Review

Author(s): Moshe Lewin

Review by: Moshe Lewin
Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), p. 1097
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692522
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Europe: Early Modern and Modern

1097

mere representatives of the center, and in this it

succeeds admirably.In sum, this book will be essential
for anyone concerned with the development of the
Soviet political and economic system during the interwar period.

Commissar Kliment Voroshilov, and also stepped on

Joseph Stalin's toes. The unpredictablycunning Stalin
supported Voroshilov in 1930, depicted Tukhachevsky
as an "anti-Marxist"fantast and even "a red militarist." He allowed the secret police to accuse TukhANTHONY HEYWOOD
achevsky of treason but finally reversed himself and
University of Bradford
decided, "after a personal investigation," that the
impetuous young officer "came out clean." In 1932,
LENNARTSAMUELSON.
Plans for Stalin s WarMachine: Stalin went even further and apologized to TukhachevTukhachevskyand Military-EconomicPlanning, 1925- sky for those earlier harsh criticisms. By now, the
1941. Foreword by VITALIISHLYKOV.(Studies in Rus- general secretarywas himself adopting the same "antisian and East European History and Society.) New Marxist"output targets for tanks and planes!
York: St. Martin's, in association with the Centre for
The monograph unravels the making of an instituRussian and East European Studies, University of tional setting engaged in anticipating the future needs
Birmingham. 2000. Pp. xv, 267.
of the military to be supplied by industry and the rest
the economy, first during a short initial stage after
During the 1920s, especially after the removal of Leon of
the
outbreak of war, next during the first year of battle,
Trotsky from his position as defense commissar in
1925, reassessment of defense problems took on a and finally for the duration of the war. An array of
renewed urgency for the Soviets because of their institutions mushroomed-in the High Command, the
military and economic weakness. Problems of this Gosplan, the Main IndustrialAdministration, the cenimportance could not but give rise to a clash of tral government, the party-each of them doing their
approaches, among military specialists, economic ex- part but also meddling and quarelling with the others.
perts, and politicians, the complexity of the road to an Many of these activities are investigated here for the
adequate military strength being magnified by the first time, showing a complicated, often messy busichanging international scene and by the military's ness, notably because these activities overlapped with
dependence on the country's problematic economic the general plans for economic development as emdevelopment. It was one thing to anticipate an attack bodied in the Five-Year Plans. A very large part of
by Poland and Romania, even if backed by France, and militaryprocurement orders had to be placed with the
it was quite another, some eight years later, when civilian branches of industry, without imparing the
Germany (allied with Poland, as it was then believed) performance of the economy in peacetime. Samuelson
became the main trouble spot. In this new situation, shows the chaos and failures that accompanied the
having enough factories capable of producing large whole process, notably the 1932 industrial flop and the
quantities of artillery pieces, tanks, and planes (and catastrophic intrusion of Stalin's purges, which dethe ever-scarce gunpowder and ammuniton) became a stroyed the flower of the officers corps and effectively
matter of extreme urgency. Yet the danger of thereby sabotaged the whole war effort. Yet the author is quite
militarizing the economy prematurely, at the expense convinced that despite all setbacks, the institutions for
of a more balanced and growth-capable development, planning and coordinating the military-economic efwas also perceived, engaging experts and agencies in fort, even though manned by less experienced people,
heated discussions of threat assessments, strategies, were at the heart of the subsequent Soviet successand operational art to be adopted in future wars as something both Adolf Hitler and the Western Allies
well as about ways of expanding the country's eco- knew little about.
nomic potential. Some of those involved argued forceThis point is interesting and worthy of attention.
fully that the coming war (which was seen as not being
Some other statements though are not too clearly
too far distant) would be one of huge and very mobile
formulated. One of them is Samuelson's repudiation of
mechanized, motorized, and airborne armies that
that Stalin panicked at the outbreak of the war,
would require an entirely new way of conducting war, claims
when
in
fact he was busy undertaking all kinds of
a thoroughly reorganized and retrained command
important measures already in early June 1941. This is
systems, and an industrial base that the impoverished
plausible, but he also argues against those who claim
Russia of, say, 1927 could only dream of.
Armed with much new archival data, Lennart Sam- that Stalin disregarded numerous warnings about the
uelson offers us what turns out to be a very intricate imminent German attack. If he did not disregard the
story, including some fascinating "personal" aspects warnings, how do we explain the fatal lack of war
centering on the talented and impetuous young readiness of the huge Soviet armies massed on the
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a military commander and frontiers against a fully combat-ready German army?
thinker who flooded the leadership with interminable Samuelson promises a further installment with more
memos, articles, and books in which he mapped out answers. Judging by the quality of the one under
the features of future technological warfarewith amaz- review, the next is worth waiting for.
MOSHELEWIN
ing foresight. He thereby ruffled many feathers, notably those of the not-too-bright and slow-thinking War
University of Pennsylvania

AMERICAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

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JUNE

2001