Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2
MixedMotive.......5
SystemicDT......7
DisparateImpact.......8
Retaliation...10
HarassmentBecauseofSex....13
HarassmentEmployerLiability..15
HarassmentBecauseofRace..16
SexDiscrimination..17
PregnancyandFamilyResponsibilities..19
SexualOrientation..20
Religion...21
NationalOrigin...24
AgeDiscrimination.........25
DisabilityDiscrimination........27
Adjudicating/RemedyingDiscrimination.......31
I.FRAMEWORKSFORUNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION
I.DISPARATETREATMENT
DISPARATETREATMENT(DT)viewedthrough3factualandanalyticallenses.
1.Singlemotiveorpretextcases
2.Mixedordualmotivecases;and
3.Patternorpracticecases.
Pisnotrequiredtospecifywhichoftheseproof/analyticalschemessheintendstorely
uponwhenshefileshercomplaint,butatsomepointduringtrialthecourtmust
determinewhichevidentiaryschemeisappropriatetodecidethecaseorinstructthejury.
(PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins).
Requiresproofofintent(employerhadintenttotreatdifferentlyaparticularmemberof
aprotectedclass)
MajorityofcasesanalyzedunderMcDonnelDouglasanalysis.
Howtoproveintent?
o Directevidence(notavailableinmostcases)
o Circumstantialevidence(applyMcDonnellDouglasanalysis>ifpretext
argumentdoesntwork,applymixedmotiveanalysis).
1.FOUNDATIONS
McDonnellDouglasAnalysis:
1. EmployeemakesaPrimaFaciecase(inahiringcontext)byshowingthatshe:
a. PrimaFacieisnotonerousburden(minimalshowingisgoodenough)
b. NonhiringPrimeFaciePjustshowshesufferedadverseemployment
actionunderthecircumstancesgivingrisetoaninferenceof(race,sex,etc.)
discrimination.
i. Wasamemberofaprotectedclass
ii. Wasqualifiedforajob
iii. Appliedforajobandgotrejected
iv. Positionremainedavailable
2. Employerofferslegitimatenondiscriminatoryreason(LNDR)forthechallenged
action.
a. Minimalshowing(burdenofproduction)
3. Employeerebutsemployersreasons,showingthattheyarepretextual,whilethetrue
reasonisdiscrimination.
a. Burdenofpersuasion(standard:preponderanceofevidence,morelikelythan
not)
*Thesameframeworkappliestopromotions,demotions,discharges(includesconstructive
discharges),andreductionsinforce.
ConstructiveDischarge:whenemployeeinvoluntarilyresignsinordertoescapeinteolerable
workingconditionsthatsheissubjectedtobecauseofherrace,sex,nationalorigin,orreligion.
Constructivedischargemayalsoarisewhenemployeeresignsinlieuofbeingfired.
Employeemustshowthat:
1. Theworkingconditionsbecamesointolerablethatareasonablepersonin
employeespositionwouldhavefeltcompelledtoresign;and
2. Adeliberateeffortbyemployertoforceemployeetoquit(somecourtsdont
requireproofofemployersintenttoforceemployeetoresign).
EmployersgoalistosurviveSJandgettothejury(7580%ofcasesareresolvedatSJ
stage,lessthan3%resolvedaftertrial).
1. EvidencePcanOffer:
1. Comparatorevidence(howsimilarlysituatedemployeesweretreated
byemployer
2. Treatmentofthesameemployeebeforebeingdischarged(showing
hostileworkenvironment,commentsbydecisionmakersshowingbias
toprotectedgroup)
o Distinguishbetweenstrayremarksandprobative
remarks
Strayremarksarenotevidenceofdiscriminatory
animus(typically,theyseemtoattenuatedtobe
connectedtotheanimus)
3. Statisticsonhiring/discharge/rehiring(thisevidencecanbolstertheDT
case,butitsmuchmorecrucialinDIcases)
4. Metooevidence(showingthatotherworkersinprotectedclasswere
alsotreatedbadly)
o Professor:USSCstillstruggleswithwhetherthisevidence
shouldbeallowedin.Courtstrytobalancerelevance(to
thecase)withprejudice(toD)inordertodecidewhether
metooevidencecanbeadmitted.
5. Generalpolicyandpracticesinrelationtoprotectedgroup
(hiring/promotion/transfer/etc.)
2. HowEmployersRespondtorequestsforotheremployeesrecords:
1. Itsconfidential(butdoesntworkwhenlitigationstarts).
2. Narrowdownthecomparetogroup(whoserecordsarerelevant).
o Employeewillmakebroadinquiry(e.g.includingall
workersinprotectedclass)butEmployermaytrytolimit
theevidencetosimilarlysituatedemployees(Example:
minoritymanagerwhosuesmightnotgetaccessto
evidenceonnonmanagerialminorityworkers).
SameActorDefense:
Ifitisthesamepersonwhohiresandfiredtheemployee,andtheperiodbetweenhiring
andfiringisrelativelyshort,employerisentitledtoinferencethatthedischargewasnot
motivatedbydiscriminatoryanimus.
o Shortperiodoftimeisafluidconceptsomecourtsstretchedthisupto3years
(ormore)
o Courtshavevariousapproachestothisdefensesomecourtsfullyendorseit;
somethinkthatitshouldbeleftforjurytodecide;andsomethinkitsneithera
mandatorypresumptionnorsomethingthatshoulddefinitelybelefttothejury,
butthinkthisevidenceshouldbetakenintoaccountatSJstage.
ReverseDiscrimination:
Aproblemwiththefirstprong(employeeisnotamemberofaminoritygroup).Many
courtsrequiredwhitePstoestablishthatDisthatunusualemployerwhodiscriminates
againstthemajority.
o Anotherwaytoapproachthisissueistokeeptheinquiryatshowingaless
favorabletreatmentthatareasonablefactfindercouldconcludewasbasedonPs
race,color,religion,sex,ornationalorigin.
HonestBeliefRule:
Ifemployerhonestlybelievesthatemploymentdecisionwascorrectoneatthetime,he
maybeentitledtodefenseagainstfindingofpretext,butthishonestbeliefmustbe
reasonable.
o providesthatsolongastheemployerhonestlybelievedintheprofferedreason
givenforitsemploymentaction,theemployeecannotestablishpretextevenifthe
employersreasonsultimatelyfoundtobemistaken,foolish,trivial,orbaseless.
Example:Employerhonestlythoughtemployeewaslateforworkwhenhe
wasnot.
Employeemustestablishthatitsreasonablerelianceonthefactsthat
werebeforeitatthetimethedecisionasmade.(Smithv.ChryslerCorp.)
CASES:
McDonnellDouglasv.Green
TexasDepartmentofCommunityAffairsv.Burdine
StMarysHonorCentervHicks
Reevesv.Sanderson
2.MIXEDMOTIVE
MixedMotiveAnalysis:
Appliestodisparatetreatment(DT)casesunderTitleVII.
Appliestocaseswherebothlegitimateandillegitimatereasonsplayedarolein
employersadverseaction.
Professor:mixedmotivecaseiseasiertoproveandgettothejury(butdamagesarenot
availabletotheemployee).
o Pretextismoredifficulttoprove(butwinningwouldallowthepartytoget
damages)
CatsPawTheory:
Referstoasituationinwhichabiasedsubordinate,wholacksdecisionmakingpower,
usestheformaldecisionmakerasadupeinadeliberateschemetotriggera
discriminatoryemploymentaction.
o Essentiallywhenthedecisionisaproductofmultipledecisionmakers.
RubberStampreferstosituationinwhichadecisionmakergivesperfunctory
approvalforanadverseemploymentactionexplicitlyrecommendedbyabiased
subordinate.(subordinatebiasliability)
ThistheorycomportswithbasicagencyprinciplesincorporatedintoTitleVII(any
agentofthebusiness).
o Undercertaincircumstances,Dmaybeheldliableforasubordinatesprejudice
evenifthemanagerlackeddiscriminatoryintent.
*Employer(finaldecisionmaker)canescapeliabilityentirelybyperformingindependent
investigation(beforemakingadverseemploymentaction)
*Employersmaybevicariouslyliableforactionsoftheiremployeesevenintentionaltorts
outsidescopeofemploymentiftheemployeewasaidedinaccomplishingthetortbyexistence
oftheagencyrelationship.
*ifyouareinHRyoudontwantHRdepartmentsrubberstampingrecommendationswithout
anyindependentinvestigation.Soagoodpolicytohaveistohavethepersonactuallyhiringor
firingdoanindependentinvestigation.
CircuitCourtsonThisIssue:
7thCircuitStandard:issueiswhetherbiasedsubordinatesdiscriminationreports,
recommends,orotheractionscasedbytheadverseemploymentaction(morethanmere
influenceorinput)
5thCircuitStandard:anyinfluence,thereportingofanyfactualinformation,oranyform
ofotherinputbyabiasedsubordinaterendersemployerliablesolongasthesubordinate
mayhaveaffected:theemploymentdecision.
4thCircuitStandard:employercannotbeheldliableevenifbiasedsubordinateexercises
substantialinfluenceorplaysasignificantroleintheemploymentdecision.
Overall:theburdenisontheemployertolookmorecloselyandconductanindependent
evaluationbeforemakingtheemploymentdecision.
Howtoanalyzethisproblem:
1. Cansheestablishaprimafaciacase?
a. Memberofaprotectedclass
b. Didntreceiveatransfer(adverseemploymentaction).Ifthereisamaterial
advantage/benefittothetransferthenitisanadverseemploymentaction.Not
everytransferwillnecessarilyqualifyasanAEA.
c. Wesomethingsthatgiverisetoaninferenceofdiscrimination(someonenotin
theclassgothiredfortheposition).
2. Pretextanalysis
a. Employerslegitnondiscriminatoryreasonwasthatitwasmadeonthebasisof
seniority.
i. Trytoshowthatinfactpeoplewithlessseniorityhadbeenpromotedor
givenadvantageousjobs.
ii. Jobdescriptionsaidentrylevel.
iii. Areall5paralegalsinthelitigationdepartmentmen?AllfiveinT&E
women.Althoughnotdeterminativethesestatisticscanbeusedas
evidenceofpretext.
iv. Whatotheroutsidecandidatesdidtheyinterview?Whichproportionwere
men?
3. Ifthefactorsunder2aareinourfavor,itgoestoajury.
4. Whatiftheemployercouldshowthatithadpromotedonthebasisofseniority,butitjust
sohappenedthatthecandidatesthatthemostseniorweremen.Whatdoesthatbringto
mind?Mixedmotivecanwesaythatgendermayhavebeenamotivatingfactor.
Withoutanyotherfactsherewecantreallybudgethelegitimatenondiscriminatory
reasonsowewanttoraiseamotivatingfactortheory.
CASES:
PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins
DesertPalacev.Costa
3.SYSTEMICDISPARATETREATMENT
Whatisthis?
SubsetofDTcases.
Focusesonstatisticaldisparitiesintheworkforce(inaparticularjobclassification)
GrossDisparities:mustbeprobative,anditsrarelysufficientwithoutshowingthatthe
samplewaslargeenough.Statscanberelevant,butinpractice,thesecasesgenerallyrely
onanecdotaltestimonyanddocumentaryevidence.Standingalone,statsarenotlikelyto
establishacaseofindividualdisparatetreatment.
o RelevantLaborMarketthisanalysistypicallyrequiresanexpert
o MultipleRegressionAnalysis(MRA)expertstatisticianisrequired.
o UseofMRAendorsedbyUSSCinBazemorev.Friday.
StandardDevision(SD)benchmarkis2SD
Ruleisifadisparityisgreaterthan2SDfromwhatwouldbepredicted,thelawwillinfer
discriminationasthemostlikelycauseofdisparity:
HowtocalculateSD(usingTeamstersnumbers):
o SD=SquareRootof(AxBxC)
Anumberoflinedrivers(1828)
BpromotionofAfricanAmericans(0.05)
CproportionofnotAfricanAmericans(0.95)
o Weexpectthat5%x1828people=911AfricanAmericandrivers.
o SD=9.318(people),2SD=approximately18people.
Soaslongasthenumberofdriversfallsbetween91and73,itsok.Ifthe
numberofdriversislessthan73,thenitsmorethan2SDandislegally
probativedisparity
FirstsanctionedinHazelwood.Twostandarddeviationscorrespondsapproximatelytoa
oneintwentyor5%chancethatadisparityismerelyrandom.Mostsocialscientists
acceptthisasthethresholdofstatisticallysignificant.
o CourtssaythatwhenresultsaregreaterthantwoSDs,theywilldrawaninference
ofdiscrimination.
LackofInterestDefense
Employermaysuccessfullyarguethatdisparityisduetolackofinterestbytheprotected
groups(seeEEOCv.Sears).
o Thiscaseissadbecausethestats/lackofinterestmightbeareflectionofself
fulfillingprophecythatwomenhad(Iwontbeabletocompetewithsales
guys).Alsocriticizedbecauseithasbeensuggestedthattheyweremakingthe
determinationsonlessthanfullinformationanddidntbelievetheywouldget
them.
*Havetoprovethatthepolicyiswhatiscausingthediscrimination.Biggerthedisparity,
thestrongertheinferenceofdiscrimination.
CASES:
Teamstersv.UnitedStates
HazelwoodSchoolDistrictv.UnitedStates
WalMartStoresv.Dukes
4.DISPARATEIMPACT
7
DisparateImpact(DI)
Itchallengesafaciallyneutralpolicythatfallsmoreharshlyonaprotectedgroupand
cannotbejustifiedbyabusinessnecessity.
Needtohavesomespecificpolicythathasadverseimpact,disparateeffectona
protectedgroup,resultinginunintentionaldiscrimination.
o Thefocusisonbadconsequence,notonbadintent.
Pdoesntneedtoproveintentbutneedstoshow:
1. Theresaneffect(stats,etc.);and
2. Thepolicyisnotnecessary(notabusinessnecessity)
PrimaFacie(afterWatson&WardsCove):
1. Statisticaldisparity(80%rule)
2. Identifyspecificemploymentpracticethatallegedlycauseddisparity.
IfPwins>therearenodamagesavailable(onlybackpay)
*ClassactionsarefrequentlylinkedtobothsystemicDTandDIclaims.
4/5Rule(80%rule)
Employeemayestablishadverseimpactbyshowingthattheemployeesintheprotected
classarehired,orpassatest,ataratethatisbelow80%oftherateofthemostsufcessful
group.
o Itsaveryroughmeasure(ruleofthumb),butitsaprimafacieevidenceofDI.
Example:menpassthetestatarateof80%,womenpassthetestatarate
of60%.Comparewomentomen:60/80x100%=75%.Itisbelow80%
>satisfiestherule.
AffirmativeDefense:
Employercanshowbusinessnecessity(e.g.thetestmustbejobrelated)tojustifythe
challengedpractice.
o Test:necessityislegitimatejustification(prettylowstandardafterWards
Cove).ButEmployerhastheburdenofproof(aftertheCivilRightsActof1991).
TestValidation:
Aprettyelaborateprocess.Therearetwopartsofdisparateimpactimportanthere.
1. Testpreparation
2. Testvalidation
InordertoensurethatyoucanprevailonaBNDefense.Theyhavetoengageinapretty
elaborateandexpensiveprocessoftestvalidation.Mustmeasurewhetherthetest
comportswiththeactualjobdutiesandthatemployeeswhopassthetestarebetteratthe
jobthanthosewhodonotpassthetest.
o Courtshavesaidthatjobvalidationstudiesarenotabsolutelyrequiredtomakea
BNdefense.
*SubjectiveemploymentpracticescouldbechallengedundertheDItheory.Fewsubjective
practiceshaveactuallybeenchallengedunderthetheorybecausesubjectivepracticescan
alsogenerallybechallengedunderaDTtheoryandaftertheCRAof1991,Pshavean
incentivetobringcasesundertheDTratherthanDItheorygiventhatdamagesare
availableforDTcasesbutnotforDIcases.
*BurdenofProofinDIcasesaftertheemployeemakesaprimafacieshowingofDI,full
burdenofproductionandpersuasionshiftstoemployertoprovebusinessnecessity
overrulesoneholdingofWardsCove.Thestatutealsorestoresthemeaningofbusiness
necessitytowhatitwaspriortoWC(thoughnotentirelyclearwhatthatwas).The
statutealsomodifiesthecourtsrequirementthatPidentifyaspecificemployment
practice;whilethestatuterequirestheplaintifftoidentifyaspecificemploymentpractice,
thestatutemakesanexceptiontotheextenttheemployersdecisionmakingprocessisnot
capableofseparation.
*Note>Civilrightsactof1991:forthefirsttimeCongresscodifiedthetheoryof
disparateimpact.Itisnotenoughforplaintiffstoshowsimplythatmoreovertime
assignmentsgotomenthanwomen,oreventhatmengetahigherpercentageofthose
assignmentsthantheirpercentageintheworkforce.TheymostcompareQUALIFIED
mentoQUALIFIEDwomen.Carpenterv.Boeing456F.3d1183(10thCir.2006).
CASES:
Griggsv.DukePowerCo.
Connecticutv.Teal
Watsonv.FortWorthBank&Trust
WardsCovePackagingCo.v.Atonio
Ricciv.DeStefano
VulcanSocietyNYCase
****************************************************
II.RETALIATION
RetaliationStatutoryText:(SEC.2000e3.[Section704]
(a)Discriminationformakingcharges,testifying,assisting,orparticipatingin
enforcementproceedings
Itshallbeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeforanemployertodiscriminateagainstany
ofhisemployeesorapplicantsforemployment,foranemploymentagency,orjoint
labormanagementcommitteecontrollingapprenticeshiporothertrainingorretraining,
includingonthejobtrainingprograms,todiscriminateagainstanyindividual,orfora
labororganizationtodiscriminateagainstanymemberthereoforapplicantfor
membership,becausehehasopposedanypracticemadeanunlawfulemployment
practicebythissubchapter,orbecausehehasmadeacharge,testified,assisted,or
participatedinanymannerinaninvestigation,proceeding,orhearingunderthis
subchapter.
RetaliationinGeneral:
AformofDTthatpermeatesalmosteverydiscriminationclaim.
7080%ofalldiscriminationclaimsalsoassertretaliation.
Statutesinsulateemployeesfromanyadverseemploymentactionevenajustified
criticism(employerscomplainthattheretaliationstatutesinsulateemployeestoo
much!)
PrimaFacieCaseofRetaliation:
1. Employeeengagedinprotectedactivity.
2. Employeesufferedamateriallyadverseemploymentaction.
3. Causallinkbetweenadverseemploymentactionandtheprotectedactivity(temporal
proximityraisesthepresumptionofcausation)
a. Fortimeproximitytheruleisthecloserthebetter(somecourtssay34
monthsisnotsufficientlyclosetoestablishcausationintheabsenceofother
strongevidence).
4. Employerknewaboutemployeesengagementintheprotectedactivity.
Framework(similartoMcDonnellDouglas):
1. EmployeeestablishedPrimeFacieshowing.
2. Employershowsanother,legitimatecauseforanadverseemploymentaction.
3. Employeehastoprovepretext.
WhoisProtected?
Formeremployees,thirdparties(Thompsonv.NorthAm.Stainless)+(Robinsonv.Shell
Oil)
NotethatwhilethecourtinDmedinev.Reinhardt(DDC1978)heldthatthirdparty
reprisalscouldbeactionableeverycourtofappealsthathasconsideredtheissuehas
rejectedthethirdpartyreprisalanalysisinDmedina.
2TypesofProtectedActivity:(remembertemporalproximity)
1. Participation:(getsemployeevirtualimmunityfromadverseemploymentaction
*unlessbadfaithmaybe)
a. Thisclauseunder704(a)hasbeenconstruedbroadlybythecourtsandincludes
filingwithEEOCorparticipatinginTitleVIIinvestigation,proceeding,or
hearing.
10
2. Opposition:(opposingadiscriminatoryaction)(complaint,publicprotest,etc.
protectionmorelimited.Istheactivityreasonable?)
a. Mannerofopposingmustbereasonable;itcannotinterfereordisrupttheworkof
otherpeople.
b. Musthavereasonablegoodfaithbeliefthatemploymentpracticeisunlawful.
Participation/OppositionNote:
TwokindsofactivitiesareprotectedundertheantiretaliationprovisionofTitleVII.The
participationclauseprohibitsretaliationbecauseanindividualhasmadeacharge,testified,
assisted,orparticipatedinanymannerinaninvestigation,proceeding,orhearingtoenforce
lawsprohibitingdiscriminationinemployment.TitleVII,704(a).Theoppositionclause,onthe
otherhand,prohibitsretaliationbecauseanemployeeorapplicanthasopposedanypractice
madeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeBookerv.Brown&WilliamsonTobaccoCo(6thCir.
1989).Theclausemakesitunlawful...foranemployertodiscriminateagainstany...
employe[e]...becausehehasopposedanypracticemade...unlawful...bythissubchapter.
Crawfordv.MetropolitanGovernment(US2009)(quoting42U.S.C.2000e(3)(a)).
*USSCdoesnotconfrontthelinebetweenparticipationandoppositioninCrawfordv.
MetropolitanGovt(page168).Whereoneemployeewasaskedtoanswerquestionsabout
sexualharassmentofanotheremployee,andsheansweredtruthfully,theCourtfoundimplicit
oppositiontosexualharassment(employeewasstillprotectedfromretaliationunderthestatute
althoughitwasntanEEOCinvestigation).
*EmployeedoesnothavetoprovehewasdiscriminatedagainstwhenhefiledwithEEOC
(engagedintheprotectedactivity)>protectionisassuredregardlessoftheunderlyingmerits
oftheclaim.(butifTitleVIIcomplaintisnotonlymeritlessandunreasonable,butalso
motivatedbybadfaith,thisactivitywouldnotbeprotectedbytheparticipationclause(Mattson
v.Caterpillar)).
*Mixedmotiveframeworkmaybeapplicablebutitsunclearhowtoapplyit(somecourtsagree
touseit,somedont)9th,4th,10thcircuitsapplymixedmotiveanalysis.
*Notes36TwodifferentstandardsnowworkplaceharassmentinresponsetoTitleVII
complaintscanbemateriallyadverseifitwellmighthavedissuadedanemployeefrommaking
orreportingdiscrimination,whereaspreviouslyithadtomeetTitleVIIsgeneralsevereor
pervasivestandard.Foradiscussionofwhatconstitutesmateriallyadverseseestringciteatp.
188189
LucerocasefromNotes189employercanintroduceevidenceoflaterfiledchargesto
showthatemployeeswerenotinfactdissuaded.
Retaliationbyitsagentsseenote6nocaselawbutcouldbeonexam.Note7isthird
partyreprisals.
11
Causation:
ClarkCountySchoolDistrictv.BreedentwoyearswillnevermakePFCcausallinktoo
attenuated.
Temporalproximity.
Conclusion:Howtomakeoutacase:
o Knowledgeofinternal/externalcomplaint
o Temporalproximity(hastobeprettyclose)
o Otheremployeeshavebeenretaliatedagainst(apattern)
o Attackthelegitimatenondiscriminatoryreason.(Page193)
CASES:
BurlingtonNorthernSantaFeRailwayv.White
UniversityofTexasSouthwesternMedicalCenterv.Nassar
****************************************************
III.HARASSMENT
Harassment:
Thisismuchmorelikeatortbasedclaim.
Employeeisnotprovingpretext,butwhatactuallyhappened(facts).
ItsnotaseparatestatutebutaninterpretationofDTstatute.
1) Didsomethinghappenatworkthatmadeitsubstantiallymoredifficultforthe
employeetoperformatwork?
2) Wasitbecauseemployeeisamemberofaprotectedcategory?
3) Isemployerliableforwhathappened?
Generalharassmentisnotacrimeunderfederalandstatelaws.Tomakeharassment
legallyactionable,itmustbetracedbacktoaprotectedcategory.
Aworkingenvironmentheavilychargedwithdiscriminationmayconstituteanunlawful
practice(Rogersv.EEOC)
1.HarassmentBecauseofSex(2categories):
1) QuidProQuo:
a.Explicitsituation,wheresexualcomplianceisexchangedforan
employmentopportunity
b.Ifdonebysupervisortheremaybevicariousliabilityfortheemployer.
2) HostileWorkEnvironment(HWE):
a.Usuallyacourseofconduct(remarks,actionsofasexualnature).
b.Itisapersistentconditionofworkthatchangesthetermsandconditions
ofemployment(itdoesnothavetoresultintheultimateemployment
action,suchasfiringorrefusingtopromote).
12
c.Sometimes,oneinstanceisgoodenoughifitsphysicalandextreme(i.e.
beingforcefullykissed).
d.Agencyprinciplesapply(seeMeritor).
Changeintermsorconditionsofemploymentcanbeestablishedby:
1) Atangibleeconomicloss(beingfired,notpromoted,etc.)
2) Iftheresnotangibleeconomicloss,theconductmustbesufficientlysevereor
pervasive(mayincludeemotionalandpsychologicalinstabilitybutinjurydoesnt
havetobeatthelevelofnervousbreakdown).
Whatconductissufficientlysevereorpervasive?:
Physicalcontact/touching(1instancecanbeenough)
Remarks/verbal(notouching)iftheresanexpectationofseveralinstancestoshowa
patternofconduct(though,itsnotclearhowmanywouldbeenough).
Pervasiveisahighstandard.
Onefreegrabtheoryofsexualharassmentisthere.Totheextentthatitisviolentthis
willbekey.(Cornered,inaprivateplace,athreatelement,etc.)Generallythatkindof
conductisconsideredsevere.
NotethatalotofSHcasesfailtogetpastSJonthegroundsthatnoreasonablejurycould
findthattheallegedactivitywassevereorpervasive.
Whatconductisunwelcome?:somecourtspendalotofattentiononthePsbehavior
USSCdidnotdefineitinpreciseterms:thistermopenedthedoortoemployerstrying
toshowthatthechallengedconductwaswelcome,whichputsemployeeinuneasy
place(toproveitwasunwelcome)
WhenisPsbehaviorsubjecttocritique?Meritorsaidprovocativespeechanddressis
notirrelevantasamatteroflaw.
Courtgenerallylooksatthisinthetotalityofthecircumstances
o Didshethinkitwouldgetworseifshedidntgoalongwithit?Whatifshewas
justsilent?
Defenses:
1) Denial(thisneverhappened)
2) Attackontheevidenceofunwelcomeness(seekingdiscoveryonemployeesprior
sexualbehaviortoshowthatemployeeshowedthatsheeitherwelcomedthealleged
sexuallyharassingconductorwasnotsubjectivelyoffendedbytheconduct).
3) Theconductwasntworkrelated(employernotresponsibleforsomeotheremployees
nonworkactivity).
4) Itwasntsevereorpervasive.
5) WEcantbeheldresponsiblefortheseunauthorizedactsofouremployees.
a. Thinksendingaroundsuggestive/pornographicemailsemployerswillsayhow
canwepolicethis?
13
*FederalRulesofEvidence412:ThepresumptionisthatPsownsexualconductisnotrelevant
insexualharassmentlawsuits.ThebalanceweighsinfavorofPtokeepthissortofevidenceout
(e.g.showingthatthesexualadvanceswerepreviouslywelcomebyP).However,this
evidencemightendupbeingadmittediftheopposingpartyshows(andjudgeagreesthat)its
relevant.
*Nextproblemtofaceiswhentheemployershouldbeliable.Individualsupervisorsare
generallynotliableunderTitleVII(althoughyoucanundersomecommonlawtheoriesanda
numberofstatelawclaims).
Howtodifferentiatebetweenjustcomments/jokesfromsexualharassment?
CourtinHarrissuggestslookingatfrequency,severity,whethertherewasheavy
pollutionofworkenvironmentwithdiscrimination/itpermeatedthewhole
environment,makingithostileandabusive(nosinglefactorisrequireditsatotality
ofcircumstancesapproach).
o Prof:Sexualharassmentcasesareveryfactspecific.
ExamplesofsevereConduct:
Asingleactofrapeissufficientlysevere(Ferrisv.DeltaAirlines)
Multiplerapesofemployeeinonenight(Littlev.WindmereRelocation)
Forcedtonguedownemployeesthroat(once)andanattempttounfasternemployeesbra
nextdaywassufficientlysevere(Hostetlerv.QualityDining)
Asingleattempttofondleemployeesbreastwasnotsufficientlyseveretoconstitute
hostileworkenvironment(Brooksv.CityofMateo)
Presidentsthreepropositionsforsextohissubordinateinonemeetingwassevere
enough(Quantockv.SharedMktg.Servs)
Strokingaleg,attempttokiss,exposinghispenisandaskingemployeetokissitwasnot
severeenough(Jonesv.Clinton).
ExamplesofpervasiveConduct:
Repeatedremarksthatbelittledemployeebecauseshewasawomanalongwithphysical
threatsweresevereorpervasive(Smithv.FirstUnionBank)
Coworkersboorishandoffensivecomment,staringandtouchingofemployeesarmwas
notsevereorpervasive(Shepherdv.Pub.AccountsofTex.)
Frequentconduct,itscontext,andthephysicalnatureofsomeactscomplainedofmetthe
thresholdofsevereorpervasive(Schianov.QualityPayrollSys.)
Chart:asseveritygoesdown,frequencyneedstogoup.
CASES:
MeritorSavingsBank,FSBv.Vinson
Harrisv.ForkliftSystems
14
2.EmployerLiability
1) Ifitisatangibleemploymentactionbysupervisoremployerisliable(strictliability)
2) Ifnotangibleemploymentactionemployerhasanaffirmativedefense
a. Employermustshowthatthereisasysteminplacetoreportharassmentandalso
showthatemployeefailedtouseit(theremaybesomeexcusestothe2ndprong,
e.g.fearofretaliation).
Whoisasupervisor?
Ifitsacoworkerthestandardissimplenegligenceemployerkneworshouldhave
knownthattheharassingbehaviorwastakingplaceanddidntdoanything.Inthat
situationtheburdenisontheemployee.Iftheemployerisraisingitasanaffirmative
defensethantheburdenisontheemployer.
o Supervisorissomeonewhocanrecommendorundertaketangibleemployment
action.Alsosomeonewhocandirectyourdailywork.Someonewhoisina
positionthatenhanceshisorherabilitytoengageinharassment.Someonewho
onewouldbereticenttoobjectdirectlyto,unlikeacoworker.
o However,notethatincaseslikeHarriswheretheharasseristhepresidentthe
actionsmaybeseenasbeingcoterminuswiththeactionsofthecompany.
TheEllerthFaragherdefenseisawidelyutilizeddefenseithasanumberofdifferent
prongsthatneedtobeconsideredseparately.
*Note5firstprongofFarragherEllerthdefense:
Inconsideringwhetheranemployerhasmetitsburdenofprovingthefirstprongthatit
exercisedreasonablecaretopreventandcorrectpromptlyanysexuallyharassing
behavioranumberoffactorsmayberelevant:Antiharrassmentpolicies(the
reasonablenessofacomplaintmechanismdependsontheemploymentcircumstances
includingtheknownvulnerabilitiesandcapabilitiesoftheclassofemployesinquestion
(EEOCv.V&JFoods[7thcir.2007]).
Youdontnecessarilyneedaformalpolicy(Hallv.Bodine(7thCir.2002),andthe
existenceofaformalSHpolicydoesnotalwaysmeantheemployerwillmeetitsburden
underthefirstprong.DisseminatingandImplementingisKEYforhowthecaseshave
gonesee564middleparagraph.
o Whataboutifthereporteedoesntreportupthechainofcommand;will
knowledgebeeimputedtotheemployer?See564565hasgonebothways.
o Employerresponsestocomplaintsonceanemployerreceivesacomplaintofa
hostileworkenvironmentcreatedbyasupervisor,itmusttakeaffirmativestepsto
investigateand,ifnecessary,takecorrectiveactioninordertoavoidliability.
Whatissufficientcorrectiveaction?see565middleofthepage.
o SHtrainingprogramsfavorableevidencethatforemployersthatreasonable
stepshadbeentakentopreventorcorrectharassment.
15
*Note6566secondprongfailuretousetheemployerscomplaintprocedure
Failuretousetheemployerscomplaintprocedurethiswillnormallysufficetosatisfy
theemployersburdenunderthesecondelementofthedefense.Faragher.
Failuretotakeadvantageofthecorrectiveopportunitiesprovidedbytheemployer
CASES:
BurlingtonIndustriesv.Ellerth
Vancev.BallStateUniversity
FaragherCase
PennsylvaniaStatePolicev.Soutters
o Note5and6
3.HarassmentBecauseofRace
SameraceharassmentisactionableafterOncaledecision.
o AlsoOncaleheldthatseverityorpervasivenessofaHWEisevaluatedinlightof
thetotalityofthecircumstances.(Page595)
AppropriatestandardtobeappliedinaHWEracialharassmentclaimisthatofa
reasonableblackperson(Page592).
Sameandcrossraceharassmentisalsoactionable(Useofraciallychargedwordsto
goadbothblackandwhiteemployeesmakessuchconductmoreoutrageous,notless
Page598)
o Courtrejectsanequalopportunityharasserdefense.Suchconductmakesthe
harassmentmoreoutrageousnotlessso.
Reverseracialharassmentisactionable(whiteemployee,whoseAfricanAmerican
supervisorcalledherwhitebitch)
Displaysofracistsymbols(e.g.nooses)alsoactionableascreatingHWE.
*Tangibleemploymentaction=significantchangeinemploymentstatussuchashiring,firing,
failingtopromote,reassignmentwithsignificantlydifferentresponsibilities,changesinbenefits.
CASES:
Harrisv.InternationalPaperCo.
16
II.SPECIFICCATEGORIESOF
DISCRIMINATION
IV.SEXDISCRIMINATION
Employermaynottakegenderintoaccountinmakinganemploymentdecision(except
thenarrowcircumstancesinwhichgenderisaBFOQ)
Sexstereotypingisnotpermittedasbasisforemploymentdecisions.Remarksatwork
thatarebasedonsexstereotypesdonotinevitablyprovethatgenderplayedapartina
particularemploymentdecision.
o Theseremarkscanofferevidence;butPultimatelymustshowthatemployer
reliedonhergenderwhenmakingitsdecision
Preliedonexperttestimonyofsocialpsychologisttoshowsexstereotyping.
HowEmployeecanshowdiscriminationbecauseofsex?
1.Directcomparativeevidence(howtheharassertreatedmembersofbothsexes)
2.Explicitorimplicitproposalsofsexualactivity.
3.Hostilitytowardthatpersonssex
4.Evidenceofsexstereotyping(e.g.amanhastobeverymasculine;ifhesnot,hemaybe
harassed)
Privacyyouaregoingtoaweightlossspaitisexclusivelyforwomenandtheyhireonly
womenattendants.Thejustificationisnotbecausethewomenwhogotothespaprefertohave
femalestaff,butbecausetheyarescantilyclad,theattendantsaretouchingthem,physically
intimatecontact,etc.
Caseshavebeenalittlebitmixedonthisthebigcasesettled.TheEEOChasarule,
thatsomeofthesesinglesexoperationstrytouse,whereitisnecessaryforthepurposes
ofauthenticityorgenuineness,theywillconsideritaBFOQSeep.379.E.g.anactoror
anactress.
Isthereafactualbasistobelievethatthatshowsthiswillhurtthebusiness.
*Whataboutamensclothingstore,saystheyonlywanttohiremenbecausetheyaremodelsfor
theclothes.
Probablynotwhatistheessenceofthebusinessthatsgoingon
*Whataboutsayingwerenotgoingtohavefemaleassociatesdotransactionaldealswith
foreign,maledominatedcompaniesinforeigncountries.Whatalltheinternationalcompanyhas
saidaslongasitsaUScompany,werenotgoingtoallowothercountriestodictate/reinforce
stereotypes.
17
Sogenerallythesetypesofpreferenceswillnotholdup.
Socustomerpreferenceisareallyhardroutetogo,andwillnotnormallysurviveasa
justificationforadiscriminatorygenderpolicy.
*ClassicBFOQcasethathasyettoberesolvedisHootershiringonlywomenwaitstaff.They
areofferingvicarioussexualrecreation.
*RememberBOFQdoesnotapplytorace.Whataboutnationalorigin?Welltalkaboutthis
later.
*FamilyDiscrimination
PDAonslideamendmenttoTitleVIIpassedin1978.Priortoitspassageand
Gilbertitwasgenerallyassumedthatdiscriminationonthebasisofpregnancywas
discriminationonthebasisofsex.Gilbertheldotherwise.
BFOQ (The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense) -703(e)(1) of Title VII
applies to facially discriminatory policy; its more stringent standard
Its not unlawful to hire and employ employees on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Note that race cannot be a BFOQ
BFOQ has a very narrow reading
Occupational means objective, verifiable requirements that must concern job-related
skills and aptitudes (qualifications that affect an Ees ability to do the job)
Discrimination under the safety exception to the BFOQ is allowed only where a job
qualification must relate to the essence or to the central mission of the Ers business
(see Johnson Controls)
BFOQ worked for actors (natl origin) but didnt work for ethnic restaurants
In general, customer preference is not enough to claim BFOQ exception (e.g., Curves
gym taking only female personal trainers).
Privacy-based BFOQ a petition signed by 10,000 customers, who said they would not
come to the health club if male trainers worked there was good enough (this case settled).
*For facially neutral employment policies, need to apply business necessity
defense (less stringent standard)
*AnexampleofsuccessfulsafetybasedBFOQisDothardv.Rawlinson,whereCtallowedErto
hireonlymaleguardsincontactareasofmaximumsecuritymalepenitentiaries.Sexwasa
BFOQb/ctheemploymentofafemaleguardwouldcreaterealrisksofsafetytoothersif
violencebrokeoutb/ctheguardwasawoman(theconcernforwomansownsafetywouldnot
justifyBFOQuse).
CASES:
18
PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins
ONCALEv.SundownerOffshoreServices,Inc.
InternationalUnion,UnitedAutomobileWorkersv.JohnsonControls
SouthwestAirlinesCase
Jesperson
****************************************************
V.PREGNANCYANDFAMILYRESPONSIBILITIES
(a) PDA (Pregnancy Discrimination Act)
- Congress passed it to overrule General Electric Co v. Gilbert (where strangely enough, S.
Ct. said that discrimination against pregnant persons isnt sex discrimination b/c not all
women are pregnant)
- Its an equality statute, not accommodation statute. Er does not have to accommodate for
pregnancy.
- Normal pregnancy disability under ADA
- Complicated pregnancy may be.
Lifting Boxes Hypo: pregnant Ee asks to be transferred to another job b/c she cannot lift heavy
boxes Er refuses to transfer (Ee has to quit as a result). How to prove the case under PDA?
- show adverse employment action (constructive discharge)
- show that Er knew Ee is pregnant
- show comparator evidence (another Ee with similar disability, who asked to be transferred to
another job and Er did it).
NY Law: prohibits discrimination b/c of breastfeeding, but theres no fed. Law for this.
*Ersrulethatprohibitedmothersofpreschoolagechildrenfromholdingcertainpositionswas
aprimafacieviolationoffed.Law(sexdiscrimination,iffathersofyoungchildrenwere
permittedtoholdthesepositions)seePhillipsv.MartinMariettaCorp.
Despiteofevidenceoftheexistingemploymentdiscriminationagainstcaregivers,nofederal
lawexplicitlyprohibitsdiscriminationonthebasisoffamilyresponsibilities.
FMLA (Family Medical Leave Act of 1993) Congress passed it to patch a hole in PDA (equal treatment for pregnant people, but no
special accommodations)
Allows for special accommodation for family or pregnancy related leaves and adoption
Its a statutory, gender-neutral law that allows for 12 weeks unpaid leave (during any 12month period)
As a general rule, employee returning from FMLA leave is entitled to reinstatement to
her former job or an equivalent position (if the original position is no longer available)
19
Employee on FMLA leave cannot lose benefits accrued prior to the start of leave, and Er
must maintain employees benefits under a properly recognized group health plan at the
same level and under the same terms as though employee continued to work.
It applies only to serious illness
It applies to Employer with 50 workers or more
Employee must have worked for a year to be eligible.
Employee doesnt have to exhaust administrative remedies can go straight to court to
sue Employer for FMLA violation
Pregnancy and the Interplay b/w Title VII (PDA), FMLA, and ADA (p. 449):
FMLA: Er must provide unpaid leave for Ees with serious medical conditions
PDA: requires Er to treat pregnant Ees the same as other Ees
ADA: requires Er to make reasonable accommodations for Ees with disabilities who are
otherwise qualified for the job
Pregnancy under ADA:
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA state that conditions, such as pregnancy, that are
not the result of physiological disorder are not impairments. Pregnancy can be viewed as
a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder or impairment. Based on these
regulations, many courts denied ADA claims of pregnant workers. Other courts applied
more nuanced analysis, finding that EEOC regulation does not explicitly exclude
pregnancy-related impairments, provided they are the result of a physiological disorder.
Pregnancy under FMLA:
Labor Dept regulations clearly permit FMLA leave for pregnancy-related health
conditions.
CASES:
Troupev.MayDepartmentStoresCo.
Chadwickv.Wellpoint,Inc.
AT&Tv.Hulteen
****************************************************
VI.SEXUALORIENTATION
Thereisnofederallawthatprohibitsemploymentdiscriminationbecauseofgender
identityorsexualorientation.However,somestates(includingNY)passedstatelawsthat
havegenderidentitydiscriminationstatutes.
20
SomecourtsusedPriceWaterhousesprohibitionagainstsexbasedstereotypingto
ruleforPsincaseswhereitsclearthatthereasonPwasdiscriminatedagainstwas
actuallyPssexualorientation.
o Othercourtsrejectedthisapproachandrefusedtobootstrapsexualorientation
intoTitleVIIprotections.
TitleVIIdoesnotprotectemployeesfrombeingdiscriminatedagainstbecausetheyare
transsexual(Ulanev.EasternAirlines)
Courtsadopted3approachestodiscriminationbecauseofsexualorientation:
1. Antibootstrapstance(sexorientationisnotprotectedbyTitleVII)
2. Smithapproach(TitleVIIprotectspeoplefromsexstereotypingregardlessof
theirgenderidentityorsexualorientationusingPriceWaterhouseargument)
3. Billingtonapproach(itissexdiscriminationperse)
PsmayalsotruesueusingEPCchallengeunder14thAmendment(ifStateisemployer)
orstatelaws.
CASES:
Ulanev.EasternAirlines
Smithv.CityofSalem,Ohio
Renev.MGMGrandHotel,Inc.
****************************************************
21
VII.RELIGION
Title VII, 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)
The duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on the part of Er
to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of Ees where such
accommodations can be made w/o undue hardship on the conduct of the Ers business.
Religion includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief
Religious practice/ observance:
Cannot be a matter of personal choice; it must be a conviction shared by a group, related
to activities/ group culture (but it doesnt have to be written in the book)
Moral/ ethical viewpoints may qualify under EEOC regulations; but courts are more
hesitant about it
Can be antireligious (atheism is OK)
It doesnt have to be organized religion but must be more than personal belief
Courts will not question religious beliefs (e.g., saying Islam does not require to wear
headscarves) but will question sincerity of Ee in believing. This could be a good defense
for Er. (can question sincerity but not veracity of religious belief)
Prima Facie and analysis:
1. Ee established Prima Facie
- Ee had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement
- Ee informed Er of this belief
- Ee was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement of
employm.
2. Er shows that reasonable efforts were made to accommodate Ee or it was undue hardship
to accommodate (need to be business-related hardship1)
- anything above de minimis is likely satisfy undue hardship (very low standard)
3. Ee disproves this as pretext
Howisitdifferentinvolvesadegreeofchoice(notimmutable),requiresreasonable
accommodation.
Whatisareligion?SincerelyheldbeliefseeEEOCregs633.
Whatyouarelookingforissomethingthataddressesthesamemoralandethical
concernsthatorganizedreligiondoes.
WhataboutsomeonewhowantsHalloweenoffbecausesheisWicken
o Youdhavetoknowmoreaboutwickenpracticebutprobablyemployersshould
nottreattheseclaimslightly.
ButseeNote1p.634.
1Prof.mentionedCostcocase(nofacialpiercingasthelookpolicyforcashiers;eeclaimedreligiousexception).Erarguedtheirneedfor
professionallylookingstaffmadeitunduehardshiptoaccommodateforEesfacialpiercingrequiredbyreligiousbelief.CtruledforEr
althoughthereasonarticulatedbyErwasnotreallyrelatedtothejobfunctionofacashier(orthelookofprofessionalcashier?).Inanothercase,
CtruledforEewhosesmalltattooinscriptionaroundthewrist(religiousAncientEgyptianmeaning)wasfoundtonotpresentanunduehardship
toaccommodatefortheEr,arestaurantthatprohibiteditsEesfromhavingvisibletattoo.Ct.saidErwasunreasonable(besides,nooneeven
noticedthateehadatattoountil6monthsintotheemployment).
22
o Notenonreligiousviewsarealsoprotectedreversereligiousdiscrimination.
ExemptionsReligiousEntityExemptionsp.636.
MinisterialexemptiongoesbeyondReligiousEntityExemptioninthehiringandfiringof
clergy,orotherchurchemployerwhohaveareligiousmission.TitleVIIdoesntapplyeven
withregardtosexandracediscrimination.SupremeCourthasnotdirectlyruledon.Some
courtsrecognizeitwithregardtohiringandfiringbutnottoharassment.Basictheoryisthat
freeexercisetrumpstitleVIIinthisregard.
Ministerial exception
Judge-made law; 1st Amen.(freedom of religion) trumps Title VII
Free exercise clause (1st Amend.) precludes judicial review of decisions by religious
entities concerning the terms and conditions of employment of their ministers.
It is extended to clergy and beyond (in some circuits)
2d Cir. does not recognize this exception
Religious beliefs do not excuse noncompliance with generally applicable state law
(Empl. Division Dept of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith)
The religious entity exemptions:
Title VII provides two broad exemptions for religious employers2
702(a)
Title VII shall not apply to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educ. institution,
or society of its activities.
703(e)(2)
It shall not be an unlawful empl. practice for a school, college, university, or other educ.
institution [in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion] to hire and employ employees of a particular religion
*Courts struggled how broadly or narrowly interpret these exceptions in light of potential
conflicts with constitutional protection of the 1st Amen. (Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause) and also the fact that there is no express exemption for race, color, sex, or national origin
(only religion). The leading S. Ct. case is Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos (non-profit
enterprises operated by religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of religion in
making employment decisions. 702 of Title VII does not violate the establishment clause of the
1st Amend see the application of Lemon test, p. 637)
2Religiousschoolsfallunderbothexceptions.
23
CASES:
EEOCv.Abercrombie&FitchStores,Inc.
TransWorldAirlines,Inc.v.Hardison
HosannaTaborEvangelicalLutheranChurchv.EEOC
TWAv.Hardison
****************************************************
VIII.NATIONALORIGIN
Its a very expansive definition; it can mean ancestry (like 10 generations away); it covers
physical characteristics, language, cultural characteristics etc.
Native Americans are covered
It doesnt encompass citizenship (need to argue that citizenship was pretext for national
origin?)
There is a split b/w the circuits about whether undocumented workers can sue based on
Title VII. Most courts find that they can sue on other grounds (e.g., race and gender
discrimination)
Theories, defenses, and analyses of DT and DI cases apply for national origin
Employer that requires its Employees to be able to speak English well as a condition of
employment may face a claim of discrimination based on national origin. If the
requirement is applied to a non-English speaking Employee as opposed to a bilingual
Employee, most courts suggest using DI model b/c the requirement will have a disparate
impact based on national origin.
English-only policy across the board is impossible to justify (under EEOC regulations,
such policy is enough to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact).
*Definedwheretheemployeecamefromhowtheyare,howtheydress,verybroadyou
donthavetobeborninadifferentcountryaslongasyouidentifywiththatgroup.Notethere
maybealotofoverlapinreligion/nationalorigin/race.See.P.684.
*DiscriminationbasedoncitizenshipisOKsolongasitisnotapretextfordiscriminationbased
onnationalorigin(appliedequally).NotehoweverthatundertheNYCHRLcitizenswhipisa
protectedcategory.
*ApplicabilityofTitleVIItoundocumentedworkersusedtobepresumedbutHoffman
PlasticsUSSCheldthatNLRBdoesntapplytoundocworkerssincethensomecourtshave
heldthatTitleVIIdoesntapplysomecourtshavehelditdoes.
AccentDiscriminationshedidntaskustoreadthis.
CourtsaysthisisdirectevidenceofdiscriminationInreRodriguez(6Cir2007).
Bottomlineisthatanemployercanbaseanemploymentdecisiononaccent,butonlyif
24
affectednonaccentedoralcommunicationsisrequiredtoperformthejobdutiesandthe
accentmateriallyinterfereswiththepersonsabilitytocommunicateinEnglish.
Thisisaprettyeasystandardforemployerstomeetbecausetheycansay,eveninjobs
thatdoesntrequiredirectcustomercontact,theabilitytobeunderstoodinEnglishis
importantinlotsofjobs(communicateandbeunderstoodbysupervisor,subordinate,
etc.).
*SeerevisedEEOCregsat722.SaysEnglishonlycreatesPFCbycourtshavebyandlarge
declinedtoadheretothese.
CASES:
Pachecov.NYPresbyterianHospital
EEOCv.SephoraUSA,LLC
InreRodriguezAccentDiscriminationfromOutline
****************************************************
IX.AGEDISCIRMINATION
Thepersonreplacingyoudoesnthavetobeyoungerthan40butthedisparityprobably
hastobearound10yearsormoretocreatetheinferenceofdiscrimination
Ifyoucanprovethattheviolationwaswillful,youcangetuptoanadditional50Kin
liquidateddamages.
Whatsdifferentaboutagediscrimination.Itissomethingthatappliesacrosstheboard.
Whataboutageisdifferent?Ingeneraljudgesandthelegislaturesaythatageisnot
necessarilyunrelatedotjobperformance.
Itsseparate(fromTitleVII)statutethatwaspassedin1967.
Protectedgroupisemployees40yearsorolder.
Statutoryminimum20employees
BothDTandDItheoriescanbeused,butmostcasesarebroughtunderDTtheory.
SupremeCourthasntdecidedwhetherMcDonnellDouglasframeworkappliestoADEA
butlowercourtsuseit(aswellassomeformsofBurdineandSt.Marysv.Hicks
analysis).
UnderMcDonnellDouglas(ifnodirectevidenceofagediscrimination):
1. Employeeestablishedprimafacie.
2. Employerrespondswithlegitimate,nondiscriminationreasons(burdenof
production)
3. Employeehastheburdenofprooftoshowpretextandthatagewasthetrue
reasonfortheaction.
25
PrimaFaciaforADEAclaims:
Employeeismemberofprotectedclassandwasqualifiedforthejob.
Employeewassubjecttoanadverseemploymentaction.
Undercircumstancesthatraiseaninferenceofagediscrimination(typically,replacedby
youngerworker)
o Whatifayoungerworkerisalsomemberoftheprotectedclass(e.g.59yearold
isreplacedby43yearold).Somecourtssaythereplacementdoesnothavetobe
under40,butusethestandardofsubstantiallyyounger(Courtsvary10year
differencewasfoundtobesubstantial,5yrsnotenough).
- Mixed motive analysis is not applicable (age must be but-for cause) see Gross case
There is no accommodation requirement for older people under the ADEA. EX: if a test is job
related, reasonable, and older workers fail it, the ADEA wont be able to protect them.
Customer preference (e.g. for younger people) courts are not so generous with it.
S. Ct. held that 11th Amend. Bars state employees from bringing private actions for monetary
damages against non-consenting states for violations of the ADEA (Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents)
BFOQ
Employer argued they wanted pilots under 50 b/c reaction time gets slower and ability to
think faster deteriorates. Ct found this argument as facially discriminatory => under
BFOQ, Employer had to look at specific duties the pilots must perform and see how
Employees over 50 perform them (TWA v. Thurnston)
One of the exceptions when age restrictions are allowed are police officers and fire
fighters (b/c of public safety issues).
Intersectionality problems
Age + gender; how is discrimination against older women analyzed? Cts analyze each
claim separately and ask for proof under each category. So, if Er shows that older men are
promoted and women are promoted, Ee (older woman) will very likely lose her case.
Proxy for age discrimination:
perceived as less productive and/or less creative
perceived as having limited skills and/or ability to acquire skills
perceived as no longer fitting into the organization
*Prof: Cost cutting is a legitimate basis for eliminating older workers, which is
pretty unique. PDA, for example, would not allow for such thing (e.g., lets
get rid of all pregnant workers b/c they cost too much).
26
*Prof: practitioners say that mixed motive is confusing for juries anyway, and
age discrimination cases prevail at higher rates than gender and race
discrimination cases even after Gross (so, it seems that Gross caused less
damage than it seemed).
*Under the ADEA, it shall not be unlawful for an employer to take any action
otherwise prohibited where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age. RFOA is a lower standard than business necessity Er
just needs to show that the action was reasonable.
*Ct. recognizes that age is different from other protected categories in that it
may affect some work related abilities and thus render certain employment
criteria as reasonable (hence, lower standard for RFOA defense).
CASES:
Sperlingv.HoffmanLaRoche
HazenPaperv.Biggins
Grossv.FBLFinancialServices
Smithv.CityofJackson,Mississippi
Meachamv.KnollsAtomicPowerLaboratory
****************************************************
X.DISABILITYDISCRIMINATION
AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)prohibitsdiscriminationagainstqualified
individualswithadisability
a. StructureisidenticaltoTitleVIIsameenforcement,exhaustionof
administrativeremediesrequirement,samenumberofemployees,same
remediesavailable
b. Privateemployerswith15ormoreemployees
ADApassedin1992
c. PredecessorwasRehabilitationActappliedonlytofederalemployers
andthosereceivingfederalfunding(schools,hospitals,prisons,etc)
d. Changedhandicappedtodisabled
ThresholdissueofwhoshouldbecoveredunderADAunlikeothertypesof
discrimination
e. ADAalsorequiresaccommodation(onlyseeninreligion)
f. ReasonableaccommodationlanguageofADAisdifferentfromreligion
becausethereisnodeminimiscostlanguageinADAlikereligion
Primafaciecase
g. DisabilitywithinthemeaningoftheADA
27
h. Qualifiedindividual
i. Sufferedanadverseemploymentactionasaresultofthedisability
i. ADAdoesntincludemotivatingfactorlanguagesodisabilityhastobethe
butforcauselikeinagediscrimination(notdecidedbySupCtyet)
DefinitionwithADA
j. Qualifiedindividualwithadisabilityisanindividualwithadisability
who,withorwithoutreasonableaccommodation,canperformthe
essentialfunctionsoftheemploymentpositionthatsuchindividualholds
ordesires
k. Disabilityisdefinedas:
ii. Aphysicalormentalimpairmentthatsubstantiallylimitsoneormoremajor
lifeactivitiesofsuchindividual;
Substantiallylimitsmeansunabletoperformamajorlifeactivity
thattheaveragepersoninthegeneralpopulationcanperform
iii. Arecordofsuchanimpairment(historyofdisability);OR
iv. Beingregardedashavingsuchanimpairment
l. Section511excludesthefollowingfromdisabilityhomosexuality,
bisexuality,transvestism,transexualism,pedophilia,exhibitionism,
voyeurism,genderidentitydisordersnotresultingfromphysical
impairments,othersexualdisorders,compulsivegambling,kleptomania,
pyromania,andpsychoactivesubstanceusedisorderresultingfromthe
illegaluseofdrugs
v. Wouldalcoholismbecovered?
Recovereddrugaddictsarecoverediftheyareparticipatingina
programofrehab
vi. HIVinfectionisadisabilityheldbySupCtinBragdonv.Abbot,1998
m. AccommodationSection102(a)nocoveredentityshoulddiscriminate
againstqualifiedindividualwithadisability
vii. Employermustmakereasonableaccommodationsfordisabledemployees
ADAAmendmentsof2008
a. Nowdisabilityhastobeconsideredwithoutregardtothemitigatingmeasures
viii. Thesemeasuresshouldnotbeconsideredwhendeterminingwhetheramajor
lifeactivityissubstantiallyimpaired
Exceptforordinaryglassesorcontactlensesthatfullycorrectthe
impairmenttheywillbeconsideredinthisevaluation
ix. Purposeistoeliminatediscriminationthatmayarisebasedonappearance
createdbyacorrectivemeasure
b. Regardedaslanguagenowincludesperception(notjustactualabilityanymore)
x. Congressreturnsthestatutetoadiscriminationmeaning
c. Expandsdefinitionofmajorlifeactivitiestoincludebroadlistofmajorbodily
functionswouldcoverdisabilitiesthatareepisodicorinremission
xi. TakenfromEEOCregulationsbutnotlimitedtolist
d. Substantialdoesntmeanseverelyrestricts
28
xii. Putsburdenonemployertomakereasonableaccommodationsforindividuals
whocandemonstrateimpairmentthatsubstantiallylimitsamajorlifeactivity
Aslongastheaccommodationsdontplaceanundueburdenonthe
employer
Whatisareasonableaccommodation?
a. Theaccommodationprocessisaninteractiveprocessbetweenthe
employee/employer
Burdenisonemployeetoshowitsareasonableaccommodation
Burdenisonemployertoshowitsanunduehardship
b. Isitreasonabletorequireanemployeetouseupsicktimetodealwiththe
manifestationoftheirdisabilityb/cworkingfromhomewastooburdensomefor
employer?
Rarelyareasonableaccommodationtoallowaworkertoworkfrom
homewithoutsupervision
xiii. Exampleemployeewantedemployertocreateanaccessiblesinkinthe
kitchen.Employerhadanaccessiblesinkinthebathroomsodidntwantto
pay$150togetsinkinkitchenaswell
Courtsaidthisreasonable,employerdidntwanttogetsinkinkitchen
aswell
Courtslooktofollowingfactorswhenevaluatinganaccommodation
a. Natureandcostofaccommodation
b. Efficacyofaccommodation;willitreallybenefitthe
employee?
c. Costcantbedisproportionatetothebenefit
d. Overallfinancialresourcesofthecompany
Exampleemployeecomestoworklateeverydayandisletgoasa
result.Employeeclaimshehasagoraphobiaandhastowaituntillater
totakesubwaytowork
a. Employermustknowaboutthedisabilityandimpairments
b. Ifanemployeehasagoraphobiaandemployerdoesntknow,
cantexpectanaccommodation
c. Employeementionstoemployerthathegetsanxiouson
subwayprobablystillnotenoughb/cnoproofthatitsa
medicalorpsychiatricissue
Employerhasadutytoengageinsomeconversationbutalsocant
insinuatedisabilitywhereonedoesnotexist
a. OnewayforemployertoavoidliabilityunderADAisto
clearlydefinetheessentialfunctionsofthejob
b. Forinstance,jobrequiresliftingof50lbs,ifemployeehurts
backandcantliftthatmuchthenhecantperformthe
essentialfunctionsofthejob
i. Properaccommodationcouldbejobrestructuring
switchcertainduties
29
ii. Ifthisisntpossible,thenthereisntareasonable
accommodationandemployeecantperformessential
functionsofjobwithorwithoutareasonable
accommodation.WonthaveclaimunderADA
xiv. MentalimpairmentsifemployeehasADDandneedsaprivateofficetodo
theirjob,isthisareasonableaccommodation?Canbeconsideredfavoritism
MedicalInquiries
a. Restrictionsonmedicalexamsandinquiriesin3situations
i. (1)Preoffer/applicationstage,ADA102(d)(2)(A)
Maynotconductamedicalexamormakeinquiriesregardingwhether
theindividualhasadisabilityorastothenatureorseverityofsuch
disability
Maydiscussmedicalissueswithjobapplicantsin3narrowsituations:
a. ADA102(d)(2)(B)preemploymentinquiriesintothe
abilityofanapplicanttoperformjobrelatedfunctions(must
bemadetoallapplicants)
b. Mayaskapplicanthowhe/shemayperformtheessential
functionsofthejobforwhichtheyareapplying
c. Mayaskanapplicantwithanobviousorknowndisabilitywhat
accommodationisrequired(e.g.wheelchair)butcantaskhow
longtheyhaveusedawheelchairorhowthedisability
occurred).
i. Iftheyneedanaccommodation,canaskforamedical
evaluation
ii. (2)Afterindividualhasbeenofferedthejobenteringemployees
ADA102(d)(2)(B)(3)employercanrequiremedicalexamafteran
offerofemploymenthasbeenmadetoanapplicantandpriorto
commencementofemploymentdutiesandmayconditionanofferon
resultsoftheexamaslongthefollowingconditionsaremet:
a. Allenteringemployeeshavetotakethesamemedicalexam,
regardlessofwhethertheyhaveadisability
b. Employerkeepsmedicalinfoonseparateforms,inseparate
medicalfiles,andtreatsifasaconfidentialmedicalrecord
c. TheemployerusestheexamonlytocomplywiththeADA
Basedonthemedicalexam,anoffercannotbewithdrawn,unless:
a. Itsrelatedtotheindividualsjob(impairsabilitytodothejob)
AND
b. Necessaryfortheconductofemployersbusiness
i. Highstandard
iii. (3)PostofferstageexistingorcurrentemployeesADA102(d)(4)
Prohibitsemployerfromrequiringcurrentemployeestosubmittoa
medicalexamormakeinquiriesaboutwhetheranemployeehasa
disabilityorastothenature/severityofsuchdisability,unlesssuch
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exam/inquiryisshowntobejobrelatedandconsistentwithbusiness
necessity
a. Youfallasleepatyourdeskeverydayanditsaffectingyour
workitsanessentialjobfunctionthatyoubeawakeonthe
jobdoyouhaveamedicalcondition?
b. Wherethereisaneedtodetermineiftheemployeeisstillable
toperformtheessentialfunctionsofthejob
b. Drugtesting
i. ADAdoesntconsiderillegaldrugusersasqualifiedindividualswitha
disability
ii. Cantdiscriminationbasedonpriordruguseaslongasemployeeisnolonger
engaginginthatactivity(historyofdrugusebutnotrecent/current)
Iftestedfordrugsatwork,testedpositiveandimmediatelyenrollin
rehabcanbedisciplinedorterminatedonthisbasisthisisnta
historyofdruguse,itwasrecent
iii. Alcoholismistreateddifferentlyfromdruguseb/cnotadrugwithin
meaningofstatute;consideredadisability
TheADAandFMLA
a. IfanemployeeisrequestingFMLAleavebuttheemployerdoesnthaveenough
informationtodetermineiftheemployeeisqualified,employermaymakeinquiries
i. Medicalcertificationfromdoctor
b. AfterFMLAleaveanemployercanrequestafitnessfordutycertificationbutonly
fortheparticularhealthconditionthatcausedtheemployeesneedforFMLAleave
GeneticInformationNondiscriminationActof2008(GINA)
a. 2typesofgenetictestingthatcanbedoneintheworkplace:
i. ScreeningforspecificinheriteddiseasedAND
ii. Screeningforsusceptibilitytodiseasesthatmightbeaggravatedbyconditions
ofsubstancesintheworkplace
b. HealthInsurancePortabilityandAccountabilityActof1996(HIPA)firstfederal
lawspeakingtouseofgeneticinformation
iii. Cantusegeneticinfoasbasistolimitanddenyhealthcoverage
c. Prohibitsdiscriminationagainstindividualsbasedontheirgeneticinformationand
makesitunlawfultoretaliateagainstindividualwhohasopposedanyactorpractice
madeunlawfulbyGINA
d. Alsoprohibitscoveredentitiesfrompurchasing,requesting,orrequiringgeneticinfo
ofanindividual
*Inordertoavoiddiscriminationliability,HRDepartmentstypicallytellsupervisorsnotto
discusshealthissuesoftheindividualortheirfamily
CASES:
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Huberv.WalMartStores
Suttonv.UnitedAirlines
Toyotav.Williams
VandeZandev.Wisconsin
****************************************************
_____________________________________________________________________________
III.ADJUDICATINGANDREMEDYING
DISCRIMINATION
Enforcement Schemes:
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3. Adjudication EEOC doesnt hold any adjudicative hearings (except for federal
employees)
Investigates and tries to reconcile interests
Cant compel employer to do anything though
4. Cause Determination
If EEOC finds probable cause, will contact employer for conciliation/settlement
If employer refuses conciliation or the cause isnt settled despite
attempts, then EEOC issues a Right to Sue Letter to Complainant
If EEOC doesnt find cause then complainant is given Right to Sue Letter
For ADA and Title VII, after 180 days can ask for a Right to Sue Letter even if
a decision hasnt been made by EEOC (only 60 days for ADEA)
5. Judicial Enforcement
Must bring claim in federal court with 90 days of receiving the Right to Sue
Letter regardless of whether its by request or after a cause determination
For ADEA, only have to wait 60 days after filing with EEOC before bringing a
case to federal court
District Court will review EEOC decisions de novo
Once case is brought to federal court, 75% of ED cases are resolved at summary
judgment
If case gets past summary judgment, likelihood of settlement goes up
exponentially
Trial is very unlikely
Damages
Total amount of damages punitive and compensatory is based on number of
employees the employer has
**80,000 claims brought to EEOC last year, only 271 actions brought by EEOC
Timing
When do the 300 days begin to run? The first act or the final act?
Equal Pay Act (EPA) employees who do the same kind of work are entitled to be paid at the
same rate (regardless of gender)
Entitled to liquidated damages, no compensatory or punitive damages
No exhaustion requirement
Almost any claim under the Equal Pay Act will also be actionable under Title VII
*January 2009, Pres. Obama signed Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law, overruling the
Ledbetter decision and making Ginsburgs dissent the law (Amended Title VII)
1. An unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to the discrimination in
compensation in violation of this title, when:
A discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted
An individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice
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REINSTATEMENT/INSTATEMENT
Objectives:
1. Recreates the employment relationship as it would have existed by for unlawful
employment discrimination
2. Prevents future economic loss to Plaintiff
3. Allows an employer to demonstrate good faith compliance with law to other
employees
4. Prevents employer form trying to get rid of employees, at any cost, who assert
their rights under laws prohibiting discrimination in employment
Reinstatement inappropriate if:
1. Innocent employee would be displaced by reinstating Pl; or
2. Hostility or animosity/hostility between Pl and employer would make amicable
and productive working relationship impossible; or
3. Position has been eliminated due to RIF, merger, etc.
Instead can get front-pay when reinstatement is inappropriate
In mixed-motive cases, under amendments that came after Price Waterhouse case, if
employer can prove that it wouldve made same decision excluding discriminatory
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Pre-judgment interest:
Significant element of damages; longer litigation lasts the more interest
accumulates; generally considered appropriate by courts
Post-judgment interest:
Usually doesnt amount to must; accrues between entry of judgment until when
its actually paid
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