively explained in their respective decisions why
they could not give weight to these pieces of evidence.
Hence, we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s application. For
greater certainty, we expound on the reasons below.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the
manner and for the period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141 is actual, not fictional or constructive. In Carlos v
Republic of the Philippines,29 the Court explained the
character of the required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as
a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s
possession requirement, the RCAM had to show that it
performed specific overt acts in the character an owner
would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of
actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of
the application is required because the phrase adverse,
continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the
RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a
conclusion of law,30 not an allegation of fact. Possession is
open when it is patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the possession is
characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people
in the neighborhood."31
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any
specific act characterizing its claimed possession in the
manner described above. The various documents that it
submitted, as well as the bare assertions it made and those
of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the property, hardly
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in
cases of this nature.32 We elaborate below on these points.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in
1948, 1966, 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any
way prove the character of its possession over the property.
Note that the settled rule is that tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported by any other evidence showing
actual, public and adverse possession.33 The declaration for
taxation purposes of property in the names of applicants for
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may
constitute collaborating evidence only when coupled with
other acts of possession and ownership;34 standing alone, it
is inconclusive.
This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the
RCAM's payments of taxes due on the property were
inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while the RCAM
asserts that it had been in possession of the property since
the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could
present was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its
application in 1966 and its amended application in 197 4, the
RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948
and 1966) covering the property. And since then, up to the
issuance of the January 1 7, 2005 decision of the R TC, the
RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those
issued in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999. The case of Tan
v. Republic35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and
sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax
declarations as basis for inferring possession, 36 the RCAM
still failed to prove actual possession of the property for the
required duration. As already noted, the earliest tax

declaration that it presented was for 1948. We are in fact
inclined to believe that the RCAM first declared the property
in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does not
appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax
declaration. Thus, when it filed its application in 1966, it was
in possession of the property for only eighteen years,
counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the possession
period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its
alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years
counted from 1948) would still be short of the thirty-year
period required by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended by RA No. 1942. The situation would be worse if
we were to consider the amendment introduced by P.D. No.
1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the RCAM's claimed
possession of the property to give rise to an imperfect title,
this possession should have commenced on June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description
for Lots 1 and 2, and surveyor s certificate only prove the
identity of the property that the RCAM sought to register in
its name.37 While these documents plot the location, the area
and the boundaries of the property, they hardly prove that the
RCAM actually possessed the property in the concept of an
owner for the required duration. In fact, the RCAM seemed
to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly possesses and
over which it claims ownership. The total area that the RCAM
applied for, as stated in its amended application and the
amended survey plan, was 794 square meters (34 square
meters for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for Lot 2). Yet, in its
various tax declarations issued even after it filed its amended
application, the total area declared under its name was still
1,832 square meters. Notably, the area stated in its 1948 tax
declaration was only 132.30 square meters, while the area
stated in the subsequently issued tax declaration (1966) was
1,832 square meters. Significantly, the RCAM did not
account for or provide sufficient explanation for this increase
in the area; thus, it appeared uncertain on the specific area
claimed.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or
any other improvement that clearly announces its claim of
ownership over the property. Neither did it account for any
act of occupation, development, maintenance or cultivation
for the duration of time it was allegedly in possession of it.
The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiestarelated and Lenten activities could hardly satisfy the
possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the
CA, this structure was constructed only in 1991 and not at
the time of, or prior to, the filing of its application in 1966.
Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented
the inherent inadequacy of its documentary evidence. While
apparently confirming the RCAM s claim, the testimonies
were undoubtedly hearsay and were not based on personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the RCAMs
claimed actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession.

b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable
and disposable land of he public domain
Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be
insufficient since it failed to comply with the first and most
basic requirement proof of the alienable and disposable
character of the property. Surprisingly, no finding or
pronouncement referring to this requirement was ever made
in the decisions of the R TC and the CA.
To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the
RCAM was bound to establish "the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute."38 It could have also secured a certification
from the government that the property applied for was
alienable and disposable.39 Our review of the records shows
that this evidence is fatally absent and we are in fact
disappointed to note that both the RTC and the CA appeared
to have simply assumed that the property was alienable and
disposable.
We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic
reasons. One, in this jurisdiction, all lands belong to the
State regardless of their classification.40 This rule, more
commonly known as the Regalian doctrine, applies with
equal force even to private unregistered lands, unless the
contrary is satisfactorily shown. Second, unless the date
when the property became alienable and disposable is
specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s
compliance with the second requirement is rendered useless
as any alleged period of possession prior to the date the
property became alienable and disposable can never be
counted in its favor as any period of possession and
occupation of public lands in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, can never ripen into ownership.41
On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied
the RCAM' s application.
Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to

confirm the title of either the applicant or the oppositor in a
land registration proceeding depending on the conclusion
that the evidence calls for. Specifically, Section 29 provides
that the court "x x x after considering the evidence x x x finds
that the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper
for registration, judgment shall be rendered confirming the
title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land x x x x."
(emphases and italics ours)
Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the CA has the
authority to confirm the title of Cresencia, as the oppositor,
over the property. This, of course, is subject to Cresencia's
satisfaction of the evidentiary requirement of P D No. 1529,
in relation with C.A. No. 141 in support of her own claim of
imperfect title over the property.
The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of
C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies
Cresencia's claim of continuous, open and notorious
possession since the Spanish time. The RCAM points out
that, first, Cresencia failed to declare for taxation purposes
the property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she
did not believe herself to be its owner. Second, Cresencia
did not have the property surveyed in her name so that she
could assert her claim over it and show its metes and
bounds. Third, Cresencia did not register the property in her
name although she previously registered the adjoining lot in
her name. Fourth, Cresencia did not construct any
permanent structure on the property and no traces of the
businesses allegedly conducted by her and by her family on
it could be seen at the time it filed its application. And fifth,
Cresencia did not perform any act of dominion that, by the
established jurisprudential definition, could be sufficiently
considered as actual possession.
We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.
On the CAs authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in

land registration proceedings
While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the

oppositor in a confirmation and registration proceedings, we
cannot agree, however, with the conclusion the CA reached
on the nature of Cresencia's possession of the property.
The RCAM next argues that the CAs act of confirming

Cresencia's title over the property is contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it filed the
application for registration of title under the provisions of C.A.
No. 141 or alternatively under P.D. No. 1529; both statutes
dictate several substantive and procedural requirements that
must first be complied with before title to the property is
confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's title
without any evidence showing her compliance with these
requirements, it claims that the CA, in effect, made
Cresencia the applicant entitled to the benefits of the land
registration proceedings that it initiated before the lower
court.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the

RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application, we also find
insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove
her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for
the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM,
Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably
proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge
this burden of proof; thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the
contrary findings of the RTC and confirmed Cresencias title
over the property.
We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.
We differ with this view.

First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that
Cresencia presented to support her own claim of imperfect
title hardly proved her alleged actual possession of the
property. Specifically, the certificates of marriage, birth and
death did not particularly state that each of these certified
events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on
the claimed property; at best, the certificates proved the
occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal
and on the stated dates, respectively.
Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the
name of Ponciano, the registration certificate for their family
s sheet manufacturing business, the photograph of the
certificate of dealership in the name of Ponciano given by a
tobacco company, and the photograph of the plaque
awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole
dealer of its gasoline products did not prove that Cresencia
and her family conducted these businesses on the disputed
property itself. Rather, they simply showed that at one point
in time, Cresencia and her family conducted these
businesses in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In fact, Cresencia
s claim that they conducted their gasoline dealership
business on the property is belied by the testimony of a
witness who stated that the gas station was located north (or
the other side) of Cresencia s titled lot and not on the
property.42
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of
Cresencia s daughter, of the two bancas owned by her
family, and of the pile of gravel and sand they allegedly used
in their gravel and sand business also hardly count as acts of
occupation, development or maintenance that could have
been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence
of these objects and of Cresencia s daughter on the property
was obviously transient and impermanent; at most, they
proved that Cresencia and her family used the property for a
certain period of time, albeit, briefly and temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment
Store business (that they allegedly conducted on the
property) actually stood on their titled lot adjoining the
property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the
adjoining lot (which they had been occupying at the time the
RCAM filed its application and where their La Compania
Refreshment Store stood), she never had the property
registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her
predecessors-in-interest declare the property for taxation
purposes nor had the property surveyed in their names to
properly identify it and to specifically determine its metes and
bounds. The declaration for taxation purposes of property in
their names would have at least served as proof that she or
her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the
property43 that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled

with proof of actual possession.
Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco
Mariano (Cresencia's daughter) on the nature and duration
of their family's alleged possession of the property, other
than being self-serving, were mere general statements and
could not have constituted the factual evidence of
possession that the law requires. They also failed to point out
specific acts of dominion or ownership that were performed
on the property by the parents of Cresencia, their
predecessors-in-interest. They likewise failed to present any
evidence that could have corroborated their alleged
possession of the property from the time of their grandfather,
Cipriano, who acquired the property from its previous owner,
Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and
Florencia, none of the witnesses on record seemed to have
known that Cresencia owns or at least claims ownership of
the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of
evidence to be sufficient, which we do not, confirmation and
registration of title over the property in Cresencia' s name
was still improper in the absence of competent and
persuasive evidence on record proving that the property is
alienable and disposable.
For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it
affirmed the RTC's ruling on this matter and confirmed
Cresencia's imperfect title to the property.WHEREFORE, in
light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated April
10, 2007 and the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646 to the extent
described below:
1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it
affirmed the January 17 2005 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811
that DENIED the application for confirmation and registration
of title filed by the petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila; and
2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by
the Court of Appeals of the title over the property in the name
of respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for lack of
sufficient evidentiary basis.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Nat Res Cases and Special Laws Part 3

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NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty.

October 22, 2004

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES

Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 2

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 3

Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 4

G.R. No. 156117

May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 5

and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 6

The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 7

delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 8

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 9

G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the

G.R. No. 137887, February 28, 2000

However, it must be clarified herein that even though

Republic of the Philippines

February 28, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 10

In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 11

Republic of the Philippines

January 28, 2008

GREGORIA MARTINEZ,1, petitioner,

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 12

Cardona and Antonia Realon. These documents indubitably

Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to

Only petitioner interposed an appeal from the trial courts

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates the same two issues

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenged the

We sustain the Court of Appeals.

From the evidence extant on record, it is at once apparent

It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 13

for reversion of title to the State. In the latter case the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 14

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO TAN, petitioner,

The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 15

in open, continuous and notorious possession of subject

In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 16

acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 17

Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals, the

NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan) 18