FACTS

ISSUE
VIDAL V. COMELEC and ERAP
Background:
Is the petition
Erap was convicted of Plunder.
for certiorari
Pardoned by GMA on 10.25.07.
proper? Why?
Erap accepted pardon on 10.26.07
Filed his COC for Mayor Manila on 10.2.12
Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is
present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty
in accordance with the preceding rules, according
to the result of such compensation.
Atty. Risos-Vidal filed before COMELEC against Erap

HELD
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution; that the text of the pardon granted to him
substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal
Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he was restored to his civil and
political rights; that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of the
grantee; and that his disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the hundreds of
thousands of Manileos who voted for him.
Presidents power to Pardon = Consti > RPC
No. The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation
of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidl v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015,
Leonardo de Castro, J).

on the grounds of:

LGC 1991 Sec 40:
Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. The death
penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of
perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
dsadas

CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
Cristobal said the pardoning
The CFI of Rizal found respondent
Santos guilty of estafa and was confined power of the Executive does
not apply to legislative
in the provincial jail for 6 months. prohibitions and would amount
However, he continued to be a to an unlawful exercise of the
Executive of a legislative
registered elector in the city of Malabon,
function.
Rizal and was seated as the municipal
president from 1934 to 1937. On 1938,
Commonwealth Act No 357 or the
Election Code, was approved by the
National
Assembly.
Section
94,
paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the
respondent from voting for having been
declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property. In view of this
provision, the respondent applied to the
President for an absolute pardon. Upon
favorable recommendation of the Sec of
Justice, the President granted the
petition
on
1939,
restoring
the
respondent to his full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment,
he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the
exclusion of the name of Santos from the
list of voters in precinct no. 11 of
Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the
latter is disqualified under par (b) of Sec

The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of clemency: that it be
exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action.
Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of this power.

94 of the Election Code. After hearing,

the court denied the petition for exclusion
and declared that the pardon extended in
favor of respondent has had the effect pf
excluding him from the disqualification
created by the Election Code.
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for
certiorari in which he impugns the
decision of the court.
Garcia vs. Exec. Secretary

Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such
is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC, held the Court.
The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period
of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner
was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court. As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. [A]bsent
any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the
General Court Martials decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29
should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioners (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence
has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.
The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. [T]he concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification, held the Court.
Finally, the Court found without merit Garcias contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his
case was violated. It noted that Garcia did not allege any delay during the trial only the delay in the
confirmation of the sentence by the President. The Court found such delay to Garcias advantage
because his sentence could not be served absent such confirmation. (GR No. 198554, Garcia v.

Executive Secretary, July 30, 2012)

Enrile vs. Salazar
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.
The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day
filed by a panel of prosecutors composed
of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
(a) Whether the petitioner has punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
committed complex crimes
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
(delito compleio) arising from mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
an offense being a necessary exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
means for committing another, maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in
which is referred to in the
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
second clause of Article 48 of However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
the Revised Penal Code?
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before
the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the

On the same date of February 28, 1990,

Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which
was followed by a supplemental petition
filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Lacuna v. Abes
The eligibility of Abes, the mayor-elect of
Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, was challenged
on the grounds that he was he had been
convicted of the crime of counterfeiting
treasury warrants and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight
(8) months, and (1) day of prision mayor,
and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). After he had partially served
his sentence, he was released from
confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of
a conditional pardon granted by the
President of the Philippines, remitting
only the unexpired portion of the prison
term and fine. Abes applied as voter in
Penaranda but he was denied by the
Election Registration Board, however, he
was able to run and even win the
mayoral elections Lacuna filed a quo
warranto petition against Abes.On 7
December 1967, on the same day when
hearing was held on the application for
preliminary injunction, the President of
the
Philippines
granted
to
the
respondent, Benjamin Abes, an absolute
and unconditional pardon and restored to
him "full civil and political rights". The
lower court favored Abes, hence the
petition.

amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

w/n Abes is qualified to be a

mayor?

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the
import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees conviction
of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised
Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of
the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary
special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code,
provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether
the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives
the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend

Parulan v. Dir. Of Prisons

-Parulan was serving life imprisonment
(commuted to 20 years by the Pres of
the Phil) in Muntinglupa. In Oct 1964, he
was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He
escaped in the same month, but was
recaptured in Manila.
- He was prosecuted for the crime of
evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under RPC157. In 1966, CFI
Manila found him guilty and sentenced
him accordingly.
- He filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus directed to the Director of Bureau
of Prisons, praying that the latter be
ordered to release immediately and
without delay the body of the petitioner
from unlawful and illegal confinement.
Parulan saw his confinement illegal
because the sentence of conviction
imposed upon him for the crime of
evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under RPC157, was rendered
by a court without jurisdiction over his
person and of the offense with which he
was charged.

W/N the CFI of Manila with

jurisdiction to try and decide
the case and to impose the
sentence upon Parulan for
evasion of service of sentence

on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The
last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the
time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became
ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the
judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not
eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy.
kidnapping with illegal detention is considered a continuing crime where the deprivation of liberty is
persistent and continuing from one place to another
Yes. In transitory crimes or continuing offenses, acts material to the crime occur in one province and
some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case.
- In some crimes, although the elements thereof for its consummation occurred in one place, yet by
the very nature of the offense committed, the violation is deemed to be continuing.
- some crimes under 1st class: estafa or malversation, abduction
- some crimes under 2nd class: libel, kidnapping and illegal detention (deprivation of liberty is
continuing), and evasion of service of sentence (the act of the escapee is a continuous or series of
acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be)
- Crime is not consummated after the convict has escaped from confinement, for as long as he
continues to evade the service, he is deemed to continue committing the crime and may be arrested
without warrant at any place where he may be found; Sec6 (c) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court (one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where he has
excaped from confinement) supports this

Pp v. Dela Torre

Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had

three (3) children with his common-law
wife Melinda Torre, namely: M1, M2 and
M3. Melinda left her family when M1 was
about seven (7) years old bringing with
her M3. The victim lived with her father
and brother M2 in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla,
teacher of M1, noticed sudden changes
in her behavior and when confronted, the
latter admitted that she was sexually
abused by her father. Her head teacher
informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about
the sexual abuses. They referred the
case to the DSWD who took her under
its custody.
M1 testified that her father committed
sexual abuses on her on the following
dates: September 30, 1996, October 10,
1996, October 18, 1996, November 01,
1996, November 12, 1996 and
December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr.
Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician
of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose
revealed that her hymen was broken with
healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and
9:00 nine oclock positions. The girl also
suffered from urinary tract infection.
Pp v. Tabaco

The Court agrees. Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. In the present case, the acts of Dela
Torre, Bisaya, and Amoroso clearly indicate a unity of action: (1) Dela Torre called AAA and brought
her inside the jeep; (2) Bisaya and Amoroso were waiting inside the jeep; (3) Dela Torre kissed and
touched AAA while Bisaya and Amoroso watched; (4) Dela Torre passed AAA to Bisaya; (5) Bisaya
kissed and touched AAA while Dela Torre and Amoroso watched; (6) Bisaya passed AAA to
Amoroso; and (7) Amoroso inserted his penis in AAA's vagina and kissed her while Dela Torre and
Bisaya watched.
Since there was conspiracy among Dela Torre, Bisaya, and Amoroso, the act of any one was the act
of all and each of them is equally guilty of all the crimes committed.

People v. Talusa
Santiago v. Garchitorena
(a) Whether the petitioner is
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged with continued crime
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of
charged by the Sandiganbayan with
(delito continuado) under
the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal
vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as
Code?
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
allegedly committed by her favoring
to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees
"unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156
the Alien Legalization Program.
[1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special
laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
petition for certiorari and prohibition to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
proceeding with criminal case on the
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
ground that said case was intended
such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner
solely to harass her as she was then a
was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury
presidential candidate. She alleged that
to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October
this was in violation of Section 10, Article
17, 1988.
IX-C of the Constitution which provides
that "(b)ona fide candidates for any
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First
public office shall be free from any form
Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified
of harassment and discrimination." The
in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
petition was dismissed on January 13,
consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
1992.
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a
disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for
hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days
after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division),
of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena
is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992. On
November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to
defer the arraignment on the grounds
that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to
file a motion for a bill of particulars.

However, on November 9, 1992, the

Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied
the motion to defer the arraignment.
More so, the petitioner cannot accept the
legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would her
from going abroad for a Harvard
scholarship because of graft charges
against her. It appears that petitioner
tried to leave the country without first
securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the
hold-departure order which. The letter of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in
defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all
persons facing criminal charges in court,
with no exception, have to secure
permission to leave the country.
The court issued the Resolution dated
March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding
Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and
DESIST from sitting in the case until the
question of his disqualification is finally
resolved by this Court and from
enforcing the resolution dated March 11,
1993, ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 Amended Informations
and from proceeding with the
arraignment on
April 12, 1993.