Workers

of

the

World

at

Century's

End

Arrighi*

Giovanni

I
six years d9o, l noted how "over the
written
In an article
parties and states
last 1,5-20 years, labor unions, working-cIass
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
g
o
v
e
l
n
m
e
n
t
s
,
o
f the Communist
ruled by socialj-st
p
r
e
s
s
ure to restructure
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
l
e
have all been under
variety,
Some
f
a
c
e
decline....
o
r
t
h
e
i
r
o
r
i
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
themselves and change
p
r
o
q
p
e
r
,
a
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
e
v
e
n
t
h
e
s
t
a
v
e
o
f
f
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
/
may be able to
but
the same result
Others can attain
simple change in strategy.
A
n
d
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
s
e
l
f
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
.
t
h
o
r
o
u
g
h
o
f
only through a
Do matter what they do" (1).
others again can only decline,
This tendency was traced to the fact that all existing
of
had formed under the circumstances
organizations
working-c1ass
t
h
e
h
a
l
f
o
f
f
i
r
s
t
t
h
e
typical
of
worl-d-market disintegration
organized labor in
Under those circumstances,
century.
twentieth
S
t
a
t
e
s included--had
United
high income ("corerr) countries--the
while
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
influence,
p
o
w
e
r
and
social
acquired considerable
income
middle
great
in
advances
had made
Communist revolution
( "semiperipheral" ) and Iow income ( "peripheral" ; countries--first
of
But the revitalization
in Russia and China.
and foiemost,
progressively
world market forces that occurred under US hegemony
on which
economic seclusion
of national
undermined the conditions
the
a
n
d
power of organized labor in core countries
the social
peripheral
and
in semiperipheral
advances of Communist revolution
al-I
Under the emerging circumstances,
were based.
countries
they had
matter how effective
organizations--no
working-class
of
been in meeting the challenges and seizing the opportunities
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
,
to
if at all
the bygone age--would find it difficul-t,
created by the
meet the challenges and seize the opportunities
economies in a single world market.
of national
reintegration
have become a nearly
Communist parties
Since this was written,
species throughout Europe; Social Democratic and Labor
extinct
and longparties
have transformed themselves out of recognition;
and once powerful labor unions have been
established

* Giovanni Arrighi
is Professor of Sociology at Binghamton
book is The Lonq Twentieth Centurv.
His latest
University.
An
t
h
e
Oriqins of Our Times (London: Verso).
Monqv, Power, and
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
t
h
e
c
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
a
p
e
r
a
t
t
h
i
s
w
a
s
o
f
version
earlier
for a New Century
Workers in the Globa1 Economy: Organizing
of
sponsored by the Center for Labor Studies, University
May 5-6, 1995.
Washington, Seattle,

struggling
to stave off decline in membership and political
crisis
of organized
influence.
ff my diagnosis of the joint
it was the
anything,
labor and Communist regimes underestimated
and the extent to which
was unfolding
speed at which the crisis
of
than transformation
rather
in the extinction
it I{OULd fesult
But the very pace and
working-cl-ass organizations.
existing
confirm with a vengeance the
of the crisis
destructiveness
organizations
that the working-class
of the contention
validity
were in the
centuly
that had been "made" in the early twentieth
process of being "unmade" at the end of the century.
This does not mean that the world labor movement has no
in order to be at all
future.
What it does mean is that,
the world labor movement in the twentieth-first
effective,
as
and structures
have to develop strategies
century will
were
century as the latter
from those of the twentieth
different
evol-ves
World capitalism
from those of the nineteenth.
under which the working
and so do the conditions
continually,
own history.
classes of the world make their
w must
are evolving,
In order to grasp how these conditions
concerning the present
first
of all dispel two misconceptions
is that the
misconception
The first
of world l-abor.
crisis
of
to a decl-ine in the disposition
either
is due primarily
crisis
working and
or improve their
to protect
workers to struggle
of
of the relocation
or to the effects
conditions,
living
countries.
i
n
c
o
m
e
t
o
l
o
w
e
r
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
i
g
h
f
r
o
m
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
industrial
the
d
e
m
o
n
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
c
r
i
s
i
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
m
i
s
c
o
n
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
The second
first
t
h
e
i
n
a
s
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
d
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
l
a
b
o
r
w
o
r
l
d
failure
of the
wel1
a
s
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
,
i
t
s
t
o
a
t
t
a
i
n
t
w
e
n
t
i
e
t
h
c
e
n
t
u
r
y
half of the
its
i
n
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
e
l
y
t
o
o
v
e
r
c
o
m
e
w
o
r
l
d
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
as the capacity of
and contradictions.
limits
is based on a nalrow focus on the
misconception
The first
to the
and a lack of attention
i
n
c
o
r
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s,
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
labor
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
l
o
n
g
e
r
t
e
r
m
wider
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
,
b
e
e
n
h
a
s
i
n
U
S
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
activities.
throughout
to lower income countries
its actj-vities
relocating
t
r
a
n
s
n
ational
b
e
c
a
m
e
U
S
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
century.
the twentieth
c
o
n
t
i
n
e
n
t
w
ide
t
h
e
i
r
h
a
d
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
s
o
o
n
a
s
t
h
e
y
almost as
and
by 1944 US
the
century;
at
the
turn
of
integration
domestic
percent
US
GNP, the
of
to
7
abroad
amounted
investment
direct
same percentage as in the late 1960s and a s1i9ht1y higher
and at
dj-d contain,
percentage than today (2).
These relocations
power and disposition
to
times rolled
back, the bargaining
But these domestic effects
struggle
of the US working class.
on a world scale by the
were more than counterbalanced
power and disposition
to struggle
of the bargaining
strengthening
to which industrial
of the working classes of the countries
(3).
activities
were relocated
More generally,

new worldwide
2

data on labor

unrest

based on

reports
in The New York Times and in the Times (London), has
revealed that labor unrest since the end of the Second World War
shows a declining
trend only in core coutries.
In semiperipheral
throughout the same period,
and in peripheral
countries
countries
labor
i
n
t
r
e
n
d
a
r
i
s
i
n
g
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
t
h
e
r
e
i
n
c
o
n
t
r
a
s
t
,
sinee 7970,
As Beverly Silver explains,
unrest (4).

'

to particular
attracted
were initially
Corporations
cheap
sites because they appeared to offer
semiperipheral
South
South Africa,
and docile workers (e.9., Spain, Brazil,
and indirect)
Korea).
The subsequent inflow of (direct
to a series of semiperipheral
investment contributed
foreign
But the
t
h
e
1
9
7
0
s and 1980s.
m
i
r
a
c
l
e
s
"
i
n
"economic
industries
mass production
expansion of capital-intensive
also created new
that accompanied these "economic miracles"
disruptive
working classes with significant
and militant
power.
Workers exercised this power in waves of struggle
of the
miracles
the semiperipheral
that spread throughout
in the
and South Africa...
l-970's and 1980's--from Brazil...
1970s to South Korea in the L980's (5).

of the ongoing
been the main thrust
relocation
Had spatial
a
r
e
that in the
t
h
e
c
h
a
n
c
e
s
c
a
p
j
t
a
l
i
s
m
,
o
f
w
o
r
l
d
restructuring
m
a
s
s
i
v
e labor
h
a
v
e
w
i
t
n
e
s
s
e
d
w
e
w
o
u
l
d
l-980s and early 1990s
to us to
n
o
t
e
v
e
n
o
c
c
u
r
i
t
w
o
u
l
d
a
n
d
t
o
d
a
y
,
unrest worldwide;
s
p
e
a
k
i
n
g
of such a
I
f
w
e
a
r
e
l
a
b
o
r
.
of world
speak of a crisis
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
al
r
e
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
s
p
a
t
i
a
l
it is because
crisis,
r
elocation
t
h
e
f
a
s
t
e
r
to lower income countries--even
activities
not
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
is
technological
by the latest
made
of the
r
e
s
t
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
the most fundamental aspeet of the capitalist
y
e
a
r
s
.
last twenty-five
As argued at length elsewhere (6), the primary aspect of
is a change of phase of processes of capital
this restructuring
to financial
on a world scale from material
accumulation
but a normal
This change is not at all an aberration
expansion.
From its
accumulation of capital.
development of the capitalist
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
,
y
e
a
r
s
t
h
e
ago down to the
600
earliest
beginnings
two
world-economy has always expanded through
capitalist
the course
phases: a phase of material expansion--in
alternating
into trade
g
r
o
w
i
n
g
m
o
n
e
y
w
a
s
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
e
d
mass of
capital
of which a
p
h
a
s
e
t
he course
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
n
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
,
a
of financial
and
growing
form and
to
its
money
mass
reverted
of capital
of which a
A
s
F
e
r
n
a
n
d
Braudel
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
a
n
d
went into lending,
borrowing
in the
out the recurrence
of this pattern
remarked in pointing
and nineteenth
centuries,
sixteenth,
eighteenth
"every capitalist
development of this order seems, by reaching the stage of
financial
expansion, to have in some sense announced its
maturity:
it was a sign of autumn' (7).
the great expansion of world trade
As Braudel was writing,
and production of the 1950s and 1-960s--the so-ca11ed "golden age

into
of capitalism'r - -began announcing its own maturity
by turning
In the l97Qs,
the financial
expansion of the 1970s and 1980s.
and in
the expansion of financial
activities
was associated with,
many ways contributed
tor rrr expansion of capital
flows from high
borrowing
fn the L980s/ cross-border
ta lower ineome countries.
-the stock of
and lending contj-nued to grow exponentiallyinternational
bank lending rising
from 4 per cent of the total
q
f
But
t
GDP
al-l OECDcountries
in l-980 o 44 per cent in L99I.
after
capital
flows from high to lower income countries,
sharply in the early 1-980s, began to recover only
contracting
towards the end of the decade (8). The ultimate
and privileged*
in
destination
of the capital
withdrawn from trade and production
in other words, has not been lower income
core locations,
that
speculation
countries
but the "hidden abodes" of financial
to one another.
It was this
connect high income countries
withdrawal,
rather than relocation,
that in the 1980s
precipitated
the crisis
of world labor.
should not be
As previ-ously mentioned, this crisis
misconstrued
as evidence in support of the view that the world
half of the twentieth
labor movement as instituted
in the first
its objectives,
or of the view that
century failed
to attain
and
its limits
world capitalism
can overcome indefinitely
p
o
w
e
r
f
u
l
workingn
o
t
i
c
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
L
e
t
u
s
b
e
g
i
n
b
y
contradictions.
D
e
m
o
c
r
atic and
Social
alass organizations
of the Trade Unionist,
h
alf of
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
themselves in
established
Communist varieti-es
of world society under
the twentieth
century as key institutions
for war
warfare or preparation
conditions
of almost uninterrupted
of Communist
among capitalist
states.
The establishment
in Russia and then
first
revolution
as a force in world politics,
result
of the ravages of the two
in China, was of course a direct
the greatest
countries,
But even in core capitalist
World Wars.
waves of class struggle
occurred towards the end and immediately
after the two World Wars (9).
The US Cold War world order, and the great expansion of
that occurred under the auspices of
world trade and production
joint
shaped by this
advance of
that order/
were thoroughly
in
and of Communist revolution
organized labor in core eountries
By the end of the
semiperipheral
and perj-pheral countries.
advance was widely perceived as
Second World War this joint
a fundamental threat
for the very survival
of world
constituting
capitalism.
If the advance was not contained and eventually
reversed,
the only question that seemed to remain open was not
whether world capitalism
would survive
but by what combination
of
reforms and revolutions
it would die.
The US "invention"
of the
CoId War was primarily
a response to this situation
of emergency
for world capitalism.
Under the CoId War worl-d order the advances of the world
labor movement of the first
half of the twentieth
century were
indeed contained and, eventually/
reversed but only through a

accomodation of its objectives.

states
Core capitalist
Partial
were encouraged to appropriate
the working-class
of
objectives
job security
("fuIl
employment") and high mass consumption.
Colonial
states were granted juridical
sovereignty.
Along with
also
pefiphefal
were
they
states,
semiperipheraland
Othef
encouraged to pursue modernization
and "development, " so as to be
able, in a more or less distant
future,
to provide their
own
working classes with the job seeurity
and high mass consumption
that for the time being only workers j-n core states would enjoy.
To be sure, the pursuit
of welfare for core workers and
n
o
n
c
o
r
e
f
o
r
w
o
rkers became objectives
of
"development"
gfovernmental action primarily
as means of an anti-Communist
crusade and, as such, it came to be embedded in a US-centered
system of military
alliances
and in an armament race between the
peacetime
United States and the USSR that had no historicalprecedent.
But the Cold War between the two superpowers did
remain "cold" and/ moreover/ it became the basis of a fundamental
reorganization
of world capitalism
designed to ensure a lasting
peace among its various national
components.
The importance of this reorganization
cannot be emphasized
too strongly.
Ever since President Wilson had responded to
Lenin's
summons to world revolution
with his Fourteen Points
(10), the more enlightened factions of the US ruling
classes had
to world
threat
implicitly
concurred with Lenin that the greatest
and
capitalism
came from i-ts internecine
struggles
over colonies
that once the Second
territory.
ft is not surprising,
therefore,
World War had validated
Lenin's hopes and Wilsonrs fears, the US
government skillfully
the fear of Communist revolution
exploited
to induce the governments of Western Europe to renounce
to enter into long-term military
with
colonialism,
cooperation
the United States, and to mutually
integrate
their
national
economies into a single commonmarket of continental
dimension.
By so doing, the United States created in Western Europe and in
the former colonial
world new arenas of profitable
expansion for
US corporate
B
u
t
i
t
a
l
s
o
capital.
created durable structures
of
political
and economic cooperation
among Western European states
that undermined their
and capabilities
dispositions
to engage in
mutual war.
The achievements of the US reformation
of world capitalism
went beyond the rosiest
expectations
of its promoters.
The l-950s
and 1960s, in Thomas McCormick's words, were I'the most sustained
period of economic Arowth in the history
and profitable
of worl-d
(11).
capitalism"
Communist revolution
continued to advance--in
Cuba, in Indochina, and in Africa--but
in ever more peripheral
locations.
What's more, the two originalcenters of Communist
revolution
developed mutual antagonisms that made it easier for
the United States and its allies
to play one center against the
other.
And while Communist revolution
was peripheralized
or
tamed, i-ndustrial
conflict
in core countries
was progressively

and after a brief revival

routj-nized;
to decl-ine precipituously.
started

in the

late

l-960s, it

howeverr cdrl this

of the imigination,
By no stretch
be construed as a failure
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
reeovery of world
miraeulous
]
e
s
s as a rasting
a
n
d
e
v
e
n
r
a
b
o
r
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
,
;?-t[e-;oiro
On the contrary,
c
a
p
i
t
a
lism.
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
resolution
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y,
not on the
b
a
s
e
d
w
a
s
the recovery of world capitalism
c
a
p
i
t
alism
w
o
r
l
d
b
y
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
r
e
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
e
but on
negation,
the
o
f
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
l
a
b
o
r
t
h
e
w
o
r
l
d
o
f
t
h
e
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
itself
of
This accomodation does demonstrate the
preceding
half century.
as historical
of world capitalism
adaptability
extraordinary
g
u
t
expansion around
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
a
n
e
w
o
f
t
h
e
o
n
s
e
t
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
social
that the
a
n
d
l
i
m
i
t
s
,
h
a
s
a
d
a
p
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
t
h
i
s
t
h
a
t
s
h
o
w
s
1-g7O
the crisis
f
o
r
e
t
h
e
t
o
b
a
c
k
b
r
i
n
g
s
l
i
m
i
t
s
t
h
e
s
e
o
f
approaching
n
e
w
f
o
r
m
s
.
a
n
d
i
n
o
l
d
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
m
o
f
tendencies
II
and fundamental
expansions are moments of crisis
Financial
As in all the
w
o
r
l
d
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
.
t
h
e
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
s
t
of
reorganization
force
t
h
e
d
riving
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
c
e
n
t
u
r
i
e
s
,
o
f
expansions
financial
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
and
t
h
e
f
r
o
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
p
i
e
s
e
n
t
o
f
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
behind the
p
l
a
n
t
e
q
u
i
p
m
ent)
a
n
d
l
a
b
o
r
,
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
w
a
g
e
sale of commodities
m
a
j
o
r
a
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
lending
to borrowing,
a
itself
competition,
of intercapitalist
intensification
a
nd
t
r
a
d
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
o
f
w
o
r
l
d
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
consequence of the
growing
a
i
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
production
(l-2). As old and new enterprises
they
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
o
f
c
o
m
m
o
d
i
t
i
e
s
,
a
n
d
s
a
l
e
in the
mass of capital
o
f
l
i
n
e
s
respective
margins in their
brought down profit
sought to
number of enterprises
And as an increasing
business.
a
c
t
i
v
i
ties
t
h
e
i
r
returns by diversifying
counter diminishing
i
n
v
a
d
e
d
o
n
e
t
h
e
y
and lines of business/
across locations
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
f
i
e
d
market niches and thereby further
another's
in a1l branches of trade
pressures and uncertainty
competitive
and production.
that a growing
it is only natural
Under these circumstances,
production
and
and
should be withdrawn from trade
mass of capital
i
n
a
n
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
o
f
to avoj-d the risks and troubles
held liquid
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
and uncertain
competitive
increasingly
that is,
This large and growing mass of surplus capital--capi-tal,
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
a
n
d
sale of
p
r
o
f
i
t
a
b
l
y
t
h
e
i
n
that cannot be reinvested
p
r
o
f
i
t
a
b
l
e
k
i
n
d
s
o
f
a
l
l
c
r
e
a
t
e
s
itself
commodities--in
to borrow, 1end, and
intermediaries
for financial
opportunities
of
flourishing
t
h
e
f
u
1
1
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
l
y
,
speculate.
a
n
w
i
t
h
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
h
a
s
a
l
w
a
y
s
b
e
e
n
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
,
financi-al
that
for the capital
competition
of interstate
intensification
in
As competition
was being withdrawn from trade and production.
governments tended to step into the
commodity markets escalated,
needed
and to compete with one another for the capital
struggle

through
mostly, though not exclusively,
to overpower rivals,
turn,
i
n
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
,
T
h
i
s
r
a
c
e
.
a
r
m
a
m
e
n
t
in the
escalation
of
t
h
e
m
o
b
i
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
f
i
t
f
r
o
m
t
o
opportunities
multiplied
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
a
n
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
in borrowing,
surplus capital

an

recognized in the present as in

can be clearly
This pattern
Throughout the 1-970s, surplus capital
past f inan-cial expansions.
and
to semiperipheral
ias channeled in directions--lending
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
--that
in currency
and speculation
peripheral
countries
in world
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
s
a
n
d
increased competitive
further
f
i
n
a
n
c
ial
i
n
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
increasing
without
trade and production
and
s
e
m
i
p
e
r
i
p
h
e
ral
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
d
markets. ALundant and cheap credit
a
n
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
e
i
r
to step up
peripheral- countries
to compete over markets and
and, Lherefore,
efforts
irodeinization
previously
been the
h
a
d
oj-I) that
(most notably,
resources
in currency
S
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
preserve of core countries.
privileged
d
e
s
troyed the
t
h
e
n
a
n
d
undermined,
first
irarkets-, for its part,
the
to
had
contributed
system of fixed exchange rates that
l-960s.
a
n
d
1
9
5
0
s
t
h
e
i
n
of world economic conditions
slability
u
n
c
e
r
t
ainty
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
s
a
n
d
increase in competitive
This furlher
from
withdraw
to
tendency of capital
the overall
strengthened
b
e
t
w
e
e
n a
it widened the disequilibrium
trade and production;
s
u
r
p
l
u
s
f
o
r
d
e
m
a
n
d
expanding suppty and a stagnant
rapidly
markets (13).
ana it depressed returns in financial
c.pittf;
under
1-979 that the US government, first
It was only after
R
e
a
gan,
u
n
d
e
r
and then with much greater determination
Carter,
for
favorabLe demand conditions
took steps that created highly
the
i
n
These steps were taken
expansion.
the ongoing financial
a
n
d
struggle
of the ideological
contexi of a major escalation
t
h
e
has called
armament race wittr the USSR--what Fred Halliday
of US
Responding to the serious deterioration
Second Cold War.
I
n
d
o
china
defeat in
thet ensued from military
power and prestige
t
o
t
h
e
the US government came
defeat in lran,
ind diplomltic
bidding up real
dol1ar by aggressively
rescue of a battered
It then used the
markets.
rates in world financial
interest
that it gained through these measures
credit
seemingly unlimited
the armament race weII beyond what the the USSR could
to escillte
support
to cut taxes to win electoral
and, simultaneously,
afford
was an increase
The result
for the new anti-Communist crusade.
debt, which provided
in the US national
proportions
of historic
with a far more secure and
surplus capital
domestic and- foreign
than it had been able to find since the
outlet
remunerative
expansion (14).
outset of the financial
thus played
power struggle
in the interstate
An escalation
expansion
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
the current
a role in sustaining
as critical
respects
o
t
h
e
r
a
s
i
n
t
h
i
s
To be sure, in
as it had in the past.
d
i
v
e
r
g
e
s
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
the dynamic of the present financial
But before
from past experience, as we shall see.
signiiicantly
m
o
re
t
w
o
w
i
t
h
d
e
a
l
m
u
s
t
w
e
we turn to these differences/
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d the
t
o
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
o
n
o
u
r
analogies that bear directly

main thrust

of

the

present

restructuring

Both analogies relate

to the
expansions have not just been the

of world

capitalism.

fact that all past financial

"closing season" of a major

material expansion of the capitalist

worrd-econony' rhe

that underlay the

competition
intensification
of intercapitalist
financial
expansions brought about also epochal changes in the
of
structure
and in the organizational
spatial
configuration
which
processes of capital
accumulation on a world scale--changes
into,
a new
prepared the ground for, and in due course translated
phase of expansion of world trade and production.
Epochal
changes of this kind have always taken long periods of time to
a rule/
more than half a century from the beginning
complete--as
the previously
dominant
Initially,
expansions.
of the financial
center always had the means to turn to its advantage the
As Halford
competition.
intensification
of intercapitalist
relative
MacKinder put it in 1899/ commenting on Britain's
are
B
r
i
tish]
competitiveness,
decline in industrial
"we'Ithe
and those who have capital
the people with capital,
essentially
of brains and muscles of other
always share in the activity
(15).
countries"
Over time, however, even "the greatest ownership of capital"
not
dominant centers in meeting the costs
did
help the previously
of the escalating
f
o
r
t
h
e
disruptions
and in compensating
w
h
ich accrued
t
h
e
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
o
f
struggle,
competitive
Thus, Britain's
t
o
n
e
w
l
y
c
e
n
t
ers.
emerging
disproportionately
First
World War
the
from the United States during
heavy borrowing
at the
guard
the
two
countries
that change of
between
initiated
w
as
t
h
a
t
world-economy
commanding heights of the capitalist
during the Second World War.
completed by more borrowing
something
should not be pushed too far,
Although the parallel
For all its
seems to have happened in the 1980s.
similar
the US eeonomy and in
results
in reflating
spectacular
inflation
of the US national
the USSR, the historic
bankrupting
debt during the Second Cold War may well have sent the United
As Kevin
States down a path of decline analogrous to Britain's.
the
Phillips
notes, "Formerly the world's leading creditor,
of 191-4United States had borrowed enough money overseas--shades
(16).
45 Britain--to
become the world's leading debtor'
supremacy has
the decline of US financial
Equally important,
Asian
t
h
e
s
p
e
c
t
a
c
u
l
a
r
r
i
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
E
a
s
t
been accompanied by
region, not just as the main "container of world liquidity",
but
Britain's
victory
in
as the "workshop of the world" as well.
both Wor1d Wars, far from slowing down, accelerated
the ongoing
shift
of the geopolitical
center of world-sca1e processes of
accumulation
from Northwestern
Europe to North America.
capital
the US victory
So, we should not be surprised
Lf, in retrospect,
in the Second Cold War turned out to have sealed a similar
shift
from North America to East Asia.

That this might indeed be the case is suggested by another

As
expansions.
analogy between the present and past financialhave
and "flexible
specializatj-on"
theorists
of "informalization"
underscored,
the relative
decline of US economic power since
in the
abOUt 797A haS been associated with a major reversal
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
century.
t
h
r
u
s
t
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
organizational
of capitalism
P
o
r
t
e
s
,
M
a
n
u
e
l
a
n
d
A
l
e
j
a
n
d
r
o
In the words of
Castells
"The large
and the
structure
with its national
verticalcorporation,
and line,
does not
separation
of its functions
between staff
toward
appear any more as the last stage of a necessary evolution
rationalized
industrial
management. Networks of economic
of
activities,
and coordinated
clusters
networks of firms,
m
o
d
e
l
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
t
o
a
n
e
m
e
r
g
e
n
t
o
f
workers appear
comprise
production and distribution"
(17).
In a similar
vein, Michael
and
Piore and Charles Sabl-e have argued that "the technologies
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
s
of
m
o
d
e
r
n
o
f
m
o
s
t
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
operating
the
many
labor
movements;
defended
by
labor-market
control
and
developed by bureaucrats
instruments
of macroeconomic control
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
e
s
;
a
n
d
t
h
e
r
u
l
e
s
o
f
economists in the welfare
systems established
monetary and trading
international
must be modified even
immediatedly after World War II--aIlif the chronic economic deseases of our times are to
discarded,
be cured" (18).
thrust
of world
Reversals of the main organizational
Thus,
century.
are no novelty of the late twentieth
capitalism
great
regularity
years ago Henri Pirenne observed the
some eighty
with which phases of "economic freedom" and phases of "economj-c
of
followed one another in the social history
regulation"
in
organization
Each swi-ng of capitalist
European capitalism.
he noted, caIled forth a movement in the opposite
one direction,
which became dominant in the subsequent stage of
direction,
Thus, the movement towards "economic
development.
capitalist
century led to the movement towards
freedom" of the sixteenth
of the seventeenth and eighteenth
"economic regulation"
led to the movement towards "economic
This, in turn,
centuries.
century,
which led to the movement
freedom" of the nineteenth
century (19).
towards "economic regulation"
of the twentieth
thrust
in the main organizational
of
A11 these reversals
expansion and
have occurred in periods of financial
capitalism
associated with the changes in the spatial
have been closely
processes of capital
accumulation
configuration
of world-scale
and
discussed above.
The alternation
of "deregulatory"
thrusts
underscored by Pirenne is but one aspect of
"requlatory"
aspects are
this recurrent
reversal.
Other and equally relevant
versus
captured by such antinomies as "informalization
formalization,
versus rigid
specialization,
" "flexible
"
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
, " "market versus
versus intensive
"extensive
( 20 ) .
corporate
capitalism"
As theorists

of

informalization

and of

flexible

specialization
have underscored, there is plenty of evidence of
an ongoing reversal
of the trend of the past century towards
formally
organized and rigidly
specialized
governmental and
business structures.
But not all regions of the world-economy
hava aqual chances in the struggle
to benefit
than J.ose
rather
from the emerging trend towards informality
and flexible
specialization.
After 600 years in which "gi-fts" of history
and
geography made the West the primary seat of world capitalism,
it
now seems that the civilization(s)
of East Asia are best
j_n the
positioned
to take advantage of this latest
reversal
organj-zational
thrust of world capitalism
(21).
This is a first
important difference
between the present and
past financial
expansions.
During past financial
expansions the
geopolitical
center of world-scale
processes of capital
accumulation
shifted
from one reqion to another of the Western
worId.
During the present financial
expansion, in contrast,
the
center seems to be shifting
to a region of the non-Western world.
Equally important,
this latest
shift
of the geopolitical
processes of capital
center of world-scale
accumulation
is
anomalous in another respect.
In the past, shifts
of this kind
were associated
with the formation
at the commanding heights
of
the capitalist
world-economy of a complex of governmenta'l and
business organizations
that was more powerful both militarily
and
financially
than the previously
dominant complex: the US complex
relatj-ve
to the British,
the British
relative
to the Dutch, and
the Dutch relative
to the governmental and business organizations
of Italian
city-states.
Past financial
expansions and the
competitive
struggles
that underlay them, in other words,
powerful fusion of world military
resulted
in an increasingly
and
power within
financial
the organizational
domains of the
hegemonic center.
The present financial
expansion, in contrast,
has thus far resulted
in a fission
of the two kinds of power.
power is increasingly
Whil-e financial
concentrated
in East Asian
power is more than ever concentrated
hands, military
in US hands.
This second anomaly of the present financial
expansion is
related
closely
to a third.
Contrary to what happened in the
course of all past financial
expansions, the escalation
in the
power struggle
interstate
of the 1-980s did not turn into open
warfare.
The United States "won" by financial
means a gg,!! war
that it could not win by military
and diplomatic
means, but the
Cold War remained "cold. " To be sure, during and after
the
Second Cold War, "hot" wars have been proliferating
in most
peripheral
and semiperipheral
regions of the world-economy--in
Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa,
Southeastern Europe,
West, South and Central Asia, often with the direct
or i-ndi-rect
participation
of core capitalist
states.
Nevertheless / even
after
the end of the Cold War, the mutual quarrels
that
invariably
set capitalist
states against one another have shown
no tendency to deteriorate
into open warfarer
ds they did in all_
l_0

previous

financial

expansions.

These anomalies of the present financial

expansion can be
intorpreted
aE reflecting
a fundamental limit
of the rong-term
tendency of historical
capitalism
to expand through the formation
of political
organizations
power
endowed with greater military
predecessors.
than their
Historically,
the emergence of these
powerful organizations
increasingty
has been the outcome of
protracted
and generalized
wars among rising
and declining
capitalist
states.
Eventually,
however, this process is bound to
j-ts limits
attain
by bringing
into existence an organization
that
p
o
werful as to be unchallangeable
is so
militarily
by newly
emerging capitalist
states.
world capitalism
under us hegemony
may well have attained
these limits
by bringing
about such a
concentration
power in the hands of the United States
of military
and its closest
allies
as to make interstate
warfare an obsolete
j-nstrument of capitalist
competition.
This does not mean, of course, that the United States is not
vulnerable
to the consequences of capitalist
competition
by means
other than interstate
warfare,
or to the prolj-feration
of loca1
wars in peripheral
and semj-peripheral countries.
On the
contrary,
the consolidation
of the US quasi-monopoly of global-as opposed to merely local or regional--military
power during the
Second Cold War has left
a legacy of fixed costs and frames of
mind that hampers seriously
the capacity
of US governmental
and
j-n a world tradi-ng
business agencies to compete effectively
system of unprecedented scale/ scope and density.
This is
particularly
the case in relation
to the governmental and
business agencies of regions like East Asia that "gifts"
of
history
and geography have endowed with low protection
and
reproduction
costs.
fronically,
power
therefore/
the military
precedent that has accumulated in US hands
without
historical
cannot prevent,
and may actually
contribute
to, the "migration'r
across the Pacific
of the geopolitical
center of world-scale
processes of capital
accumul-ation.
III
Let us now return
to the issue of what changes in the
conditions
of working-class
struggles
can be expected to ensue
from the ongoing restructuring
and reorganization
of the
capitalist
world-economy.
The world labor movement of the
twentieth
century developed in response to the crisis
of worl-d
capitalism
as instituted
under British
hegemony. what are the
chances that the ttautumn" of world capitalism
as instituted
under us hegemony will
give rise to a world rabor movement as
effective
as its predecessor?
And what would such a l_abor
movement look like?
l_1_

A first
answer to these questions is that it is stil1
too
early to te1I.
The first
years of the latetwenty-five
nineteenth
century financial
expansion were characterized
by an
extreme instability
in working-c1ass
organization
and by many

nofe defeatS than victories for the workinq classes of most

countries.
It took another twenty-five years before the

ideological
and organizational
contours of the world labor
movement beqan to crystallize
and be discernible,
and yet another
twenty-five
before that movement became powerful
enough to impose
some of its objectives
(22).
There is no
on world capitalism
reason, of course, for supposing that the world labor movement of
the twentieth-first
century will
develop at the same pace and
along the same trajectory
as its predecessor.
But whether it is
actually
emerging, what form it is going to take, and how
effective
it is going to be- -these are issues that cannot be
decided on the basis of the tendencies of the 1ast, or even of
the next , !0-20 years.
It is nonetheless not too early to tell
that the conditions
under which the workers of the world will
make their
own history
in the twenty-first
radically
from the
century will
differ
To be sure, the present
conditions
of the past century.
financial
expansion, like the preceding one/ marks the beginning
from one kind of spatial
of world capitalism
of a transition
But each
and organizational
structure
to another.
configuration
transition
has peculiarities
of its own, which make the
from what they
struggles
different
conditions
of working-class
had been during the preceding transition.
A first
difference
is that the changing spatial
world-economy can be expected to
configuration
of the capitalist
towards peripheral
the epicenter
struggles
shift
of working-class
and semiperipheral
in general and towards East Asia in
countries
particular.
As previously
noted, the notion that the world labor
movement has been weakened by a massive relocation
of industrial
is a
activities
from high to 1ow and middle income countries
myth.
Had such a massive relocation
actually
the
occurred,
chances are that the world labor movement would have already been
revitalized.
The main reason why it has not is that in the 1980s
the primary destination
of the flight
of capital
have not been
low and middle income countries
but extraterritorial
financial
markets.
The main exception to this general tendency has been East
Asia, where the financial
expansion has been accompanied by a
rapid growth of trade and production.
Should this tendency
continue,
there can be littIe
doubt that this region,
China
included,
will
witness the formation of a vigorous labor
movement.
And to the extent that the material
expansion of the
East Asian regional
economy will
develop sufficient
momentum to
translate
into a new material
expansion of the entire
worldeconomy, the chances are that this vigorous
labor movement will
1,2

become globaI

in

scope.

A second difference
is that the reversal
of the trend of the
past century towards formally
specialized
organized and rigidly
to ehanse
expected
be
can
and bUSineSS StrUCtures
dovernmental
The
as
wel1.
of the world labor movement
the main thrust
t
h
e
in
century following
of capital
increasing
bureaucratization
of
for the bureaucratization
l-870 created favorable
conditions
It is quite possible that the reversal
labor movements as we1l.
in
for the revival
create the conditions
of this tendency will
and informal
new forms of the more flexible
entirely
typical
of the labor movement of the
structures
organizational
nineteenth
century.
will
occur, w should expect afso a
ff and when this revival
a
nd gender composition of the
major change in the ethnic/racialj
o
i
n
t
and
of capital
b
u
r
eaucratization
world labor movement. The
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
t
h
e
c
o
r
e
century benefited
labor in the twentieth
As labor and
component of the world labor force.
white-male
t
h
e
bureaucratic
within
commodj-ty markets were "internalized"
of "ful1
(23), and the objectives
structures
of core capital
employment" and high mass consumption were taken over by the
white male workers
governments of core capitalist
countries,
paid and more secure jobs.
the better
succeded in monopolizing
since
competition
of intercapitalist
But the intensification
to seek cheaper and more flexible
about 1-970 has induced capital
not just in low and niddle income countries,
sourges of labor,
In
but atso among women and non-white males in all countries.
the short run, the main impact of this tendency has been to
of white male workers in core
heighten the "fear of falling"
may well
In the longer run/ however, its main effect
countries.
be the emergence of a world labor movement in which women and
than they
people of color have a far greater weight and influence
have had in the past.
warfare as an
Fina11y, the obsolescence of interstate
can be expected to weaken
competition
instrument
of capitalist
orientation
of the world labor
and statist
the nationalist
noted, the world labor movement of the
As previously
movement.
twentieth
century developed under conditj-ons of almost
for war among capitalist
warfare or preparation
uninterrupted
power of states
the military
states.
Under these circumstances,
cfasses, and be perceived by the
could be presented by the ruling
of
as a key ingredient
classes (workers included)
subordinate
in the twentieth
As a result,
national
wealth and welfare.
component of labor
became an integral
century nationalism
became
and the class struggle
movements almost everywhere,
power struggle.
interwoven with the interstate
inextricably
warfare
To the extent that the obsolescence of interstate
c
o
n
f
i
r
m
e
d by
w
i
l
l
b
e
competition
of capitalist
an instrument
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
l
y
s
t
r
u
g
g
l
e
w
i
l
l
b
e
t
r
e
n
d
s
,
t
h
e
c
l
a
s
s
future
l_3

as

disentangled
from the interstate
power struggle.
There is of
course no guarantee that this dj-sentanglement will
translate
into
a more internationalist
rather than "tribalist"
among
disposition
the workers of the world.
The invention
of new/ or the

COnSOlidatiOnOf OId, ninaqined communities" aTons ethnic or

religious
lines is no doubt an easier response to the
intensj-fication
of world market competititon
and state breakdowns
than the formation
of class solidarity
across borders or cultural
divides.
As the experience of the former Yugoslavia illustrates
tragically,
however, the easier response may well be a cure much
worse than the disease.
The Croatian and Serb militias
may well prefigure
the
predominant form of proleta::ian
organization
of the twentiethfirst
century.
But there is at least an equal chance that the
predominant form will
be prefigured
by the kind of working-cIass
cooperation
that is being organized slowly and loosely
from below
across the US-Mexican border.
Whether the now weaker wind of
prevail
internationalism
will
eventually
over the wind of
is a question ultimately
in the hands of the workers
"tribalism"
of the world themselves.
ENDNOTES
(1) Giovanni Arrighi,
"Marxist Century, American Century: The
Making and Remaking of the World Labor Movement. " New Left
Review, L79, l-990, p.55.
(2) Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational
and the Law of
Corporation
Uneven Development. "
In J.N. Bhagwati, d., Economic and World
Order (New York: Macmillan, 7972) p. L2L; Mira Wilkins,
The
Emerqence of Multinational
(Cambridge: Cambridge
Enterprise
University
Press, 1970) pp. 201"-2; Ethan Kapstein, "We Are Us:
The Myth of the Multinational."
The National Interest,
Winter
1,991,/92, p.57.
(3) Giovanni Arrighi
and Beverly Silver,
"Labor Movements and
Capital Migration:
T h e U ni t e d S t a t e s a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e i n W o r l d
Historical
Perspective. "
In C. Bergquist, ed., Labor in the
Capitalist
World - Economv (Beverly Hills:
S a g e, L 9 8 4 ) .
(4) Beverly J. Silver,
"World-Scale Patterns of Labor-Capital
Conflict:
L a b o r U n r e s t , L o n g W a v e s , a n d C y c l e s o f H e g e m o n y ."
Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 18, I, 1995, pp.L77-9.
(5)

"Wor1d-Sca1e Patterns

of Labor-Capital

Conflict,

" p.

1-82.

(5) Giovanni Arrighi,

The Lonq Twentieth Centurv.
Monev, Power,
and the Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 1-994).
(7)

Fernand Braudel,

The Perspective
L4

of the World

(New York:

Harper

& R o w, 1 - 9 8 4 ) p .

(8)
pp.

The Economist,
6-9, L4-L7 .

(9)
pp.

Silver,
I58-73t

246 .

"World Economy/Survey,"

"World-Sca1e Patterns
177.

September !9,

of Labor-Capital

1992,

ConfIict,"

to Contemporary
(10) Geoffrey Barraclough,
An Introduction
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1-967) p. 1'27.
Historv
McCormick, America's Half Centurv. United States
in the
C o l d War ( B a l t i m o r e ,
MD: Johns Hopkins
P r e s s , l - 9 8 9) p . 9 9 .

(11) Thomas J.
Foreicrn

Policv

University

(12) For a lengthier

and documented treatment
see Arrighi,
The Lonq Twentieth Centurv

of what follows,

rates in the United States

(13) In the mid-1970s, real interest
plunged below zero.
See World Bank, World Development
apparently
Press, 1985) p. 5.
Report (New York: Oxford University
(14) Between 1-9Bl-, when Reagan entered the White House, and 1-991-,
to $300 bill-ion
increased from $74 billion
the US budget deficit
to $4 trillion.
debt from $f trillion
a year and the US national
payments skyrocketed to $195
interest
net federal
As a result,
a year/ more than ten times what they had been in the
bil1ion
Republicans,
mid-1970s.
Kevin Phi11ips, Boilinq Point.
(New York:
Prosperitv
Democrats, and the Decline of Middle-class
RandomHouse,1993)pp.2I0,220;Pau1Kennedy,@
Twentv-First
Centurv (New York: RandomHouse, L993) p. 297
Trade since
(15) Quoted in Peter J. Hugi11, @.!!
Geoqraphv, Technoloqv. and Capj-talism (Baltimore,
Press/ 1-993) p. 305.
Hopkins University

(16) Egj-.Liag_Point,, p.

1-431-.

MD: The Johns

220.

Dynamics, and Effects of the

(17) "World Underneath: The Origins,
and L.A. Benton,
f n f o r m a l E c o n o m y /' r i n A . P o r t e s , M . C a s t e l l s ,
eds. ,
(Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Developed Countries
Press, 1989) pp. 29-30.
(18) Michael J. Piore
Divide:
Possibilities
1"984) pp. 4-s.

and Charles F. Sab1e,

(New York:
for Prosperitv

Basic Books,

(19) Henri Pirenne, "stages in the Social History of Capitalism.

In R. Bendix and S. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power: A
(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press,
Reader in Social Stratification
19s3) pp. s1-s-16.
1_5

"

(20) Arrighi,

The Lono Twentieth

Centrrrv-

pp. 127-7 4, 239-300.

(2I) Cf. Gary Hamilton, "Civilizations

and the Organization of
Economies."
In N. Smelser and R. Swedberg/ eds./ The Handbook of
Press,
(Princeton,
NJ: Prj-nceton universitv
Eeonomie Socioloqv
: - . 9 9 4 )p p . l - 9 8 - 9 ; A r r i g h i ,
The Lonq Twentieth Centurv, Epilogue.
(22) Cf.

Arrighi,

"Marxist

(23) On the "internali

and Michael J. Piore,

Century,

zation"
Internal
MA: D.C.

Analvsis

(Lexington,

Arrighi,

The Lonq Twentieth

American Century,"

pp.24-47.

of markets see Peter B. Doeringer

Labor Markets and Manpower
Heath

Century,

and Companf,

L97L)

PP. 239-42,

287-9

and