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DisparateTreatment..

2
MixedMotive.......5
SystemicDT......7
DisparateImpact.......8
Retaliation...10
HarassmentBecauseofSex....13
HarassmentEmployerLiability..15
HarassmentBecauseofRace..16
SexDiscrimination..17
PregnancyandFamilyResponsibilities..19
SexualOrientation..20
Religion...21
NationalOrigin...24
AgeDiscrimination.........25
DisabilityDiscrimination........27
Adjudicating/RemedyingDiscrimination.......31

I.FRAMEWORKSFORUNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION
I.DISPARATETREATMENT
DISPARATETREATMENT(DT)viewedthrough3factualandanalyticallenses.
1.Singlemotiveorpretextcases
2.Mixedordualmotivecases;and
3.Patternorpracticecases.
Pisnotrequiredtospecifywhichoftheseproof/analyticalschemessheintendstorely
uponwhenshefileshercomplaint,butatsomepointduringtrialthecourtmust
determinewhichevidentiaryschemeisappropriatetodecidethecaseorinstructthejury.
(PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins).
Requiresproofofintent(employerhadintenttotreatdifferentlyaparticularmemberof
aprotectedclass)
MajorityofcasesanalyzedunderMcDonnelDouglasanalysis.
Howtoproveintent?
o Directevidence(notavailableinmostcases)
o Circumstantialevidence(applyMcDonnellDouglasanalysis>ifpretext
argumentdoesntwork,applymixedmotiveanalysis).

1.FOUNDATIONS
McDonnellDouglasAnalysis:
1. EmployeemakesaPrimaFaciecase(inahiringcontext)byshowingthatshe:
a. PrimaFacieisnotonerousburden(minimalshowingisgoodenough)
b. NonhiringPrimeFaciePjustshowshesufferedadverseemployment
actionunderthecircumstancesgivingrisetoaninferenceof(race,sex,etc.)
discrimination.
i. Wasamemberofaprotectedclass
ii. Wasqualifiedforajob
iii. Appliedforajobandgotrejected
iv. Positionremainedavailable
2. Employerofferslegitimatenondiscriminatoryreason(LNDR)forthechallenged
action.
a. Minimalshowing(burdenofproduction)
3. Employeerebutsemployersreasons,showingthattheyarepretextual,whilethetrue
reasonisdiscrimination.

a. Burdenofpersuasion(standard:preponderanceofevidence,morelikelythan
not)
*Thesameframeworkappliestopromotions,demotions,discharges(includesconstructive
discharges),andreductionsinforce.
ConstructiveDischarge:whenemployeeinvoluntarilyresignsinordertoescapeinteolerable
workingconditionsthatsheissubjectedtobecauseofherrace,sex,nationalorigin,orreligion.
Constructivedischargemayalsoarisewhenemployeeresignsinlieuofbeingfired.
Employeemustshowthat:
1. Theworkingconditionsbecamesointolerablethatareasonablepersonin
employeespositionwouldhavefeltcompelledtoresign;and
2. Adeliberateeffortbyemployertoforceemployeetoquit(somecourtsdont
requireproofofemployersintenttoforceemployeetoresign).
EmployersgoalistosurviveSJandgettothejury(7580%ofcasesareresolvedatSJ
stage,lessthan3%resolvedaftertrial).
1. EvidencePcanOffer:
1. Comparatorevidence(howsimilarlysituatedemployeesweretreated
byemployer
2. Treatmentofthesameemployeebeforebeingdischarged(showing
hostileworkenvironment,commentsbydecisionmakersshowingbias
toprotectedgroup)
o Distinguishbetweenstrayremarksandprobative
remarks
Strayremarksarenotevidenceofdiscriminatory
animus(typically,theyseemtoattenuatedtobe
connectedtotheanimus)
3. Statisticsonhiring/discharge/rehiring(thisevidencecanbolstertheDT
case,butitsmuchmorecrucialinDIcases)
4. Metooevidence(showingthatotherworkersinprotectedclasswere
alsotreatedbadly)
o Professor:USSCstillstruggleswithwhetherthisevidence
shouldbeallowedin.Courtstrytobalancerelevance(to
thecase)withprejudice(toD)inordertodecidewhether
metooevidencecanbeadmitted.
5. Generalpolicyandpracticesinrelationtoprotectedgroup
(hiring/promotion/transfer/etc.)
2. HowEmployersRespondtorequestsforotheremployeesrecords:
1. Itsconfidential(butdoesntworkwhenlitigationstarts).
2. Narrowdownthecomparetogroup(whoserecordsarerelevant).
o Employeewillmakebroadinquiry(e.g.includingall
workersinprotectedclass)butEmployermaytrytolimit
theevidencetosimilarlysituatedemployees(Example:

minoritymanagerwhosuesmightnotgetaccessto
evidenceonnonmanagerialminorityworkers).
SameActorDefense:
Ifitisthesamepersonwhohiresandfiredtheemployee,andtheperiodbetweenhiring
andfiringisrelativelyshort,employerisentitledtoinferencethatthedischargewasnot
motivatedbydiscriminatoryanimus.
o Shortperiodoftimeisafluidconceptsomecourtsstretchedthisupto3years
(ormore)
o Courtshavevariousapproachestothisdefensesomecourtsfullyendorseit;
somethinkthatitshouldbeleftforjurytodecide;andsomethinkitsneithera
mandatorypresumptionnorsomethingthatshoulddefinitelybelefttothejury,
butthinkthisevidenceshouldbetakenintoaccountatSJstage.
ReverseDiscrimination:
Aproblemwiththefirstprong(employeeisnotamemberofaminoritygroup).Many
courtsrequiredwhitePstoestablishthatDisthatunusualemployerwhodiscriminates
againstthemajority.
o Anotherwaytoapproachthisissueistokeeptheinquiryatshowingaless
favorabletreatmentthatareasonablefactfindercouldconcludewasbasedonPs
race,color,religion,sex,ornationalorigin.
HonestBeliefRule:
Ifemployerhonestlybelievesthatemploymentdecisionwascorrectoneatthetime,he
maybeentitledtodefenseagainstfindingofpretext,butthishonestbeliefmustbe
reasonable.
o providesthatsolongastheemployerhonestlybelievedintheprofferedreason
givenforitsemploymentaction,theemployeecannotestablishpretextevenifthe
employersreasonsultimatelyfoundtobemistaken,foolish,trivial,orbaseless.
Example:Employerhonestlythoughtemployeewaslateforworkwhenhe
wasnot.
Employeemustestablishthatitsreasonablerelianceonthefactsthat
werebeforeitatthetimethedecisionasmade.(Smithv.ChryslerCorp.)
CASES:
McDonnellDouglasv.Green
TexasDepartmentofCommunityAffairsv.Burdine
StMarysHonorCentervHicks
Reevesv.Sanderson

2.MIXEDMOTIVE
MixedMotiveAnalysis:
Appliestodisparatetreatment(DT)casesunderTitleVII.
Appliestocaseswherebothlegitimateandillegitimatereasonsplayedarolein
employersadverseaction.
Professor:mixedmotivecaseiseasiertoproveandgettothejury(butdamagesarenot
availabletotheemployee).
o Pretextismoredifficulttoprove(butwinningwouldallowthepartytoget
damages)
CatsPawTheory:
Referstoasituationinwhichabiasedsubordinate,wholacksdecisionmakingpower,
usestheformaldecisionmakerasadupeinadeliberateschemetotriggera
discriminatoryemploymentaction.
o Essentiallywhenthedecisionisaproductofmultipledecisionmakers.
RubberStampreferstosituationinwhichadecisionmakergivesperfunctory
approvalforanadverseemploymentactionexplicitlyrecommendedbyabiased
subordinate.(subordinatebiasliability)
ThistheorycomportswithbasicagencyprinciplesincorporatedintoTitleVII(any
agentofthebusiness).
o Undercertaincircumstances,Dmaybeheldliableforasubordinatesprejudice
evenifthemanagerlackeddiscriminatoryintent.
*Employer(finaldecisionmaker)canescapeliabilityentirelybyperformingindependent
investigation(beforemakingadverseemploymentaction)
*Employersmaybevicariouslyliableforactionsoftheiremployeesevenintentionaltorts
outsidescopeofemploymentiftheemployeewasaidedinaccomplishingthetortbyexistence
oftheagencyrelationship.
*ifyouareinHRyoudontwantHRdepartmentsrubberstampingrecommendationswithout
anyindependentinvestigation.Soagoodpolicytohaveistohavethepersonactuallyhiringor
firingdoanindependentinvestigation.
CircuitCourtsonThisIssue:
7thCircuitStandard:issueiswhetherbiasedsubordinatesdiscriminationreports,
recommends,orotheractionscasedbytheadverseemploymentaction(morethanmere
influenceorinput)
5thCircuitStandard:anyinfluence,thereportingofanyfactualinformation,oranyform
ofotherinputbyabiasedsubordinaterendersemployerliablesolongasthesubordinate
mayhaveaffected:theemploymentdecision.
4thCircuitStandard:employercannotbeheldliableevenifbiasedsubordinateexercises
substantialinfluenceorplaysasignificantroleintheemploymentdecision.

Overall:theburdenisontheemployertolookmorecloselyandconductanindependent
evaluationbeforemakingtheemploymentdecision.

Howtoanalyzethisproblem:
1. Cansheestablishaprimafaciacase?
a. Memberofaprotectedclass
b. Didntreceiveatransfer(adverseemploymentaction).Ifthereisamaterial
advantage/benefittothetransferthenitisanadverseemploymentaction.Not
everytransferwillnecessarilyqualifyasanAEA.
c. Wesomethingsthatgiverisetoaninferenceofdiscrimination(someonenotin
theclassgothiredfortheposition).
2. Pretextanalysis
a. Employerslegitnondiscriminatoryreasonwasthatitwasmadeonthebasisof
seniority.
i. Trytoshowthatinfactpeoplewithlessseniorityhadbeenpromotedor
givenadvantageousjobs.
ii. Jobdescriptionsaidentrylevel.
iii. Areall5paralegalsinthelitigationdepartmentmen?AllfiveinT&E
women.Althoughnotdeterminativethesestatisticscanbeusedas
evidenceofpretext.
iv. Whatotheroutsidecandidatesdidtheyinterview?Whichproportionwere
men?
3. Ifthefactorsunder2aareinourfavor,itgoestoajury.
4. Whatiftheemployercouldshowthatithadpromotedonthebasisofseniority,butitjust
sohappenedthatthecandidatesthatthemostseniorweremen.Whatdoesthatbringto
mind?Mixedmotivecanwesaythatgendermayhavebeenamotivatingfactor.
Withoutanyotherfactsherewecantreallybudgethelegitimatenondiscriminatory
reasonsowewanttoraiseamotivatingfactortheory.

CASES:
PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins
DesertPalacev.Costa

3.SYSTEMICDISPARATETREATMENT
Whatisthis?
SubsetofDTcases.
Focusesonstatisticaldisparitiesintheworkforce(inaparticularjobclassification)
GrossDisparities:mustbeprobative,anditsrarelysufficientwithoutshowingthatthe
samplewaslargeenough.Statscanberelevant,butinpractice,thesecasesgenerallyrely

onanecdotaltestimonyanddocumentaryevidence.Standingalone,statsarenotlikelyto
establishacaseofindividualdisparatetreatment.
o RelevantLaborMarketthisanalysistypicallyrequiresanexpert
o MultipleRegressionAnalysis(MRA)expertstatisticianisrequired.
o UseofMRAendorsedbyUSSCinBazemorev.Friday.
StandardDevision(SD)benchmarkis2SD
Ruleisifadisparityisgreaterthan2SDfromwhatwouldbepredicted,thelawwillinfer
discriminationasthemostlikelycauseofdisparity:
HowtocalculateSD(usingTeamstersnumbers):
o SD=SquareRootof(AxBxC)
Anumberoflinedrivers(1828)
BpromotionofAfricanAmericans(0.05)
CproportionofnotAfricanAmericans(0.95)
o Weexpectthat5%x1828people=911AfricanAmericandrivers.
o SD=9.318(people),2SD=approximately18people.
Soaslongasthenumberofdriversfallsbetween91and73,itsok.Ifthe
numberofdriversislessthan73,thenitsmorethan2SDandislegally
probativedisparity
FirstsanctionedinHazelwood.Twostandarddeviationscorrespondsapproximatelytoa
oneintwentyor5%chancethatadisparityismerelyrandom.Mostsocialscientists
acceptthisasthethresholdofstatisticallysignificant.
o CourtssaythatwhenresultsaregreaterthantwoSDs,theywilldrawaninference
ofdiscrimination.
LackofInterestDefense
Employermaysuccessfullyarguethatdisparityisduetolackofinterestbytheprotected
groups(seeEEOCv.Sears).
o Thiscaseissadbecausethestats/lackofinterestmightbeareflectionofself
fulfillingprophecythatwomenhad(Iwontbeabletocompetewithsales
guys).Alsocriticizedbecauseithasbeensuggestedthattheyweremakingthe
determinationsonlessthanfullinformationanddidntbelievetheywouldget
them.
*Havetoprovethatthepolicyiswhatiscausingthediscrimination.Biggerthedisparity,
thestrongertheinferenceofdiscrimination.
CASES:
Teamstersv.UnitedStates
HazelwoodSchoolDistrictv.UnitedStates
WalMartStoresv.Dukes

4.DISPARATEIMPACT
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DisparateImpact(DI)
Itchallengesafaciallyneutralpolicythatfallsmoreharshlyonaprotectedgroupand
cannotbejustifiedbyabusinessnecessity.
Needtohavesomespecificpolicythathasadverseimpact,disparateeffectona
protectedgroup,resultinginunintentionaldiscrimination.
o Thefocusisonbadconsequence,notonbadintent.
Pdoesntneedtoproveintentbutneedstoshow:
1. Theresaneffect(stats,etc.);and
2. Thepolicyisnotnecessary(notabusinessnecessity)
PrimaFacie(afterWatson&WardsCove):
1. Statisticaldisparity(80%rule)
2. Identifyspecificemploymentpracticethatallegedlycauseddisparity.
IfPwins>therearenodamagesavailable(onlybackpay)
*ClassactionsarefrequentlylinkedtobothsystemicDTandDIclaims.
4/5Rule(80%rule)
Employeemayestablishadverseimpactbyshowingthattheemployeesintheprotected
classarehired,orpassatest,ataratethatisbelow80%oftherateofthemostsufcessful
group.
o Itsaveryroughmeasure(ruleofthumb),butitsaprimafacieevidenceofDI.
Example:menpassthetestatarateof80%,womenpassthetestatarate
of60%.Comparewomentomen:60/80x100%=75%.Itisbelow80%
>satisfiestherule.
AffirmativeDefense:
Employercanshowbusinessnecessity(e.g.thetestmustbejobrelated)tojustifythe
challengedpractice.
o Test:necessityislegitimatejustification(prettylowstandardafterWards
Cove).ButEmployerhastheburdenofproof(aftertheCivilRightsActof1991).
TestValidation:
Aprettyelaborateprocess.Therearetwopartsofdisparateimpactimportanthere.
1. Testpreparation
2. Testvalidation
InordertoensurethatyoucanprevailonaBNDefense.Theyhavetoengageinapretty
elaborateandexpensiveprocessoftestvalidation.Mustmeasurewhetherthetest
comportswiththeactualjobdutiesandthatemployeeswhopassthetestarebetteratthe
jobthanthosewhodonotpassthetest.
o Courtshavesaidthatjobvalidationstudiesarenotabsolutelyrequiredtomakea
BNdefense.

*SubjectiveemploymentpracticescouldbechallengedundertheDItheory.Fewsubjective
practiceshaveactuallybeenchallengedunderthetheorybecausesubjectivepracticescan
alsogenerallybechallengedunderaDTtheoryandaftertheCRAof1991,Pshavean
incentivetobringcasesundertheDTratherthanDItheorygiventhatdamagesare
availableforDTcasesbutnotforDIcases.
*BurdenofProofinDIcasesaftertheemployeemakesaprimafacieshowingofDI,full
burdenofproductionandpersuasionshiftstoemployertoprovebusinessnecessity
overrulesoneholdingofWardsCove.Thestatutealsorestoresthemeaningofbusiness
necessitytowhatitwaspriortoWC(thoughnotentirelyclearwhatthatwas).The
statutealsomodifiesthecourtsrequirementthatPidentifyaspecificemployment
practice;whilethestatuterequirestheplaintifftoidentifyaspecificemploymentpractice,
thestatutemakesanexceptiontotheextenttheemployersdecisionmakingprocessisnot
capableofseparation.
*Note>Civilrightsactof1991:forthefirsttimeCongresscodifiedthetheoryof
disparateimpact.Itisnotenoughforplaintiffstoshowsimplythatmoreovertime
assignmentsgotomenthanwomen,oreventhatmengetahigherpercentageofthose
assignmentsthantheirpercentageintheworkforce.TheymostcompareQUALIFIED
mentoQUALIFIEDwomen.Carpenterv.Boeing456F.3d1183(10thCir.2006).

CASES:
Griggsv.DukePowerCo.
Connecticutv.Teal
Watsonv.FortWorthBank&Trust
WardsCovePackagingCo.v.Atonio
Ricciv.DeStefano
VulcanSocietyNYCase
****************************************************

II.RETALIATION
RetaliationStatutoryText:(SEC.2000e3.[Section704]
(a)Discriminationformakingcharges,testifying,assisting,orparticipatingin
enforcementproceedings
Itshallbeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeforanemployertodiscriminateagainstany
ofhisemployeesorapplicantsforemployment,foranemploymentagency,orjoint
labormanagementcommitteecontrollingapprenticeshiporothertrainingorretraining,
includingonthejobtrainingprograms,todiscriminateagainstanyindividual,orfora

labororganizationtodiscriminateagainstanymemberthereoforapplicantfor
membership,becausehehasopposedanypracticemadeanunlawfulemployment
practicebythissubchapter,orbecausehehasmadeacharge,testified,assisted,or
participatedinanymannerinaninvestigation,proceeding,orhearingunderthis
subchapter.
RetaliationinGeneral:
AformofDTthatpermeatesalmosteverydiscriminationclaim.
7080%ofalldiscriminationclaimsalsoassertretaliation.
Statutesinsulateemployeesfromanyadverseemploymentactionevenajustified
criticism(employerscomplainthattheretaliationstatutesinsulateemployeestoo
much!)
PrimaFacieCaseofRetaliation:
1. Employeeengagedinprotectedactivity.
2. Employeesufferedamateriallyadverseemploymentaction.
3. Causallinkbetweenadverseemploymentactionandtheprotectedactivity(temporal
proximityraisesthepresumptionofcausation)
a. Fortimeproximitytheruleisthecloserthebetter(somecourtssay34
monthsisnotsufficientlyclosetoestablishcausationintheabsenceofother
strongevidence).
4. Employerknewaboutemployeesengagementintheprotectedactivity.
Framework(similartoMcDonnellDouglas):
1. EmployeeestablishedPrimeFacieshowing.
2. Employershowsanother,legitimatecauseforanadverseemploymentaction.
3. Employeehastoprovepretext.
WhoisProtected?
Formeremployees,thirdparties(Thompsonv.NorthAm.Stainless)+(Robinsonv.Shell
Oil)
NotethatwhilethecourtinDmedinev.Reinhardt(DDC1978)heldthatthirdparty
reprisalscouldbeactionableeverycourtofappealsthathasconsideredtheissuehas
rejectedthethirdpartyreprisalanalysisinDmedina.

2TypesofProtectedActivity:(remembertemporalproximity)
1. Participation:(getsemployeevirtualimmunityfromadverseemploymentaction
*unlessbadfaithmaybe)
a. Thisclauseunder704(a)hasbeenconstruedbroadlybythecourtsandincludes
filingwithEEOCorparticipatinginTitleVIIinvestigation,proceeding,or
hearing.
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2. Opposition:(opposingadiscriminatoryaction)(complaint,publicprotest,etc.
protectionmorelimited.Istheactivityreasonable?)
a. Mannerofopposingmustbereasonable;itcannotinterfereordisrupttheworkof
otherpeople.
b. Musthavereasonablegoodfaithbeliefthatemploymentpracticeisunlawful.
Participation/OppositionNote:
TwokindsofactivitiesareprotectedundertheantiretaliationprovisionofTitleVII.The
participationclauseprohibitsretaliationbecauseanindividualhasmadeacharge,testified,
assisted,orparticipatedinanymannerinaninvestigation,proceeding,orhearingtoenforce
lawsprohibitingdiscriminationinemployment.TitleVII,704(a).Theoppositionclause,onthe
otherhand,prohibitsretaliationbecauseanemployeeorapplicanthasopposedanypractice
madeanunlawfulemploymentpracticeBookerv.Brown&WilliamsonTobaccoCo(6thCir.
1989).Theclausemakesitunlawful...foranemployertodiscriminateagainstany...
employe[e]...becausehehasopposedanypracticemade...unlawful...bythissubchapter.
Crawfordv.MetropolitanGovernment(US2009)(quoting42U.S.C.2000e(3)(a)).
*USSCdoesnotconfrontthelinebetweenparticipationandoppositioninCrawfordv.
MetropolitanGovt(page168).Whereoneemployeewasaskedtoanswerquestionsabout
sexualharassmentofanotheremployee,andsheansweredtruthfully,theCourtfoundimplicit
oppositiontosexualharassment(employeewasstillprotectedfromretaliationunderthestatute
althoughitwasntanEEOCinvestigation).
*EmployeedoesnothavetoprovehewasdiscriminatedagainstwhenhefiledwithEEOC
(engagedintheprotectedactivity)>protectionisassuredregardlessoftheunderlyingmerits
oftheclaim.(butifTitleVIIcomplaintisnotonlymeritlessandunreasonable,butalso
motivatedbybadfaith,thisactivitywouldnotbeprotectedbytheparticipationclause(Mattson
v.Caterpillar)).
*Mixedmotiveframeworkmaybeapplicablebutitsunclearhowtoapplyit(somecourtsagree
touseit,somedont)9th,4th,10thcircuitsapplymixedmotiveanalysis.
*Notes36TwodifferentstandardsnowworkplaceharassmentinresponsetoTitleVII
complaintscanbemateriallyadverseifitwellmighthavedissuadedanemployeefrommaking
orreportingdiscrimination,whereaspreviouslyithadtomeetTitleVIIsgeneralsevereor
pervasivestandard.Foradiscussionofwhatconstitutesmateriallyadverseseestringciteatp.
188189
LucerocasefromNotes189employercanintroduceevidenceoflaterfiledchargesto
showthatemployeeswerenotinfactdissuaded.
Retaliationbyitsagentsseenote6nocaselawbutcouldbeonexam.Note7isthird
partyreprisals.

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Causation:
ClarkCountySchoolDistrictv.BreedentwoyearswillnevermakePFCcausallinktoo
attenuated.
Temporalproximity.
Conclusion:Howtomakeoutacase:
o Knowledgeofinternal/externalcomplaint
o Temporalproximity(hastobeprettyclose)
o Otheremployeeshavebeenretaliatedagainst(apattern)
o Attackthelegitimatenondiscriminatoryreason.(Page193)
CASES:
BurlingtonNorthernSantaFeRailwayv.White
UniversityofTexasSouthwesternMedicalCenterv.Nassar
****************************************************

III.HARASSMENT
Harassment:
Thisismuchmorelikeatortbasedclaim.
Employeeisnotprovingpretext,butwhatactuallyhappened(facts).
ItsnotaseparatestatutebutaninterpretationofDTstatute.
1) Didsomethinghappenatworkthatmadeitsubstantiallymoredifficultforthe
employeetoperformatwork?
2) Wasitbecauseemployeeisamemberofaprotectedcategory?
3) Isemployerliableforwhathappened?
Generalharassmentisnotacrimeunderfederalandstatelaws.Tomakeharassment
legallyactionable,itmustbetracedbacktoaprotectedcategory.
Aworkingenvironmentheavilychargedwithdiscriminationmayconstituteanunlawful
practice(Rogersv.EEOC)

1.HarassmentBecauseofSex(2categories):
1) QuidProQuo:
a.Explicitsituation,wheresexualcomplianceisexchangedforan
employmentopportunity
b.Ifdonebysupervisortheremaybevicariousliabilityfortheemployer.
2) HostileWorkEnvironment(HWE):
a.Usuallyacourseofconduct(remarks,actionsofasexualnature).
b.Itisapersistentconditionofworkthatchangesthetermsandconditions
ofemployment(itdoesnothavetoresultintheultimateemployment
action,suchasfiringorrefusingtopromote).

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c.Sometimes,oneinstanceisgoodenoughifitsphysicalandextreme(i.e.
beingforcefullykissed).
d.Agencyprinciplesapply(seeMeritor).
Changeintermsorconditionsofemploymentcanbeestablishedby:
1) Atangibleeconomicloss(beingfired,notpromoted,etc.)
2) Iftheresnotangibleeconomicloss,theconductmustbesufficientlysevereor
pervasive(mayincludeemotionalandpsychologicalinstabilitybutinjurydoesnt
havetobeatthelevelofnervousbreakdown).
Whatconductissufficientlysevereorpervasive?:
Physicalcontact/touching(1instancecanbeenough)
Remarks/verbal(notouching)iftheresanexpectationofseveralinstancestoshowa
patternofconduct(though,itsnotclearhowmanywouldbeenough).
Pervasiveisahighstandard.
Onefreegrabtheoryofsexualharassmentisthere.Totheextentthatitisviolentthis
willbekey.(Cornered,inaprivateplace,athreatelement,etc.)Generallythatkindof
conductisconsideredsevere.
NotethatalotofSHcasesfailtogetpastSJonthegroundsthatnoreasonablejurycould
findthattheallegedactivitywassevereorpervasive.
Whatconductisunwelcome?:somecourtspendalotofattentiononthePsbehavior
USSCdidnotdefineitinpreciseterms:thistermopenedthedoortoemployerstrying
toshowthatthechallengedconductwaswelcome,whichputsemployeeinuneasy
place(toproveitwasunwelcome)
WhenisPsbehaviorsubjecttocritique?Meritorsaidprovocativespeechanddressis
notirrelevantasamatteroflaw.
Courtgenerallylooksatthisinthetotalityofthecircumstances
o Didshethinkitwouldgetworseifshedidntgoalongwithit?Whatifshewas
justsilent?
Defenses:
1) Denial(thisneverhappened)
2) Attackontheevidenceofunwelcomeness(seekingdiscoveryonemployeesprior
sexualbehaviortoshowthatemployeeshowedthatsheeitherwelcomedthealleged
sexuallyharassingconductorwasnotsubjectivelyoffendedbytheconduct).
3) Theconductwasntworkrelated(employernotresponsibleforsomeotheremployees
nonworkactivity).
4) Itwasntsevereorpervasive.
5) WEcantbeheldresponsiblefortheseunauthorizedactsofouremployees.
a. Thinksendingaroundsuggestive/pornographicemailsemployerswillsayhow
canwepolicethis?

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*FederalRulesofEvidence412:ThepresumptionisthatPsownsexualconductisnotrelevant
insexualharassmentlawsuits.ThebalanceweighsinfavorofPtokeepthissortofevidenceout
(e.g.showingthatthesexualadvanceswerepreviouslywelcomebyP).However,this
evidencemightendupbeingadmittediftheopposingpartyshows(andjudgeagreesthat)its
relevant.
*Nextproblemtofaceiswhentheemployershouldbeliable.Individualsupervisorsare
generallynotliableunderTitleVII(althoughyoucanundersomecommonlawtheoriesanda
numberofstatelawclaims).
Howtodifferentiatebetweenjustcomments/jokesfromsexualharassment?
CourtinHarrissuggestslookingatfrequency,severity,whethertherewasheavy
pollutionofworkenvironmentwithdiscrimination/itpermeatedthewhole
environment,makingithostileandabusive(nosinglefactorisrequireditsatotality
ofcircumstancesapproach).
o Prof:Sexualharassmentcasesareveryfactspecific.
ExamplesofsevereConduct:
Asingleactofrapeissufficientlysevere(Ferrisv.DeltaAirlines)
Multiplerapesofemployeeinonenight(Littlev.WindmereRelocation)
Forcedtonguedownemployeesthroat(once)andanattempttounfasternemployeesbra
nextdaywassufficientlysevere(Hostetlerv.QualityDining)
Asingleattempttofondleemployeesbreastwasnotsufficientlyseveretoconstitute
hostileworkenvironment(Brooksv.CityofMateo)
Presidentsthreepropositionsforsextohissubordinateinonemeetingwassevere
enough(Quantockv.SharedMktg.Servs)
Strokingaleg,attempttokiss,exposinghispenisandaskingemployeetokissitwasnot
severeenough(Jonesv.Clinton).
ExamplesofpervasiveConduct:
Repeatedremarksthatbelittledemployeebecauseshewasawomanalongwithphysical
threatsweresevereorpervasive(Smithv.FirstUnionBank)
Coworkersboorishandoffensivecomment,staringandtouchingofemployeesarmwas
notsevereorpervasive(Shepherdv.Pub.AccountsofTex.)
Frequentconduct,itscontext,andthephysicalnatureofsomeactscomplainedofmetthe
thresholdofsevereorpervasive(Schianov.QualityPayrollSys.)
Chart:asseveritygoesdown,frequencyneedstogoup.
CASES:
MeritorSavingsBank,FSBv.Vinson
Harrisv.ForkliftSystems

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2.EmployerLiability

1) Ifitisatangibleemploymentactionbysupervisoremployerisliable(strictliability)
2) Ifnotangibleemploymentactionemployerhasanaffirmativedefense
a. Employermustshowthatthereisasysteminplacetoreportharassmentandalso
showthatemployeefailedtouseit(theremaybesomeexcusestothe2ndprong,
e.g.fearofretaliation).

Whoisasupervisor?
Ifitsacoworkerthestandardissimplenegligenceemployerkneworshouldhave
knownthattheharassingbehaviorwastakingplaceanddidntdoanything.Inthat
situationtheburdenisontheemployee.Iftheemployerisraisingitasanaffirmative
defensethantheburdenisontheemployer.
o Supervisorissomeonewhocanrecommendorundertaketangibleemployment
action.Alsosomeonewhocandirectyourdailywork.Someonewhoisina
positionthatenhanceshisorherabilitytoengageinharassment.Someonewho
onewouldbereticenttoobjectdirectlyto,unlikeacoworker.
o However,notethatincaseslikeHarriswheretheharasseristhepresidentthe
actionsmaybeseenasbeingcoterminuswiththeactionsofthecompany.
TheEllerthFaragherdefenseisawidelyutilizeddefenseithasanumberofdifferent
prongsthatneedtobeconsideredseparately.
*Note5firstprongofFarragherEllerthdefense:
Inconsideringwhetheranemployerhasmetitsburdenofprovingthefirstprongthatit
exercisedreasonablecaretopreventandcorrectpromptlyanysexuallyharassing
behavioranumberoffactorsmayberelevant:Antiharrassmentpolicies(the
reasonablenessofacomplaintmechanismdependsontheemploymentcircumstances
includingtheknownvulnerabilitiesandcapabilitiesoftheclassofemployesinquestion
(EEOCv.V&JFoods[7thcir.2007]).
Youdontnecessarilyneedaformalpolicy(Hallv.Bodine(7thCir.2002),andthe
existenceofaformalSHpolicydoesnotalwaysmeantheemployerwillmeetitsburden
underthefirstprong.DisseminatingandImplementingisKEYforhowthecaseshave
gonesee564middleparagraph.
o Whataboutifthereporteedoesntreportupthechainofcommand;will
knowledgebeeimputedtotheemployer?See564565hasgonebothways.
o Employerresponsestocomplaintsonceanemployerreceivesacomplaintofa
hostileworkenvironmentcreatedbyasupervisor,itmusttakeaffirmativestepsto
investigateand,ifnecessary,takecorrectiveactioninordertoavoidliability.
Whatissufficientcorrectiveaction?see565middleofthepage.
o SHtrainingprogramsfavorableevidencethatforemployersthatreasonable
stepshadbeentakentopreventorcorrectharassment.

15

*Note6566secondprongfailuretousetheemployerscomplaintprocedure
Failuretousetheemployerscomplaintprocedurethiswillnormallysufficetosatisfy
theemployersburdenunderthesecondelementofthedefense.Faragher.
Failuretotakeadvantageofthecorrectiveopportunitiesprovidedbytheemployer

CASES:
BurlingtonIndustriesv.Ellerth
Vancev.BallStateUniversity
FaragherCase
PennsylvaniaStatePolicev.Soutters
o Note5and6

3.HarassmentBecauseofRace

SameraceharassmentisactionableafterOncaledecision.
o AlsoOncaleheldthatseverityorpervasivenessofaHWEisevaluatedinlightof
thetotalityofthecircumstances.(Page595)
AppropriatestandardtobeappliedinaHWEracialharassmentclaimisthatofa
reasonableblackperson(Page592).
Sameandcrossraceharassmentisalsoactionable(Useofraciallychargedwordsto
goadbothblackandwhiteemployeesmakessuchconductmoreoutrageous,notless
Page598)
o Courtrejectsanequalopportunityharasserdefense.Suchconductmakesthe
harassmentmoreoutrageousnotlessso.
Reverseracialharassmentisactionable(whiteemployee,whoseAfricanAmerican
supervisorcalledherwhitebitch)
Displaysofracistsymbols(e.g.nooses)alsoactionableascreatingHWE.

*Tangibleemploymentaction=significantchangeinemploymentstatussuchashiring,firing,
failingtopromote,reassignmentwithsignificantlydifferentresponsibilities,changesinbenefits.

CASES:
Harrisv.InternationalPaperCo.

16

II.SPECIFICCATEGORIESOF
DISCRIMINATION
IV.SEXDISCRIMINATION

Employermaynottakegenderintoaccountinmakinganemploymentdecision(except
thenarrowcircumstancesinwhichgenderisaBFOQ)
Sexstereotypingisnotpermittedasbasisforemploymentdecisions.Remarksatwork
thatarebasedonsexstereotypesdonotinevitablyprovethatgenderplayedapartina
particularemploymentdecision.
o Theseremarkscanofferevidence;butPultimatelymustshowthatemployer
reliedonhergenderwhenmakingitsdecision
Preliedonexperttestimonyofsocialpsychologisttoshowsexstereotyping.

HowEmployeecanshowdiscriminationbecauseofsex?
1.Directcomparativeevidence(howtheharassertreatedmembersofbothsexes)
2.Explicitorimplicitproposalsofsexualactivity.
3.Hostilitytowardthatpersonssex
4.Evidenceofsexstereotyping(e.g.amanhastobeverymasculine;ifhesnot,hemaybe
harassed)
Privacyyouaregoingtoaweightlossspaitisexclusivelyforwomenandtheyhireonly
womenattendants.Thejustificationisnotbecausethewomenwhogotothespaprefertohave
femalestaff,butbecausetheyarescantilyclad,theattendantsaretouchingthem,physically
intimatecontact,etc.
Caseshavebeenalittlebitmixedonthisthebigcasesettled.TheEEOChasarule,
thatsomeofthesesinglesexoperationstrytouse,whereitisnecessaryforthepurposes
ofauthenticityorgenuineness,theywillconsideritaBFOQSeep.379.E.g.anactoror
anactress.
Isthereafactualbasistobelievethatthatshowsthiswillhurtthebusiness.
*Whataboutamensclothingstore,saystheyonlywanttohiremenbecausetheyaremodelsfor
theclothes.
Probablynotwhatistheessenceofthebusinessthatsgoingon
*Whataboutsayingwerenotgoingtohavefemaleassociatesdotransactionaldealswith
foreign,maledominatedcompaniesinforeigncountries.Whatalltheinternationalcompanyhas
saidaslongasitsaUScompany,werenotgoingtoallowothercountriestodictate/reinforce
stereotypes.

17

Sogenerallythesetypesofpreferenceswillnotholdup.
Socustomerpreferenceisareallyhardroutetogo,andwillnotnormallysurviveasa
justificationforadiscriminatorygenderpolicy.

*ClassicBFOQcasethathasyettoberesolvedisHootershiringonlywomenwaitstaff.They
areofferingvicarioussexualrecreation.
*RememberBOFQdoesnotapplytorace.Whataboutnationalorigin?Welltalkaboutthis
later.
*FamilyDiscrimination
PDAonslideamendmenttoTitleVIIpassedin1978.Priortoitspassageand
Gilbertitwasgenerallyassumedthatdiscriminationonthebasisofpregnancywas
discriminationonthebasisofsex.Gilbertheldotherwise.
BFOQ (The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense) -703(e)(1) of Title VII
applies to facially discriminatory policy; its more stringent standard
Its not unlawful to hire and employ employees on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Note that race cannot be a BFOQ
BFOQ has a very narrow reading
Occupational means objective, verifiable requirements that must concern job-related
skills and aptitudes (qualifications that affect an Ees ability to do the job)
Discrimination under the safety exception to the BFOQ is allowed only where a job
qualification must relate to the essence or to the central mission of the Ers business
(see Johnson Controls)
BFOQ worked for actors (natl origin) but didnt work for ethnic restaurants
In general, customer preference is not enough to claim BFOQ exception (e.g., Curves
gym taking only female personal trainers).
Privacy-based BFOQ a petition signed by 10,000 customers, who said they would not
come to the health club if male trainers worked there was good enough (this case settled).
*For facially neutral employment policies, need to apply business necessity
defense (less stringent standard)
*AnexampleofsuccessfulsafetybasedBFOQisDothardv.Rawlinson,whereCtallowedErto
hireonlymaleguardsincontactareasofmaximumsecuritymalepenitentiaries.Sexwasa
BFOQb/ctheemploymentofafemaleguardwouldcreaterealrisksofsafetytoothersif
violencebrokeoutb/ctheguardwasawoman(theconcernforwomansownsafetywouldnot
justifyBFOQuse).
CASES:
18

PriceWaterhousev.Hopkins
ONCALEv.SundownerOffshoreServices,Inc.
InternationalUnion,UnitedAutomobileWorkersv.JohnsonControls
SouthwestAirlinesCase
Jesperson

****************************************************

V.PREGNANCYANDFAMILYRESPONSIBILITIES
(a) PDA (Pregnancy Discrimination Act)
- Congress passed it to overrule General Electric Co v. Gilbert (where strangely enough, S.
Ct. said that discrimination against pregnant persons isnt sex discrimination b/c not all
women are pregnant)
- Its an equality statute, not accommodation statute. Er does not have to accommodate for
pregnancy.
- Normal pregnancy disability under ADA
- Complicated pregnancy may be.
Lifting Boxes Hypo: pregnant Ee asks to be transferred to another job b/c she cannot lift heavy
boxes Er refuses to transfer (Ee has to quit as a result). How to prove the case under PDA?
- show adverse employment action (constructive discharge)
- show that Er knew Ee is pregnant
- show comparator evidence (another Ee with similar disability, who asked to be transferred to
another job and Er did it).
NY Law: prohibits discrimination b/c of breastfeeding, but theres no fed. Law for this.
*Ersrulethatprohibitedmothersofpreschoolagechildrenfromholdingcertainpositionswas
aprimafacieviolationoffed.Law(sexdiscrimination,iffathersofyoungchildrenwere
permittedtoholdthesepositions)seePhillipsv.MartinMariettaCorp.
Despiteofevidenceoftheexistingemploymentdiscriminationagainstcaregivers,nofederal
lawexplicitlyprohibitsdiscriminationonthebasisoffamilyresponsibilities.
FMLA (Family Medical Leave Act of 1993) Congress passed it to patch a hole in PDA (equal treatment for pregnant people, but no
special accommodations)
Allows for special accommodation for family or pregnancy related leaves and adoption
Its a statutory, gender-neutral law that allows for 12 weeks unpaid leave (during any 12month period)
As a general rule, employee returning from FMLA leave is entitled to reinstatement to
her former job or an equivalent position (if the original position is no longer available)

19

Employee on FMLA leave cannot lose benefits accrued prior to the start of leave, and Er
must maintain employees benefits under a properly recognized group health plan at the
same level and under the same terms as though employee continued to work.
It applies only to serious illness
It applies to Employer with 50 workers or more
Employee must have worked for a year to be eligible.
Employee doesnt have to exhaust administrative remedies can go straight to court to
sue Employer for FMLA violation

Pregnancy and the Interplay b/w Title VII (PDA), FMLA, and ADA (p. 449):
FMLA: Er must provide unpaid leave for Ees with serious medical conditions
PDA: requires Er to treat pregnant Ees the same as other Ees
ADA: requires Er to make reasonable accommodations for Ees with disabilities who are
otherwise qualified for the job
Pregnancy under ADA:
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA state that conditions, such as pregnancy, that are
not the result of physiological disorder are not impairments. Pregnancy can be viewed as
a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder or impairment. Based on these
regulations, many courts denied ADA claims of pregnant workers. Other courts applied
more nuanced analysis, finding that EEOC regulation does not explicitly exclude
pregnancy-related impairments, provided they are the result of a physiological disorder.
Pregnancy under FMLA:
Labor Dept regulations clearly permit FMLA leave for pregnancy-related health
conditions.

CASES:
Troupev.MayDepartmentStoresCo.
Chadwickv.Wellpoint,Inc.
AT&Tv.Hulteen
****************************************************

VI.SEXUALORIENTATION

Thereisnofederallawthatprohibitsemploymentdiscriminationbecauseofgender
identityorsexualorientation.However,somestates(includingNY)passedstatelawsthat
havegenderidentitydiscriminationstatutes.

20

SomecourtsusedPriceWaterhousesprohibitionagainstsexbasedstereotypingto
ruleforPsincaseswhereitsclearthatthereasonPwasdiscriminatedagainstwas
actuallyPssexualorientation.
o Othercourtsrejectedthisapproachandrefusedtobootstrapsexualorientation
intoTitleVIIprotections.
TitleVIIdoesnotprotectemployeesfrombeingdiscriminatedagainstbecausetheyare
transsexual(Ulanev.EasternAirlines)
Courtsadopted3approachestodiscriminationbecauseofsexualorientation:
1. Antibootstrapstance(sexorientationisnotprotectedbyTitleVII)
2. Smithapproach(TitleVIIprotectspeoplefromsexstereotypingregardlessof
theirgenderidentityorsexualorientationusingPriceWaterhouseargument)
3. Billingtonapproach(itissexdiscriminationperse)
PsmayalsotruesueusingEPCchallengeunder14thAmendment(ifStateisemployer)
orstatelaws.

You are gay Hypo:


Ee is gay, but his appearance is conforming to his sex; he is not subject to any harassment
at work. He applies for promotion, and during the interview Er tells him, You are gay, no
problem with us, but we cannot give you this position b/c we need someone
(heterosexual), who could relate well to other executives. In this scenario, P cannot
succeed in claiming sex. discrimination under Title VII (only state law, if it exists).
Reverse Sexual Orientation Discrimination (p. 488)
Ct found theres a genuine issue of material fact on whether a female heterosexual worker
was harassed because of sex where offensive conduct of lesbian co-workers was
allegedly motivated by sexual desire (Dick v. Phone Directories)
P, a heterosexual female who claimed sex. discrimination by gay men co-workers who
displayed nude pictures of men at the workplace to which she objected, failed to prove
she was subjected to hostile work environment. The offending conduct was neither severe
enough to be actionable under harassment nor was it based on her sexual orientation as a
heterosexual female (P argued violation of a local ordinance that covered sex.
orientation). See Brennan v. Metro. Opera.

CASES:
Ulanev.EasternAirlines
Smithv.CityofSalem,Ohio
Renev.MGMGrandHotel,Inc.
****************************************************

21

VII.RELIGION
Title VII, 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)
The duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on the part of Er
to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of Ees where such
accommodations can be made w/o undue hardship on the conduct of the Ers business.
Religion includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief
Religious practice/ observance:
Cannot be a matter of personal choice; it must be a conviction shared by a group, related
to activities/ group culture (but it doesnt have to be written in the book)
Moral/ ethical viewpoints may qualify under EEOC regulations; but courts are more
hesitant about it
Can be antireligious (atheism is OK)
It doesnt have to be organized religion but must be more than personal belief
Courts will not question religious beliefs (e.g., saying Islam does not require to wear
headscarves) but will question sincerity of Ee in believing. This could be a good defense
for Er. (can question sincerity but not veracity of religious belief)
Prima Facie and analysis:
1. Ee established Prima Facie
- Ee had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement
- Ee informed Er of this belief
- Ee was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement of
employm.
2. Er shows that reasonable efforts were made to accommodate Ee or it was undue hardship
to accommodate (need to be business-related hardship1)
- anything above de minimis is likely satisfy undue hardship (very low standard)
3. Ee disproves this as pretext
Howisitdifferentinvolvesadegreeofchoice(notimmutable),requiresreasonable
accommodation.
Whatisareligion?SincerelyheldbeliefseeEEOCregs633.
Whatyouarelookingforissomethingthataddressesthesamemoralandethical
concernsthatorganizedreligiondoes.
WhataboutsomeonewhowantsHalloweenoffbecausesheisWicken
o Youdhavetoknowmoreaboutwickenpracticebutprobablyemployersshould
nottreattheseclaimslightly.
ButseeNote1p.634.
1Prof.mentionedCostcocase(nofacialpiercingasthelookpolicyforcashiers;eeclaimedreligiousexception).Erarguedtheirneedfor
professionallylookingstaffmadeitunduehardshiptoaccommodateforEesfacialpiercingrequiredbyreligiousbelief.CtruledforEr
althoughthereasonarticulatedbyErwasnotreallyrelatedtothejobfunctionofacashier(orthelookofprofessionalcashier?).Inanothercase,
CtruledforEewhosesmalltattooinscriptionaroundthewrist(religiousAncientEgyptianmeaning)wasfoundtonotpresentanunduehardship
toaccommodatefortheEr,arestaurantthatprohibiteditsEesfromhavingvisibletattoo.Ct.saidErwasunreasonable(besides,nooneeven
noticedthateehadatattoountil6monthsintotheemployment).

22

o Notenonreligiousviewsarealsoprotectedreversereligiousdiscrimination.
ExemptionsReligiousEntityExemptionsp.636.

MinisterialexemptiongoesbeyondReligiousEntityExemptioninthehiringandfiringof
clergy,orotherchurchemployerwhohaveareligiousmission.TitleVIIdoesntapplyeven
withregardtosexandracediscrimination.SupremeCourthasnotdirectlyruledon.Some
courtsrecognizeitwithregardtohiringandfiringbutnottoharassment.Basictheoryisthat
freeexercisetrumpstitleVIIinthisregard.
Ministerial exception
Judge-made law; 1st Amen.(freedom of religion) trumps Title VII
Free exercise clause (1st Amend.) precludes judicial review of decisions by religious
entities concerning the terms and conditions of employment of their ministers.
It is extended to clergy and beyond (in some circuits)
2d Cir. does not recognize this exception
Religious beliefs do not excuse noncompliance with generally applicable state law
(Empl. Division Dept of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith)
The religious entity exemptions:
Title VII provides two broad exemptions for religious employers2
702(a)
Title VII shall not apply to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educ. institution,
or society of its activities.
703(e)(2)
It shall not be an unlawful empl. practice for a school, college, university, or other educ.
institution [in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion] to hire and employ employees of a particular religion
*Courts struggled how broadly or narrowly interpret these exceptions in light of potential
conflicts with constitutional protection of the 1st Amen. (Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause) and also the fact that there is no express exemption for race, color, sex, or national origin
(only religion). The leading S. Ct. case is Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos (non-profit
enterprises operated by religious organizations may discriminate on the basis of religion in
making employment decisions. 702 of Title VII does not violate the establishment clause of the
1st Amend see the application of Lemon test, p. 637)

2Religiousschoolsfallunderbothexceptions.
23

CASES:
EEOCv.Abercrombie&FitchStores,Inc.
TransWorldAirlines,Inc.v.Hardison
HosannaTaborEvangelicalLutheranChurchv.EEOC
TWAv.Hardison
****************************************************

VIII.NATIONALORIGIN

Its a very expansive definition; it can mean ancestry (like 10 generations away); it covers
physical characteristics, language, cultural characteristics etc.
Native Americans are covered
It doesnt encompass citizenship (need to argue that citizenship was pretext for national
origin?)
There is a split b/w the circuits about whether undocumented workers can sue based on
Title VII. Most courts find that they can sue on other grounds (e.g., race and gender
discrimination)
Theories, defenses, and analyses of DT and DI cases apply for national origin
Employer that requires its Employees to be able to speak English well as a condition of
employment may face a claim of discrimination based on national origin. If the
requirement is applied to a non-English speaking Employee as opposed to a bilingual
Employee, most courts suggest using DI model b/c the requirement will have a disparate
impact based on national origin.
English-only policy across the board is impossible to justify (under EEOC regulations,
such policy is enough to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact).

*Definedwheretheemployeecamefromhowtheyare,howtheydress,verybroadyou
donthavetobeborninadifferentcountryaslongasyouidentifywiththatgroup.Notethere
maybealotofoverlapinreligion/nationalorigin/race.See.P.684.
*DiscriminationbasedoncitizenshipisOKsolongasitisnotapretextfordiscriminationbased
onnationalorigin(appliedequally).NotehoweverthatundertheNYCHRLcitizenswhipisa
protectedcategory.
*ApplicabilityofTitleVIItoundocumentedworkersusedtobepresumedbutHoffman
PlasticsUSSCheldthatNLRBdoesntapplytoundocworkerssincethensomecourtshave
heldthatTitleVIIdoesntapplysomecourtshavehelditdoes.
AccentDiscriminationshedidntaskustoreadthis.
CourtsaysthisisdirectevidenceofdiscriminationInreRodriguez(6Cir2007).
Bottomlineisthatanemployercanbaseanemploymentdecisiononaccent,butonlyif

24

affectednonaccentedoralcommunicationsisrequiredtoperformthejobdutiesandthe
accentmateriallyinterfereswiththepersonsabilitytocommunicateinEnglish.
Thisisaprettyeasystandardforemployerstomeetbecausetheycansay,eveninjobs
thatdoesntrequiredirectcustomercontact,theabilitytobeunderstoodinEnglishis
importantinlotsofjobs(communicateandbeunderstoodbysupervisor,subordinate,
etc.).

*SeerevisedEEOCregsat722.SaysEnglishonlycreatesPFCbycourtshavebyandlarge
declinedtoadheretothese.
CASES:
Pachecov.NYPresbyterianHospital
EEOCv.SephoraUSA,LLC
InreRodriguezAccentDiscriminationfromOutline

****************************************************

IX.AGEDISCIRMINATION

Thepersonreplacingyoudoesnthavetobeyoungerthan40butthedisparityprobably
hastobearound10yearsormoretocreatetheinferenceofdiscrimination
Ifyoucanprovethattheviolationwaswillful,youcangetuptoanadditional50Kin
liquidateddamages.
Whatsdifferentaboutagediscrimination.Itissomethingthatappliesacrosstheboard.
Whataboutageisdifferent?Ingeneraljudgesandthelegislaturesaythatageisnot
necessarilyunrelatedotjobperformance.
Itsseparate(fromTitleVII)statutethatwaspassedin1967.
Protectedgroupisemployees40yearsorolder.
Statutoryminimum20employees
BothDTandDItheoriescanbeused,butmostcasesarebroughtunderDTtheory.
SupremeCourthasntdecidedwhetherMcDonnellDouglasframeworkappliestoADEA
butlowercourtsuseit(aswellassomeformsofBurdineandSt.Marysv.Hicks
analysis).
UnderMcDonnellDouglas(ifnodirectevidenceofagediscrimination):
1. Employeeestablishedprimafacie.
2. Employerrespondswithlegitimate,nondiscriminationreasons(burdenof
production)
3. Employeehastheburdenofprooftoshowpretextandthatagewasthetrue
reasonfortheaction.

25

PrimaFaciaforADEAclaims:
Employeeismemberofprotectedclassandwasqualifiedforthejob.
Employeewassubjecttoanadverseemploymentaction.
Undercircumstancesthatraiseaninferenceofagediscrimination(typically,replacedby
youngerworker)
o Whatifayoungerworkerisalsomemberoftheprotectedclass(e.g.59yearold
isreplacedby43yearold).Somecourtssaythereplacementdoesnothavetobe
under40,butusethestandardofsubstantiallyyounger(Courtsvary10year
differencewasfoundtobesubstantial,5yrsnotenough).
- Mixed motive analysis is not applicable (age must be but-for cause) see Gross case
There is no accommodation requirement for older people under the ADEA. EX: if a test is job
related, reasonable, and older workers fail it, the ADEA wont be able to protect them.
Customer preference (e.g. for younger people) courts are not so generous with it.
S. Ct. held that 11th Amend. Bars state employees from bringing private actions for monetary
damages against non-consenting states for violations of the ADEA (Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents)
BFOQ
Employer argued they wanted pilots under 50 b/c reaction time gets slower and ability to
think faster deteriorates. Ct found this argument as facially discriminatory => under
BFOQ, Employer had to look at specific duties the pilots must perform and see how
Employees over 50 perform them (TWA v. Thurnston)
One of the exceptions when age restrictions are allowed are police officers and fire
fighters (b/c of public safety issues).
Intersectionality problems
Age + gender; how is discrimination against older women analyzed? Cts analyze each
claim separately and ask for proof under each category. So, if Er shows that older men are
promoted and women are promoted, Ee (older woman) will very likely lose her case.
Proxy for age discrimination:
perceived as less productive and/or less creative
perceived as having limited skills and/or ability to acquire skills
perceived as no longer fitting into the organization
*Prof: Cost cutting is a legitimate basis for eliminating older workers, which is
pretty unique. PDA, for example, would not allow for such thing (e.g., lets
get rid of all pregnant workers b/c they cost too much).

26

*Prof: practitioners say that mixed motive is confusing for juries anyway, and
age discrimination cases prevail at higher rates than gender and race
discrimination cases even after Gross (so, it seems that Gross caused less
damage than it seemed).
*Under the ADEA, it shall not be unlawful for an employer to take any action
otherwise prohibited where the differentiation is based on reasonable
factors other than age. RFOA is a lower standard than business necessity Er
just needs to show that the action was reasonable.
*Ct. recognizes that age is different from other protected categories in that it
may affect some work related abilities and thus render certain employment
criteria as reasonable (hence, lower standard for RFOA defense).
CASES:
Sperlingv.HoffmanLaRoche
HazenPaperv.Biggins
Grossv.FBLFinancialServices
Smithv.CityofJackson,Mississippi
Meachamv.KnollsAtomicPowerLaboratory
****************************************************

X.DISABILITYDISCRIMINATION

AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)prohibitsdiscriminationagainstqualified
individualswithadisability
a. StructureisidenticaltoTitleVIIsameenforcement,exhaustionof
administrativeremediesrequirement,samenumberofemployees,same
remediesavailable
b. Privateemployerswith15ormoreemployees
ADApassedin1992
c. PredecessorwasRehabilitationActappliedonlytofederalemployers
andthosereceivingfederalfunding(schools,hospitals,prisons,etc)
d. Changedhandicappedtodisabled
ThresholdissueofwhoshouldbecoveredunderADAunlikeothertypesof
discrimination
e. ADAalsorequiresaccommodation(onlyseeninreligion)
f. ReasonableaccommodationlanguageofADAisdifferentfromreligion
becausethereisnodeminimiscostlanguageinADAlikereligion
Primafaciecase
g. DisabilitywithinthemeaningoftheADA

27

h. Qualifiedindividual
i. Sufferedanadverseemploymentactionasaresultofthedisability
i. ADAdoesntincludemotivatingfactorlanguagesodisabilityhastobethe
butforcauselikeinagediscrimination(notdecidedbySupCtyet)
DefinitionwithADA
j. Qualifiedindividualwithadisabilityisanindividualwithadisability
who,withorwithoutreasonableaccommodation,canperformthe
essentialfunctionsoftheemploymentpositionthatsuchindividualholds
ordesires
k. Disabilityisdefinedas:
ii. Aphysicalormentalimpairmentthatsubstantiallylimitsoneormoremajor
lifeactivitiesofsuchindividual;
Substantiallylimitsmeansunabletoperformamajorlifeactivity
thattheaveragepersoninthegeneralpopulationcanperform
iii. Arecordofsuchanimpairment(historyofdisability);OR
iv. Beingregardedashavingsuchanimpairment
l. Section511excludesthefollowingfromdisabilityhomosexuality,
bisexuality,transvestism,transexualism,pedophilia,exhibitionism,
voyeurism,genderidentitydisordersnotresultingfromphysical
impairments,othersexualdisorders,compulsivegambling,kleptomania,
pyromania,andpsychoactivesubstanceusedisorderresultingfromthe
illegaluseofdrugs
v. Wouldalcoholismbecovered?
Recovereddrugaddictsarecoverediftheyareparticipatingina
programofrehab
vi. HIVinfectionisadisabilityheldbySupCtinBragdonv.Abbot,1998
m. AccommodationSection102(a)nocoveredentityshoulddiscriminate
againstqualifiedindividualwithadisability
vii. Employermustmakereasonableaccommodationsfordisabledemployees

ADAAmendmentsof2008
a. Nowdisabilityhastobeconsideredwithoutregardtothemitigatingmeasures
viii. Thesemeasuresshouldnotbeconsideredwhendeterminingwhetheramajor
lifeactivityissubstantiallyimpaired
Exceptforordinaryglassesorcontactlensesthatfullycorrectthe
impairmenttheywillbeconsideredinthisevaluation
ix. Purposeistoeliminatediscriminationthatmayarisebasedonappearance
createdbyacorrectivemeasure
b. Regardedaslanguagenowincludesperception(notjustactualabilityanymore)
x. Congressreturnsthestatutetoadiscriminationmeaning
c. Expandsdefinitionofmajorlifeactivitiestoincludebroadlistofmajorbodily
functionswouldcoverdisabilitiesthatareepisodicorinremission
xi. TakenfromEEOCregulationsbutnotlimitedtolist
d. Substantialdoesntmeanseverelyrestricts
28

xii. Putsburdenonemployertomakereasonableaccommodationsforindividuals
whocandemonstrateimpairmentthatsubstantiallylimitsamajorlifeactivity
Aslongastheaccommodationsdontplaceanundueburdenonthe
employer
Whatisareasonableaccommodation?
a. Theaccommodationprocessisaninteractiveprocessbetweenthe
employee/employer
Burdenisonemployeetoshowitsareasonableaccommodation
Burdenisonemployertoshowitsanunduehardship
b. Isitreasonabletorequireanemployeetouseupsicktimetodealwiththe
manifestationoftheirdisabilityb/cworkingfromhomewastooburdensomefor
employer?
Rarelyareasonableaccommodationtoallowaworkertoworkfrom
homewithoutsupervision
xiii. Exampleemployeewantedemployertocreateanaccessiblesinkinthe
kitchen.Employerhadanaccessiblesinkinthebathroomsodidntwantto
pay$150togetsinkinkitchenaswell
Courtsaidthisreasonable,employerdidntwanttogetsinkinkitchen
aswell
Courtslooktofollowingfactorswhenevaluatinganaccommodation
a. Natureandcostofaccommodation
b. Efficacyofaccommodation;willitreallybenefitthe
employee?
c. Costcantbedisproportionatetothebenefit
d. Overallfinancialresourcesofthecompany
Exampleemployeecomestoworklateeverydayandisletgoasa
result.Employeeclaimshehasagoraphobiaandhastowaituntillater
totakesubwaytowork
a. Employermustknowaboutthedisabilityandimpairments
b. Ifanemployeehasagoraphobiaandemployerdoesntknow,
cantexpectanaccommodation
c. Employeementionstoemployerthathegetsanxiouson
subwayprobablystillnotenoughb/cnoproofthatitsa
medicalorpsychiatricissue
Employerhasadutytoengageinsomeconversationbutalsocant
insinuatedisabilitywhereonedoesnotexist
a. OnewayforemployertoavoidliabilityunderADAisto
clearlydefinetheessentialfunctionsofthejob
b. Forinstance,jobrequiresliftingof50lbs,ifemployeehurts
backandcantliftthatmuchthenhecantperformthe
essentialfunctionsofthejob
i. Properaccommodationcouldbejobrestructuring
switchcertainduties
29

ii. Ifthisisntpossible,thenthereisntareasonable
accommodationandemployeecantperformessential
functionsofjobwithorwithoutareasonable
accommodation.WonthaveclaimunderADA
xiv. MentalimpairmentsifemployeehasADDandneedsaprivateofficetodo
theirjob,isthisareasonableaccommodation?Canbeconsideredfavoritism
MedicalInquiries
a. Restrictionsonmedicalexamsandinquiriesin3situations
i. (1)Preoffer/applicationstage,ADA102(d)(2)(A)
Maynotconductamedicalexamormakeinquiriesregardingwhether
theindividualhasadisabilityorastothenatureorseverityofsuch
disability
Maydiscussmedicalissueswithjobapplicantsin3narrowsituations:
a. ADA102(d)(2)(B)preemploymentinquiriesintothe
abilityofanapplicanttoperformjobrelatedfunctions(must
bemadetoallapplicants)
b. Mayaskapplicanthowhe/shemayperformtheessential
functionsofthejobforwhichtheyareapplying
c. Mayaskanapplicantwithanobviousorknowndisabilitywhat
accommodationisrequired(e.g.wheelchair)butcantaskhow
longtheyhaveusedawheelchairorhowthedisability
occurred).
i. Iftheyneedanaccommodation,canaskforamedical
evaluation
ii. (2)Afterindividualhasbeenofferedthejobenteringemployees
ADA102(d)(2)(B)(3)employercanrequiremedicalexamafteran
offerofemploymenthasbeenmadetoanapplicantandpriorto
commencementofemploymentdutiesandmayconditionanofferon
resultsoftheexamaslongthefollowingconditionsaremet:
a. Allenteringemployeeshavetotakethesamemedicalexam,
regardlessofwhethertheyhaveadisability
b. Employerkeepsmedicalinfoonseparateforms,inseparate
medicalfiles,andtreatsifasaconfidentialmedicalrecord
c. TheemployerusestheexamonlytocomplywiththeADA
Basedonthemedicalexam,anoffercannotbewithdrawn,unless:
a. Itsrelatedtotheindividualsjob(impairsabilitytodothejob)
AND
b. Necessaryfortheconductofemployersbusiness
i. Highstandard
iii. (3)PostofferstageexistingorcurrentemployeesADA102(d)(4)
Prohibitsemployerfromrequiringcurrentemployeestosubmittoa
medicalexamormakeinquiriesaboutwhetheranemployeehasa
disabilityorastothenature/severityofsuchdisability,unlesssuch
30

exam/inquiryisshowntobejobrelatedandconsistentwithbusiness
necessity
a. Youfallasleepatyourdeskeverydayanditsaffectingyour
workitsanessentialjobfunctionthatyoubeawakeonthe
jobdoyouhaveamedicalcondition?
b. Wherethereisaneedtodetermineiftheemployeeisstillable
toperformtheessentialfunctionsofthejob
b. Drugtesting
i. ADAdoesntconsiderillegaldrugusersasqualifiedindividualswitha
disability
ii. Cantdiscriminationbasedonpriordruguseaslongasemployeeisnolonger
engaginginthatactivity(historyofdrugusebutnotrecent/current)
Iftestedfordrugsatwork,testedpositiveandimmediatelyenrollin
rehabcanbedisciplinedorterminatedonthisbasisthisisnta
historyofdruguse,itwasrecent
iii. Alcoholismistreateddifferentlyfromdruguseb/cnotadrugwithin
meaningofstatute;consideredadisability
TheADAandFMLA
a. IfanemployeeisrequestingFMLAleavebuttheemployerdoesnthaveenough
informationtodetermineiftheemployeeisqualified,employermaymakeinquiries
i. Medicalcertificationfromdoctor
b. AfterFMLAleaveanemployercanrequestafitnessfordutycertificationbutonly
fortheparticularhealthconditionthatcausedtheemployeesneedforFMLAleave
GeneticInformationNondiscriminationActof2008(GINA)
a. 2typesofgenetictestingthatcanbedoneintheworkplace:
i. ScreeningforspecificinheriteddiseasedAND
ii. Screeningforsusceptibilitytodiseasesthatmightbeaggravatedbyconditions
ofsubstancesintheworkplace
b. HealthInsurancePortabilityandAccountabilityActof1996(HIPA)firstfederal
lawspeakingtouseofgeneticinformation
iii. Cantusegeneticinfoasbasistolimitanddenyhealthcoverage
c. Prohibitsdiscriminationagainstindividualsbasedontheirgeneticinformationand
makesitunlawfultoretaliateagainstindividualwhohasopposedanyactorpractice
madeunlawfulbyGINA
d. Alsoprohibitscoveredentitiesfrompurchasing,requesting,orrequiringgeneticinfo
ofanindividual
*Inordertoavoiddiscriminationliability,HRDepartmentstypicallytellsupervisorsnotto
discusshealthissuesoftheindividualortheirfamily

CASES:
31

Huberv.WalMartStores
Suttonv.UnitedAirlines
Toyotav.Williams
VandeZandev.Wisconsin

****************************************************
_____________________________________________________________________________

III.ADJUDICATINGANDREMEDYING
DISCRIMINATION
Enforcement Schemes:

1981 of Civil Rights Act of 1866


passed to prevent race discrimination in employment as it was in 1866 a
combination or national origin and religion e.g. Jewish race, Scandinavian race
Adjudication/Remedies
No administrative enforcement scheme of employment discrimination claims
based on 1981 or the Constitution so dont need to exhaust administrative
remedies
SOL is 4 years, as opposed to the limited SOL for Title VII
No cap on back pay
No financial cap on compensatory or punitive damages
Often parties will join a 1981 claim with a Title VII claim in order to circumvent
the SOL and remedies limitations`

Procedure for Title VII, ADA, and ADEA:


1. Jurisdiction
Employer needs to employer 15 or more employees to be subject to federal antidiscrimination laws (ADEA requires 20 or more)
NY only requires 4 or more employees to be subject to state anti-discrimination
laws
Must exhaust administrative remedies before taking claim to federal courts (also
for GINA)
2. Timely Filing Procedures
Charge must be filed with EEOC or with state or local agency that has formal
relationship with the EEOC
If there is a state/local agency then must file with 180 days of employment
discrimination
If no state/local agency then have 300 days to file with EEOC
If charge is filed with state/local agency, can file with EEOC within 300 days but
EEOC will defer until decision is received from state/local agency
If charge is first filed with EEOC, they will wait for 60 days to see if state/local
charge will be filed

32

3. Adjudication EEOC doesnt hold any adjudicative hearings (except for federal
employees)
Investigates and tries to reconcile interests
Cant compel employer to do anything though
4. Cause Determination
If EEOC finds probable cause, will contact employer for conciliation/settlement
If employer refuses conciliation or the cause isnt settled despite
attempts, then EEOC issues a Right to Sue Letter to Complainant
If EEOC doesnt find cause then complainant is given Right to Sue Letter
For ADA and Title VII, after 180 days can ask for a Right to Sue Letter even if
a decision hasnt been made by EEOC (only 60 days for ADEA)
5. Judicial Enforcement
Must bring claim in federal court with 90 days of receiving the Right to Sue
Letter regardless of whether its by request or after a cause determination
For ADEA, only have to wait 60 days after filing with EEOC before bringing a
case to federal court
District Court will review EEOC decisions de novo
Once case is brought to federal court, 75% of ED cases are resolved at summary
judgment
If case gets past summary judgment, likelihood of settlement goes up
exponentially
Trial is very unlikely
Damages
Total amount of damages punitive and compensatory is based on number of
employees the employer has
**80,000 claims brought to EEOC last year, only 271 actions brought by EEOC
Timing
When do the 300 days begin to run? The first act or the final act?
Equal Pay Act (EPA) employees who do the same kind of work are entitled to be paid at the
same rate (regardless of gender)
Entitled to liquidated damages, no compensatory or punitive damages
No exhaustion requirement
Almost any claim under the Equal Pay Act will also be actionable under Title VII
*January 2009, Pres. Obama signed Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law, overruling the
Ledbetter decision and making Ginsburgs dissent the law (Amended Title VII)
1. An unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to the discrimination in
compensation in violation of this title, when:
A discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted
An individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice

33

When an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation


decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits or other
compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
practice
Every discriminatory claim (i.e. every paycheck) restarts the clock
with regard to the SOL
2. Will still have to prove intent on the part of the employer, however many years ago that
the discriminatory intent occurred
3. Can go back 2 years from when you file a charge for back-pay

REMEDIES: back-pay, front-pay, and reinstatement/instatement

Basic Remedial Principles


Deterrence and Compensation Principles
1. Deterrence principle effectuated by the rightful place theory of relief
award the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment that they
would have had but-for the unlawful employment discrimination
2. Compensatory principle effectuated by the make-whole theory of
relief monetary compensation to remedy economic harm suffered in
past or may suffer in future as consequence of unlawful employment
discrimination
Compensatory and punitive damages available under 1981 cases
1991 Act now makes them available under Title VII and ADA but only for
disparate treatment cases not involved mixed-motive claims
1. For ADA, entitled to back-pay from the date terminated until the
judgment
2. For ADEA claims under federal law, remedy is doubled back-pay;
except if you have a supplemental state law claim (in NY for
example), then you have the opportunity for compensatory damages

REINSTATEMENT/INSTATEMENT
Objectives:
1. Recreates the employment relationship as it would have existed by for unlawful
employment discrimination
2. Prevents future economic loss to Plaintiff
3. Allows an employer to demonstrate good faith compliance with law to other
employees
4. Prevents employer form trying to get rid of employees, at any cost, who assert
their rights under laws prohibiting discrimination in employment
Reinstatement inappropriate if:
1. Innocent employee would be displaced by reinstating Pl; or
2. Hostility or animosity/hostility between Pl and employer would make amicable
and productive working relationship impossible; or
3. Position has been eliminated due to RIF, merger, etc.
Instead can get front-pay when reinstatement is inappropriate
In mixed-motive cases, under amendments that came after Price Waterhouse case, if
employer can prove that it wouldve made same decision excluding discriminatory
34

motive, Plaintiff doesnt get presumptive reinstatement or injunctive relief gets


declaratory relief and attorneys fees
FRONT-PAY
Monetary award to compensate for future lost wages during the period between judgment
and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement (discretionary)
No federal statute specifying front-pay as remedy but judicial opinion awards it under
Title VII, ADEA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and 1981
Same elements in determining front-pay as those used in determining back-pay
7th Circuit calculates it as the difference (after proper discounting to present
value) between what Pl would have earned in the future had he been reinstated
at the time of trial, and what he would have earned in the future in his next
best employment
When does it end?
Maybe when Pl reaches same level of compensation or finds equivalent job
In age discrimination case where plaintiff will retire soon, will get paid up
until a reasonable retirement age
BACK-PAY
Cannot extend more than 2 years prior to filing of a charge. Pertains primarily to
promotion decisions.
For termination, back-pay begins at date of termination until judgment on liability
Back-pay includes:
1. Salary, raises and cost of living raises, value of contributions to retirement
plan, other benefits employer gives
2. Medical expenses may be included or reimbursement of medical expenses that
wouldve been covered if you were insured
You get it if you win presumptive entitlement (not determined by jury)
Mixed-motive case
1. If employer proves it wouldve made same decision Pl gets limited relief
(attorneys fees and costs, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief)
2. If employer unable to prove that it wouldve made same decision Pl gets
back-pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, etc.
Limiting back-pay liability
1. Mitigation doctrine employee has a duty to mitigate the damages
i. Must look for a job
ii. Burden on employer to prove failure to mitigate
2. Employer may offer plaintiff their job back back-pay stops when employee
begins working
i. Refusal must be for good cause
3. Employer may try to find dirt on the employee in order to show that
discharge/employment action was legit
i. Would preclude back-pay
4. If employer can prove that it no longer has the job its been eliminated that
would cut off the back-pay period
35

Pre-judgment interest:
Significant element of damages; longer litigation lasts the more interest
accumulates; generally considered appropriate by courts
Post-judgment interest:
Usually doesnt amount to must; accrues between entry of judgment until when
its actually paid

*Back-pay, front-pay, reinstatement = equitable remedies, determined by judge


Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Compensatory damages are defined under 1991 Act to include future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other non-pecuniary losses
Punitive damages maybe recovered if Pl proves that D engaged in an unlawful
employment practice with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights
1. Requires conduct that more than intentional discrimination
2. Factors considered: nature and severity of the discriminatory conduct,
duration and frequency of conduct, and financial status of employer
Combined compensatory and punitive damages are capped; hasnt been changed since
1991
1. Employer has more than 14 but less than 101 employees cap is $50K
2. Employer has more than 100 but fewer than 201 employees cap is $100K
3. Employer has more than 200 but fewer than 501 employees cap is $200K
4. Employer has more than 500 employees cap is $300K
JURY DETERMINES compensatory and punitive damages
Jury isnt informed of caps, judge reduces any award in conformity with the caps
Compensatory/Punitive Determinations dont include back-pay and front-pay
The judge determines these.
Liquidated Damages
Only under ADA
Get it regardless of proof of physical/emotional distress if employer action is willful
Much more routinely awarded in ADA cases than punitive damages are awarded
Taxation
Back-pay always considered taxable income
Rule is that damage for emotional distress are taxable, with slight exceptions sometimes
for emotional distress that is the result of physical injuries. Then, punitive damages are
taxable.
Sometimes Pl can negotiate a payout so all of award isnt paid out in 1 year
Attorneys Fees
36

Need a judicial decree to receive an award of attorneys fees


i. In a private settlement, you arent entitled to attorneys fees
In an ADA claim, if P wins, D pays Ps attorneys fees
Rebuttable presumption that D isnt entitled to attorneys fees
i. Can rebut if Ps claim is found to be frivolous then P would pay Ds
attorneys fees.
Calculating attorneys fees
i. Includes: attorneys work hours, deposition costs, and court fees
ii. Reasonable hours x reasonable rates
iii.
Must keep records specifying what youre working on because only entitled to
attorneys fees for claims on which you prevailed
iv. Awarded after a court decision so takes some time to get this money
If working without a fee (non-profit or pro bono) still entitled to fees b/c part of
remedial scheme of Title VII prevailing market rate for attorney
i. Attorneys fees are a form of punishment to hurt the employer
Lump sum awards: defendant doesnt allocate attorneys fees from plaintiffs award,
plaintiff and their attorney figure it out
i. As a result, all employment discrimination cases are on contingent fee basis
1/3 of award goes to attorney

Basic Remedial Principles


1. Deterrence (Franks): the rightful place theory relief. A court is to award successful Ps the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment they would have had with D but for
unlawful employment discrimination.
2. Compensation (Moody): make-whole theory of relief. Successful Ps are entitled to
monetary compensation to remedy the economic harm they have suffered in the past or
may suffer in the future as a consequence of the Ds unlawful employment
discrimination.
Offer of employment after rejecting the applicant
Absent special circumstances, an offer of employment to a rejected applicant tolls the
accrual of back pay if Er makes an unconditional offer of the job denied, even if the offer
does not include all the relief that the plaintiff is entitled to receive (p. 71).
Collateral Source Doctrine
Some courts hold that benefits received from a source collateral to the discriminatory
conduct (social security, unemployment compensation, welfare benefits, and disability
income) may not be used to reduce back pay awards. Some courts hold that district courts
have discretion to set off collateral income against a back pay award.
Pre-judgment Interest
Trial courts have discretion to award prejudgment interest on back pay (recognized by the
S. Ct.)
Post-judgment Interest
Mandatory under federal law (p. 72)
37

The Caps on Compensatory and Punitive Damages


Employers with 14-100 employees: $50,000
101-200 employees: $100,000
201-500 employees: $200,000
More than 500 employees: $300,000
All money awards are taxable (except the attorneys fees)
Attorney fees are recoverable (by the prevailing party, and it means if Employee wins. If
Employee loses, Employer would have a hard time recovering the attorneys fees from
Employee will have to show that Employees claim was frivolous, groundless, or made
in bad faith, which is usually not the case if the claim got to trial). The fees are calculated
as (reasonable hours) x (reasonable rates). Employee can get the attorneys fees even if
she is represented by a public interest firm.
Employees are also entitled to recoup expert fees, deposition costs, and other related
costs.
Lump sum award one way Er may go about settling the whole case (difficult for
attorneys as need to figure out how much of it would be paid to them to determine if the
figure is reasonable).
CLASS DISCUSSION/HYPO:
You are harassed at work, arent promoted, and resign because the conditions are so
intolerable.
You arent entitled to back pay unless this is proven to be constructive discharge
If it is not constructive discharge, youre only entitled to compensatory and
punitive damages for harassment claim
Failure to promote claim must be within SOL
Two make whole remedies
1. Back pay (can only go 2 years back)
Base salary
Benefits health insurance (what you paid for private insurance or if you
didnt have insurance, what you paid for health care costs), contribution to
retirement/pension
Cost of living raises, merit raises, bonuses
Pre-judgment interest (present value of money you wouldve gotten 2 years
ago)
2. Injunctive relief
Reinstatement or front pay
Will reinstatement bump an innocent employee?
Mitigation of damages
Did employee try to find other work
Attempt to hire person back
Unemployment insurance benefits (may or may not cut against award)
Compensatory and punitive damages
Injury to reputation
38

Evidence of malice by employer


Only if there is intentional discrimination

39

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