Due Process Clause

Main article: Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies against only the states, but it is
otherwise textually identical to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies
against the federal government; both clauses have been interpreted to encompass identical
doctrines of procedural due process and substantive due process.[72]Procedural due process is
the guarantee of a fair legal process when the government seeks to burden [jargon] a person's
protected interests in life, liberty, or property, and substantive due process is the guarantee that
the fundamental rights of citizens will not be encroached (intruded/violated) on by government.
[73]

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also incorporates most of the

provisions in the Bill of Rights, which were originally applied against only the federal government,
and applies them against the states.[74]

Bennis v. Michigan
Tina Bennis (Petitioner) jointly owned a car with her husband. The police arrested
him after an indecent sexual activity with a prostitute inside the car. An indecency law
states that the government can seek forfeiture of property that is a public nuisance.
The government sought to declare the car a public nuisance.
The petitioners defense was that she was innocent and had no knowledge of her
husbands indecent scheme; thus, the taking of the car violates her rights as
provided in the 14th amendment.
It was held and ruled in this case, that such defense does not suffice. The vehicles
forfeiture did not violate the property rights of petitioner, specifically, the due process.
Petitioners car was used in criminal activity. The state sought to deter illegal activity,
and they rightly do so by subjecting the car to forfeiture. Further, Michigan is not
required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.

The clear and convincing standard of proof has been variously defined in this
context as "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a
firm and settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the
circumstances
Cruzan v. Director
Nancy Cruzan was in a coma, specifically, in a persistent vegetative state which
required life support (artificial nutrition and hydration procedures). Her family
members requested that she be withdrawn of life support but were denied because
of insufficient evidence of Nancys intent. Ms. Cruzans parents now bring suit on her
behalf, alleging she has a liberty interest in withdrawal of treatment.

The issue of this case was whether the State of Missouri had the right to require
"clear and convincing evidence" in order for the Cruzans to remove their child from
life support.
Unwanted medical treatment is considered a battery at common law. Hence, it is
clear that there must be a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. However, the
treatment must be unwanted by the patient. Missouri is free to choose whether or not
they will accept a surrogate for an incompetents medical decisions, but they are free
to establish the standard by which they do so.
While the Supreme Court decides there is a liberty interest in requesting to withdraw
treatment, the Ms. Cruzans family is not afforded the remedy they hoped for, as the
Supreme Court also ruled that Missouri has a state interest in determining how that
liberty interest is to be applied in the case of an incompetent.
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse
medical treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not
able to exercise such rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan
desired treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's actions
designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Because there was no
guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent
patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible,
the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements.
BELTRAN V. SEC. OF HEALTH
FACTS: This case involves a law seeking to promote voluntary donation of blood and
to phase out commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. The purpose
of the law is to prevent blood transfusion transmissible diseases which were proven
in studies to be more prone in blood transfusions w/c come from the commercial
blood banks as compared to those coming from the Phil. National Red Cross.
Petitioners assailed the latters constitutionality on the ground of deprivation of
property and liberty.
ISSUE: WON RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) constitutes as unlawful
deprivation of personal liberty and property.
HELD: No. It was a VALID legislation. The interest of commercial blood banks must
yield to a greater interest of the public.