PRIL Digests 6

(which is initially at least 1/2 of the estate), for

admissions by a party related to the effects of
foreign laws, which have to be proven in our
courts like any other controverted fact, create
estoppel.

Philippine Commercial and Industrial

Bank v Escolin (1974)
PCIB (administrator of Mr. Hodges estate) and Magno
(administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate) are in disagreement
as to the estate left by Mrs. Hodge.
SC: Since the position now of PCIB is that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be
1/4 of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an
admission of fact. It would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could
be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be the
actual provisions of Texas law.

Charles Hodge and his wife Jane (Texas citizen)

provided in their wills that:
They bequeath the remainder of their respective
estates to their spouse during his/her lifetime
Upon that spouses death, the remainder of what
he/she will inherit from the other will be given to
the brothers and sisters of the one who died first

Mr. Hodge later on died.

Magno adminsitratix of MRS. Hodges estate

PCIB administrator of MR. Hodges estate
Probate proceedings were held jointy.

PCIB says: PHILIPPINE law applies

Because the spouses were both Philippine residents,

the estate left by MRS. Hodges to her siblings is ONE
HALF of her share in the conjugal partnership, or
LESS, even if she was a Texas citizen.

Basis: Art 16 in relation to Arts 900 and 872 of the Civil

Code.
Magno says: TEXAS law applies

Texas law, where there is no system of legitime,

applies.

SO: The estate of MRS. Hodges is ONE HALF or

MORE of her share of the conjugal properties.
HELD:

PCIB is estopped from claiming that the estate of

Mrs. Hodges is less than , because it already
said that it is under Texas law (?)

RATIO:
What the laws of Texas state is NO longer of consequence

1.

Regardless what law is applicable and regardless of

whether or not Mr. Hodges did renounce his share, it is
clear from the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges
himself as executor of his wife's estate that there are
properties which constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges
which should be distributed among her heirs pursuant
to her will

2.

Whatever be the provisions of Texas Law applicable,

the estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE
CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
Existence and effects of foreign laws are
questions of fact
Since the position now of PCIB is that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the law of
Texas, should only be 1/4 of the conjugal
estate, such contention constitutes an
admission of fact
Consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
further proceedings in these cases to claim
that said estate could be less, irrespective of
what might be proven later to be the actual
provisions of Texas law...

3.

Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate estate

of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should proceed,
there having no proper and legal adjudication or
distribution yet of the estate
Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs.
Hodges's estate

MRS. Hodge died first.

MR. Hodge was appointed executor of the will but no
liquidation occurred.
MR. Hodge allegedly stated to US inheritance tax
authorities that he had renounced his inheritance from
Mrs. Hodge in favor of her other heirs (siblings)

Issues that can be decided by the court:

PCIB allegedly averred that under the laws of

Texas (although it was arguing that RP laws apply),
there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjugal
estate
So PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of
Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it

4.

What cannot be decided:

1. WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share
2. WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of
the conjugal property
(case is remanded to trial court to allow the parties to
present evidence in relation to these issues)
Court does NOT make a determination as to the validity of
testamentary dispositions

Since under the Civil Code, the nationality of the

testator is controlling, and since Mrs. Hodges is a US
citizen, the case must be remanded so that the parties
can prove what Texas law provides

In Re Estate of Johnson (1918)

Johnson was a US citizen, whose will was probated in
Manila. His daughter now wants to annul the probate
because his will was not made in accordance with Illinois
laws.
SC: Found that the probate judge took judicial notice of
Illinois law by reading an annotated book on the Revised
Statutes of Illinois. This is a mistake because courts can
only take judicial notice of acts of the US Congress, not of
laws of different states. BUT court did not annull probate.
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PRIL Digests 6

2.

Emil Johnson US Citizen, died in Manila

He left a holographic will
Signed by himself and 2 witnesses only (Code of
Civil Procedure requires 3 witnesses)

The judges error was not raised in the assignment of

error.
Effect of failure to plead 1: Dismiss case

Walton v Arabian American Oil Co (1956)

A petition for probate was filed on the ground that at

the time of his death, Johnson was a citizen of Illinois
and the will was duly executed in accordance with the
laws of Illinois so, it could be properly probated here
under the Code of Civil Procedure
So, the will was admitted to probate

Parties are US citizens; accident occurred in Saudi Arabia.

Court refused to take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian laws,
because unlike those of Britain it cannot be easily
comprehended.
Also, processual presumption does NOT apply because
Saudi Arabia might have different tort principles.

Later on, his alleged daughter, Ebba Ingeborg,

moved for the annulment of the decree of probate
and commencement of intestate administration of
the estate

Daughter says:
a. Johnson was NOT a RESIDENT of Illinois
b. Will was not probated in accordance with the laws
of Illinois
ISSUE: W/N the will was validly admitted to probate
YES
RATIO:
NO allegation that Johnson is NOT a CITIZEN of Illinois
The daughters petition only says that he is a
RESIDENT of the Philippines did not deny US
citizenship
So, probate cannot be set aside for lack of necessary
citizenship

Walton sued Saudi Aramco in NY.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts are

authorized to take judicial notice of acts of the
legislative department of the US
These refer to Acts of the Congress of the US,
and NOT the laws in different states
Even reference to those similar to the
enumeration in the Code cannot refer to the
different laws of the states
SO: The proper RULE is to require proof of the
statutes of the States when their provisions are
determinative of the issues in an action litigated in
Philippine courts
BUT: Doesnt bolster daughters case even if the judge
erred in taking judicial notice
1.

The daughters petition does not state that Illinois law

is different from what the court found

No evidence of Saudi Arabian law alleged by plaintiff,

nor did the defendant offered to prove it.

NY TC

Defendant was negligent under NY law

HELD:

Substantive law applicable to alleged tort is the LAW

OF THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGED TORT
OCCURRED - So should apply Saudi Arabian law

BUT Saudi Arabian law was not proved.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

federal court must receive evidence if it is admissible
according to the rules of evidence of the state in which
the court sits.
So, it might seem that the judge erred in refusing
to take judicial notice of Saudi Arabian law, in light
og Siegelman v Cunard White Star

In Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, court took JN of

foreign law but this is an exception because US
Court can easily comprehend of ENGLISH
decisions, which are like those of any state in US

Probate judge erred in taking judicial notice of Illinois law

The Court cannot rule on whether the will was
executed in accordance with Illinois law because no
witness testified on the law of Illinois
The trial judge took judicial notice of Illinois law he
examined the Revised Statutes of Illinois in an
annotated book
The judge was MISTAKEN

Walton
Citizen and resident of Arkansas
Seriously injured while temporarily in Saudi Arabia
by a truck owned by Saudi ARAMCO
Saudi ARAMCO
Incorporated in Delaware
Licensed to do business in NY
Engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi
Arabia

IN THIS CASE:

It involved Saudi Arabian Law: Comprehension of

foreign "law" is, to say the least, not easy, then,
according to the somewhat narrow interpretation of the
NY Statute by NY courts, a court "abuses" its
discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes judicial
notice of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and
surely does so unless the party, who would otherwise
have had the burden of proving that "law", has in some
way adequately assisted the court in judicially learning
it
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PRIL Digests 6

assumption that it would be similarly treated by the

laws of all civilized countries
No processual presumption

In countries where the common law does not prevail,

our doctrines relative to negligence, and to a master's
liability for his servant's acts, may not exist or will be
vastly different.
So Walton can't argue that the rudimentary tort
principles should have been presumed to be
recognized in Saudi Arabia.
Though it deemed unjust, as this involves both US
citizens, the court said it should strictly enforce its laws

Leary v Gledhill (1951)

Leary and Gledhill entered into a contract in France (loan).
Leary sued Gledhill for the payment in a New Jersey court.

Here: the presumption # 2 (that forum law applies when

parties fail to prove foreign law) is universally applied
regardless of the nature of controversy

Zalamea v CA (1993)
NY law re overbooking was pleaded but not proved.

(Probably in NY) the 3 were wait-listed as their seats

were already taken.
As Mr. Zalamea was holding the full-fare ticket, he
was allowed to board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea
and their daughter were compelled to buy tickets
back to Manila from other airlines

Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based on

breach of contract of carriage before RTC Makati

Court: court presumed that the law of France in common

with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to
make repayment

While they were in France, Gledhill mentioned to

Leary that he needed a sum of money.
When Leary returned to Germany, he mailed Gledhill a
check for $1500, without indicating what it was for.
Later on, Leary sued Gledhill to recover the loan.
Gledhill moved to dismiss on the ground that there
was no pleading or proof of the law of France,
where the transaction occurred.

ISSUE: Which law applies, France, or New Jersey? NEW

JERSEY
RATIO:

Transaction occurred in France

France is not a common law jurisdiction (Court took

JN): so inappropriate to presume that the principles of
common law prevail there

BUT HERE (cf. Walton v. Saudi Aramco): even if did

not present French law, not deemed to have lost COA
and the court could presume any the ff:
1. French law same as law of forum
2. French law recognizes certain fundamental
principles, e.g. that the taking of a loan
creates an obligation upon the borrower to
make repayment
3. parties by failing to prove the law of France
have acquiesced in having their dispute
determined by the law of the forum

So the court presumed that the law of France in

common with that of other civilized countries
recognizes a liability to make repayment under the
facts here present, and its decision is not w/o
substantial merit

BUT this approach has a limitation: Its difficult to

determine WON the question presented was of such a
fundamental nature as reasonably to warrant the

Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3

airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans World
Airlines Inc
One on full fare, 2 for 75%
All tickets confirmed in Manila and re-confirmed in NY

RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD + Atty's fees

CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking being an
accepted practice in US Airlines so no fraud nor bad
faith on the part of TransWorld Airlines
ISSUE: W/N the Zalameas should have been awarded for
Bad faith on the part of Transworld YES
RATIO:

The US law allegedly authorizing overbooking has

never been proved.
Code of Federal Regulations fo the Civil
Aeronautics Board Transworld Airlines relied solely on
the statement of its customer service agent that their
aeronautics laws allows overbooking
BUT aside from this statement, no official publication of
the law was presented in evidence
IN ANY CASE: Even if the Code of Federal
Regulations does exist, it is NOT applicable to this
case
Why? Because we adhere to the principle of lex loci
contractus
Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law would be Philippine law

So applying Philippine law

Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad

faith, entitling passengers to an award of moral
damages.
Processual Presumption

Miciano v Brimo (1924)

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PRIL Digests 6

Since the brother failed to prove Turkish law, the court

presumed that Turkish law was the same as Philippine law,
and allowed the testamentary dispositions.

Joseph Brimo Turkish national, executed a will in the

Philippines
Juan Miciano judicial administrator of the estate of
Brimo
Filed a scheme for partition, which was opposed
by one of Brimos brothers
Basis of opposition: The will was not in accrodance
with Turkish laws. Hence, they are void for violating
the Philippine Civil Code provision that provides that
testamentary successions shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question

BUT The oppositor failed to prove that the testamentary

dispositions are not in accordance with Turkish laws.
Turkish laws were not proved.
HELD: The approval of the scheme of partition was NOT
erroneous

In the absence of evidence on such laws, they are

presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
SO: There is no evidence on record that the national
law of Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions
Not being contrary to our laws, the dispositions must
be executed.

Suntay v Suntay (1952)

Jose Suntay Filipino citizen and resident

Died in Amoy, Fookien in China
Left properties in the Philippines
One of his children from a first marriage was appointed
administrator of his estate.
His will (executed in the Philippines in 1929) was not
probated because a copy could not be found.
After the Pacific War, his son from his second
marriage, Silvino, claimed that he had found among
the documents of Jose a will in Chinese characters
which was allegedly probated in the Amoy district
court.
Silvino filed a petition for the probate of the will
executed in the Philippines in 1929, or the will
executed in Amoy, China in 1931.

ISSUE: W/N the wills may be probated NO

RATIO:
1929 will in the Philippines

Falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions

of the lost will must be proved by at least 2 credible
witnesses

Will in China

Court enumerated some facts which had to be proved:

1. That the municipal district court of Amoy, China is
a probate court
2. The law of China providing the procedure for the
probate of wills
3. Legal requirements for the execution of the valid
will in China

IN THIS CASE:

These things were not proven

What was presented was just the statements of the

Consul General of China (depositions)
These are INADMISSIBLE because:
1. Consul General is not necessarily an expert
on Chinese law on procedure in probate
matters
2. The proceedings in the Amoy court were only
for the taking of depositions of witnesses, and
not for the probate of the will

In the absence of proof that the Amoy court is a

probate court and on the Chinese rules of
procedure, it may be presumed that the
proceedings are the same as those under
Philippine laws.

So, applying Philippine rules

Probate is a proceeding in rem, for which personal

notice and publication to interested parties must be
made
IN THIS CASE: Notice requirement was not complied
with

CIR v Fisher (1961)

The pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the
husband full ownership of the properties acquired during
the marriage has NOT been proven.

Walter Stevenson British, married to Beatrice who is

also British
Stevenson died in 1951 and instituted his wife as his
sole heiress.
Later on, the administrator of the estate filed a
preliminary estate and inheritance tax return

CIR says: The taxable estate is the whole of the

decendents estate

The property relation of the spouses should be

determined by English law, and not by Philippine law,
since they are British

English laws do NOT recognize legal partnership

between spouses

Under English law, all properties acquired during the

marriage belong exclusively to the husband.
CTA Reduced taxable net estate to . Applied Philippine
law without an ante-nuptial agreement, conjugal
partnership applies.
ISSUE: What law applies ENGLISH LAW, but Court
applied processual presumption
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PRIL Digests 6

RATIO:

The case is governed by the Old Civil Code since the

marriage of the spouses in the Philippines took place
in 1909

Its true that the relevant articles in both the old and
new Civil Code adhere to the nationality theory in
determining the property relation where one of the
spouses is a foreigner and they have made no prior
arrangement pertaining to their property relations.
In such case, the national law of the HUSBAND
applies in determining the property relaitons

BUT: there are differences in the 2 articles:

Art 124 NCC provides that it shall be applicable
regardless of whether the marriage was
celebrated in the Philippines or abroaed
Art 1325 OCC limited to marriages contracted in
a foreign land
HOWEVER: The said provisions apply only to MIXED
marriages (one is a Filipino, the other is foreign)
Manresas view: the applicable law is the English law,
since both of them are foreigners.

BUT: the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in

the husband full ownership of the properties acquired
during the marriage has NOT been proven.

So Court applied processual presumption presumed

that the law of England is the same as our law

Board of Commissioners v Dela Rosa

(1991)

Commission on Immigration and Deportation

commenced deportation proceedings against
William Gatchalian, an alleged Chinese citizen, for
violation of the Immigration Act.

CID says:
1. The marriages of Gatchalians Filipino
grandfather Santiago to a Chinese in China, and
the marriage of his father also in China, were not
supported by evidence except their own selfserving testimony.
2. There was no showing what the laws of China
were.
3. For the marriages to be valid in the Philippines, it
should have been shown that they were valid in
China.
4. SO: Since Santiago was born out of a valid
marriage, he followed the citizenship of his mother
(Chinese)
ISSUE: W/N Santiago Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen
NO
RATIO:
Court applied processual presumption

Apply processual presumption: In the absence of

proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises

the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine

law.

Why no evidence was presented

Lack of proof of Chinese law cannot be blamed on the

grandfather, much less Gatchalian himself who was
only 12 then.

The grandfather was not pressed by the CID to prove

China marriage laws it was believed that the
marriage certificate was lost during the Japanese
occupation of China.
Statements regarding pedigree or family relation

The testimonies of the grandfather and the father

before the Philippine consular and immigration
authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are admissible in evidence
as statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree.
In accordance with Rules of Court, Civil Code,
Family Code
Philippines follows the Lex loci celebrationis

All marriages performed outside RP in accordance

with the laws in force in the country were performed
and valid there shall also be valid in this country (FC
26)

All presumptions favor the solidarity of the family (CC

20)

He who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our

laws bear the burden of proof to present the foreign
law

Since the marriages are valid, Santiago Gatchalian is a

Filipino citizen (because rule is that a legitimate child
follows the citizenship of his father)

NOTE: At first, it was Gatchalian who was required to prove

the existence of Chinese law to prove that the marriages of
his grandpa and papa were valid. But with the presumption
in favor of the solidarity of families, the burden of proving
that the marriages were not valid, thus, of proving the
Chinese law which says so, was transferred to CID.
Public policy exception

Pakistan Intl Airlines Corp v Ople (1990)

PIA, a Pakistan corporation licensed to do business in

the Philippines, executed to separate contracts of
employment with the 2 respondents.
Contract provides:
Contract of employment is for 3 years
Clause 6(b) PIA may terminate the employment
contract at any time, with one month advance
notice
1st clause Par 10: Agreement shall be construed
and governed under the laws of Pakistan
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PRIL Digests 6

2nd clause par 10: Only the Court of Karachi,

Pakistan will have jurisdiction over any matter
arising out of the contract

1 year and 4 months before the expiration of the

contracts, PIA terminated the flight stewardesses
conformably to clause 6(b)

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

Par 10 2nd clause (use of Pakistan Court)

ISSUE: W/N PIA may dismiss the employees pursuant to

the contract NO
RATIO:
Par 10 1st clause (application of Pakistan law)

The first clause of Par 10 cannot be invoked to prevent

application of Philippine labor laws to the employment
relationship between PIA and the respondents.
That relationship is much affected with public interest
and Philippine laws cannot be rendered illusory by the
agreement of the parties.

This clause also cannot be invoked.

There ware multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law, Philippine courts, and the
relationship of the parties.
1. Contract was executed and performed here
2. Respondents are Philippine citizens
3. PIA is licensed to do business here and has a
resident here
4. Respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights
These contacts point to Philippine courts as the proper
forum.

In any case

PIA did not plead and prove the contents of Pakistan

law.

SO: processual presumption: Presume that Pakistan

law is the same as Philippine law